Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 519 U.S. 248 (1997)

519 U.S. 248
117 S.Ct. 796
136 L.Ed.2d 736

INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC., et al., Petitioners,
v.
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, et al.
No. 95-1081.

Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Nov. 12, 1996.
Decided Feb. 18, 1997.

Syllabus *

While working for petitioner Ingalls as a shipfitter, Jefferson Yates was
exposed to asbestos. After he was diagnosed as suffering from asbestosis
and related conditions, he filed a claim for disability benefits under the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA'' or "Act'').
Ingalls admitted compensability and eventually settled with Mr. Yates,
who, in the meantime, had sued the manufacturers and suppliers of the
asbestos products that were allegedly present in his workplace when he
contracted asbestosis. Before his death, he settled with some of these
defendants, each of whom required releases from respondent Yates, Mr.
Yates' wife, even though she was not a party to the litigation. None of
these predeath settlements was approved by Ingalls. After Mr. Yates'
death, Mrs. Yates filed a claim for death benefits under the Act. Ingalls
contested the claim under Act §33(g)(1), which states: "If the person
entitled to compensation . . . enters into a settlement with a third person . .
. for an amount less than the compensation to which the person . . . would
be entitled under this [Act], the employer shall be liable for compensation
. . . only if written approval of the settlement is obtained from the
employer . . . before the settlement is executed.'' The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) ruled for Mrs. Yates, and the Benefits Review Board (Board)
affirmed, holding that, at the time she executed the predeath settlements,
she was not a "person entitled to compensation'' under §33(g)(1) because
her husband still lived, and, therefore, her right to death benefits had not
yet vested. The Fifth Circuit agreed and affirmed. The court also rejected
Ingalls' argument that the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, lacked standing to participate as a respondent in the appeal of a
Board decision.
Held:

1.Before an injured worker's death, the worker's spouse is not a "person
entitled to compensation'' for death benefits within §33(g)'s meaning, and
does not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the Act for failure
to obtain the worker's employer's approval of settlements entered into
before the worker's death. Section 33(g)(1)'s plain language reveals two
salient points. First, the use of the present tense (i.e., "enters'') indicates
that the "person entitled to compensation'' must be so entitled at the time
of settlement. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475,
112 S.Ct. 2589, 2594, 120 L.Ed.2d 379. Second, the ordinary meaning of
the word "entitle'' indicates that the "person entitled to compensation''
must at the very least be qualified to receive compensation. Id., at 477,
112 S.Ct., at 2595. Thus, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether Mrs.
Yates satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining death benefits under the Act
at the time she signed the releases contained in the predeath settlements.
Taken together, §9 of the Act, which governs the distribution of death
benefits, and §2, which contains relevant definitions, indicate that a
surviving spouse qualifies for death benefits only if: (i) the survivor's
deceased worker-spouse dies from a work-related injury; (ii) the survivor
is married to the worker-spouse at the time of death; and (iii) the survivor
is either living with the workerspouse, dependent upon the worker-spouse,
or living apart from the worker-spouse because of desertion or other
justifiable cause at the time of death. It is impossible to ascertain whether
these prerequisites have been met at any time prior to the death of the
injured worker. The Court therefore rejects the argument that a person
seeking death benefits under the Act can satisfy the prerequisites for those
benefits at any earlier time- e.g., when the worker is initially injured or
when the worker enters into a predeath settlement. Because Mrs. Yates'
husband was alive at the time she signed the releases, she was not a
"person entitled to compensation'' at that time and was therefore not
obligated to seek Ingalls' approval to preserve her entitlement to statutory
death benefits. Ingalls' arguments to the contrary-that §33(g)(1)
effectively brings any person who "would be entitled'' to compensation
within its purview, and that strict adherence to the section's plain language
is at odds with the Act's underlying policy of avoiding double recoveryare unpersuasive. Pp. ___-___.

2.Although the Act itself does not speak to the issue, the right to appear as
a respondent before the courts of appeals is conferred upon the Director,
OWCP, by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a), which, in pertinent
part, states: "Review of an order of an administrative . . . board . . . must
be obtained by filing with the clerk of a court of appeals . . . [the
appropriate form] . . . . In each case, the agency must be named
respondent.'' (Emphasis added.) The Court declines to adopt the narrower
reading of Rule 15(a) set forth in Parker v. Director, OWCP, 75 F.3d 929,
934 (C.A.4), and McCord v. Benefits Review Board, 514 F.2d 198, 200
(C.A.D.C.). Where a single overarching agency has two subagencies that
wear the hats of, respectively, litigator/enforcer and adjudicator, the
"agency'' that must be named as a respondent under Rule 15(a) is the
overarching agency, which is free to designate its enforcer/litigator as its
voice before the courts of appeals. It is not necessary that the overarching
agency have absolute veto power over the decisions of its adjudicator, so
long as it has substantial control over those decisions. By statute and
regulation, the LHWCA adjudicative and enforcement/litigation functions
of the Department of Labor are divided between the ALJs and the Board
on the one hand, and the Director on the other, and the Secretary of Labor
has named the Director as the Department's designated litigant in the
courts of appeals. The Department is thus the "agency'' for Rule 15(a)
purposes, and the Court concludes that the Director may be named as a
respondent in the courts of appeals. Although the Director does not always
have the right to appeal as a petitioner to those courts, Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 1287-1288, 131 L.Ed.2d
160, this does not result in a "lopsided'' representation scheme whereby
the Director can appear only in defense of the Board's decisions. The
Director, even as a respondent, is free to argue on behalf of the petitioner,
see Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North
River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 301, 103 S.Ct. 634, 639, 74 L.Ed.2d 465,
and to challenge the Board's decision. Pp. ___-___.
65 F.3d 460 (C.A.5 1995), affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect
to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER,
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
Richard P. Salloum, Gulfport, MS, for petitioners.
Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, DC, for federal respondent.
Wynn E. Clark, Gulfport, MS, for private respondent.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

1

Section 33 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA
or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §933, gives the "person entitled
to compensation'' two avenues of recovery: Such a person may seek to recover
damages from the third parties ultimately at fault for any injuries and still
recover compensation under the Act from the covered worker's employer as
long as the worker's employer gives its approval before the person settles with
any of the third party tortfeasors. The question we decide today is whether an
injured worker's spouse, who may be eligible to receive death benefits under
the Act after the worker dies, is a "person entitled to compensation'' when the
spouse enters into a settlement agreement with a third party before the worker's
death. We also consider whether the Director of the Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs is a proper respondent in proceedings before the courts
of appeals.

2

* Jefferson Yates worked for Ingalls as a shipfitter at its Pascaguola shipyards
in Mississippi between 1953 and 1967 and was exposed to asbestos in his
workplace during this time. In March 1981, Mr. Yates was diagnosed as
suffering from asbestosis, chronic bronchitis, and possible malignancy in his
lungs. Less than a month later, he filed a claim for disability benefits under §8
of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. §908, asserting that his present condition resulted
from his exposure to asbestos while employed by Ingalls. Ingalls admitted the
compensability of this claim and eventually entered into a formal settlement
with Mr. Yates in satisfaction of its liability under the Act.

3

Mr. Yates, in the meantime, filed a lawsuit in Federal District Court against the
23 manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos whose products were allegedly
present at the Pascaguola shipyards during the period in which Mr. Yates
contracted asbestosis. Before his death in 1986, Mr. Yates entered into
settlement agreements with 8 of the 23 defendants ("pre-death settlements'').
Each defendant required Maggie Yates, Mr. Yates' wife, to join in the
settlement and to release her present right to sue for loss of consortium, even
though she was not a party to the litigation. Six of the eight defendants also
required Mrs. Yates to release any cause of action for wrongful death that might
accrue to her after her husband died. None of the third-party settlements was
approved by Ingalls.

4

After her husband's death, which the parties have stipulated resulted from
asbestos exposure that occurred "in the course and scope of [his] employment,''
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-59, Mrs. Yates filed a claim for death benefits as Mr.
Yates' widow under §9 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §909. Ingalls contested the claim
on the ground that Mrs. Yates had been a "person entitled to compensation''
under the Act when she entered into the predeath settlements. Ingalls argued
that by failing to obtain its approval of those settlements she forfeited, under
§33(g)(1), her eligibility for death benefits. In response, Mrs. Yates argued that
she was not a "person entitled to compensation'' when she entered into those
settlement agreements because her husband was still alive at that time. The
deputy commissioner referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ).

5

The ALJ ruled in favor of Mrs. Yates. Yates v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 26
BRBS 174 (1992). The ALJ recognized that Mrs. Yates was no more than a
"potential widow'' when she entered into the settlement agreements. App. to
Pet. for Cert. A-67. Reasoning that the prerequisites for the recovery of death
benefits could not be established prior to the worker's death, he found that the
"spouse of an injured employee has no cause of action [under the Act] until the
injured employee dies from his work-related injury.'' — Id., at A-68. Because
Mrs. Yates had no cause of action for death benefits prior to her husband's
death, the ALJ concluded that she was not a "person entitled to compensation''
obligated to seek the employer's approval of any settlements signed at that time.

6

Ingalls appealed to the Benefits Review Board. Yates v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,
Inc., 28 BRBS 137 (1994). The Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, appeared as a respondent in support of Mrs. Yates. The Board
affirmed, largely in reliance upon our decision in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992), in which
we held that an injured worker was a "person entitled to compensation'' for the
purpose of disability benefits under §8 of the Act at "the moment his right to
recovery vested,'' id., at 477, 112 S.Ct., at 2595, which in that case was when
the worker suffered his permanent injury. The Board reasoned that Cowart's
"vesting'' rationale applied to death as well as disability benefits, and observed
that Mrs. Yates' "right to death benefits under the Act could not have vested
before she became a widow.'' App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35 (emphasis in original).
Although it might appear at the time of settlement that Mrs. Yates would likely
become a "person entitled to compensation'' under the Act, before her husband's
death any one of several events might occur that would prevent her from
recovering any death benefits under the Act-she might predecease her husband,
she might divorce her husband, or her husband might die from causes
independent of his work-related injury. For these reasons, the Board held that
Mrs. Yates was not a "person entitled to compensation'' at the time she entered
into the predeath settlements, but acknowledged that its ruling was at odds with
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cretan v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F.3d 843 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1219, 114
S.Ct. 2705, 129 L.Ed.2d 833 (1994).

7

Ingalls again appealed, this time to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
65 F.3d 460 (1995). Although Ingalls renewed its §33(g) argument, the Court
of Appeals rejected it for the reasons advanced by the Board. Ingalls also
moved to strike the brief of the Director and to disallow the Director's further
participation in the appeal on the ground that the Director lacked standing. The
Court of Appeals dismissed this argument in a footnote, citing its prior decision
in Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Systems, Inc. v. White, 681 F.2d 275, 280284 (C.A.5 1982), overruled on other grounds, Newpark Shipbuilding &
Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399, 406-407 (C.A.5) (en banc), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 818, 105 S.Ct. 88, 83 L.Ed.2d 35 (1984), in which the court
held that "the Director has standing to participate as a respondent in the appeal
of a [Benefits Review Board] decision [before the Court of Appeals].'' 65 F.3d,
at 463, n. 2. The court distinguished our decision in Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 514 U.S. 122, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 131 L.Ed.2d 160 (1995), as relevant only to
the question of the Director's standing as a petitioner to the Court of Appeals,
and not as a respondent.

8

The Courts of Appeals are in disagreement over both questions addressed. The
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits are divided on the meaning
of the phrase "person entitled to compensation.'' Compare 65 F.3d, at 464
(potential widow is not a "person entitled to compensation'') with Cretan, supra,
at 847 (potential widow is a "person entitled to compensation''). The Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, and for the District of
Columbia, are split over whether the Director may participate in proceedings
before the Courts of Appeals as a respondent. Compare Parker v. Director,
OWCP, 75 F.3d 929, 935 (C.A.4 1996) (Director may not appear), cert. denied,
519 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 58, 136 L.Ed.2d 21 (1996) with Shahady v. Atlas Tile &
Marble Co., 673 F.2d 479, 483-484 (C.A.D.C.1982) (Director is a proper
respondent as a person "adversely affected or aggrieved'' by the decision
below); Goldsmith v. Director, OWCP, 838 F.2d 1079, 1080 (C.A.9 1988)
(same); White, supra, at 281-282 (Director may appear pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a)).

9

We granted certiorari to resolve these splits, 517 U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1671, 134
L.Ed.2d 775 (1996).
II

10

We begin our inquiry into the meaning of the phrase "person entitled to
compensation'' in §33(g), as we must, with an examination of the language of
the statute. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 465, 112
L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) ("In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its
language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning'') (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Section 33(g)(1) states in pertinent part:

11

"If the person entitled to compensation . . . enters into a settlement with a third
person . . . for an amount less than the compensation to which the person . . .
would be entitled under this chapter, the employer shall be liable for
compensation as determined under subsection (f) of this section only if written
approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer and the employer's
carrier, before the settlement is executed, and by the person entitled to
compensation . . . . '' 33 U.S.C. §933(g)(1) (emphasis added).

12

The plain language of this subsection reveals two salient points. First, the use of
the present tense (i.e., "enters'') indicates that the "person entitled to
compensation'' must be so entitled at the time of settlement. Second, the
ordinary meaning of the word "entitle'' indicates that the "person entitled to
compensation'' must at the very least be qualified to receive compensation.
Black's Law Dictionary 532 (6th ed.1990) (defining "entitle'' as "To qualify for;
to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or claiming'').

13

We reached the same conclusion in Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,
505 U.S. 469, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). There, Cowart, an
injured worker, settled with a third party without obtaining the consent of his
employer or his employer's insurance carrier. Cowart thereafter filed a claim for
disability benefits under the Act, which his employer contested. The employer
argued that Cowart had been a "person entitled to compensation'' under the Act
at the time of his settlement, and that his failure to obtain his employer's
approval of the settlement barred any further recovery of benefits under the
Act. In response, Cowart asserted that he had not been a "person entitled to
compensation'' when he entered into the settlement because that phrase referred
only "to injured workers who are either already receiving compensation
payments from their employer, or in whose favor an award of compensation has
been entered.'' Id., at 475, 112 S.Ct., at 2594.

14

The Court held that Cowart was barred by §33(g) from receiving further
compensation under the Act. We recognized that the relevant time for
examining whether a person is "entitled to compensation'' is the time of
settlement. Ibid. —("The question is whether Cowart, at the time of . . .
settlement, was a "person entitled to compensation' under the terms of §33(g)
(1) of the LHWCA''). We then addressed the definition of the term "person
entitled to compensation.'' We said:

15

"Both in legal and general usage, the normal meaning of entitlement includes a
right or benefit for which a person qualifies, and it does not depend upon
whether the right has been acknowledged or adjudicated. It means only that the
person satisfies the prerequisites attached to the right.'' Id., at 477, 112 S.Ct., at
2595.

16

We concluded that Cowart had satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining the
permanent disability benefits at issue in that case when he was injured, so that
he was a "person entitled to compensation'' and required to obtain his
employer's approval at the time he entered into the settlement agreement. Ibid.

17

With Cowart and the plain language of §33(g) in mind, the relevant inquiry in
this case is whether Mrs. Yates satisfied the prerequisites for obtaining death
benefits under the Act at the time she signed the releases contained in the
predeath settlements. Section 9 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §909(b), governs the
distribution of death benefits, and provides that a "widow or widower'' is
entitled to such benefits " [i]f the [employee's] injury causes death.'' See also
§902(11) (defining "death'' as a basis for a right to compensation as "death
resulting from an injury''); §902(2) (defining "injury'' as "accidental injury or
death arising out of and in the course of employment''). The Act defines a
"widow or widower'' as "the decedent's wife or husband living with or
dependent for support upon him or her at the time of his or her death; or living
apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his or her desertion at such time.''
§902(16).

18

Taken together, these statutes indicate that a surviving spouse qualifies for
death benefits only if: (i) the survivor's deceased worker-spouse dies from a
work-related injury; (ii) the survivor is married to the worker-spouse at the
time of the worker-spouse's death; and (iii) the survivor is either living with the
worker-spouse, dependent upon the worker-spouse, or living apart from the
worker-spouse because of desertion or other justifiable cause at the time of the
worker-spouse's death. Cf. Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334, 336, 74 S.Ct.
555, 556, 98 L.Ed. 733 (1954) (looking to status of spouse at time of death to
determine whether spouse is a "widow'' or "widower'' for purposes of
LHWCA). It is impossible to ascertain whether these prerequisites have been
met at any time prior to the death of the injured worker. Accord, Cortner v.
Chevron Int'l Oil Co., 22 BRBS 218, 220 (1989) ("It is not until death occurs
that the right to benefits arises and the potential beneficiaries are identified'');
51 Fed.Reg. 4270, 4276 (1986) ("Since a claim for survivor benefits does not
arise until the employee's death, there is no claim [against the employer] that
can be settled [before then]''). We therefore reject the argument that a person
seeking death benefits under the Act can satisfy the prerequisites for those
benefits at any earlier time-e.g., when the worker is initially injured or when
the worker enters into a predeath settlement. See also 20 CFR §702.241(g)
(1996) (no one can enter a settlement agreement with the employer regarding
death benefits before the worker dies). Because Mrs. Yates' husband was alive
at the time she released her potential wrongful death actions, she was not a
"person entitled to compensation'' at that time and was therefore not obligated
to seek Ingalls' approval to preserve her entitlement to statutory death benefits.

19

Ingalls contends that the plain language of §33(g)(1) mandates a contrary
conclusion. Ingalls' analysis focuses on the presence of the phrase "would be
entitled'':

20

"If the person entitled to compensation . . . enters into a settlement with a third
person . . . for an amount less than the compensation to which the person . . .
would be entitled under this Act, the employer shall be liable [only if approval
is obtained].'' 33 U.S.C. §933(g)(1) (emphasis added).

21

Because this subsection examines the compensation to which the person
"would be entitled'' under the Act, argues Ingalls, it "encompasses a broad
forward looking concept'' that effectively brings any "person who would be
entitled to compensation'' within its purview. Brief for Petitioners 15. As
support, Ingalls draws upon the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Cretan v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 F.3d 843 (1993). On facts almost
identical to those presented here, the Court of Appeals held that the injured
worker's spouse was a "person entitled to compensation'' for death benefits
prior to her husband's death. The court found "little sense in a distinction that
turns on whether the death for which settlement is made has yet to occur.'' Id.,
at 847.

22

Ingalls essentially takes issue with our conclusion that the proper time to
evaluate whether a person is "entitled to compensation'' is the time of
settlement. Ingalls' position is at odds with our precedent, see Cowart, 505 U.S.,
at 475, 112 S.Ct., at 2594, and with the plain language of this statute, supra, at
__. The phrase "would be entitled'' in subsection (g)(1) simply frames the
inquiry into whether the approval requirement applies at all. If the person
entitled to compensation enters into a settlement for an amount less than that to
which the person "would be entitled'' under the Act, then the employer's
approval must be obtained. If the settlement is for an amount greater than or
equal to the amount to which the person "would be entitled,'' then the
employer's approval need not be obtained. Id., at 482, 112 S.Ct., at 2597-2598.
Ingalls' reading would assign an additional and unnecessary purpose to the
phrase. Under Ingalls' suggested reading, a worker's spouse who signs a
predeath settlement is considered a "person entitled to compensation'' even
though, in the time between the settlement and the worker's death, the worker's
spouse might become ineligible for those death benefits (e. g., by predeceasing
or divorcing the worker). In this context, the worker's spouse would not
actually be entitled to death benefits, but would nonetheless be considered the
"person entitled'' to such benefits. This reading cannot be supported by the
statutory language.

23

Ingalls also contends that we should depart from a plain reading of the statutory
language because strict adherence to it is at odds with the policies underlying
the Act. More specifically, Ingalls avers that our reading of §33(g) will
effectively abrogate the employer's right to offset its liability for death benefits
by any amounts received by the surviving spouse in predeath settlements.
Section 33(f) allows an employer to reduce its compensation obligations under
the Act by the net amount of damages that the "person entitled to
compensation'' recovers from third parties. 33 U.S.C. §933(f) ("If the person
entitled to compensation institutes proceedings . . . the employer shall be
required to pay as compensation under this chapter a sum equal to the excess of
the amount which the Secretary determines is payable on account of such injury
or death over the net amount recovered against such third person''). If, as
Ingalls asserts, the phrase "person entitled to compensation'' means the same
thing under §33(f) as it does under §33(g), see Cowart, supra, at 479, 112 S.Ct.,
at 2596, then our holding today means that an employer would not be permitted
to reduce the spouse's death benefits by any amounts the spouse receives from
predeath settlements. Such a spouse would be able to recover once from the
third party and again from the worker's employer under the Act after the
worker's death. In effect, a spouse in this situation-unlike a spouse who entered
into settlements the day after the worker dies-would receive double recovery
for her injuries. This double recovery, Ingalls contends, contravenes one of the
central tenets of the Act set forth in §3(e), 33 U.S.C. §903(e), of the Act: "
[A]ny amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death for
which benefits are claimed under this chapter pursuant to any other workers'
compensation law or section 688 of title 46, Appendix (relating to recovery for
injury to or death of seamen), shall be credited against any liability imposed by
this chapter.'' See also Cowart, supra, at 483, 112 S.Ct., at 2598 (noting that the
Act "ensures against fraudulent double recovery by the employee''); 2A A.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §71.21 (1996) (" [T]he policy of
avoiding double recovery is a strong one . . . ''). In Ingalls' view, our reading of
the statute gives a "potential widow . . . greater benefits and protections than
that afforded to covered employees who settle their third party claims.'' Brief
for Petitioners 22-23.

24

This entire argument, however, presupposes that the definition we today give to
"person entitled to compensation'' under §33(g) applies without qualification to
§33(f) as well. This is a question we have yet to decide, and is one we leave for
another day. If, for the sake of argument, we assumed that Ingalls' proposition
were correct, our conclusion on the question presented in this case would not
change. We agree that the Act generally reflects a policy of avoiding double
recovery. See 33 U.S.C. §903(e). But §903(e) is of fairly recent vintage, Pub.L.
98-426, 98 Stat. 1640; E.P. Paup Co. v. Director, OWCP, 999 F.2d 1341, 1350
(C.A.9 1993) ("Prior to [enactment of] section 903(e), the credit doctrine
allowed offset of benefits against LHWCA awards only if prior benefits were
awarded under the LHWCA'') (emphasis added), and its reach is not allinclusive. See, e. g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 848 F.2d 125
(C.A.9 1988) (allowing double recovery of veterans disability benefits and
LHWCA benefits); Brown v. Forest Oil Corp., 29 F.3d 966, 971 (C.A.5 1994)
("Although admittedly the LHWCA has a general policy to avoid double
recoveries, we have also noted that limitations on employee recovery are not
favored absent statutory authority'') (footnote omitted). Because the prohibition
against double recovery is not absolute, we do not find the possibility of such
recovery in this context to be so absurd or glaringly unjust as to warrant a
departure from the plain language of the statute. See United States v. Rodgers,
466 U.S. 475, 484, 104 S.Ct. 1942, 1948, 80 L.Ed.2d 492 (1984) (plain
language controls unless it leads to results that are ""absurd or glaringly
unjust'''). Furthermore, as Ingalls acknowledges, see Reply Brief for Petitioners
13, subrogation under the Act is not an employer's exclusive remedy against
third parties responsible for employees' injuries; an employer in Ingalls'
position would remain free to seek indemnification against a third party through
a tort action in state or federal court. Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461
U.S. 529, 538, 103 S.Ct. 1991, 1996, 76 L.Ed.2d 120 (1983); Federal Marine
Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, 412-414, 89 S.Ct.
1144, 1149-1150, 22 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). Accordingly, we hold that before an
injured worker's death, the worker's spouse is not a "person entitled to
compensation'' for death benefits within the meaning of LHWCA §33(g), and
does not forfeit the right to collect death benefits under the Act for failure to
obtain the worker's employer's approval of settlements entered into before the
worker's death.
III

25

Ingalls also challenges the "standing'' of the Director, OWCP, to appear before
the courts of appeals as a respondent in cases in which there are already two
adverse litigants. To assess this claim, familiarity with the Act's appeals
process, as well as with the Director's role within that process, is helpful.

26

A person seeking compensation under the Act must file a timely claim with the
local deputy commissioner. 33 U.S.C. §913(a) (one-year limitation period).
The commissioner notifies the employer of the claim, §919(b), at which time
the employer might: (i) agree to pay the amount of benefits fixed by the Act, 20
CFR §702.231 et seq. (1996) (procedures for payment of noncontroverted
claims); (ii) enter into a formal settlement with the person seeking
compensation for a (presumably) lesser amount, subject to the approval of the
deputy commissioner or an ALJ, 33 U.S.C. §908(i); 20 CFR §702.241 et seq.
(1996); or (iii) give notice that it is denying liability for, or controverting, the
claim, §702.251. If the employer controverts the claim, the deputy
commissioner is empowered to attempt to resolve the parties' dispute
informally. §702.311 et seq. Should informal discussions prove unsuccessful,
the commissioner refers the matter to an ALJ and a formal hearing is held. 33
U.S.C. §§919(c)-(d); 20 CFR §702.316 (1996). " [A]ny party in interest'' may
appeal the ALJ's decision to the Benefits Review Board. 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3).
An appeal from the Board's decision to the courts of appeals may be initiated
by " [a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board.''
§921(c); see also 20 CFR §802.410(a) (1996).

27

The Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs plays a
significant role in this process. In addition to being charged with the LHWCA's
administration, §701.202 (transferring to the Director "all functions of the
Department of Labor with respect to the administration of benefits programs
under the [LHWCA]''), and enforcement, §802.410(b) (noting that Director is
"responsible for the administration and enforcement of the [LHWCA]''); see
also Newport News, 514 U.S., at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 1287 (noting Director's "duty
of uniform administration and enforcement''), the Director has also been
authorized by the Secretary of Labor to appear as a litigant before the relevant
adjudicative branches of the Department of Labor, the ALJ and the Benefits
Review Board. 20 CFR §702.333(b) (1996) ("The Solicitor of Labor or his
designee may appear and participate in any formal hearing [before an ALJ]
held pursuant to these regulations on behalf of the Director as an interested
party''); §802.202(a) ("Any party . . . may appear before and/or submit written
argument to the [Benefits Review] Board''); §801.2(a)(10) (defining "party'' to
include "the Secretary or his designee''); §802.201(a) ("The Director, OWCP . .
. shall [under certain circumstances] be considered a party adversely affected''
for purposes of initiating appeal to Board).

28

The Director may also appear before the Courts of Appeals, although the limits
of the Director's authority to do so are less clear. Section 21(c) of the Act, 33
U.S.C. §921(c), provides in relevant part that:

29

" [a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board
may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the
circuit in which the injury occurred . . . . ''

30

In Newport News, we held that "the phrase "person adversely affected or
aggrieved' does not refer to an agency acting in its governmental capacity,'' 514
U.S., at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 1285, so that the Director was therefore not permitted
to appeal from a decision of the Benefits Review Board when the Board's
decision did no more than "impai[r] [the Director's] ability to achieve the Act's
purposes and to perform the administrative duties the Act prescribes,'' id., at ---, 115 S.Ct., at 1283. We expressed no view on the question whether the
Director can appear before the court of appeals, not as a petitioner seeking
review, but as a respondent. Id., at ----, n. 2, 115 S.Ct., at 1284, n. 2.

31

Any impediment to the Director's appearance as a respondent in this case is not
of constitutional origin. As we stated in Newport News, although the Director
had no statutory authorization to petition the Court of Appeals, "Congress could
have conferred standing upon the Director without infringing Article III of the
Constitution.'' Id., at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 1286. In light of this observation, Article
III surely poses no bar to the Director's participation as a respondent in those
courts. Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1707, 90
L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (reserving question whether persons seeking to intervene
"must satisfy not only the requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art III'').

32

Whether the Director has statutory authority to appear as a respondent before
the courts of appeals is not as easily resolved. The Act itself does not speak to
the issue. Section 21(c) of the Act, by its very terms, defines only who "may
obtain a review of [a final order of the Board],'' 33 U.S.C. §921(c); it does not
purport to delineate who may appear in those proceedings once a proper party
initiates them. Thus, we must reject Ingalls' argument that §21(c) requires the
Director to demonstrate an "advers[e] [e]ffect or aggriev[ement]'' in order to
appear as a respondent.

33

Section 21a of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §921a, similarly provides no authorization.
While §21a states that " [a]ttorneys appointed by the Secretary shall represent
the Secretary, the deputy commissioner, or the Board in any court proceedings
under section 921 of this title or other provisions of this chapter,'' it says
nothing about when the Secretary may be a party to those proceedings in the
first place. See also 20 CFR §802.410(b) (1996) ("The Director, OWCP . . .
shall be deemed to be the proper party on behalf of the Secretary of Labor in all
review proceedings conducted pursuant to section 21(c) of the LHWCA''). Nor
need we infer the Director's right to appear as a respondent in order for §21a to
have meaning. Although Newport News curtailed the Secretary's right to appear
as a petitioner before the courts of appeals in most circumstances, that decision
did not foreclose an appearance as a petitioner in all situations. See, e. g.,
Newport News, supra, at ----, n. 3, 115 S.Ct., at 1284, n. 3 (leaving open the
possibility that the Director may be a "person adversely affected or aggrieved''
when appealing a Board ruling adverse to the §944 fund).

34

Left with no guidance from the Act itself, we turn to the general rule that
governs all appeals from administrative agencies to the courts of appeals,
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a). That Rule, in pertinent part, states:

35

"Review of an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer
(hereinafter, the term "agency' will include agency, board, commission, or
officer) must be obtained by filing with the clerk of a court of appeals . . . [the
appropriate form indicated by law] . . . . In each case the agency must be named
respondent. '' Fed. Rule App. Proc. 15(a) (emphasis added).

36

We believe that it is this Rule that confers upon the Director the right to appear
as a respondent before the courts of appeals. Rule 15(a) clearly applies to
appeals from the Benefits Review Board: The LHWCA authorizes appellate
review of the "final order of the [Benefits Review] Board,'' 33 U.S.C. §921(c),
and Rule 15(a) applies to " [r]eview of an order of an administrative agency [or]
board.'' We decline to read Rule 15(a) more narrowly, as the Courts of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit and the District of Columbia have done. Those courts
have held that Rule 15(a) applies only where "a single private party is
contesting the action of an agency, which agency must appear and defend on
the merits to insure the proper adversarial clash requisite to a "case or
controversy.''' McCord v. Benefits Review Board, 514 F.2d 198, 200
(C.A.D.C.1975). Where "there is sufficient adversity between [the employer
and the claimant] to insure proper litigation'', ibid., they reason, "the Director's
presence as a party is not necessary'' and would in fact run afoul of Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1(b) by "extend[ing] . . . the jurisdiction of the courts of
appeals.'' Parker, 75 F.3d, at 934 (citing McCord, supra, at 200); see also Fed.
Rule App. Proc. 1(b) ("These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as established by law'').

37

We reject this interpretation, which would effectively require us to tack the
words "when necessary to preserve adversity'' onto the otherwise unqualified
language in Rule 15(a) that "the agency must be named respondent.'' Where
there is already a case or controversy between parties properly before a court,
as there is in this case between Ingalls and Mrs. Yates who properly appear
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §921(c), that court's jurisdiction is not extended by the
inclusion of an additional party whose presence is also consistent with Article
III, see supra, at __. See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d
35, 42, n. 5 (C.A.2 1976) ("The existence of sufficient adversity between
private parties has not been thought to preclude the Government's right to be a
party in many other sorts of review of federal administrative action''), aff'd. on
other grounds, sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S.
249, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). Justice Scalia is concerned that
Rule 1(b) might be violated in the converse situation-i.e., when the Director is
the sole respondent whose presence is "necessary to preserve adversity.'' See
post, at __. Although the Director's participation in that case would not extend
the courts' jurisdiction beyond the perimeter of Article III, see Newport News,
514 U.S., at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 1286 (no Article III impediment to the director's
participation), it is possible that such participation might exceed the court's
statutory authority to hear the case. While this transgression of statutory
authority is not a question we decide today, it nevertheless raises a concern
relevant to our interpretation of Rule 15(a). We do not find this concern
controlling, however, when, as in this case, the Director is not in fact the sole
respondent.

38

Having concluded that Rule 15(a) applies, the question becomes which
"agency'' must be named as a respondent. When an agency has a unitary
structure-i.e., where a single entity wears the hats of adjudicator and
litigator/enforcer-the application of Rule 15(a) is straightforward. The Federal
Communications Commission, for instance, has adjudicative duties, 47 U.S.C.
§§154(j), 155(c), as well as enforcement duties that require it to appear as a
litigant, 47 U.S.C. §402. It is therefore proper to name the FCC as the
respondent "agency'' in proceedings before the courts of appeals under Rule
15(a). Indeed, it is necessary to do so, since the FCC is the only "agency'' that
could be named. See also 29 U.S.C. §160(f) (National Labor Relations Board
adjudicates unfair labor practice claims and litigates before the courts of
appeals); 16 U.S.C. §§825f, 825g (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
investigates, enforces, and adjudicates violations of the Federal Power Act).

39

But not all agencies share this unitary structure. Some have a split-function
regime in which Congress places adjudicatory authority outside the agency
charged with administering and enforcing the statute. The Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, for example, gives general enforcement authority to
the Department of Labor, but vests adjudicatory authority in an independent
body, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. See 29 U.S.C.
§§651(b)(3), 661; Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
499 U.S. 144, 147, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 1174, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). See also 30
U.S.C. §§811, 823 (authorizing Secretary of Labor to promulgate health and
safety standards under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, but
establishing independent Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
to exercise adjudicatory authority under the Act). Other split-function regimes
involve only one agency, whose adjudicative and enforcement/litigation duties
have been divided by Congress between two sub-"agencies,'' both of which are
under the umbrella of the same overarching agency.

40

In this latter type of split-function regime, the only type that we address today,
it is the overarching agency that is the "agency'' for the purposes of Rule 15(a),
since an order of the agency's designated adjudicator is in reality an order of the
agency itself. That "agency'' may then be free to designate its enforcer/litigator
as its voice before the courts of appeals. To require the agency's adjudicator to
appear before the courts of appeals makes little sense because that adjudicator
has no more interest or stake in defending its orders in the courts of appeals
than does a district court. It would also compel what we believe is a strange
result-the substitution of an agency's adjudicator for its designated litigator
once the case reaches the courts of appeals.

41

Although our interpretation of Rule 15(a), as the dissent points out, is not free
from anomalies, neither is the dissent's interpretation. In particular, we take
issue with the dissent's view that the overarching agency must have absolute
veto power over the decisions of its adjudicator before the adjudicator is
deemed to be "within'' the agency and before the order of one can be considered
the order of the other. Compare 8 CFR §3.1(h) (1996)(Attorney General may
review and modify decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's adjudicator). Other methods of agency
oversight exist, and an agency's inability to employ the most compelling form
of oversight does not mean it possesses no supervisory authority over its
tribunal or that it is therefore somehow unfair to treat the adjudicator's order as
the agency's. The Secretary of Labor's power under the LHWCA to appoint all
five members of the Benefits Review Board, 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(1), and to
establish the rules of procedure of the Board, 20 CFR §802.101 et seq. (1996),
demonstrates the Secretary's indirect but substantial control over the Board and
its decisions. Perhaps these concerns animated the Courts of Appeals actually
confronted with this situation, since they have seen fit, in over 2,000 decisions,
to allow the Director's participation as a respondent. WESTLAW, CTA
database (Jan. 21, 1997). Should Congress wish to alter this review scheme, it
is, of course, free to do so.

42

As it stands now, however, we conclude that the Director may be named as a
respondent in the courts of appeals. By statute and by regulation, the
adjudicative and enforcement/litigation functions of the Department of Labor
with respect to the LHWCA are divided between the ALJs and the Benefits
Review Board on the one hand, 20 CFR §702.332 (1996) (formal hearings
conducted by ALJs); 33 U.S.C. §921(b) (appeals from ALJs heard by Benefits
Review Board), and the Director on the other, see supra, at __-__. Because the
Benefits Review Board is a subdivision of the Department of Labor, see
H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 12 (1972)(describing Board as "provid[ing] an
internal administrative review of initial decisions in contested cases by a threeman board within the Department of Labor'') (emphasis added); 20 CFR §801
et seq. (1996) (describing "establishment and the organizations structure of the
Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor'') (emphasis added), the
Board's order is the Department's order, and the Department of Labor is the
"agency'' for the purposes of Rule 15(a). Congress, however, has delegated to
the Secretary of Labor, the Department's chief administrator, the right to choose
the Department's legal representative, 33 U.S.C. §921a, and the Secretary has
exercised that discretion by naming the Director as the Department's designated
litigant in the courts of appeals. 20 CFR §802.410(b) (1996).

43

This conclusion does not upset the balance of representation in the courts of
appeals. Although in Newport News we held that the Director does not always
have the right to appeal as a petitioner to the courts of appeals, 514 U.S., at ----,
115 S.Ct., at 1287-1288, and we now hold that the Director may appear as a
respondent before those courts, this will not result in a "lopsided'' scheme
whereby the Director can appear only in defense of the Benefit Review Board's
decisions. The Director, even as a respondent, is free to argue on behalf of the
petitioner, see Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297,
301, 103 S.Ct. 634, 639, 74 L.Ed.2d 465 (1983) (Director appeared as
respondent before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit but filed a brief
on behalf of the petitioner), and to challenge the decision of the Board. Indeed,
the Director's participation before the courts of appeals would be plenary but
for the inability to initiate an appeal; the Director must usually wait for
someone else to do so first. Although this is unusual, it does not result in a
"lopsided'' proceeding and is an oddity wrought by congressional "oversight,''
Newport News, supra, at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 1288 (GINSBURG, J., concurring),
and not by virtue of our holding today.

44

For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit is affirmed.

45

It is so ordered.

46

Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

47

Today's opinion concludes, on the basis of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
15(a), that the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, a
sub-agency within the Department of Labor, is a proper respondent in the
courts of appeals when review is sought of an order of the Benefits Review
Board (BRB), an independent adjudicatory body within that Department. This
conclusion is at odds with the plain language of the Rule, and produces a
bizarre arrangement that will have troublesome consequences for both agencies
and private parties. I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment on this
issue.

48

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a) provides:

49

"Review of an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer
(hereinafter, the term "agency' will include agency, board, commission, or
officer) must be obtained by filing [a petition for review] . . . . In each case the
agency must be named respondent.''

50

It is clear (and the Court does not say otherwise) that despite the Rule's
shorthand use of "agency'' in the second sentence, the entity that must be named
respondent is the one whose order is under review, whether it is an agency,
board, commission, or officer. Thus, in determining whether the Rule
authorizes the Director, as representative of the Department of Labor, to appear
as a respondent in the courts of appeals, the central question is whether the
order under review is that of the Department. The answer to that question is
obviously and unavoidably no.

51

To begin with, the very statute that provides for the judicial review at issue
indicates that the order under review is that of the BRB:

52

"Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the Board may
obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit
in which the injury occurred . . . . Upon such filing, the court shall have
jurisdiction of the proceeding and shall have the power to give a decree
affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, the order of the
Board . . . . '' 44 Stat. 1436-1437, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §921(c) (emphasis
added).

53

The governing statute elsewhere specifies that the Board is the statutorily
created entity responsible for "hear[ing] and determin[ing] appeals . . . taken by
any party in interest from decisions with respect to claims of employees under''
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). §921(b)(3).
The Board's disposition of those appeals is not subject to review by the
Secretary of Labor in his capacity as head of the Department, but must be
appealed to the courts pursuant to the review provision quoted above.

54

Despite the clarity of the statute, the Court concludes that it is "in reality'' an
order of the Department that is under review in the courts of appeals. Ante, at
__-__. It offers two arguments in support of this proposition. First, it saysrelying upon a regulation promulgated by the Secretary, 20 CFR §801.1 (1996),
and upon a statement in the House Report on the LHWCA Amendments of
1972, 86 Stat. 1251-that the Board is "a subdivision of the Department of
Labor.'' Ante, at __. But of course neither a Secretary's regulation nor a House
Committee's report has the power to transform a statutory entity into something
it is not. While the Board may be a "subdivision'' of the Department of Laborand thereby subject to the Secretary's authority-for certain purposes, see, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. §921(b)(1) (Secretary appoints Board members); §939(a) ("Except as
otherwise specifically provided, the Secretary shall administer the provisions
of'' the LHWCA); 20 CFR §802.101 et seq. (1996) (regulations of Secretary
establishing rules of procedure for Board), the Court expressly acknowledges
that the Board is not a subdivision in the sense that the Secretary, as head of the
Department, can direct or override its decisions. Ante, at __-__. But that sense
is the one relevant to the question whether an order of the Board is "in reality''
an order of the Department, ante, at __. Insofar as vindication of the order is
concerned, there is no "necessary identity of interest'' between the Board and
the Department or the Director as its chosen delegate. Shahady v. Atlas Tile &
Marble Co., 673 F.2d 479, 485 (C.A.D.C.1982) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, the
Department through its delegate may well be hoping to see the Board's order
overturned in the court of appeals. See, e.g., Parker v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, 75 F.3d 929, 932-934, 935, n. 7 (C.A.4),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 58, 136 L.Ed.2d 21 (1996); Simpson v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 681 F.2d 81, 82 (C.A.1
1982), cert. denied sub nom. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of
Workers Compensation Programs, 459 U.S. 1127, 103 S.Ct. 762, 74 L.Ed.2d
977 (1983). The Court's attribution of the Board's order to the Department
contradicts our recognition, only two Terms ago, that it is "quite simply
contrary to the whole structure'' of the LHWCA to view the Board's
adjudicatory functions as the province of (implicitly) the Department as
overarching agency and (explicitly) the Director as its delegate. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 1287, 131 L.Ed.2d 160 (1995).

55

The second argument offered in support of the view that the Director is a proper
respondent when review is sought of an order of the Board is that (1) Rule
15(a) requires the naming of someone representing the agency, and (2) the
Director is certainly a more sensible candidate than the Board. Ante, at __, __.
The second part of this analysis, the faute de mieux point, is questionable: The
Board could readily develop a staff to defend its judgments, and it is hard to
imagine a worse defender than an entity that is free to disagree (and often does
disagree) with the order under review. Cf. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 42, n. 5 (C.A.2 1976) (Friendly, J.) (suggesting that
Board rather than Director is proper respondent), aff'd. on other grounds sub
nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 97 S.Ct. 2348,
53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977). But the real flaw in the reasoning is the first step,
which assumes that when Rule 15(a) states that the "agency, board,
commission, or officer'' whose order is under review "must be named
respondent,'' it means to confer upon such entities (or, in the Court's view, their
parent agencies) a party status and litigating power they would not otherwise
possess-so that a purely adjudicatory body with no policymaking responsibility,
which would otherwise not be a party, is suddenly free to step in (perhaps
through its parent) to "defend'' its judgment. That is not only an unlikely
function for the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to perform (and thus an
unlikely reading of the language of Rule 15(a), which, contrary to the Court's
suggestion, see ante, at __, is far from unambiguous on this point); it is an
impermissible function, since it may give appellate courts jurisdiction over a
dispute (if it can be called a dispute) that would otherwise be beyond their ken,
namely, one in which the victorious private party to the lower-court
adjudication has no interest in defending it, and only the adjudicator itself (or
its parent) appears. That extension of litigation would violate Rule 1(b), which
provides that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure "shall not be construed
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals as established by
law.'' Fed. Rule App. Proc. 1(b). In the present context, for example, if the
victorious employer against whom the employee takes an appeal chooses not to
contest it, or ceases to exist while the appeal is pending, the agency's status as a
party respondent would permit continued litigation of the appeal. The concern
with extending the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals through participation of
the Director is more than theoretical; he has in the past sought to continue
litigation of claims (at least at the Board level) that the employee and employer
preferred not to pursue. E.g., Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Systems, Inc. v.
White, 681 F.2d 275, 277 (C.A.5 1982), overruled on other grounds, Newpark
Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399, 407 (C.A.5 1984).

56

The Court's response to all of this is that concerns about extension of
jurisdiction are "not . . . controlling'' in this case, since both private parties are
participating. Ante, at __-__. But of course when we interpret a rule of general
application, such as Rule 15(a), we are bound to take into account not only the
ramifications of our interpretation for the case before us, but also the
ramifications for future cases. Indeed, a different approach would make the
meaning we ascribe to the general rule turn on the specifics of the case that first
raises the issue. For good reason, that is not our practice. Because interpreting
Rule 15(a) to make the Director a party would sometimes extend the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, and because Rule 1(b) requires that the
Rule be construed to avoid that result, the Rule should not be given the
meaning that today's opinion accords it.

57

Invoking Rule 15(a) (and, of course, ignoring the identity of the body that
issued the order) is the only imaginable basis for concluding that the Director is
always a proper respondent in the courts of appeals, regardless of the outcome
below. There is, however, a respectable argument in support of his respondent
status when he participates before the Board and prevails. That parties in
whose favor the judgment under review runs are ordinarily proper respondents
or appellees in the courts of appeals is so obvious that the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure-which, contrary to the Court's belief, purport to prescribe
which parties must be named, not who is a party-do not bother to provide for
the naming of such individuals. (That is to say, there is no analogue to Rule
15(a) for them.)

58

But the Director-even assuming he is entitled to participate as a party before the
Board, compare 20 CFR §802.201(a)(1) (1996) (allowing participation) with
Newport News, supra, at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 1283 (" [T]he [LHWCA] does not by
its terms . . . grant [the Director] authority to prosecute appeals to the Board'')is not an ordinary prevailing party. An ordinary party in that position would, if
he had lost below, have the right to prosecute an appeal. The Director, in
contrast, has no such power. Newport News, supra. This inability to appeal
reflects the limited character of the interests of the Director affected by the
Board's judgment, which include neither his exposure to financial or other
liability, nor nullification of one of his own orders, but only legal or policy
disagreement with the Board's decision.* It would be an odd and novel result if
the Director, in cases of this nature, could be named as a respondent if he was
on the prevailing side below, but could not initiate an appeal if he was on the
losing side. I would not reach such a result unless the statute left no choice,
which is not the case here.

59

Finally, I may observe that today's game has really not been worth the candle.
The strange and countertextual arrangement that the Court has constructed
might perhaps be excused if excluding the Director from party status would do
some substantial harm to the scheme of the LHWCA. But it does not. His
"significant role'' in administering the Act, ante, at __, does not mean that his
participation in proceedings before the courts of appeals is essential. As we
emphasized in Newport News, limits on the Director's ability to participate in
the judicial-review process are of relatively minor consequence because his
"power to resolve legal ambiguities in the statute'' may always be exercised
through his rulemaking authority. 514 U.S., at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 1287. In
addition, the Director is guaranteed the right to file an amicus brief in the court
of appeals, with or without the consent of the parties. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 29.

60

***

61

I think it plain that the intent of Rule 15(a) is not to restructure the Executive
Branch, or to convert Article I courts (or their parent agencies) into litigating
arms, but rather simply to require that those agencies entitled to party statusi.e., those that would be entitled to intervene in the appeal under the criteria set
forth in Rule 15(d)-must be named as respondents. By making the Rule much
more than that, and then flatly misidentifying, through sheer will power, the
agency whose "order'' is at issue, the Court creates a zany system in which an
Executive officer from whom the Board has carefully been made independent,
and one who will often disagree with-and perhaps even have argued against-the
Board's judgment, will be charged with "defending'' that judgment in the court
of appeals, where, once arrived, he is free instead to maintain an independent
attack upon the judgment, even though, as we held in Newport News, he would
not have been able to launch that attack by appealing on his own. Today's
disposition regarding the Director's status is at odds with the relevant provisions
of law and creates the potential for disruption of orderly litigation and
settlement of disputes between employers and employees. I respectfully dissent
from that portion of the judgment.

*

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26
S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
In my view the Director is akin to an ordinary respondent or appellee when
he prevails before the Board in his capacity as administrator of the
LHWCA special fund established by 33 U.S.C. §944. In Newport News,
we left open the question whether the Director has standing to appeal an
adverse ruling of the Board when he participates in that capacity. 514
U.S., at ----, n. 1, 115 S.Ct., at 1282, n. 1.