Motion to Dismiss - Allonge
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1, PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL DYMINSKI, DEFENDANT. _________________________________________/ DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ACTION COMES NOW, the Defendant DANIEL DYMINSKI (hereinafter “Defendant”) by and through the undersigned counsel MATTHEW D. WEIDNER and respectfully moves this Court to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the above entitled civil action, pursuant to Rules 1.210(a) and 1.140(b)(6) Fla. R. Civ. P., and precedent case law, and in support thereof states: FACTS 1. This is an action for foreclosure of real property owned by the Defendant. 2. The named Plaintiff in this case is WELLS FARGO, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2007-CP1 (hereinafter “Plaintiff”). 3. In its Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n August 25, 2006, [the Defendant], executed and delivered a promissory note and a mortgage securing payment of same to SAND CANYON CORPORATION F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION.”1 4. SAND CANYON CORPORATION (hereinafter “Sand Canyon”) is not the named lender 1 See Complaint, ¶2. CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
on the Mortgage and Promissory Note attached to the Plaintiff’s Complaint. The named lender is OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a California Corporation (hereinafter “Option One”). 5. Option One, however, has had its status as a California corporation suspended since 1990 according to a copy of the California Division of Corporations Records attached hereto as “Exhibit A.” Therefore, the Record is devoid of any mention as to how Sand Canyon has come into existence or how it can legally hold a mortgage or note. 6. Appearing in the Court File is a purported “allonge” which allegedly endorsed the Mortgage and Note to the Plaintiff. However, when undersigned counsel examined the Court File, this purported allonge was not affixed to the Promissory Note attached to the Plaintiff’s Complaint nor, upon information and belief, is this purported allonge currently affixed to the Promissory Note. Furthermore, the purported allonge was not dated or notarized. 7. There is ample blank space on the Promissory Note filed with the Plaintiff’s Complaint to stamp an endorsement. This includes abundant space both below the Plaintiff’s alleged signature and on the back of the Note. STANDARD OF REVIEW In ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a trial court is limited to the four corners of the Complaint, and it must accept all the allegations in the Complaint as true. See Lutz Lake Fern Rd. Neighborhood Groups, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 779 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). However, when a question has not been previously decided by a Florida court, the decisions of a court of another state may be considered. Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule
Industries, Inc., 68 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1953). Such a decision, when on point, is regarded as persuasive. Tonkovich v. South Florida Citrus Industries, Inc., 185 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA
1966). INTRODUCTION There is a dearth of case law to which the Court could look to for guidance when deciding matters dealing with allonges. A search on Westlaw reveals that the entire universe of Florida cases, both in State and Federal courts, is two: Booker v. Sarasota, Inc., 707 So. 2d 886 (Fla 1st DCA 1998) and In re Canellas, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010). Moreover, a search of the word “allonge” on Westlaw for the entire American judicial system, both State and Federal, reveals only 274 documents. It should be noted by the Court, however, that the vast majority of these cases only mention allonges in passing, most often reciting the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of an allonge in the footnote of the decision or simply making reference to an allonge when reciting the facts of the case. Very few opinions, then, delve into actual substantive matters regarding allonges. According to the only Florida appellate case which deals with these ancient documents, “[a]n allonge is a piece of paper annexed to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Such must be so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Booker, 707 So. 2d at 886 (Fla 1st DCA 1998). See also U.S. Bank National Association v. Weigand, 2009 WL 1623764 (Conn. Super. 2009); P&B Properties I, LLC v. Owens, 1996 WL 111128 (Del. Super. 1996). Furthermore, while “Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code does not specifically mention an allonge, [the Code] notes that ‘for purposes of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is made part of the instrument.’ Fla. Stat. §673.2041(1) (1995).” Booker, 707 So. 2d at 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). LEGAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Failure to be Prosecuted in the Name of the Real Party in Interest a. Legal Standards Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, but a personal representative, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.” Recently, the Second District held that Plaintiffs in foreclosure actions are required to establish, through admissible evidence, that it held the note and mortgage in question and so had standing to foreclose the mortgage before it would be entitled to summary judgment in its favor. BAC Funding v. Jean-Jacques, 2010 WL 476641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Furthermore, the Second District held that whether such a Plaintiff does so through valid assignment, proof of purchase of the debt, or evidence of an effective transfer, they are nevertheless required to prove that it validly held the note and mortgage which it sought to foreclose. Id. In BAC Funding, the Second District ultimately ruled that an incomplete, unsigned and unauthenticated assignment of mortgage attached as an exhibit to the Plaintiff’s response to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss did not constitute admissible evidence establishing the Plaintiff’s standing to foreclose on the note and mortgage in question. Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of Florida recently denied a movant’s motion for relief from stay so the movant could foreclose on real property owned by a debtor, in part, because the movant did not establish that it was the real party in interest through a valid allonge. In re Canellas, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010). There, the movant accompanied its motion with a mortgage and note which were endorsed to someone
other than itself. Some three months later, the movant filed an allonge with the Court which purportedly endorsed to it the mortgage and the note. However, the allonge was not notarized nor was it dated. The Court ultimately denied the movant’s motion and questioned the veracity of the allonge because, amongst other reasons, the allonge was not: (1) dated; or (2) notarized. b. Argument Here, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible evidence that it is entitled to proceed in this action. The named lender according to the Plaintiff’s own Complaint is SAND CANYON CORPORATION F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION; however, Option One, the actual named lender on the Mortgage and Note, has had its corporate status suspended since 1990 and the Record is completely devoid of how Sand Canyon has come into existence or how it can legally hold a mortgage or note. Furthermore, the purported allonge which the Plaintiff alleges gives it the power to enforce the Mortgage and Note in question is not dated nor is it notarized. Option One’s suspended corporate status, the unclear and undefined existence of Sand Canyon, and the lack of a date or notarization on the purported allonge itself are firm grounds for the Court to doubt the veracity of this document and, as an extension, the Plaintiff’s status as the real party in interest. WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to prosecute this cause in the name of the real party in interest, the instant case must be dismissed. II. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed for Failure to State a Cause of Action Because the Purported Allonge was not Firmly Affixed to the Promissory Note a. Legal Standards Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6) provides, in pertinent part, that “the following defenses may be made by motion at the option of the pleader…failure to state a cause of action.” In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must assume that all
allegations in the complaint are true and decide whether the Plaintiff would be entitled to relief. Carmona v. McKinley, Ittersagen, Gunderson & Berntsson, P.A., 952 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Nevertheless, as indicated in the Standard of Review discussion, supra, exhibits attached to the Plaintiff’s complaint are part of the complaint, and where the allegations made in the complaint do not agree with the exhibits attached, the exhibits control. There is no Florida case on point which provides guidance as to how an allonge must be physically attached to an instrument in order for it to become “firmly affixed” to same. Therefore, the Court may look to decisions of courts in other states for persuasive authority. To begin, two reasons have been cited for the “firmly affixed” rule: (1) to prevent fraud; and (2) to preserve a traceable chain of title. See Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc., 853 F. 2d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 1988). A draft of the 1951 version of the UCC Article 3 included the comment that “[t]he indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or an allonge, which, as defined in Section _____, is a strip of paper so firmly pasted, stapled or otherwise affixed to the instrument as to become part of it.” ALI, Comments & Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1 – Article III 114 (1946), reprinted in 2 Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 311, 424 (1984). More recently, however, courts have held that “stapling is the modern equivalent of gluing or pasting.” Lamson v. Commercial Cred. Corp., 187 Colo. 382 (Colo. 1975). See also Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson, 964 S.W. 2d 262 (Texas 1997) (holding that an allonge stapled to the back of a promissory note is valid so long as there is no room on the note for endorsement, but affixed does not include paperclips.). Regardless of the exact method of affixation, numerous cases have rejected endorsements made on separate sheets of paper loosely inserted in a folder with the instrument and not physically attached in any way. See Town of Freeport v. Ring, 1999 Me. 48 (Maine 1999); Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc.,
853 F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988); Big Builders, Inc. v. Israel, 709 A. 2d 74 (D.C. 1988). b. Argument Here, the Plaintiff’s purported allonge, as found in the Court File, is in no way so firmly affixed to the Promissory Note as to give the Plaintiff the ability to raise a cause of action for foreclosure of a mortgage and note which is made out to someone other than itself. Specifically, when undersigned counsel examined the Court File, this purported allonge was not affixed to the Promissory Note nor, upon information and belief, is this purported allonge currently affixed to the Promissory Note. Because the purported allonge is not affixed to the Note, the twin aims of affixation, namely to prevent fraud and to preserve a traceable chain of title, have expressly not been met. WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted within the four corners of the Complaint or in any other Pleading or Filing, the instant case must be dismissed. III.Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed for Failure to State a Cause of Action Because the Promissory Note Contained Room for Endorsement a. Legal Standards There is also no Florida case law which provides guidance on how to decide “No-Space Tests”, or how to proceed when there is room on the instrument for an endorsement but an allonge is nevertheless attached instead. However, numerous jurisdictions permit allonges only where, because of multiple endorsements, no additional space for signatures remains on the negotiable instrument. See Shepherd Mall St. Bank v. Johnson, 603 P. 2d 1115, 1118 (Okla. 1979); Tallahassee Bank & Trust Company v. Raines, 187 S.E. 2d 320, 321 (Ga. App. 1972); James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky Assoc., Inc., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 624 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas 1965). But see Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 616, 626-27 (Wis. 1863) (allonge permitted even
where space remains on note). Perhaps the seminal case which deals with the issue is Pribus v. Bush, 118 Cal. App. 3d 1003 (Cal. App. 1981), which reasoned that the law merchant rule [which permits the use of allonges only when there is no room on the instrument itself]…was developed as a refinement of the basic rule that an indorsement must be on the instrument itself. This basic rule must have become impractical when strictly applied in certain multiple indorsement situations, due to the finite amount of space on any given instrument. The allonge, then, was apparently created to remedy the inconveniences of the basic rule, not as an alternative method of indorsement. Id at 1008. Emphasis added. The Pribus court ultimately decided that the majority view is to follow the law merchant rule and only permit allonges when there is no physical space left on the instrument itself. Id. b. Argument 8. Here, the allonge was improper because there is ample blank space on the Promissory Note filed with the Plaintiff’s Complaint to stamp an endorsement. This includes abundant space both below the Plaintiff’s alleged signature and on the back of the Note. Florida courts, in the absence of a Florida case directly on point, should follow the majority rule which only allows the use of an allonge when there is no room on the instrument itself for endorsement. Doing so preserves the law merchant rule, an ancient principal of commercial law. Because the allonge was improper, the Mortgage and the Note are endorsed to someone other than the Plaintiff, and therefore the Plaintiff does not have the ability to raise the cause of action for foreclosure. WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted within the four corners of the Complaint or in any other Pleading or Filing, the instant case must be dismissed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A.,
2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312. By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1, PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL DYMINSKI, DEFENDANT. ________________________________________/ NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney will take the deposition of: NAME: DATE: TIME: PLACE: CONNIE SPLETT APRIL 14, 2010 1:00 P.M. LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW D. WEIDNER 1229 Central Ave. St. Petersburg, FL 33705
upon oral examination before a Notary Public or an officer authorized by law to take depositions in the State of Florida. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. The deposition is being taken for the purpose of discovery, for use at trial, or for such other purposes as are permitted under the Rules of Court or Applicable Statutes. IF YOU ARE A PERSON WITH A DISABILITY WHO NEEDS ANY ACCOMMODATION IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS DEPOSITION, YOU MAY REQUEST SUCH ASSISTANCE BY CONTACTING MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, 1229 CENTRAL AVE., ST. PETERSBURG, FL 33705, TELEPHONE: (727) 894-3159 WITHIN 2 WORKING DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS SUBPOENA. Dated: March 23, 2010 By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A., 2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312. By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1, PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL DYMINSKI, DEFENDANT. _________________________________________/ NOTICE OF PRODUCTION
CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
YOU ARE NOTIFIED that after 10 days from the date of service of this notice, if service is by delivery, or 15 days from the date of service, if service is by mail, and if no objection is received from any party, the undersigned will issue or apply to the clerk of this court for issuance of the attached subpoena directed to CONNIE SPLETT, who is not a party and whose address is currently unknown, to produce the items listed at the time and place specified in the subpoena. Dated: March 23, 2010 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A., 2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312.
By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1, PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL DYMINSKI, DEFENDANT. _________________________________________/ THE STATE OF FLORIDA: TO:
CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
Connie Splett Assistant Secretary – Option One Mortgage Corporation Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A. 2901 Stirling Road Suite 300 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear before a person authorized by law to take depositions at THE LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, 1229 Central Ave., St. Petersburg, FL 33705, on May 1, 2010 at 1:00 P.M., for the taking of your deposition in this action and to bring with you the following: 1. Corporation Resolution or any other document authorizing CONNIE SPLETT to endorse any document on behalf of SAND CANYON CORPORATION F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION. 2. All books, papers, records, documents and other tangible things kept by SAND CANYON CORPORATION F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION concerning the transactions alleged in the complaint against DANIEL DYMINSKI. 3. Any and all other books, papers, records, documents or tangible things that relate to WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1’S claim against DANIEL DYMINSKI. 4. All employment records, including but not limited to timesheets, which exist between CONNIE SPLETT and any employer who has employed CONNIE SPLETT two weeks preceding and two weeks subsequent to the execution of the purported allonge at issue in this case. 5. All records that purport to give CONNIE SPLETT the authority to sign or execute any documents on behalf of any person or entity. 6. If you are a notary public, your notary public’s logs. 7. All documents, records, books, evidence or instructions that you reviewed or relied
upon in order to prepare the affidavit or assignment executed in this case. If you fail to appear, you may be in contempt of court. You are subpoenaed to appear by the following attorney, and unless excused from this subpoena by this attorney or the court, you shall respond to this subpoena as directed. DATED on March 23, 2010 Matthew D. Weidner, Esq. For the Court By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957 Any minor subpoenaed for testimony shall have the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian at all times during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616, Florida Statutes, except upon a showing that the presence of a parent or guardian is likely to have a material, negative impact on the credibility or accuracy of the minor’s testimony, or that the interests of the parent or guardian are in actual or potential conflict with the interests of the minor. IF YOU ARE A PERSON WITH A DISABILITY WHO NEEDS ANY ACCOMMODATION IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS DEPOSITION, YOU MAY REQUEST SUCH ASSISTANCE BY CONTACTING MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, 1229 CENTRAL AVE., ST. PETERSBURG, FL 33705, TELEPHONE: (727) 894-3159 WITHIN 2 WORKING DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS SUBPOENA.
on the Mortgage and Promissory Note attached to the Plaintiff’s Complaint. The named lender is OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a California Corporation (hereinafter “Option One”). 5. Option One, however, has had its status as a California corporation suspended since 1990 according to a copy of the California Division of Corporations Records attached hereto as “Exhibit A.” Therefore, the Record is devoid of any mention as to how Sand Canyon has come into existence or how it can legally hold a mortgage or note. 6. Appearing in the Court File is a purported “allonge” which allegedly endorsed the Mortgage and Note to the Plaintiff. However, when undersigned counsel examined the Court File, this purported allonge was not affixed to the Promissory Note attached to the Plaintiff’s Complaint nor, upon information and belief, is this purported allonge currently affixed to the Promissory Note. Furthermore, the purported allonge was not dated or notarized. 7. There is ample blank space on the Promissory Note filed with the Plaintiff’s Complaint to stamp an endorsement. This includes abundant space both below the Plaintiff’s alleged signature and on the back of the Note. STANDARD OF REVIEW In ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a trial court is limited to the four corners of the Complaint, and it must accept all the allegations in the Complaint as true. See Lutz Lake Fern Rd. Neighborhood Groups, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 779 So.2d 380, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). However, when a question has not been previously decided by a Florida court, the decisions of a court of another state may be considered. Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule
Industries, Inc., 68 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1953). Such a decision, when on point, is regarded as persuasive. Tonkovich v. South Florida Citrus Industries, Inc., 185 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA
1966). INTRODUCTION There is a dearth of case law to which the Court could look to for guidance when deciding matters dealing with allonges. A search on Westlaw reveals that the entire universe of Florida cases, both in State and Federal courts, is two: Booker v. Sarasota, Inc., 707 So. 2d 886 (Fla 1st DCA 1998) and In re Canellas, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010). Moreover, a search of the word “allonge” on Westlaw for the entire American judicial system, both State and Federal, reveals only 274 documents. It should be noted by the Court, however, that the vast majority of these cases only mention allonges in passing, most often reciting the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of an allonge in the footnote of the decision or simply making reference to an allonge when reciting the facts of the case. Very few opinions, then, delve into actual substantive matters regarding allonges. According to the only Florida appellate case which deals with these ancient documents, “[a]n allonge is a piece of paper annexed to a negotiable instrument or promissory note, on which to write endorsements for which there is no room on the instrument itself. Such must be so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Booker, 707 So. 2d at 886 (Fla 1st DCA 1998). See also U.S. Bank National Association v. Weigand, 2009 WL 1623764 (Conn. Super. 2009); P&B Properties I, LLC v. Owens, 1996 WL 111128 (Del. Super. 1996). Furthermore, while “Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code does not specifically mention an allonge, [the Code] notes that ‘for purposes of determining whether a signature is made on an instrument, a paper affixed to the instrument is made part of the instrument.’ Fla. Stat. §673.2041(1) (1995).” Booker, 707 So. 2d at 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). LEGAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed for Failure to be Prosecuted in the Name of the Real Party in Interest a. Legal Standards Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very action may be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, but a personal representative, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.” Recently, the Second District held that Plaintiffs in foreclosure actions are required to establish, through admissible evidence, that it held the note and mortgage in question and so had standing to foreclose the mortgage before it would be entitled to summary judgment in its favor. BAC Funding v. Jean-Jacques, 2010 WL 476641 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Furthermore, the Second District held that whether such a Plaintiff does so through valid assignment, proof of purchase of the debt, or evidence of an effective transfer, they are nevertheless required to prove that it validly held the note and mortgage which it sought to foreclose. Id. In BAC Funding, the Second District ultimately ruled that an incomplete, unsigned and unauthenticated assignment of mortgage attached as an exhibit to the Plaintiff’s response to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss did not constitute admissible evidence establishing the Plaintiff’s standing to foreclose on the note and mortgage in question. Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of Florida recently denied a movant’s motion for relief from stay so the movant could foreclose on real property owned by a debtor, in part, because the movant did not establish that it was the real party in interest through a valid allonge. In re Canellas, 2010 WL 571808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010). There, the movant accompanied its motion with a mortgage and note which were endorsed to someone
other than itself. Some three months later, the movant filed an allonge with the Court which purportedly endorsed to it the mortgage and the note. However, the allonge was not notarized nor was it dated. The Court ultimately denied the movant’s motion and questioned the veracity of the allonge because, amongst other reasons, the allonge was not: (1) dated; or (2) notarized. b. Argument Here, the Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible evidence that it is entitled to proceed in this action. The named lender according to the Plaintiff’s own Complaint is SAND CANYON CORPORATION F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION; however, Option One, the actual named lender on the Mortgage and Note, has had its corporate status suspended since 1990 and the Record is completely devoid of how Sand Canyon has come into existence or how it can legally hold a mortgage or note. Furthermore, the purported allonge which the Plaintiff alleges gives it the power to enforce the Mortgage and Note in question is not dated nor is it notarized. Option One’s suspended corporate status, the unclear and undefined existence of Sand Canyon, and the lack of a date or notarization on the purported allonge itself are firm grounds for the Court to doubt the veracity of this document and, as an extension, the Plaintiff’s status as the real party in interest. WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to prosecute this cause in the name of the real party in interest, the instant case must be dismissed. II. Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed for Failure to State a Cause of Action Because the Purported Allonge was not Firmly Affixed to the Promissory Note a. Legal Standards Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b)(6) provides, in pertinent part, that “the following defenses may be made by motion at the option of the pleader…failure to state a cause of action.” In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court must assume that all
allegations in the complaint are true and decide whether the Plaintiff would be entitled to relief. Carmona v. McKinley, Ittersagen, Gunderson & Berntsson, P.A., 952 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Nevertheless, as indicated in the Standard of Review discussion, supra, exhibits attached to the Plaintiff’s complaint are part of the complaint, and where the allegations made in the complaint do not agree with the exhibits attached, the exhibits control. There is no Florida case on point which provides guidance as to how an allonge must be physically attached to an instrument in order for it to become “firmly affixed” to same. Therefore, the Court may look to decisions of courts in other states for persuasive authority. To begin, two reasons have been cited for the “firmly affixed” rule: (1) to prevent fraud; and (2) to preserve a traceable chain of title. See Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc., 853 F. 2d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 1988). A draft of the 1951 version of the UCC Article 3 included the comment that “[t]he indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or an allonge, which, as defined in Section _____, is a strip of paper so firmly pasted, stapled or otherwise affixed to the instrument as to become part of it.” ALI, Comments & Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1 – Article III 114 (1946), reprinted in 2 Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 311, 424 (1984). More recently, however, courts have held that “stapling is the modern equivalent of gluing or pasting.” Lamson v. Commercial Cred. Corp., 187 Colo. 382 (Colo. 1975). See also Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson, 964 S.W. 2d 262 (Texas 1997) (holding that an allonge stapled to the back of a promissory note is valid so long as there is no room on the note for endorsement, but affixed does not include paperclips.). Regardless of the exact method of affixation, numerous cases have rejected endorsements made on separate sheets of paper loosely inserted in a folder with the instrument and not physically attached in any way. See Town of Freeport v. Ring, 1999 Me. 48 (Maine 1999); Adams v. Madison Realty & Development, Inc.,
853 F. 2d 163 (3d Cir. 1988); Big Builders, Inc. v. Israel, 709 A. 2d 74 (D.C. 1988). b. Argument Here, the Plaintiff’s purported allonge, as found in the Court File, is in no way so firmly affixed to the Promissory Note as to give the Plaintiff the ability to raise a cause of action for foreclosure of a mortgage and note which is made out to someone other than itself. Specifically, when undersigned counsel examined the Court File, this purported allonge was not affixed to the Promissory Note nor, upon information and belief, is this purported allonge currently affixed to the Promissory Note. Because the purported allonge is not affixed to the Note, the twin aims of affixation, namely to prevent fraud and to preserve a traceable chain of title, have expressly not been met. WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted within the four corners of the Complaint or in any other Pleading or Filing, the instant case must be dismissed. III.Plaintiff’s Complaint Should be Dismissed for Failure to State a Cause of Action Because the Promissory Note Contained Room for Endorsement a. Legal Standards There is also no Florida case law which provides guidance on how to decide “No-Space Tests”, or how to proceed when there is room on the instrument for an endorsement but an allonge is nevertheless attached instead. However, numerous jurisdictions permit allonges only where, because of multiple endorsements, no additional space for signatures remains on the negotiable instrument. See Shepherd Mall St. Bank v. Johnson, 603 P. 2d 1115, 1118 (Okla. 1979); Tallahassee Bank & Trust Company v. Raines, 187 S.E. 2d 320, 321 (Ga. App. 1972); James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky Assoc., Inc., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 624 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas 1965). But see Crosby v. Roub, 16 Wis. 616, 626-27 (Wis. 1863) (allonge permitted even
where space remains on note). Perhaps the seminal case which deals with the issue is Pribus v. Bush, 118 Cal. App. 3d 1003 (Cal. App. 1981), which reasoned that the law merchant rule [which permits the use of allonges only when there is no room on the instrument itself]…was developed as a refinement of the basic rule that an indorsement must be on the instrument itself. This basic rule must have become impractical when strictly applied in certain multiple indorsement situations, due to the finite amount of space on any given instrument. The allonge, then, was apparently created to remedy the inconveniences of the basic rule, not as an alternative method of indorsement. Id at 1008. Emphasis added. The Pribus court ultimately decided that the majority view is to follow the law merchant rule and only permit allonges when there is no physical space left on the instrument itself. Id. b. Argument 8. Here, the allonge was improper because there is ample blank space on the Promissory Note filed with the Plaintiff’s Complaint to stamp an endorsement. This includes abundant space both below the Plaintiff’s alleged signature and on the back of the Note. Florida courts, in the absence of a Florida case directly on point, should follow the majority rule which only allows the use of an allonge when there is no room on the instrument itself for endorsement. Doing so preserves the law merchant rule, an ancient principal of commercial law. Because the allonge was improper, the Mortgage and the Note are endorsed to someone other than the Plaintiff, and therefore the Plaintiff does not have the ability to raise the cause of action for foreclosure. WHEREFORE, because the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted within the four corners of the Complaint or in any other Pleading or Filing, the instant case must be dismissed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A.,
2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312. By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1, PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL DYMINSKI, DEFENDANT. ________________________________________/ NOTICE OF DEPOSITION
CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney will take the deposition of: NAME: DATE: TIME: PLACE: CONNIE SPLETT APRIL 14, 2010 1:00 P.M. LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW D. WEIDNER 1229 Central Ave. St. Petersburg, FL 33705
upon oral examination before a Notary Public or an officer authorized by law to take depositions in the State of Florida. The oral examination will continue from day to day until completed. The deposition is being taken for the purpose of discovery, for use at trial, or for such other purposes as are permitted under the Rules of Court or Applicable Statutes. IF YOU ARE A PERSON WITH A DISABILITY WHO NEEDS ANY ACCOMMODATION IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS DEPOSITION, YOU MAY REQUEST SUCH ASSISTANCE BY CONTACTING MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, 1229 CENTRAL AVE., ST. PETERSBURG, FL 33705, TELEPHONE: (727) 894-3159 WITHIN 2 WORKING DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS SUBPOENA. Dated: March 23, 2010 By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by
U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A., 2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312. By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1, PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL DYMINSKI, DEFENDANT. _________________________________________/ NOTICE OF PRODUCTION
CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
YOU ARE NOTIFIED that after 10 days from the date of service of this notice, if service is by delivery, or 15 days from the date of service, if service is by mail, and if no objection is received from any party, the undersigned will issue or apply to the clerk of this court for issuance of the attached subpoena directed to CONNIE SPLETT, who is not a party and whose address is currently unknown, to produce the items listed at the time and place specified in the subpoena. Dated: March 23, 2010 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail on this ____ day of March, 2010 to PASCALE ACHILLE, Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A., 2901 Stirling Road, Suite 300, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312.
By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1, PLAINTIFF, v. DANIEL DYMINSKI, DEFENDANT. _________________________________________/ THE STATE OF FLORIDA: TO:
CASE NO. 08-018162-CI-11
Connie Splett Assistant Secretary – Option One Mortgage Corporation Ben-Ezra & Katz, P.A. 2901 Stirling Road Suite 300 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33312
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear before a person authorized by law to take depositions at THE LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, 1229 Central Ave., St. Petersburg, FL 33705, on May 1, 2010 at 1:00 P.M., for the taking of your deposition in this action and to bring with you the following: 1. Corporation Resolution or any other document authorizing CONNIE SPLETT to endorse any document on behalf of SAND CANYON CORPORATION F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION. 2. All books, papers, records, documents and other tangible things kept by SAND CANYON CORPORATION F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION concerning the transactions alleged in the complaint against DANIEL DYMINSKI. 3. Any and all other books, papers, records, documents or tangible things that relate to WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR OPTION ONE MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2007-CP1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATE SERIES 2007-CP1’S claim against DANIEL DYMINSKI. 4. All employment records, including but not limited to timesheets, which exist between CONNIE SPLETT and any employer who has employed CONNIE SPLETT two weeks preceding and two weeks subsequent to the execution of the purported allonge at issue in this case. 5. All records that purport to give CONNIE SPLETT the authority to sign or execute any documents on behalf of any person or entity. 6. If you are a notary public, your notary public’s logs. 7. All documents, records, books, evidence or instructions that you reviewed or relied
upon in order to prepare the affidavit or assignment executed in this case. If you fail to appear, you may be in contempt of court. You are subpoenaed to appear by the following attorney, and unless excused from this subpoena by this attorney or the court, you shall respond to this subpoena as directed. DATED on March 23, 2010 Matthew D. Weidner, Esq. For the Court By:__________________________ MATTHEW D. WEIDNER Attorney for Defendant 1229 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33705 (727) 894-3159 FBN: 0185957 Any minor subpoenaed for testimony shall have the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian at all times during the taking of testimony notwithstanding the invocation of the rule of sequestration of section 90.616, Florida Statutes, except upon a showing that the presence of a parent or guardian is likely to have a material, negative impact on the credibility or accuracy of the minor’s testimony, or that the interests of the parent or guardian are in actual or potential conflict with the interests of the minor. IF YOU ARE A PERSON WITH A DISABILITY WHO NEEDS ANY ACCOMMODATION IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS DEPOSITION, YOU MAY REQUEST SUCH ASSISTANCE BY CONTACTING MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, 1229 CENTRAL AVE., ST. PETERSBURG, FL 33705, TELEPHONE: (727) 894-3159 WITHIN 2 WORKING DAYS OF YOUR RECEIPT OF THIS SUBPOENA.
