International Relations of Taiwan

Published on January 2017 | Categories: Documents | Downloads: 34 | Comments: 0 | Views: 331
of 3
Download PDF   Embed   Report

Comments

Content

International Relations of Taiwan Mid-term examination Semester 2, 2009 by David Reid 芮大衛 student number: 96924016 Hickey's article looks at the reasons why China perceives Taiwan as an integral part of its territory and seeks to incorporate it as such at some time in the future. Many of the arguments that China uses to stake its claim over Taiwan are easily rebutted. However ,the key point is that on the Chinese side these arguments are widely accepted by the government and the public and this is unlikely to change in the future. Hickey argues that the China's ambitions regarding Taiwan remain an ongoing source of conflict that threatens peace and stability in the region. The framework for Taiwan-China relations was established during the Cold War era. Now the world has moved into a new age of globalisation. The economies of Taiwan and China have developed rapidly and developed a degree of interdependence. Taiwan has established itself as a democracy, while China remains an authoritarian one party state. This new framework of globalisation presents new opportunities for multilateral cooperation and the building of cross border institutions that facilitate this cooperation. The question is will these lead to peace and stability or are there factors in Northeast Asia and cross-Strait relations which make this impossible? Haggard (2004) establishes a framework for analysing the causal factors involved in possible outcomes for Northeast Asia. The three causal factors are: (1) the balance of power; (2) the political effects of economic integration; and (3) the consequences of regime type. Analysis of balance power in the Taiwan-China relationship cannot look at the two countries alone. It must also consider the United States' role and to a lesser degree other countries or groupings with regional influence such as Japan, Russia and the nations of ASEAN. However, the US is the key and even though it doesn't seek to act as a direct intermediary between Beijing and Taipei it has important influence on both sides of the Strait. US relations with Taiwan are based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which says the US will provide defensive weapons to Taiwan. The TRA supports a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan Strait issue, but takes no position on independence or unification. The US position is often described as one of “strategic ambiguity”. In the world of realpolitik the US must seek to balance its interests in China and Taiwan. Avoiding being drawn into a war is a high priority for the US. The US now has considerable economic interests in China and has moved to a closer relationship on that basis while simultaneously recognising China's possible threat to US strategic interests in the Pacific. Hence, at that moment the US may be more accommodating to China and less vocal in its support for Taiwan. China's rise creates the possibility of other countries in the region bandwagoning, that is acceptance of China's dominant role in the region. If other countries acquiesce to China then the US's position is weakened as it lacks key support. This may even lead the US to give up on defending the interests of

the Taiwanese people as spelt out in the TRA. The consequences would be that Taiwan would have to find accommodation with China without US support and the US would effectively retreat from the West Pacific, allowing China to become the sole major power influencing the region's affairs. A question this raises is whether a multilateral institution linking Northeast Asian nations might serve to restrain China. In theory greater interdependence reduces the likelihood of war. While China's economy has expanded rapidly it still depends a lot on foreign investment. Hence, while China might act to promote its own interests it is still constrained by the need to maintain foreign investment. At present the main organisation including Northeast Asian nations is APEC, although its functions are fairly limited. The emerging ASEAN + 3 (China, South Korea and Japan), perhaps provides the most potential for a comprehensive organisation governing the region. However, it currently excludes Taiwan. There are fears that Taiwan will be marginalised if ASEAN expands. This seems to be one of the reasons why the proposed ECFA agreement between Taiwan and China is being pushed forward. It will allow Taiwan to enter FTAs with ASEAN and other countries. The question is will this benefit Taiwan or will it be at the cost of giving China greater leverage over Taiwan's affairs? It may be the case that Taiwan is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't. Taiwan risks undermining its sovereignty through ECFA, yet it also risks being marginalised and denied the ability to participate fully in the regional economy if it can't join regional institutions or sign trade agreements. Different regime types on either side of the Strait have a significant influence on the nature of relations. Taiwan is a democracy and there have been several transitions of power. Each transition of power results in some changes in the way cross-strait relations are handled. Actually both the DPP and KMT have similar goals in terms of developing the three links and managing economic exchanges between Taiwan and China. However, there is considerable difference in the framework under which they seek to achieve these outcomes. The DPP worked under a “One China, One Taiwan” policy where relations were viewed as state-to-state. The new KMT government uses the so-called 1992 Consensus of “One China with different interpretations”. For the DPP sovereignty is a principle that cannot be compromised while the KMT seems to be more flexible on this issue. China is a one party authoritarian state. At present the leadership of the CCP is united and there are no major internal divisions. While the decision making processes of the Party lack transparency, it is at least somewhat predictable and consistent. Changes in its policies and actions toward Taiwan have occurred in response to changes in government in Taiwan. China engaged in saber rattling when the DPP government was in power from 2000-2008. Since the KMT returned to power in 2008 there has been a détente and China has acted in a less aggressive and hostile manner toward Taiwan. At present there seems to be no sign of political reform toward democracy in China. Should such reforms begin at some time in the future it is difficult to predict how this would affect Taiwan. Some might point to democratic peace theory in suggesting democratisation in China would bring peace. However, analyses suggest that transitional or illiberal democracies are more war-prone than either liberal democracies or authoritarian regimes. It is quite possible that a Chinese transition to democracy would have dysfunctional elements. Part of that dysfunction could be an unrestrained nationalism which actively promotes the annexation Taiwan. Growing East Asian economic integration, US reassessment of its policies in the region in light of China's rise and China's authoritarian regime with hegemonic ambitions combine to pose a deep

challenge to Taiwan's future. Taiwan must find creative ways to participate in regional institutions that allow it to be an active participant while maintaining its sovereignty. This is extremely difficult in the face of a powerful Chinese government that denies Taiwan's sovereignty and seeks to annex the island by force if necessary. For those who believe in the fundamental right of the Taiwanese people to determine their own future the outlook is not optimistic.

Sponsor Documents

Or use your account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Forgot your password?

Or register your new account on DocShare.tips

Hide

Lost your password? Please enter your email address. You will receive a link to create a new password.

Back to log-in

Close