Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974)

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Filed: 1974-05-28Precedential Status: PrecedentialCitations: 417 U.S. 106, 94 S. Ct. 2174, 40 L. Ed. 2d 694, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 19Docket: 73-726Supreme Court Database id: 1973-119

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417 U.S. 106
94 S.Ct. 2174
40 L.Ed.2d 694

COOPER STEVEDORING COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
v.
FRITZ KOPKE, INC., et al.
No. 73—726.
Argued April 15, 16, 1974.
Decided May 28, 1974.

Syllabus
A longshoreman was injured when, while loading a vessel owned by one
respondent and time chartered to the other (hereinafter collectively the
Vessel), he stepped into a concealed gap between crates which had
previously been loaded by petitioner. The longshoreman then sued the
Vessel, which filed a third-party complaint against petitioner. The District
Court found both the Vessel and petitioner negligent, and divided the
liability equally. On petitioner's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The award of contribution between joint tortfeasors in a noncollision
maritime case was proper under the circumstances. On the facts, no
countervailing considerations detract from the well-established maritime
rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors, since where the
longshoreman, not being an employee of petitioner, could have proceeded
against either the Vessel or petitioner, or both, and thus could have elected
to make petitioner bear its share of the damages, there is no reason why
the Vessel should not be accorded the same right. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318,
distinguished. Pp. 110—115.
Sessions v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 5 Cir., 479 F.2d 1041, affirmed.
Joseph D. Cheavens, Houston, Tex., for petitioner.
Dixie Smith, Houston, Tex., for respondents.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

1

This case concerns the extent to which contribution between joint tortfeasors
may be obtained in a maritime action for personal injuries. The S.S. Karina, a
vessel owned and operated by respondent Fritz Kopke, Inc., and under time
charter to respondent Alcoa Steamship Co., was loaded at Mobile, Alabama,
with palletized crates of cargo by petitioner Cooper Stevedoring Co. The vessel
then proceeded to the Port of Houston where longshoremen employed by MidGulf Stevedores, Inc., began to load sacked cargo. The Houston long-shoremen
had to use the top of the tier of creates loaded by Cooper as a floor on which to
walk and stow the Houston cargo. One of these longshoremen, Troy Sessions,
injured his back when he stepped into a gap between the creates which had
been concealed by a large piece of corrugated paper.

2

Sessions brought suit in the District Court against Kopke and Alcoa (hereinafter
collectively the Vessel) seeking to recover damages for his injuries.1 The
Vessel filed a third-party complaint against Cooper alleging that if Sessions
was injured by any unseaworthy condition of the vessel or as the result of
negligence other than his own, such condition or negligence resulted from the
conduct of Cooper and its employees. The Vessel also filed a similar third-party
complaint against Mid-Gulf.

3

Prior to trial, Mid-Gulf and the Vessel apparently entered into an agreement
under which Mid-Gulf would indemnify the Vessel against any recovery which
Sessions might obtain. Pursuant to this agreement, Mid-Gulf was dismissed as a
third-party defendant and MidGulf's attorneys were substituted as counsel for
the Vessel.2

4

The case then went to trial, after which the District Court, which sat without a
jury, orally announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court
found that the Vessel's failure either to make adequate arrangements to assure
that the stow would not move and leave spaces in the course of its trip from
Mobile to Houston or to put some type of dunnage on top of the stow had
resulted in an unsafe place to work and unseaworthy condition. The court found
that Cooper was also negligent in not stowing the creates in a manner in which
longshoremen at subsequent ports could safely work on top of them. Finding it
difficult from the evidence to 'evaluate exactly the responsibility between the
shipowner on the one hand and Cooper on the other,' the District Court divided
the liability equally between the Vessel and Cooper.3 Judgment was entered
allowing Sessions to recover $38,679.90 from the Vessel and allowing the
Vessel to recover $19,339.95 from Cooper.

5

Cooper appealed,4 asserting that the District Court's award of contribution in a
noncollision maritime case was in direct conflict with this Court's decisions in
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct.
277, 96 L.Ed. 318 (1952), and Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Erie Lackawanna
R. Co., 406 U.S. 340, 92 S.Ct. 1550, 32 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). The Court of
Appeals rejected this contention, relying on prior decisions of the Fifth and
Second Circuits to the effect that the apparent prohibition against contribution
in noncollision maritime cases announced in Halcyon and Atlantic was
inapplicable where the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought is
not immune from tort liability by statute. See Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J. E.
Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993, 91 S.Ct. 461, 27
L.Ed.2d 441 (1971); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (CA5 1970);
In re Seaboard Shipping Corp., 449 F.2d 132 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 2038, 32 L.Ed.2d 337 (1972). The Court of Appeals found
this principle applicable here since Sessions, in addition to suing the Vessel,
could have proceeded directly against Cooper as the latter was not his employer
and, therefore, not shielded by the limited liability of the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905, 479 F.2d 1041 (CA5
1973). We granted certiorari to consider this question, 414 U.S. 1127, 94 S.Ct.
864, 38 L.Ed.2d 752 (1974), and now affirm.

6

Where two vessels collide due to the fault of each, an admiralty doctrine of
ancient lineage provides that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally the
damages sustained by each. In The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 1 S.Ct. 41, 27
L.Ed. 91 (1882), Mr. Justice Bradley traced the doctrine back to the Laws of
Ole ron which date from the 12th century, and its roots no doubt go much
deeper. Even though the common law of torts rejected a right of contribution
among joint tortfeasors, the principle of division of damages in admiralty has,
over the years, been liberally extended by this Court in directions deemed just
and proper. In one line of cases, for example, the Court expanded the doctrine
to encompass not only damage to the vessels involved in a collision, but
personal injuries and property damage caused innocent third parties as well.
See, e.g., The Washington, 9 Wall. 513, 19 L.Ed. 787 (1870); The Alabama, 92
U.S. 695, 23 L.Ed. 763 (1876); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 23 L.Ed. 863 (1876);
The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 19 S.Ct. 491, 43 L.Ed. 801 (1899). See
generally The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 8—11, 11 S.Ct. 29, 30—32, 34 L.Ed.
586 (1890). In other cases, the Court has recognized the application of the rule
of divided damages in circumstances not involving a collision between two
vessels, as where a ship strikes a pier due to the fault of both the shipowner and
the pier owner, see Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 22 L.Ed. 619 (1875), or
where a vessel goes aground in a canal due to the negligence of both the
shipowner and the canal company, see White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape
Code & New York Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341, 42 S.Ct. 338, 66 L.Ed. 649 (1922).
See also The Max Morris, supra, 137 U.S., at 13—14, 11 S.Ct., at 32—33.
Indeed, it is fair to say that application of the rule of division of damages
between joint tortfeasors in admiralty cases has been as broad as its underlying
rationales. The interests of safety dictate that where two parties 'are both in
fault, they should bear the damage equally, to make them more careful.' The
Alabama, supra, 92 U.S., at 697. And a 'more equal distribution of justice' can
best be achieved by ameliorating the common-law rule against contribution
which permits a plaintiff to force one of two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss,
though the other may have been equally or more to blame. See The Max
Morris, supra, 137 U.S., at 14, 11 S.Ct., at 32.

7

Despite the occasional breadth of its dictum, our opinion in Halcyon should be
read with this historical backdrop in mind. Viewed from this perspective, and
taking into account the fectual circumstances presented in that case, we think
Halcyon stands for a more limited rule than the absolute bar against
contribution in noncollision cases urged upon us by petitioner.5

8

In Halcyon, a ship repair employee was injured while making repairs on
Halcyon's ship. He sued Halcyon for damages, alleging negligence and
unseaworthiness. Since the employee was covered by the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901—950, he was prohibited
from suing his employer Haenn. Nevertheless Halcyon impleaded Haenn as a
joint tortfeasor seeking contribution for the judgment recovered by the
employee. We granted certiorari in Halcyon to resolve a conflict which had
arisen among the circuits as to whether a shipowner could recover contribution
in these circumstances. See 342 U.S., at 283—284, and n. 3, 72 S.Ct., at 278—
279. One court had held that the employer's limitation of liability vis-a -vis its
employee under the Harbor Workers' Act barred contribution. See American
Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (CA2 1950).
Another Circuit had held that the Act did not bar contribution, see United States
v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (CA9 1950), and yet a third
Circuit, in the case reviewed in Halcyon, had permitted contribution but limited
it to the amount which the injured employee could have compelled the
employer to pay had he elected to claim compensation under the Act. 187 F.2d
403 (CA3 1951).

9

Before this Court, both parties in Halcyon agreed that 'limiting an employer's
liability for contribution to those uncertain amounts recoverable under the
Harbor Workers' Act is impractical and undesirable.' 342 U.S., at 284, 72 S.Ct.
at 279. The Court also took cognizance of the apparent trade-off in the Act
between the employer's limitation of liability and the abrogation, in favor of the
employee, of common-law doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption
or risk. Id., at 285—286, 72 S.Ct. at 279—280. Confronted with the possibility
that any workable rule of contribution might be inconsistent with the balance
struck by Congress in the Harbor Workers' Act between the interests of carriers,
employers, employees, and their respective insurers, we refrained from
allowing contribution in the circumstances of that case.

10

These factors underlying our decision in Halcyon still have much force. Indeed,
the 1972 amendments to the Harbor Workers' Act re-emphasize Congress'
determination that as between an employer and its injured employee, the right
to compensation under the Act should be the employee's exclusive remedy.6
But whatever weight these factors were properly accorded in the factual
circumstances presented in Halcyon, they have no application here. Unlike the
injured worker in Halcyon, Sessions was not an employee of Cooper and could
have proceeded against either the Vessel or Cooper or both of them to recover
full damages for his injury. Had Sessions done so, either or both of the
defendants could have been held responsible for all or part of the damages.
Since Sessions could have elected to make Cooper bear its share of the
damages caused by its negligence, we see no reason why the Vessel should not
be accorded the same right. On the facts of this case, then, no countervailing
considerations detract from the well-established maritime rule allowing
contribution between joint tortfeasors.

11

Our brief per curiam opinion in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Erie Lackawanna
R. Co., 406 U.S. 340, 92 S.Ct. 1550, 32 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), is fully consistent
with this view. In that case a yard brakeman, employed by Erie, brought suit for
injuries sustained while working on a boxcar owned by another railroad.
Atlantic, while the boxcar was being transported on a carfloat barge owned by
Erie. The accident was allegedly due to a defective footboard and handbrake of
the boxcar and the plaintiff sued Atlantic for its negligence in supplying
defective equipment. Atlantic sought contribution from Erie on the ground that
its negligence was also a factor in causing the injury. The District Court denied
contribution, relying on Halcyon. The Court of Appeals affirmed and we
granted certiorari because it initially appeared that the decision was
inconsistent with the Courts of Appeals' decisions in Horton, Watz, and
Seaboard, supra, which had allowed contribution, notwithstanding Halcyon, in
situations where the party against whom contribution was sought was not
entitled to the limitation-of-liability protections of the Harbor Workers' Act.
After oral argument, however, it appeared that the case was factually
indistinguishable from Halcyon. Erie, against whom contribution was sought,
was the plaintiff's employer, and in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S.
334, 73 S.Ct. 302, 97 L.Ed. 367 (1953), we recognized that a railroad employee
injured while working on a freight car situated on a carfloat in navigable waters
was subject exclusively to the Harbor Workers' Act. Erie was therefore entitled
to the limitation-of-liability protections of the Harbor Workers' Act, just like
the employer in Halcyon.

12

Petitioner argues, however, that this protection was ephemeral in Atlantic since,
under Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731, 87 S.Ct. 1419, 18
L.Ed.2d 488 (1967), the injured employee in Atlantic could have sued Erie, the
shipowner-employer, for unseaworthiness of the vessel. See also Reed v. The
Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 10 L.Ed.2d 448 (1963). But the fact that
Erie may have been subject to a suit based on unseaworthiness for damages
caused by defective boxcar appliances, compare The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158,
175, 23 S.Ct. 483, 487, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903), with Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 213, 83 S.Ct. 1185, 1189, 10 L.Ed.2d 297 (1963), did not
make it a joint tortfeasor subject to a contribution claim. Contribution rests
upon a finding of concurrent fault. Erie's liability, if any, for unseaworthiness of
its vessel would have been a strict liability not based upon fault. In other words,
even if Erir were negligent, its injured employee was entitled to claim
compensation from it under the Harbor Workers' Act, and Erie was accordingly
entitled to the protective mantle of the Act's limitation-of-liability provisions.
And to the extent Erie was not negligent but nevertheless subject to a suit on a
seaworthiness theory, Erie was not a joint tortfeasor against whom contribution
could be sought. See Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 390 F.2d 353 (CA9), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 858, 89 S.Ct. 126, 21 L.Ed.2d 127 (1968).

13

In sum, our opinion in Atlantic was not intended to answer the question posed
by the present case, as its failure to discuss Horton, Watz, and Seaboard
indicates. Rather, Atlantic proves only that our decision in Halcyon was, and
still is, good law on its facts.

14

Affirmed.

15

Mr. Justice STEWART took no part in the decision of this case.

1

This suit was commenced prior to the enactment of the 1972 amendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901—944 (1970 ed., Supp. II), and all parties agree that the
amendments are therefore not applicable. Accordingly we need not decide
whether Sessions' suit against the Vessel or the Vessel's third-party
complaints against Cooper or Mid-Gulf could be brought under the Act, as
amended. See § 905(b).

2

3

4

Petitioner suggests that the Vessel cannot recover contribution because it
has already been fully indemnified for the judgment under its agreement
with Mid-Gulf. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts §§ 48—49 (4th ed. 1971).
But this suggestion rests on a faulty construction of the agreement between
the Vessel and Mid-Gulf. The latter agreed to indemnify the Vessel only
to the extent necessary after trial of the lawsuit, and the assumption of the
parties was that Mid-Gulf would step into the Vessel's shoes both to
defend the suit brought by Sessions and to prosecute the third-party
complaint against Cooper.
Since the District Court concluded that the only apportionment of fault it
could reach on the evidence in this case was an equal division, we have no
occasion in this case to determine whether contribution in cases such as
this should be based on an equal division of damages or should be
relatively apportioned in accordance with the degree of fault of the parties.
Cf. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 15, 11 S.Ct. 29, 33, 34 L.Ed. 586 (1890).
See also Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed.
1166 (1942); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct.
262, 83 L.Ed. 265 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 56 S.Ct.
707, 80 L.Ed. 1075 (1936). See generally Staring, Contribution and
Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 Calif.L.Rev.
304, 340—344 (1957).
The Vessel also cross-appealed, contending that the District Court should
have allowed it full indemnity from Cooper. The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, relying on the District Court's finding that the Vessel's
'conduct precluded its full recovery on the indemnity claim because it
failed to fulfill its primary responsibility under its arrangement with
Cooper to assure that some type of dunnage was placed on top of the
cargo.' 479 F.2d 1041, 1042. Cf. Weyer-haeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema
Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 567, 78 S.Ct. 438, 440, 2 L.Ed.2d 491
(1958). The Vessel did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari to seek
review of this aspect of the Court of Appeals' judgment, and we therefore
lack jurisdiction to consider its contention that it is entitled to recover full
indemnity on the basis of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956).

5

6

The lower courts have generally not read Halcyon as petitioner suggests,
and have continued to recognize a right of contribution in noncollision
maritime cases. See, e.g., Crain Bros., Inc. v. Wieman & Ward Co., 223
F.2d 256 (CA3 1955); Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Constr.
Co., 409 F.2d 917 (CA1 1969); Coca Cola Co., Tenco Div. v. S.S.
Norholt, 333 F.Supp. 946 (SDNY 1971); Dow Chemical Co. v. Tug
Thomas Allen, 349 F.Supp. 1354 (ED La 1972); Bilkay Holding Corp. v.
Consolidated Iron & Metal Co., 330 F.Supp. 1313 (SDNY 1971);
American Independent Oil Co. v. M. S. Alkaid, 289 F.Supp. 329 (SDNY
1967); Cities Service Refining Corp. v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 146
F.Supp. 418 (SD Tex 1956).
Under the 1972 amendments, an employee injured on a vessel can bring an
action against the vessel for negligence, but the vessel's liability will not
be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or breach thereof. And where
the vessel has been held liable for negligence 'the employer shall not be
liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any
agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void.' 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
(1970 ed., Supp. II). The intent and effect of this amendment were to
overrule this Court's decisions in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946), and Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. PanAtlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956),
insofar as they made an employer circuitously liable for injuries to its
employee, by allowing the employee to maintain an action for
unseaworthiness against the vessel and allowing the vessel to maintain an
action for indemnity against the employer. See H.R.Rep.No.92—1441, pp.
4 8 (1972); S.Rep.No.92—1125, pp. 8—12 (1972).

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