Financial Markets and the Long Term Debt Outlook

 

 April 27, 2012   Topics: Why financial markets are paying close close attention to how Congress addresses the lo long-term ng-term budget outlook

In August 2011, the United States lost one of its AAA credit ratings, a designation first bestowed around 100 years ago, which when combined with the debt ceiling debate, created one of the sharpest market corrections in post-war US history. Financial markets remain concerned about the ability and willingness of the US and Europe to tackle their respective fiscal challenges. With US federal debt approaching its highest level since the formation of the federal government in 1789 (other than during WWII and its immediate aftermath), rating agencies are taking a close look at rising US debt and what the legislature does to contain it. The appetite of foreign central banks to accumulate Treasuries has provided the US with a reprieve; these entities, entities,  plus Federal Reserve holdings, holdings, now account for half of all Treas Treasury ury bonds. But monetary policy in Asia Asia and the Middle East is subject to change, and we have seen in Europe suddenness with can re-priced by financial markets. Downgrades, government shutdown rumors andthe political impasse onwhich deficitsovereign reductiondebt have notbelost their ability to negatively affect equity markets, business activity and confidence. confidence. This note details 10 reasons why we believe financial markets will take a close look at what Congress does in the year ahead. [1] Assuming that sequestration takes place as planned, the Budget Control Act reduces the trajectory of the debt from the CBO’s explosive Alternative Case, but does not yet set federal debt on a sustainable path.   Even after incorporating all phases of the BCA and assuming expiration of various  business and household household tax relief provisions, provisions, future debt ratios still rise into the mid-80s mid-80s as a percentage of US GDP. The CBO Baseline shows a decline in federal debt since it assumes the following three policy options: a sunset of all Bush tax cuts, an end to indexation of AMT to inflation, and reductions to Medicare doctor reimbursements which Congress has agreed to but never enacted. These three cuts cuts and associated interest savings would amount to roughly $6 trillion in deficit reduction over a 10 year period. However, it remains remains unclear what political support there would be to do so.

US long-term debt scenarios Net debt to GDP, percent 100%

CBO Alte Alternative rnative Case

90% 80%

Post-BCA case

70% 60% CBOBaseline

50% 40%

30% 20 04 2 00 6 2 0 08 20 1 0 2 0 1 2 20 1 4 2 0 16 2 0 1 8 2 0 20 20 2 2 Sourc e: CBO, J.P. Mor Morgan gan P Priv riv ate Bank.

[2] Financial markets are focused on this issue since large deficits and debt levels can affect growth. There are plenty of debates in the economic community these days (e.g., why haven’t monetary or fiscal stimulus multipliers behaved the way their supporters believed they would). One possible explanation is that fiscal stim stimulus ulus loses its effectiveness when debt ratios rise too high. In the chart below, we summarize Ken Rogoff’s findings that when debt ratios in the US and in other advanced economies have exceeded 90%, economic growth growth suffered notably. With the US federal debt ceiling ceiling now over 100% of GDP (on a gross debt basis) and projections of net debt rising above What fiscal austerity supporters worry about: 90% cliff  80%, financial markets have reason to be concerned. GDP growth 5%

Supporting Rogoff’s findings is a paper prepared by BIS1 economists for the Fed’s 2011 Jackson Hole symposium . In a study of sovereign, corporate and household debt over the last 3 decades, the authors find that at around 85% of GDP, government debt exerts a significant negative drag on growth. Their conclusion: “the immediate implication is that countries with high debt must act quickly and decisively to address their fiscal  problems. The longer-term longer-term lesson is that, to build build the fiscal buffer required to address extraordinary events, governments should keep debt well below the estimated thresholds.” 

4%

 Ad vanc ed econ om ies (1946-2009)

U.S. (1790-2009)

3% 2% 1% 0% -1% -2% Debt/GDP: Debt/GDP: Debt/GDP: Debt/GDP: 60-90% 90%+ 60-90% 90%+ Source: "G rowth in a Time o f Debt", Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, January Jan uary 7, 2010, Natio nal Bureau of Economic Resea Research. rch.

[3] Hoping for growth might not be the best strategy. The  post-BCA post-BCA debt ratio of 85% 85% by 2022 includes the CBO growth assumptions shown shown in the chart below. Growth is assumed to spike spike to 5% in 2015, and avera average ge 2.7% over the decade. Some argue that faster growth may bail out the US from its budget problem, reducing the need for deficit reduction measures. It is true that the the US has experienced growth growth surges before, and it is always possible another another one will occur. In the 1950’s, 1950’s, real 1

 “The Real Effects of Debt”, Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, BIS, presented at the Fed’s August 2011 Jackson Hole symposium. 

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 April 27, 2012   Topics: Why financial markets are paying close close attention to how Congress addresses the lo long-term ng-term budget outlook

GDP growth averaged 4.3% for the entire decade [see table in Appendix], which resulted in debt ratios declining from 80% to 46%. However, the unique economic conditions conditions and productivity gains of the 1950’s (e.g., interstate highway, highway, rebuilding of Europe and Japan) may not be repeated. repeated. While we are hopeful that the US economy economy recovers more quickly, if it do doesn’t, esn’t, debt ratios might not decline below the mid 80’s, risking another round of rating agency downgrades. US military spending since 1940 Percent of GDP

CBO's real GDP growth assumptions Percent YoY 5.0%

14%

4.5% 4.0%

12% 10%

3.5% 3.0%

8%

Since June 2009

2.5%

6%

2.0% 1.5%

4%

1.0% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

2% 1948 1955 1962 1969 1976 1983 1990 1997 2004 2011 2018 Source: CBO, OMB, J.P. Morgan Private Bank.

Source: Co ngressional ngressional Budget Office.

Other areas of potential budget slippage: projections of military spending declines are not the same as structural deficit reduction. One item in the President’s budget proposal was an assumed $800 billion in savings from troop withdrawals out of Iraq and Afghanistan (so-called “OCO” spending). While progress has been made on this front, uncontrollable geopoli geopolitical tical

events could require OCO spending to rise again. In addition, as shown above, the Budget Control Act already projects that non-OCO military spending as a % of GDP will fall to its lowest level since 1940, barely above the levels now spent by Japan and Germany after decades of demilitarization. As a result, financial markets may not ascribe a high likelihood to deficit reduction achieved through lower estimates of future military spending. [4] It’s not just rating agencies that are unnerved by polarization of political parties. Markets are aware of the polarization polarization in Congress, a trend that can be understood understood by empirical an analysis alysis of Congressional vo voting ting patterns. As shown below, the  polarization in the House House and the Senate is as high as iitt has ever been, even higher than after Recon Reconstruction, struction, one of the mos mostt acrimonious periods in the country’s history. history. A closer look at the Senate in particular (below, right) shows that the number of  party non-conformists has has plummeted. Without a political political middle, there is a greater risk th that at the ideological divi divide de between the 2  parties cannot be bridged, leading leading to intermittent intermittent government shutdowns shutdowns (or the threat of them ) and market disruptions. Congress Congres sion al polarization at an all tim e high Degree of partisans hip as m easured tthrough hrough analysis of all Congres sional roll calls, 1879-2010

1879

45

1 9 5 0 's

40

100%

  s    i   e    t   r 90%   a    P   e 80%    h    t   n 70%   e   e   w60%    t   e    b   e 50%   c   n   a 40%    t   s    i    D30%

Number of party n on-con form ists in the Se Senate nate 1 195 9533-20 2004 04

House

1 9 6 0 's

35 30

1 9 8 0 's

1990's

Total

25

Republicans

20

Senate

1 9 7 0 's

15 10

Democrats

5 0 85 1899

1919

1939

1959

1979

1999

Source: Keith Keith T . Poole, Poole, Univers ity of California - San Dieg o, January 2011.

89

93 97 101 Co ngr essional session number 

105

Source: The Creation of an Endangered Species: Species: Party Nonc onformists of Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, 2005. the U.S. Senate, Rich ard Fleisher

[5] Entitlements: where we are now. Market participants are increasingly focused on entitlements relative to discretionary spending. First, some history. When Medicare was introduced introduced in 1960’s, it was described described as “brazen socialism” in the Senate. When Truman proposed a national healthcare program in the 1940’s, the plan was called a Communist plot by a House subcommittee. And when President Roosevelt introduced introduced Social Security in the 1930’s, he was branded as a Communist sympathizer by Republican Senators from Ohio, Pennsylvania and Minnesota, publisher William Randolph Hearst and Alf 2

 Financial markets are aware that last year’s compromise avoiding a shutdown was mostly a reflection of FEMA discovering that it underestimated the amount of funds that it had on hand. There wasn’t a compromise, since Congress didn’t need to make one.

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 April 27, 2012   Topics: Why financial markets are paying close close attention to how Congress addresses the lo long-term ng-term budget outlook

Landon (Roosevelt’s GOP opponent in the the 1936 Presidential election). So in 1969, when the US Census found that one quarter of Americans over the age of 65 lived in poverty, politicians showed courage in creating a larger social safety net. However, it may take even greater courage to examine and adjust what was created.   In the late 1960 1960’s, ’s, the government estimated that Medicare expenses would grow by 7 times by 1990 (unadjusted for inflation); they grew by 61 times instead.  As shown in the table, healthcare spending has overtaken education spending (a); entitlements have grown sharply compared to growth in  population, household household income and overall government government spending (b); price-sensitive medical spending spending (paid out-of-pocket) out-of-pocket) has collapsed (c); and more “productive” forms of government spending have fallen to an all-time low (d). David Walker, the former Comptroller of the US, refers to this as the “crowding out” of productive discretionary programs. In d i c at i v e e n t i t l e me n t t r e nd s : 1960-2010

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000 2009/10

(a)

Healthcare s pending (% of GDP) Education s pending (% of GD P)

1% 4%

3% 6%

4% 5%

5% 5%

6% 6%

8% 6%

(b)

Entitlem ent program enroll m ent (% of population) Entitlem ent incom e (% of avg. pre-tax incom e) Social Security s pending (% of total federal s pending) Medicare s pending (% of total federal s pending) Medicaid s pending (% of total federal s pending)

N/A N/A N/A N /A N/A

1 8% 8% 15% 3% 1%

22 % 11 % 20 % 5% 2%

2 5% 1 1% 20 % 8% 3%

2 7% 1 2% 2 3% 11% 7%

2 9% 1 5% 2 0% 13 % 8%

(c) (c )

Price s ens itive out-of-pocket s pending (% of healthcare s pending) Medicare/Medicaid (% of healthcare s pending)

4 8% N/A

33 % 1 8%

23 % 25 %

1 9% 26%

14 % 32 %

12 % 35 %

(d)

"Productive" federal s pending (% of total federal s pending)

N/A

6 8%

54 %

46 %

36 %

3 2%

Includes spending on defense, education, infras tructure and tec hnology hnology Source:: Kleiner Source Kleiner P Perkins erkins Caufield & Byers . 2009/10 ref lects latest data point available.

[6] Entitlements: where we go from here. Markets generally look at financial financial statements which are governed governed by GAAP accounting, which requires accrual of future commitments. Countries and states are not bound by accrual accounting, leaving markets to wonder (and sometimes panic) when they find out what hasn’t been accrued. The existing federal debt, which is already at elevated levels, does not include the present value of unfunded future entitlement entitlement payments. Government agencies have estimated this latter number at $36-63 trillion, which is 3-6 times the existing stock of federal debt held by the public. How much would tax rates have to rise to support entitlements growing at 5%-7% per year, if nominal GDP grew at 4%-5%? First, the 2001 tax cuts would have to expire on all brackets, and then tax rates would have to be raised by the same amount on everyone. At that point, federal debt to GDP would still be well above 2007 levels, but at least it would create some borrowing borrowing capacity to fund entitlement payments. payments. The question is what such a policy would do do to growth and employment. employment. The existing Federal debt is the lesser of 2 problems Trillions, USD $70 $60 $50 $40 $30 $20 $10 $0

Existing net debt

Present value of unfunded entitlement obligations, through 2086

Present value of unfunded entitlement obligations, over an infinite horizon

Sourc e: US Department of the Tr easu easury, ry, US Social Security A Administration dministration,, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Se Services. rvices.

[7] How long will China keep buying?  US Treasury markets have benefitted benefitted substantially from the appetite of Chinese and other central banks to accumulate Treasury bonds. As shown below, China’s purchases of $1.5 trilli trillion on in Treasuries and Agencies is unprecedented, even when compared to other industrializing industrializing countries with managed exchange rates. While China has prospered by doing this (keeping its exchange rate cheap and exporting more), it is a policy that carries substantial risk,  primarily in the form of higher higher Chinese inflation. As a result, it would be risky risky to expect this pace of reserve accum accumulation ulation to

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 April 27, 2012   Topics: Why financial markets are paying close close attention to how Congress addresses the lo long-term ng-term budget outlook

last forever. Eventually, the US Treasury will once again have to rely on private markets to finance its deficits and stock of debt. Japan has been able to sustain sustain high federal debt and low interest rates, but it has a stock stock of domestic buyers prepared to hold them: 93% of all Japanese government bonds are held by Japanese locals. Chinese foreign exchange res reserve erve accumul ation Percent of US GDP 14%

Dominant world reserve currency by year  U.S.

Chin a 1 1990 990 - 201 2011 1 Japan 1990 - 2011 2011

12%

Britain

Japan 1957 - 1978 1978 Germany 1960 - 1981 S.Korea 1978 - 199 1999 9

10% 8%

France

6%

Netherl

4% Spain

2% 0%

Portugal

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 1 14 41 15 51 16 61 17 71 18 8 19 19 2 20 02 21 12 22 2 Year  Source: Sourc e: IMF IMF-- IFS, B BEA, EA, C China hina National Bureau of Statistics Statistics..

1400 1575 1750 Source: Hong Kong Monetary Monetary Authority.

1925

2100

[8] Risks to the status of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency . The primary reason that China accumu accumulates lates Treasury  bonds is that its central central bank is looking for large, large, liquid, secure places to put ttrillions rillions of their ow own n currency. The most sensible

 place to find such an investment: inves tment:65%), the world’s curren currency. cy.ofThe percentage of global reserves reserves held dollars has no nott changed much recently (around nor hasreserve the percentage global FX transactions denominated inin dollars (85%). However, financial markets are well aware of the catalysts that led to the end of reserve currency status over the last few centuries. In general, they are: an over-extended fiscal budget, too much money-printing money-printing,, declines in productivity, military adventurism and the inability to adjust to changing changing times, circumstances and adversaries. Financial markets understandabl understandably y look at the actions of the Congress and the President on issues like these. Congress’ actions will be an important marker on the timeline of the United States and its ability to sustain its economic economic primacy of the last 100 years. For the record, as shown in the chart above, that’s about as long as most reserve currencies last. [9] What economic model does the United States want to use?   This chart below reflects the the implicit fiscal dilemma of the last decade: the US mixes a European style welfare state with a libertarian tax regime. The result is that even after an economic recovery boosts tax receipts, the IMF projects the US structural deficit to still be around 4.4% in 2013. Governm ent revenues and expendi tur es: es: 2011 2011 and 20 2012 12 are unusual on both fronts, Percent of GDP

Fiscal deficits First six m onths of fiscal year, percent of annu alized GDP, inverted -6

24

Expenditures

22 20

-5 -4 -3

Receipts

-2

18

-1 16

0

14 1950's

1960's

1970's

1980's

1990's

2000's

'11/'12 estimate Source: Office Offi ce of Management and Budget, Cong Congressional ressional Budget Offi ce.

1 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Source: Treasury, Treasur y, BEA, J.P J.P.. Morg Morgan an P Priv riv ate Bank.

[10] The risk of premature fiscal tightening does not preclude Congressional work on the long term deficit d eficit issue. At a recent event we held with Pete Peterson regarding his foundation’s mission on budget dynamics, he reiterated his view that the reported choice between “jobs and deficit reduction” is a false one. There has been a lot of debate around what to do regarding the fiscal cliff facing the US next year (see first chart below). Current law would impose impose one of the largest fiscal drags in decades. Economists Larry Summers and Brad DeLong have argued against too much fiscal consolidation consolidation right now, asserting that (a) additional government spending can ease the long-term budget constraint in conditions similar to today’s, and (b)

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 April 27, 2012   Topics: Why financial markets are paying close close attention to how Congress addresses the lo long-term ng-term budget outlook

tightening policy now would risk permanent loss of human capital, lower labor productivity growth and lower trend growth. Let’s assume they are right, and that now is not the time for current law to be imposed in full. That doesn’t mean that progress cannot be made on the longer term entitlement issues like Social Security and Medicare. The risk of inaction should be considered as well; in the second chart, the Government Accountability Office estimates rising net interest costs over the next few decades under different budget assumptions. While we consider the CBO’s Alternative Case too pessimist pessimistic, ic, the risk is that it falls somewhere in between, between, consuming a greater and greater share of g government overnment tax revenue. We have added a line showing the current share of education spending for context. Scheduled austerity for 2013 Change i n cyclically-adjusted federal deficit, % of potent potential ial GDP

Net interest cost proj ections Percent of GDP

50% Based on CBO CBO 45% -3 2010 federal,  Altern  Alte rn ati ve Case 40% -2 state and local 35% spending on -1 30% elementary, Based on 0 25% secondar y and and CBO Baseline 1 Case 20% post-secondary 2 education 15% 3 10% 4 Fiscal 5% Fiscal stimulus 0% 5 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013 Source: US Go vernmen vernmentt Accountabil Accountability ity Office, CBO, US Cen sus. Source: CBO, IMF, Goldman Sachs , J.P. M Morg organ an P Priv riv ate Ban Bank. k. -4

201 2013 3 estimate assuming curr ent law law

Fiscal Fiscal drag

My son recently asked me what I thought was the most important document in US history. There are a lot to choose from, but of all the possibilities, I picked George Washington’s Washington’s Farewell Address, written in 1796. The relevance of Washington’s warnings regarding the importance of unity, the threat of political factions, the importance of the separation of powers, the dangers of permanent foreign alliances and the need for public morality and education have not diminished diminished with time. One entire section in Washington’s Farewell Address is devoted to the use of public credit, and Washington is quite clear about what he thinks about Congress passing the buck to future generations: “ As a very important source source of strength and security, cherish cherish public credit. One method of preserving it it is to use it as  sparingly as possible…avoid possible…avoid accumulation accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occas occasions ions of expense, but by vigorous exer exertions tions in  time of peace to discharge discharge the debts which unavoidabl unavoidablee wars have occasioned, not ungenerously ungenerously throwing upon pos posterity terity the  burden which we ourselves ought to to bear." Michael Cembalest Chairman of Market and Investment Strategy J.P. Morgan Asset Management Appendix: 1950’s debt reduction was based on growth, not austerity Net deb t Net de bt Nominal Real GD GDP P (bn Outl ays (% Receipts (% (% of GDP) (bn) GDP (bn) 1950 USD) of GDP) of GDP) 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957

80% 67% 62% 59% 60% 57% 52% 49%

1958 49% 48% 1959 46% 1960 Comp. ann'l gr:

$219 $214 $215 $218 $224 $227 $222 $219

$273 $320 $349 $373 $377 $396 $427 $451

$273 $302 $322 $341 $343 $354 $368 $377

16% 14% 19% 21% 19% 17% 17% 17%

14% 16% 19% 19% 19% 17% 18% 18%

$226 $235 $237 0. 8%

$460 $490 $519 6.6%

$377 $398 $415 4.3%

18% 19% 18%

17% 16% 18%

Source: OM OMB, B, BEA.

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 April 27, 2012   Topics: Why financial markets are paying close close attention to how Congress addresses the lo long-term ng-term budget outlook Additional sources to consult on the long-term deficit outlook

  A January 2011 paper from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget , a group made up of former directors of the CBO, the OMB, the House and Senate Budget Committees and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors ”, a slide deck from David Walker, President of the   “The Financial Condition and Fiscal Outlook of the U.S. Government ”, Peter G Peterson Foundation and Former Comptroller General of the United States Fiscal and Generational Generational Imbalances: Who Will Will Pay and How?”   An IMF paper from April 2011, “ An Analysis of U.S. Fiscal

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  A speech by Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher in May 2008 entitled “ Storms on the Horizon”   Perhaps the most thorough piece of all, a 460-slide behemoth entitled “USA Inc”, distributed by venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers with an introduction from George Shultz, Paul Volcker, Michael Bloomberg, Richard Ravitch and John Doerr   “ Republicans Repeat Repeat Medicare Mistake of 1965 1965”, an editorial from Democratic Senator Bob Kerrey to the New York Times in 1995 on the government’s decision to not impose cost controls on Medicare, a policy error Kerrey dates back to 1965, when the American Medical Association insisted on “usual and customary fees” in exchange for their support   " Measuring Unfunded Unfunded Obligations of of European Countries Countries", Jagadeesh Gokhale, European Commission Economic Papers,  No. 297, December 2007; National National Center For Policy Analysis, Analysis, Policy Report No. 319, January 20 2009. 09.   “Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy”, Brad DeLong (Berkeley) and Larry Summers (Harvard), March 20, 2012

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OCO CBO BCA AMT FEMA BIS

Overseas Contingency Operations Congressional Budget Office Budget Control Act Alternative Minimum Tax Federal Emergency Management Agency Bank for International Settlements

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