Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919)
Content
249 U.S. 479
39 S.Ct. 332
63 L.Ed. 717
HOUSTON et al.
v.
ST. LOUIS INDEPENDENT PACKING CO.
No. 264.
Argued March 20, 1919.
Decided April 14, 1919.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for appellants.
Mr. Alexander F. Reichmann, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
The Secretary of Agriculture, assuming to exercise authority under the Meat
Inspection Act, approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 669, 676, 678, c. 3913),
promulgated a regulation, effective April 1, 1913, in part as follows, viz.:
2
'Washington, D. C., Feb. 28, 1913.
3
'For the purpose of preventing the use in interstate or foreign commerce of meat
or meat food products under any false or deceptive name, under the authority
conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture by the provisions of the act of
Congress, approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 674), regulation 18 is hereby
amended by the addition of sections 15 and 16, to read as hereinafter set out.
4
'James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture.
5
'(Section 16, paragraph 1.) Sausage shall not contain cereal in excess of two per
cent.; when cereal is added its presence shall be stated on the label or on the
product.
6
'(Paragraph 2.) Water or ice shall not be added to sausage, except for the
purpose of facilitating grinding, chopping and mixing, in which case the added
water or ice shall not exceed three per cent., except as provided in the following
paragraph.'
7
Immediately after the effective date of this regulation the appellee, an extensive
manufacturer of sausage correctly interpreting it as prohibiting the marking,
stamping or labeling as 'sausage' any compound of chopped or minced meats
containing cereal in excess of 2 per cent. and water or ice in excess of 3 per
cent. (except as otherwise provided), filed the bill in this case in the District
Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Eastern District of
Missouri, averring that 'sausage' made by it with cereal and water in excess of
the requirements of the regulation was wholesome and fit for human food and
that the effect of the order would be to exclude its product from interstate
commerce, to its great and irreparable damage. The prayer was that the
defendants, the Secretary of Agriculture and the officers subordinate to him, be
enjoined from refusing to mark as 'Inspected and passed' all 'sausage'
manufactured by the petitioner found to be sound, healthful, and wholesome,
and which contained no dyes, chemicals, preservatives or ingredients which
would render such 'sausage' unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food;
that they be required by mandatory injunction to mark such 'sausage' as
'Inspected and passed,' and that the regulation be declared to be unauthorized by
law, null and void.
8
The District Court denied the application, on the bill, for an injunction (St.
Louis Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 204 Fed. 120), but on appeal that
holding was reversed and the case was remanded by the Circuit Court of
Appeals (St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 215 Fed. 553, 132 C.
C. A. 65).
9
The Secretary of Agriculture then answered admitting that it was the purpose of
the Department to refuse, and that it had refused, to mark as 'Inspected and
passed' as 'sausage' the product of the appellee unless manufactured in
compliance with the regulations complained of, and, as warrant therefor, he
quoted in his answer from the act of Congress the following:
10
'No such meat or meat food products shall be sold or offered for sale by any
person, firm, or corporation in interstate or foreign commerce under any false
or deceptive name; but established trade-name or names which are usual to
such products and which are not false and deceptive and which shall be
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture are permitted, and that said Secretary
of Agriculture shall, from time to time make such rules and regulations as are
necessary for the effecient execution of the provisions of this act, and all
inspections and examinations made under this act shall be such and made in
such manner as described in the rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Agriculture not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.'
Answering the allegation of the bill that the appellee's trade in 'sausage' would
be ruined by the enforcement of the regulation, the Secretary of Agriculture
averred that the appellee manufactured and sold large quantities of sausage
which did not contain any cereal or added water, and added:
11
'That the manufacture and sale of a product as sausage which product contains
added cereal and water in quantities as described in plaintiff's bill, or in any
quantities in excess of the amount designated in said regulation, effective April
1, 1913, is false and deceptive; that the ordinary consumer of sausage
manufactured by the plaintiff has no knowledge or information that sausage
contains cereal and added water, that such information is not conveyed to
persons who purchase plaintiff's sausage at retail by any method of marking or
branding now or heretofore in use by plaintiff, and that it is impracticable and
impossible in the ordinary course of manufacture and distribution of sausage to
mark or brand the same so that the purchaser at retail or the consumer will be
informed as to the amount of cereal and water added thereto.'
12
An elaborate trial on the merits resulted in the dismissal of the bill by the
District Court (231 Fed. 779), but this judgment was reversed by a divided
Circuit Court of Appeals (242 Fed. 337, 155 C. C. A. 113) and the case was
remanded with directions to award the appellee injunctions substantially as
prayed for. The case is here for review on appeal.
13
The claim made by the government in the lower courts that the compound of
meats, cereal and water, which the appellee claimed the right to sell as 'sausage'
was unwholesome is abandoned in this court and the only question argued and
submitted is whether it was within the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to
prohibit the use of the word 'sausage' as false and deceptive, within the meaning
of the act, when applied to the appellee's product.
14
The foregoing statement shows that the question for decision in this court is:
Whether, in promulgating the regulation assailed, the Secretary of Agriculture
acted arbitrarily and in excess of the authority given him by the act of
Congress, to make, from time to time, such rules and regulations as are
necessary for the efficient enforcement of the act, or whether he acted in good
faith and upon substantial grounds in deciding that the sale of appellee's product
as 'sausage' resulted in deception of purchasers and consumers, so that his
determination of such question of fact was within the power conferred upon
him as the head of an executive department of the government and is not
subject to review by the courts.
15
The contention of the government is that the product of the appellee being a
meat food product, put up in containers—casings or canvas coverings—it falls
within the prohibition of the act that such product shall not be sold or offered
for sale by any corporation in interstate commerce 'under any false or deceptive
name,' and that the regulation being for the purpose of preventing its sale under
the false or deceptive name of 'sausage,' it is plainly within the authority given
to the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules and regulations for the efficient
execution of the act.
16
On the other hand, the contention of the appellee is that the product being
wholesome and containing no dyes or chemicals, which render it unfit for
human food, an earlier provision of the act applies, which it is asserted deprives
the Secretary of all discretion in such a case and requires that he shall cause the
product to be marked 'Inspected and passed,' and also, it is claimed, that the
word 'sausage,' when qualified as was required by prior regulations by
including in the label such expressions as 'Cereal added,' or 'Sausage and
cereal,' was not a false or deceptive name.
17
The contention of the appellee that if its product is wholesome, and if it does
not contain dyes and chemicals, the act imperatively requires the Secretary to
mark its product as 'Inspected and passed' is clearly unsound if the word
'sausage' as applied to it is false and deceptive, for plainly the provision of the
act requiring the marking of the product must be harmonized with the
subsequent provision that no such meat or meat food product shall be sold or
offered for sale under any false or deceptive name.
18
Whether or not the term 'sausage,' when applied to the product of the appellee,
in which more than the permitted amount of cereal and water is used, is false
and deceptive is a question of fact, the determination of which is committed to
the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture by the authority given him to make
rules and regulations for giving effect to the act, and the law is that the
conclusion of the head of an executive department on such a question will not
be reviewed by the courts, where it is fairly arrived at with substantial evidence
to support it.
19
This rule has been most frequently applied in Land Department cases, but often
also to decisions by heads of other departments.
20
Thus, to the action of the Secretary of the Navy in Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet.
497, 599 Appx., 10 L. Ed. 559, 609, to the action of the Secretary of the
Interior, on full consideration of the subject, in Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall.
347, 19 L. Ed. 62, and in Burfenning v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 321,
16 Sup. Ct. 1018, 41 L. Ed. 175, and to decisions of the Postmaster General in
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 894, and
Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 6, 57 L. Ed. 119. The doctrine
has been extended by act of Congress to decisions by the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 32 Sup. Ct. 359, 56
L. Ed. 606; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L. Ed. 218;
Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291, 34 Sup. Ct. 488, 58 L. Ed. 967.
21
The scope of the rule is illustrated by this court, saying in Johnson v. Drew, 171
U. S. 93, 99, 18 Sup. Ct. 800, 802 (43 L. Ed. 88):
22
'If there is any one thing respecting the administration of the public lands which
must be considered as settled by repeated adjudications of this court, it is that
the decision of the land department upon mere questions of fact is, in the
absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and such questions cannot thereafter be
relitigated in the courts.'
23
And in New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261, 264, 13 Sup. Ct. 303, 305 (37 L.
Ed. 162):
24
'In Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, decided at the present term [147 U.
S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123], we had occasion to examine the
question as to when a court was authorized to interfere by injunction with the
action of the head of a department, and came to the conclusion that it was only
where, in any view of the facts that could be taken, such action was beyond the
scope of his authority. If he were engaged in the performance of a duty which
involved the exercise of discretion or judgment, he was entitled to protection
from any interference by the judicial power.' db[3] That the case before us is
one for the application of this rule is shown by the record, which contains an
interesting history of what large manufacturers have come, in a more or less
gradual progress, to regard as the proper ingredients of the product which they
have sold as sausage, and which also shows, without conflict, that the ultimate
purchaser and consumer of the product is not informed and in general does not
know of the presence of cereal and added water in it. The evidence shows that
the poorer classes of beef and pork are used in making sausage, such as
trimmings, hearts, ears, cheeks, liver, snouts and tripe, 'and all that kind of
things,' but the preferred material is bull meat; that such meat, other than bull
meat, is dry and has not the cohesive properties which will unite it when ground
or minced into the mass popularly known as 'sausage' and that, for this reason,
cornmeal, potato flour and other like substances have come to be used by the
trade as 'binders' to give it the desired cohesiveness and appearance.
25
The president of the appellee testified that when he first began making sausage
25 years ago he used anywhere from 5 per cent. to 12 per cent. of cereal and
that when the regulation was promulgated he was using 2 or 3 per cent. to 10
per cent., when he used any at all, but that in a part of his product he did not use
any, notably in that which was sent into Pennsylvania, where the use of cereal
was prohibited by statute; that when he used 10 per cent. of cereal he added
from 15 to 20 per cent. of water, and that in general water was added in double
the percentage of cereal used; and that the cereal, usually corn meal or corn
flour, was resorted to to cheapen the product and cost about 2 cents a pound,
while the meat used cost from 6 to 15 cents a pound.
26
Before the regulation assailed was promulgated cereal and water were
generally used by large manufacturers of sausage, but all of the representatives
of manufacturers, other than those of the appellee, who were called as
witnesses, testified that they were obeying the regulation, and the agreement of
such witnesses was general that retail purchasers and consumers did not know
of the presence of cereal in what they were buying as sausage.
27
There is conflict in the evidence as to whether the use of cereal in excess of the
prescribed amounts renders the product less digestible and wholesome, whether
it reduces its food value, and whether the sausage will ferment in a shorter time
than when cereal is not used at all, or when used in smaller quantities.
28
The result, thus stated, of the examination of the record before us shows
beyond controversy, that the Secretary of Agriculture in promulgating the
regulation complained of acted on substantial evidence and with sufficient
reason in concluding that persons purchasing or using as 'sausage' the appellee's
compound of various meats, cereal and water would be deceived as to its
composition and as to its value as a food product, and we cannot say that it was
an abuse of discretion to prohibit the use of the word 'sausage' as applied to it,
rather than to prescribe qualifying terms explanatory of it. Few purchasers read
long labels, many cannot read them at all, and the act of Congress having
committed to the head of the department, constantly dealing with such matters,
the discretion to determine as to whether the use of the word 'sausage' in a label
would be false and deceptive or not, under such circumstances as we have here
this court will not review, and the Circuit Court of Appeals should not have
reviewed and reversed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture.
29
The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
30
Reversed.
39 S.Ct. 332
63 L.Ed. 717
HOUSTON et al.
v.
ST. LOUIS INDEPENDENT PACKING CO.
No. 264.
Argued March 20, 1919.
Decided April 14, 1919.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for appellants.
Mr. Alexander F. Reichmann, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
The Secretary of Agriculture, assuming to exercise authority under the Meat
Inspection Act, approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 669, 676, 678, c. 3913),
promulgated a regulation, effective April 1, 1913, in part as follows, viz.:
2
'Washington, D. C., Feb. 28, 1913.
3
'For the purpose of preventing the use in interstate or foreign commerce of meat
or meat food products under any false or deceptive name, under the authority
conferred on the Secretary of Agriculture by the provisions of the act of
Congress, approved June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 674), regulation 18 is hereby
amended by the addition of sections 15 and 16, to read as hereinafter set out.
4
'James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture.
5
'(Section 16, paragraph 1.) Sausage shall not contain cereal in excess of two per
cent.; when cereal is added its presence shall be stated on the label or on the
product.
6
'(Paragraph 2.) Water or ice shall not be added to sausage, except for the
purpose of facilitating grinding, chopping and mixing, in which case the added
water or ice shall not exceed three per cent., except as provided in the following
paragraph.'
7
Immediately after the effective date of this regulation the appellee, an extensive
manufacturer of sausage correctly interpreting it as prohibiting the marking,
stamping or labeling as 'sausage' any compound of chopped or minced meats
containing cereal in excess of 2 per cent. and water or ice in excess of 3 per
cent. (except as otherwise provided), filed the bill in this case in the District
Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Eastern District of
Missouri, averring that 'sausage' made by it with cereal and water in excess of
the requirements of the regulation was wholesome and fit for human food and
that the effect of the order would be to exclude its product from interstate
commerce, to its great and irreparable damage. The prayer was that the
defendants, the Secretary of Agriculture and the officers subordinate to him, be
enjoined from refusing to mark as 'Inspected and passed' all 'sausage'
manufactured by the petitioner found to be sound, healthful, and wholesome,
and which contained no dyes, chemicals, preservatives or ingredients which
would render such 'sausage' unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food;
that they be required by mandatory injunction to mark such 'sausage' as
'Inspected and passed,' and that the regulation be declared to be unauthorized by
law, null and void.
8
The District Court denied the application, on the bill, for an injunction (St.
Louis Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 204 Fed. 120), but on appeal that
holding was reversed and the case was remanded by the Circuit Court of
Appeals (St. Louis Independent Packing Co. v. Houston, 215 Fed. 553, 132 C.
C. A. 65).
9
The Secretary of Agriculture then answered admitting that it was the purpose of
the Department to refuse, and that it had refused, to mark as 'Inspected and
passed' as 'sausage' the product of the appellee unless manufactured in
compliance with the regulations complained of, and, as warrant therefor, he
quoted in his answer from the act of Congress the following:
10
'No such meat or meat food products shall be sold or offered for sale by any
person, firm, or corporation in interstate or foreign commerce under any false
or deceptive name; but established trade-name or names which are usual to
such products and which are not false and deceptive and which shall be
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture are permitted, and that said Secretary
of Agriculture shall, from time to time make such rules and regulations as are
necessary for the effecient execution of the provisions of this act, and all
inspections and examinations made under this act shall be such and made in
such manner as described in the rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Agriculture not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.'
Answering the allegation of the bill that the appellee's trade in 'sausage' would
be ruined by the enforcement of the regulation, the Secretary of Agriculture
averred that the appellee manufactured and sold large quantities of sausage
which did not contain any cereal or added water, and added:
11
'That the manufacture and sale of a product as sausage which product contains
added cereal and water in quantities as described in plaintiff's bill, or in any
quantities in excess of the amount designated in said regulation, effective April
1, 1913, is false and deceptive; that the ordinary consumer of sausage
manufactured by the plaintiff has no knowledge or information that sausage
contains cereal and added water, that such information is not conveyed to
persons who purchase plaintiff's sausage at retail by any method of marking or
branding now or heretofore in use by plaintiff, and that it is impracticable and
impossible in the ordinary course of manufacture and distribution of sausage to
mark or brand the same so that the purchaser at retail or the consumer will be
informed as to the amount of cereal and water added thereto.'
12
An elaborate trial on the merits resulted in the dismissal of the bill by the
District Court (231 Fed. 779), but this judgment was reversed by a divided
Circuit Court of Appeals (242 Fed. 337, 155 C. C. A. 113) and the case was
remanded with directions to award the appellee injunctions substantially as
prayed for. The case is here for review on appeal.
13
The claim made by the government in the lower courts that the compound of
meats, cereal and water, which the appellee claimed the right to sell as 'sausage'
was unwholesome is abandoned in this court and the only question argued and
submitted is whether it was within the power of the Secretary of Agriculture to
prohibit the use of the word 'sausage' as false and deceptive, within the meaning
of the act, when applied to the appellee's product.
14
The foregoing statement shows that the question for decision in this court is:
Whether, in promulgating the regulation assailed, the Secretary of Agriculture
acted arbitrarily and in excess of the authority given him by the act of
Congress, to make, from time to time, such rules and regulations as are
necessary for the efficient enforcement of the act, or whether he acted in good
faith and upon substantial grounds in deciding that the sale of appellee's product
as 'sausage' resulted in deception of purchasers and consumers, so that his
determination of such question of fact was within the power conferred upon
him as the head of an executive department of the government and is not
subject to review by the courts.
15
The contention of the government is that the product of the appellee being a
meat food product, put up in containers—casings or canvas coverings—it falls
within the prohibition of the act that such product shall not be sold or offered
for sale by any corporation in interstate commerce 'under any false or deceptive
name,' and that the regulation being for the purpose of preventing its sale under
the false or deceptive name of 'sausage,' it is plainly within the authority given
to the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules and regulations for the efficient
execution of the act.
16
On the other hand, the contention of the appellee is that the product being
wholesome and containing no dyes or chemicals, which render it unfit for
human food, an earlier provision of the act applies, which it is asserted deprives
the Secretary of all discretion in such a case and requires that he shall cause the
product to be marked 'Inspected and passed,' and also, it is claimed, that the
word 'sausage,' when qualified as was required by prior regulations by
including in the label such expressions as 'Cereal added,' or 'Sausage and
cereal,' was not a false or deceptive name.
17
The contention of the appellee that if its product is wholesome, and if it does
not contain dyes and chemicals, the act imperatively requires the Secretary to
mark its product as 'Inspected and passed' is clearly unsound if the word
'sausage' as applied to it is false and deceptive, for plainly the provision of the
act requiring the marking of the product must be harmonized with the
subsequent provision that no such meat or meat food product shall be sold or
offered for sale under any false or deceptive name.
18
Whether or not the term 'sausage,' when applied to the product of the appellee,
in which more than the permitted amount of cereal and water is used, is false
and deceptive is a question of fact, the determination of which is committed to
the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture by the authority given him to make
rules and regulations for giving effect to the act, and the law is that the
conclusion of the head of an executive department on such a question will not
be reviewed by the courts, where it is fairly arrived at with substantial evidence
to support it.
19
This rule has been most frequently applied in Land Department cases, but often
also to decisions by heads of other departments.
20
Thus, to the action of the Secretary of the Navy in Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet.
497, 599 Appx., 10 L. Ed. 559, 609, to the action of the Secretary of the
Interior, on full consideration of the subject, in Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall.
347, 19 L. Ed. 62, and in Burfenning v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 321,
16 Sup. Ct. 1018, 41 L. Ed. 175, and to decisions of the Postmaster General in
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 894, and
Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 6, 57 L. Ed. 119. The doctrine
has been extended by act of Congress to decisions by the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor. Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 32 Sup. Ct. 359, 56
L. Ed. 606; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L. Ed. 218;
Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291, 34 Sup. Ct. 488, 58 L. Ed. 967.
21
The scope of the rule is illustrated by this court, saying in Johnson v. Drew, 171
U. S. 93, 99, 18 Sup. Ct. 800, 802 (43 L. Ed. 88):
22
'If there is any one thing respecting the administration of the public lands which
must be considered as settled by repeated adjudications of this court, it is that
the decision of the land department upon mere questions of fact is, in the
absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and such questions cannot thereafter be
relitigated in the courts.'
23
And in New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261, 264, 13 Sup. Ct. 303, 305 (37 L.
Ed. 162):
24
'In Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, decided at the present term [147 U.
S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123], we had occasion to examine the
question as to when a court was authorized to interfere by injunction with the
action of the head of a department, and came to the conclusion that it was only
where, in any view of the facts that could be taken, such action was beyond the
scope of his authority. If he were engaged in the performance of a duty which
involved the exercise of discretion or judgment, he was entitled to protection
from any interference by the judicial power.' db[3] That the case before us is
one for the application of this rule is shown by the record, which contains an
interesting history of what large manufacturers have come, in a more or less
gradual progress, to regard as the proper ingredients of the product which they
have sold as sausage, and which also shows, without conflict, that the ultimate
purchaser and consumer of the product is not informed and in general does not
know of the presence of cereal and added water in it. The evidence shows that
the poorer classes of beef and pork are used in making sausage, such as
trimmings, hearts, ears, cheeks, liver, snouts and tripe, 'and all that kind of
things,' but the preferred material is bull meat; that such meat, other than bull
meat, is dry and has not the cohesive properties which will unite it when ground
or minced into the mass popularly known as 'sausage' and that, for this reason,
cornmeal, potato flour and other like substances have come to be used by the
trade as 'binders' to give it the desired cohesiveness and appearance.
25
The president of the appellee testified that when he first began making sausage
25 years ago he used anywhere from 5 per cent. to 12 per cent. of cereal and
that when the regulation was promulgated he was using 2 or 3 per cent. to 10
per cent., when he used any at all, but that in a part of his product he did not use
any, notably in that which was sent into Pennsylvania, where the use of cereal
was prohibited by statute; that when he used 10 per cent. of cereal he added
from 15 to 20 per cent. of water, and that in general water was added in double
the percentage of cereal used; and that the cereal, usually corn meal or corn
flour, was resorted to to cheapen the product and cost about 2 cents a pound,
while the meat used cost from 6 to 15 cents a pound.
26
Before the regulation assailed was promulgated cereal and water were
generally used by large manufacturers of sausage, but all of the representatives
of manufacturers, other than those of the appellee, who were called as
witnesses, testified that they were obeying the regulation, and the agreement of
such witnesses was general that retail purchasers and consumers did not know
of the presence of cereal in what they were buying as sausage.
27
There is conflict in the evidence as to whether the use of cereal in excess of the
prescribed amounts renders the product less digestible and wholesome, whether
it reduces its food value, and whether the sausage will ferment in a shorter time
than when cereal is not used at all, or when used in smaller quantities.
28
The result, thus stated, of the examination of the record before us shows
beyond controversy, that the Secretary of Agriculture in promulgating the
regulation complained of acted on substantial evidence and with sufficient
reason in concluding that persons purchasing or using as 'sausage' the appellee's
compound of various meats, cereal and water would be deceived as to its
composition and as to its value as a food product, and we cannot say that it was
an abuse of discretion to prohibit the use of the word 'sausage' as applied to it,
rather than to prescribe qualifying terms explanatory of it. Few purchasers read
long labels, many cannot read them at all, and the act of Congress having
committed to the head of the department, constantly dealing with such matters,
the discretion to determine as to whether the use of the word 'sausage' in a label
would be false and deceptive or not, under such circumstances as we have here
this court will not review, and the Circuit Court of Appeals should not have
reviewed and reversed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture.
29
The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
30
Reversed.
