Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752 (1942)
Content
315 U.S. 752
62 S.Ct. 854
86 L.Ed. 1166
JACOB
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK.
No. 589.
Argued March 6, 1942.
Decided March 30, 1942.
Messrs. Dominick Blasi, of Brooklyn, N.Y., and Silas B. Axtell, of New
York City, for petitioner.
Mr. Alfred T. White, of New York City, (Messrs. William C. Chanler,
Corp. Counsel, Paxton Blair, and Leon Shaw, all of New York City, on
the brief), for respondent.
Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh
Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether
guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously
guarded by the courts. The present case is a suit by petitioner under the Jones
Act1 for personal injuries sustained when he fell because the wrench he was
using to tighten a nut slipped under the torque applied to it. We are called upon
to determine whether on the evidence adduced by petitioner, and in
contravention of accepted juridical standards, petitioner was wrongfully
deprived of his statutory right to jury trial by the action of the trial court in
dismissing his complaint,2 thereby refusing to submit the case to a jury which
had been duly empanelled to try it. In holding that petitioner had failed to prove
facts sufficient to warrant submitting the issue of respondent's negligence to the
jury, the trial court relied on the so-called simple tool doctrine. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 Cir., 119 F.2d 800. The novel questions thus
presented in the administration of the Jones Act prompted us to grant certiorari.
314 U.S. 595, 62 S.Ct. 117, 86 L.Ed. —-.
2
Petitioner's testimony3 is the complete answer to the question whether the case
should have been taken from the jury. The gist of that testimony is as follows:
For three weeks prior to the accident petitioner, an employee with twenty years'
experience, had been serving as water-tender in charge of the fire-room on the
'Dongan Hills', a ferry-boat operated by respondent between Staten and
Manhattan Islands in New York harbor. One of his duties was to change oil
strainers. This was done about three times a week and required the removal and
replacement of a manifold head, housing the strainers, which was held in place
by six studs and nuts. When the manifold was replaced, the nuts had to be very
tight. The best tool to remove and to tighten the nuts was a straight end wrench
fitting a 1 1/4' nut. Petitioner used an S-shaped end wrench of the proper size
which was 'well worn', 'had seen a lot of service', was 'a loose fit', and 'had a lot
of play on it'. There was about one-sixteenth of an inch 'play in the jaws; it was
worn.' The wrench was about eighteen inches long and the 'play' at the end was
'about an inch'. Petitioner asked the chief engineer for a new wrench three
times, the first request being when petitioner first had occasion to use the worn
wrench to change an oil strainer, and the last two or three days before the
accident. In answer to this last request the chief engineer 'said for me
(petitioner) to look in the tool closet and see if there was one in there; and I
went up there and couldn't find any and I believe he said he sent an order out
for one.' The regular way of requisitioning needed tools was by a report to the
chief engineer. All petitioner was supposed to do was order; he did not know
what respondent kept in its storeroom. The 'Dongan Hills' docked at Manhattan
Island on the average of six or seven times each day. On the day of the accident
petitioner did not renew his request, but he did look in the chief engineer's tool
set. He found no end wrench of the proper size, did not know if a Stillson
wrench was there, but believed that a monkey wrench was. A monkey wrench
could 'probably' be used on any nut. At the time of the accident petitioner was
using the worn, S-shaped, end wrench to tighten the nuts after changing the oil
strainer. There was about five-eighths of an inch of thread on the studs, and
petitioner had changed the wrench on one nut four times. As he started the fifth
tightening, the wrench slipped, causing him to fall from the eighteen inch
square platform on which he was standing to the catwalk eighteen inches
below. In the course of the fall petitioner sustained an injury to his right side
which struck an angle iron alongside the catwalk.
3
The Jones Act, in addition to giving injured seamen the right to trial by jury in
actions arising under the Act, also incorporates 'all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees'. Among such statutes is 45 U.S.C. § 51, 45
U.S.C.A. § 51, which provides in part that a carrier is liable for 'injury or death
* * * by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its (the carrier's)
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works,
boats, wharves or other equipment'.
4
Although proof of negligence is an essential to recovery under the Jones Act,
Kunschman v. United States, 2 Cir., 54 F.2d 987; cf. Beadle v. Spencer, 298
U.S. 124, 128, 56 S.Ct. 712, 713, 80 L.Ed. 1082, contributory negligence and
assumption of risk are not available defenses. The admiralty doctrine of
comparative negligence applies. Secony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S.
424, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed. 265. The salient points of petitioner's testimony,
summarized above, made a sufficient showing to allow the jury to consider the
issue of respondent's negligence. The wrench petitioner was using had become
defective for the purpose for which it was designed. After discovering that
defect petitioner made three requests to the proper person, the chief engineer,
for a new wrench. The first of those requests was about three weeks prior to the
accident, the last but two or three days before it occurred. At that time the chief
engineer said he sent out an order for one, but it was not forthcoming in the two
or three days intervening before the accident despite the fact that the 'Dongan
Hills' docked at Manhattan Island six or seven times a day. While the best tool
for doing the work was a straight end wrench of the proper size, petitioner had
access to a monkey wrench which 'probably' could be used on any nut. We
think these facts entitled petitioner to have the jury consider whether his injury
was caused by any 'defect or insufficiency, due to its (respondent's) negligence,
in its * * * appliances'. That is to say, it was for the jury to decide whether a
monkey wrench was a reasonably safe and suitable tool for petitioner's work,
whether respondent's failure, although it had at least two days' and possibly
three weeks' notice of the defect, to supply petitioner with a new wrench
amounted to negligence on its part, and whether respondent, after it had
knowledge of the defect, might not have reasonably foreseen the possibility of
resulting harm if it allowed the worn wrench to remain in use. Cf. SoconyVacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, supra. Without doubt the case is close and a jury
might find either way. But that is no reason for a court to usurp the function of
the jury. We are satisfied that a due respect for the statutory guaranty of the
right of jury trial, with its resulting benefits, requires the submission of this
case to the jury.
5
The simple tool doctrine, used by the courts below to bolster their belief that
the evidence was insufficient, does not affect our conclusion. In the first place,
the contrariety of opinion as to the reasons for and the scope of the simple tool
doctrine, and the uncertainty of its application,4 suggest that it should not apply
to cases arising under legislation, such as the Jones Act, designed to enlarge in
some measure the rights and remedies of injured employees.5 But even
assuming its applicability, the doctrine does not justify withdrawing this case
from the jury. For the only possible basis for the doctrine which is compatible
with the provisions and policy of the Jones Act is that the master is not
negligent in the case of defective simple tools because the possibility of injury
from such tools is so slight as to impose no duty on him to see that they are free
from defects in the first instance or to inspect them thereafter.6 Newbern v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Cir., 68 F.2d 523; cf. Hedicke v. Highland
Springs Co., 185 Minn. 79, 239 N.W. 896—or to put it another way, the master
is relieved of the duty to inspect simple tools for defects because the servant's
opportunity for ascertaining such defects is equal to or greater than the master's.
O'Hara v. Brown Hoisting Mach. Co., 3 Cir., 171 F. 394; Miller v. Erie R.R.
Co., 21 App.Div. 45, 47 N.Y.S. 285; 2 Agency A.L.I. § 503(d). Petitioner
inspected the wrench, found it defective and then asked three times for a new
one. This satisfied the burden of inspection placed on his shoulders by the
doctrine, and it was then for the jury to say whether respondent's failure to
comply with those repeated requests was negligence on its part. To deny
petitioner the right to have the jury pass on that issue because of the simple tool
doctrine is to say that doctrine relieves the master of any duty to furnish
reasonably safe and suitable simple tools in spite of the fact that he knows they
are defective, and requires the servant not only to inspect simple tools for
defects, but also to supply his own simple tools when he finds those of the
master defective. This is so obvious a perversion of the Jones Act as to require
no comment. 7
6
Since there must be a new trial we deem it appropriate to state that in our
opinion no reversible error was committed when the trial court refused to allow
opinion testimony as to the best type of tool for the work.8 Respondent's duty
was not to supply the best tools, but only tools which were reasonably safe and
suitable. Cf. The Tawmie, 5 Cir., 80 F.2d 792; The Cricket, 9 Cir., 71 F.2d 61.
7
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. So ordered.
8
Reversed and remanded.
9
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice JACKSON concur in the result.
10
The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice ROBERTS, and Mr. Justice REED are of
opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed.
1
2
3
4
5
6
41 Stat. 988, 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.
The complaint set forth two causes of action—the first for personal
injuries and the second for maintenance and cure. Respondent moved to
dismiss only the first cause of action. At the same time, in settlement of
the second cause of action, respondent offered to consent to judgment for
loss of wages from the time of the accident until petitioner returned to
work. This offer was refused by petitioner's counsel and the second cause
was thereupon dismissed. The Circuit Court of Appeals, sua sponte,
directed that judgment be entered on the second cause of action for
petitioner in the amount admitted to be due from respondent. That
judgment is not in issue here. Only the first cause of action, that for
personal injuries, survives for our consideration.
Petitioner was the sole witness in his own behalf. The trial court did not
allow an opinion witness, called for the purpose of establishing the best
type of wrench for the work petitioner was doing at the time of the
accident, to testify.
See 3 Labatt, Master and Servant (2d ed.), pp. 2476-2484.
Compare McCarthy v. Palmer, 2 Cir., 113 F.2d 721, with Spain v. Powell,
4 Cir., 90 F.2d 580.
If the doctrine is but a phase of assumption of risk or contributory
negligence, as has been suggested (see Labatt, op. cit., pp. 2479, 2480,
2484), it is manifestly not applicable to actions under the Jones Act for
those common-law affirmative defenses are not available in such actions.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed.
265.
And, if the scope of the doctrine is that a master is under no duty to furnish
reasonably safe an suitable simple tools (see Allen Gravel Co. v.
Yarbrough, 133 Miss. 652, 98 So. 117; Middleton v. National Box Co.,
D.C., 38 F.2d 89), the doctrine is hardly compatible with the scheme of the
Jones Act fixing liability on a master for injuries caused by defects and
insufficiencies in his appliances due to his negligence.
7
8
See note 6, ante.
See note 3, ante.
62 S.Ct. 854
86 L.Ed. 1166
JACOB
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK.
No. 589.
Argued March 6, 1942.
Decided March 30, 1942.
Messrs. Dominick Blasi, of Brooklyn, N.Y., and Silas B. Axtell, of New
York City, for petitioner.
Mr. Alfred T. White, of New York City, (Messrs. William C. Chanler,
Corp. Counsel, Paxton Blair, and Leon Shaw, all of New York City, on
the brief), for respondent.
Mr. Justice MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental
feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is protected by the Seventh
Amendment. A right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether
guaranteed by the Constitution or provided by statute, should be jealously
guarded by the courts. The present case is a suit by petitioner under the Jones
Act1 for personal injuries sustained when he fell because the wrench he was
using to tighten a nut slipped under the torque applied to it. We are called upon
to determine whether on the evidence adduced by petitioner, and in
contravention of accepted juridical standards, petitioner was wrongfully
deprived of his statutory right to jury trial by the action of the trial court in
dismissing his complaint,2 thereby refusing to submit the case to a jury which
had been duly empanelled to try it. In holding that petitioner had failed to prove
facts sufficient to warrant submitting the issue of respondent's negligence to the
jury, the trial court relied on the so-called simple tool doctrine. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 Cir., 119 F.2d 800. The novel questions thus
presented in the administration of the Jones Act prompted us to grant certiorari.
314 U.S. 595, 62 S.Ct. 117, 86 L.Ed. —-.
2
Petitioner's testimony3 is the complete answer to the question whether the case
should have been taken from the jury. The gist of that testimony is as follows:
For three weeks prior to the accident petitioner, an employee with twenty years'
experience, had been serving as water-tender in charge of the fire-room on the
'Dongan Hills', a ferry-boat operated by respondent between Staten and
Manhattan Islands in New York harbor. One of his duties was to change oil
strainers. This was done about three times a week and required the removal and
replacement of a manifold head, housing the strainers, which was held in place
by six studs and nuts. When the manifold was replaced, the nuts had to be very
tight. The best tool to remove and to tighten the nuts was a straight end wrench
fitting a 1 1/4' nut. Petitioner used an S-shaped end wrench of the proper size
which was 'well worn', 'had seen a lot of service', was 'a loose fit', and 'had a lot
of play on it'. There was about one-sixteenth of an inch 'play in the jaws; it was
worn.' The wrench was about eighteen inches long and the 'play' at the end was
'about an inch'. Petitioner asked the chief engineer for a new wrench three
times, the first request being when petitioner first had occasion to use the worn
wrench to change an oil strainer, and the last two or three days before the
accident. In answer to this last request the chief engineer 'said for me
(petitioner) to look in the tool closet and see if there was one in there; and I
went up there and couldn't find any and I believe he said he sent an order out
for one.' The regular way of requisitioning needed tools was by a report to the
chief engineer. All petitioner was supposed to do was order; he did not know
what respondent kept in its storeroom. The 'Dongan Hills' docked at Manhattan
Island on the average of six or seven times each day. On the day of the accident
petitioner did not renew his request, but he did look in the chief engineer's tool
set. He found no end wrench of the proper size, did not know if a Stillson
wrench was there, but believed that a monkey wrench was. A monkey wrench
could 'probably' be used on any nut. At the time of the accident petitioner was
using the worn, S-shaped, end wrench to tighten the nuts after changing the oil
strainer. There was about five-eighths of an inch of thread on the studs, and
petitioner had changed the wrench on one nut four times. As he started the fifth
tightening, the wrench slipped, causing him to fall from the eighteen inch
square platform on which he was standing to the catwalk eighteen inches
below. In the course of the fall petitioner sustained an injury to his right side
which struck an angle iron alongside the catwalk.
3
The Jones Act, in addition to giving injured seamen the right to trial by jury in
actions arising under the Act, also incorporates 'all statutes of the United States
modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees'. Among such statutes is 45 U.S.C. § 51, 45
U.S.C.A. § 51, which provides in part that a carrier is liable for 'injury or death
* * * by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its (the carrier's)
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works,
boats, wharves or other equipment'.
4
Although proof of negligence is an essential to recovery under the Jones Act,
Kunschman v. United States, 2 Cir., 54 F.2d 987; cf. Beadle v. Spencer, 298
U.S. 124, 128, 56 S.Ct. 712, 713, 80 L.Ed. 1082, contributory negligence and
assumption of risk are not available defenses. The admiralty doctrine of
comparative negligence applies. Secony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S.
424, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed. 265. The salient points of petitioner's testimony,
summarized above, made a sufficient showing to allow the jury to consider the
issue of respondent's negligence. The wrench petitioner was using had become
defective for the purpose for which it was designed. After discovering that
defect petitioner made three requests to the proper person, the chief engineer,
for a new wrench. The first of those requests was about three weeks prior to the
accident, the last but two or three days before it occurred. At that time the chief
engineer said he sent out an order for one, but it was not forthcoming in the two
or three days intervening before the accident despite the fact that the 'Dongan
Hills' docked at Manhattan Island six or seven times a day. While the best tool
for doing the work was a straight end wrench of the proper size, petitioner had
access to a monkey wrench which 'probably' could be used on any nut. We
think these facts entitled petitioner to have the jury consider whether his injury
was caused by any 'defect or insufficiency, due to its (respondent's) negligence,
in its * * * appliances'. That is to say, it was for the jury to decide whether a
monkey wrench was a reasonably safe and suitable tool for petitioner's work,
whether respondent's failure, although it had at least two days' and possibly
three weeks' notice of the defect, to supply petitioner with a new wrench
amounted to negligence on its part, and whether respondent, after it had
knowledge of the defect, might not have reasonably foreseen the possibility of
resulting harm if it allowed the worn wrench to remain in use. Cf. SoconyVacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, supra. Without doubt the case is close and a jury
might find either way. But that is no reason for a court to usurp the function of
the jury. We are satisfied that a due respect for the statutory guaranty of the
right of jury trial, with its resulting benefits, requires the submission of this
case to the jury.
5
The simple tool doctrine, used by the courts below to bolster their belief that
the evidence was insufficient, does not affect our conclusion. In the first place,
the contrariety of opinion as to the reasons for and the scope of the simple tool
doctrine, and the uncertainty of its application,4 suggest that it should not apply
to cases arising under legislation, such as the Jones Act, designed to enlarge in
some measure the rights and remedies of injured employees.5 But even
assuming its applicability, the doctrine does not justify withdrawing this case
from the jury. For the only possible basis for the doctrine which is compatible
with the provisions and policy of the Jones Act is that the master is not
negligent in the case of defective simple tools because the possibility of injury
from such tools is so slight as to impose no duty on him to see that they are free
from defects in the first instance or to inspect them thereafter.6 Newbern v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Cir., 68 F.2d 523; cf. Hedicke v. Highland
Springs Co., 185 Minn. 79, 239 N.W. 896—or to put it another way, the master
is relieved of the duty to inspect simple tools for defects because the servant's
opportunity for ascertaining such defects is equal to or greater than the master's.
O'Hara v. Brown Hoisting Mach. Co., 3 Cir., 171 F. 394; Miller v. Erie R.R.
Co., 21 App.Div. 45, 47 N.Y.S. 285; 2 Agency A.L.I. § 503(d). Petitioner
inspected the wrench, found it defective and then asked three times for a new
one. This satisfied the burden of inspection placed on his shoulders by the
doctrine, and it was then for the jury to say whether respondent's failure to
comply with those repeated requests was negligence on its part. To deny
petitioner the right to have the jury pass on that issue because of the simple tool
doctrine is to say that doctrine relieves the master of any duty to furnish
reasonably safe and suitable simple tools in spite of the fact that he knows they
are defective, and requires the servant not only to inspect simple tools for
defects, but also to supply his own simple tools when he finds those of the
master defective. This is so obvious a perversion of the Jones Act as to require
no comment. 7
6
Since there must be a new trial we deem it appropriate to state that in our
opinion no reversible error was committed when the trial court refused to allow
opinion testimony as to the best type of tool for the work.8 Respondent's duty
was not to supply the best tools, but only tools which were reasonably safe and
suitable. Cf. The Tawmie, 5 Cir., 80 F.2d 792; The Cricket, 9 Cir., 71 F.2d 61.
7
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. So ordered.
8
Reversed and remanded.
9
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice JACKSON concur in the result.
10
The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice ROBERTS, and Mr. Justice REED are of
opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed.
1
2
3
4
5
6
41 Stat. 988, 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.
The complaint set forth two causes of action—the first for personal
injuries and the second for maintenance and cure. Respondent moved to
dismiss only the first cause of action. At the same time, in settlement of
the second cause of action, respondent offered to consent to judgment for
loss of wages from the time of the accident until petitioner returned to
work. This offer was refused by petitioner's counsel and the second cause
was thereupon dismissed. The Circuit Court of Appeals, sua sponte,
directed that judgment be entered on the second cause of action for
petitioner in the amount admitted to be due from respondent. That
judgment is not in issue here. Only the first cause of action, that for
personal injuries, survives for our consideration.
Petitioner was the sole witness in his own behalf. The trial court did not
allow an opinion witness, called for the purpose of establishing the best
type of wrench for the work petitioner was doing at the time of the
accident, to testify.
See 3 Labatt, Master and Servant (2d ed.), pp. 2476-2484.
Compare McCarthy v. Palmer, 2 Cir., 113 F.2d 721, with Spain v. Powell,
4 Cir., 90 F.2d 580.
If the doctrine is but a phase of assumption of risk or contributory
negligence, as has been suggested (see Labatt, op. cit., pp. 2479, 2480,
2484), it is manifestly not applicable to actions under the Jones Act for
those common-law affirmative defenses are not available in such actions.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed.
265.
And, if the scope of the doctrine is that a master is under no duty to furnish
reasonably safe an suitable simple tools (see Allen Gravel Co. v.
Yarbrough, 133 Miss. 652, 98 So. 117; Middleton v. National Box Co.,
D.C., 38 F.2d 89), the doctrine is hardly compatible with the scheme of the
Jones Act fixing liability on a master for injuries caused by defects and
insufficiencies in his appliances due to his negligence.
7
8
See note 6, ante.
See note 3, ante.
