Docshare

Published on April 2017 | Categories: Documents | Downloads: 65 | Comments: 0 | Views: 338
of 6
Download PDF   Embed   Report

Comments

Content

EN BANC
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,
represented by PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
through ATTY. ORLANDO L.SALVADOR,
Petitioner,
- versus HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity
as OMBUDSMAN;
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF GOVERNORS AND OFFICERS AT THE
TIME Rafael Sison, Joseph Tengco, Alice Reyes,
Vicente Paterno, Joseph Edralin, Roberto
Ongpin, Verden Dangilan, Rodolfo Manalo;

for Certiorari seeking to nullify the September 3, 1999
Resolution[1] of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-950443, dismissing the criminal complaint filed against private
G.R. No. 145184
respondents, and the June 6, 2000 Order[2] denying its
reconsideration.
Present:
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
PUNO, C.J.,Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad
QUISUMBING,
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee),
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
which reads:
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of
CORONA,
the 1987 Constitution provides that Subject
CARPIO MORALES,to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
AZCUNA,
the State adopts and implements a policy of
TINGA,
full public disclosure of all transactions
CHICO-NAZARIO, involving public interest;
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of
REYES, and
the 1987 Constitution provides that The
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,JJ.
right of the state to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or
Promulgated:
employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred
March 14, 2008
by prescription, laches or estoppel;

BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES,
INC.Querube Makalintal,* Ambrosio
Makalintal, Vicente Jayme, Antonio Santiago,
Edgar Quinto, Horacio Makalintal, Alfredo de
los Angeles, Jose Rey D. Rueda, Ramoncito
Modesto, Gerardo Limjuco,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

WHEREAS, there have been
allegations of loans, guarantees, or other
forms of financial accommodation granted,
directly or indirectly, by government owned
and controlled bank or financial institutions,
at the behest, command or urging by
previous government officials to the
disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine
government and the Filipino people;

NACHURA, J.:

The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, (the Committee), representing the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through Atty.
Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador) filed this Petition
to be composed of the following:
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission
on
Good
Government - Chairman
The
Chairman

Solicitor

General -

ACCORDINGLY, an Ad-Hoc
FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON
BEHEST LOANS is hereby created

Representative from the
Development
Bank
the Philippines - Member

of

Representative from the
Philippine National Bank - Member

Vice-

Representative from the
Asset Privatization Trust - Member

Representative from the
Office of the Executive Secretary Member

Government Corporate Counsel Member
Representative from the
Department of Finance - Member
Representative from the
Department of Justice - Member

The Ad Hoc Committee shall
perform the following functions:

Representative from the
Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation Member

1.

Inventory all behest loans;
identify the lenders and borrowers,
including the principal officers and
stockholders of the borrowing
firms, as well as the persons
responsible for granting the loans
or who influenced the grant
thereof;

2.

Identify the borrowers who
were granted friendly waivers, as
well as the government officials
who granted these waivers;
determine the validity of these
waivers;

3.

Determine the courses of action
that the government should take to
recover those loans, and to
recommend appropriate actions to
the Office of the President within
sixty (60) days from the date
hereof.

The Committee is hereby empowered to
call upon any department, bureau, office,
agency, instrumentality or corporation of the
government, or any officer or employee
thereof, for such assistance as it may need in
the discharge of its function.
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9,
1992, the functions of the Committee were subsequently
expanded by including in its investigation, inventory and study
all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. It
likewise provided for the following criteria which might be
utilized as frame of reference in determining a behest loan, to
wit:
1.

It is under-collateralized;

2.

The borrower corporation is
undercapitalized;

3.

Direct or indirect endorsement
by high government officials like
presence of marginal notes;

4.

Stockholders, officers or agents
of the borrower corporation are
identified as cronies;

5.

Deviation of
proceeds
from
intended;

6.
7.

use
the

of loan
purpose

Use of corporate layering;
Non-feasibility of the project
for which financing is being
sought; and

8.

Extraordinary speed in which
the loan release was made.

Moreover, a behest loan may be
distinguished from a non-behest loan in that
while both may involve civil liability for
non-payment or non-recovery, the former
may likewise entail criminal liability.
Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee
for its investigation, including the loan transactions between
Comptronics Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now Integrated Circuits
Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the loan transactions,
the Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of
a behest loan as defined under Memorandum Order No.
61. Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of
the Committee, and representing the PCGG, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint[3] for violation of
Section 3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Concerned
Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned
Directors and Officers of ICPI, namely, Querube Makalintal,
Ambrosio C. Makalintal, Vicente R. Jayme, Antonio A.
Santiago, Edgar L. Quinto, Horacio G. Makalintal, Alfredo F.
delos Angeles, Josery D. Ruede, Manuel Tupaz, Alberto T.
Perez and Gerardo A. Limjuco (private respondents).
Atty. Salvador alleged that ICPI applied for an
industrial loan (foreign currency loan) of US$1,352,400.00,
or P10,143,000.00, from DBP. The loan application was
approved on August 6, 1980 under DBP Board Resolution No.
2924. Atty. Salvador claimed that there was undue haste in the
approval of the loan. He also alleged that prior to its approval,
ICPI was granted an interim loan of P1,786,000.00 to cover
the projects initial financing requirement. He added that the
ICPIs industrial loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was
undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted. ICPIs paid
up capital by then was only P3,000,000.00, while the
appraised value of the machinery and equipment offered as
collaterals was only P5,943,610.00. Atty. Salvador concluded
that ICPI was undeserving of the concession given to it, and
the approval of the loan constitutes a violation of Section
3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
On March 13, 1996, Atty. Salvador filed a
Supplementary Complaint Affidavit,[4] to include in his
complaint ICPIs interim loan of P1,786,000.00, which he
claimed was granted with undue haste and without collateral,
except a promissory note and comfort letter signed by DBP
Chairman Rafael Sison. He added that the stockholders,
officers and agents are identified cronies, since the Chairman
of the Board Querube Makalintal was, at the same time, the
then Speaker of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. He named
Rafael A. Sison, Jose Tengco, Alice Ll. Reyes, and Casimiro
Tanedo as the ones responsible for the approval of the loan
who should, thus, be charged, along with the officers and
directors of ICPI, for violation of R.A. No. 3019.

After evaluating the evidence submitted by the
Committee, the Ombudsman issued the assailed
Memorandum, finding that:
After going over the record, we
find no probable cause to warrant the filing
of the instant case in court.
To start with, the cause of action
has prescribed.
The loan in [question] was entered
into between ICPI and DBP sometime in
August 1980, while the complaint was filed
on February 17, 1995 only, or after the lapse
of almost fifteen years. Under Section 11,
RA 3019, offenses committed before March
16, 1982, prescribed in ten (10) years.
The
transaction
was
duly
documented and the instruments drawn in
support thereof were duly registered and
open to public scrutiny, the prescriptive
period of any legal action in connection with
the said transaction commenced to run from
the date the same was registered sometime
in 1980.
xxxx
Complainants allegation that the
questioned loans were not covered by
sufficient collaterals is negated by the
evidence on record. It appears from the
Executive Summary attached to the
complaint that ICPI loans were secured by
the following, to wit: (a) Machinery and
Equipment to be acquired valued
at P5,943,610.00; (b) The Philippine Export
and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation
guarantee up to 70% of the proposed DBP
loan or P7,100,000.00; (c) By the Joint and
several signatures with ICPI, Philippine
Underwriter Finance Corporation; Atrium
Capital Corporation, Mr. Ambrocio and
Querube Macalintal. The value of the
machineries and equipment and the amount
guaranteed by Philippine Export and
Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation have a
total amount P13,043,610.00. ICPIs paid up
capital in the amount of P3,000,000.00 was
also considered as additional security. The
aggregate value of ICPIs securities was
thereforeP16,043,610.00, while the total
amount
of
loans
granted
was
only P10,143,000.00. Clearly, therefore, the
loans granted to ICPI were not
undercollaterized (sic).
Moreover, ICPI had an authorized
capital stock of P10 Million of which P3
Million had been paid up or more than 25%

of the authorized capital. It cannot be said
that the corporation is undercapitalized.
In fine, the questioned loans were
not considered behest loans within the
purview of Memorandum Order No. 61,
dated November 9, 1992 (Broadening the
Scope of the Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans Created
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 13,
dated October 8, 1992).
Finally,
the
aforesaid
Administrative and Memorandum Orders
both issued by the President in 1992, may
not be retroactively applied to the
questioned transactions which took place in
1980 because to do so would be tantamount
to an ex post facto law which is proscribed
by the Constitution.[5]

Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the
instant complaint be, as the same is hereby,
DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.[6]

A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the Ombudsman
denied the same on June 6, 2000.[7]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Before tackling the issues raised by the petitioner,
this Court takes notice of a serious procedural flaw. Joseph
Edralin, Roberto Ongpin, Verden Dangilan and Rodolfo
Manalo were impleaded as respondents in this
petition. However, they were not made respondents in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman. Neither was there any
allegation in the sworn-complaint and supplementary
complaint executed by Atty. Salvador before the Ombudsman
that Edralin, Ongpin, Dangilan and Manalo had any
participation in, or were responsible for, the approval of the
questioned loan. As such, they cannot be made respondents for
the first time in this petition. Accordingly, we dismiss the
petition as against them.
With the procedural issue resolved, this Court now comes to
the issues raised by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its criminal
complaint had prescribed; (ii) Administrative Order No. 13
and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws; and
(iii) there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for
violation under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

The computation of the prescriptive period for
offenses involving the acquisition of behest loans had already
been laid to rest in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[8] thus:
[I]t was well-nigh impossible for
the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
the time the questioned transactions were
made because, as alleged, the public
officials concerned connived or conspired
with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we
agree with the COMMITTEE that the
prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not
from the day of such commission.[9]

The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee
on
Behest
Loans
v.
Ombudsman
Desierto,[10] wherein the Court explained:
In cases involving violations of
R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution that
ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we
ruled that the government as the aggrieved
party could not have known of the violations
at the time the questioned transactions were
made. Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those
transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after
an exhaustive investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans.[11]

than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense in order to convict the defendant;[12] or (e)
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which
when exercised was lawful; or (f) which deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction
or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[13]
The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws
is aimed against the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws
are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.[14]
Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a
penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It merely creates
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest
Loans
and
provides
for
its
composition
and
functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other hand,
simply provides the frame of reference in determining the
existence of behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
cannot be characterized as ex-post facto laws.
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,[15] in which
petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No.
6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
decision, we had occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no
jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a
law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in delving into the constitutionality of the subject
administrative and memorandum orders.
Now, on the merits of the case.

The Sworn Statement filed by Atty. Salvador did not specify
the exact dates when the alleged offenses were
discovered. However, the records show that it was the
Committee that discovered the same. As such, the discovery
could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the
date when the Committee was created. The complaint was
filed on February 17, 1995, less than three (3) years from the
presumptive date of discovery. Thus, the criminal offenses
allegedly committed by the private respondents had not yet
prescribed when the complaint was filed.
Likewise, we do not agree with the Ombudsman’s
declaration that Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to
the questioned transactions because to do so would violate the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a)
which makes an action done before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such
action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater

Private respondents were charged with violation of
Section 3(e) (g) of R.A. No. 3019. The pertinent provisions
read:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public
officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to

officers and employees of officers or
government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
xxxx

deserving of the grant, considering the viability and economic
desirability of its project. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that
DBP did not exercise sound business judgment when it
approved the loan. Neither was there any proof that the
conditions imposed for the loan were specially designed in
order to favor ICPI.

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government,
into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same,
whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.

The Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code
directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which
springs from the fountain of good conscience.[20] Well-settled
is the rule that good faith is presumed. Specifically, a public
officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the
performance of his duties.

Petitioner asserts that the loan transaction between
DBP and ICPI bore the characteristics of a behest loan. It
claims that the loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was
under-capitalized when the questioned loan was hastily
granted. Petitioner believes that there exists probable cause to
indict the private respondents for violation of Section 3(e)(g)
of R.A. No. 3019.

Mistakes committed by a public officer are not
actionable, absent a clear showing that he was motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. [21] Bad
faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or
negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill will. It
partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of
self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.[22] Petitioners
utterly failed to show that private respondents actions fit such
description.

Case law has it that the determination of probable
cause against those in public office during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman.[16] The Ombudsman is empowered to determine,
in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause exists,
and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime
as defined by law. As a rule, courts should not interfere with
the Ombudsmans investigatory power, exercised through the
Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the
presence or absence of probable cause, except when the
finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17]
For one to have violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, the following elements must be established: 1) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions; 2) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and 3) he must have caused undue injury to any
party, including the government, or given any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, in the
discharge of his functions.[18] Evidently, mere bad faith or
partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be
held liable under the law. It is required that the act constitutive
of bad faith or partiality must, in the first place, be evident or
manifest, while the negligent deed should be both gross and
inexcusable. Further, it is necessary to show that any or all of
these modalities resulted in undue injury to a specified
party.[19]
On the other hand, to be liable under Section 3(g),
there must be a showing that private respondents entered into
a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the
government.
Petitioner did not satisfy either criterion.
It is clear from the records that the DBP officers
studied and evaluated ICPIs request for an interim loan and an
industrial loan, and they were convinced that ICPI was

Neither was there any convincing proof offered to
demonstrate that the contracts were grossly disadvantageous to
the Government, or that they were entered into to give ICPI
unwarranted benefits and advantages.
Petitioner asserts that ICPI was undeserving of the
accommodation given by DBP. To support this allegation,
petitioners quoted a portion of the credit evaluation report,
which reads:
Investigations conducted by DBPs Credit
Department revealed adverse findings on
ICPI and Mr. Gene Vicente Tamesis, who
until recently, has been the principal
stockholder and executive officer of subject
Corporation. x x x Mr. Tamesis, however,
has since transferred all of his shareholdings
to Mr. Ambrosio G. Makalintal. Aware of
Mr. Tamesis unfavorable credit standing,
ICPIs management has, further, caused him
to yield his position as Chairman of the
Board in favor of Mr. Querube C.
Makalintal, former Justice of the Supreme
Court and presently Speaker of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa.[23]

But we note that the said credit investigation report goes
further, and states:
With the responsible management of the
Makalintals and the conversion of
substantial liabilities of ICPI into equity
(subject-firms major creditors, namely,
Philippine
Underwriters
Finance
Corporation and Atrium Capital Corporation

have both agreed, in principle, to convert
their claims into equity), the corporation can
now operate on a clean credit slate and
stands a good chance of meeting its credit
obligations.[24]

There is, thus, no solid basis for petitioners to claim that ICPI
did not deserve the concession given by DBP.
Contrary to what petitioner wants to portray, the contracts
between ICPI and DBP were not behest loans. ICPI was not
under-capitalized and the loan was not under-collateralized at
the time of its approval. Likewise, the approval can hardly be
depicted as one done with undue haste.
The records show that in 1979, Atrium Capital
Corporation and Philippine Underwriters Corporation agreed
on the conversion of their P8,500,000.00 worth of creditors
equity into capital stocks.[25] Then, in 1980, the individual
stockholders paid their respective subscriptions amounting
to P3,000,000.00, thereby increasing ICPIs paid up capital
to P11,500,000.00 as of April 23, 1980.[26] This belies
petitioners claim that, at that time, ICPI was under-capitalized.
Similarly, the industrial loan was sufficiently
collateralized at the time of its approval. It was granted on the
condition that the assets intended for acquisition by ICPI
would serve as collateral. The Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC) also guaranteed 70%
of the loan extended. ICPI was further required to assign to
DBP not less than 67% of its total subscribed and outstanding
voting shares, which should be maintained at all times and
should subsist during the existence of the loan. As additional
security, ICPIs majority stockholders, namely, Integrated
Circuits Philippine, Inc. (ICP) of Philippine Underwriters
Finance Corporation, Atrium Corporation (AC), Ambrosio G.
Makalintal and Querube Makalintal were also made jointly
and severally liable to DBP. DBP was also given the right to
designate its comptroller in ICP.[27]
Petitioners insistence that DBP excluded the joint and
several liabilities of the majority stockholders of ICP and AC
and of Querube Makalintal has to be rejected. It is true that
DBPs Industrial Project Department recommended the
amendment of this condition. However, no proof was offered
to prove that the DBP Board of Directors approved such
recommendation.
Petitioner also points to the alleged non-implementation of the
guarantee by PEFLGC to demonstrate that the loan was undercollateralized at the time of its approval. But the
evidence[28] presented shows that the PEFLGC approved the
guarantee, although the approval lapsed in 1985. Thus, it
cannot be gainsaid that, at the time of the approval of the loan,
there was a guarantee by PEFLGC. Besides, even if we
exclude as security the guarantee of PEFLGC, the loan still
had sufficient collaterals at the time of its approval.
The contention that the loan was hastily granted also
fails to persuade. The supplemental complaint alleged that the
interim loan was granted on April 6, 1980. However, there

was no allegation, much less proof, as to when ICPI applied
for this interim loan. In the absence of such proof, we cannot
conclude that the same was hastily granted.
Neither does the industrial loan appear to have been
hastily granted. Admittedly, the interim loan granted on April
6, 1980 formed part of ICPIs application for industrial or
foreign
currency
loan
in
the
amount
of
US$1,352,400.00. Logically then, we can assume that ICPIs
application was filed earlier than April 6, 1980, the date of the
approval of the interim loan. DBP, however, approved the
industrial loan only on August 6, 1980. The processing period
of more than four months is inconsistent with the claim that
the loan was hastily granted.[29]
In sum, petitioner does not persuade us that the
contract between ICPI and DBP was a behest loan.
Finally, we note that petitioner did not specify the
precise role played by, or the participation of, each of the
private respondents in the alleged violation of R.A. No.
3019.No concrete or overt acts of the ICPs directors and
officers, particularly of Mr. Querube Makalintal, were
specifically alleged or mentioned in the complaint and its
supplement, and no proof was adduced to show that they
unduly influenced the directors and concerned officials of
DBP. Neither were circumstances shown to indicate a
common criminal design of either the officers of DPB or ICPI,
nor that they colluded to cause undue injury to the government
by giving unwarranted benefits to ICPI.
The Ombudsman can hardly be faulted for not
wanting to proceed with the prosecution of the offense,
convinced that he does not possess the necessary evidence to
secure a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Memorandum and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB0-95-0443, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Sponsor Documents

Or use your account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Forgot your password?

Or register your new account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Lost your password? Please enter your email address. You will receive a link to create a new password.

Back to log-in

Close