Giachetti-United States Military Relations With Turkey

AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY


UNITED STATES MILITARY RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

by
David M. Giachetti, Lt Col, USAF


A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements


15 February 2008


Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; distribution unlimited.

DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

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Contents
Contents…………………………………………………………………………………...ii
Biography………………………………………………………………………………...iii
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….….1
U.S.-Turkish Relations Background……………….….……….………………………..…2
Internal Domestic Issues………………………….……………………………………......7
The Turkish Armed Forces……………………………..…………………………………14
The Kurdistan Workers Party……………………………………………………………..15
Iraq………………………………………………………………………………………...17
Cyprus……………………………………………………………………………………..19
Summary and Recommendations…..……….……………………………………….……21
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………27


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Biography
Lieutenant Colonel David M. Giachetti graduated from Saint Vincent College in Latrobe PA in 1986 where he earned a B.S. in Biology. He received his commission from Officer Training School in December 1986. After earning his navigator wings as a distinguished graduate, he was assigned to the 366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home AFB, ID where he graduated from F-111 initial training as a distinguished graduate. In June 1989, Lt Col Giachetti was assigned to the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, 494th Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom where he served as an F-111F weapons system officer (WSO), instructor and evaluator. He deployed to Taif, Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and flew missions in support of Operation Provide Comfort. He then transitioned to the F-15E Strike Eagle at RAF Lakenheath, 494th Fighter Squadron, and flew missions in support of Operation Northern Watch. In 1994 Lt Col Giachetti was assigned to the 4th Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB NC, where he was an Instructor WSO, academic instructor and flight commander in the 4th Training Squadron and the 334th Fighter Squadron. In June 1997, he was assigned to the 604 Air Support Operations Squadron, Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea, where he served as an Air Liaison Officer with the US Army’s 2nd Infantry Division. In July 1998 he attended the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico MCB, Virginia. Upon graduation he was assigned to Headquarters Air Combat Command, Directorate of Requirements where he served as the Chief of F-15E Operational Requirements. In Feb 2001 he moved to HQ USAF at the Pentagon as the Chief of Fighter Colonel Assignments and Deputy Chief of Colonel Assignments at the Air Force Senior Leadership

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Management Office. In Feb 2003 Lt Col Giachetti became the Executive Officer to the Commander of 16th Air Force, Aviano Air Base, Italy and served in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. He took Command of the 12th Operations Support Squadron in March 2006. In July 2007 he arrived at Maxwell AFB to attend Air War College.

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Introduction
The relationship between the United States and Turkey has been an enduring and at times tumultuous one wherein the United States has long considered Turkey a critical strategic ally. Many factors have influenced the nature of this sometime fragile relationship since the formation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 through his vision of a strong secular nationalist state. Turkey emerged from World War II as a critical geostrategic and geopolitical world player and soon held key importance as a NATO member and anchor of NATO’s strategic southern flank and a hedge against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Recently, Turkey has emerged as a vital partner in the war on terror and it continues to play an important role in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy vis-à-vis Russia and the Middle East. Although at times fraught with differences and difficulties, from its basing support for troop rotations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to Turkey’s geographical location straddling Europe and Asia and political position at the crossroads of Islam and democracy, this pivotal state is and will continue to be an ideal military and strategic political partner. In the continued development and nurturing of this strategic partnership, the makeup of the Turkish secularist government and the role of the Turkish military, in the form of the Turkish General Staff (TGS), and its influence on the political direction of the country, must be taken into consideration. The fervent defense of the secularist form of government in Turkey is the hallmark interest of the TGS and the Turkish National Security Council. The military-to-military association between the U.S. and Turkey is influenced more by politics than others because of the mantle of ownership that the TGS holds for the governmental ideals set forth by Atatürk.

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This relationship between the TGS and the Turkish civilian government is in contrast to the U.S. civil-military relationship so it must be viewed and analyzed in that context. The nexus of U.S. and Turkish national interests are key to the continued mutual benefits gained in what has become a delicate relationship. The bond that currently exists between the U.S. and Turkey cannot be sustained in isolation of the interests of each of the countries governments, a point sometimes overlooked by Washington. The key questions are not necessarily geographic, as they may have been viewed in the past, but how Turkey will act, and whether Turkish and American policies are convergent or divergent.1 This paper will explore the post Cold War Turkish domestic and regional issues affecting its current and long-term security relationship with the U.S. The issues addressed are intertwined and inextricable from one another. It will address issues concerning internal domestic politics, specifically the influence of the TGS and recent presidential and parliamentary elections. Also, regional security issues of interest to both countries will be considered including the PKK, Cyprus and Iraq. Turkey will remain central to U.S. security goals in the region and this paper will present recommended courses of action for realistic and successful bilateral security expectations. First, because of the complicated and complex nature of this strategic partnership, some background on the history of this relationship and some of the geopolitical factors that influenced it will be presented.

U.S.-Turkish Relations Background
Contemporary U.S. diplomatic and military relations with Turkey can be traced to the period after World War I when diplomatic relations with the newly established Republic of

1

Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics”, Survival, 48, no. 3 (2006): 83.

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Turkey began in the 1920’s. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded the modern Turkish state out of the rubble Ottoman Empire after its destruction and breakup following World War I. Atatürk’s vision for this new Turkey was one of a strictly secularist republic with a view toward the West. Turkish nationalism was at the heart of his dream. He is a figure of intense devotion and reverence in Turkey to this day and is considered the force that allowed modern Turkey to emerge and become the regional power in the world that it is today. Without his vision, ambition, and “boldness in sweeping away traditions accumulated over centuries, today’s Turkey would not exist”.2 There is a genuine reverence for and near worship of Atatürk in modern Turkey and to try to understand Turkey “without understanding Atatürk, would be like studying European history without considering Christianity”.3 As far back as 1912 while traveling abroad as an army officer, Atatürk remarked that “the Turkish nation has fallen far behind and the aim should be to lead it to modern civilization”4. The modern civilization he looked to was Europe. Bringing about this radical change to Turkish political organization and ultimately daily life required the adoption of a stringent secularism, called Kemalism, whereby the government maintained control over religious institutions and teachings while strictly limiting public displays of devoutness.5 He then turned his sights and efforts on all the other Islamic institutions in the country including the Caliphate itself followed by the Islamic courts, the Muslim calendar, Arabic script and all other public symbols of Muslim identity. These reforms, he felt, were absolutely necessary for Turkey to “join the civilized world”. The seriousness to which the Turks take their devotion to Atatürk is manifest not only in tradition but in law, Statute 5816,

Stephen Kizner, Crescent & Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 36. Ibid., 36. 4 Ibid., 38. 5 Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier?: Turkey and the West After the Cold War (Santa Monica: Rand/Arroyo Center, 1992), 32.
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established as a crime to “curse Atatürk’s memory,” punishable by up to three years in jail.6 The strong influential memory of Atatürk and his reforms for the country form the basis of Turkish secular political and diplomatic thought. Throughout the years it was inevitable that Atatürk’s reforms would be challenged at various times by differing interests, these consisted of those who believed that there should be a closer affiliation with Islam in Turkish society and a corrupt portion of the Turkish government. The military views itself as the keeper and guarantor of Atatürk’s reforms and in 1960 as many of the Kemalist reforms were being overturned in favor of the return of many of the previously banned public displays of Islam, and corruption raged nearly out of control within the government, the Turkish military staged a coup and overthrew the government installing a regime of young officers. Political and religious turmoil continued until September 1980 when the military staged another coup and dissolved all political parties. The undercurrent of an Islamist political movement was now firmly established. The military leaders held power for three years and in 1987 removed the ban on political leaders that were active before the coup. This Islamist undercurrent became an Islamist Refah or Welfare Party (RP) and led the coalition government from June 1996 until June 1997.7 Since 2002 the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has controlled a majority of seats in the Turkish parliament. Regardless of Turkey’s historical Muslim background and orientation, the reforms put in place by Atatürk that are highly prized and zealously guarded by the Turkish military set the foundation for the resumption of formal diplomatic relations with the U.S. in 1927. The pivotal point in bringing the U.S and Turkey together was the post World War II era and the Soviet Union’s demand for territorial concessions from Turkey. “It was the Soviet threat that literally
Stephen Kizner, Crescent & Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 49. Carol Migdalovitz, “Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy”, CRS Report for Congress RL31429 (Washington DC, May 2002), 4.
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moved Turkey into siding with the United States”.8 Turkey’s geographical position fit perfectly into Washington’s developing Cold War policy of containment. Turkey would serve as the strategic hedge to the Soviet Union and guardian of NATO’s southern flank. Turkey’s proximity to the Soviet Union and its historical connections with the Middle East were factored into the U.S. strategic objectives in the region. The burgeoning relationship between the two countries would produce geopolitical and strategic advantages for Turkey as well as the U.S. The U.S. began to finance the defense of Turkey in light of the Soviet threat, “encouraging and enabling the U.S. to commit to Turkey’s defense constituted a cornerstone of Turkey’s security outlook”.9 The establishment of a truly modern defensive strategic partnership between Washington and Ankara had begun. Turkey thus became a situational ally of the U.S., a country focused on the establishment of a Cold War containment policy aimed at the perfect geographically and geopolitically positioned partner. In 1947 the defensive alliance was solidified by the Truman Doctrine. This doctrine formalized the U.S. guarantee of the security of Greece and Turkey against the advance of communist ideology. From it would flow Marshall Aid and an increasing amount of military and economic support which to date has totaled, more that $12.5 billion in economic aid and $14 billion in military assistance.10 Turkey would fulfill its commitment as a strategic partner and also further its own political agenda of looking to the West, by joining the United Nations forces in Korea in 1950 and then formally joining NATO in 1952. In 1954 the U.S. and Turkey signed the Military Facilities Agreement, formalizing the opening of U.S bases in Turkey and providing

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, “Turkish-U.S. Political Relations”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/mfa (Accessed 12 Nov 2008). 9 Bill Park, “US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?”, Defense Security Analysis, 23, no. 1, (March 2007), 42. 10 U.S. State Department Website, “Background Note: Turkey”, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm (Accessed 12 Nov 2008).

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a Status of Forces Agreement for U.S. military personnel.11 Turkish facilities immediately became useful for the projection of U.S. and NATO military power into the Middle East and for verifying arms control agreements with Moscow.12 From the perspective of the U.S., Turkey from this point on would be considered the geographical and geopolitical bridge between the West and the Middle East. A view not necessarily shared by the Turkish government. The bilateral relationship between Ankara and Washington has encountered many strains and indeed been stormy at times. The differences between the U.S and Turkish positions on several regional matters are of note and can be lessons for the future. Not surprisingly these include, the long running Turkish dispute with the Kurds or more specifically the PKK, that directly influences its views on the outcome of the Iraqi state, and Turkey’s position on the governance of Cyprus. Throughout the years in response to the differing positions on these issues the U.S. has responded politically and militarily in the form of the “Johnson Letter” of 1964, the 1974 arms embargo because of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and at various times the closure of U.S. facilities. Ankara has repeatedly increased its rhetoric, restricted access to Incirlik Air Base and other facilities whenever there has been a difference of political objectives with the United States.13 Prior to and during the Cold War period the bilateral relationship at times was tested as the result of diverging national objectives. Not unexpectedly many of the strains were due to Turkish internal domestic politics as well as the diverging regional issues.

Alyin Guney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the U.S.-Turkish Alliance”. Turkish Studies, 6, no. 3 (Accessed 3 October 2007), 342. 12 Stephen F. Larrabee, “The Troubled Partnership: Turkey and Europe”, (RAND, Washington DC, 1998), 1. 13 Bill Park, “US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?”, Defense Security Analysis, 23, no. 1, (March 2007), 42.

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Internal Domestic Issues The dawn of the 1980’s witnessed the loosening of the grip of the Turkish military on civil society. The elections of 1983 brought to power the Motherland Party (ANAP), headed by Turgut Ozal, and the electoral defeat of the Nationalist Democracy Party that had been created by the Turkish generals.14 During their rule prior to 1983, the NDP government had put Ozal in charge of the economy as deputy prime minister. The economic stabilization measures put in place by Ozal would lead to a solidification of the trust of Turkey by the International Monetary Fund states. Ozal lived in the U.S. and his election and policies would internalize the connection to the United States. Ozal would be a force of personality to galvanize Turkish domestic political and economic forces to strengthen civilian control in the country from his days as prime minister through his presidency from 1989 until 1993. As the Cold War came to a close the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. would again undergo a major revision. U.S. global engagement priorities began to shift as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union and a declaration by President George H.W. Bush that “our enemy is uncertainty and instability.”15 In early 1990 the U.S. ended the grant and military aid program and reduced the overall military aid program to Turkey as well as Greece and turned it into a low interest loan program for the purchase of military equipment. The reason for the cut was articulated by a former member of congress, “we provide military assistance to countries only when there is a common military purpose.”16 The Ozal government and the Turkish population were resentful of this move, although this was a completely rational realist policy change by the U.S. It would not be long before Turkey would have a chance to reassert itself as a key ally of Washington.
14 15

Andrew Mango, The Turks Today (The Overlook Press, 2004), 84.
Aylin Guney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance”, (Turkish Studies, 2005), 344.
16 Ibid., 345.


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After a history of nonintervention in Middle Eastern disputes, Ozal would seize the opportunity to reassert Turkey’s importance in the region by his handling of the Turkish position of support for the U.S. and the coalition in the first Gulf War in 1991. Ozal’s main motivation besides demonstrating allegiance and strategic importance to the West was that he assumed that “great economic and diplomatic benefits would accrue to Turkey as a result”.17 Although this did not turn out to be the case, the early decision to support the U.S. and the United Nations coalition against Iraq would be the beginning of increasingly negative public and opposition party opinion of the United States. Despite this negative public opinion, Turkey’s assistance was critical in the coalitions successful removal of Saddam from Kuwait. The result was a strengthening of political and military ties with the U.S. and an increase in importance of Turkey in the regional strategic calculations of the United States. The successful end of the first Gulf War brought an increase in ties between the U.S. and Turkish government and military. As Turkey faced a potential disastrous flow of refugees from northern Iraq, an international force set up a safe haven in northern Iraq for the protection and humanitarian relief of the Iraqi Kurds. In July of 1991 coalition air forces, led by the U.S. established a no-fly zone in northern Iraq south to the 36th parallel. This coalition was based at Incirlik Air Base and the air operation was subject to approval by the Turkish parliament at sixmonth intervals. Ozal was now balancing the relief operation in northern Iraq with the official Turkish position that Iraq should remain a sovereign state. The Turkish concern was and still is that the Iraqi Kurds would establish an independent Kurdistan, and this safe haven could allow them just that opportunity. The power vacuum allowed the PKK to establish bases in this area and attack targets in Turkey, all the while “protected” by the coalition forces in the area.18

17 18

Philip Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, (University of Washington Press, 2003), 59.
William Hale, Turkey, the US and Iraq, (London, 2007), 51.


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The political dilemma this situation presented Ozal was a difficult one and at times would strain relations with the U.S. The mutual security interests between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey were undeniable. The security zone provided a buffer for Turkey against Saddam Hussein and the Kurds who depended upon Turkey and the OPC coalition for protection and relief supplies. Turkey also needed information to prevent the establishment of PKK bases in the area. Ozal would establish a working relationship with the Kurdish leaders during this period to facilitate the battle against the PKK. In an attempt to soften the economic impact of the war on the Turkish economy due to the closure of the oil pipeline, the loss of cross-boarder trade revenue and the cost of mobilizing the army, the U.S. increased the amount of security assistance, trade benefits and military aid.19 Turkey for its part worked to soften its stance on the issue of Cyprus and proposed several conferences to help resolve the issue. Turkey’s importance as a regional player had grown considerably as a result of the cooperation shown to the U.S. and the coalition. Turkish internal politics would intervene to change the direction of Turkish foreign policy with the rise to power of Prime Minister Erbakan in 1996. Erbakan came to power on a radical anti-Western Islamic platform that included a threat to withdraw Turkey completely from NATO and end military ties with Israel and forbid use of Turkish bases to support the Kurds. Once in power to the relief of the U.S. he did not implement any of these radical ideas. At the time State Minister Abdullah Gul admitted “in Turkey sometimes politicians exaggerate, not just Erbakan”.20 Although he did not bring his Islamist views visibly to his government, some of his actions were alarming. His first foreign visit was to a staunch adversary of the U.S., Iran, where a natural gas deal was struck and he made some denouncements to U.S policy vis-à-vis Israel.

19 20

Yasemin Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, (Praeger, 1999), 78
Ibid., 83.


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Washington was concerned about the course of Turkish foreign policy. Concerns also continued in Turkey about the status of relations with Iraq. The Erbakan government was eager to normalize relations with Iraq for Turkish economic reasons, while the U.S. continued to desire the enforcement of economic sanctions. The potential for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region also continued to be a thorn in the Turkish governments side. Internally, although Erbakan had Islamist leanings his opposition party and the Turkish military kept him from straying from Turkey’s secularist principles. In a communiqué in February, 1997 the National Security Council issued a public warning that, “no steps away from the contemporary values of the Turkish Republic would be tolerated,” and that “secularism is not only a for of government but a way of life and the guarantee of democracy and social peace.”21 This change in direction of the Turkish government again made the U.S. skeptical of the intentions of Ankara relative to their relationship with the Western world and the world of Islam. Some in Washington would speculate on the reliability of Turkey as a regional ally given the fact that the government’s foreign policy or at least its rhetoric could change so dramatically with the rise of the Islamists. There would be some truth to this fear and the strains over regional strategic differences would play out very publicly in 2003. During Erbakan’s RP party’s rule however, the rhetoric would be harsh but the actions to back it up would not follow. Turkey, even during major domestic political transformation, with internal pressure from the TNSC, would maintain a moderate westward leaning foreign policy. In March of 1999, President Clinton spoke to the Turkish Parliament in Ankara and formally announced the existence of a “strategic partnership” between the U.S. and Turkey.22 An obvious signal from Washington that Turkey still held high importance in terms of U.S.

21 22

Ibid., 86.
Eugene R. Belmain, “The Asian European Bridge”, (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004), 16.


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strategic objectives in the region and that the U.S. shared common broad political and military goals in the region with Turkey. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, could be considered the latest high water mark in the military and political relationship between the two countries. Immediately following the attacks Ankara quickly expressed its solidarity with the American people and Turkey signaled clearly that it would stand with Washington in the fight against global terrorism.23 The bilateral relationship between the governments and the militaries of the U.S. and Turkey was seen by both as strong. Washington was pleased with the cooperation and participation of Turkey in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The senior Turkish military leaders encouraged participation by the Turkish armed forces in active UN missions as well as leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Positive indications in the relationship included the election to the head of the Turkish General Staff of General Hilmi Ozkok who had studied at the US Army War College and the NATO Defense College.24 This was viewed as an opportunity for the U.S. military to strengthen its ties with the TGS. The parliamentary election of 2002 would bring to majority power for the first time the AKP party which although Islamist, was seemingly pro-Western. All signs pointed to renewed strong ties with converging regional interests between the two countries. At the time senior U.S. policy makers felt comfortable that they “understood their Turkish political and military counterparts interests and intentions”.25 Internally, Turkey would continue to struggle with its deep-rooted secular ideology and its overwhelmingly Islamic population. The rise to power of the AKP party in parliament and

Steven A. Cook, “Generating Momentum for a New Era in US-Turkish Relations”, (CFR No. 15, 2006), 7. NATO Website, Biographies, http://www.nato.int/cv/chod/tu/ozkok.htm (Accessed 26 November 2007). 25 Mark Parris, “Turkey’s Future Direction and US-Turkey Relations”. Statement before the House International Affairs Committee. (October 2001).
24

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then in the election of the president, Abdullah Gul, would once again pit the TGS against the civilian government. Although a moderate Islamist committed to a secular government as called for in the countries constitution, a serious crisis would develop between his government and the Turkish generals. Seemingly resolved, the relationship between the civilian government and the TGS is historically rocky and could again become a source of internal friction with which the government must deal. At an Islamic foreign minister’s conference 2003 and while still Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul outlined his vision for the Middle East region. He argued that the Muslin world “needed to determine the issues and shortcomings that continue to hamper our progress”, and that it needed to get its own house in order.26 He further asserted that “Turkey is living proof that a Muslin society can be governed in a democratic, accountable and transparent manner in accordance with European norms.”27 As president, with his AKP party in power, these pronouncements bode seemingly well for the future relationship of Turkey with the West. His current positions work to tamp down some of the anxiety of the EU and the U.S. at the prospect of the Islamists coming to power in Turkey. In the 2003 run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom the same senior U.S. policy makers would be stunned by the Turkish Parliament voting not to allow the U.S. to use Turkey as a launching point for a northern front for the Iraqi war. In retrospect the U.S. could have anticipated this outcome. Turkish opinion polls were overwhelmingly, near 95%, against U.S. action and Turkish assistance. The AKP party was new to power and had yet to find its political footing, the Turkish political elite viewed the U.S. invasion plans with distaste.28 The unpopularity of the decision to be made was an opportunity for the TGS to allow the AKP government to “lose face”
26 27

Bill Park, “US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?”, Turkish Studies, (2007), 44.
Ibid., 44.
28 Eugene R. Belmain, “The Asian European Bridge”, (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004), 44.


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with the local population for helping the U.S. or cross Washington for not offering support. The U.S. government would take a hard line in the negotiations and this would be viewed as an inappropriate tactic by the AKP government and the Turkish population. Both sides would miscalculate the others intentions. The AKP party, viewing Turkey as indispensable to the U.S. invasion plan, felt they could hold out for more aid and assistance. The U.S. government believed, incorrectly, that the Turkish Parliament would ultimately allow Turkey, despite overwhelming negative public opinion, to be used for a northern front. In this case the U.S failed to properly analyze Turkish national security interests in the region, and internal politics, believing that Turkey would fulfill its obligations as long time U.S. regional ally. The actions of both governments would damage U.S.-Turkish relations significantly. As the Turkish government looks ahead to expand its regional and international influence, the admittance of Turkey to the European Union is at the top of the agenda. The issues of Turkey’s accession to the EU are considerable as are the benefits to both Turkey and the EU. The major stumbling blocks include the Cyprus issue, internal human rights issues, the further subjugation of the Turkish military to the civilian government and the current state of the Turkish economy. The U.S. government supports Turkey’s admission to the EU, but the affect it will have on the bilateral US-Turkish relationship is the biggest unknown. The Turks are far less enthusiastic about the EU than several years ago. Offense is taken by the continued threats from the EU concerning the Turks recognition of Armenian genocide, concessions concerning the Cypriots and the demand to improve the civilian control of the military.29 Considering the uncertainty that Turkey’s accession faces, it seems that the strategic bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Turkey will continue to deepen even taking into

Carol Migdalovitz, “Turkey’s 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power”, CRS Report for Congress, (CRS, June 2007), 11.

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account the strains that the relationship now endures. The current value of the Turkish relationship to Washington stems from the use of Incirlik Air Base as a transit hub for the supply of U.S. forces in Iraq, Turkey’s support for ISAF and their continued support of ongoing UN peacekeeping missions. The Turkish Armed Forces Since the inception of Kemalism in Turkey the Turkish military, has considered itself the keeper of Turkish democracy and the military has always had a close relationship with politics in Turkey. For example six out of Turkey’s first seven heads of state were retired senior military officers, spanning the period from 1923 to 1989.30 The avenue for military influence in governmental affairs is through the National Security Council (NSC) whose charter is to submit its views on “the formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the state”.31 The influence of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) is most dominantly felt in the policy concerning the Kurdish insurgency in eastern Turkey. They also lead the effort to monitor anti-secular activities in the country. Even with the Ozal era of the ‘civilianization’ of Turkish politics the military still used various political methods to influence policy-making. The Turkish Armed Forces influence comes from its position on the NSC, and the emphasis of the possibility that if the armed forces were dissatisfied with the direction the country was headed, they would not hesitate to stage another intervention.32 It was the power of the Turkish military that prompted Erbakan to tone down his anti-Western rhetoric.33 The Turkish military are the guarantors of Turkey’s western

30 31

Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms, (Seattle, 2003), 75.
Ibid., 76.
32 Ibid., 21.
33 Yasemin Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, (Paeger, London, 1999), 93.


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oriented foreign policy as much as the country’s internal secular stance and Erkaban ultimately yielded to the pressure from the military and resigned.34 This unique political-military relationship both keeps Turkish domestic and foreign policy from straying into any radicalism on either end of the political spectrum. It is also inherently opposite to the U.S. dictum of civilian control of the military. The ebb and flow of the power and influence of this shadow government makes policy arrangements with Turkey difficult to negotiate at best from a strictly civilian point of view. The pressure that the Turkish military establishment is able to bring upon the political institutions and the political status of the chief of staff of the Turkish military, who ranks only behind the prime minister, are issues that can and do affect U.S.-Turkish relations. Public opinion notwithstanding, the TGS was the main driver in the Turkish governments position in the run up to the Iraq war in 2003. The Turkish military did not offer it’s full support to the U.S. in an attempt to broker a better deal from the U.S. than was being offered. The TGS had determined that the Turkish military bases would be indispensable to the U.S. for a successful operation and they were not pleased with the restrictions placed upon the Turkish military if they participated. The U.S. believed that the Turks wanted into northern Iraq to destroy the possibility of a Kurdish state.35 This fundamental mistrust and misunderstanding of each others intentions would ultimately severely damage U.S. and Turkish military relations. Beyond these pockets of misunderstanding and distrust, some of which can be blamed on cultural differences, the interests of the TGS and the U.S. government are still largely convergent. Above all else the TGS is the protector of the secular state. Their methods of enforcement of the Turkish constitution have in the past been strong handed in the eyes of the

34 35

Ibid,. 93.
Michael M. Gunter, “The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarry”, World Affairs, 167, no. 3 (Winter 2005), 118.


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U.S. and EU but the interest that benefits both in the political arena is that Turkey remain a secular constitutional democracy. The status of northern Iraq and the PKK is less clear.

The Kurdistan Workers Party The increased negative internal pressure on Ozal and subsequent Turkish leadership would, as expected, directly impact Ankara’s dealings with Washington, especially concerning the Middle East in the years to come. The first Iraq war would also directly highlight the issue of the Kurds and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and turn it into an enduring Turkish domestic and foreign policy time bomb. The issue of the PKK would increasingly come to the fore in the 1980’s as the Kurdish insurgency grew. The domestic political dilemma of the Kurds grew into a foreign policy crisis as the PKK set up bases in northern Iraq from which to strike into Turkey. The U.S. military continued to use Incirlik Air Base to support Operation Northern Watch, previously called OPC, now protecting Iraq’s northern Kurdish population from the regime of Saddam Hussein more than providing humanitarian relief. Simultaneously, while enduring great political risk, the Turkish government took in nearly 500,000 Kurdish refugees. With some acknowledged irony, at the same time the U.S. and Turkey were cooperating to protect the Iraqi Kurds, the Turkish government launched another round of attacks against the PKK in southeastern Turkey bordering Iraq. The U.S. would assist Turkey in this endeavor by offering intelligence and assisting in the capture of the leader of the PKK Abdallah Ocalan in 1999. Turkish fears of an independent Kurdistan and a safe haven for the PKK have only been heightened since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. These fears are based upon the potential for an ethnically divided Iraq as the final political outcome of the current war.

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Concerns that are not unfounded as Bill Park notes, “The Kurdish aspirations that Iraq should be organized as an ethnically-based federation dates back at least to the Kurdish Regional Government’s establishment in 1992”.36 This vision has oil-rich Kirkuk as the regional capital and the Kurds having their own military, an outcome completely unacceptable to the Turks. The concerns of the Turkish government put Washington in a precarious position between two allies with regard to the one stable region of Iraq, essentially governed by the Kurds and the Kurdish Regional Government and the overall outcome of the governance of the country of Iraq. The Turkish government in this case is fearful and suspicious that the U.S. will side with the Kurds to solidify the stability of northern Iraq. On October 22, 2007 approximately two hundred PKK operatives crossed Turkey's border from northern Iraq and killed twelve Turkish soldiers. Even more concerning, according to Turkish military sources, the PKK's membership has increased from 3,000 to more than 7,000 since 2003. Thus, the issue of a safe haven for these militants is in the forefront of Turkish-Kurdish relations.37 This view only increases internal public pressure, which is weighed heavily against the U.S position, on the TGS and the government to break with the U.S. position and act unilaterally against the PKK in the region to prevent the establishment of a safe haven. The worry extends to internal Kurdish nationalism being enflamed. The PKK issue may be the biggest and most immediate challenge facing Turkish politics today--perhaps as severe as it was in the early 1990s.38 The establishment of a centrally controlled Iraqi state is the most urgent cross-cutting issue that must be addressed between Washington and Ankara. Steven A. Cook from the Council on Foreign Relations believes “it can be considered the most

Bill Park, “US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?”, Turkish Studies, (2007), 47. Soner Cagaptay, “The PKK Redux: Implications of a Growing Threat”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1305, (13 Nov 2007), http://washingtoninstitute.org (Accessed 17 November 2007). 38 Ibid
37

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important foreign and domestic policy challenge on the Turkish agenda”.39 The potential is for a major direct confrontation between the Turkish and U.S military in northern Iraq, or a move by the Turkish government to improve relations with Iran with whom they share the Kurdish problem, both of which would have disastrous consequences for U.S.-Turkish relations. The strains in the strategic partnership are apparent and continue today as national interests diverge on these key issues. IRAQ The low-water mark in U.S.-Turkish relations can be traced to the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003. The failure of the Turkish parliament to vote to allow the U.S. military to use Turkey for transit of ground troops and basing of combat aircraft left the relationship in tatters. Many Turkish domestic and international concerns drove this decision. The Turkish public saw OIF as an attack against a fellow Muslin state and public opinion was overwhelmingly, nearly 95%, against Turkish involvement and cooperation with the U.S. in the operation. Also, Turkish nationalists feared that once the regime of Saddam fell that Iraq would be split into separate ethnic communities with an independent Kurdish state on its border, fueling internal Kurdish dissatisfaction and nationalism. Ankara’s has mistrust of U.S. policies toward Kurdish self-determination and frustration at their strategic dependence on an ally that seems indifferent to Turkey’s most profound strategic sensitivities,40 are the basis for what some view as a deteriorating relationship. Washington has pushed Turkey into the arms Syria and Iran, two countries that see eye to eye with respect to the Kurds and their independence but are visceral rivals of the U.S and its policies in the region.
Steven A. Cook, “Generating Momentum for a new Era in U.S.-Turkish Relations”, CSR No. 15, Council on Foreign Relations (June 2006). 25. 40 Bill Park, “US-Turkish Relations: Can the Future Resemble the Past?”, Turkish Studies, (2007), 44.
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In the Pentagon the frustration with Turkey resulted in a sharp drop of official military contacts and impatience with the attention that furtherance of the relationship required.41 The military relationship between the two countries has yet to fully recover from this issue. Regardless, the U.S. military continues to rely on the use of Incirlik Air Base as a critical transportation hub in support of its Iraqi operations. Fully 60% of all air cargo destined for U.S. forces in Iraq passes through Incirlik. Further, the Habur Gate at the Turkish-Iraq border, 25% of fuel used by coalition forces and 29% of the fuel and 19% of food and water used by Iraqi consumers enters the country.42 The Turkish government also continues to provide over-flight clearance for missions supporting Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. This is a quietly executed yet critical contribution of the Turkish government to the continuing U.S. operations. Cyprus Since the Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus in response to a Greek initiated coup d’etat in 1963, the differences between the two countries over the sovereignty of Cyprus has become an international issue and one that is blocking Turkey’s most prized political and economic goal, entry into the EU. In the intervening decades enormous diplomatic efforts from the world community have focused on the reunification of Cyprus. The initial U.S. response to the crisis on the island would have a lasting impact on U.S.­ Turkish relations. In an attempt to deter attacks on the Turkish Cypriot minority by the Greek majority following an attempt at a consolidation of power by the Greek led government, Ankara turned to threatening action by staging air power demonstrations. Although an invasion was unlikely, a letter sent from President Johnson to the Turkish Prime Minister in June 1964 aimed

41 42

Ibid., 9.
Congressional Research Service, Memorandum Concerning US-Turkish Relations, (March 2007).


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to deter any possible thoughts of intervention.43 Essentially warning Turkey that any military intervention could upset the balance of power and that neither the U.S. nor NATO should be counted on for help in the event of Soviet involvement. The letter dubbed the “Johnson Letter,” would have a lasting impact on U.S-Turkish relations. The Turks view of the letter was a lack of concern and dismissal of the “Turkish view” of the situation. After the letter was leaked to the press, it provoked a widespread anti-American backlash in Turkey. The Turkish governments long term response would be a shift in foreign policy to a more multidimensional view including an attempt at garnering international support for Cyprus, and most alarmingly closer relations with Moscow.44 The U.S. punitive action would escalate to an arms embargo from 1975-1978 following the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. The arms embargo would further shake Turkish confidence about the reliability of the U.S. as an ally. The Johnson Letter and the arms embargo are still in the fore of the Turkish political and literal mind and can be considered at the root of the mistrust that continues to this day in the relationship between the U.S and Turkey. The Turkish view of the situation was one of the advancement of its vital interests while its Western ally withheld decisive support.45 Although the crisis concerning Cyprus has stabilized into a situation that is essentially a standoff between the Greeks and the Turks, it cannot be seen in isolation and must be factored not only into Turkey’s potential entry into the EU but also its dealings with the U.S. Although not a Copenhagen criterion for EU entry, the EU wants a settlement on the island of Cyprus.46 In 2002 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a plan for the reunification of Cyprus. The
Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms, (Seattle, 2003), 131. Ibid., 131. 45 Morton Abramowitz, “Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy”, (New York, The Century Foundation Press, 2000), 14. 46 Carol Migdalovitz, “Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy”, Report for Congress, (CRS, May 2002), 14.
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plan called for the establishment of a federation of two constituent states on Cyprus, territorial adjustment and population relocation, all to the benefit of the Greek Cypriot side.47 Although the Turkish government was seen as the obstacle to a settlement, the plan was defeated by the Greek Cypriots in a 2004 referendum vote. After what Turkey considered responsible negotiation by the Turkish Cypriots in the run up to the vote, a further stumbling block was put in place by the international recognition and EU membership of the government of Cyprus. This set of circumstances leaves little leverage for the Turks in the negotiations for a permanent settlement. Since the continued division of Cyprus is an obvious obstacle to Turkish accession to the EU, it has become an area of mutual interest to the U.S. and Turkey. The U.S. has the opportunity to play a major role in the negotiations and recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). As Dr. Soner Cagaptay, Director of Turkish Research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, testified before Congress, “Washington, Ankara, Turkish Cypriots and the EU are all on the same page regarding Cyprus”. If the U.S. helped to ease the sanctions on northern Cyprus it would “clear a major hurdle of Turkey’s EU accession but also improve its image in Turkey”.48 Clearly, with the current rampant anti-Americanism that grips Turkish civil society, this step forward, on the side of the Turks concerning the Cyprus issue would go a long way toward repairing U.S.-Turkish relations the minds of the Turkish public.

Annan Plan, The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, (31 March 2004),http://www.hri.org/docs/annan (Accessed 29 Nov 2007). 48 Soner Cagapty, The State of US-Turkish Relations, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st sess., 2005, 19.

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Summary and Recommendations
One glance at the map demonstrates why it is so important to strengthen the ties between our two countries. Turkey is influential in the Balkans, in the Black Sea, the Caucasus and in the greater Middle East. In this vitally important arc of countries where so much of our foreign policy attention now lies. Turkey is the vital link for the United States and our European allies in addressing common economic, security and political challenges and opportunities in these critical regions.49 - R. Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary for Political Affairs

The U.S. and Turkey have a long, sometimes, volatile strategic relationship that continues today and will continue in the years to come. The converging regional and political interests in light of the issues addressed here continue to keep this relationship moving forward. Fault for the sometimes strained relationship cannot be attributed to one side alone. Much misunderstanding between the two cultures exists today. On the Turkish side there has always been a paranoia of sorts about an assault on “Turkishness” as it applies to Turkish culture and the secular state. Issues that the U.S. may consider trivial, are seen as slights or deliberate snubs by the U.S. of the Turkish military and especially Turkish society in general. As a unique secularMuslim society situated in an extremely volatile region of the world, some paranoia about the protection of Turkish national interests may be justified. On the U.S. side there has been an assumption since the end of World War II that Turkey would always fall in on the side of U.S. geostrategic interests without regard to Turkish regional and domestic interests. The U.S. is increasingly viewed by the Turks as an overbearing ally that at times resorts to bullying tactics to further its own interests. The 2003 negotiations in the run up to the Iraq war were especially detrimental in this regard. Some considered the aid package offered by the U.S. as nothing more than bribery. Washington must consider the importance of Turkey as a strategic ally for the future. The framework of the Cold War provided a mutually beneficially foundation and necessity for
R. Nicholas Burns, The Future of the US-Turkish Relationship, Remarks at the Atlantic Council of the US, (September 2007), http://www.state.gov (Accessed 28 Nov 2007).
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the relationship in the past. The critical assessment that must be made is what the future holds in terms of mutual regional strategic interests. The key to the future is ‘mutual’ interest. Without this basis for cooperation the relationship will drift. Interest in the Turkish perspective and action by the U.S. government and military can combine to improve and strengthen this critical regional association. As stated at the outset, the issues that link the U.S. and Turkey in the current environment cannot be dealt with in isolation but there are many issues of mutual interest that the U.S. and Turkey can concentrate on to solidify the relationship. The most important in the current context is cooperation on the way ahead for engagement with the PKK and northern Iraq. Turkey sees the battle against the PKK as a sine qua non of U.S.-Turkish cooperation in Iraq.50 A stabilized northern Iraq is in the national interest of Turkey and the U.S. in terms of border security and stopping the incursions of the PKK and the overall stabilization of Iraq. Currently the most stable region in Iraq, the U.S. cannot afford for this delicate balance to be upset. The recent agreement with the Bush administration for intelligence sharing with the TAF in their battle against the PKK is a positive first step in military to military cooperation. The U.S. government has formally declared the PKK a terrorist organization and expressed its commitment in assisting Turkey combat the PKK. This is an important and visible stage in setting the conditions for the defeat of the PKK, but the Turkish government and especially the Turkish public will be looking for substantial actions in this all-important effort. Another significant step would be to increase the individual level military to military contact between the U.S. and Turkey. The positive military relationship has always been the basic building block for a flourishing international relationship. An increase in joint military exercises and officer

Soner Cagaptay, Turkey’s Future Direction and US-Turkey Relations, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, (October 2003).

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exchanges is especially important in the current environment to facilitate understanding of the operational setting faced by each country’s military with respect to Iraq. This ‘tactical’ level engagement allows an accurate understanding not only of current operations but future intentions as well. This type of personal confidence building cannot be accomplished at the governmentto-government level. The formation of a close military relationship is critical in the long term regional access and freedom of action for the furtherance of U.S. strategic objectives in the region. Ankara for its part must be willing to accept its role as a power projection partner as it attempts to counter Turkey’s and the U.S.’s regional challenges. Military assistance has always been a key aspect of U.S.-Turkish relations and further defense industry related engagement can also a key opportunity to foster cooperation. The TGS has long valued compatibility and interoperability with the U.S.51 The Turkish military modernization program is an area of cooperation with the potential for an even bigger increase of Foreign Military Sales. The Turkish military is improving its U.S. and NATO long-term compatibility issues with the upgrade of its F-16 fleet, its partnership in the Joint Strike Fighter program, the Patriot missile system and the purchase of Black Hawk helicopters. Defense economic cooperation is just one aspect of strengthening the economic ties of the U.S and Turkey. Strong sustained economic growth is creating conditions for greater bilateral economic exchange and therefore regional cooperation.52 A major failure of U.S. policy is allowing the perpetuation of the perception that the U.S. continues to ‘use’ Turkey to further its foreign policy agenda at the expense of Turkish national interests. Ian Lesser argues that “public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign policymaking

Daniel Fata, Testimony for Europe and NATO, US House of Representatives, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, (March 2007). 52 Turkey-US Economic Partnership Commission Action Plan, (May 2007), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/cba/, (Accessed 28 Nov 2007).

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and that Turkish public opinion has turned decidedly anti-American in recent years”.53 With the election of the Islamist AKP party and its president Abdullah Gul, the Turkish government must deal in more concrete terms with the majority Muslim Turkish population. Since the end of the Cold War Ankara has seen less of a need for reliance on Washington and in several cases has turned to its regional neighbors including Syria and Iran to deal with vital national interests to Turkey in its strategic neighborhood. Without continued close engagement by the U.S. on all levels and a concern for Turkeys local and regional strategic goals, the relationship will suffer continued strains. The Turkish government as well as the TGS has shown their willingness to turn away from the U.S. strategic interests in favor of their own as the perception of their need for U.S. support and agreement on every issue dwindles. Bilateral U.S. policy issues that consider and in some cases favor the Turkish position is one way to assist in turning around Turkish public opinion and the pressure it places on the government. A specific overlapping very publicly visible policy interest is the Turk and U.S dealings with the PKK and northern Iraq. It is certainly in the national interests of both the U.S. and Turkey to have a stable unified Iraq. The disconnect between the two governments is the perception by the Turks that the U.S. is trying to set up a separate Kurdish state in northern Iraq and a perception by the U.S. that Turkey is using the PKK issue to act as a spoiler for stability in Iraq. The group that is acting to stabilize at least one region in Iraq for the U.S. efforts, the Kurds, is the same group that the Turks fear will cause instability in its eastern region. As complicated as this issue is the U.S. could go a long way toward improving Turkish trust on the issue by a more transparent working relationship on this problem. Washington should increase Turkish participation in the development of longterm regional policies with regard to Turkish border issues, specifically dealing with the PKK, and concerns with respect to the overall stability of Iraq, as well as an economic cooperation plan
53

Ian O. Lesser, “Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics”, Survival, 48 no., 3, (October 2006), 85.

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between Turkey and northern Iraq. Although the U.S. government has reinforced its view of the PKK as a terrorist organization and has recently increased intelligence sharing, military-to­ military contacts, liaison officers and even joint operations against the PKK with the Turkish military in the Kurdish region would allow operational mission transparency and would reduce misunderstandings of regional military and political policy. One possibility for military cooperation would be the pursuit and elimination of the PKK leadership, similar to the cooperation to capture and detain Abdullah Ocalan in 1998. Another area where the U.S can continue and increase support and overt action is the issue of Turkish admittance to the EU. Again, another problem that cannot be view in isolation, the key aspect for U.S concentration should be resolving the Cyprus issue, since it appears to be the biggest stumbling block to Turkish accession to the EU. As R. Nicholas Burns has remarked “The time has come for the United Nations and all of us to achieve a just solution to the longfestering problem of Cyprus”.54 U.S. influence in the UN, easing of economic sanctions as well as possible direct U.S. led talks between the Turkish and Greek leadership will again go a long way toward repairing Turkish anti-American attitudes while viewing Washington’s interests in line with Turkish interests on this issue. Turkey’s domestic political issues, as they affect Turkish foreign policy, must also be addressed by Washington. With the rise of the AKP government there was and possibly still is a tendency for the U.S. to expect Turkey to begin to lean more to its Muslim roots and regional Muslim neighbors. So far though this does not seem to be the case. The Kemalist secularism is deeply rooted in the Turkish psyche and of course monitored by the TAF. Prime Minister Erdogan has recently commented that “the Turkish nation is aware of the fact that the two

R. Nicholas Burns, “The Future of US-Turkey Relationship”, Remarks at the Atlantic Council of the United States, (September 2007).

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countries need each other today and tomorrow”.55 This acknowledgement as well as recent meetings between the Turkish President Abdullah Gul and President Bush bode well for the governmental relationship. The U.S. for its side must embrace the Islamist government of Turkey for what it is, that is a democratically elected secular parliamentary representative democratic republic that places its interests first just as the U.S does. As the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey has moved away from the mutual defense commonality of the Cold War, the question of the strategic relevance of the two countries to each other must be answered. Based upon the myriad of regional issues, only a few of which have been discussed here, the resounding answer to the question yes, the U.S. and Turkey are still strategically important and relevant to each other in terms of their individual national security interests. In the simplest of terms, Turkey’s geographical and geopolitical position in a historically volatile region and the U.S.’s economic and military might in a region of vital national interests, will necessitate U.S.-Turkish “strategic partnership” for many years to come.

Soner Cagaptay, Turkey’s Future Direction and US-Turkey Relations, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, (October 2003).

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