Charleston & Car. RR v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915)
Content
237 U.S. 597
35 S.Ct. 715
59 L.Ed. 1137
CHARLESTON & WESTERN CAROLINA RAILWAY
COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,
v.
VARNVILLE FURNITURE COMPANY.
No. 273.
Argued May 12, 1915.
Decided June 1, 1915.
Mr. F. B. Grier for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 598-599 intentionally omitted]
No counsel appeared for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
1
This is an action for $14.75, damage to furniture in transit from High Point,
North Carolina, to Varnville, South Carolina, $4.60 overcharge, and $50
penalty under a South Carolina statute (Civil Code 1912, § 2573), for a failure
to pay the claims within forty days. The defendant contended that the law
imposing the penalty was invalid under the act to regulate commerce,
especially § 20 [24 Stat. at L. 386, chap. 104], as amended by the act of June
29, 1906, chap. 3591, 34 Stat. at L. 584, 593, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 8563, 8592,
known as the Carmack amendment. The lower courts gave judgment for the
plaintiff, and the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122, 54 L. ed. 411, 30 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 378, was relied upon as still sustaining the law notwithstanding the
amendments of the Federal act. 98 S. C. 63, 79 S. E. 700.
2
The defendant (plaintiff in error) received the goods from the Southern Railway
Company and delivered them in damaged condition. Where the damage was
done does not appear. But by § 2572, in such cases the initial, intermediate, or
terminal carrier who fails within forty days from notice to inform the notifying
party when, where, and by which carrier the property was damaged is made
liable for the amount of the claim and a penalty of $50, although it may escape
by proof that it used due diligence and was unable to trace the property, etc. By
§ 2573 a similar liability is imposed on carriers for failure to pay claims for
freight overcharge or damage to property while in the possession of such
carriers, 'within forty days in case of shipments from without the state, after the
filing of such claim,' etc. If the property never came into their possession, they
are remitted to § 2572. It seems to follow from the decision in this case, that the
terminal carrier is held for a loss anywhere along the line, and for the penalty,
unless it proves that the property never came into its possession, etc., or
succeeds in shifting the loss within the forty days allowed. Therefore the
assumption of this court in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S.
122, 129, 54 L. ed. 411, 416, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378, that the statute only
concerned property lost or damaged while in the possession of a carrier in
South Carolina, no longer is correct; perhaps because of amendments in what
now is § 2572.
3
It is true that in the opinion of the supreme court the judgment is spoken of as
being for damage done to a shipment 'while in defendant's possession in this
state,' and it is said that the statute limits the liability to such damage. But in
view of the record this can mean no more than that there is a presumption that
the carrier that fails on notice to point out some other as responsible is itself in
fault. The defendant happened to be the last carrier of the line, and in many
states, including South Carolina, a so-called presumption has been established
at common law that property starting in good condition remained so until the
latest moment when it could have been harmed. But while this seems to have
made its first appearance in the guise of a true presumption of fact, it became, if
it was not always, a rule of substantive law, a rule of convenience, calling on
the last carrier to explain. Willett v. Southern R. Co. 66 S. C. 477, 479, 45 S. E.
93, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 635; Moore v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 173 Mass.
335, 337, 73 Am. St. Rep. 298, 53 N. E. 816. The rule is stated as a rule of
policy in South Carolina, and the statute makes it still more clearly so, since,
with the limits that we have stated, it applies indifferently to any carrier in the
line, if within the state, according to the accident of the plaintiff's demand. The
case, then, we repeat, is that a carrier in interstate commerce has been held
liable for a loss not shown to have happened while the goods were in its
possession or within the state, or to have been caused by it, if those facts are
now in any way material, on the strength of a rule of substantive law.
4
The claims dealt with in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S.
122, 54 L. ed. 411, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378, all arose before June 29, 1906, the
date of the Carmack amendment. The South Carolina law has been amended
and enlarged in scope since that decision, but it is less necessary to scrutinize
those changes than to consider the modifications of the United States law. As it
now stands that law requires the initial carrier to issue a through bill of lading,
and makes it liable for all damage anywhere on the route. § 20. By § 1 as
amended by the act of June 18, 1910, chap. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. at L. 539, 546,
Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563, it is made the duty of carriers to secure the safe
transportation and delivery of property subject to the act, upon reasonable
terms. As was said in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 420,
58 L. ed. 1377, 1382, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790, the result of many recent cases
there cited, beginning with Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L.
ed. 314, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, and coming down through
Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 58 L. ed. 868, L.R.A.1915B, 450,
34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, is that 'the special regulations and policies of particular
states upon the subject of the carrier's liability for loss or damage to interstate
shipments, and the contracts of carriers with respect thereto, have been
superseded.' It is true that in that case the inclusion of the attorney's fee, not
exceeding $20, in the costs upon judgments for certain small claims was
upheld, although incidentally including some claims arising out of interstate
commerce. But, apart from the effect being only incidental, the ground relied
upon was that the statute did not 'in any way enlarge the responsibility of the
carrier' for loss or 'at all affect the ground of recovery, or the measure of
recovery' (pp. 420, 422). The South Carolina act, on the other hand, extends the
liability to losses on other roads in other jurisdictions, and increases it by a fine
difficult to escape. It overlaps the Federal act in respect of the subjects, the
grounds, and the extent of liability for loss. We leave on one side the remote
analogies put forward in the decision of the state court, as, in our opinion, the
cases and principle to which we have referred are sufficient and direct. We
should add that the item for overcharges also falls under the act of Congress, §
2, as it now stands, since that section makes the receiving of greater
compensation than is received from others for similar services an unjust and
unlawful discrimination. The penalty, the only matter that we are considering,
was exacted for a failure to pay both claims, within forty days, irrespective of
the question whether adequate investigation had been possible, as required by
the Interstate Commerce Commission's rulings, Nos. 462, 236, and 68.
5
It is suggested that the act is in aid of interstate commerce. The state law was
not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress, but to enforce a state policy
differently conceived; and the fine of $50 is enough to constitute a burden.
Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 443, 56 L. ed. 257, 262, 32 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 140. But that is immaterial. When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state
law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress
has seen fit to go. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers' Elevator Co.
226 U. S. 426, 435, 57 L. ed. 284, 287, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 203, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.
174; Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439, 446, 447, 59 L.
ed. ——, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304. The legislation is not saved by calling it an
exercise of the police power, or by the proviso in the Carmack amendment
saving the rights of holders of bills of lading under existing law. Adams Exp.
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 506, 507, 57 L. ed. 314, 320, 321, 44 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148.
6
Judgment reversed.
35 S.Ct. 715
59 L.Ed. 1137
CHARLESTON & WESTERN CAROLINA RAILWAY
COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,
v.
VARNVILLE FURNITURE COMPANY.
No. 273.
Argued May 12, 1915.
Decided June 1, 1915.
Mr. F. B. Grier for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 598-599 intentionally omitted]
No counsel appeared for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
1
This is an action for $14.75, damage to furniture in transit from High Point,
North Carolina, to Varnville, South Carolina, $4.60 overcharge, and $50
penalty under a South Carolina statute (Civil Code 1912, § 2573), for a failure
to pay the claims within forty days. The defendant contended that the law
imposing the penalty was invalid under the act to regulate commerce,
especially § 20 [24 Stat. at L. 386, chap. 104], as amended by the act of June
29, 1906, chap. 3591, 34 Stat. at L. 584, 593, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 8563, 8592,
known as the Carmack amendment. The lower courts gave judgment for the
plaintiff, and the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122, 54 L. ed. 411, 30 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 378, was relied upon as still sustaining the law notwithstanding the
amendments of the Federal act. 98 S. C. 63, 79 S. E. 700.
2
The defendant (plaintiff in error) received the goods from the Southern Railway
Company and delivered them in damaged condition. Where the damage was
done does not appear. But by § 2572, in such cases the initial, intermediate, or
terminal carrier who fails within forty days from notice to inform the notifying
party when, where, and by which carrier the property was damaged is made
liable for the amount of the claim and a penalty of $50, although it may escape
by proof that it used due diligence and was unable to trace the property, etc. By
§ 2573 a similar liability is imposed on carriers for failure to pay claims for
freight overcharge or damage to property while in the possession of such
carriers, 'within forty days in case of shipments from without the state, after the
filing of such claim,' etc. If the property never came into their possession, they
are remitted to § 2572. It seems to follow from the decision in this case, that the
terminal carrier is held for a loss anywhere along the line, and for the penalty,
unless it proves that the property never came into its possession, etc., or
succeeds in shifting the loss within the forty days allowed. Therefore the
assumption of this court in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S.
122, 129, 54 L. ed. 411, 416, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378, that the statute only
concerned property lost or damaged while in the possession of a carrier in
South Carolina, no longer is correct; perhaps because of amendments in what
now is § 2572.
3
It is true that in the opinion of the supreme court the judgment is spoken of as
being for damage done to a shipment 'while in defendant's possession in this
state,' and it is said that the statute limits the liability to such damage. But in
view of the record this can mean no more than that there is a presumption that
the carrier that fails on notice to point out some other as responsible is itself in
fault. The defendant happened to be the last carrier of the line, and in many
states, including South Carolina, a so-called presumption has been established
at common law that property starting in good condition remained so until the
latest moment when it could have been harmed. But while this seems to have
made its first appearance in the guise of a true presumption of fact, it became, if
it was not always, a rule of substantive law, a rule of convenience, calling on
the last carrier to explain. Willett v. Southern R. Co. 66 S. C. 477, 479, 45 S. E.
93, 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 635; Moore v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 173 Mass.
335, 337, 73 Am. St. Rep. 298, 53 N. E. 816. The rule is stated as a rule of
policy in South Carolina, and the statute makes it still more clearly so, since,
with the limits that we have stated, it applies indifferently to any carrier in the
line, if within the state, according to the accident of the plaintiff's demand. The
case, then, we repeat, is that a carrier in interstate commerce has been held
liable for a loss not shown to have happened while the goods were in its
possession or within the state, or to have been caused by it, if those facts are
now in any way material, on the strength of a rule of substantive law.
4
The claims dealt with in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S.
122, 54 L. ed. 411, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 378, all arose before June 29, 1906, the
date of the Carmack amendment. The South Carolina law has been amended
and enlarged in scope since that decision, but it is less necessary to scrutinize
those changes than to consider the modifications of the United States law. As it
now stands that law requires the initial carrier to issue a through bill of lading,
and makes it liable for all damage anywhere on the route. § 20. By § 1 as
amended by the act of June 18, 1910, chap. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. at L. 539, 546,
Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8563, it is made the duty of carriers to secure the safe
transportation and delivery of property subject to the act, upon reasonable
terms. As was said in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412, 420,
58 L. ed. 1377, 1382, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790, the result of many recent cases
there cited, beginning with Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L.
ed. 314, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, and coming down through
Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 58 L. ed. 868, L.R.A.1915B, 450,
34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, is that 'the special regulations and policies of particular
states upon the subject of the carrier's liability for loss or damage to interstate
shipments, and the contracts of carriers with respect thereto, have been
superseded.' It is true that in that case the inclusion of the attorney's fee, not
exceeding $20, in the costs upon judgments for certain small claims was
upheld, although incidentally including some claims arising out of interstate
commerce. But, apart from the effect being only incidental, the ground relied
upon was that the statute did not 'in any way enlarge the responsibility of the
carrier' for loss or 'at all affect the ground of recovery, or the measure of
recovery' (pp. 420, 422). The South Carolina act, on the other hand, extends the
liability to losses on other roads in other jurisdictions, and increases it by a fine
difficult to escape. It overlaps the Federal act in respect of the subjects, the
grounds, and the extent of liability for loss. We leave on one side the remote
analogies put forward in the decision of the state court, as, in our opinion, the
cases and principle to which we have referred are sufficient and direct. We
should add that the item for overcharges also falls under the act of Congress, §
2, as it now stands, since that section makes the receiving of greater
compensation than is received from others for similar services an unjust and
unlawful discrimination. The penalty, the only matter that we are considering,
was exacted for a failure to pay both claims, within forty days, irrespective of
the question whether adequate investigation had been possible, as required by
the Interstate Commerce Commission's rulings, Nos. 462, 236, and 68.
5
It is suggested that the act is in aid of interstate commerce. The state law was
not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress, but to enforce a state policy
differently conceived; and the fine of $50 is enough to constitute a burden.
Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 443, 56 L. ed. 257, 262, 32 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 140. But that is immaterial. When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state
law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress
has seen fit to go. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers' Elevator Co.
226 U. S. 426, 435, 57 L. ed. 284, 287, 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 203, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep.
174; Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439, 446, 447, 59 L.
ed. ——, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304. The legislation is not saved by calling it an
exercise of the police power, or by the proviso in the Carmack amendment
saving the rights of holders of bills of lading under existing law. Adams Exp.
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 506, 507, 57 L. ed. 314, 320, 321, 44 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148.
6
Judgment reversed.
