Chapter Three_PhD_Terry Flew

 

107

Chapter Three Broadcast Media Policy, Broadcast Property and the ‘Social Contract’

This chapter draws upon theories of public policy and regulation in order to understand Australian broadcast media as operating within a policy system, with a distinctive political economy, institutional framework, policy culture and policy disc discou ours rse. e. The The conce concept ptss of po poli licy cy commu communi niti ties es an and d policy policy di disc scou ours rsee ar aree developed in this chapter, as ways of understanding the origins, scope and limits of policy activism. It is argued that the nature of o f regulatory authority in Australian   broa broadca dcast stin ing g ha hass re revo volv lved ed ar aroun ound d an im impl plic icit it ‘s ‘soci ocial al co cont ntra ract ct’’ betwe between en commercial commer cial broadcasters, broadcasters, regulatory regulatory agencies, and activist activist and public interest groups, whereby industry protection and the safeguarding of broadcast property has, over time, been exchanged for a commitment to ‘affirmative’ programming init in itia iati tives ves,, pa part rtic icul ular arly ly in the the ar areas eas of Aust Austra rali lian an co cont nten entt an and d child childre ren’ n’ss  programming.

The concept of policy activism, or activism in the policy process, draws attention to the fluidity of interactions between policy ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, as well as the ways in which dominant policy discourses and the nature of policy

 

108 communities have set limits to structural change through such interventions. It is apparent, to take one example, that policy activism has been more possible in Australia in policy areas concerning media content, where regulatory agencies have had significant autonomy from government, than those in the area of media ownership, which have been more strongly driven by the relevant Minister and by Cabi Ca bine net. t. It ha hass al also so pe perh rhap apss be been en th thee ca case se th that at impl implic icit it supp suppor ortt fo forr th thee maintenance of oligopolistic media markets may underpin activist approaches to conte con tent nt re regu gula lati tion, on, pres presen enti ting ng new ch chal alle leng nges es when when th ther eree is a dy dynam namic ic of  cumulative structural, technological and regulatory change.

Broadcast Media, Regulation and the State

Policy institutions have a central role in the development of media as cultural form fo rms. s. They They re regul gulat atee the the owne owners rshi hip, p, pr prod oduct uctio ion n an and d di dist stri ribut butio ion n of mass mass-circulation circul ation media, and seek to manage cultural cultural practices practices in order to direct media conduct cond uct toward towardss partic particula ularr goals goals such such as those those associ associate ated d with with citize citizensh nship. ip. Regulation of the media of communication is, as James Michael has observed, ‘as old as blood feuds over insults, and … as classic an issue as deciding whose turn it is to use the talking drum or the ram’s horn’ (Michael 1990: 40). The media of  masss communi mas communicati cation on generat generatee partic particula ularr concern concernss for regula regulatio tion n becaus because, e, as James Donald notes:

 

109 The modern media  produce and  police publics, and modes of behaviour  appropriate to public participation, and in that sense themselves constitute a technique of regulation. From this point of view, most discussions about media regulation appear to be concerned with the second order regulation of the conditions necessary for the effective creation and maintenance of   publics and citizens through the media. (Donald 1998: 221)

Broadcast media, as the pre-eminent mass medium of communications in the twentieth century, have attracted particularly extensive forms of governmental regulation. regulat ion. Reasons for such extensive regulation regulation have included: concerns about their potential impact on children and other ‘vulnerable’ individuals; the ability to use such media for citizen-formation and the development of a national cultural identity; and the implied right of public participation and involvement associated with the distinctive nature of broadcast spectrum as both a common cultural resource and a particular form of property (cf. Bennett 1982). There has also been significant regulation of broadcasting in order to achieve what Philip Schlesinger  terms ‘communicative boundary maintenance’ (Schlesinger 1991b: 162), which has included local content regulations, controls over foreign ownership of media, and the the sp spon onso sori ring ng of bo both th publi publicc br broa oadc dcas aste ters rs and domes domesti ticc au audi diovi ovisu sual al  production in order to develop national culture and cultural diversity.

In the Australian context, media policy has been directed as much towards the creation of national cultural infrastructures that can be subsequently protected

 

110 as towards the protection of existing cultural industries and practices. This is indicative of a broadcast media structure that, in terms of Anthony Smith’s (1989) three approaches to guaranteeing the public interest in broadcasting (discussed in Chapt Cha pter er One) One),, is ba base sed d up upon on a du dual al br broa oadc dcas asti ting ng syst system em,, wi with th a domin dominant ant commercial sector and a state-funded national broadcaster. In a country that is Anglophone, Angloph one, relatively affluent, affluent, has strong strong cultural cultural ties to the United States States and Britain, and has a dominant commercial sector, support for distinctive national cultural forms and institutions swims against the tide of dominant market logics to some degree, and thus requires significant state subvention.

Compa Com pare red d wi with th other other form formss of medi media, a, su such ch as pr prin int, t, ra radi dio o an and d fi film lm,,  broadcast television has been subject to relatively high levels of government inte in terv rven enti tion on.. One One re reas ason on for for this this is const constit itut utio iona nal. l. Se Sect ctio ion n 51 (v (v)) of th thee Const Con stit itut utio ion n of Aust Austra rali liaa give givess the the Commo Commonw nweal ealth th po powe wers rs ov over er ‘p ‘pos osta tal, l, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services’, which has been interpreted as giving the federal government the power to regulate broadcast media, whereas  powers relating to print media reside with the states. Government intervention in the commercial broadcast television marketplace in Australia has, since 1956,  been observed in four areas, area s, as shown in Table 3.1:

 

111 111

Table 3.1 Government Regulation of Commercial Broadcasting

AREA OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION Control of Entry

Ownership and Control

Content

Program Standards

POLICY GOALS

POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Planned development of   broadcasting services Ensuring station viability and system stability Limiting concentration of  media power  Australian control of   broadcasting services Responsiveness to local communities Promoting Australian national culture Promoting local program

Licensing of commercial  broadcasters Limits on station numbers

 production Providing opportunities for  local producers Catering to specialist audiences (eg. children) Ensuring fair, accurate and responsible coverage of  matters of public interest Respecting community standards Protection of children from harmful material

Quota requirements for   program types (eg. local drama, documentary)

Limits on concentration of  ownership Limits on cross-media ownership Limits on foreign ownership Local ownership requirements Australian content standards Children’s programming standards

Program classification standards Advertising standards Time restrictions on program content Requirements for news and current affairs programs

While such regulation of commercial broadcast media appears extensive, it must again be noted that, in contrast to publicly funded cultural institutions such as public museums or educational institutions, the capacity of policy institutions to ‘guide the possibility of conduct’ of broadcast media towards pro-social ends has, in practice, always been significantly constrained by two factors. One has  been the private ownership of broadcast media institutions, and the circumscribed capacity of the state to control the uses of private property. The second has been

 

112 thee cr th cros osss-bo bord rder er dist distri ribu buti tive ve capabi capabili liti ties es of br broad oadca cast st media media as cultu cultura rall technol tech nologi ogies, es, and their their ten tenden dencie ciess to ‘uncou ‘uncouple’ ple’ the ‘fi ‘fit’ t’ between between polity polity and culture within a national space that has frequently been the goal of governmental regulation of cultural institutions and textual forms.

Australian Broadcast Broadcast Media as a Policy System

Policies toward broadcast media in Australia occur within a wider policy system. The concept of a policy system, as developed by Considine, implies ‘some level of concerted action across a known field’, as well as ‘groups of actors engaged in continuing, interdependent activity’ (Considine 1994: 22). Participation in such a  policy system ‘does not imply high levels of agreement about what is being done, nor great great an and d de detai taile led d kn know owle ledg dgee on th thee pa part rt of pa part rtic icip ipan ants ts’. ’. Rather Rather,, th thee minimum requirement for continuing participation on the part of actors is some levell of shared leve shared resour resource ce depende dependency ncy,, or ‘their ‘their shared reliance reliance on the set of  services which they system s ystem provides’ (Considine 1994: 22).

Conceiving of broadcast media as part pa rt of a policy system provides a useful mid-level approach to understanding the centrality of policy to the development of the Australian Australian broadcast broadcast media system, system, while allowing policy processes to be linked to wider historical, social and political relations and developments. It allows for detailed empirical analysis of what Miller and Rose (1992) refer to as the governmental technologies of state administration as well as their underlying

 

113  political rationalities. At the same time, it allows policy to be viewed not just as a series of decisions and programs, but as ‘the continuing work done by groups of   policy actors who use available public institutions to articulate and express the things things they value’ (Cons (Considi idine ne 1994: 1994: 4). The concept concept of a policy policy settle settlemen ment, t, outlin out lined ed in Chapter Chapter One, One, aims aims to combin combinee these these distin distincti ctive ve elemen elements ts of the Australian broadcast media policy system.

According to Mark Considine, a policy system can be seen as having four  related elements: political economy, policy institutions, policy culture, and policy actors, as shown in Figure 3.1

 

114

Figure 3.1 Elements of a Policy System

Policy Institutions

Political Economy

Policy Culture

Policy Actors

Source:: Considine 1994: 9. Source

The first two elements of this policy system - political economy and policy institutions - are held to be primarily related to the material dimension of policy, or the allocation of social resources, while policy culture is primarily associated with the intellectual dimension, or with ideas, values and discourses. A policy actor is defined by the terms developed by Hindess (1987), and discussed in Chapter One, as an individual or collective agent that has reasons for and interests in taking action, and is capable of assessing situations and reaching decisions about appropriate forms of action. Such forms of agency will primarily take an

 

115 institutional form, but it is important to distinguish those agents - primarily nongovernmental - that participate in policy processes on the basis of their interests, and those - primarily governmental - policy institutions whose role is to assess and adjudicate on the claims of competing policy agents and interest claims.

Political Economy of Policy Systems

The political economy of a policy system can be defined at two levels. First,  political economy can be defined as the institutional and structural forms through which social collaboration is organised in order to meet the material, cultural and symbolic needs of a society. A second level of definition, which follows from the first, is the particular configuration of social roles and a nd relationships through which the production, distribution and consumption of resources to meet such material, cultu cul tura rall an and d sy symb mbol olic ic ne need edss ar aree orga organi nise sed d (Mos (Mosco co 19 1995; 95; Garn Garnham ham 19 1997) 97).. Considine proposes that four elements need to be examined in any political economy of policy:

1. Provision: Provision: relations relations between between producers producers and consumer consumers; s; 2. Associ Associati ation: on: links within within each producer producer/pr /provi ovider der and consume consumer/u r/user  ser  group; 3. Interv Intervent ention ion:: the roles roles of publ public ic agenci agencies; es; 4. Organi Organisat sation ion:: prevai prevailin ling g techni techniques ques and forms forms to or organi ganise se relati relations ons  between producers, consumers and government.

 

116   In each of these areas, we can observe distinctive elements of commercial free-to-air broadcast television as a policy system. First, in the area of provision, free-to-air television programming has possessed strong ‘public good’ elements, as well as being a private commodity commodity.. The ‘public good’ aspects of the commodity include:

1. The The broa broadca dcast stin ing g sign signal al no nott be bein ing g dest destroy royed ed in an in indi divi vidua duall act of  consumption, so consumption by one person does not affect the access of  others (non-rivalry); 2. The The broad broadca cast stin ing g signa signall be bein ing g si simu mult ltane aneou ousl sly y se sent nt to al alll si site tess of  consumption capable of picking up the signal (non-excludability); 3. The near-zero near-zero marginal marginal costs of both consumption and distribution; 4. The costs costs of productio production n not being directl directly y relate related d to the number number of  viewers.

All of these factors point to a situation where the price of individual broadcasting signals should be zero, since the marginal cost of sending them to each household is virtually zero. This is the basis of the provision of television programs on a free-to-air basis (Owen et al., 1974; Collins et al., 1988; Picard, 1989). In an environment where consumers are unlikely to pay directly for the provision of  television programming, two broad options for its financing present themselves:  public financing through the taxation system; and revenue acquired through the

 

117 sale of advertising time. There is thus an homology between the cultural and the economi econ omicc ration rationale aless for the existe existence nce of dual-s dual-sys ystem tem broadca broadcasti sting, ng, with with a taxpayer-funded public sector dedicated to ‘specialist’ or ‘minority’ programming, programming, and an

ad adve vert rtis iser er-f -fin inanc anced ed

comme commerc rcial ial se sect ctor or

co comm mmit itte ted d

to ‘maj ‘major orit ity’ y’

 programming.

A second feature of the political economy of the broadcast media sector is that

it

possesses

strong

tendencies

towards

the

organisation

of 

 producer/distributor interests, and very weak tendencies towards the organisation of consum consumer/ er/use userr intere interests sts.. Commer Commercia ciall free-t free-to-a o-air ir broadca broadcasti sting ng has been characterised by oligopolistic market structures, where a small number of large organisations operate within a given broadcasting market, and the barriers to entry forr new compe fo competi tito tors rs ar aree high. high. Reas Reason onss fo forr th thee pr prev eval alenc encee of ol olig igop opoly oly in commerc comm ercial ial free-t free-to-a o-air ir broadc broadcast asting ing includ include: e: restri restricti ctions ons upon upon access access to the elect ele ctro roma magne gneti ticc sp spec ectr trum um for for broad broadca cast stin ing g si sign gnal als; s; gover governme nment nt li licen censi sing ng  procedures, which regulate entry into the broadcasting industry; and the existence of economies of scale and scope, on both the cost side (simultaneous transmission into into many markets) markets) and revenu revenuee side side (abili (ability ty to of offer fer adverti advertiser serss the lar larges gestt   poss possib ible le au audi dien ence) ce),, wi with th benef benefit itss accru accruin ing g to th thee la larg rges estt ne netw twor orks ks in bo both th  production and distribution (Litman 1990).

Since the cost of reaching each additional audience member (actual or   potential) is virtually zero, the stations which reach the largest possible audience

 

118 will, all else being equal, be the most profitable. This in turn has led to the commercial television industry tending to aim for the largest possible audience at any time by broadcasting programs which are ‘excessively similar’ to those being screened by their competitors (Neuman 1991). While such an arrangement does not constitute formal collusion, it implies a similarity of conduct and performance among competitors. By contrast, the direct consumers of free-to-air broadcast television are almost infinitely dispersed, and the likelihood of them exercising collective agency in broadcast markets is virtually zero, as the costs of ‘exit’ or  switching from one broadcasting service to another, or from television viewing to another social activity are virtually zero. In a structural environment characterised   by signif significan icantt concent concentrat ration ion of broadc broadcast ast televi televisio sion n seller sellerss and almost almost total total disper dis persal sal of buyers buyers,, and with with high high barrie barriers rs to entry entry, neo-clas neo-classic sical al indust industry ry economi econ omics cs predict predictss minima minimall produc productt differ different entiat iation ion,, low pressu pressures res to cost cost minimisation and high levels of network profitability (Flew 1993).

An important consequence of these features of the broadcasting market is that th at,, du duee to the the high high so soci cial al,, po poli liti tica call an and d cu cult ltur ural al si signi gnifi fican cance ce at atta tache ched d to  broadcast media, and the low level of market power and capacity for intervention on the part of its audiences, audience s, governments will often actively intervene on behalf of  a wider community or public interest, or in the interests of particular sections of  the community such as children. Further, governments may also feel inclined to ‘rebalance’ the political marketplace in which policy processes between broadcast media networks and other participants are negotiated, rather than simply acting as

 

119 thee passi th passive ve ar arbi bite terr of compet competin ing g inte intere rest sts. s. They They may do th this is by activ actively ely su supp ppor orti ting ng the the capaci capacity ty of policy policy actor actorss to re rema main in in invol volved ved,, su such ch as th thos osee representing children, ethnic minorities, local producers or the ‘public interest’. It is also important to note that governments intervene in the overall Australian  broadcasting system in two principal ways: they regulate the commercial sector  and they fund public broadcasters such as the ABC and the SBS. This means that somee govern som governmen mentt policy policy objecti objectives ves,, such such as achievi achieving ng cul cultur tural al divers diversity ity in  programming, coverage of events of local significance, educational programming, and provid providing ing an Austra Australia lian n perspe perspecti ctive ve on intern internati ational onal events, events, have have been  primarily the responsibility of public broadcasters rather than regulatory goals towards the commercial sector.

Policy Institutions and Policy Culture

  Policy institutions can be understood at two levels. First, they exist as formal structures for making and enforcing rules in a particular policy domain. In the field of broadcasting in Australia, regulation and policy-making has been a federal government governm ent responsibil responsibility ity,, derived derived from the Commonwealth Commonwealth’’s powers under  Section 51(v) of the Constitution. Institutional responsibility has typically been divided between a Department responsible for technical aspects of broadcasting and commun communica icatio tion n and direct directly ly account accountabl ablee to the releva relevant nt Minis Minister ter,, and a regulatory authority whose members are appointed by the Minister, but which  possesses an ‘arm’s length’ relationship to the government of the day. Second,

 

120   policy policy insti institut tution ionss can be unders understoo tood d as ‘infor ‘informal mal rules rules and proced procedure uress that that str struct ucture ure condu conduct’ ct’ (Sco (Scott tt 1995: 26).

It was observed observed in Chapter Chapter One that a

conditi cond ition on of existe existence nce for social social instit instituti utions ons is shared shared social social and cogniti cognitive ve conventions among a group, and that institutions in turn confer identities upon individuals indivi duals.. While sociological sociological work on instituti institutions ons has tended to focus on nongove govern rnme ment nt form formss such such as co corp rpor orat atio ions ns,, tr trad adee unio unions ns an and d pr prof ofes essi sion onal al associations, the forms of such institutions are in practice shaped by the formal  policy and regulatory institutions of government. One reason for this mutually reinforcing relationship is that the state, both as actor and institutional structure, tends to create particular governance regimes, notably through the capacity to create, maintain, enforce and transform arrangements concerning property rights (Campbell and Lindberg 1990).

Policy institutions maintain themselves through the development of  policy  policy cultures. Considine defines policy cultures as ‘complex structures for political cultures. learning and memory’, which exist within policy systems and are ‘made up of  characteristic values, preferences and habits of interaction’ (Considine 1994: 47). Considine proposes that these can be traced through the existence of shared sets of values, assumptions, categories, customs and conventions, languages and forms of naming. Christina Spurgeon (1997) has provided a detailed account of the   pol polic icy y

cult cultur uree

that hat

has has

prev prevai ailled

in

inst nstit itut utio ions ns

shapi haping ng

Aus Austra rallia ian n

communications policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Spurgeon argues that dominant communications policy discourses in this period combined an understanding of 

 

121 communi comm unicati cations ons-as -as-tr -transm ansmis issio sion n with with a str strong ong belief belief in the promise promisess for the future predicted by the advocates of digital technology. As a result, Spurgeon argue arguess that that key polic policy y agent agentss divi divide ded d th thee polic policy y pr prob oble lems ms of Aust Austra rali lian an communications into ‘first-order’ problems, concerning the promotion of new mark ma rket etss and digi digita tall te tech chnol nologi ogies es,, an and d ‘s ‘sec econd ond-o -ord rder’ er’ pr prob oblem lems, s, su such ch as information quality, equitable access and social regulation of communications   power power.. The conseque consequence nce has been the develop developmen mentt of a dichot dichotomy omy betwee between n ‘techni ‘te chnical cal’’ and ‘socia ‘social’ l’ problems problems,, with with resolu resolutio tion n of the former former common commonly ly  presented as the condition for resolving the latter. latter.

Policy Communities and Policy Discourse

communities, or policy networks, describes ‘the informal The concept of  of    policy communities, and semi-formal linkages between individuals and groups in the same policy system’ syst em’ (Considine (Considine 1994: 103), and the resul resulting ting ‘dependency ‘dependency relationships relationships that emerge between both organisations and individuals who are in frequent contact with one another in particular policy areas’ (Atkinson and Coleman 1992: 157). A  policy community tends to be a fairly small group of policy agents, both within and outside of government, who are able to influence policy outcomes through their ability to establish the ‘rules of the game’ surrounding a policy domain, in terms of control over access to resources, and through a shared set of values and  beliefs on a policy issue which set the agenda for debate on that issue. Stability in a policy community is generated both by the ability to sustain a value consensus,

 

122 and the ability to generate outcomes that provide additional resources for each member of that policy community (Smith 1993). Broadcasting is an area whose  political economy makes it particularly susceptible to such developments, since it has been characterised by a small number of producer/distributor interests with signif sig nifica icant nt economi economicc power power,, high high barrie barriers rs to entry entry for new compet competito itors, rs, the cultural significance of the medium, the capacity ca pacity for political influence on the part of its controllers, and the highly fragmented nature of its consumers/users.

The concept of policy of policy discourse refers to the ways in which the structuring of language within a policy system shapes the behaviour of actors by constructing what Michael Shapiro describes as ‘not only the horizons of possible speech but also also the the horiz horizon onss of po poss ssib ible le actio action’ n’ (Sha (Shapi piro ro 19 1981: 81: 130). 130). Dr Draw awin ing g up upon on Foucaul Fou cault’ t’ss notion notion of a discur discursiv sivee format formation ion,, Sha Shapir piro o has applied applied discour discourse se analysis to political theory, observing how language is ‘constituitive ‘ constituitive of political about political  phenomena rather than merely about  political phenomena’ (Shapiro 1981: 5), and that the content of political language is embedded in the social and institutional relations within which it is used.

Policy communities and policy discourses interact with one another. In his history of US broadcasting policy, policy, Thomas Streeter (1996) has used the co concept ncept of  interpretive communities to pro provid videe a basis basis for unders understan tandin ding g how domina dominant nt meanings are formed through interaction among policy agents, which in turn co cons nsti titu tute te the the inte interp rpre reta tati tive ve ba basi siss fo forr un unde ders rsta tand ndin ing g an and d re resp spon ondi ding ng to

 

123 developments in the policy field. Noting that policy-making is not simply a goaloriented activity but also constitutes a mode of thought, he argues that the key to understandin unders tanding g which arguments arguments prevail in broadcast broadcast media policy lies not in the  prohibition of certain types of argument, but in recognition of the discursive rules which ‘determine whether one’s arguments make sense to others, and what sense others oth ers make make of them’ them’ (Str (Streete eeterr 1996: 1996: 116). 16). Thi Thiss interp interpret retati ative ve commun community ity  possesses a range of forms of discourse (eg. those of academics, policy-makers and lobbyists), political positions within the community (eg. over the virtues of  competitive markets, or the nature and significance of the ‘public interest’ as a guidin gui ding g concept concept for regulatio regulation), n), and can shift shift in its dominant dominant positi positions ons (eg. (eg. attitudes towards new technologies, or barriers to entry for new competitors) over  time. What remains are a series of discursive rules which stabilise meanings over  time for an otherwise diverse set of policy institutions and agents. Such rules are, for ‘insiders’ in the policy community, ‘like water to fish; so much a part of the environment as to be invisible’ (St (Streeter reeter 1996: 148).

One of the most important discursive rules is the distinction made between be tween ‘politics’ and ‘policy’. Policy-making is defined as ‘a neutral, calm, reasoned, carefully moderated process’, in contrast to the ‘contaminated’ domain of politics. Such Suc h a contras contrastt leads leads to leadin leading g to ‘compl ‘complain aints ts about about the “inter “interfer ference ence”” of    political concerns with policy making’, and to calls for ‘replacing a chaotic “political” process with a rational “policy” process’ (Streeter 1996: 125). Another  discursive rule is the importance attached to expertise. Expertise provides the

 

124 dividi div iding ng line line that distin distinguis guishes hes the ‘subje ‘subjecti ctive’ ve’ ar argum gument entss of broadca broadcaste sters, rs, lobbyists and other ‘hired guns’, from the ‘objective’ positions of regulators,   poli policy cy an analy alyst stss and acade academi micc co cont ntri ribu buto tors rs to th thee po poli licy cy pr proc oces ess. s. It al also so distinguishes the policy ‘insiders’ from the ‘outsiders’, most notably critics of the economi econ omicc struct structure ure of commerc commercial ial broadc broadcast asting ing.. The idea idea that that discus discussio sion n of  underlying systemic structures is ‘off limits’ to broadcast media policy debates  provides a central unspoken discursive rule, allowing broadcast media policy to remain, as Robert McChesney describes it, ‘a realm for experts, not for “politics” in the broad sense of governance in a democratic society’ (McChesney 1993: 128).

Policy Activism

 Policy activism refers to the capacity of motivated policy actors to transform  policy systems and policy outcomes through active and strategic engagement with   poli policy cy proce process sses es.. It is perhap perhapss wort worth h di dist stin ingu guis ishi hing ng th three ree fo form rmss of po poli licy cy activis acti vism. m. First, First, there there are policy policy entrep entrepren reneur eurs, s, or those those within within governm government ent institutions, who seek to develop and implement innovative approaches to the creation, design and implementation of policies (Roberts and King 1991). Such  policy entrepreneurship may arise from the failure of existing approaches, new  policy demands with a change of government, or new requirements for a policy agency (eg. that it become more self-reliant in funding). In broadcasting in the United States, such ‘policy entrepreneurs’ emerged around cable television in the

 

125 1970s, as the FCC Cable Bureau competed for policy influence within the FCC, as a high-p high-prof rofile ile represen representat tative ive of cable cable intere interests sts and as a conduit conduit for ‘new ‘new thinking’ within within the agency agen cy (Horwitz 1989: 252-253).

Second, there are professional or practitioner forms of policy activism, wher wh eree prof profes essi sion onal al po poli licy cy an anal aly ysts sts se seek ek gr grea eate terr in invo volv lvem emen entt in po poli licy cy communities through the generation of forms of knowledge relevant to current   policy policy issue issues. s. The involv involveme ement nt of academi academics cs in the broadca broadcast st media media policy policy  process provides various case studies in this form of involvement. This has the role role play played ed by mass mass co comm mmun unica icati tion onss re rese sear arche chers rs in TV vi viole olenc ncee debat debates es (Rowland 1983); the debate among those in policy studies about policy advocacy as distin distinct ct from from ‘value‘value-fre free’ e’ pol policy icy analys analysis is (Fores (Forester ter 1993); 1993); the growin growing g  participation of economists in areas which had not been strongly influenced by economic forms of analysis, such as media and communications since the 1970s; and the more recent advocacy of a policy orientation to cultural studies made by those involved in the Australian cultural policy debates.

Fi Finall nally y, there there is an unders understand tanding ing of policy policy activis activism, m, develo developed ped by Yeatman (1998) and others, that is based upon explicitly normative orientation toward tow ardss commun community ity partic participa ipatio tion n and an open-st open-stakeh akehold older er concept conception ion of the  policy process.  Such policy activism has the potential to blur the distinction  between policy ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, since one of the goals of a bureaucratic   policy activist is to bring advocates and activists from outside of government

 

126 inside the policy-making process. In her account of the strategies of housing   policy policy activists activists in New South South Wales ales in the 1970s 1970s and 1980s, 1980s, Julie Julie Nyland Nyland observes that the boundaries between state agencies and the community-based networks of ‘civil society’ become increasingly porous and intermeshed as a result of such policy activism:

  Net Netwo work rkss form formed ed ac acro ross ss the the two two se sect ctor ors, s, li link nkin ing g ac acti tivi vist stss in th thee community sector with activists who had moved into the public sector ... The picture is no longer a simple scenario of public policy makers locked in policy combat with community activists. In between these protagonists were the ‘policy activists’, who pursued policy reform across a range of  ar arena enas, s, in colla collabor borat atio ion n wi with th one an anot othe herr ac acro ross ss th thee in inst stit itut utio ional nal   boundar boundaries ies of public public and communi community ty sector sectors. s. Us Using ing inform informal al policy policy networks, they burrowed deep into the policy-making processes and into the very woodwork of the public p ublic sector. sector. (Nyland 1998: 217)

Paul Dugdale refers to the ‘hybrid policy activist-professional’, who works within government but has ‘loyalties to something other than the requirements of   bureaucratic office ... [and] a substantive ethical attachment to the pursuit of their  work as bringing about some good’ (Dugdale 1998: 107). For Dugdale, the hybrid  policy activist-professional most effectively operates within a ‘division of activist labour’, lab our’, connect connecting ing with with communi community ty-ba -based sed activi activists sts,, releva relevant nt profes professio sional nal groupi gro upings ngs,, and the agencie agenciess of policy policy and govern governmen ment, t, while while bringi bringing ng their  their 

 

127 specialist knowledges to bear upon the policy process by being able to link  normative and ethical principles, policy discourses and operational programs.

Broad Br oadcas castin ting g Pr Prope operty rty,, Reg Regula ulator tory y Agenci Agencies es and the the ‘So ‘Socia ciall Contract’ in Broadcasting

Broadcasting Broadca sting as a cultural cultural technology has always been deeply inscribed inscribed by legal relations, and the forms of government policy that underwrite such legal relations. Thomas Streeter (1995) has argued that television is never simply a technology; it is a set of social relations and practices constructed in myriad ways by law and  politics, with the result being that television, as technology and cultural form, is a legal inscription on technology. The regulation of private access to the spectrum, and the nature and conditions of access to spectrum space, establish broadcasting stations as ‘a combination of a particular channel with a particular transmitting facility, legally constituted and protected with a federally issued licence’ (Streeter  1996: 221). For Streeter, broadcast licences are  soft property, as they are both  public and private property, and ‘neither a thing nor a natural condition of human existence, but is rather a shifting, flexible bundle of rights, a set of contingent  political decisions about who gets what in what circumstances’ (Streeter 1996: 207). Broadcasting is an area where, as a result of the fundamentally social nature of the service, in terms of how it is distributed through commonly held spectrum and received as a freely available public good, the capacity of state agencies to deter det ermi mine ne the the le lega gall and inst instit itut utio iona nall ar arra range ngeme ment ntss and condi conditi tion onss fo forr th thee

 

128 all alloc ocat atio ion n of prop proper erty ty right rightss is ce cent ntra rall to th thee condu conduct ct of br broad oadcas caste ters rs as institutional agents. 1

One of the features of broadcasting policy is that its history appears as one of re regu gula lato tory ry agenci agencies es an and d othe otherr in inst stit itut utio iona nall in inte tere rest stss movi moving ng betwe between en ‘cooperation and competition, government “interference” and private initiative’ (Streeter 1996: 165). This is not simply a reflection of shifting political fortunes,  but rather a manifestati manifestation on of the inherently inherently intertwined intertwined nature of the private and the social, the marketplace and government, in broadcast property and the rights to its use. Rejecting the public/private dichotomy, Streeter argues, with reference to the US experience:

Broadcast policy … is best understood, not as government regulation, but as the mix of public and private social arrangements that undergird market relations. And those private and public social arrangements are usefully approached through the question of property creation. The category of   property is the point where private and public most clearly and forcefully intersect. Property is a kind of nexus of culture, economics, ideology and state power. (Streeter 1996: 166)

It was noted in Chapter Two that the public nature of the airwaves has  provided media reformers with some powerful rhetorical tools with which to engage commercial broadcasters. Likewise, the origins of regulatory agencies in

 

129 the need for distinctive governmental apparatuses to oversee the uses of private   power power for social social ends ends has given given them, them, histor historica ically lly,, the potenti potential al capacit capacity y to constrain the economic power of corporations deriving from control over property rights rig hts.. While While establ establish ishmen mentt of these these agencie agenciess involv involved, ed, in the theory ory,, a for formal mal reduction in the scope of freedoms of private property, in practice regulatory agencies have tended to interpret their mandates conservatively, and to be more  protective than confrontational towards the industries they regulate.

Horwitz (1989) has observed how regulatory agencies have developed a form of ‘soft legalism’ or ‘bureaucratism’, possessing the formal apparatuses and capacities to enforce decisions as formal legal institutions, but tending in their  everyd ever yday ay conduct conduct toward towardss a practi practice ce that has ensure ensured d mutual mutually ly satisf satisfact actory ory outcom out comes es be betw tween een co cont nten endi ding ng inst instit itut utio ional nal agent agents. s. Horw Horwit itzz pr propo opose sess th that at regulatory agencies are involved in two particular elaborations of the political  power of government. First, regulatory agencies combine legislative, executive and judicial functions, but are restricted in their domain of activity and their  ability abil ity to initia initiate te bro broader ader changes changes.. Second, Second, the operati operation on of these these agenci agencies es occurred on the basis of a more informal mode of rule making than formal legal institutions, with the agencies undertaking conduct that is more open-ended and discretionar discr etionary y in their dealings with contending contending parties that have operated within within their domain of activity.

 

130 Thee cond Th conduc uctt of al alll regul egulat ator ory y agen agenci cies es has has been been sh shap aped ed by the combination of the vague and open-ended legislative mandates which established thei th eirr ex exis iste tence nce,, the the ne need ed to ad adopt opt quasi quasi-j -judi udici cial al pr proc ocedu edure ress to manag managee th thee ‘probl ‘pr oblems ems of discre discretio tion’, n’, and the practi practical cal emphas emphasis is upon bargai bargainin ning g with with interested parties as a way of minimising the costs, forms of conflict and lack of  flexibility which arise from more formal, legalistic procedures. The value of   bargaining is that it provides a relatively low-cost and informal means to resolve conflicts, but with outcomes, given the quasi-legal status of regulatory agencies, that have the force of law. The cost, from the point of view of those seeking to reform regulatory conduct, is that such an approach tends in practice to maintain existing policy communities and dominant interests in the regulated sectors.

Horwitz locates three phases in the development of national regulatory ag agen enci cies es in the the Unit United ed St Stat ates es,, with with or orga gani nisa sati tion onss such such as th thee Fede Federa rall Communications Commission (FCC) being part of o f the ‘second era’ or ‘New Deal’ industry-specific regulatory agencies established in the 1930s and 1940s. 2  The Fede Federa rall Comm Commun unic icat atio ions ns Commi Commiss ssio ion n (F (FCC CC), ), es esta tabl blis ished hed in 1934, 1934, was was established primarily to develop guidelines for utilisation of the electromagnetic spectr spe ctrum, um, and to formul formulate ate substa substanti ntive ve guidel guideline iness for what what would would constit constitute ute  broadcasting in the public interest. In a manner characteristic of agencies set up in this period, the FCC promoted co-operative relations between government and  broadcasters, promoting a ‘rationalisation’ of competition as a tradeoff for the establishment of mechanisms to ensure that such industries serviced particular 

 

131 ‘public interest’ goals. The resulting social resulting  social contract was contract was one where the nature of  the airwave airwavess as common common proper property ty subseq subsequent uently ly alloca allocated ted to privat privatee intere interests sts necess nece ssita itated ted that that ‘the ‘the broadca broadcast st truste trusteee ... had to fulfil fulfilll certai certain n “affir “affirmat mative ive”” obligations’ (Horwitz 1989: 13). These ‘affirmative obligations’ characteristically included a commitment to children’s programming, coverage of matters of public importance, and coverage of events of local or community significance. In the Australian context, adherence to Australian content regulations would also be a central part of such a social contract.

Understanding its principal obligation as being to protect broadcast service to the public, and working with a broad but vague mandate and in a context of  strong countervailing forces to its authority (the courts, the broadcast networks, the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of speech and the Congress), the FCC consistently adopted a pragmatic and conservative approach to regulation. In facto o pro rela relati tion on to sp spect ectru rum m allo allocat catio ion, n, it en ensu sure red d ‘de fact protec tectio tion n of exi existi sting ng  broadcasters and broadcast services’ while, in relation to licensee behaviour, it made various, largely ineffectual attempts, ‘to influence licensee behaviour and  programming decisions by broad, ultimately unenforceable policy statements and   by means means of indire indirect, ct, subtle subtle threats threats … or “r “regul egulati ation on by raised raised eyebro eyebrow”’ w”’ (Horwitz 1989: 156). In his six-country study of broadcast regulation, Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem reached similar conclusions about the conduct of broadcasting regulatory agencies, observing that their regulatory conservatism arose in part from the concern that the use of formal sanctions, rather than ‘soft regulation’, or 

 

132 regulation through informal negotiation with interested parties, would be seen as inappropriate intrusions upon freedom of speech:

As time time passe passes, s, su super pervi viso sory ry au auth thor orit itie iess in incr creas easin ingly gly te tend nd to al alig ign n themselves with the broadcasting industry’s industry’s interests in the success of their  operations. They also contribute to maintaining the status quo - or deviate from it only gradually. gradually. As a result, result, once broadcasters broadcasters have been licensed, licensed, thei theirr inte intere rest st in a re renew newal al of th thee li licen cense se is us usual ually ly sa sati tisf sfie ied d … th thee superv sup erviso isory ry bodies, bodies, when when in doubt, doubt, play their part in suppor supportin ting g the incumbent rather than a competing applicant. (Hoffman-Reim 1996: 326327)

The overall effect of such a regulatory orientation has been to create   barr barrie iers rs to pa part rtic icip ipat atio ion n for for thos thosee who who se seek ek re refo form rm to ex exis isti ting ng re regul gulat atory ory arrangements. This has most notably included public interest and other advocacy group groupss on the the one ha hand nd,, and po pote tent ntia iall new compe competi tito tors rs on th thee ot othe herr. This This commitm comm itment ent to a regula regulatory tory   status status quo in broadc broadcast asting ing,, that that has exchange exchanged d industry protection and the safeguarding of broadcast property for a commitment to ‘affirmative’ or ‘pro-social’ forms of programming, has not gone unchallenged. In the United United St States ates,, consum consumer er,, enviro environmen nmental tal and public public intere interest st advocac advocacy y groups sought from the 1960s to control corporate prerogative and, seeing the regulatory agencies as captured by their corporate clients, engaged in policy activism through a combination of legal activism and demands for legislative

 

133 change. In doing so, they were encouraged by the sporadic regulatory activism of  the FCC during this period, particularly when Newton Minow was Chair (196163) and put forward his famous ‘Vast Wasteland’ critique of US commercial television (Krasnow and Longley 1984: 43-52). At the same time, the so-called ‘Chicago School’ of economic analysis emerged, with its critique of regulatory   behaviour as a form of cartel management, that transferred wealth and power  from ‘disorganised’ interests such as consumers, to organised interests in industry and government. In the United States, technological change would promote a shift towards a new form of policy discourse, where cable TV in particular promoted the emergence of a new political alliance, that included the cable TV industry,   professio professional nal groups, groups, policy-makers policy-makers (particularly (particularly the FCC Cable Bureau), Bureau), and libera lib eral-p l-prog rogres ressiv sivee advocacy advocacy groups groups,, who advocate advocated d cable cable televi televisio sion n as the solution to a diverse range of problems in broadcasting, ranging from lack of  competition to lack of community access (Streeter 1983).

Broadcast Media Policy, Debate Cultures and Cultural Criticism: Academic Debate Cultures and Australian Content Regulations

The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the role that intellectuals and cultural critics have played in the development of broadcast media policy in Austra Aus tralia lia,, parti particula cularly rly as this this has been reflec reflected ted in debates debates about about Austra Australia lian n content regulations for commercial regulation, and their relationship to wider  analyses analy ses of Australian Australian culture. culture. Broadcast Broadcast media policy constitutes constitutes a site where a

 

134 diverse range of forms of institutional and personal agency are brought together, and where a series of distinctive debate cultures both coexist and compete for   political influence. A central element of participation in these policy processes is the capacity for  translation of ideas and values, or the ability to link political rati rationa onali liti ties es an and d ethi ethical cal-m -mor oral al co conc ncer erns ns th that at ar aris isee fr from om wi with thin in pa part rtic icul ular  ar  institutional formations and actor networks with the technologies of government that th at form form the the basis basis of po poli licy cy.. The work work of tr trans ansla lati tion, on, when when su succe ccess ssfu ful, l, ‘establishes a mutuality between what is desirable and what can be made possible through the calculated activities of political forces’ (Miller and Rose 1992: 184), or, in Michel Callon’s terms, enables the expression ‘in one’s own language what others say and want, why they act in the way they do and how they associate with each other’ other ’ (Callon 1986: 203).

For cultural critics, there is an ongoing danger of presenting administrative or bureaucratic rationality as only ‘one side’ of a full moral personality, with the ‘other side’ being represented by the humanist intellectual or social critic. What results is a tendency to present the ethical persona of the social critic as morally superior to that of the bureaucrat, with the result being, as Ian Hunter has argued, that ‘the marginality of the critical intellectual to the processes of bureaucratic government … is converted into ethical prestige’ (Hunter 1993/94: 101). This claim to ethical authority exists in spite of its inability to be translated into  proposals that can meaningfully shape the development of social institutions (cf. Hunter 1994). Moreover, the dominance of various forms of ‘grand theory’, such

 

135 as Marxism and structuralism, has often meant that mundane technical issues of  regu regulat latio ion, n, policy policy form format atio ion n an and d inst instit itut utio iona nall mana managem gement ent ar aree fr freq equen uentl tly y subord sub ordina inated ted to struct structura urall assump assumptio tions ns about about the nature nature of class class and other  other  interests.3 Tom O’Regan has also noted that instances of policy failure, which are often quoted as evidence of the inability of policy-makers to overcome their moral narro nar rown wnes esss and te techn chnic icis istt le lean anin ings gs,, may may in fa fact ct be a pa part rt of the on ongo goin ing g devel dev elopm opment ent of go gove vern rnan ance, ce, wher wheree po poli licy cy fa fail ilur uree co conta ntain inss wi with thin in it th thee expectation of policy improvement:

The ongoing activities of Australian governments and critics recording and  publicising failures is an intrinsic part of government. Citing the failure of  go gover vernm nmen entt po poli licy cy to se secu cure re it itss desir desired ed en ends ds is pa part rt and pa parc rcel el of  educating the public, enlisting its support, and legitimating new policy directions. It’s part of the tension between different parts of government, which, whi ch, in any democra democratic tic society society,, spills spills over over into into the public public domain. domain. Without this information, and evidence to back it up, policy development and change is not made in the full glare of publicity and accordingly  public consent is not forthcoming. (O’Regan 1998: 6)

An important point that needs to be established is that intellectuals or  cultura cult urall critic criticss are not to be found found solely solely within within the universit universities ies and other  other  educational institutions. Michel Foucault drew attention to the emergence of what he termed ‘specific intellectuals’, and the new forms of connection between

 

136 theory the ory and politi political cal practi practice ce emergin emerging g betwee between n those those engaged engaged ‘i ‘in n a specif specific ic relation to a localized form of power’ through their own conditions of life, work, and professional practice (Foucault 1984: 72). Such a capability to engage in activis acti vism m throug through h the policy policy proces processs is a partic particula ularr outcome outcome of the growin growing g significance of expertise in modern forms of governance, identified by Terence Johnso Joh nson n as involv involving ing a closer closer relati relations onship hip between between profes professio sional nal experts experts and governmental strategies, related to the growing dependence of governments upon ‘the neutrality neutrality of expertise expertise in rendering rendering social social realities realities governable’ (Johnso (Johnson n 1993: 151). It will be argued in the second part of this thesis that the period from the early 1970s in Australia marks the emergence of such a network of ‘specific intellectuals’ concerned with broadcast media with the policy networks or policy communities which are associated with the governance of Australian broadcast media. Their relationship relationship to these networks is partly a personal personal and institutional institutional one, but is also in part a discursive one, concerned with negotiating the shifting terrain of policy language in this field in order to maximise political advantage.

An interesting case study in engagement by cultural critics with the media  policy process has occurred around the question of Australian content regulations for commercial television. television. Early work by cultu cultural ral intellectuals intellectuals on this topic was largely concerned with developing a critique of ‘Australianness’ as a stable and given giv en cultur cultural al entity entity,, analogo analogous us to the wider wider critiq critique ue of cult cultura urall national nationalism ism developed by historians such as Richard White (White 1981). Nonetheless, others have sought to associate such critiques critiques with proposals proposals to develop more effective effective

 

137   poli policy cy inst instru rume ment ntss for for the the re regu gula lati tion on of Aust Austra rali lian an co cont nten ent. t. Such Such a policy policy orientation has in turn reflected three concerns. First, there is a recognition that, whateverr the ‘mythic’ whateve ‘mythic’ status status of national national cultural cultural identity identity,, cultural cultural institutio institutions ns involved with the generation of ideas, images and symbolic forms associated with a national culture have a material basis as part of the cultural industries, and there are issues associated with the development of employment opportunities in these industries (Sinclair 1996). Second, recognition that national cultures are what Philip Schlesinger has described as ‘sites of contestation in which competition over definitions takes place’ (Schlesinger, 1991: 174) has meant that discourses of  ‘nationing’ can take on a variety of political inflections, some of which are more  politically progressive and culturally inclusive than others.4 Third, and perhaps most significantly in the Australian case, there is the condition of postcoloniality faced by Australian cultural intellectuals, defined by Graeme Turner as a ‘double  bind’, where:   Postcoloni Post colonial al intellectua intellectuals ls may feel compromised compromised when criticisi criticising ng their  own culture, because their criticism tends to align them with the coloniser; altern alternati ativel vely y, uncriti uncritical cal defence defence of their their cultur culturee aligns aligns them with with the chauvinistic nationalism so widely and variously used as a mechanism for  generating consensus on a delimited definition of the nation. (Turner 1992: 427)

 

138 A ‘policy turn’ in Australian media and cultural studies arose in p part art out of  the endeavor endeavorss of Austra Australia lian n cultur cultural al intell intellect ectual ualss to negoti negotiate ate an approp appropria riate te analytical and political position of engagement, between what Turner has termed the ‘rock’ of an exclusionary and backward-looking cultural nationalism, and the ‘hard place’ of global circuits of cultural production and distribution. Such critics sought to engage with the detail of Australian film and broadcast media policy, and the conflicting and contradictory tendencies of policy formation. Such work is open to critic criticism ism from from left left cultur cultural al critic criticss for its compli complicit city y with with nation nationali alist st discourses (eg. Milner 1991), and from those within policy communities who question whether the direct critical address of cultural nationalist arguments may weaken the capacity to lobby governments and industry organisations (eg. Bailey 1994). The fact that such a detailed body of work has been undertaken in Australia is also a reminder that the ‘policy turn’ in Australian media and cultural studies was only partly the product of critiques of cultural studies, but also arose out of  debates about the relationship between national culture and global media.

In an early study of Australian content on television, Tim Rowse and Albert Alb ert Moran Moran ar argued gued that that ‘it is imposs impossibl iblee to define define Austral Australian ian content content in television’ (Rowse and Moran 1984: 231). This is partly because nations such as Australia are marked as much by the differences within their boundaries as by similarities, and attempts to impose a unitary definition of ‘Australian culture’ are conservative and exclusionary. In spite of these concerns, Rowse and Moran suppor sup ported ted Australi Australian an content content regula regulatio tions ns for televi televisio sion, n, bec becaus ausee they had the

 

139  potential to create spaces for locally-produced TV content that presented more Arts, Rowse elaborated critical perspectives on Australian society. In  Arguing the Arts, on this position, calling ca lling for a stripping ba back ck of the definition of ‘Australianness’ in in  publicly supported cultural activity, away from attempts at substantive cultural definitions, to the point where ‘“Australianness” should mean nothing more than that a number of o f residents of Australia Australia were employed in the th e making of it’ (Rowse 1985: 79).

In The Screening of Australia, Australia , Dermody and Jacka (1987) concluded that the search for an Australian national cinema had proved, in the course of the 1970s, to have generated a conservative, aesthetically impoverished and culturally regr regres essi sive ve film film cu cult ltur ure, e, maki making ng film filmss th that at au audie dienc nces es,, both both Aust Austra rali lian an an and d international, no longer wanted to watch. In a later essay dealing with Australian film of the mid-1980s, Jacka (1988) argued that there had been a ‘commercial turn’ in Australian cinema, which had seen a decisive blurring of ‘distinctly Australian’ cinema into an international film circuit, encouraged by systems of  feature film funding based upon tax deductions such as the ‘10BA scheme’. In asking whether such developments made ‘Australian cinema’ an anachronistic concept, Jacka drew attention to the ways in which arguments for public support to Australian film and TV production had possessed considerable continuity over  time, in their combination of ‘a realist aesthetic ... with a unitary conception of  Australia’ (Jacka 1988: 120). Awareness of the limitations of cultural nationalism in a diverse, diverse, multicultur multicultural al Australia Australia did not diminish the likel likelihood ihood of continued continued

 

140 deployment of such arguments in policy debates, because they have both a strong rhetorical effectiveness and are the easiest proposals to legislate for. What had  become apparent to Jacka, however, was that there was a widening gap between cultural critique and cultural policy, as film and media policy activists found it difficult to accommodate the growing body of academic commentary on the socially constructed nature of Australian national culture, preferring instead to redeploy ‘the same rhetorical positions that were expressed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, when the situation was profoundly different’ (Jacka 1988: 126).

Both Jacka and Rowse used a cultural cultural industries industries rationale rationale for supporting supporting industry indust ry assistance assistance measures for Australian Australian film and television, television, recognising recognising that the economic and employment arguments for government assistance to secure the   produc productio tion n of Austra Australia lian n content content remain remained ed persua persuasiv sive, e, eve even n if the cultura culturall arguments argum ents underpinning underpinning them have become increasing increasingly ly suspect. suspect. At the same time, both envisaged that Australian film and television productions could emerge that were not, as Jacka put it, associated with ‘the nationalist, the populist, the tour to uris isty ty’’ (198 (1988: 8: 12 126) 6).. Inst Instea ead, d, bo both th Ja Jacka cka an and d Rows Rowsee lo look oked ed to a fi film lm and television production sector that was ‘local’, not in a geographical sense, but was rather grounded in a complex dialectic between national culture and everyday experie expe rience nce in cultur culturall ally y divers diversee societ societies ies.. Jacka Jacka and Rowse Rowse both both sought sought to  promote the ‘local’ as an alternative to the ‘national’, since the strategic value of  the ‘local’ is that it functions as an empty signifier; unlike the ‘national’, it has no  pre-given form or content. Regulation for Australian content thus becomes a

 

141 necess nece ssary ary,, but not a suffi sufficien cient, t, conditi condition on for develo developin ping g a ‘post ‘post-na -natio tional nalist ist’’ response to the limitations of cultural nationalism, in the context of a global economics of cultural production that threatens the viability of small national film and audiovisual cultures.   There The re are two proble problems ms with with the these se ar argum gument ents. s. First, First, whateve whateverr their  their  limitations, discourses of national culture and cultural identity continue to provide a foundation for the intervention of nation-states in the cultural sphere. It is difficult to replace these arguments with variants of economic policy discourse, such as strategic trade policy, since such discourses lack the rhetorical depth of  national culture discourses and their ability to inspire passion and commitment. Second, the problem with championing the ‘local’ is that its rhetorical strength of  vagueness and lack of proscription is a weakness when translated into the policy domain, since the conditions of existence of local cultural production have only  been defined in apparent contrast to the ‘national or ‘regional’. There is a ‘know it when you see it’ quality to the concept; as Jacka puts it, ‘the local … cannot be legislated for; it will erupt unpredictably if spaces are created for it’ (Jacka 1988: 127).. Such 127) Such innovat innovative ive local local audiovi audiovisua suall product product has materi material al condit condition ionss of  existe exi stence nce in public public poli policie ciess which which suppor supportt initia initiativ tives es tha thatt take place place through through cultural institutions, such as film funding policies which support low-budget and independent cinema, television content policies (particularly towards public or  non-com noncommer mercial cial broadca broadcasti sting) ng),, and in cultur cultural al policy policy discour discourses ses of access, access, diversity,, multiculturalism and innovation. diversity innov ation.

 

142

St Stuar uartt Cunning Cunningham ham (1992a (1992a)) used used the debate debate about about Austra Australia lian n conten contentt regulations for commercial television to make a larger claim about the importance of develop developing ing a policy policy dimens dimension ion for Austral Australian ian cultur cultural al and media media studie studies. s. Cunningham argued that, in policy terms, there was an important distinction to be made between: (1) critiques of cultural nationalism which work within official culture, demanding greater acknowledgment of pluralism, diversity and conflict in constru cons tructi ctions ons of the nation; nation; and (2) approaches approaches which reject the concept concept of  ‘national culture’ as deeply reactionary, and which celebrate the devolution of the nation-state through economic globalisation on the one hand, and the reassertion of sub-cultural and community identities on the other. Cunningham argued that, at least in the Australian context, the latter set of oppositions ignored the extent to which rhetorics of national culture had constitued a condition of existence for the establishment of national cultural infrastructures, which in turn have been the  basis for extension of more local and community-based cultural policy initiatives:

What Wh at [a [ant ntii-na nati tion onal alis ist] t] analy analyse sess ... ... overl overloo ook k is th that at a rh rhet etor oric ic an and d infras inf rastru tructu cture re for communi community ty cultura culturall produc productio tion, n, and its conseq consequent uent employment and economic multipliers, have emerged in Australia only recently, and that these developments have been facilitated by initiatives taken and arguments won at the level of national coordination, policy and funding. fundi ng. National National rhetorics, rhetorics, which may appear transparently transparently ideological to the social critics, are of recent vintage and are quite vulnerable to the

 

143 stronger imperatives toward internationalisation which have a persuasive tech techno nolo logi gica call an and d ec econ onom omic ic ca cach chet et.. Wit itho hout ut a na nati tion onal al cu cult ltur ural al infras inf rastru tructu cture, re, and a workabl workablee rhetor rhetoric ic to sustai sustain n it, the source sourcess for  enlivening community, local, regional or ethnic cultural activity would be impoverished. (Cunningham 1992a: 43).

The debate about Australian content regulations for commercial television illustrated, for Cunningham, the tensions and misunderstandings which can arise   between the debate cultures of cultural criticism and cultural policy. Cultural criticism was seen as being ‘ideas-rich’, characterised by practices of rigorous scepticism and continuous textual innovation, whereas policy discourse was seen as being being ‘ideas ‘ideas-th -thick’ ick’,, charact characteri erised sed by the st strat rategi egicc deploy deployment ment of famili familiar  ar  concepts and arguments as the basis for incremental change across a diverse range of fiel fields ds.. As a re resu sult lt,, Cunn Cunnin ingha gham m ar argu gued, ed, cu cult ltur ural al cr crit itic icis ism m fr frequ equen entl tly y misrecognises the distinctive functions which policy discourse performs, since ‘the rhetoric of policy tends to be so much grist to the critical mill’ (Cunningham 1992: 68-69).

An ongoin ongoing g tensio tension n in Cunnin Cunningham gham’’s work work arose arose when when consid consideri ering ng its implications for critical intellectual practice. Hawkins (1992) has argued that Cunningham does not adequately address some of the dilemmas of intellectual work applied to the policy field, such as the critiques of Australian cultural nationalism as a discourse that is both politically conservative and no longer 

 

144 intellectually tenable. By contrast, Cunningham was saying that, whatever its other limitations, the rhetoric of cultural nationalism retains strategic value in the  policy field. This may reflect the continuing gap between cultural critique and cultural policy as much as it does a rapprochement  between the two, which is what wh at Cunn Cunnin ingh gham am soug sought ht.. It is al also so a re remi mind nder er of th thee co comp mple lexi xiti ties es an and d ambigui ambi guitie tiess of intell intellect ectual ual work work that that respon responds ds to glo global balisa isatio tion n from from ‘semi‘semi  peri periphe phera ral’ l’ or ‘a ‘ant ntip ipode odean an’’ count countri ries es su such ch as Aust Austra rali lia, a, an and d th thee re resu sult ltin ing g likelihood, as Turner describes it, of ‘living with contradictions [and] occupying  positions that can be show to be less than consistent’ (Turner 1992: 427).

Conclusion

This chapter has undertaken a general overview of Australian broadcast media policy as being formed within an overall policy system, characterised b: a dist distin inct ctiv ivee

polit politic ical al

econom economy y,

wi with th

st stro rong ng

te tend ndenc encie iess

to towa ward rdss

in indu dust stry ry

concen con centr trat atio ion, n, high highly ly disp disper erse sed d co cons nsum umer ers, s, an and d si sign gnif ific icant ant publi publicc good good characteristics; a policy culture which has tended to give primacy to technologies and structures over culture and content; and policy discourses that have often   placed placed wider wider questio questions ns about about the social social role role of broadca broadcasti sting ng of offf limits limits,, as compared to technical issues about the delivery of broadcasting services. At the same time, the mixed nature of broadcast licences as ‘soft property’, with both  public good and commercial characteristics, has provided the scope for significant forms of policy activism in the field, particularly when this has been accompanied

 

145  by a commitment to institutional pluralism and open processes on the part of  regulatory agencies. Content regulations in their various forms have provided a site for such engagements, which have included intellectuals and cultural critics as well as the range of institutional and social agents who have a more ongoing involvement with the broadcast media policy field.

 

1

For a general discussion of this aspect of state capacity capacity,, see Campbell and Lindberg, 1990. The first, ‘Progressive’ era of the early twentieth century, century, saw the establishment of agencies concerned primarily with the construction of general and uniform rules for the conduct of behaviour by corporations in the marketplace, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Reserve System. The third, ‘Great Society’, era of the 1960s and 1970s involves the establishment of agencies concerned with the promotion of ‘public’ or  ‘consumer’ interests, as well as a critique of existing regulatory agencies as being ‘captured’ by producer or industry interests. 3 Alec Nove’s The Economics of Feasible Socialism (Nove 1983) relates this reluctance of the left to engage with concrete questions of policy to certain assumptions in Marxist theory, most notably the belief that the increased material 2

abundance 4 of advanced industrial capitalist societies would render processes of socialist planning simpler over time. Tony Bennett’s work on the changing nature of museums, from sites for the training of national populations to ‘contact zones’ involved with ‘relations of reciprocal interaction with the different communities which comprise their  cultural hinterlands’ (Bennett (Bennett 1998: 211), provides an example of such developments.