of x

Kerslake-Deleuze and the Unconscious

Published on July 2016 | Categories: Documents | Downloads: 34 | Comments: 0



ror a period of yean before the pubfialtion of the ftnt volume -of
bi! lllaW:rplece -.4 (19'12, co-autborm
with Felix Gwarwi), Gi11e& Deleuze explored a af different theories of
the tln(:OQtdOWi. He appears 1IQ have inbabin:d a wnishlng in French
intellEctual Piem'! janet's psychology 'Of the UficorOOous 5till
lr.l.d some parity wiUi Sigmund Freud'., Deleuze went poo\OUng in 8. number
of ob!lcurepla<;es, ffilt of aight of we daylight Conr:emJl of culture and
times: 8eTgllOn'll of instinct and memory, JungJaniomi. symbolism,
Bachofen, .em.wis.. (Johann 'Ma.liattl and Hoene \\'rol'lskl). Gustav
Fe<hner's fanlallY of the thtt'e Itp of human
Ludwig Binswanger's theory of !lclrlzophreni:a:drug experimentation, .sortl!t)
. anything but Freud." He ransacked forgotten cranny in modern
thought in ll'earCh of of the unconscious that restore
pmlIlage5, iI'l1theses and d:rat:nas of the mind occluded by Freudian psycho-
anal'YSis. While it is still unclear to me whether he <:Ver with a single
theQry of the l.1nl':GnSdDU&, till:' 'Written records ofhill acunioMdo offer U& an
UfuJlually vivid glimpse inside of the foJ:goOel'l warehou.ses of the nine-
teenth. lind tw'entieth<ent'UJ")' of the The single idea
that unites theBe disparate theories uUte there ill lIuch a thing 'a&
uncontdous lIWntalil]: the UIlcomK:iouI iI !WIeT lIKtrely the
0theT than that, though, one is just aI hi:e1y to find werewolYa, ll()rceret'i.
drug-addiets. al1:iJlrs, <:entlurs, perbap «M:I1 ....
mandett and gylphii (not to meJiUon chat peculi.ar elui of people known _
'scbiFoph:ren.ia') in galleries of the aa one is to find
ablieWOlUll and h1'sterics..
With the tim volume of _
(and Gw.u:mri) cenainly played a role. however in the demise of
Freudian psychoanalysis in intdlecw.al and cultnre, .But un1ikr
other critics of Freud, Deletl7At had alwayI intended w repla«;e die Freudian
theory of the WlCI).lU(:!OUS with powerful theory of the unron·
Ht; did not Mm.! to or rcdu<:e it, or rep1ac<:, it with '<:ognir:iW:
To experience a 'fractured "r" (D1l88-91) is to be pry-
... .hosis, and the J.ocic of the psydlotk c3lUlot be with such
means.. The novel thingabout thecontempor;vyworld, accooiing l() Deleuze.
is that we:are up to the dest:inalion of the human mind, 'the madndl
of the 1IlJbject' (CC that KAnt had tint inadw:rtentlr uncow::red in the
Pure (and which found a fUrtive. explo..;ive expression in
H:)lderlw s descnption of the Oedipw. (OK $, 89), \\-'hat Deleure
in was iu ongoing inability to &al with the phenom-
f:na of pychom, and ill the psydloo..:: phenomena that puncttJ.il.te neurosis
and ,l:he of in general. In ont respect at teast, the 'A.nti-
Oedipus IS. the berng that emerge! after me of 'Oedipm', For
Lacan beyond the Oedipw complex COOSWl'Ull<\l':oes iuelf in
the d1$5()lutton depernonali:zation of at CO!OfiW. 'Oedi.pm says:
Am I made to tb<' hour I cease to That i.I the of OedipUJi'!
psvcboanalysts - the pm:hoon:al}'51J1 of Oedipm is only at CokmU!1.
when. he tear!. his face apart. That is the essential moment, whkh his
story us meaning' (yean 1954-5: 214). S1avoj ZiUk writes of dtt 'horror' of
Oedipus at Colonw, who 'round himself reduced to Ii kind 1)£ soap bubble
bum. asunder - a 5Ct<Ip ofthe real, the ]d'toYer of a formle'>5 slimf. without an}'
mpr;on the symbolk order' 2001: 21). For L.ac:anian psychoanaJr>i.'l,
the Real must be kfPt at a di.stmce, on the other side ofthe symbolic
order. What mun be a'll1)ided m ail Cj)$U is the slide into psychosis. whkh 14
the totAlo;JUapse of!JeIf-ref1exi.-e For 2iZek, Hegel
was right [0 des.crlbe madness <1$ a withdrawal into the 'night of the wwId"
although 'bt' all too quickly of this withdrawal. as a to
rhe level 9f the "anima) soul" embedded in its natural em·irons and deter-
mined by the rbythm. (Zi.iek.1998: 258). Deleuze mesaoompl.e:telv
different VleWofps)lCboslS. derived fromJung, and <:loaer to Hegersown view:
"'hat regression brings to the surface cerWnlyseems at fmn: light to be slime
from the depths; but if one does nor stop short at a !Uperficial evalu,adon
.re-fraine &om paWfigjudgment on me basis of a prewliceived dogma,
It.will be found that this '!lime' contains not incompatible and
re,reCted rernnaIlo of e\'eryday life, or incoDwmient and
tendendtl$, but 4W.o gfl11U of new Ii&; and vit:I1 posr>ibiHtie8 fur the future.
(CW 8: 34)
In an early. pieu. endonc!sjung's view rhat 'FI'ellwan methodolOHi-e,
are appropOiote I.'lwNy fhr ynu.og- neurotics ',dime dillOf'ders :ttc' related to
remini5cenU5 :lnd. whose problems are about recondfing thermelYet
MW the 1'I!6l (Joviug, Orleselflcw.able, adapting, etA:. L without regard for
the role of any interior confli.cbl' (SM The lcind of
by are tbw primarily WlIOrdel"ll of adapl:aliou, and he to
OOUtltenance mar 'there dl'e neurmes of quite another 1.l'pe which ne.arer to
(ibid.), ForJv.ng and Delewe, Hli pt'Oce5ses ofindividuation invol\le a
fundamental p$j'Chotic moment: 'The who.le Cl>UI'Se ofindiYidlDtiQu a diakcri
cal, arui the: llO'i:alled ill the confrom:ation ofthe egt> with the
the centre. Here the limit <4 the poaOfe expel"ierice i$ reached: the
dWolvell as the reference-point <lung 197&259).
The of DeJeuze'! and Guattari's unset·
tling: we have :urlved at a hOOorical point where we no longer haw:: religious
or ll:IOl'a1 protection agallul me madness thai ill inheremto the: human mind.
'The two volumes of Capit41iJm and Sah:IZDphtmaa.. whiclt :m; necessarily extrava-
gant and delirious, are attempts to map out thi! new space, in order to learn
to navigate and control it for a higher (l'W"(I'Qlle Abhough We human being
IlOt the 'king of creation" it. is 'the being who jg in. intimate contaCt with the
profound life ofall forms ofbeingl. 'Who is for nen the
stan and animal life . , . ('ternal CUllUldian. of the machlnes of the
(AO 4). Deleuze ill connected l.O a of ttlought about the WtConscious
which ill older than freud's. and mort: rooted in the pbilollophkJl.1 tradition.
1''01' Leibna and Schelling, the 1a5k of me human being W';lS to pass through
the unconscioQUS in order to ful.1 CO!Udo'Wne$$, At one level, &his
proc. iakfl$ pIau duri.ng what LeIhni:l:" Jung and Deleuze a.l1 call 'indmdu-
ation', But at another Le¥eJ, it occun a<::TO!lI hwnan culture, in areas we have
been condiuoned (by the success of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century)
not to \lee all Mte:lo of unoonKious activity. The eni;OWlt:er wim rhe L"l."lUOt1sdous
is continually to be kit puahing from the other side of modem cu.ltJlre, nO(
just in psychopathology, but in the cinema of the period. in modem
music. in occu.ltism and in drug-explonrion. The unC<.msciOUll hal not
\lant!ihed at all. we still lost in its jungle. perhaps eve1'l IDilJ'e than before.
Newapproaches to the Ullronsc:ioWl are needed to the full range of
im inhabitantll.
What follows is nQ more than a series of attempted on DeJcw'.es hive
of ideas about the u.noon.sciOWl, I have left as many gates open. and laid out all
many different options fm'mterpretari<m, as pos&lbJe. The book could serve all
a source book. for a reading of on the unconscious, although there are
plenty of om.Uisions and probably lotS of too, I have ended up
a-eati.ng thi:s as inevitable subject, which il£ a fascinating and complex
one. and I hope other, better boob are written on il before too lon'll' A lot of
attention is paid here to early work and influences, upon which
much light $till needl. to be shed. lhe doctrines of iU"e roootly
OO1ittlld, beca"USie a dear account of the work is already .available in
Holland's l111.mdtu:tibn ttl (Holland 1999), and partir
beeaUJe' the book atremptll to UIlCover die theoretka.l bai:kgroWld to that work.
and itll sequel. A Pf.aJ.eaw.
The book not a general introduction to De1ew:e (or even to Deleuze and
the unconscious), and there is WlfonWlaldyahio little of clinical rele\.-ance
heef(', ttl part because Deleuze's to the unconscious are not
restr1<:1ed to pathology. but include '3(tive' (0 &he unconscious
(an. intOlckarion. magll:').f <:hapu'Bare written from a phiJOS()phic:al. not
a perspectiv«! - although Ihere is c:enainlywork to be done about
Deleuze'f and Guawtri'. 'schb!oanalysis' from the latter The aims
()f philOtOpby and plyChiaU1 are difierent., and is no reall<)n why this
.should DOt be so .in of the unconscious, whiclt bas its own hbtol)' in
phUosopbi<;al thought. will see for themselvt'l that I h3Nt'
not always been abk to the <aitical' from the 'dinical", nor ,"waft
been able to tdl when is a philosopher, as a 'doctor'
dviIi.zation, or as a 'patient' 01ft. J 1did attempt to keep tny philosopher's "''iII
on mrllugbout my intothe n'Jore floridly esoteric domains faroured 1>:'
Deleuze. but 1 confe!ll; that the wig may have slipped on occasion, out of
lltUpefied f.a!lcination u moch a& WIth DeleUT.(: more than anv
other Freru.:h philOllOpher. we are (\)fced lO SUlpeJ1d OUT nonns .mou"t
what cOtUututel! 'philosophy', even that son of pbikwlophy done in thai: thor-
ougblydubiow !ieldknown as 'continental'. 1have heM obliged lOworit
no\jUSf 3& a 'philosopher', but more ipeCmcally:.u _ detecd:ve, a paKi fool, on
the trail ofan enigmatic. slighdy prepollreroUS flpn:. rather dandified by all
atX»Unu, with long fingernails (d. N !i)J whme Dame everybody to
know, but about whom curiously very little has ye'1 been
Chapter 1
The Pathologies of Time:
The Unconscious Before Freud
In the wike of the of Darwinimt and modem physiological and
pn}'Siad. lciena: lit the tum ufthe twentiettl (mUlry, manyef(ol"tA were tmder
way to !lee bow far the pbf$iologica1 and biotogieal approache8 to conllcioos--
neg could go. 'Ihe ()f the ittri\Ycd ;at independently and
by and Freud alCQ OUt of attemplll to pu$h
the and biological frameworb to their limits, albeit in f1I.djcally
Freudw.mtIi! uu»publbbed 'P!fChology for neurologiftu' , flJr
Both works begin with a, bask physiological frameowork - the neflex
arc and proeeed from there to an account of the e-e.'OlUtiODary IlldwnUlgft
and diadvantase& of complex nervous But both troth n:suIt in con-
dmi:oos that !let dleir ..who.., apart from the mainst:ream of
Iheoria of the mind.
Both authon dUcQver that me ptoceu thaI should really be given a prWllege
in the mind ili not cQlUt'iousnm at all, bur the unconsdouil. It is !:he UDc:on.
scious that gives riu: to the real.pur between human beinp and the rest of
nature, not consdoUUlCIlS. FM Freud. dlili infight led to the abanOOnment of
neurophysiology. the 1a:wI of the unc:onsdoU8 pm£elI:IM':S appeared to have a
logic of their mm: oondel'llllUion. reprelillion. etc,) wbk:h
deJerved anafv5is in its own tennll. rather than in dire'1!y physical terms, Freud
iiCrepted dw. it wa'S impossilik to directly match wishes, desin:$ and senie-
beari,ni phenomena with ph.yaiologica1l1tW!a, 60 he pUt off the project for
'scientilk poychology'. For BetglIon, the insight into the impon:ance of the
tmcorw:ioul autle dIrough his reafu:.ation thu rnttnory cannot be appt"OaChed
as a purely procell&, the human aw..&rc:rtes of time and.
In pank:War, the past. introduces a new kind of proeeu into the bmin..
I1kmoria canoot be explained in term.ll of the Imdn; racher the humlm brain
ibaped w moulded at'QU¥ the pure mcm'Jrlt:lJ that <:onRiwre the put.
MenKlria for the most part are and !K) the moot <:I'taraaemtic
aspect of human cognition Illtmconscioull. Delewe ta.ke$ Berp:m's dMCO\1ery
atI a tbaltenge w transeendental philosophy; from n(lW 00.. rather than
focusing OJ) the I.ramI::endent3l philosop.bet' mUll explore
synthes.es of time wltic:h are
From our vant1'lgIe point .. centurylater. it is saU.ing h<Jl'l the influence of the
:Berg8on-Janet .rradiOOn to been somehowabruptly extmpooed
Thf> peculiar Bergronian p5YChology ofmemory that dominated the begin·
ning of me tw€nrieth century might therefore J1l)w appear to be nothing
more than a cunOU.'l anomaly rhat mainly begs foe treatrm:nt bv
mgtor1an$. However. the Startling fact is thilt it is fUp.clamclluI to the:: fJlPICho.
logicaJ thought of Deleuze. who r.endi ttJ thought of as- one of the most.
'oontemporary' of French philosophers. Deleuze began writing OIl 8erpm
in the earlv 1950s and Bergson's theory of remains fundamental to all
of bill work. )-!ig statemeiit of what is living in Bergson' 5
plulosophy is his 1966, although the CifumaIxlob ofthe I9SO!;
are also apKcidv de"\'eJoped wi-min a del.aikd Bergsotllim framework. In
remming to Bergson. Deleuze ran ag:riullt me ude, and in J972 he l-e-marq
that 'people .. , laugh at me simply for baling written about Jlergwn at all'
IN 6). However. Dekure's return w BergllOi1 w;u a return I;(J aspecu in
8ergJOn" theory rhat fell ouWde the cariotunl \oiew of' it as an aflinnadon
of Heradh.e-an flux or novelty. F<>r it W2!I not me well-known theory
of duration that is :Rergson'8 lI\OSt &ignilit:mt oomribution to t:hc:,> philosophy
of time. but his theory of memory. 11m theory, which is i.ncredibly baroque
and COW1:teI'·intuitl.,,-e. and :remains $0 in prr:n.ides Dele\J.2'.e me
basis fur hiJl awn theory of the unco0iC101.lS. There are aIro key references ro
]a.nct and Jung in Deleuze's work. For DelcUU!, tbe notion of the uncon-
sdoWl cannot be adequately treau:d ouwde ofan Ilc<;ount of the temporal
syntheliell that chara<:t.ertze human De1cl.lU' develops and elab-
antes Bergson's and these$ on memory and arrives at a theory that
but recognizably indebred to the early Fren<:h theory of the
[t is therefore not surpriring \:hat Deleuze's .first approach to
the notion of the unwlUCious is thrt:iughlung ratheJ than Fn:ud,
What was me eMtntial difference between the Fren,h and Vrepne1lc notlQnS
of the unconscious:> In 1898. Freud "'''rore to F!ieM, '1 recently pub-
lished book. by 12nel., HysJmir n I.t1kt with a pounding bem and pm
it lI$id(' again wit.h my pulse calmed. has no inlding of tlu: key' (Letter of
10 Ma:l'ch 1898. Masson 1985: 3(2). The key. of COl.tne, is se::ruality. ff('ud
ackn<>Wledged that memorie&were the 11'\()8L tllMous examples ofUUIZOflliCious
psychic but he iU'gued that appe<Uing to nlt'mory does not give:
me- b'y to why cenain of these memories a:re dynamically repressed. 'For an
a£COOnl of die dynamic relation of the to COmdO<\Wle5S, one
needs to venture outside theory .of humow [email protected]'lition and into lhe theory
of sexual dcrelopment. What is ouly - that is. from ron-
- is what is with com:;('prion of itself. Drawing
on rhe sexual trails that thC'.rapy shows 10 b<: behind mall'jI neurotic
Freud inferred that it wu selCnal wntent it!elf winch formed the bedrock of
the unccnsdous.
Itmlghl seem surpri:ring 1.0 place Deleuu\ who is known as a phililiKlpher of
.d8i,re'. in the- &rgs.ou-Janet tradition of conceptualizing the Wlconscious
md in tetJn$ of the fr3mework of memory and time, rather
than mat of However, as we will the
and 'sexuality' \\'$ key fOl"Jung, whQ$fl Dc1eu.ze explicitly affirmed in
196L In and DeJ.e.w:e develops a theory of the 'synthesis of
whkh he holds is also a 'synthesis of Eros', In it. Deleuze implies &u
Freud w.all a 'Victim of an illusion about thl!' krWI.1 aetiology of psychopathol-
ogy. Sexual eorttent ill 1IO impon3JUin matw"'fll.U'OSeS it is necei8arllv
futed upon during the proees& of a dA.:e"; shift that 0CCIll'S at a panicularh.
cnJdal stage of psychological development (adoleK:eflC'e). It is not the C4&l1U dr
plI}'CoopatOOlogy (or. indeed, of the uncQwcious). The iM1thesis of memon:
by Wclf uro.tnes, .ahnost u a b)--product, a specUk 'erotic· function during
of individu3) psychological development. Elsewhere rn: polnt8 OUt
that many other disorders, Nch u schimpbrenhl.. Of the
neuroses of in their tb.inia and above. are Mt cauaed bf Il!xual
problel:Wl, ahbough sexuality might play a role in mem. account of
lleXUality is non-Freu.dlan &om the beginning. Moreover, Deleute', first work
on sexualityoccur:red in the context of theories of and his main inilu.
etl<ei were Bergson and Jung. in conjunction with anthropological theories
from Malinowski and Hume, Fr-eudWu have gone to great lengtlu to distin.
guis"h 'Fri8b (drive) nom instintt, but in the beginning Delem.e squarely
situ.a.ta hirnseJt 00 the side of instinct. Prom the out.v!t DeIeu2e Been1& k> have
Been the pote'ntial in Bergsoniml fur a non-Freudian refOrmulation of the
basic themes of psychoart3.lwi.s,
Bergson and Duration
The Ili.mpleu way to begin to di:s$olve Ihe apparent aberration involved in
De1etuc's rel'W'tt to /$ to begin wtth. the (act that what is UllUal1y ta1:.en
to he most central to 'Betgsoni:l$m' - tbe notion 0{ expounded in
8ergst)n's lint hook. the Euuy OIl tNt J)<Jt,a fJl (tranllla1.ed
u r_t:md..f1me WillI - is a.et'l:S.1ly the mere ponat In a much more
and profou.nd theory of memory. Dekwe't decillion to entitle his book
&pminn is mUll. polemical. insofar as he redefines i$ of central mrereu

8ergsoni!ml bas often been J-educed to the following idea: duration is sub-
and tonsntutes our intemallife. And h. 1$ true that Bergson had to
aprea himelf in this way, at k88t at the OUtaet. But increasingly, he came
to say !IOD'let.b.ing quite different; the only is time. non<hrono-
logical time grasped in its fuwulaoon, and it .is who :ate intemal to time,
not the otb«way romI.d.. (C2 82)
1>eleme's depiction \If the framework towilrds which Berge;on mowed is not
e.xa(:tly peUorid here. but it is enough to.,- that the 'nnn-chronOO:lgicaJ t.ime-
refesred to concerns 1llI;mory. for Berpln, oW' memories coexist with oW"
present, and ads ofmemory must be taken a" d1$c1)ntinuoos KlI."tieS lnro a pre-
S(:rved past composed of iJlI Q'Wn stratified formations. Bergson's bizarre but
comprUinr theory of melQ()ry le3ds towards a very di!ferent, rnucb moce
ccmple.ll., theory of time than the notion of duration,
In the &sat OR fM Data oj duration is really defil'led
by succeili:m, referring back to space, and by the power of
novd.ty. repecirion refeJring back to Mauer. But., more profoundly. duration
i& only llWJCession (we have seen in the same way that it is
only .indirlsible rebuively). Ducation is ind.ecd mcCeaHon, but i.t is !IO
only Uetauae, more profOundly, it is virtr.I.aJ the with
iuelf of all the all the tensions, all tht' degrees of contraaion and
relaxation. (860}
:Ddeum by nO means ignores the notion of duration. but he sees it u the
to Bergson's philOllOphy rather than its «:ntre. 8efun: it leads to
memory. it tint leads to what will be the key concept of revision of
Kant's 1ran&cendentidA.estbetic. the notion o£ 'mwmve difference', &18 aue.
as Berp:m Siil}'5 in the that taking dum100 seriously tneltN that we must.
abandon any theory of mind which of mental comeRt in Ienns or
discrete. repre.semations which. indifferent to temporal ehange.
The conacloQ& mind (in K.mtian renns 'inner sense') is dur-
lltional. and itl! content5 are therefore if spaUally.
But what thill meatnJ is that, tnso£ar iIli the mind is duraw:mal It ill. host to a
- a$ opposed to extensive- form of developmental differ·
entiation. From. ('hlldhood In adulthood, me mind pIl.SlleS through int.emM:
thresholds that etCh entail of its mnemk contem and
pr.lCtic3l aimt, Hen.ce it !n.a.kelIlIetl.Se tl) begin our investigatiQl\ with DeIeuze'$
refonnubtioo of Bergsonian duration. In his book, Mo.Jt.
(1896). Bergson re«:>nceptwilizes. his oodoo of duration IlO that it
now te!llifies to an of memory, wbile the role of
ness becomes almoet exclusively practical and .Focuied 00 the In the
&ury on the Di:It4 of 'bctwe-."el", d'W'atioo i& $imply ideno.
fied as the fundaulental medium of..boIogie:alli£e, DurMion it identified
with In general. to the exrenc mat Bergson d<eniea that duration
is a feature of the world. A rough general !lke:b:b of w position can
be gfYen. before we qualify it in cerorin crudal retpeeU. Mental life is .DOl
of dltcreu: The way mental representatiQJ\J appear
is fundamentally aft'ected the form of thea appeatance. The form. of lbeir
is dm:arion. in which teprelentauom are never
and but hlend m1tJ each otheT, ina 'heremgeneoU$ condnWty'
1889; 128). Mental must appeva5 part ohdevelop-
ing mental whole, which :is in. one respe<:t enduring (it prolongs the experi-
ences'of the past), and in another respect. open to nmeJEf (the accumulation
of the past in the present means one tends to bring an
-eomplex mental backgroo.nd to what one expcrimu:t:ll now, which :ma.k.es
l'ien(:e of repeawd event$ qualitatively difl.eJent ro their put occurrem:et).
The (}fTimt
Duration and Intensitj·
Bcrgwn'5 theo-ry of duration is bulll on h.i& critique of in the
tint chapter of his nr'S! boot.. the Ew1:J 1m the lJt:ruI, <if
'IO<'"e should t'eC{)UI'ft this critique here, as mu chapter b an absolutely
fundamfntal building block both in &rgson's wary in general. and in bill
speculations about the In the history of psychology, Fechne:r"s
psychopb)"ics is. often held to be me fint attempt 3t a genuineir experimental
ps)'cno-Iogy. A properly quan'tilatiYe account of mental
pombJt> for the first lime, in 'Which mental eventS can be ror·
related with physical mmuli. By attaCking psychophysic$. Berpon was auaek-
mg experimenw psyml)ltlJ!Y as it emt.ed at the time.
Bergson'lI rrWn. tltrgeCl are Gu&tav Fechner (1801-87) andJOJJ.ePb Delboeuf
(1831-00), btu we will focus here on the fonner. In his
( 1860). F«hner had defined (hJtOOJihJIffJr.) as •the exuct llcienc:e
of the dependent rdatiomof bod)' and llQul Of, generally, of
the material and the mentaL of the phyi;ical and WI; world6'
{Fe&ner 1800: L 7}. Fechner :.t his aim of :l
account of the ClJI'relaliOftll between stimuli and mental eventi by
a.ffinning. m.emaI and eve.tlU, rather \han attempting a
redu<:tI'Ctn of lleIlllauons to phyW:aI evenlll, a6 bad been attempted by the
Enlifillenment materialist'>. By k'llsatlona lQ physic.a.l
e:venl!i. the early modf;rn mauri.alism had Jelt $ensatKmll all mere appearances
or -epipbenomena, and hmce without my SUl.rm of their own. On dJis \'Ie'W a
mathematical relatioMbip stimulm and senlllUi:on 'Illall neither
polt1ible nor Fechner'i mvatigatiQlU in ptyl:1KJphysia were there
fore intimately rel;tted to hill a.ff'innation of psy<chopbysital parnDelism. Wi! will
.expJore the of this ,.,itcm we have C3.l.I:IoI!! to wm to
Fecllner argued that while an mcrease in the intensity ofa phy:dcal
doe! not produce a one-urone incrt:a3e' in mental the-re II iNtead a
logarithmit; relatiooship bet\\<UJ\ the twO: series increases geometrically.
and the other arithmetically. A logarithmic relationmip twQ quanti-
tative series allows for increase; in the second series to be proportionally
retath-e to tlli.! quanti.t:ies that already esillt in the fir&l Jerles. ThU6 if t.l:ie aural
Jtimulus of one ringing bell is added to another, the in !lelllWion ill
greater than if one ie added to ten already rinsing be..
Now, intensive in i)bjcr:tive stimuli (for the
Jnea.lltlrement of$Ound or weight) no pa.rticuhu problem. if ilppropriate
and nnsiave instruments are avail.ahle. Fedmer baIell hi:tn!elf on a law which
be auriburefl to one 4 his ll!!2Chers, E, ft Weoo·, according to which a differ·
ent:e between twO stimuli is perceived lIl! equal if il:5 raQ.Q to the lltimuli
remains Ihe same, regardless of changes in die lire. 'For example. an
addiUol'l of 1 unit to a stimulus M haYing a mapitude of 100 uni.U
iJ peIa!iwd the: 1WVl.t as an addition of 2 ro a Stimu.tus of 200 units, of:J to a
sl:i:mttlus of !OO uniu, and so on' (Fechner 1800: I, 112; cf, Berg:wn 1889: 60).
Thf!: :mdacity of Fedm.er's proposa1lies in his enemlon of this law to
stimuli and lIematiom.
The problem.. as Fechner aI:ready completely :aware, is how me
series, the series of ptychical sensation. is to be lIC<' uruts
of FedlMf suggested two method! fur identifying the mmuna of a
change in fint one mUllt fi;rId the dtmltol4of a sema.uon,
then go on to \$Glare iu thm1l.«4. A1.I absolute ideutifieo;
the pobu at whKh 11 !1..Ull.ImIOOIl of throOtJh (0 aware'
By inc.rea:si.ng me rol\,l'l'fle of a sound smrting from zero, one can
me point ;at which it be"wmes audibLe. But me ab601UU' th,rt$hold only gtVC!'S
one value' of a semation _ the- iowC$t intemity of a stimulUi at which a 8eJl!la-
cion "ff'lt (fur eHJnple, the point at which pain ill fint felt on the inaertion of
:I pm into the hand). To reiaw twO ofimelllliIie$, one
be 10 show a whole range of wrrebtiol\&. F«hner that
GOuld be' done if one d&(J'oIered the difit:tentkd tbrel>hoId of xmation - the
minimal unit. of cllange which could give me to a sensation (Fedmer 1860:
)W2). One therefore statt: with die identJlkation of the absolure thresh-
old. and then gu hac. and identitV w minimum phrH<:al pressu£e
for 'a to be sensed,
I[ t.hen becomt=a possible 10 use th.eK minima w. thle W3V to the
series of 9C1ilIation. To quote
For if we treat :;a a quantity the difference perceJved ITl
between the twO M::rl$atiotU which succeed ont' another in the coune of a
continuous inae;ue of ttimulus, if we call the .first senWion S. the
xcond AS, we 5ha1I have to I;:OtlJider sensation ail a fum. obtained by
the addition of the minimum diffett:n€. through which we pass be10re
reaming "- (Bergson 1889: (5)
With the identifk-ation of minimal differences of sen»itufJn, :a. mailiematical
rehuk1tuhip can apparently be Qt3blillhed between the series of sbmuli and
the of ElH;h quantitati'W: change in Mitnultu a
rorrelat.i've quantirativc change: in the' Krles of
Of COUl'lll:', it ls intuiti-vely that the of heat wiD 3l«'t: in m:
widi the increase in but Ber:pm argues that there .are batiic
pmbleilil with takklg a mathematical view of (1)15 correl.at.wn. !l.bhough we am
always when WI' :are hotttr or colder. it would lI«ID that: the
we ntaIIe OW' of warmth and the degr«
of tempt':J.':mJ.re reA on .:onvention. MMeover,.a£e 'degreei' reaIly
of the _Dft kind af, of such u tetnpera.rure? I do not.
pass t:hrough two ewx:eMlve but through of
sensation l\'hkh flow into lmitllUlOther. '1'lte mi:st;ake which made .•.
WiiIi that he t:J.tttevro in an iJw:'rvall:letwt:'en two senSlll.lions S3nd S',
is a OM to the other and not a m the
arithmetiod sense of We word' (Bergson 1889: off), Thm sensations jUlIt do
not Iee1ll to be meuur:able in the way that itimuJi an. However. 'the no-rel
feature in Fechner's 'I.'l"eatment i. that he did Qot consider this difficultv ifts'u1I.
T.aJUng aci'!:antage oftMfact thnaen.sation wries by
while the stirn:ulus i:m:reues continuously. he did not helritate to call thee dif.
ferences of semarion by die same name: they are aU, he lIIlf8. differ-
eDce8, since each r:orrespondi to the smallest pm;eptible lntte3lle in the
external lltimulus' (Bergson 1889: 64}. But why should the deteTmination of
the dUterential th1:eshokJ ofaeensat:lon yield a minim.um difference which can
go on to be a.ppI:ir:d homogeneously throughout the series of sensation?
In 1874 jule& 1lwnery began r:o pul>Wb a series of obj«tions to Fechner's
whkh already c.ontain certain a&pectll of BerPJn's critiqUt'< He
The ewen.tiaI <:ba.rn.e:temtk of direaly men'urablc dimemlons is
IS added. such wa;( mcreasea, is of the exact kind
3$ that which was aIn:ady there: length, sur&.ce lUl.d time are cliJneQliions of
thi$ kind. Ifwe addone length to another, bach ofthem are of the same kind
and es&enct: and their ll'WllS are also of the same Lind. Directly measurable
di.men$bons n«essariIy have this quality, because ntcasurement iuelf
requiret that dimensions of the ume kind be comparable. (Thnnery l875:
8ul:, 'Thnnery. ifone is holding a warm ol:!iec[ in one:'s hand and 111 heat
inCJ"e3S6, then the original semation of heat i$ going to be of :it different land
to the later sematlon of pam (Heidelberger 2004: :!OO). The fact that dle'mere
in sti:mulus ditTerent nervel inl7'<Jduces heterogeneity into
the s.enes of!ensaUOIl5. HoJN)gencityin the :If.lnes QflIlimuJi lIhould therelbre
not automatically be upon the series ofsen«atkms.
cites Tannery's (which abo include the that
fleft.Sadoo differenrla.ls are IDefflly c:onw:ntinnal) but gt\'M on to develop criti-
omm of his own. He aH:s WI to dre sensation of pain caused bv a
(Bel'QllOn 1889: Md). On the h)pOthesis of p1ychoph)'SiaU
Ie1tsm. we should predkt that if we apply a slowly but continlJOUlly inCl1l'asing
amount of fhf()('; on d:1c pm. then we will fed a pain that muellllle$ in paralleL
But what happel1$ " dm.t ill certain points threahol& are read1ed. when the
pain goes frombeing, (or inatrmce, merely natice2ble, «1 being nther irbome,
to .and then excruciating. There are qualitative leapa in the-
feeling of pam, of tr'anlIfornwion. whc::re a change in nature C1lItlC$
about in the quality of the pain. Thm may indicate that the aeries of
baa its uwn thresholds, which .ve relatively autonOQlOWl of the &t.ilDuJHeriea.
The oflICmations of pain. for instance. may have mfernal, relative thresh-
which ca.n:tlf,K be deduced from phy3kllogical stbnu.llWon. Tht.' pain we are
feeling :It anyone paint aumot be simply analysed inro the addi'lion of homo-
geneotlll quantities of pain, an 5laCke<l up indii&:rently upon each other. Now
this could be explained (as Thnnery suggettll) through appeal to different
nerve centres and functions in the 00dy. But 8eTpon Dolluggests - and this is
his original contribution - that the quality of ilie !ICIlsaQon ill a1Bo crucially
influenced by hftt kmg we're been endunnS the pam. He lIUggests. againat
Tannen that time in fact should Mt be a! a homogeneous rna,gnicude.
but that it should be conMdered to be the root of the
found in the series of Time. or iWrt2timl., rnak.e$ a to
ltlbon. For instance. $(ImedmCll we do not even have to im:reate dae fOrce of
pin to make the pain unbearable, we canjust let the illme qWllUity go on for a
while and the of abrmis reached. Thill mdiates that the way
the pain feels after live minutes will be coloured by the fut of my having
the pain for SO' long, whkh thus influences tbe moment of tmMforma-
don at wbich tMpain becomes unbelstable.
Berg!!on goes on to make three imporwn inferences at this junmtre. which
in fAct oontribute toWards a. definition of .duration'. First. each of
pain implies the tragel:lllll of a preceding whicb mwt be endured in
order to get to the pain- We CiUlIlo( mis3 OUt any of. the smge$, A
in time of incmuing pain ill in me: 3trict sense that it ill
e:Jtpe:rlenced ali a who.1Ie, and must include an itIl The pain is 'swollen
by the whole of its past' (Bergson 1889: 15'), A boiling point cannot be
reached at once; a certain speed cannot be reached lrlchout passing through
all the other speeds, however qukldy. Stwnd, o'erylltrics ofchanges is pUll(;-
mated at various points by at 'Which a tran$COrmaUon OCCUJ'll. So we
could iJldeed plot a. of ch2ngCll during which there only regular.
quantitative changes chat can be p16U'led on a gnph. But 'WOUld onlJ be
differences of wheR:u what Fechner has not accountm for are the
possible differences in liM or 1Iatim1 between sensat:ioo&. While Water til
coming to the boil tluil degrees of temperature can be measured quw:lLitii.tively
from 0 «1100 degrees t:entigrade; but at 100 degrees. an happens: the
water m MIUn' and !lWU to turn into liteM1. Similarly, the <ieKent of
the lCJJlper.iltUre of water «) 0 degrees signifies a cbangr in 1Ulb.Ire:
J)eJeo:l;e willoill these distinCtive poinrs The third of
duration folIOWll from the fim. two, Once such .3. plateau hu been reached,
there is a complete change in the way the e1emenl:!l relate to GIll!
another, The whole utuation cbange1l at 0 and 100 degrees, Ice. liquid and
steam all behaff In difrerent ways, if the same suh8wu:e is inmwcd.
water. Thus wr transformation, there is a. change in 1M meaning
that ..'hat happellll nat happens OIl new
lbese auributet of duration mqest a conception d in gt!neraJ,
which Bergson will nowargue should be lind divided up to
The classic dyad between spau and time is misleading, lilI it per:made$ us
that there ill somethingin cammon between the two. Kant, foc instance, rhOllttht
'P"Ce and time shared f!.I:lilCdy abe same formld acmaJ infinity
and homogeneity (K:ant 1782/1787: A23/B38). Berp>n, on the adler hand. is
D.ying that the forms of and .pa<:e Ilhould be oompIetdy diitinguishoo. By
ascribing it spedal kind of 'heferogeneous continuity' to time, Bel"lP0n is nor
just saying mal there UO boundaries between (Kant
wouM agree, and say that the gon foe space :ll5 an inftniM,
magnitude). His point 11 that the type of di.ffi:rentiation appropriate to \hi.
inllofar as diey muat he di$tinct .from the kind of differentialiOl'l .appro-
pNtt' to things il1l/lO£v as thry underswod purely $paually and timf'leuly. 8).'
not the role' of duration in sensation, psyc.hophvlics an
abstract, spatialiled account ofsensation. This, for Bergson, ill w n:al Cl1\1M!' of
tnt' of p.n\:hophysicli.
DeIeuze's emphasil on the pallIling of intellJi"1! mreshol&clarifie!> 8eJWlOll"to
on the 'indivbibility' of duration and thtrrefore of human experi·
ence. Bergson )(lffietimes t:a.lb in 11 Rornmti.-; WlIy abcIw iht: 'indivisibility' of
duration (thu& pladng the ducaOOn3l-a«OWlt of human experience in an
Qp}>QSition with the lIcientific one, which 'murden to dissect').'
In the way. DergltOfI' $ conclusIDn is that the n::t\.lm> of phwical quantity and
sensate quality are '!:he fucl t& that there is no point of
contaCt benl'een the and the emend.ed, between quality and
quantity' iBerpm J889: The idea proposed by Kant, that there 1$ a
l<pecial .kind of rn:at>"Ilitude', sensatiQns can IX'.' more or
intense, ill by Bergson. If distinguish IWO kinds ofquantity. the ODe
intensive, whicb admil!> only of a '"more o.rleM", the other extenNft'. wbicb
]en(b itself to we are not fu from siding with FC'clmer and the
pIl'YCbophyllidm, rc,r, » won iii a thing is acknowledged to be <:apable of
mcrel1lle and decrease. it seem! natumll'O au by how mUlh it deaeallCtl or br
how mlU';h it nu:re31.iell " . , Either, then, !!iellW:lon is pure quality. or, if it :il.
magnitude, we ought to try to me/lSl,.Ire it' (72). 11.M:- notion of intentky iii a
cOI1:fuRd concept, 'silWl.tod <l.t the of two iltreams' e:xten:me
quantity and the kind of sell:5e(l multiplkity in COnsciolWle..
Del.euz.e's a.n:a.Iy$i$ shows tbaf du.radon !t more lItrtcd1 'relatively indiviu'ble'
(B 60; d. DR in that. each nap (r<ming (Wef a threshold involves a
change in ItlllUre (and therefure ill indivisible), hut tha( may
less be many U".wernm of thresholds.r. Delf:)JZIjI to show, arrer event,
how BergoJOn du:I not fully undentand the Implications of the conttprion of
dur3Uon he wall brtngUlg lnw existence; me job of the commmWol' is to
make these unp1icat:iOIl8 Upl1clt In the (Jon Ihe lmItI fI/ Colt·
Berg$on bimlle'lf had couched hii critique of J.l8TCboph",iaI paraJ-
k.l.i&rJ:l 311 a of the nQtion of intellllity. which he takelIm imply c:hangell
in degree, me3!l'Ut'ed in quantity. In the scholastic nQrion of
imemtry, &ull active in Kant'. philOllOphy, degrt:e5 of inteti$ky AR saki \0 be
CQfll:inuow and homogeneO'l.B. 'fime is not held to make anvdifTerenct' to the
gradual Increa3e in inrensitv of the colour red. But fM Bergson's
'lotion of dur:.ldon helps in fiIct to indicate d\e trUe fonn and nature ofmten-
'ity (DR 239). ff1're follow thmugh line oftbought, l'IIe
at rh(' beart ofdumrion the lmplicatlNJ or<ler ofintentiity' (DR239). form
of differentiation revealed by dumtion that intemity mUllt be
thouglu: on the threshold model of intemive difJmmu. To say that 'the expres-
00n. "difference of intensity" ill " tau«ology' (DR 222) is an exaggeration.
tJe(;3,U!!e Deleute himself abo spelb out otMr, ide-d!, forms of - but
nCYenhele6s be shO'l'>1i dw duration and intt!.miry at'e imimat.elv related and
produce the ba&k form ofdi£fefel1ltia.l:inn thr any theol)' of s.en!iadon.
'NQ'lIr. although BerglOfi romeamell.llet!mJ to ,uggest {particularlyat the SW1
(If that t:lII:1I. »lOiIIIo\mt, by 'Virllle of taking place in duration,
1nVQl\'es tomething lU'.!W ()C. in Delew;ian tfrllU, lhat any repetition a
Delew.e :leel! that It is not to (:ommit oneself to Ihit
eul'eJIle pmition. There are stretches of eltpl:.oena: when nothing mw:h
happens (in the books he calls these 'anr-instaxulJ-whllJeVer', mst<mJs
The $tll:m!J point of Bergson's about duration u that
enduring a ;renf;won or experience can al J(jlR.I' puillt gh"t' rl.$t' to lit cbange in
nature, and that thii property requU:es that we abandon any notion of time
articulated in tellrnl of the accred()n of discrete. homogeneolB interval& {<".g.
dock time).b Such mremoJds of I.f'9JUformBoon are fairly frt'.quent in expe:n.-
ence. and in the &sa, Bergson gives a number of desl.:ripoQruI of dm:sho1d&
thal puncl:ll.al.l.': emotions {e.g. desire and angu). However.
thr5lolds are ob'fim:DIy not tilOOUDtered at every moment (wbkb '!'<'OUId
as it would the mdU1'rJ1Iaot' a particular state). In Oelew.·
i.an terms, the repetition ofa type ofevent does nor oJ:wo:p In'f{)l.e
Furthermore, if Ihis. Is the reason that the new. then dri&
tht'standard, over>$\mplhul; of Bergaon'$ in.simence
tlw. duration Implies novelty, It i& not that the 1Wll i5 ceasdeuly prodlXed by
the m.et'e fact of duration.
It it rather that the newi& produt:ed dartltllm
is lIw 't'elUdt:fur
Durtiion hall the property of Ihn:3bol.dli. of In1n5fonnation,
but each ilwance ofsuch :il seems w mec US back to the thing that
is being lIefllled or experienced. The im.eMive pmpl:rties of me experience
refer back to prope:rtits of die thing. which in the 5eft!le dwthey
.are internal or irltrin&ic:, all opposed to exremal Of !/deCondary. For in!KllDce, me
experience of trapped in a yeUow room would thus ha'lo'e singularities
particillar to it it might. be optic:a!ly at first, but at a «rtain point I
might glaTt to fuel naUM'OUlL In the Ci'1Umll boob a few time!! tel
Goethe'$ theory of{;Glour, which state:! that when tlJe of oolOllr! are
Ibey often produce a trat1$fortna6on= yeUow of ted
around IL So there might be :ill $Omof uptiol effectl; produald by being $I:Ucl;.
in a yellow rooM long enQugh. Tht'n" vrold till» be diiferenDal thrt:sholds
proper to me exclusive re.:eptiDn of colour yellow. Repeated stimulation
by the wlour yellowwould have its own nf &ingularitie5. After haYing been
locbd in a yeUow :room once in my life, the repnitWn at a later point of me
expt:'ricnce might geneGW:: and then, depending oli howmany
it repea.tl':d. panic, AJthough would be generated within
my body in the room. they are mO'f'e properly auributed to dle room itllelf. A
Yellow Room ba:s. lou 0"'1\ intensive firld. dilierent in kind to the
The Patiwlogits of Tmu 17
lmenaiti¢s generawd by a. White Room. Dcleuze nplidtly takes the roncept of
duration to gi:\'e a«:ess ro 'thing3 themsel.'\u' (see, for instance. D1 2.!J), and
COD$dOl.J.llly plays on lhe mtLItipie meanings of me lI!iOTd 'intensity': rortaphY""
ical, duratioml.l and affective.
We already lee Deleuze .a. compromise Berpon and
Fechner. Bergsonian U. ro conceal me differential
thremol.di :identified byFechner, but nowextracted from their abattact, homQ-
ge.ueous Thus, although thresholdJI - wh.ether they be of pain or
!Ioen1lOry qu.aDtit5- are embodied in malXtrlal bodie$.. Ihcse thresholds au- only
reached oncondirloo that their transformation, are I!Rdtmd. H, :iU'o Kam.li3}'S in.
the First Analogy. the pase.age of time em only be measured by UIl.lI!ling a
penmment substance lU the backdrop to change'S in Bergson mm.."6
hew I.be nature of aubltanccs can be modulated 1:, time all duration,
It was Bergson'5 reali.zaticn that dur.won implies the pl'aer¥ation of the
past whidl ftm:ed him to modify hilildentifu:ation of duration with
If duration i& only possible on condition that t:he palIt ill preserved, rhen,
Bergson rellJ:izc:s, be mwt radically modifv his theory that eonsciOUlness is me
primary site ofduration. The past is preserved by memory, but at anyone time,
the vast of memories mUlit relide outside oonsc::ioumess. But if
du.ration i&the prolonptkmofthepast inro the present. and yet memories are
mOll! of the time not then me durational nat:'Ul'e of me mind only
indirectly concenll consclol.lllfte4 Memory. the lite of uncomcioll!!. mental
representations. now bears the of duration. From now on. the role of
wnsciolMle!Jl! will be restricted. and will in fact not directly conn.&ted with
dw-ation at all, The function ofconsciowness isnthCT to fix itBclf to thejnJ:JJmt.
that is, ro the Here we begin to see the albeit quite ace..
dental and via a completely independent route. with freud: oonsci:QUllfleSll
now b«omes ill phenomenon, concerned with the 'exigencies of
life' •which ronspirea to ronc.eal. deeper, UllI."OnsOOUS root! proper to the
buman mind. Bergson plunges into 'the unblguities v.mch $Uffound the
problem of the UllCOl1lCious', iUld he arguing th4lt 'the idea of an
is dear, despite prctiudice' (Berpon 1896:
The Past
When 'We are indoors, we assume that the world outside carries on
unperceived. We assume that there is an serles of event!! occurringin
the external world, whicll hall nothing to do with us, However, Berp:Jn
suggetltll thou it is not eklough to dose the CI.I.'t'tains and ,.,indOWll, liO detach
from to which one spend$ one', daylight
houn trving to adapt, to succeed in escaping 'reality'- We do$e ounclves otl
from ext:et'l1a1. reaHry only for another, inner curtain to open. Once
theworld of the senses is dimin.iJhed,. one tnrountert that «Jurr world,
the past. In Berpon's gothic philO6Opby of memory. the past .. at.least as real
3lJ the external wurld, 1llere is 110 mote re:uon tQ tay 'that the past e.f&t::es
i1Jdf as 500n 31 perceived than there is to mpPMe th(ll: maleJial obJecu cease
to ex.Ut when we (;ea8Ir. to peTCen.e them' (Bergson 18'9& 142). The unper-
ceived external workl i8 ;;malogous tn !.he unperceived pasL More mongly,
Bergson goes 110 far all to claim thai: it l:$ the past that truly is, Put e<rents may
appear sterile and powetlesa,. while our pt"eie1lt seems malleable and open to
continual redireaion. Bur onee an event is done. it is fixed. It is photo-
graphed, and if it can change iu significance due to future interpretatiom. it
cannot be the pur. has the a.ttrlbute ofpermanence which
t.h.irWmi Iinre Plato have atl::l'ibntt!d 10 the nolion of 'being'. The present. 01\
the ot:her hand, is w fleeting and impossible to pin down th3t it does not have
the right to be ll3id ro be.
Led by the logic of me concept of dumriun, Bergson is led to the same con,.
clWlion that haunted a number of the most signitic:ant thinken of die day,
among them Freud art<l 'in the menw reakn, there is no annihiJ..
(el. Nletu<;he 1911: t# 588). Pertlaps it thevertiginow fJlllCination with
mil; thoupt thar llepa:rate& our age lIO r:adically from Betp>n's, Nothing th.u
was e'm' in the human mind can leave it. Pan of the reatIOO why Berpon
and are more impon.:mt £han Freud for is that thf:' fOrmer
twO IQ)' t.I:"Ile5t to this thought, to the pointofddirlum. BergJon's meoryofme
past, and NterDc.he's meorv or me eternal rerum, home3rpre6& in their di&:r·
ent (and, Deleuze conacnds, ultimately complemencary) the impfu:-
mOlU at both the psychological and etJric:al level!., of this one thought: that if
npenencell are lost to our present, the past is not lost to the mind. Deleuze's
rotlttiburion iB lO identifY Bergson as the philosopher who provided the most
pc-:r:ful alJUmf:DU to back up mal thnught; this ia why Mtater f1M Memm) is
the central of Bergsonlan phibsophy for Ddcuze, Furthermore, if
the 'gre:ate$t weight' that Niet.l:lKhe encounters in the dJought of the t:t.ernal
return ia tbe thought dw. tJlJ the pa!t is preserved, then Deleu.re'$
seetm to be to show how &erp:tn's argumentl about the p3Sl all<> help to
incmIJe this 'weight' - to the point that liberation from the burden of me past
through me affirmation of the et:ernlII return becomes a necessity.
theory of memory is the mangeS(, most part of
his philosophy, and for the casual reader of Ddeuze (perhaps inrrodu.ced to
his work through it cannOt but: be surpri!ring to find a contem-
porary philosopher defending it so energetically. .But lleJetl.Il:: c.a.rries on
defending the meory well aftI:t: and it fom1& backbone of
1(1985).1 The proposition that the pastil. rat all the ext.emal world
is already enough to give us ajolt. Realitj· appean to !JPiIl out f1'Iff the confine.
of the present moment; surely a Iil.Daq ;., aIbot? Yea. of course the praent is
BetgKm U$ - but th3t doell not mean it hall a monopoly on
JfC'JliIj, which might be something quite' different. h it. a priori true that only
what ill aetttally bappening ambe said to Im'e reality? 1:& the past then nothing
but a: figment of the imagimttion? But, we ,,-ant to lnsit.t, past is dead and
8UJ1C; there is notbillg we can db about it. Berp.m relIpOl:Ida: it DI2Y be dead,
but ir is not gonr-_ Withom the preset"V3tlon of the past, there would be no
action in the present. nor the ability to distinguish rnere imagina.
tIOn from memo'l' The p3St is completely real, says Bergson: in (act, reality
be with grcluer :.wurance to the past than to &he- pretelu. which
1lI forever ltl, flight, alw'ays by lUi imntincm negation. Why, then, we
protest ethereal Frenchman, does not the past flood anto the present.
mcapacnanng and choking it, if it is more real than the present? is
welL in fuct Ir d.oesfiOmet:imcs in certain pathological C3U$, and if
It does not for most othen. that is beCO\use are able w inkibittheir aware.
ness of the past. The paM. Bergson cont::Judes, is unconscious_
The route of BergllOn and Janel intO the notion of the unconsciOIlS wa.s
through the notion of memw-y. The more they had on the condi.
tions fO: more .Irey $lIW psychopatholoS' as resulting from
failures U\ the inhiblOOn of memory. It was thi$ line of research which m:a({t"
them impervious to Freud's se"ua1 theoryof the lmoonsciou:s when
it Freud is often held to have radlcilly change<! lhe
self.1IIlag'e of bumantty thr<iugb his discovery of the unoomdous. for Deleuze.
the diJoo\tery Qf the reaJuy of the past i3 more fat-reachirlg in its
of n.ur self-image as hllman subjects.. As a phiJ050pher.
Bergson 5 rec:oncepuon Qf a toW vision of tI)('
hwnan mind whkh is inevitably wider in scope than work, which
tedlered ro its origins in the study of psychopathology. But
at III that Freud does D<;t happen to be a by training or
.on, The 11UlJtods by, which B.erg$on and freud <fu<:over their -Sepat".t.Ie
thoonc$ of the unronsclQUS are completel}' dUtiner. Freud discovers thto
unconscious by its on the basis of the theory of he
COrtW'ucts after omen.mg patientl5 exhibiting 'exces.sivdy Intense' h'
, "'--- , . an 15
c IC. neud s method g<>e$ from d,.namk ro the l1Dconsci0u5;
shape ofthe W1OOIlsciow is from Ihe dfecu uf reprt'.IllIQn. f11l1 notion
of unconaci.oUll is thus 'rclati\-e' to the pnx-ess of and the cri.
tenon of wha.t must be from COraciQUSQe5S. [( Freud discover
what the au.rse of Ttpression is. then, it follow'S, he will know i"Jature Qf ule
Bergson. on the other band, discovers his own theory of the uncoruscious-
based on the notion the 'pure past' or memory' _ through philoso-
phy. After the implications of the of the past in
memorr· ill led to <!eduu- &vm there that «'al. yel 'pure
memones mu,ft m tum be 'repreue<t' in normal psychology; if theY arc not.
th.en psychopathology must result. Ibm '$ diso:m:ry of dte uncon
!JC10\l1l proo:eds in the rcvene direction from Freud's. \\<'here.as Freud goes
from to thf' of the 8erg$on goa
from philosophIcal postular.e of the to psyclu)pathology. In
that rhi$ procedurt;' a1Iows Bergson to discover a
of the unoonscio\lS which is occluded from Freud's vi$ion, pro-
ct'!ediug as be does frt)rn the cQnl;cpt of repression (or ddence in his
writing.;) to thaI of the \Ul(OI'lA(:I(tw. Bergson [\0;(1
t:ouceptions of the unconscitlW. Ofl<! ofwhich can claim to be ontological, the
ather psychological. Afttor ,taring fhal in Bergson t:Mre is a "ps}"Chological
unco1l3cious. dilltinct fr(Jffi the ontological Wlconscious' {B il}, Ddeuze says
that 'there is no contradktion between t:lteMo two descriptions of lWO distinct
unconsdousllesses' (B "2). Whether Deleuu is saying here that there are two
kinds of unconscious which exist separ.ttely, (Jr, on the other hand. that there
are different 'levels' of the same Wlcons<:iou..., we will have to examine later. In
thi$ chapter we will be fQl;using 'On the: 'ontological unconscious' which
Deleuze claims that Berg$on uncovers in his theory of memory. This uncon-
scious 'corTCspond$ to a memory that is pure, virtual, impassive. inactive, in
iJMlf (ibld.). LikeJung's unconscious, this Bergsonian ontological
unconscious has an autonomy of its own, and is not produced through repees-
In ,\1I2tt.eTa7Ul (1896) Bergson stared that trurh about 'latent' menlla.!
is that they are past states. There are two types of memories:
mechanical habit 'memories' and proper memories of individual e\-enls.
If a
mind can retain mental traces of past events, then it remains permanently at
me risk ofthe caprkious reproduction of Ih<!se traces, whenever it cncoWlrers
something resembling or contiguous with its wrmer perceptions. There is ;\
'spontaneity' that must be attributed to the memory trace, which 'is as capri-
cious in ]'('producing as jt is f.:lithful in presernng' (Bergson 1896: 88). By
threatening, mOTOOVei, to mingle- past images present ones, of load the
mind with painful1mageli. memolY risb unbalancing the mind when all the
lauer needs to do, practkally speaking, is to perfonn its functionll for the
oflldaplation, and retaiD 'auenlkm to life' (Bergson 1896: 175). The
differeru:e in kind between perception and memory can mw be identified in
termS of the presence or absence of 'acti'iry'. "TIre adualii:t of our perception
in irs adiz-lty. in the movements which prolong it, and Tlot. in Its greater
inten!i.ty; the past is only idea. the present n ideo-motor, .. The past is essen·
t:iafh.. !Aat iJ.'hKh am tUlltmger . .• By misundemanding this dJaracteri5tic of the
past, become incapable of making a real distinction between it and the
present, i.e., that which is aain( (68-9),
In' eramining this theory, and Deleuze's own IDe of it, we- will be faced with
some difficUlt c:lurices. The first choke concerns the staM of
the fhenry. Wlur kind of rhecry is st! Ddeu:ze explkitly this queuion,
hut it rums out that his suggesrions raise more problems than l.Il.ey answer.
we have mentioned already, Deleuze describes pure memory ll'l 'onrologi.cal',
as opposed m .psychological' , Hi5 main cba.racreriz.ation of the difference
between Ollrology and psychology in ampassage:
What Bergson calls 'pure memory' bas no ps-;.-chological exi&-
renee. This is why It is Gilled iNl;tive. and UJl(OO$(Wll$. AU
wordll are daDgCfOl.l:5, in particular, the wurd 'unconscious' whkh, since
Fteud, has become imepardhle from an etpecially clI'emYe and actM
20 /Nkw.e and
psychololPw We will haM: occll!ion to compare Freudian
uncot'it(iQUS with the silu:e b:lmBelf1'D.1Ide Wlnpar-
!son. We mwt nevertheless clear ar point that Berp;m does not
the word 'Uf)(onscious' to denou: a psychological reality outside e.oDICiOUlr
Ile$$, btu (0denou: a reality - being as it is initself. Strictly
the is the present. Only che is 'pSJlChologi.
cal'; but the past i! pure ODh:Jlogy; pure memory has only ontoIogkalsigni{·
lumre. (B 56)
The dai.m to ontological nacus appean to rest on two attributes of 'pure
memories'. Fillst, Bergson ill arguing that male a di8.tinctlon
'pure memories' that. is, as they are in tbemaelres
prior to their beingbrought to and metnoriea as they are 'actu-
alized' and to consdoumeu in the of memory iUclf; tht:sre
latter are 'memotJ"imagel' Hence pure memories have an
an 'ifHudf' stat1JS, unlike 'memol)'-imagt:s'. whichj lit> we will see,
are to the- context in which they are acm:alized. But this is not
to make them 'ontological' In any substantial !leMll! of the tErm.
Hence the
soecond attribute of pure :memoria would seem to be the key one;- that. lit> paat.
thete pure memories have :.l pem:umence which is granted to no other
phenomena. Aa Dekuze 'the only equi:¥aJent thesis is Plato'3 noO.QI'lof
Remi.ni&cence. Remlnilcence aho afli.ntt.a a pure being of the past, .a being in
itllclfof the. pau, an Memory th.tt i!. capable of serving:all the foun-
dation fur the unfolding of time. Yet apln. a PIatoni<: 1mpi.r.ttion maUs itself
profoundly felt in.Berpon' (B 59).
Deleuze'li actual explanation of how this 'ontological metnQry' is posiible will
appeallO U1lnlKendent.al ground" rather than ontological cf;;dms in the saiet
By the time of N Ddeuu li describing
Bel'glOn's theory of memoryin tellllS of'mmscendental synthesis' 'What do we
mem in speakingof a pure, af1'rio"pmt., the past in genellli or as such? If
mra is a great boo.... it is perllap!: because Bewpon profoundly explol'ei;!
the domain of this 8}'uthesJs of a pure pwand dillCovered all its
constituti'ile paradOJ«:3' (OR. 81), The danger of tiWng Deleu:!e at his word
when he de5Cribes the past as 'ontological' is that if we taU tNll thought 1.0 hs
conclusion we MIl end up with a weird spiritualist Plawnillm, with pure
memories all omologially fundamf:ntal entities. But !here JeemI to be lKitJre-
thing mOTe going on.. t::'O'en inJanet's Strllnge dream of a paleo-
which would allow one to 'trawl' into past.u
For BeTpon andJanet, human being is 3D organism that I:tappe.ta to
have complex enough to open up a 'zoo of indetl:m:lination'
(Berpm 18%: st} in itll brain. which permlt$ the maperWon of habitual
relIGtion and the apptaI to put experience. 1':bts cerebl:1ll rone of indetenn1-
nation heoomes the 'pp' 01' throlJlh wbkb duration enten, pr0-
ceeding to take charge of turning it inside aut. T:u:ne llurges into
brain. changing everythmg. so that now it is tlu: brain which
shaped around an ontotogi<:al memmy. nII.hB' cb:m vice
versa. Wherever interiorized duration arises. rime pushes through and invem
the:f:abrk of £he l.IIliverse, so that matrer mullt nowbe talum as che at
temporal becoming, r:a.ther than dmf: beingdependent on ma.tter. In
.llft4 Delruze :make.e the Kantian point that 'It llUCceuion of inst.anlll
does nat cODllliture I:i.u:If: my more than it it to disappear; it indi0.rt:5
only iu constantly aboned moment of binh. Tune- is only in the
orIgina.ry synthesis which operates on the repetition ofinsranu' (DR 70). At
Ute moment that the 't1I1.iverae invert! itleJl :md int.eri.orizea itself
vittually, it (startingwith lbe bl':ilin) beoomes maped armmd time, :rather than
vice there is an ascent, through the involution of W1ualit¥- to iW
entird>' new order of validity, bcycmd the order of actual &cL
'Ihe emergence of memory tlI:rou.gh the wne of indetermination opent up
a mteriori2ed whkh peoceeds I'D evolve in tension with
the more tendencies of inwllige.oce. Accmding to Deleuze, the
i$$ue here is not ultirn:ittcly whether memories can or cannot be localized in
the brain. Even if Iheycould be I.ocaJ.iwj in MUt'Ofial connections, char. would
aside the fact that 'lrir.b the of difference (the partiCU'-
tar memories), a new relationship which mwi be articulated in tcJ1Dll of
vinualiJ:y and actuality, Memariell are preserved in 1M ""'fill, and muM there-
fore ilIlDlehow coulat with the attenbon to present reality that my
COIUclOUlIllesli. 1"Iti!i reJatiomhip requires a. diflen:nt fuunework fur
than does the evolubonary process in
In w twentieth (mtury, man)' phUotophm in !he post·Kantlan trad.idon,
Sartre pemaps being the gm.u M:ampJe, insiBted on treating the mind M a 'for
iudi' beca.\J$e of the qf beyond the- of the
pb),ical. Following Kant, amsclOlU.Rea mwt be taken as: irnplicitk' Jlelf..
wnKiow.. In "J"h,s of SFit Hegel says that OOmciowlnellill is
implldtly self<onscious bea;we acta of a:mlICioUli cognition implicidy
to which allow us to know mat we are knowing, think that iiln
thinking, etC. 'Hence'. Hegel SII}'S. 'it is something that goes be,ond limi.u, and
since thete limits are its own, it is sotnetb1ng that goes beyond itself (lUgd
1807: !ill. "Ibts double t.ilUlKendence (w objectS and to self) means that
oonsciol.l.ll'l.eSll mUlit be taken as fundamentally In dfect, San:re goes
on to HeceI's claim about the relation between conxiOUSlleM and
Sa.rtre inren that thk m.elUlS that Q ooIy as
'beingfur-iuelf" iUpure 'lad:of'bdng' (Sal:ue 1943;
85).n On the other side of the subject there i3 being the world of
, non<ONcioul objects or phyaka1 Mates, In and for which theTe is no ttan-
llCendenre. In sense. chen, being. pure immanenu-; it '1.$ what it is', as
opposed to Ir.m.Icendau:.e, which 'is what it is not and is nor wbar it is'. Human
beings thUll cannot be tre'llted in strictly evolutionary rerms because of their
capacity fur
But in TIu.F.ooltl.tMm (publiahed five yean befoRSame's &i:fIg4.
Janet argues that the explanation for the absence C1C nothingnelll8
that distinguWJ.eS }wman romooWlnes.s is 1a besought, quite llpeoncall:y, in
memory, not in in geneTat 'Th¢iQaI of memory h to triumph
0\'eT ab,ence and it is ttl'" strugglf' .ag-.rimt absence which cha:racrerises
nr.mory' (Janet 1928: 221), The appe.u memory at drill point i5 more
c.umpJe-x I.han dIe appeaJ to comdousneu, all memory itself is It
function, having Doth oonscwU!$ eM unconsciom Bergson, Janet and
are performing a delicate balancing act ntre.l...ik-t Freud, the\' think.
it i.Il wrong to dillringuish human b¢inp from animalll on thte basi$ of the con-
sdoume. ofthe fonner. ConsdOl.lMeJ$ itself is not. us from
animaa; the post-Kandan psycbological tradition (led by Wundt) had
mca!eded in tlhiUling down COIl!lCiOUllneS$ to attenoorL But (or and
hi! 0lIf'll I:radition. Freud in turn ill wrong to il'mll'oe th21 a theory ofmind un.W
therefore tQmmit itself to 'the task of tracing aU the of our
back 10 (SE 1: R:nher, the notion ofthe unoonseiou.!'
should be explained in another v.ay. '111eidea of an
)1$ dear, despite eurrem pre-judice' (Bergson 1896: 142). Wh.uhas been ruislt.ed
by both Freud and the pO,t-Kantian tradition is how it it w
'ffUmWry and CDtlSdm.tJ attirr..tU.m which s.eparat.es human bei.J:tg1l &om the: Te.1iI! of
the animal W<H'ld, On the one tmnd, .mE'JIlt:lrieg the deYeJoprnents
that cake plac.e in dtlfation, and bttome pot.entlaUy fur £Ot1$clOUII-
ness. But on the hand, cOflK'ioUsness - as an adapUw: function _ IKlW
gain$ a new function, as it mU51 now t:Iid.ualize (II" inAihit virmaHv subsistent
me-monell. The conseql.len<:e: of the mteriorizaoon of the emer-
gence ofa newrelationship actual and virtual DeleuzeanKulates this
relationship .in 1eJ'Dl3 of tht! c<m<xp:l$ of ·differen.ce' and 'reperi.cion'.
Feom Ikotcuze', penpecdl'e, then, Berpon misimerpret.s his own Temlts. As
we havt' ilCltn, lklt"l,I;re £ametimes loob ambiwtlent about. the real
5f3tm of Berpon'J theory; Ja}!l that his method is lit ona 'more than a
deKIiption of and feu (in appean.nce) tban a transcendenral
analysis' (1)1 36/4{»). In and however (more
Ulan the 1956 arocb \\.1lkh are Mill under the speD of &rgson's theory of
organk and DeIWl'C'iiI effort is to CODvt"I1 Bergsoniim into
3. pltilOHOphy, ThUl the bMue it not about whether memories
can «hl4lI:p (or 'ontolugially') mbsist outSide of the brain. 8erpm beli.l:'lJes
thar. 'cQnttmlporary is seding to get away from •. , anatnmical
schemes' {Bft'gson 1908: .116). !Wwewr, if one adheres to a
reading of.8erg1liOn. one can in fll£t 3VQid potential conIIkt with nel.lJ"mcience_
The point b¢comes not to defend Immateriality of memorieli, but [0
shO"N how the bcain orpnized around 3 piaticular
. problem' whkh can no longer even be! red\Ked In a problem ofadapution.
In Bergsonism, the problem of temperdl $yJuhem develops: into a mOTe'
complex problem: how the virtual and 3£tluJ are to in the same bh>
togi<:'.aJ entity, His most powerful point is thal thf< relatianllhip of WtuaJity:.and
acmality must Mvt" iu own. autonomous fOnn. and amOOl be reduced to
material: catlSality. In this sense, his theory is \:-ompati1:>k- with e'I01u-
rionan' .a:c.eOUDl.. and evc::n with r.endenciei in Nieu:u;be's. work. [n a note from
1886-.7, Nietzsclle m.akes the remark that memory must be a -late' phenome-
non, 'imofiIr as here the drM to mm equal RenU already to have been
Nbdue<J; difterentiation i$ (Niewehe 1967; # 501), The point is
the same as 8etgKtn'$:: (he of.m.emories it; necessarily in tension
with ocher bkltogial tendencies in the human organism, Even if
the dllrerentbJion of memorW be counk'd on iu own tel'IIlll as an
function, an eqU2ll.y bnporCUlt question concerns the compensations
and adjustments that would :D'ille At a con6equence within the mind, The
B.elgsGnian-Delewian is that a new thre,hotd is fea(:h.ed with the
interioriza.tion of memory, and that the mind undug()C$ a change in
Once the e'*Olutionary path the pre$¢rvation of
mem<:Jri.e, is taken. a. new, fundamentalllelf-reWic>nship is permitted to arise
within the mind. This self-relationship is not in one of inhibition or
reprelSion (as on the Freudian model), bllt is primmlyone of
The need fOT repression mayari$e {IS a w pn!lW)' tum toward$
the actuali.zation of the virtual in 'pJfd1k Jt is the
of memory that possible in compln organmns that lets themapart
from other .anitnJlI!. "The more complt!x a S}'S'em. the more the
to impUcfJlifm appear within it' (DR 255). [w Delem.e, is an eumple
- perhaps the privilegedexample - ofhowthe pliysiod and
constitution ofli,,'lng bemlPcan beCOflle radi<;a)ly 'Complex
incteafi.nlly fend to interiorise their £omUmth'e • The
mlm! the difference on whkh the' system depend$. .. interi,omed in the
phe.l1omenon, the more J:\':petioon finds il!elf the lev it un
external rondiuoo$ which are supposed to etlS\U'(' the reproduction {If' me
"a.me" dilft:,reneel' (DR 2&6). U»e 'incerkJrintion' involved in nvrnory if. the
fundamental oondinon of the of 'p;ychic sy*ms', because
repetition only beeome5 truly 'interior' OIl (OIIdition that memory i,$ pouible,
The dilfeTeac:e between 'material' :md'spiritual' repetition depend! on the
pn."$4!.'QU' lhe- repet.itions..1he material and the spiri-
tual, t.berIe it it \'tit The fonner is, a repetition of Sll(:C(:ll8M:
independent or 1nlilQRl:S; the is ll. repetition of the Whole Oil
coesildnl ... Spirimal repeUtion unfolds in the being in iuelf
of the p:ut' (DR. 84).
hprellllion dOt'S not produce the unconscious, no more than it is tiu: final
fom1 of the rdationship actual and virtual, On thi! point, Ddeu.ze
all lhat. the proce5S ofindhidw,uon comprises an 'unconsciQllS
(PS 14) which eulminal4!$ ill a final integration of consciour
I1(i'; :and the uncof!.li'ciQU$. arut by virtue (If It! 'i!lteriorization of difference',
the indi\.iduation of mind ua.l1lO undentood a, !be \'ebicle fOr the coming t6
self<ons.ciowmeu of the whole of life, In a !«:'markable pa.uage from Berp:m.
ism (to which we return in cha.pter 6). Oelwu how
in man, and only in man, me actual bewmes adeqwe ro the virtual. It
could be lI8id that man is c:apabk of rediscovering aU the levels. all the
degrees of expansion and contral:1ion that coemt in the virtual
Whole. As if he weR capable of all the 3nd brought about in himtelf
ellf.!I'ydriug that, elsewhere, can only be embodied in di&rent
species , .. man h apable of scrambling the phmes, of going beyond his own
plane as his own coodition, inorder tinally to expreM naturing Nawre, (B1(6)
It is completely to miss the point to be pul off by the word 'man' or 'human'
here; none of mil> u 'anthropomorphit'. 'Humanity' JUS(. hllppoe:m to be the
;q>ecies in QIIU' world that has internalized time through the development of
memory, Other species could do the WIle under certain conditions, and
probably have done and will do the same, in d.i&J'ent region., of the universe.
It ill futile to think that tOIDJ*!x life forn:J.s on other "'Orids will live subitan-
tWly different (better?) 'UvcJ than our own. The problems they encounter will
be more 01' k$a. the same, because the synthe!lis of time is a fundamental, uni-
versal invariMu, with a finite &elt of raodet. This is not to say th;u: modifi.catiolUi
in the theory of synth_1Yil1 not aJ:ways be poaible - Dele'll2le ]a pre,.
occupied with Just 8UCb - but what make$ Rant'" Copemlam
rerolution S() monumental his uncovering of a lew!'l of funda.mental, ttan-
setmdentll. anal)'sis ",-him bokh for mi., finitE Any being which both has
senses and thinb "''ill have (:0 wgan.ln: their data ilirough nonrr.aIiYe articula.
tions 'fNbich function ftw that being mrourh the synthesis of time. \l\'berever
there is inteligent life, it will be organized in temporalllfl'tbes6
Perhaps than any other recent pbiloliopher. Deleuz.e has insisted 011
demonslnuing the C\dl extent to which thl:! Copernican ret'Olution has mrned
tM: uni\1erSe imide out. It ill not just Wat time grO\mded In me
'Time is nat the intAmor in WI, hutJUSt me opposite, the interioritY in
which we in which we :rmwe. live and change. Serpan ill much d03er [0
Kant than he himself Kant dclined time as the form of inrc.rklrity, in
the that we are intenuu to lime' (C2 82). .Berg5on QpeDi up memorv's
Pandora's box. the eontmt.s flying ow to 0CCUJlf the en'li.re mind, vanishing
Into depths ofmental life which were hitherto unknown. By virtue ofopening
up the domain of SO that if f1(JW threab:D5 to dwarf the present,
Bergson in tum ratcheQ up the ethico-tetnporal problem, making
KieIt.egaam'. and Nietl8Che's all the more tmdrcl.l.lllYel1mb1e. How
can tJIl t!J« be n-willed?
It hali al.reaitr been noted that the ida 1hat the past is JH'ClI'em:rl l.n Its
entirel.)' had become $01nething of an occult in Europe.
The tact that the !aI:De klea appears in NietDche, Freud and Berp:m at moTe
or less the !lame time that an unconscious, oo.ti«:live current was at
work during this period, being pkked LIp on by thin.lr.er; from nuny intellec-
tual traditions. .. ill not i:mmediatdy de:ll1" what hilItorieal or sociological
methodology would be adeq'Wlte for tUticuIa.t:ing mu uncotW:ious current.
Moreover. a theon:tkaJ ovetdetermination remits from melle
multiple recepUoDi of the j3iDe idea.. Freud beg.m by making the d.isti.ncrion
bet'wetn memory and perception in pt.m:J.y neurologial r.enm. only going on
to remove this IDllt'erlal bMi$ afru TIu t7j1Jrlrrms. For NietzllChe the
thought of the of the past W'll.f both a mystical md :an ethical
fhought. thought of the etf'rna.I return firlIt appc-ared as a lntu--
trion of the preservation and return of trn: put an iIdinllC number of ril:nea,
but NietzEhe immediately emacted the ethical signilicancc of this lho.t:
the thoopt that the past. is pretefVl::'d and will rem.rn b.ecomes 'the gre:uest
weight', whicb demands that _ Can the past
be Deleuze su.ggesu the syntheds of time internally points
lOW'.U'dIt the problem dw he calJs 'repeddon\ which he repcesenta all a kind
of ot'dea.l, an experience of terror and freedom (DR 19). Ddeuze (Opes with
the diarp made aptwt Bergson'$ theOJ:'ies of time by the existe1\Uallsu br
oonwnding thilt if 8etpon's theaty of time does not a completely theo-
rized aaowu of the role of death, then it nevertheless prmides an important.
newbamfur a re-d\inking ofhwnan finitude. The finitude implied in human
temporality obscure without a full accmmt of how humm memory
pre8el"ml the past. and DeJ.euze mOWll that Bcrpon'. theory of memory might
even provide the dearest basi. to UI'ldentand the NO stakes implied itl the
exilt£ndal.ist theme of repetition. For KieBqaard and Hefdtgger. repetitian
ill the act that allows a human being to embrax:e the fact that lib are
DOt determined, wbether br an ellIlimtiaJ llaturC or by the pasr:.. We finally
<x>mront the emptine.s of the future and our respoDiihiliry for OW'" actions
only by affum.ing our past as radially rontingent. WhateVer happened to me
in the past, I accept it as my respoosibiliry, I can do otherwille now, and there-
fore I CQuld done then. 1 now sanctify the realiz.\tion of the
concingenq of my past by an affinnalion of its conimgencr- In Nietzltdte's
tenns, re'pC'tition is a (NietDche IBM, 'Of Redemptioo') ,
rhat finally frees one to will forwards.
JI DeI¢uze is right, then as the process of inr.eriorization contir:l'oes in the
evolution rhe of limemight writ inreDiify rorrespoodingly,
It is no wonder. then. that many today want 10 abandon ship, to affirm crude
furms of mateJ:'ialism or Oarwiniml, and simply tul'n their baeb on the
d.emand$ of temporality, Btu 311 the parable ea:rs. what it, some day or night. a
demon weJT. to "teal af'tI!r them into their loneliesllonelineJ6 and llay to &bem;
'Thil Uk all )'OU now live it _ lived it" you will hawe tQ live onu more
and inllUlDt!r.\b1e limn. more .• : (NJeuxhe 188i: '*' 541), So tha-e ia no real
akernativ<-..: we mUlLam.strl.ld the paleoscope.
1b.e Actual and the VIrtUal
In DeIeuR. the distinction between the actual and the vir1:ua1 tends 10 taU
over from the diKinction cQllSdousn_ and the unOO1l8doos. Thu
distinction goes beck to l..eibni7.'s ,'W:rD 1m the Hu'l'll4'n his
critique of empirldsm. Its fint target i$ Locke's ide2. that !he mind is
hom as Ii !USa. Leibnb; to defend me doctrine of innae ideas
appearing l¢ a dl.£ferent the mind is Ilk<- a 'O'cined block of marble.
Vcim lmd shapes are preterit Of} the surface, .. well as within the depilis ofme
ll'Iarnle. but theae can only be discovered orbeing chiJ,el1ed to
the tight. Depending on where one begin$ cltiaetling atid hotH one proceeds,
"elm 'Will come w me while others may reman! entirely
latem. Tln.D the shape of an be said to be i,nna.re in a block of
marbJe on "'nndicion that then' an: vinualvcln8 whkh oudirle hiB but
even if his shape i$ virtually that does not medn that it is like a
ti4/iJ;) in the Ari$totdi:m seme, which rather driva the process of
{the being the hel"ie}, It ill innate, but it bu no po'lI.'Cr over
whether it gets or not. Thua Leibniz 'TIl" a how ideas and
truths are innate in \LY - as i.nclinJUiOl1ll, Qr vir·
tuatitia r and not as ahhough these are
aaCJltlpanied by certain ai;t\A.lJt.iet, l.lib:n ones, which ill-
them' (Leibniz 1765; tranl!. modified}, There is a dear analOJY
8trg'S<.'lnian pure memories and Leibnirian In:lIJ'ble veins, mthat !lJlIeither can
properly be dexribed ;u 'potentia/itH:5'. Another term, vlrtualitv. must be used
ofboth. We will return to Leibniz at the end of the »fur the moment
our goal 1$ to establisb the vil1uaJjty £If memories, rather than 'innate
In tnetmeJvet. recoJlectiomare sterile, inacti'lle. 111t' time .maycome
when they are reca1k:d for.a p;uticular but in the meantiDH:, theyhave at!
status to die present ol:!jecl'l of the mgooug. All memoryi8 Iil withdrawal
to $Orne extent: 'to calf up the past in form of an image, we mmt be able to
withdrawounelva frotfi the actionof moment, we the power tov:ahle
the l.IlIlelai, we wtW haw: the'll.ill tJ:Jdmun' (Bergson 1896; $2,,3). In fuct. memory
and dn:mn1ng are not: $0 far from Other: dream is the pole of memorywhich
is MtJ$( to the demandJ ofthe pre:ient We mould not
regard tomplell:':' memoriclo lC\ ones that. alii! complex.. but ali 'J1
mote impersonal, nearer rn a.cnon. and therefore, mort: of
molding iuetf- like,ateady.!ltilde ,gamu"lJ(- upon the nfM of the presem
situation' (241). Ifa. memQryis particularly fM dna not mean chat it bas
been more indelibly imprinted ill che brain, but that is able to delaCh oneself
mmcK1JUy from the detl'landJ> of !he I.C be able- to rermre the
UM:ffiOry in a cognitive I:h.at approach£<!. a We become .ab.\ent from the
present, 'absenr,..minded'. An inteMe is d"ten detleribed as a rewrle; it is
like a but more rh:n 'the develop-
ment or !lp()lllalleous memory in most children ill due to the fact that they nor
yet their memory Kl remain bound up with theft conducl ... The
apparem diminutiOll of as intellect deW'lopl, l'imetl due to the growjllg
orpntS3tion of with a£l'5' (15).4;. When a child rememben. it is- not
:llO far from an adwt dreaming, theyare compkrely absorbed in the mt'motY of the
specific ewmt, and QlI remenlbet' detaibllWbich adufu Their exemption
from the primary taIk$ of adaptlltlOn Of) doubt accounts for We tu:mwl child's
ability I!O Ft kiln In and
Tlu Patlw. fJFTiml
The drearol'ij;;e character of memory. which i$ mOM. marked in children.
leads Bergson tA) of memory in termll of (l62, !4l}. If rec-
ollections subsist in the mind unron5C'IDmly, men due to thelrrinuality we al"ie
forced to think of them as awaiting the chance to be revived, or reincarnared
in the pretoent. Each sUuation i& like • of light which break$
through the eeili.ng of the of Illuminating or two of
ItS denizem, memorlea are COl'lPntWly evoked
and c;ontiguities wid! present peKepUon&, and which are m
tll41 W'.1V depenmon the degree to which the recollC'A::tor 1!l active or
The more 'relaxed' the conseiQwneJlS i$. the deeper and more i.nd:J:..
the whkh rise to the Bl.l.l'bce. The p;t'It emerge:; '''''ith the
3SStitanc:e' of the present, jUllt all' Horner"$ ghosu. l>OUflht om new blood
for their teincarrwion.
The sensorl-mot(',r appar.llU$ fumillhes w meffect:iw:, •
the mt,am of raking on 1:1 body. or memsel'fes" In
short of becoming pr.r:sent. For, that a t'ecO!lecOOD should appear mcon,
l!dou..'Uleili, it ilia( it should from the hdght$ of puce
memory down to the point where is taking plat:e. In Olber
words, it is from the preaent thllt the appeal to which mml>OfY
(.:otnQ, and it 1$ fu:m1 the iensoti-motor clemenu of ptaent action that a
mt'mory bor'r<1m the warmth which gl.'lIeS h (15S)
MeJnOf"'V, as UIl:derwodd, il!. thus home to of bloodlel!ll.
which loot'. up whenever a my 0( light pierces thl'OUgh a crack 1tI
preaent. Hence cemdownesi must set aNde alI those pan unagei which
cannot be coordlnaU:d wiili tbe present perception and are unable to form
with it a combination, 'A.l.ra<»1. the whole of our is hidden U5
because if: 16 inhibited by the nectmlQes of present aetJOlf (154), Jf the
cbological tension' involvedinkeeping one's attention focused on the presem
1& Itft to slacken. the remelubered past couJd end up out the
pre,ent.1ll There 13 thus a primarY or as Qe!ew:e it, a rep1'e$$!on
(8 ';2), which that only wlw can on the
situation is a(cepwd from the The:e 'It a over
p3llllt: 'FOrtunare are 110'(' to have this obstacle. prW-Ol.t$ to ':-a IS the 'ft."it:
The brain ill what sec.url!S to Ull this advantage. It our attentron bedon
fife; and lik I.ooks forw:arrl; it loob bad cmly in the degree to which the pall:
am aid It to illumine and prt!:pare lbe (.a.etpon 57). These
virtualities are n:aI " in some ways more real th:an present -
btu Me inactive. they u{} longer act.. The cerebml mechaniam
lUTlU'lgedjust so as to drive had; mt() unCONciOUi a!moet. the whole of ch.Is
pll.lK, and w admit the thre&hold ooly tb3t which em cast Dahl on W
pl"l!$ent lIlwation or funber the action l10W being prepared - in shon. <mly
mal which (-.art gWe ustjulwr>rk' (tkrpml90'1;S}.
Paramnesia and the Thansrendental Synthesis of Memory
ofa 8erponian thewy of mind i3more oornp16,
an It oeI not rest on the foregoil'l3l1iXOUDt of the psy<:hic inhibj.
non of the past. Ilekw.e attempt& to bring ..t",...... - . cl
. Into oser
the Kantian and l)llIU"Kantian transcendental cont:eplion of
mmrl. foregrounds an epiilemll: approach to the fundamental Sj'QtJwu
of the !1und.
The P!JtMlJ)gi.n ()f TilW 19
C/imt.t£1JS the limof great flow of eats in 100 (Kierkeg.aard
1843a: x), In the text. Kimqaard anempu to identify 'repetlUoo' as the basi'
an.egory foe' dealing with the ttl:atlon ideality 3Jld r¢3li1Y:
In reality a5 web. there is no reperlrion.. 'I"his mnot 1:leaWse i&
rerent, not al all. if in the world eompletely ldenlDl,112
reality there would be no repetition, because Iea!it¥ ill only in the mometl'l.
If the world, i1utead ofbemg 'beauly, were nothing but equally large unvar-
bouldeJ'$, there would still be no repetition. TbroUgbout eternity, in
every moment, 1would tee :l boulder. but would be rtG quettioll :as to
whelher it ';\Q$ the same ont: I had geefi before. (Kierkegaard 1843a: 111)
neither in reality nor ideality, in tbenuetves. 1'hcn: ill
no repetition in reality not beO.uae reality ill aJreadY dit.l'ere

to the principle of sufficient teaIOO). but It III needed for
repetition to take place. on the other band, <in ideality there
no repeotion. for the idea isand remains the same, and as u be
repeated' {uni'rerlIa1t h:we their own VAlidity, regartik:&a oftheir in5tal\wtwn}.
In neither reality ncr ideality by 1ht:ll'lselYes does anything like a n:pedtion
exist; but when the twO come together. a is po_leo
""nen ideality and realiry touch each other, repetition occun. ",'hen,
for elCllmple, I llee something in me moment. ideality in and will
explain t.hal: it is a repetition. Here u. the contmli(.1ion. lor that ,mien is, Is
abo inanother mode. Tb3.t thC' enemal is, chat I lee. but in the same Instant
I brl:ng itinto relarion with lOIl'lemlng tha1 :aliso U, lIOm.ething that is the I!oiUItC
and that abo will explain that the odlo i:s the wne. Here U a redoubling',
here it is a of repetition. Ideality and reality therefore collide Ul
whaL medium? In time? lbat is indeed an r.n eternity? That is
indeed an Ullpo8$i.bUity. In what then? In - there is the c0n-
tradiction. (Ibid,)
Where can mil .collision' take p13oe? It cannot take place in time, bc:caus.e the
repetition is the ..ery condition of polISl"b11ity of time. But.it
c:antiot a1Io take pbt:e in eu:mh:y, as there would be no m l3\
effect, wouid be back with the boulders floaling in sp8U. except the
boulden would now tOOaot :M monads in an eternal ()I'der. The concept of
't'epeUlfon' thUll a paradoxical an \ink or fold,
lnvaginared (as we saweaiier) in the hUttWl brnin. .
But if the concept of going tel be the tundmnenW smtbeslS of
time, 1heI1 M!Jctm to be a prublem. as the presence of III repetition
that an ori.giMl is being repeated. But if repetition l:t;. to be
the ba8.ic svnrhe'a:b of time. then it '* conl:nldictory fi) po&it :L tint moment 'in
time' me !lVDthesis iuelL We !lecmto'Wbad; with the probk:m 1mpicit
in Kant's of apprehension'; it is boW. necellll3!Y and to
of a tint manifold or multiplicity 'in. itself'. This problem can be
1lO1ved if we p<1l!it that the fulSt moment is a The norion of
repetition would only become coos.l$(ent if the $CX:ond moment could be a
repenriQu of the tint. while the first I'OOment il:!lelfwouJd be
a ful:Ure repetition, due to its preservation, 11lere IDlJ.$t be a 6nl
moment, a iyDthesis of pre;ervation, where events are preserved independ'
ernly of their n:prodUttion. 8f giving priority to the notion of
repetition, it as if is charging Kanl with h3ving omin-ed a more
originary moment:from this accoum{)f the 'Yllthe.si!! of 'reproduction', for if
a reproduction is to be po&5ibJt, then t:h&t requires thal, the ti.m' rnotnent mCL'S!.
haW' bc:en Before the $]lldresi!! Qf reproduction, rhere lll'U)l be ..
svm.he.sis of HQW can a teproduction rwill thm Yanooed past
moment unJe$$ me moment was prepared fur pJt:Serwtion at the
point of ilJ
In order JOr a pIBl moment to be reproduced. it must ha'\'e been rocordeO
fOT reproduction 31 me moment of to pa,sing, For Ddeuze. Bergson is the Qne
conlemporary thinker who has tahn up thill lind submitt«l t() m
cOlJllrequenCA'$: that 'an (:owciousne.5, tbc:n, is memory - and
accumulation of the palIf in me present' (8erp>D 1919: 5). In many ofhu
early wor'kJ (and beyM:d), Deleme ill to be found wrestling wi.dl a very deep
problem, a properly philosophical problem: how doel!i the present piIIi-I into
the p3$t? How 15 t:he pa61 wnstituri!!d 4$ past? Delcu:r.e pnxeed1 to find
problem in NieUllChe. ProWlt and Freud, l3mOng othen;. But as we have seen,
Derpon the phOOsopher who 8CJC1l, into the qtrelldon of the of the
plMt and in most detail.
It is not enough, he chatge:l, to say Ihar. the past ill con&kuted as such aftIlra
new prl!:Sl.'nt has taken its place. as then thf' $Cope of that p:;ut would be
to what it sipilled for the: following present:
:\a;oroing to the point oCviewin \ldtich L:un placed. Qr the centre rninle1:eSt
which I ("boose. I dividI: differently. dilK:overing 5e'\'erai 'rerydiffier-
ent llene5 of situations or stati!:$ in it. ... Scores of of are
polll!.ible, no spten1 correspond! with joinl.'J of reality- What right nave we.
then. to suppose that memory cht'lOla one particular system, or that it
into definite and awaim the endof each period
in order '(0 up it'$ ilCC(>Unts "¥rim perception? 19(18; 129)
Now, be<::allk the <:OIttent of each pm5CIlt cannot .imply be dellmlled as soon
at; the moment hall and beaw.se it :InUit remain open fIX £Utur-e rein-
terpretation whlle nOI ce-iiI.1Iing (0 be identified as tMt pa$t, _ are forced to
<llISume that put is wmehow formed 'alongdde' the presmt. Bergson'$
paratioxical rewlution. according to Deleuze. is thai '00 t:'l'tr
'WeI:'e it fiQt past Mat lIaIDe ume" » it u. present .. _'1"be past is
poran«,iUS with. the pretent that it 'C»fl$' (DIlSi}. Or as l\erp;!n b.imleH puts it:
r hold that the q/mDliMliJm is iJu
tUm; II as lltim u: For wppolle recolleclion iJ not created at the
llaine moment as pel'ception: At what moment will it begin to exist? , , , The
more we rcllect. the more impossible it l& to ilna.gine ;my way in which tbi!'
rew11ection can Mise af tt i5 not creatro step by ltep with the
1t'Je1f (Berpon 128; cited inB 12.';)
In otherwomll. acwal present is romehow dOUbled by a vUmal 'shadow'
of which enables It to be re-Qcwal.i.red as the past It will ha!ve betln, f.ach
3CtuaJ image, he sa}'!!. must be taken to have U3 OU'1l virtwll afterimage. which
enableli it ro be re-itCtualil:ed as the pa:<t of thai acrullJ moment,
Ifwe \hi! direcoon to its limit, an w;rt the acw.a1 image i:tIelfbas
a virtual image whicb to it like a double or II In
8ergsonian turrll!, the real is re6ected in a as in the
l'irtuaJ object which. from lUi side and IdmultaneOU!ly, envelops or
the rea!: there is a bet:ween the twl:). is a form3lion of an
image with t'WQ ilidea. actual auvirtuill. It is as if an image in a JniJ:T(Jr, a
phoro or ill postcard CIUI'Ie t() we, aMt.UDOO and passed imo
the actual, even if thi.l meant that the actual image retUrned into the mirror
:md rCllwned its place in the postcard or the photo. rollowing a double
In<1Vement Qf tibcmrlon and captur«, «(;2 68-)
Dc!'lewe presenn this argument a number of timN, and a detailed {}f
hili varioua presenatarlonswouldbe de&ir:t.ble, but (:atmot bt! made here.
.metaphor of the photograph ill helpfuL th('IUgb, It is a5 if a phorograpb is
'l:2ken by memory. :l luminous imprint of real1ty, WhOfe oontent can only be
and interpreted later. EvetUll can happen which will h<l'le 6ignifK:ance
fm-U& point in the Wt:lJ:re, but Me of this significance- in
and direcdyafur me prel!ent. Nevertfl.elc§, the event ha.s happened. and that
it 1ulppmMl will haunt US '!'then we realize later what it meant. Somet:ime$ a
magnifyin, gJas.i will be 1ll!!eesaaJ."Y in Qrder to dilw::ern the ligns of future fate
in die phot:.ogr;lph. BlJt, liIfrer l:he we condemJmt to these
for t.n\Ces ofan uncomcioos fine of fau:, MUch has. only become
later, when it • too fate. In hts first article on Berpon, Deleuu
lll:Utes expUdt the role of the inthe constitution oftbepast: 'If the
past had to wai" to bt! no more, itit nor immediately and bencefunhpa!It.
"'1Jtssi In gencra.r. it would fW!!'Vef ,a'bte to what it is., it would
be ,tw pa;IL Pll;,\l is there'fure the in-iuel( the tb'iconfll::ioU$, or more
prcclJely, as IkrgllOn flaYS> the 'l1frtuaf (Dl 29).
gel'gson'& modd to be a kind of geneI7!lilll'Jd model
or •deUrred action'. rooted ill the comtitucion of t.i.me itJelt', Freud tllIDed to
the mode) oftrauma in order to undemand why it Wti representati.onll
in particular which were into me unrnn...4cious. 'If fll} experi-
ence oc:curs during the period of immaturity and the memory of it is
arolllled during or lifter maturity, then the memory will h:l\'e 3 b.r stronger
e.xcit.:lwry etieet than W did at the time it and thi$ i5
in the- me:mt:irD.e puberty has lmmefl$ety the capacityofthe
sexualapparatDldor reaction' Hi7). 111:..., infantile 1lex:wU ttamna had a
'deferred etfect\ beQus.e at W t:ime of the t:nlUJ:na. teXUa.tity W3i In an W'lde-
veJcped form, lIO the significance of the event was not und.e.,(t!Od; but
()l1ce puberq had been patQed. belatedly 11".aIiz.es the .dicance
of me memory. and now beeo.roe; bellieged by a meIDOry it ill powerleu to
alm:aCL freud 'W33 rotced to abwtdon this model fur a white OllCC.e he bad
begun w affinD the existence of in&ntite kXI.IaHty, which undel"l'Dined it:;
nevertheles., it retl.It'min the caM of the Man, wiIh me Ckdipl..l$ oompla
as the mediating conduct« u.t ll.1l0W5 the deferred to a more
powerful alfet:t. What b tuiking about Bergscm'$ genera.liled model of
deferred action is that the requirement for a. spedfk mediaUng conductor
appears to 8ecawe Berpoo has no au to g.rbul for aay specific aet»
logical agent in (1l'l:lCh as in Freud), ineffect he 00et
nOt an account of hQW specific e\.-enu U'IlJme a belated tolticlty, The
comparison Ii thw m1s1eadmg. For
psychoparholosY annot be on the basil of the deferred a.et::i(IQ of
particular eiilrly events. Although hilil colleague Janet will the role of
actUal traumatic events., (in line with eariv Freud. of the 'seduction theory'.
bUt withOUt his restriction trauma), the oft.rauro.a iI. rooted
in the ensuing diidoadonin the temporal. stl.'UCtUre of even
if there is no actual trauma, lhere is. a pathological oriencuion built into the
of temporality. Rerpon a theory of which
take, up all the' fuundaIion [or II lbeory of th¢ a.utonomOlJll p4Pws of
the mind: 'ap.1lhology of repelilion' (DR 290).
The pure layer of the past must iu.elf be immediately 'furgotttm' all the
needs of the present are entirely In the abon term, we ot'tly need
to nmlember what is of immediate use in the lubsequent tnotnenf.l, Under
drCW'lWlmces, theTdbre, till., 'double imctiptiQn' of'fl3lKand
tt not experienl:\:'d as lltKh, because our attetuinn is directed the
Cwure. But if this fatter conditionis (due to &ilu:re6 in attending to
the present), then:a ce.rWn, par.ut0XlCid 'ntemOr'V oftbe prescot' takes place:
dliji We this present a. f>4Jt (Bergson 1008). Th!:ja VI.l,
Betpon only makes if we that the past is coratiwted all
past at. the lIRI'ne lime a& the praerlL The Berponian notion of c:ieji vu
provides Deletu.e with a e.u.m:ple of'traslKmdema.1 empiricism'.
1ran.scendenWJy spealing, 'our actuaJ •.. whilst it i& UllmUed m
lime, dut>1k:.a.t.a itself aD along with a \'iI'n.lal e:Urence. a miI':ror-lmage. Every
momemofour life prell!nG two upetts. it Uattual and virtual. perception on
the onc side .and memory on the Other. Each moment oflife is split up all and
when it ill Or rather, it (;onsJsl$ in this very Iplinhlg' (Berpon 1908:
1M). .But if the direction of a>gnition 'we can
be<'A)IDe ronlldous of mil duplkating', <md experience what Delftaze a
'direct or Deja w thus to a lruth
at the that 'each pre.ent goe:lJ badto itll'elf tor returns to
iuelf'j M past- (B 59).
l)e.le\Ue goes on Hi suggest that the experience of deji w II in £aA:[ one C1f
the coodiUotUl £or the enletgeJlce of aut:Ol:lOUlOUS Like
Deleuze Goa nnt believe that thought ill IOII)ethm.a nan.wral or proper to
human rather somethinl must lint force us fA) thto.k. Fint lID intemive
diiferenCe u llefll!ed wt.W:b 'move'il the llOul. "perplexes" It - in other
forc.es it. w po&e a (DR ).40). An intetUlive dlR'Shold:ill and
Vtoe cannot appeal to whelp decipber it. becauee a'OSII&nt
the tbredlold takes u.s beyond habitual of $en&lltioo, 9ut be<:au.",
there are metnQI'ietI or COIl£e:pU lA) helpUlI. De1euze that
what happens ilnl is that we are thrown bal:k on the -veryground ofour ability
to svnthe1iize experience: the pure past. The pure past pressa in on
of cognl;tive lndetennim.cy,. There is thw an im.ttledi:ate tendency CO ideruify
problems Of questkIM 'with singullr objta.s of 11 Memory' (DR
Dc:koNze suggcmdwPlatonic :mamneMll. orrecoUection might have its tr'3.D.
!Cen4enw groWld here. In the A.frM, PlaiD that what. ill deJ<rlbed WI
'1e:aming' it reallr the recollection of IruWthat have been fi:Jrgottm, becaUM:
one em neither learn what one already knO'i!llJ, nof' learn what one dod not
already know (b" how ec.ndd one recognize ill or even know\\'hat if)
look C{n?'). Knowing i& Wrd"ore recQlle<:1ion, lnllOfar all me eternal are
only partiaDy figured .in my empirieaf we ent.'OunW. rh.e expe-
rience of knowing' must be somewhat akin to an experience of deja.vu. The
Ftatonl.st will. experience their own a£tMty as a reconecbWl of a
previous. Qf an Ide-.I, DelelJ.te is that tltiJ
Platonizlng moment it in fAa a. necessary detour in the morement dw goet
itom inten!ity to thought- We think: I hmtlwJtn, but I can't
when, it's OUt of reach . _ What Deleum calls a 'transcendental memory" now
emeraes, preei:ldy because orthe $l'nleture of thot of the p!iStJUil
'tramcendental memory ... grasps that tdUch &om the ootlld can only be
recalled, even the first rtm.e: Dol a contingent past. but. the being 01 the put
all lI'UCh lind tIw: pav. of every tnne. In mil mmne!', the t.bing
appeiV5 in penon t£l. the nwemory whkh essentially apprebend.ll it. It doet
not address memoty addreuing the forgetting witlnn mellwry. 1."be
memorandum here is hom unrememberable and immemorial ForpttlnCis
nO longer il corningent Incaparity separating US ftom a memory is
itselfcontil'l:goent: it exiII!!I- within efteflCial meJnm;r :as. though if: 'Ne1'\e the 'nth'
of snemory with regani to ib own limit or to dw: which em only be

Ddeuu and 1M Cfnromcious
Thii recoliecriYe moment the from intenlllty to thought Tet3.tn$-it
5t.rO-;g power ovet' the of the experience. It is alwa.}'!\
possible dIal one can gel stud at the sLagt! of recollet:tion. and not dIe
to thQught.. entire contribution to the theory of
a.nses. from the of probkml internal to it Me of mcnwrv or remmis-
«!1KL. '
no longer a funf;uon of the pilf{, bw. a function of tht' future. It ill n6t UK>
1'nemQt)' of sensibility, but of the will It is not the memory of bur of
words. It is the faculty of promllJing, commiunent w the futu.re, of
the future itself. Remt'Illber the promise that bai been made is not recalling
that it was made at a panicu1ar past :montent. but that une mWlt hold to It at
a future moment This is the se1ectM: of culture; forming It
man ea.pable of promising aJ'ld thus of making me of the future, a free and
powerful man. (NP 1M)
1'he neurotic, it would seem, i5 the one wbo remahu unable to tumthe passive
memory iruo an 'active' memory. De1ew'.e :makes it dear that be does not
believe that this symptom of as me necessary result of an
external ll3Wna. ill DO need fuI' him. to have experienced an
exciwion. Thill mayhappen, but it is not nccc:saary' (NP 115). 'Thill appem to
the di,tinaion betweell man of and the indi·
vidual a matter ofconstitution. One from or O'ne
can 'attively forget' .
The man of in himself is a being full of pain; the .-Jerosis or
hardening ofhiil COIJ.$CimW'1ell:i, the rapidity wUh which em-y exctmti(»\ lIets
and freezes within him, tM weight of the aaas that invade him are so maDV
(TIle) mfferings. And mort!: deepty, the IUmOry ojtwJa:1 isfull of mWilf
and by lJMJf. 11 is venomoUll and depreciative becrius.e it bJ.ames the object in
order to cOlDpensate COl" its <JIm inability to e$C.ape from the tn\(;1:'5 of the
cOl're$ponding ex.ciWlQU. (1\,}> 116)
In -a Deleuze's 3I::Count of psychological min comes to
test on me assumption of a dispo$ition to in the <:ognitiYe faculty <I
memory. In a significant reference toJung., Dcleuze suggeats that his 'typolog-
ical' approach to guilt and p$)'Chopathology", modelled onJUllg'$
typoIogital approach (NP 2121. l1se psychopathology in Ni&w.1te and
fJkJ ;;auld be daaibed 3$ a vbalired. Niw.scbeani7A:d v.!nlon ofJung's dis-
tinction between and
From the beginning Jung rum lllO£e in common with Bergson and Janet
thlUl with Freud. Bu, ifJung doe! mdemside WithJanet in gi'lling expbJutory
prima<:)' to rather then aIllo should nOt
overlook the BergsonJan inJanet'& po6ition dlaI might have
through toJung, The most irnporblll for U6 ill Bergsonian oonceprl<m
ol the stnKtw'e of disoociation. For BcfWiDn, Janet and the
fQUlldation for Is I.:.nalt in thi: \'crY temporal coodltion:lc of nperl-
ena. is a 'split',.l SfH:lltungin me subject, as Lacanians daim, thtnfo..
Bcrgstmillm, faulilinc; itJ inherent ID the comtiturion of time itself:
Our a.«ual existence" whiLIt it it unrolled in time, duplicates itself JU
along with a virtual a mlrroMmage. Every- moment of our life
pt'esent1I twoaspects. it 18 3Ctl.U1 Md VIrtUal, perception on the one side and
on the other, F..ach moment of lie ia llpti( up as and when it is
jJ08ited. Or .rather, it con.siIlIta in thit very splitting. (Bergson J'Q08: 135)
The pa5t z.nd present are cOIltc'mporaneo1J.ll, although they abIolutely retain
their difference in nature: one virtual and. me other uactual. 'Tune ba!i 00
Ip{il at the same tit:ne it ... unfolds irJelf it splitJ. into two
one of which makes aU the preacnt piUS 00" while the other all
the put" «(;2 81). For the Frenchmen. it Is as if the mqe<t is fim of aD IpDt
down a llne that is intrinsically temporal: the put and the
De.1euz£'lllWO jeu' of time, the pl_ofeach direeOOb of
time Ue 2l(:tion and dream, lung can be read u renamirll these 'tWO poles as
and 'The only diffet'ence) bet:lf'eel tbOle who tend
towa.n:b the$e polet. he says in 'The of Life'. 'it tIw the- <me has
estr.m:g«t. from the Pa'!lt and tbe other from the ful:t1n" (CW 392),I"
Repetition and Eternal Return
There are twO ethical iOnns of repetition.. Repetition is fim a liberation from
recoll«tion hf the of cmllingenq to the past. It Us only on« one
has come to with the p*and is gi'ren freedom in relation to it (by wit-
nessingi$ that one is tree to act nflW_ Thus repetiOOn I'll'" tint
involve the abiity to re-wi11 my pUt Q£t10N. The imperative asb: 'Can. )'OU
$C<m vrer all ,uur pall aml willlt again?' Only once mill re-willing is done <;an
another son of oome into belng, in which I uk myrelf ?'hether I
can will the amant I am about decide zgamin me futUre, This f.t the
letond form.. 'Can you will thill action that you are about to do apin'? Thus
:u well as Nlewche. the ClIlJed. 'repetition' thu.. leads
111 two direettons: brKbards and forwat'd.'t, You must be able to paR
or will bacbr:«rds. But you mu:st abo k able to 're-wUJ' fono1U1k. The
problem ill that both of these fornu of me to infB'C'()nnected
WJ.th rqprd m the fJ.flt form, the WlI'f tofree ouellelffrom 1I recolJ(:(;ti'Ye W::w
of the past is to say 'I willed it thus'. Bur. the T who ViiIbl the pUt must be
d.ii'ferent from the '1' Who wok tbetnllelves to be detenn.iMd by the past. By
agency in preftOUllllW where one belieged there 'WQ8 none, the
re-wiIllngtubJett a one's relation to the PlUto The
fJl'YChoanalytic treatme:m p:roridet the be:5a eumple of this prot:4bfS. But mh
in the willing agtnt obviously precludes the prMence of a
'telf-idencical' autonwny (in whkh the awonor.m:n.IJ seJf-binding
a:>ntinuil:yof put, present and MI:I.Ire); with the .notion of repetition we
1:0 a:tltoMmy (i.e, not hack:ward.s to 'before' autonomy).20
f"eprd to the form, howeYer, the idea that 1can commit
to re-will my present actions llf!eD1.i to depend 011 the of an idemi-
cal self into t:h.e m\Ure. But matJ.ern not so simple, Although in hill 1962
inlerpretation of Niel:25Che, a. Kanuan. ethkal noQon of
etanal return. Deleuze h3s to walt for to point out that the- erema.I
return implies the dissolution of the ident:ica.t in the future as well.tl
Etef'Wd remrn implies that if [ am going to rc-wiDa pteYiOl\! a£1ion.1 will only
be able to do 50 by taking it as tho: aa •.KlomeOM with whom I an
no longer myself. rem.iads us that N'letlKne's first
encounter with the thought of the eter1lal remm involvet a ldnd of anamnesis
(KlO1llOWll.ki 1969: 57). N"tetndte experiences an uncanny Stmwlungin which
he fee. aJI nhch. been heR before. H01\tlm!!r, experienc:e of the
thought of etellHl.i mmn goes I:M:yond deja w. The demon dw. aligh18 on
NiettIclre'! sAoWder that day on the mountain in 1882 Ia)'l to him: what ifyou
have not onW 00tn bt-re befure, hut been here before infini<e tirnear- For
the milly hiMdioue. thought about the eternal return la not tba.t
one'. of dtJl vu mJght be only the latest in an infinite tille. but
t.llIhef aD ofthat hypothesis. Forifyouhave been rel:llmirlgto t.hill
ipOt times. then that means you have in the meandme )'OW'
pretetlce And the logk dictilU!s that you will (orget it apin.
But then once this. presence of forget:tiog: is introduced. t1Nl
thought of eW'lUll return begins to e':l£CI't more power. The impIka1ion now
!l.1'engthem the premilM!. For forgetting is wmething that uout 0{ my (;Oft-
scioUll conlrol AnamntlllU or recollection already imolve:t forgetting: when I
know something on the modd of I remember lKmlething dw. J
have fO:rgouen. But if I bave forgot.Wl it once, then I might fof'gooen it
a number of times. My ego toha¥e .,Jute:ly no power aver forgetting.
But if a stria of rememberings a.nd 16 po_Ie, then the anamne-
siac's problem changes.: problem of Isolating 'JOme pmileged, originary
momeru when the truth was given (an original of the Ideas, another
world beyond the rive-r ofLedte) disappe.ars. anamnClliac their trail-
Deleuze RreMelllbat 'uthere if.. in or elsewhere. a
knO'Wledge of ete:mal ret.l.un, it is a t:nJel and e'SOterlc:: knowledie which must
be sought in anodJer di.mentlon. more In)'llteriomandmono: uncommon than
that of or qualit.a.t.iYe eyelet and I:hcir generalidet' (DR 242).
TO¥lo"at'd& the end of thee- l).ook 'fe will see bow important'ellOterk:' e<mcept.i.ons
of tMhuman mindwere to Deleuz.e. In the writinp of thim.cefttmy
Alftandria,. tM bUtbpi3lce of Neoplatonism and me Cabbala, 600. dw:
idea that the hwmm being's true 'identity' is diKoven!d when 11 Jeej UNff'..
'tnialxoam'. In De1euze's esokric: rendering of me eremai return, the. aruun-
loses theit to an tran!lCendena!, Uutcad.. in the \IIiOI:'dI
of the fml l.n the 'being made (Copen·
haw;r 6), ThiJ an only be reaiiled through the encounter
with a higher, interior Other, the
l.eibniz, Locke and the Theatre of the Uncomcious
In "is 1980 l«tures on Leibnu-, Dele-l.l.Ze that 'It ill Leihniz wtlo Mt
proposed rbi' gteat idea. IhilllIrllt great tht'Oryof«his differential unCam<::lOUll,
and it lwM'ler gOne away sinl:<:, 'There i:$ a very long tradition of this differ-
enlial cun.,;eption of th(t unco!Uclow baled on percepr.lon5 and
rninUl<e appeUtiam' £nird U:ibn.iz lecmre, 12). We,.,ill hear mOle about this
amoll$ tr.adidon (which ptThaps only e.xiics in mind) in chapter 5,
bUt thili opening chapter will with a brief inU"Cldl.ll:;uon to Utibniz's
pb1losopb)' l){ the unroracious, in which the Hennetic rr.adirion meets with
Lcilm.h expounds his notion of pe.rceptiOl1ll in lJlO$t <:letail in
Oft lluma:tt hit critiqut of empirlctsm,
wnuen m the funn of a dialogue between 'PhiJ:adleles' and 'Theophilus" who
represent Loch and Lcitmiz respccoveiy.!J\ Lodte daiutil that we an: tabula
tlIIIa or blank surface at the momen't o£birth. but as thl!' child begins to accom.-
modate to its mrroundingl, it it ill in fact in II camera obeM:ura:
·External and lnu:rnall.leJ'Wdon are the only that I can find, of);.n;)W.>
ledge, to the undenamding_ 11lae <Uone:. as far as I <:an diJcover. are
windows b;> which light it Jet Int<.l this d.arlr l'OOM. For, methinks, tile undel'
not much UJl1ike a. closet whollj' mur from light. with only !lOme
left., to let in ur.e.ma1 \IW.bk resemblances, or ideas of things
Without (Locke 1690: II, 11.11). 1beophUus. Leibniz's ipokemwl in tile N8W
replies that the undentmdinS is indeed rather like a dark .f'OoOm, but if
Phllathelell examined it a littko more clOflely, lIe would sen diat the contours of
this roanl it to be lIOJrl¢tbing different lIQain from a camera obicura
First.. '\1,'4' UJouJd have to postulate that mere is II $(T'(len in tbill dark 1"OOm'
(Leibniz 1165: 144), The camera obscura ill fitted with Ii small candle that
a small amount of tighr (Locke IG9Q; I, 1.5}, U) we can imagine
PI'Illatbeles wandering about with this candle. and then accepting that one of
.the Jltlghr. ,..".11 serve M a lICTeen. but only fur the of madOl''5.
Ihetbwi It, Theophilus then continues, 'i..'i nOl uniform', No this
is by folds representing items of innate KnO'Wkdge; 'and,
what, tb1i &erffJl. or membrane, being under tension, has 11 land of
eJa.moty Of' furce, and indeed it acts (or reaets) in wa,s whkh are
both leo (<.lIds and to new llJ1es coming from the impressions', The
reatlJon of Philatheki, !A:Jck.e'g. in the lW:w Esut;p, to th6 haUuQ..
nar"ory is nOl presented. but one can imagine him saYing (to,ith il
Ul'lM.tr), it's; a. screen for but also a ;on of pt.l1h1Janng
and it hat folds. more like a the:atte L"Un.ol.in than a SC:re-en in fact
, , " Yes. Theophilw and 'mill acnon would consilt in cerrain vibra-
tions or osdll.atiol1.l, like we ke when a £Oro under- tel1lIk:m u plucked
and of a mwlIt::d Ik')uod. For not only do we recei,.-e im.s
and traces m the bram. but we funn new from them when bring
"complex ideas" to mind; and the 'Which rnpresenl$ £IUr brain mWI£
bf. active and pWtic. This would explail1 rea.'lOnably "''ell what goei on
in the brain' {ibid.}.
It 13 eti}' 10 see why 1leleuze begim his late book on Lejbl'li2, 1'?v Frffl:t. with a
detlcription afLcibnu's baroque makeovert:ifLod;e's camera tlbscura Eve:r'l"
thing abour mil> scene in the Ntfl} brings to mind thar pel-"Uliar Mfett
which 1leem!! tn reskk :it the core of Delew:e'll work. and iJ manifest
dearly in Injj:mtr:e(J#I(j the llense of exb:tence all a lheme when: the
that uotolck before <me ill w.t)'$ threatening ur turn into
II rorporeal, directly felt nightmare, where the red CW'13i.n$ mitt pan More
the state are revealed, on clOiler Ii(} be made from lmng
where hallucinatory dread I;. ConUfl'tlllily blending with II d.adtm.
Somehow, we bo.clt 'n theatre of repetition' 7 where 'we experience
pure forces, dynamic. lines In space which act wJt!:tOUl intermediary upon the
spirit, and link it. di:n:cdy with nature and hi5rory . . , with pm.res wbkh
develop hd'ore organised . , •with spenres and phanroms before char,
<lCU!f'$ - the apparatus of repetition as a "u:mDlt; (DR 10), Thil
p:assage on the theatre of repetition lJl Diffemmad Repftidtm i3 n:minUl::ent
of Hegel'$ famous 'Man, that Night' fragment 181,)5..6; 87); both are
mot thrQl.kgh With the :u.mt' conceptual (lb!curity and yet blool:blbQt emoriollal
clarity. One !ioeIUeS that for Delew:e. Leibniz t, the phiiotiopher who i! dOM'it
to this atniO!phere, In his tramfot'mal:ion of the c:ament obKum,
it if not to recall deKriptiQns of the weird d:read that attend$. an
bl-e3k.. A dark room begirli to with
:an impenon:al. inhuman life. Lcibniz is the uncon6cious, but
the undecidable osc.iDadon of reason and madnesil with he approaches
it .Ii dOfe£ ro that of the paychooc mtb:er than the nelll"OUc. If then: one
lhing (ommon ur the great mooern speculative Leihniz, Hegel
,md it is tire dik chat the with a non-orpnit
life might make it altogether uniDhabitabJe far sane bl.lM4U.\ beings.. Lcibnlx'-,
haltudnarory, l'1letamQrphk theatl'ell, Hegel'a Night and Dela.u:e's theatre of
terror eadl ieem to signal a moment iuJl of dread before the llI.talnment of
absolute self.d1ff'ercntiation: the moment of fear that the abwlul.e
Qlpaht.e ofinc.amaling (IT' 'bearing' ahlJolu!.t' dUkrence mtght be, in fact, (;om,
flIetdv inJI;ane. In Deleua's work, mOM in 4P'ld
this fear is never far from me .mrface, md in a one could $l.)' mat, :afu:r
Leilmil Md Hegel, it has in Deleure. His ultimate problt!m,
is howttl (Opt wilb pogib.Wy that the absolute tl.ll!ject, in and fOr
iuclf, is mad, :l fraaured T,
. In the NJ!W the notion ill the UJlCt)l:!4(iuUll is 33 a special
domain bf t.IuNgJt.t (l.e, moTe than a descriptiOn of the mental staUl$ of pny,..
iological. mch as breathing). notion of' tt..t: U1ICornciQUS emerges
out ill LeRmiz's attempt to find a retp<>tUe to Lod;e', cmpi:rki$t C1ttapQlad<m
of notion of cOD.iClowmess, L:ld:r mki up idea lbat
m.enw must be Iimlilabl(' to ctmSdoumess. .and then puu it to anti·
ends. ThIJ3, following be alI1lltm that "til altogether as
inteUigible to say, that a body isextended without pan$. all lhat any thing tldRks
rfU, or perceiving, that it doe$ so' (Locke 1600: Il, 1.19).
To that there can be trlfmW State.! mtbout conJcio.umeu il abturd; if
lIOD1Cthing is in the mind, tlKm. II b cOD5CIoUl. ·What.ever Idea was per-
ceived by the mind. \1,'3$ In the mind' libid.: 11.4.20). to lnier
from this•• d<>es, dY.tt the!' eoo.tents of the mind a.r(!
'trltnSparent to us, and that "Nt'! MOW our mind$ better tblll'l our bodiI!!l, II
mht.akc:n. The problemIiawith imi.Kence thal the mind hi a sub-
!Gt1ce in Its own right Ifit ha!i the independent, .elkuffident and permanent
StiltUs ()f a mhmwce, and ifall its conteotf are avail.abl.e to then
mwt be lnlOJ:Rnia&:; lO the point of delirium. Here,.
Locke empiricist common ICnSe is The empiricist
starting point ts that the mind i5 a t:ahub. the mmd is 'furnished' in the
course ofexperience (loI;:ke 1600: n, l..2). But in that case, Locke wggesu, 'I
see no reason to belte¥e, thai the tki1W bIfimt lilt fu't-
ms/uld it wiI.h idIJtu 10 lhink on' (ibid.: iI, 1.!O). It .. he kI av, with Descartes,
that mental content ill eowdous bydetlni£io-D, but whcth.,r there 1! actually
anything going on itt the mind at any giwm point is another qt:IaItWn entirely.
may be nothlnglU. there maybejwt wharew:t' be (K'CU-
pymg.the!letlJeS at that mODlC'nt. But is present in the m!nd must be
In Leibni.t;'s response we the blnh of the concept of
Aa a. rationaliK in the Cartesian tradition, he is completely re&iswtt ID «be
Locb:mdoctrine that 'there is nothing in the soul wbich does not i:OIIle trnm
Dd'cndingthe independlmce tithclIphere ofthe mental from the
$phere Qf sensation, Leihniz's famous ritxX'te is that there uindeed nothing in
:t'e sou:! which does nOl come from the - apart from the Rlul it!elf: ror
the 5Oull.ndudtls bemg, mbs1ance: On.:!, !alllC'. aw.IIe. perception, reasoning,
lUlU many other notions which me sen:ses CilJUlQt provide' (Leibniz 1765: Ill).
The obje<:tion antidplUeS.Kant's € on diCfereJU:c in kind between
sensation and the undentanding. But at the same time. Leoibniz_ the force
of Locke's critique of «be Cane&ian theory of mind. H one i& going to mggest.
that theTe is more in the mind than what is coming from the 9m8ell, then it is
indeed ahmrd to say mat l\I\.lch an extended domain of (OO(etlt tnUllt
tM: Hence there ill one way out: introduce the COtIc::ept of uneon-
tnenml content, Leibni.z'g way of expanding the mind beyond con-
is, through the notion of peruptlon. As NichoIa$JolIey pul.1 it: 'For
pen:eption is a genus of whidJ me thought or co.tUcioume1J8 recog-
ntlled by t>elllC'ar'teS lUld l..ocke if a Uld thus he 'WaI'lt:s 10 a dass
of or tmcoNcious perceptions
Dot awilable (JolJey 1984: 101). In fact. k i$ an
quirk of the hiswry of philo'llopby tblU. Leihniz roirm the
to di$tinguilih between WlCQtudout and eonsciow pcrcep-
tlOnlt. hi of Na.tme and Grace'. he puts it 38 follu'lft:
It is good to distinguish between wbkh is the int:e'/'1'l.3i tW.e of thlJ
monOId representing external thinp. lind which is
Of the refl«ti\'e knO'lll'iedge of thill internal Kate, IOmet.hing not gi'¥l:m to all
1lOUls, nor at an rimes w a given lOW. MoreoYer. it is because they lac;k'this
distinction thai. the failed. dillrepr<llilg the perception5 thM we
dQ not m me same WOlf that people d.iMegard imperapdble
bo<Iies. (Letbni:ll714: 1m8)
Remaining clOlJ;e to Lejbniz.'s text here penIliB us m bring abtlut some 8Ubde
shitm in our umal conceptiomof the MColUciowl. For jwt 8$ Lei'bniz ill wg·
gesting that there ill, a layer of con.5ciOI.l.5fl.e&S beneath apperception, 50 also hi!!
own tem:t - perce.ptions - sugge.scs the of bi$ allit'1l notion
of the 'un<:onsciOUl'. C:mld the 'i.wIerW.bIe' be albeit in lOme

Leibniz goes on to pm$$ \bat Lock.e'i doctrine 11 indefensible from an empir-
ic:alpsycho1ogica1 hal faroedCanesiam to adnowledge
the ahwrdit\' of their ac«tUft\ of mind, he bas a&o forced himself into 1111
llppOO.fe em:ner, fur now be is '1::UC:k with an account of mind ttw. Itrictly
speaking. only dow!l what i5 C0mc10w.ly present in the mind. to wunt
as m.cmtai. It is lit this point mal Leilmiz introdU<:e1l the ootinn of the uncon·
scious. through me mediation of the concept of the
Ow: lifted author seems to claim t1w there ial10rhmg vintWf in u.'I.
Jut he <:annol hold Strll:tIy to this: his position would be tOO
since _.. we are not at". aware of our acquired dispositionli,
or the of ow' memory, and do not «Mm come to our aid
whenew!r we need them, though mey Qfien rome readily to mind when
some idle drcumst:lllloCe reminm11$ of them, :as when heiring lbe opening
W'OI"ds of a llOftJ it to bring back me- rellL (Ibid., ttans. modified)
Here Leibnit jntrot.iw:'et habits and latent memorte= as of mental
oo1ltflnt wbkh must mbsW. YlraJll11y, but without actual from
there Inl."M:ll to memlJJies whkh l'etiu being pulled up into
but 'WIricl\ are htler provett to Mw! been. SUbsisteDl in the mind
Such fur the ufwlllK:ontcious ptrsi6tin (d. SE If:
2{)1). It is iDmre:J1ing ro obsene how pbeoomwa. of memory onlY' 9tart to
become a philc»ophical imle in the 'IIi'Ue at' this pan:icular cmpuu bf/twflr(ln
lind empir:icis'ls. Pmmpe it taket this dispuue fur future
of the of memory tQ to go on to acqW.re a new. rv-
reaching signifiCADCe. In dfet:t. the of me unc:onsciooa 6m emerges
through a kind of diaiectic nrir..lNlisl and empiricist aaounu of um-
Klousnea. Rena l..dbmz'1I privileged pos'oon. as it pou-Lodean
(Descmes and5pinQDwere dead wen befiJre the publication of Uw,1.
In tm Arne Leibniz goes on to
'linrla hill them to the ltatam:m: I:hat l'.hfm! iI nodUng in us of have
not at le.tSt preriollsly been aWilJ"e' (ibid.), This restncrioo allows locke, in
to deal with the above Qbjections, Howeller, he is still obliged to
for how latent mmlOries are posr;ibte on hiJ own official theory <If cowciol15-
ness. He dOfi not do this. so the them perhaps gOCi $how that be
is aware of me of his ot.ficiaJ theory, Neverthek$$, it is
chal Leibniz continues the attack After all, this restrit:!:ed IS
completely compatible with the Freudian doct:rine of the uncOD5cioOll, so we
might be surprised to :let; contif'luing the a.uaek., He wunten thi!>
limited memwith an argument that te!16 omown lJinjt<;, with regard to now£aT
we.are prepared to follQw the ratiomdlst'f, commitment to reason: 'But no one
can establish by reason alone bow far OUT past and nOW perJaps forgottell
apperceprimls may have especially if we accept the Platonist's
doctrine of recollection which, through myth, ill entixdy consilltent with
umtdmtled rea.llQn' (ibid" modified). These cQJtJt1lMt! do abo point
forw.w:i to modem conception,; of the uDconsClOO$. but Ihry' are noL Freudian.
Bergson mggeth Unl me fonn ta.k¢n by the preJJen-ed past iUtrodllCes effecUl
into memory which do not derive from the mere recording of previous 5enu·
tiQns; Kierkegaanl ShOWli IIDwPlatonic rerolt.e<:rion ma.Jt.e.8 Ileme for us mOl:knu,
and Jung attempts to defend the idea of the preservation of an impersonal p3S1..
.As leibniz 'Funbemwre. why mlL'K we acquire everything rbrough
apperceptions of outer lhings and not he able to unearth anything from within
oune1'l:f!s' (ibid.)? Leibnit's own mit:roconnk l';onception of \mCQIlsaous per'
ception i.! presented most vi\'idly in the
minUle , , . are more effective in their resului th:m ha£
been recognised. They cOII$tinu:e je I'U! J6M 'fUOi, thOfie tlavoUJ:ll, thO&e
imagH of sensible qualities, vivid in 1M aggregate but contUsed as 10 the
pariS, tbO!le impre5Sions which are made on us by the bodJies around U$ and
which involve the infinite; that connetrion thai each being has with ail
rest ilf the univenle. It can even be said that by virtue of these minute per-
cep(KmS the preS(:nt 1$ big with the future and burdeMd with tbe past, that
all things harmonize - fR:mI4, as Hippocraw$ put it - and that
as piemng as God's could read in rhe lowliest robsr:ance the universe's whole
of evenu - '"-'hat is, what was. and what will S(H)n be brought in
the future' [Vtrgil]. (U!ibniz 1765: 54-5)
The present is bod! pl"egnalll with the fulUre and "burdened with the past',
This double burden appears in the ibrm of unoonscious perCf!poons. l.eibniz
claims th.n ·thefe l.nllen!rible percepdong' are aIoo responsible for me prellef-
\'anon of past experient;es; in the individual, 'even when the individual hi:msoelf
has no lIeJ:i$e of the previous AtalO1, ie. no L<mger hM any explil;it memory Qf
thfln' (Leibniz 1765: 55), Hen: uncomcioU$ are now properly
unconscioU:$ - i. e. more than latent and readily retriet'able because
they an: i.ItaIe! that have become 'lmplil::akd' or <envcloped' once and
no longer belong to the unfulding of the present. As we have $een. Leibniz
The Patlwiop$ of
uLkft it as an empirical fact that it is poMble for merrwrie, to elude
and this is one of tw. reasom ror claiming the of per-
ceptions. But it is not JUSt that previous con5cious experiences are retained all
unconscro1J5 perception!, Striking a blow the Lockean remicdon of
mental llCU\lity to «mJICiousness. l.eibni2. contends that I can coB!ciously
thtrJg$ now of which I W3(I 'flC( conscious at the time. The present
moment it burdened with unconscious virtual I:l\emones which have not ret
been Uplicated, as well ali registering evellt$1h:.lt are 'not corw:ioudy attended
to.it the time of [their) oa:urrence' (Jolley 1984: 139),
Now, although unconscious perceptions l'JllW btc relegated to a fltcker-
ing, l.eibniz then insists th<n tho!':\' can also in rnrn go on to
'be known by a luperior mind', The 'superior mind' might simply be lhought
G) 00 God, it Doctor the ensuing suggestion that the !uperior mind is one'}
own mind. now rnpable of recollecting these forgotten, currendy wo:msOous
pen:eptiOtl5. Leibni: argues that 'Ut(l$e runoonscl00sJ perceptions aJ$O provide
the In('an, for rewverlng this mt:mory at n<:<ed, M a improve-
menl$ which one mav undergo' (ibid.), Now, in the
piur.lI here cannot: refer to the reliurre<:Uoo, a5'tbat ill supposed to be a $lngular
event. So these \0 refer to theexpansion of t;b(' CJlPabiIit},
[Q be affected, leading to some ron. of intuitive .
Personal Identity and the Metempsychotic Unconscious
Leibniz's i:nlroduction of the uncomcioUll has specific with
reptd to the iswe of penonal identity.•-\$ we have Leibnu dd'wds the
notion of thinking N'bstance ;tpinst Locke'$ empiricimn, by hmng
.ret:Qune to the notion of unconltdOUi thought. BUI in the proceN of criOriz-
ing De&carte'&, Locke :tho develops a powerful and mftuential cridque of
Descartes's notion of the identity of the thinking has a 'sub-
namwi.&t' or nOUl11enal notion ofidentity (Jolley 1004: 126). can cltart
de!leloptnenl in the concept of personal identity from DfSl:::lnes, Loeb: to
L.et1:mil: by reference to Da\id Lynch's Lost Hig1uJxIJ (1996}, whkh develops
th.e same theme, For Desr::arres. the protagonist of the' fUm, Pete, would be
the lIll.Ine person as Fred if they share the same immateri.al mbrumce, The
problem 'riew is dill( thi$ identificaQ011 an tmlr ever be made
by an omnisdfflt God and there is nc) way for U$ wjudge whether identity of
substance i$ indeed conserved. In Lal HighrtklJ' the only omnbcioent prellence
is the <letnoni( Mystery Man. who is,notfurrhcoming about. peft; and
are the same KlUl, As obl!ervel'$, all we ba\<e to go 01.'1 is the
00dy ofthe other; and Pete and Fred.ate played by different actors in the film.
But him5e.lf admi15 that the material alrn'atIDn of the propenie&of
the does not its identity, otherwiK. widt
mcyding d *mand organs throughout the liruyde, we would paa throUfh
a llerie!l of different identities. So. from I.be Cartesian poinl of mw. it ..,
conceivable dw. Pete and Fred may be difffient ' wlhl' of the $Ilme
wbaamce. if are prepared to at::Cept that the pollSibility 1hat rome radical
physkaJ lI"anaoIllliltian of Fred'!\ llOOy hu $OO;lebow happened OvemighL
Mttteover, if we (;u IUm theomt.& suc.g$) ;;It" idmtihing with
Fred as the prot.a.goMit of the fihn. we feeljust ltS unable to otTer anv criteria
for identity if we t.ah up his standpoint and .uempt to see thingts from his
peI1lpective. FtJtahadowingl'Ca.nt in the DellCartei admits that we
do 11m peralNe !'I.I.bstance direetJy, but only 'know A subslaJ1Ce by one of ib
awibutl:s' {De.K:iU"te1 210}. And oonsequently, extrapalaring from Fred
to us, there are no internal c:rlteria ebher for asse56ing whether 6Ur identity is
l»ntinuow. Hence the male\'Q!ent M)'lltery Man in the film is permitted to
intercede, as a demon, between WI and Ute 'truth' about Fred's/Pete's identirv.
and to ex.ploit our arudetieJ about the potential disconcinuity of the self. .
. In thlC .&.sGy, Locke sees clearly that a lIubstant:ia.list notion of penonal
is untenable, and offers no defem!:' against demonk at all. U-
the sUbiA.anec is material. then our idenUtie8 change with our if the
is immaterial, then there are no t:riteria (or det:iding
whether mmtal1ces exist continuowly, or whether 'we' are in fact composed
of discondnoous in any case Locke hal already mounted 2. cele-
brated critique apinst the notion of iJnnwmaI (whkh he sa.tiri.Ja
ti nothing :more than an 'I knownot wnm' tlmt is held to be behind
ances) , There is. in fact. nothing in the CMtesian view which dOoell anything to
hold 3l bay 'thO$e philoaophers who allow of tranl'Jll.igmtion, and of the
opimon that tlH! soul$ ofmen may. for their mittaniages. be ckuuded into the
bodies of beasts, as fif hahiwioJU. with orgamroited (0 the sat:ilifaction of their
brura! inclinations' (Locke 1690: n.27.6). .I..OCke believei that the absurdity of
mch a view make$ iuelf dear when we reflect that 'nobodv could he be sure
that the soul ofHdiogahalus in (me of hir. yet say that hog
were a mtlltOC (ibid.), That way tmidnea lies. So Locke tonb:!n&
dutr. peniOnai identity is in fua not dependent on the pe:rmanenee of mho-
at all, but on the continuity ofOUT consciousness over time, The preser-
of identitr is not the relevant crilerion for personal identity.
Since consoousn.esa accompanies t.h:inking, and 'tli that. that makes
every one to be, be calk it Nlf; and di.trlnguishea hilMelf from aD
other thinJting hemp, in mw alone ldimlitJ' (Locke 1690:
II.27.9). For Lode, a is 'a th.inlting intelligent being, that Jwfea:9On and
reflection. and can consider ItllClf as 1ue1f, tht: Wlle thinking thine at
tinle$ and places'; a m.an. on the other hand, i.I the bQdy inh&bired by the
penon. On Locke's argument. if I remember preW>LB as having
happened to me. then I am identical with me person who I.ived those event!.
'As far as this consclous.neu em be exteru:kd backward. to any past Action or
Thought, 80 far reacbell a:he Identity of that Pmtm; it is the same :ulf QOW 26 it
was then; and 'tis try the same s.elfwith thi., present one that now retJecu an it..
tJul.\ Action Wall done\ (ibi.d.). TI:riI is one or Locke's mast
,he gels beyond the idea that identity ill rooted in tile of
llQme ma.ccessible subMance. and by empha..'lizing <:ontinwty of conscloUlIDess
over time, penmlal identity from the of denl()nic
However, in doing so, he aho tries ro be very careful to allow Wr the
'l!n<:e of the of the Resurrection. If we are resurrC(;ted. and we dD
happen to remember our life. then the resurrected penon is the
same lil$ the formerly dad despite being pregeTltM with Ii. new, post-
apocalyptk, gloriowl bod,. So is saved. and Resurrectian W(l remain.s
But 3lUU! point. the- find a cr:lCk. and creep back in. Lt:.;de
also that an odd result of hiJI rargument is. to admit the pom."'bllity of
the tr.lnlImigra1io of souls, on tIuit tJw past liv& arr rrmemberetL So if
He1iogabalus emerged from his royage through the circuit of binm iWd
rebirths, and 1\Ia$ able t<J remember his past lives, whether il'1 Rome or in the
pip.J. chen we ;;ould quite Jegitim4lte1y llity that had been the
.me 'penOn' throughOUt his traVaila.
l'heophilus with Philatbeles on dl.is poinl 'If there were no connec·
tion by way of memory between the different ... there would nat be
enougb moral identity to say that this a pentOn. And if God WlShed
a hwmm soul to p35lI into the body of a bog and to forget the man and
perfunn no rational acts, it would not comUi:ute a man' (Leibniz W).
A!I hogs are not able to speak. write or paint pictUte$, we might l1e'rel" feml of
the hog's true identity (this would pethaps only become clear when the wheel
of births had been Theophihls r«aIllI thm in 1M
Goldm Lucim 1& forced to wander from mal!te1" to master in the akin of an
ll§ until he is restored to his fonner shape. (Flction. Leibniz lelh w. tan show-
bO'll1 such tramfonnations can be wrought in one lite, but, as Lcibnixno doubt
knew. ApWciua's GoiJ.A A.v, the original titk of which ill the Dj
of t9 no ordinary fietion, all it is held to contain an
auth.enric account of inidati6n inID an oriental CulL)
Theophilua alto acknowledge. certa.in of Philathda',j pointll about 1M
importance of bMing criteria fur identity. bued in the continuity
of memory and CODKIoU8nel!l {OJ: personal identity. In fact, he adds a further
oiterion: the permu.:me of reguJat and cUm#tel1t appearanc¢$
in the external world, veriliabte t1u:'ough the wstimony of odten in the outer
world (ibid). AI: one point TheopJillus l!\"en concedes that real idmdl}' could
be altered by God in some manner, while personal identity
lIf()uJdbe preserved (i.bid.: 237). But then TheophilUli objects that Phlbtheb'll
theory ia too l!troIlg as It fu!ID'M from it that we are nol the same pel"llOfl .. we
were when we were infanw .) would Mt 1rish to deny, .. that -penooal
identity" and even the "'set£" persist in w. and that 1am that I who 1l/4Lil in tbt'.'
cradle mtff:1y on the grounds rhat J c.m no longer renl<!mber anything that I
did at thaz rime' (ibid,: 2!6). Childhood or clinical amne:'ria pro¥ides examples
of how the loss of memory is not equivalent to the IoeIll of pmonal identity. I
am silll the Jiallle individual that 1 WlI!l in the cndle; in iu:t there may have
been events or pa.tteJ'm ofe:rperienc.:e in my &lldhood wbkh influ.encei
my currem but wbi<:h are not currtmtly KC9$l"ble at,ul. It 3brw:d
ttl e«lu.de them from my identity. What ill moT'l:':, 'if I forgot my whole pa:It
46 Tbt! Pathologies I>f TitM 41
, , I oo\Wl-tti1l Jearn from othen about my li£e duringmy preceding and
WnJ_ty, I would ba+<e remined my rigbts 'Without haYing to be dmded into. tiro
peIWtu and made to inherit from mysdf" (Ltibniz J.765: 'l.be
tel\ce of my past should not be excluded from my identity even if It is out of
reach (If my pnwnal, conSl:loU! ac15 of memory,::'
10 cOJ:W.Tl(maton, u:ibniz just revem to
posnion that Lodtt VI attading: that noumenal or robstantial. identitYis ewm-
uaJ to' personal identity, Indeed. he dOC$ say that 'an identity ....bkbisapparem
to the penon com:eml'd , , . a real identity Qbu1ning
euh immediate !temporal) 236; Jolter 1984: 134-7), But
according w]ol1e\: Leibniit ar.:.c.epts Locke' 5 criterion of personal identity, and
'even adopm a !t.1"Unger and cruder fonn ofthe criterion than. Locke', QWTl. for
UJcke argue.$ onlv tor pOlemw mat a penon could
remember an event I.l.nder cemin conditions - l.eibniz is committed to a form
of actual memorY. At every moment in hIS MtorV ;\ penon is unron&Ciously
'r«::membering' prt\'\oioWl awe, as well • antictpatin$ all his fulW't expe-
riences' (Jolley 1984: 14.0). It ili indeed true that Leibnu.'s monadology
him to be a SUbsWltia&t about identity without beinga materlalillt. But it is 8i
if,jmt at Ole moment mtereMin,appean in Leibniz'. thought.
hI' is seel' to retreat ""tit a flO1irilh. utteringablurd theologial MWUbojUl1l00
3$ be goes. L.eitmi! from lht: hlArory of the ph.ik!8ophyof theuncorulcious.
The problem is that condUlliiom O'l1erlook what a probably the lnOlft
importmt thing: disrinction between lhe muw md the lW:tual
(Lcibll17 1765: 52). .!U preserved, memory is DOl acmal at: all, hUI rather
virwal; the exi$tence of mwility does nOt depend on its
Perhaps Theophilw'$ h6itatiOfi!1 at thi5c point are of an
Internal in the dialogue. There u. no real between
uibniz and 1.«" :at this poifit.. died m1705 while Leibniz wall finW!-
ing the NI!!W and Ihmnever got to hear about percepUl)IlS.
teibnlz in1agmed that f« Locke, the question of unromcious would h.a:re
been primarily a The to maimain identity is eMl'l.-
rl3l £01' moral real;Qn5.: . is a omn' (Locu 1690: n.27,U).
Personality u required lrotjuIt for accountability in this life, bl.tt fur 3CCountl-
bility at I.h«: I.a.ttJudgement. IfIOmebody ii Co be held auounbble for their
a<::tions. then they must be able 00 :rernetnber them. or else any punishment
be unjUSt, that amtCQt.l:Witted in drugged or
drunken Slatet, or in eannot be no more than aet&
commltled before an <mae. of Even if the t'ir&t IWO e.x.arnplcl. are
'fOluntlUy and me latw' In\'61unw)', the problemremairts ofhowto thtc
blaI.nC'WOrtby 3t'tIDn. A drugged murdeft\f is not held acroumable for murder
became he voJum.artly but. he cllUlmmd murder - but
the to murder and m: oon.surt\Jll;i\ti(ln in It. of deran.ge'
Uno.on.sciotl.S memory is 'i'irtwd, and in a &tate difi't!tmt in kind
&om actual which are ind«d impurable. em imagineLeibniz at this
point. peering with Theophilus lY'In the edge of cOllScioumess, heriwing
before the riIion of a of inferior and s:upertor consdi::lU!i-
ne&5es, ea<.:b enveloping the toOrid {r{)m their own and
according tQ their QWtl speed. There will have M be a re'lolUJion in fgrensia
in o.rder to deal with milt of psycl\k life.. If there are 'superior
M:10U5l1esst!S', thq mum' have undergone !lOme tI'llI:IldOmlan()ll, by which their
dommant. rooni'llh broken mto II 'sreatel' theatre' (Lribniz 1114h: 223, #
75. 1:.f'a.'CU. modified), With the image ofTheophilus and Pbilatbe!es frozen on
the in hi5 YWlera L.eibniz relieeu further. W(-
rombing «>!Omniaca1 'Souk. in genna}, living mitrot'$ or
ot'U1e of aeatuI'e.$' inth:Jt they their relations with the rest of
the universe through perceprion and memoryof it. Rut m. tum 'minlt! areabo
Imi<{i;cc of dMntry ilVli . , , of knowing che system of the univene'
{Leibniz 22!. '# 83). SpmruaI be\J1gl! can unfold or develop their i'C'Ja..
rions to die untrene and attempt ro uodef1ltllnd • it i8 in the \VliI.y
it is. By rationa11v reconstructing the order of the univene, (tIer am ultimarely
pose the ofwhetber iJ h.tu to be in mis parti.(ular \<Ia'Y. The
'piriroaJ bt:ing. &:commodatirlg itlleLf w. in 'more roMe me3ire' DcapabU! IlOt
only of knowing tM of the but of 'imitaling something of it
lhrougb rna scbematic represenm.ti<m:t of it, each mind being l.ib!r Q little
divinity in it! own realm' {lribniz 1714b, 22!, ." 8'}.
But what of the innumerable 'inferior enveloped Indarker
and darkn obscUlity? lLibnil tnunnurs that 'not only 501.113, but also :I.Ilimals
Camtf}{ be generated and cannOt peri!h. Thq are only enveloped.
reclothed, Ufldothrd, and tr.mM'onned' (LelbriiF.I71k 20'9}< He is inllistlng
that this ill no barbaric affinmrtion of 1M traNlmign.tioD of 5OO1s (or
'metemlh'Y'-'nom'), Since 'soul-! nevecr entirely leaw: their body. and do Dot
paHfrom one body intoanother that is entirely newto lbem . < , there it there-
fOre nQ but there l!l 11U!Ja1Mr1'1wsis' (ibid.). While it may not be
$tna. met.empeychOiU, however, this t;QV.1d be called in a
limited '" ,ou!.6 lltilljourney through where»
they dominate over the body in ()ne lifetime, in the Den,. ma)' be rele-
gated to some inferior mipped of the power to dominate,
What could All. this mean? In 11Ie Fold Dcleuze a precis ofFechm:r'5
l.:I#Ie lJook f!f Lifr ajter 1N4Ii, which he takes ro iBli5tr.lte this conception.$
:t'edmer mggem thal omview of Life aIter death should be compared to the
wthorn itilimt's \IieYr of Ilk after bLrtb For the unwm ehil1t its immineut
binh llipaIJ lhe of the in which it hurotne W
sciousneu. When the waten it h3$ no that it ill about to emerv
into a wider life, Fechner IlaY'that 'the relation of the first 5.to the second
t-e<::Ur! in a higher degree mthe relations of the llCCOnd to the third. Om
whole acbon and in lhill world is mkulated to fOr U$ an
mganiam. whic.b. in the next world. 'We ihaIl pc:tceivt and use a£ OW' Self'
(f'echner 18:Jfi; 2'1-8), In me third agf: of man, as wen WI corporeality. it if>
:tenmbllt intUition (A whidi is cast off, leaWlg <mly
the 'spiria..ar behind, becawe •every <:llU!le retains iu dfe«s lIS an
eremlil In the following chaptet$ 00. !twinet and oa:u11:i.sJn 1ft
will dw. Deleure cat..es the ewcerk: dktw:n that the 'wmidisan egg'
air Ser1CnJily!'& The entire pJ'OCe1lll of ontogenesis m:ay be undeNt.OOd 35 the
flight of an embryo through the pha.tei of bUimq, childhood. youth, etl:,
are the molar intemive miLt make up the process of
individuation. But if, with Lejbniz 4Vld Berpm, we the
that the human being is il mkTocolIm, then we 1llU$t be to bet::oJne
aware of a v.w:er set of 'molerolar' intenSive tran5fOrrna.ticmI, In that ca"l'e
Fechner's plfChophysiQ. COl'll'J'"ar'y tl) what we may hlwe at the begin.
ning, even become!> <l.nsepar:a.ble from the spiritUal fLM1l'(;haniams of the
monadic soul' (F 97). Leibrlh 'lIUbW.nu.e[lJ me ooOon f){ "mt!fallClu:mat:iul"
for that of metempl)'Chom. meaning by thit that a toW new:r <:hanp bodies,
but that its body ec;uJd be or in order ID enter
other ficldJ of .individuation. thereby returning to a "more mbde theatre"
(DB. 254: d: DR83;.t\j Jt ill notthxm immonaJ soul is able to change b<!diel,
but rather that the body it of intensive tTmlfur:maUom which permit
me cro&M.ng of thresholds of consciouaneu.
Chapter 2
The Wasp'5 Sympathy for the Caterpillar:
The Somnambulist Theory of Instinct
Freud'l the<rry of sexuality concerns not inllbnCt, but the
teXtS have been llttempting to warn English reaclerll of the
erro.r in the Sttwlmrl Editilm of Fu:ud's works. where 1'fN6 (drive)
is tra.1U1at4l'd • 'lnW.ucl'. Even in France, psychoanalytm !lUch as Laom were
mfficiently diarorbed by the Englim translation error to lIl:iIJr.e refer-
ence. to the «iii&!rence in kind between the notion mimtina and Freud's
noooru of wish or drive. model of instinct i.a uaed (we wiD !lII:e that
are several), in exh awe lNtinct presentll us with a
Imrmouy', in which 'the anima) fits inJo its environment' (Lat.an 1954-5: 86}.
The ol6ect of pychoana1}W differs in twO fundamental TesptCU. F'snt, the
human wiIh {or 'desire', ILl the French ttanB1ate- \o\\IfUdl) is a repetition of
earlier experiences of sat:ls:fuctlon. but their emergence occurs strictly on the
ontogenetic rattler than phylogenetic level There are therefore no pre-gMtl
instinctual ra.ther desire is something conatructed in the experienu of
the infant. Second, fuud's anaIy8l$ in 'Drives and their \o'idsaitud.es' dearly
that the fully fonned sexual drive it the 6.xated product of a complex
tr.tjeaory that i5 sul:!Jea to numerous rontingend.es..
But what if this dislincrion bw.inCt and drive, which hu become a
dopna in La.caPian doea not cover the full set of possibilities
latent in concept ofinstina?The concept of instinct has bad an
intereuing history, full ofconflku, and. on doier inspection. it proves impos-
llible ro compn:M this hiMory WID II unified FwF'Tc:udiamand l.ar::a--
Tlians. instinct is ISmply what is biologically given, • opposed to what 1$
colllltJUcted in me (ourseofcllildhood (d.rive). The
of aims, mnes, and libidinal f.hremofds (SE
14: 122) introduce to much Y.lriation into early child deYeJDpmcmt that the
IWIion of butinet is :made redundant. But in Schopenhauer. Betpon and
Deleuze (_weD aI'l Raymond Ruyet. another influence on dH!re is a
that can already be atu"ibuted 10 imtinet. My clm.I.1r:Dgl: here fA
to show that imltinct already hu a pqchic romple:rlty. and that it i& not the
mu.r.e bioIogk.:aJ given it is a.ken to be. If that i& rigln, the dlstinc:tron bety;een
il'lJltinct and drire bccome& dear cut.
After a briefperiodofpubli<:ation in 1945-7 (llnidesm Dt.era.ryjownals iilWd
preD.cC1l to boob, devoted to intensely seJf.U3J and or religious
themes). Deleuze Iapled mto silence until I95S, which is when the 'offidal'
French biography of his wribngll !t.a.rts.
For.a period ofl'iftren up until
the publication of hii landmark I;xx,k. Diffl!Tmu and Rlpf!ti.tWtt, l}eleuu: 1'o'lU to
publi6h, many studies in me hislOry Qf philosophy and literature, Hi!- fin>.t pulr
lkations in the early 1%05 were to Hume artd &rgron. F.rplidt dis-
CLmWn of the unconscllQW rare in these workll, In hili first article on
Bergson. Del.ewe had aftirmed Bergson's ilieory (in /Pta .\ifmory) truzt
'The past is the in·iue!f, the t.mwf1$ciow or. preci.'llely, as Bugron the
virtwll {OI 29). This identification of memory with the uncomCiOUS wa¥
3lre3dy profoundly non-Freudian. in that the uncoNcious was not primarily
as the repository of panlculM represenu.·
nOlD, but InStead the rer:ained past as a wlw1£. in its relation to
lil'ing present. On tbi5 theory. what is Utimofall past iIMlf. not
particular whereas Freud toQk little interw in latent memorie&.
they......ere die ley to the norion ofthe uncowcious for Bergson. Bcrpon
oped his p$Y(;hologv In close rol1tat:t with PierreJanet. For andJanet.
what mak.et ODe ill is nO( the reprmioll of particular noxious memories. but
the- of diswciation from liCtM.ty.! Bergson andJanet insisted that
psycllopathology often baJ temporal {and spatial} which c.annot lx
Teduced to wne$,. Dekuze will adhere to this fundamem:alh
temporal contepoon of the unl;onsOous up until DiJ!em'ue and
where he atgUe$ that the IJn((lJl.lIcioU$ is CClmtltuted by three sfntheses of time
(DR 150).
SUI: <luring the 1950. DeIt!\lZe was also paying a lot ed' attentkm to what was
pe.rhap<> &rp:>n's mOll( notorious theory. thf.' theorv of instinct in C1'IiJJ.tvt
Evolwitm, whkb a more compfu:ared rel:atiomhip the of the
uncon$Clow. In 1953 Deleuze published a V<llume entitled fIMd
bulittdloM, an edited collection of six:ty8Ix extract! on the eponymom themelI
and their rclationsbips.' DeJeuze provides an illumimuing prefar.e to the
volume (reprinted in lk$erl whidl mgge5t! that the text is not mupiy
to be reed a! a 'Reader" or anthology, but ;u promoling a patucular line of
thooghL l( canoot be denied that mece i$ lOme degre€' of ventriloquism 1n
DeLM1u'! editQrial approach to &U1 as his selection wvery
specific and idiosyncr.tric, and their sequ.endng also t:() embody an
argument, which promota a particular set of condmions, WhM cannot but
strike the contempoca.ry reader is that, despite pubUlIbed t'WQ years after
the appeanmce olTtnbergen'$landmark book TM Sttuly ufbutina. DeleUU'1I
volume conI:3in.! no to the ethology of Tllltx:rgen Of" Lorenz.. In
fur, lhere ill noteYen an nt:I'3Ct from Deleuu's favourite ethologi5t.Jakob \100
Instead. the rollettion is by the 'dairvo}-ant'
bu&t- drwry ofinlltlnct, which h:t.1 a long tra.ditkln behind it (as the e:lUnrn
in tht- 1IQlumc show), and l\lIidl !IUmS to climax in B.ergson's reworl:.i.ng Q£ it
in Cmli.ve (1907). The lint exmu:t on theme ofinsrinct is from
Qmer, f<.w" whom the instinctive animal it> 'a, of sonmambu.1i8f who
'a sort of dream Of ""'ion' (I Ii: It<). Other cital:icau from Scbopell"
hauer,Jean-Henri Fabre and Iloergsol1 !.akf up and pursue funhe-r thi.$ model
of instinct. The problem of msQnC'.1 ii presented through a of t.l!':Xt$ tiD
eTltoInQ\Qgy, which illwtrate the baule berween Darwinmn$ and disciples of
faMe. whom. Deleuz:e describes a:s (ibid.: 82). [)e}.,uze's
selection seems intended to show that the modelllot only pre-
dated me "l>al"winian conception of instinct, bUt ako it.
In 1859, Dal"Win mggt>'sted thai should be as an evolved
mechanism J.ib: any other, e¥oh.ing through '!low and gradual accurn.uIarion
ofnumerom, slight. }'t!t profilable, ,,-ariatiOD!' (Darwin 1859: 256). But despire
the SUCCellIl of in other areas. $U".mgely his explanation <>f instinct
met with only qualified aceepcmce. AL the beginning of !.he twentieth century.
the notion of imti:na be-came a for debatelO about the range or t.h.tt
theory of evolution in the !are niN!1eenth t:enl:U.rY. Bergson's complaint
against Darwin in C,eaUv4 Ewl14t.on W3tl conantrlil.rCd SJ"ound the que:mon 0(
imtin<:t. ffu main problem was thu: if lnstineu invoWe very irate-
pbysioJogicalll.eCJucnces of llWenlS. then howcan they ev<>1vt" gnulually?
Berpon felt entitled to I"e'Y!Ye the 100dei by
Q:Mer, Scbopenbauer and Fabre, claiming ;against Darwin that Wtlna must
invok-e mOTe than a of ID()tQr mecllanisms and must. be taken a:. a kind of
knowledge. impIying:it peeuJiar kind of mentality. Just as the $Otlma.m.bulist is
perfectly ConsclOUll of wIItft they are doing, but is W1oonsdous of wkJ they are
doing i .... instinctual activity .im'otves a kind of consciousness wbkb is inreIJ.ec·
tually unawa.rl.' of its purpo8l.'.
Awhole lI(:hool of 'in.5ti:nct·theorists' abo appeared in the F.ngJilllwpeaking
world from the late 1890s 00 - {or WCU:KC, Conwy Uoyd Morgan,
W, H. It. Rivent and Wtl1iam McOovgaU, and akhoogh onlysome of them
cxpUcl1:.ly sympathetic to Berpm, all aJ.$() that instinct Hsould be ,on
ccived on the model of knowledge.1> In h'is 1917 mT\o'f'Y of dine \':rends and
their pltilmlOphica.t origi.n$, Imti.nct in Man. James DreveT notes the sim:ilariry
bet.weeP Berg$<m's idea ofwMcllUld the hr]Xlthem put Jbnfard by Eduard
von in has of tiM (1869) that inmlJl:t iii mani"
through arypeaf'dairwyaminruition' (D-rever 1917: 101.66). Ddeuze
does not refe-r 00 the Briti8b iMtinct-theori.stll, but it is thii general intdJectuaI
milieu that he inhabit6 in tmdJ1LStit.utimu. On three .eparate OCQSions,
:Be.rp>n'$ $OI'Mamhutistic in&tinct theory is given a prune in the
But BetgSQn's theory of 'i.nsrinCb.sal $)'Jnpatby' - whose privileged
example is that of the- wup whiclt para.tylles the caterpillar in order to provide
iu .Iar¥ae wim 3 livipg larder - is probabty the D\O/it bizarre element in
Berpm'$ philosophy. Reviewing We contribuooNl of Fabre and BetgllOn in
his D/MifU!., Russell remarked on hO\llO' 'laYe ofthe marvellow
may mislf!ad even :>0 an observer as Fabre and 50 eminent a philOM:>-
ph...r :itS Bergson' (.R.uMclJ 1921: 56)• .From 1920 onw:m:Js, a vebemern reaction
fb.red up the throreUcai e.xce!l$($ of contemporary i.r-t.3timt theorv, and
bt:h<mQl,.I..ri.ml made an .aggregi.ve attempt to reduce all wflUnca 10 oS
The instinct-theorists were smftly forgotten•.and if Bergson'$ theory It
was only due to the accident of hafing been propoeed by a great philosopher,
52 Deleuze and the Unwnsciou.s The Somnambulist Theury of Instinct 53
whose work. was preserved for other reasons (the same was DUe for Schopen-
hauer's theory).
It is wually held that the concept of instinct only beeatne acceplable again
as a result of the emergence of Lorenz's and Tinbergen's erhology in the
19509. Both ethologists stressed the compatibility of their rheories with
Darwinism. Deleuze's lmtinds and Institutitms pr<!iect was therefore a rather
unusual one and probably appeared anachronistic even when it was pub-
lished. His preference for von Uexkiil.I and Buytendijk in any case suggests
that his conception of ethology is quite at variance widi what became the
dominant version of ethology proposed by Lorenz and imbergen, which com-
pletely rules out appeal to the subjectivity of rhe organism. Uexbill's original
proposal to replace anthropomorphic language in the description of animal
behaviour with more neutral tenninology was not originally targeted against
the ascription of subjective properties to animals. Rather he proposed that
'receptor', for instance, should replace 'sense organ', because an animal's per-
ception of its environment is sekctTve and which implies that, for
instance, since animals do not necessarily 'see' in the way that humans do, the
most one can infer from the presence of eyes in animal! is that they are recep-
tive of light (Burkhardt 2005: 155). For Uexlriill, the campaign against anthro--
pomorphism was fully consistent with the ascription of subjective qualities to
organisms. 'According to the behaviorists, man's own sensations and will are
mere appearance, to be considered, if at all, only as disturbing static ... We
[on the other hand] no longer regard animal! as mere machines, but as
subjects whose essential activity consists of perceiving and acting' (Uexkiill
19M: 6).
In his 1'JI.eomicaJ BiologJ, Uexkiill makes clear his debt to Kant, and explicitly
focuses on the question of how the world appta'rS to die animal (UexkJ.ill
1926). The later ethologists rejected Uexkiill's emphasis on subjectivity. Tin-
bergen took. Uexklill's earlier critique of anthropomorphic terminology one
step further by stating the methodological principle that 'because subjective
phenomenacannot be observed objectively in animals, it is idle either to claim
or to deny their existence' (Tinbergen 1951: 4). imhergen and Lorenz object
against Uexbill that it is quite possible to conceive ofa selective lJmweIJ carved
out of the wider envirorunent without malting reference to subjectivity. The
tick's behaviour, for instance, can be seen as a sequence of evolved sub-
routines in the service of its reproductive function. At. is well mown, in A
'Thou.stmd l'laJeawand 'Spinoza and Us' in spmeea.' PmctiaJl P1likJsop/ry, Deleuze
appeals to SpinOla'S psychophysical paral1elism in order to defend UexllU1li.an
ethology from this charge (Ansell Pearson 1999: 179).
But his approach to animal subjectivity in his early writings appean to be
rooted in a preference for Bergsonian instinct theory. If we take into consid-
eration the importance ascribed to Bergson's theory of instinct in Instincts and
Inslitutiims and in other places in his work, then it becomes clear just how
unonhodox Deleuu's approach to ethologywas. Uexkilll certainlywould have
baulked at some of Bergson's inferences about animal subjectivity. But the
somnambulist theory of instinct appears to have profoundly preoccupied
Deleuze during what he describes as an 'eight-year hole' in his life, from 195:3
to 1961, when he published very little.
and the Theory of Instinct
Deleu:ze begins his chapter on instinct in Iwtinct and Institutions with a quote
from Cuvier. 'One can only get a clear idea of instinct by admitting that
animals have innate and constant images or sensations in their sensorium,
which determine them to act, just as ordinary and accidental sensations deter-
mine them. It is always a sort of dream or vision which they pursue; in every-
thing that has to do with instinct. one should see them as a species of
somnambulist' (I Be I: 18). The ensuing extract from Fabre does not take up
this theoretical anal}'Jis, but does seem to be intended to illustrate it. Fabre
gives a description of one of the most disturbing behaviours found in the
order of hymenopter.l., the paralysing attacks of the A1m1U1J>hila Hinula wasp_
Although Deleuze cites a nwnber of texts from Fabre in Instincts and Institu-
tions, it is likely that he selected the description of the Ammoj)hiJa because
Bergson also refers to it in his pages on instinct in CirrLaive Evolutiofl (Bergson
1907: 172--4). Solitary nest-building wasps had been the focw of debate about
instinct at the end of the nineteenth century. The solitary character of the
wasps clearly precludes the learning of nest-building or hunting behaviours.
The AmflW/Jhilo wasp hunts caterpillars, sometimes weighing fifteen times as
much as itself, as food for its lanae. The lanae do not accept corpses, however,
so the wasp paralyses its prey and presents it to them inunobile and alive. Fabre
describes how the wasp, in a series of swift and precise operations, puts the
main locomotor centres of the caterpillar out of action. What is astonishing
about the paralysing wasps, he says, is that they specifically target the motor
ganglia, as ifthej /mew that stinging other ganglia might cause death and there-
fore putrefaction. The AmmtJ1fJhIlo. stings no less than nine of the locomotor
centres of the caterpillar, just sufficient to immobilize it. It then squeezes the
head of the caterpillar with its mandibles, again with enough force to cause
paralysis but not death. .After the attack. is over, the Ammophi14 grabs the cater-
pillar by the throat, dragging it back. to its shaft in the eanh. At.tride the par.al.
ysed segments of the caterpillar, the newly hatched grub now has continual
access to a larder of food which is preserved from putrefaction because it is
slill alive. During the whole oper.ltion, says Fabre, die wasp proceeds with
'surgical precision', as if it knew intimately the facts of her victim's complex
nervoussystem (I &:1: 19; Fabre 1920: 38--(0). It was this kindofcomplex, inte-
grated behaviour that persuaded Fabre to affirm the fixity of species, against
Fabre's wasp and caterpillar provide the set piece of Bergson's account of
instinct in CnJtI#wEvolution. In tum, Deleuze's and Guattari's fascination with
the 'a-panillel evolution' of the wasp and the orchid is pre-dated by De1euze's
earlier fascination with the funereal dance of the wasp and caterpillar in Fabre
and Bergson. What is happening here, says Bergson (moving far beyond
obsen'lUions). is. :an example of a divinatorv sympathJ that flows
throughout nature. In ita rime and after:, this suggestion caused cOAAI5wn to
ewlry-one (JankeMviteh 1959: 152). Wbat sympathy! How does Bergson arnve
at such a fantaStical hyporhC$l$, so radically opposed to I;Urrent mains.tream
views of i.n.sW1cruaJ bebaviOW' thaI .it ill hard to now that <:oulcl
have taken it $erWusJy? The probJern of the anachroniim of Deleuze's remm
tll Bergson'& theory of instinct is dwarfedby the uncenain rone of hIX'U1l
implied by 8eIp:m'$ proposal. ,,'rust ;tIe the rules that gO\Jetll thu obKure
region of thought?
BerpoD begins by approacbing instinct thmugh aconaast with i.tltclligence
the (<lpacity to use tools. Whfieai 'intelligence perfected is the faculty of
making and tHing unOl'ganis.cd in$Ul1l'OenlS', 'imtinct perfected is a faculty of
wring and of conlltrue.Ting organised m51J"ulnenu' (Bergson 1007: 140).
Instincts are thus the dirc<:t 'continuation of the work of wgani!iiltion' (ibid,:
139). For both Bergson and Darwin, the instinct t(I mdat me brea8l i3 not dif.
ferent in kind to the evolution of the mammary gLands themselves. in rerms of
adaptive ftmctIon. The $(Kia] imtinets of inseru are direcdy correlated with
men- anatomy, as mown by the worku bees in a hive. which have ... diffc«int
anaromical structure to the others. We cannot tell where the activityof instirn:t
begins and where thar. of namre ends {ibid.,. Nevertheless, Bergson cl3.inls
that something 1lt:Dp5 us from reducing mstinct to pbysiologkal and causal
mechanwm.. in conformiry with a Oarwinian account of adaptation. Some-
thing the activity of lnstinct from. on the one hand. m«hanical
and on the other hand, from intelligent, consciOU$ behaviour, This is
the role of lk in inst:iru:tJJ.a.l it("uvity.
In hLttinlif aM ImtittJiiMu .at the conclusion of the cha.pter devoted to
1ns6.nCI, Deleuze cites a pa.ssage from 8ergron'5 which di!-
tinguisbes between "two type'$ ofun<:onsdousness' (Bergson 1907: I &: I
'28}, On the one hand. dlere is. an unromciOUl! 'in which consciousness is
the sume is unconsciQUS be<:ause it never W'dS nor oould have been con-
scious. But on the other hand. there is an unrolW:lOUS 'in which t:onsciousness
ill 7WIJijiMf.' A stone may ha,'fIe zero of its fall.jmt an instinct
may have rero C(im('ioumeSI. But the two zeros nOl the same, one is the
result of a suppression. With me notion of the of
we seem to be d.os¢ lQ Freud. But this impression rums OUl to be misleading_
This is the pasaage, dted by DeLeu:e, in which Bergson introduces his \lefSlon
of the somnambulistic model of iJminct.
When we mechanically perlorm an tuabitual action, when the- fiOIIlnambu-
I.ist automatically aces his dre:un, un<:OIISciousncss may be abroltue; but this
is merety due to the bCl that the representation of the act is in check
by perfomtant:e of the ac t itself, ",hich resemblefl dw: &<lea ro perfectly,
artd nts it sa ¢U(.tly. that oonicloumes9 is unai:He to find room between
them, is JkJf1IW, up 6y action. 'l'he proof of this is. that if the
accomplishment of tht' act is arrested or thwarted by an obstacle, <on-
sdousness may reappear. It wa5 there, but neutrali.lled by th(" -a.:'t1on which
fulfilled and thereby filled representation. The obmK'le
nothing }JQsitive; it simply ;l vcid,. removes a swpper. This inade-
quacy of act to represemadon is pre6$ely what we here call consciousness.
(:Bergwn 1907: 144)
This passage is impossible (0 understand if oue ill exp«ting the 'suppression'
of consciousness to be si:milar to the Freudian mOOd of repres&ioD. There is
also a difficulty h('J'e b«ause Bergson is in the proress. of moving beyond the
functionalist account of cousciousness he maintains in .Ya#er 12MMmurry. In
that text., is primarily tre6ted as a function of intelligence. One
would expect therefOre tha1 Bergson would go on to deny ro
instinct (which is the opposia:e ofintelligmce). It appears that iUs a condiuon
of consciousness that there ill some {minimal or maximal) choice in relation
to the Consciousness only 'lights up' when there is a multiplicity of
COUfllCll of a.ction that might be taken.. when to the situation is
required. It it, moreow:r. by definition never 'adequate' to Us ol:!ieet (there is
a 'distance between act and idea'; ibi.d.; 145), sinc:'e by iu nature it
involves appeal 10 past experiences, to generafuations, and. 00 abstractions that
have a .strictly pragm3tIC wlue in the present sitU3.Uon. 1ft this
hOWe'\ier, has gone beyond the identification of consOOWIles5 with
aueution. Intelligent conliciousraess does not exhaust the genus of oomoow...
ness. and we are given reasons for assuming the elOStetu:e of a conJICiowness
'by right' whkh i$ (juite independent of the fun<tion of intelligence (ibid.;
We might SllflPO$e that consciousness.. ever! in the m<mrudimentarY¥l-imal.,
COVt'.'r.l by right an enomlOWi field, but is compre..sed infact in a kind ofw.e:
each adv.mce or the nervous centte5, by giving the organism a choICe
between a larger number of actions, calls forth the potentialities that are
of surrounding the real. tbm opening the vi'le wider md allowing
consciousness to pass more freely. In dlis 5eCOnd hypothesis . . . it is. more
true 10 say that action is the instrument of consclousnet& , .. It is a., if a. broad
WfTt::1lt of had penetrated matter, loaded, M all conscioumC$A
i&. with an enonnoU$ mulliplicity of inrel'WQYen potentialities. (Bergllon
Deleu:ze will call thili type of conMiousne$S 'pure On wp of
the perfectly funrUoll4d explanation of cofl.!JciQU$IlC$S as an effet:t of the need
to solve practical problems, Be.rpon goes 00 t£) ruggest mat 'we must 2Iso
palm OUt that things would go on in jusI. the same way ifconsciousnellS,
ofbcing the etTCCl, the cauIIe'. Rather than being an effect in the
sy.Kem, me ncrwus system is 0lpQil;wl arwad a mote primary, pw-e con-
Thii pure consciownea appears .0 be identical. to what Berp:m aills 'intu-
ition' .Is instinct the roott 'invoh.luid' (I)rmofintu.ition, as Bergson ternh 110 say
in h. th«>l!ophical momentt., or ill inmitinn ra.ther the most
form of m.mt;:t? Thii question will be in the fl)llowinS section.
For tOO 'We shouldjUlt nooe that:l\e1pon intuition to be the
Conn of to inJtiIIet. Imtinct a llilUation
'fromwithin, quite OOlerwUIe than by a proce. ofkoowledge - by an intuition
lliwdrather than (ibid: 175). Irudncu are 1dlnuher than f.4t:N(iht'
(172), It. insdnauallU:ttmy r.heIe is no distanee aa and i&a.. Irutinc-
tuaJ intuition even appean to be a kind of 'adequate ma', in Much the .l(:t
oorrelpOnds 110 a idea, or '.fu16b' the idea.. Bergson II
aware': that tm.'l intuitive of inmnct Cannot be thought ;as
'unrotl8CIDW!:' in the sente of 'tepreued ulog'etber from Cllnsctoumesil'. If
thc:re is no w.rlIlciott:meS$ at all in u'llul:t1on, then .t would be ab6urd to talk of
an 'adequacy 01' act In idea', Haw can an idea be adeqllllte if it is absoJwely
uncOJUcim.fUThe intuitive a&pect ofirlstmct is impalllible to d.lvoree from .JOftk
4(lft. of consciOU$nesi.
In 1m dt'fence of Berpon'& theory of instinct, 'Berpm et la Sphex
Ammophile'. Ruyu arguet that Bergion's error In this is 110
'lI1llU ·consciousneB4" rhc s,1'K.m}'tf1 1959: In),}li
Wben be claitM that imdnct invotves a 'mppu(tSion' of crmtdoullnClll. be
ltIUi!lt mean mark invowes a mppression of oonll(:iom or int.cli-
gent with its efforn of attmtion and appeal to conceptual
norttlll. He -Y' darly that 'although instinct is not within the domain of intel-
ligence, it Is nQl situatedbeyond the limits olll:lind' (Bergson 190': 175), but
in the crudai in question, it is made lev than deat that be fj talking
about the repre!Jllion of intelligent eO%1llCiousoeu. But th•.le the OW'll wav of
making of his position. lmtinct tl'l:U$t not be thoopt of as
unconscious in the maIlllet" of the fiIlllng stone (for then it not be
llive). but rather all UIlCOl'ISciooa to intelligen<:e. But far from being
in!tincr in that case might tum out to be
imJofar all it 1m'OWes. the adequaq<J! act tnidea. Berpon'f IDlilinetion
two of !hot,l.\d have been augmetl.tc:d. with a disdnmon
between tWO f:ypet {or perhaps: poles) of 'What may be uneon-
sciOUll 10 empirical, :represe-nQrlonal be intemety e(lOo
llci.ouIl to :lnmncwal consdouaneu.
'\o\i.th this in mind, we might be to make ofa pecuIiat
in 4NI where DeJew:e bhmdy invem the FM.Id.ian notion
that the (lIkIng..m.h the and repetitiom it
produces.) b a result 'I do repeat because J rep...." but 'I
I repeat, I forget 1repeat- I I't:preII,. because I c.ul. 1M:
certain tltinga or eenain txperlencu only in the mode of repetltion. I am
determined to repmlS wunId me from lliIing them thus: in
particular, the tepfeileDtatron 'lltbich the lived by relating it to the
form of a similar or i....tkaJ (DR 18). lnstinmwould be the fim 'rep-
me first syntheses of ctlIllloCioul!nel'&, but in a field of
which is not yet ne<:e:narily b1.ll'Dlm. :Bc:tJ.lIon'. tMory points U$ an
Insti.nctual collM:ioumelll! native to aninl:lll life in general, and which nay,
under S()mc modified fonn. a1lIo distribute itiIelt in human .:ollectivitiet.
The Somnambl.l.&t Theoryof the Unconscious
Noting the increasing popuJarity of the psychology of the at the
fin dtt the Kantian f.lSYCboklgiat. Wllbebn Wundllaundwl an attack on
the nolion, which pointedly wilh n1"f5tiCIlma and the 'Schelling
school' (Wundt 1908-11: In. 636). In hill tJ/ he ronttnded
any psychkaJ. element that tw. from consciousness lJ to
called unc.amcious in me Ilense that 1ft" aamme t.he poIlflibiJity of its renewal.
that 1$, its reappearance in me acwal inW'CODnection of-p;.ycbh:al
Our knowledge of an element that hu be<:ome unt:omdom does nOt
exund beyond the pombiIily lis renewal ... .A.uumpthmt as to .-e
of the 'uncon5ci.ous' or a& to 'utU:OWlCious PI'OCe!IfIe!l' of any kind ... are
entirely unproductive fur P'YChology. (\Yundt 1896: 22'1-8j
In later; twentieth-eentury editions oems rD:gor the dIr
tJ/ 60t published m
1874). illII5eI't6 thlU 'fur hypothetical uoroJ'llldous pro«s&es we could
mbstimte acwalJy de.rnOOllmible or at any ICIlI hypmhet:ical con&ciOUl
processes' rwundt 1908-11, IfI.nO).l!
For Freud and 8eIgIoo aiile the problem 01 me uncoJ1KiouIl dDe$ indeed
corn:ern llUbsistA!:nce ofuooonscious $tlltell. The idea that there- are
physioloGical movements wbidi are beneath tilt: threshold of OOJ:UIcioUl per-
ception is entirely and Wwult bUrnleI' wrOte in gyca.t detail
about loweT-ordu' physiological pnxes.te. in the brain. We -are uUlxwcious of
the nlO¥eme!llS of me autonOlUO\L\ nervous ll')"lItem and the dn:u-
lation of the blood. idea that there l& an raitIes m»joI'
philveophical How do l.lnCOrllICloW statea.ubsist before and ...
they are WIlSCious? Ifthey fina1iy come to OOUIClowmelllO, dDetI thlIIl mean there
ito no longer an unooWlciowl? How doelI the ego them, in order EO
them out of (Sattre's problemotlhe What i$ the
of the dynamk reblion between. and the WlCOrlIICiowI?
M'at'.ry phiIo!ophkal proponents of the unoonJcious today are still
to Wundt's Katit.ia.n ¥tion of the nol:IDn of the Ull£tln.scioul, We will :teronl
In it in chapter 3. where we di!Jc:uaJUDB'. rc:apoD!le to iL Wundt'a poRtion
reJIl.'iIin4 powerful in a pt-JIollophB:al climate split by the dualism between nat-
ura1l.Irlc and normadve approaches to the mind. AngIo-Amerian philoeophi-
tal defendl!n of Freud Wundt', by UJUing thai.
unconscloUl menW1t.af.ell amnot be reduced to pb.,.,iologicallmte!l precisely
The Somnambulist TluJary ofInstinct 59
they d.;l make implicit appeal (0 me l10rmative ;:onditiomof
(Hnpk.im 1982: xvil-xx; c.:n.en 1993: 31-3). Freud mJks of
uncon6cl<ms and ro have :a wish or a delrire ill an intentional stair, which
in turn requirt"S ha\1ng the desirltd (Gardner 199]).
All this Is 1ibf'IIMSWe and <:annot be reduced to the na1Ul'alilltic order of phvsi-
ology, Defending Freud from such a reduction, David Buller a
properly 'pef5()nal un(:onKlQus' from these unconscious
prou::iUIe'!l' which 'inferentially isolated' from the sortlJ ofinfor-
mad£Jn that figure ja the cootents of the conscious moU\IeS .and beliefs of
personal psychology' (Buller 1999: 10)). It is thar are
ul\Iolved in the estimation of depth from binocular vWon, or in paning sen-
teO';:e$ of our mother tongue. lSuIler suggests that the kind of lIUOCon.sdi:nJs
'homuncular' mechanisms identified by D3nie1 Dennett in his book c.,.
.tciounus.l generally ofthis type. on the omer
band, are not 'inferentially isolated', but are ptt-
ctsetv because of the they carry, and the meaningful implit:atiom with
which they are bound.
Bergson would agree that the infant's instinct to mek. (for instance) is not
uru,;onsdou8 in the sense that the growing glands is un<:onlCiow.
It not a physiological event, bur nor is it a di.<ltoned prodmt of th.e nonns of
conceptual representation either. Contemporary normativillt llttempts to
i!alvage the remain hampered by one ofFreud'I key.assumptions.
If there is any b'Uth in the idea that FR'ud was me diMoverer of the uncon-
sciow, then it is perhaps because he is the tint to (;reate a slriet.ly 'mow'
opposition between conscioumes." and the WlcOIUK:ious, Freud transformed
the pbilOllophy of the by putting it in lID ab!ltraet r-elation of
mutual exclusion with t;OnsciousneM. Either a representation is uncou.scl<:m.s
oc it is not: unconscious. repres,<ied 'repres-entationll' afC injdmJd from their
comciQUS represeSltatioU&, The um:onlldOllll ill tht' non-a>nsctous,
and all pathologkaJ states are c.onsdom derivatives of thi.& radically uncon·
scious WIte. But Freud's opposition miMes the distinctiLm between two kinds
of consciousness: not an tol1JlCioosneu Is dominated by the function of intel-
ligence. Models influenced by Freud tbi$ £;ili.e either imel.
Spt conscioumCM (me;ms.....end actions, concepwaJ or no
conscioU&lre$i at all
Bur. is another o-adition of thought a.bout the lJ1Konf<;iow: the
'somnambulist' lradition, fi:Jr whkh it was the of conscioumess-
which was lht! prim;lt)' dinied tXt, lhe lIOmnambulillt Jno<fel of the- uncon.
scious prevailed for 3 periOd longer th;m the rcip of In
Europe, the pnclkf' of bJIPIlOl!hl was tQ
<::irzuses and theatres,. and irs. tbeorywdS but 5W1mg in tbf'
eighteenth centu.ry wilh Meaner and continuing th.rougboUI thO!f1 of (he
nineteenth century, fllIUIralllOmnambWmn (instinct; and IIttificialSOlll.nam-
buliml {hypnOlia} played an zmportant role in psychology as :a theoreueal
and practical model and tooi. original idea was hau:hed in his dl$.-
sertation in medicine at the University of Vienna, which was devoted to the
influence of the moon and planet!! on pathological 'The sun and
moon not only raised the tides of the lieU on the earth, but ah<;t l;:oot:ributed
to 'alWO$pheric tides', wbich in tum have an effect on the of the
bod\" He men w !:be monthly 'tide&' of After graduating and
private practK«:. Mesmer ,.<1 young woman who had been
suffering from dcliriwn, mani.a. convulsions, fainting and mysterious aches
and pams.. Miss Oesterline agreed to subject heI1lelf to Mesmer's experiments
in m.agpetir f(lf'<:e t(l 'artificia.l tides' in her body, compen-
tating rot ber disequiJibrium wllh r.he- natI.I.ral cosmic tides. After experiencing
tome burning palm. decided that he must have engineered a
magt1tdc influence. Bu( then for some re3S0n he $W"ted to magnetize
.material objet:f3 tucll a5 bread or ll£Oncs, and found wt these mbstanCe1i
the same .effect, Mesmer 9lo'a1l trnly hamed, Then it da"'ned upon
hJJ'n: r.he magneusrn was .emanating from him, There Wll.S mch a thing all
'an.iD'W magnetism:. ",,'bien went quire beyond mere mineral magnetism.
whkh did not affect ncrvot.&ll tissues. Besides Bergson and Schopenhauer.
other th.in.kers important ro DcJeuu: but not cited in In:nfnt:t5 tmd Ifllslitulw1u
4bo bad " deep In llOmnambulism, both nattl.f31 and anificial.
W3$ by 'clair\Ioryance' (m aara and the
fl)r instance) • .mile in 1817 rIle was sent by the
Viennese murt 10 :animal in the dink of K. C. Wo1£m,
a follmRr Qf Mt'3mer who had 5tet. up a sta.t:e-5Ub5idized dinic in Berlin fur the
magnetic treatment of !he poor {Ga:uld 1992: 89tU In hinmdy ofJung'lI n:la-
tiunship to PleneJanet, John lhule suggests that the main foci of inrerm in
tate: Il.ineteenth-cenmry Pfl)'Chology - hypnosm, hysteria and spi.ril:ualiml- 'are
all variant3 'fJf sommambulism', which refers to 'mty complex: act perfOrmed
while asleep. in tnmce, 01' in some other "altered Mare of COIl5ciowIness""
(Haul,=, 19St: 245). The price of Freud's molar oppooirion bet:ween comci.ous-
n$and the waf the lo&sof derna.n.:ations bef.ween dUfeTent ki.nds
of $f<*$ role of in the fragmentatioo oC
pel:l(JlUl idenlity, ;U"''en the spatio-tl::mpol"al distortions ofboth
and neurosa, were KOtOmi:zed by Freudian of the wu::omcioua.

In France Janet had a.tternpttd to srnthem.e the popubr u-adition of
thought about 5Omnambul.iMn with academtc psychology, Continuing the
emphasis on apperception and .Sfl\the!lis in the tradition of Xantian psychol-
ogy represented by Wundt,Janer had gone on to differentiate appcroeptive 01'
syru:hetk comciowmess from other of
ness found in cases of dissociation. For Janet. the by,surk u- during
her state of dissociation; the problem is that she cannot recall U.
and therefore <annot integrate it with ber ego-funetions. For Bergson too. one
is even conscious while one dreams: it is just that this kind of oonOCKmmeu U
quire different to the cont:l'3cted. narrowe.d-down coD9ciousnen one has when
one is paying 'atl:rntion to Ii.fco', The $(JmnambuJ.iat ill fully aMU'(, of what is
happening. while it is happening; the problem iii that the)' remember nothing
60 61
Gf it (until, perilaps. the next somnambu:lisUc episode), For Jung,
in turn, the encounter 'l\-iih an archetype will 1rl'lIoive <l kind of 'intuition'
whICh Q{ representalional but still a
kind of In elACh of these caIOe5, there is no 'MQlar' oppoilrtllJn
and the H a diiSociative ltate is
subRquendy denied or furgotten by the eg6, that doe! Qot mean that It had
not been fi.dty while it W"Ml happening. Di!!IIOCilued, tomnambullllt:k
consciousness is tr.lnCfltike, and henee ofa differ-
ent nature to ordiIlluy, conM:ioumess, wtili:h mwWves 4;ognt·
livesynches15, Orgaamand frenzy arc cenmtl &ires ofsingle-minded imtincmaJ
in bUrmul culture, and of dWociation ha'll'e the same form
But l£ $Omnambulillt! are (';on.c1O'UJ,. Wen of what a.re they unconscious?
Janet agreed widt Charcot that somnambulism and hylIted:1 share a lad of
awarentiS of the po1"p05e of the :action, a dillsodatkm from the rest of the
mental field (110 that the palient cannot remember the fWe clearly), and the
trait tha1subconlCiOll5 fixed idea.'! O\'erwhdm or tlke 0'lIe:r patient':J
sc:ioU$tltllll duringll crisis. I;reud. anotheT student of Charcot. decided to
diaoount I:he last aspect of the phenomenon.Janet and other Fnmch Jl'IYChol,.
ogilJa insisted t1w the patimt amnot thilll\lOmnambulisdc trim
the rest of thdr con.«<;iousness lJt.unLJe it Is 1tll) and not
awillahIe 1m: srnthesi:o under general wncepta.lli
Schopenhauet' aDd &rgson to appty the mmnamhulistk model
of the uneonscioull to the problem of Sixty before Bergson,
SchopenhaUCt" had ;argued at length mIn it b not jUat fJlfYChopathology tfult
Ca5CS but that one mUll attribute: it mon= funda..
mr:ntally to instinct ilMlt. Inttirlet iii important for Schopenhauer all it B 1be
ezacr. analogue of blffld rDt1I, iNola.r U it is both uncontrolled by the ego, and
yet romciou3 (juit all Milton was beth b.Iind and consaoUS).16 In the chapter
of m WitlaM devoted I'i) instmct,
that are to a umUn extent namral somnambu.li5!ll'. 'the JWt)l-
pathetic nene hal taken the diretUon of the mttemal u wdl'(II.
344:). Howeo¥er, for the of instinct
CODCern& the of purpolles. When 'the apidel' tech :t3 if
It hall spin its web, although tt neither knQM nor undent.ands im purpose'
rn, !44), this ie tQ the llOnmambulist who cat'lie1! ooi at:tions
by a without knowing why, JWIl becal.1$e the spider is
'Wlc:omlciOll! of the end of iu acUOln does not mean that it cannot be COD-
il(:iouII of the itimuli whidl triger Ole instinct. 01', in the form of an aJermel$
OT adaptability. ofa DH:ani to the aim. The lI()mruu:nbulist b conscious of the
'Nbjectiv'e represeowionBwhich srimulate the desire' (Ii, 541), but not of tIle
t':rld of the t::Ie$lre. In a a:rtatn !#:1lSe, that mak.ea instincwaI behaviour mom
- in the llense of'interior' or hermetically endo!led - than intelli-
gem find in the C'.3llle of those ani.m:als f1w; are
by instinct, espedally of Ii preponderance at dlIe
i.e. the nervoU$ over the or cuebra1
{ihid.).11 The involved in in!.tinct " 'su.bJeo:ive' of i€ll
partiality, Animals therefore a highly consc:ioumeu.,
Uuofar as Ibdr attention is by tbcir imdncts; all inrellipnce
and habit 15 to th4! £ol1Sllllllll4'\don nfinmncL
In one 3er.l!e. though, Bergson's view is the opposi((! to SChopenhauet"s, as
he says not only that instincrual conK1oumea must inteUigent COD-
sciousneu. but that insWu:t. :l kind of aa to mll. Wtth this
notion of 'adequacy' BeI:JllOIl ls col'lJcio\dty barting blw:k to the
model of <inleneauaI intuition' ourliDed in llellenteenth-antury nu:ionaliam.
Insdna: suddenly $tartS to appeal' as mof)$trous, M a
kind of'knowledge' that dwarit lnteRig.mt We come nowto the
centre of &rgson's theory ofi:wtirn:;t.
The Wasp's Sympathy for the Caterpillar
The argumem proceeds, perhaps :already fatally, Via lUl analogy with memory.
'Ls h not plain th:n life 80eI to work here euct1}' like consctoU5lJCSIS, exactly
li.ke 1lliml000' (Bergson 1907: 167)? Consider buman memory; 'we trail bdtind
us, UDlIWlUeI, the wbole of our pa&l; but OW' memory poun mm the preKlit
only tht: odd r«01kction two that in lOme way complete our present situa-
tion' (ibid.). WI.(h instinaive knowledge, it is the same: 'It L'l imtx*ih1e to
lIO.lfle ofme special ituUnctll ofthe animal and 01the plant, evidently
ar1llen in ell:l:I'".aOI'dinary clrCUJl'lStiUlces, ..Jtt 1JJlIu 1fIColltctimu,
UIIUt;A V/J under tIt4".,.. ofan nM4
(ibid,; iLalli:: added). There is thus an 'inner history' of nature, a petllpCdive of
'lWUce fromwithin', which parallels the i.1winctual patterns; The
b1ll'ldiOflter3n seems to bave ltOme IlOl't of 'organic memory' (.19), whereby it
am in tht' form of an image, another pbyletic line. Under it
u.rgemneed', budnet can regre!lfl to a tommotl arthropodkform,
shared vt.idt m. pot.ential 'ricdm, and intuit the arwomioJ location Df the
laaL'r'fI motor pngia. If the AmfllDfJAilt.l know'!! bow to isolate the appropriate
gaqglJa in it$ Yidim, that i3 be(aUle It am somehow 'idencify' with itll victim.
Admittedly, h. but a very little 01 that force. what CWlCcrllS iUlelf;
but at leatlt it &seems it from wixhin, quite otherwise than by a process of
- by an intuition (liwd dum whim i6 probabiy
like what·we call dmning sympamy' (ibid.: 115). We must 'suppose a
On the etymOlogica1l1e'llJe of the word) betwl:en the and its Dctim,
whidt teaches it from within, liO to say, <'bl'KemiDg the vulnerability of the:'
This feeling of 1IUl.nerab'ility mighl 0'/lI!: nothing 10 oulWlU'd per-
ception, but l"t':5ult from the mere pretence mgether of the and the
carerpillar, J;(;nooered no organimls, but as l:wO lU:tivirles. It
would expreu, in a COOCrete form. the or the one m tht: Qw.er'
(Be.rpon 1901: t7!-4).
it anot jWlt that a pure mtuitive c;o115cioumeu is attributable to all of
lire. With Bergson's thtmy of inmrKt, enter int<> an (Of. m.:
precisely, pamll!!)} universe. It isruled by the order of the Hymenoptera. Like'
\luJmUl some of bymenoprera are IlOrial. but $Orne art" .,
solitary. ba'-<e Q.eveloped a form of no<
with othef'$ of dleir own l!pecies, but with other spociei in the arthropod
k1ngdom. like t1lf: able 1:0 diMem me ebn vital 'from
within, .. bran innntWn (tiv#dratber ihlUl (175). They-commu·
nicate by recollecting. in the moment of 'urgent ilPpeallng ro their
extremely intuition. the1£' phylogenetic communitY with their
1"his Unot governed by the la."''ll of but depends ()1l an
memMY' ofwe phvlogenedc pll'(. We ro be in 3. uruvene Utterly unlike
our own, willch recQgni.ze$no known physical Qr moral laws, where the wasp
wid the CiIll.trp111ar stage' 2 weird and in which one enter, into
'sympathy" with the oilier and ptOl;te&to tQnure them.llergson talks of
in5Un(:t d!I a 'm_al them¢'. but 'it 18 obviowly diffiroh to epvi.s3ge the aeru·
ality <l( th6 mmic:d theme, it rael plat;e W'itbm the current of pure
duration, without any spatial backdrop. On Bergson'$ Wory. thi5
order of: the hueCt does not inhabit a different world from
Human order it inhahit$ Ute same world .UBftC«
the gothic bt:a:uty ot' nightmarl&b a.nd florid vi&ion of.
sympathy, the argumenG in im faYOur would appear to be
dis.peUed, Berg'llOD ugWtlg :hal: thls frenDed ..esaon (in the face of 'the
pressure ti u.rgem l1e'td') a di'linatorr intWtiun of lil reoollected,
common pa.'lt. And the less inrelliga\.t web an et'IOrt. the bettcT. Thl$
'I.'p erowiey'. remark dW. 'alI dlv'nadon raembles an
attt':lPpt by a tnllfl oorn blind 10 obtain sight by gf:uing blind drunk' {Crowley
J912: 1i. 'The idnoflil. sympathy 'within the Wuml' weI! is au occult
idea. Lor(m" and ida cert:ainIy reqWI!lI fewer aaumptiotl5:
hutinct ii an evolved mecbanifmfor sele(:ting certain patterns in tbt enviro!i,
ment, which • 15e!'Ve 3$ a for the release of a ()/
Ruyer's Defence of Bergson's Theory of Jm1inct
But pel'bap5 lU'e oth« waY' of e'lrplain.lnl Betg8(ll1'S theory. One d
lbymotldRuyf'fs aimt in his an:icIe on ;;beory of instinct ('8efpon «-
if: Spun 1959) is m .bow that theory is oomp:atible
'WWt <tthologr. R.uyt''' ingeniously awUs the full implKatimu of theory
when dail'm that 8erp;)Jt bas mlIoI!e anocber t'rror ill choosing the wrong
ex.ampt.e _the lMlincts of wasps to acro!lIl his point. He should
not hlwe refttredtn !he 'Ilo1lI:'Ip and me but ttl 1M .-.m itt
human betnS'. lmoling Fabre's <kscripdon of the wa:lfI and the t;::&Wtpillat,
Royer wrlteli dW: in the young bwna.n ro.aJe'i 6nt ofse'J:.
u If he bad known - bd<'1f1e haW'rg oonJUlu::d allY 1ttatise' - the
anatomy. or the the oq;ant of tht: man and \be womatl'.
E..-ecyiliing bappesu M if the hll.l1W1 \lIIho iniWite8 sex knew in advance what to
do, Without havi"f it (Ruyer 166), The acnlaliz:atioo of (he
institlct, lnerefQR, 1$ a perfett cDmple of a }i,'ld of C'olOCiousl'1eSS whkh is dif·
fefetu in land to intelligent oowdomness, md in which 'reprelICIltaJioa
swpped up by li£6on' Sesuai involvn the of repre-
setllauOI1lU coIl.llciQusneu, and ,.an thUl be deocribed as ;onmambuli,ltk1.
Ruy-er daims tD:ar me 'decisi:Ye argumem' il purely mechankal ...i.ew
of iNrl'lc;t isfu.m.idled, '';IS Bergson had see» perfectly' by 'the equivalence'
het.ween inltinct and orpnillaOOl1' {In). Why llhouki ..hi:! be? Berp:m's wg.
g-adon tbau is ::. l:'onrin:uation of orplll1.:ui1:m seems, uf quite
neuttal about Wbat kino of p}umomenon innina is. In50m:t can be said to
C'A)Rtinl1e th!' work ()/ otp'li.tarlon inpt the same all an3.lOlY1ical smK'-
rut'... th,. work uf the But mil; Is an view, In fact, what
is it to:say that mstinet is eM ,:onrlnuation of orpniwion other than to ll8V
thllt arunnctli Come into being through dIe process of in other
words. if we Me to w'lIkl:llUlnd imrl"lct, then we mlJ$t undenomd it as a funn
or onrogenw. The key tD the 'competence' Or 'virtual power' eshlbhed in
instinct In Ruyer notts that apptal to the
notiomof'capaelty', 'competencc', 'YirtuaI power' and'potl:ntiafity', Wbelher
one Liles tl Qr nrn:. he these do rIot mean anydling if mer do not
imply lOme sort of knowledge, and that. fUrther, implies IlOft of (;011.-
1Ci000lleil5. n1'u5 not: on1v IS instmc' oomciow, but 50 is the embrYo. Thlt'
elllbryo hall 11 power. 'The unicellUlar entity has neither nor
eyes. It neW!rth<"les& fomu pseudopods, a. mouth. a stumach, and it <:xcretes.
An egg.. an embryo in its initial lItage, act! like auniCellular entlty, Ir defortlW
iuelhrim regard 1.0 its overall form' (Rufer 1988: 25). Ruyer I'mIb:s much ..
petb.,. tQO I1lU1:h - of the self-o:rganwng propen.ie:& ()f the embryo.
Even before Berpon's CmJtiw the fotU$ of bi(OOgy had
to embryology with HaM in the 18'90s, wMcb
that the embf}'O had allODi$hing seU:.organizing propertiel, It WiIlb
discO'l'ered that it i$ pos.-.ible to rran:;plant of an embryoand graft it Ollfn
.. simibtt' embryo, where it will bt- lmlMpO>-<1wi into iUl The
embryonic can undergo d.ra&W: and yet umr«owr
fully. DrletlCb ifone out me
of the egg of a sea Ul'clUn. each WDUId develop into <:omplete 1.aJ:vae. albeit in
dwamd form. tha no spedat
regions in the egg that gMt rise' to special organs.. "The relariw- poilirion of a
blastomere in the whole detmJlirles in geneml what dt:\IeIop! from it: if its
pniiOOn be dr.mied. it giva rife ll) something diffetent. In othex WQtdls. its
prO!lpec;tive value ua function ofi15 (quoted in 1056).
Dries!:h's 00 the prim.xy of llpati«cmparal relatiotu in
elJis, ali weU WI oblern.tiQll:$ of the embryo's appa.tl:'nt ability to
the conditions of tr'amplantWon are both fU1\dlQN':nw fbf' '£bit
seH'-orp,nUing powelll of the embryo rnabe it trnpt»llible not to attribute rome
furm at to it, It it a fundamental be saylI, to devel-
opmen1 to the tmfolding of a gcnetk programme. Ob!lef1le the embryo when
it i.s disp1lv:oo to another by tmrltlptannuion. it imper·
turbably the work. it has begun. do not tbmlr: thai T.hill. indicat.es it lI. a mere
It !eem.'\ uncon-lciow or 'dilltracb:!d' in II: tallk become :abl..urd
it is intensely oomclous af tl,i.$ t:a.tlk.. It with men ardour
mat it appean to be a robot. A prodlgioU5 cak:uJaw. an elec·
tronic calculator .. Neverthele5li, it hal moved to'h"Md right
answer. where an adding machine simply functions ..• It Ieelns 'distraaed'
because it caun¢t be dist.J:a(:ted. It seems unt:(d'lsc;ioull bean:rllIe iJ. is cOnsOO\1S
of what it dDe'I and ofnofning ellle. (Ruyer 198& 21)
The embryo- has a cOll!lCioume!l!f, but it ill likt; the coDlltioUllnestl of an arrist
absorbed in his work. If it to have die efficiency ofII: machine, which
nm be lifted up and taken ebe while still c<mtinuing iii per-
formance, that is not it rea1ly is a machine, but bec.wse it is so very
InlAy. 'It does not see U$ it does not speak to Wi - and fur li pid reasoo.
8mneither doe& a very busy crafim:lan, II: painteT or a malhematldan who ill
quite communicate with children who watch him or even with his
own 'Wife and children' (ibid.: 25). Ruy<'r that ll.n artist is 10it in his
Wl)rk, but then corretts him$elf: 'not lQlit. but he identifies himself
with the very form of this work being U'3RSf'ormed by hill bands and befure
(ibid.). We are reminded of Bergson'! analogy of instinct'll.a1 know·
ledge wifh the ofme :mist to identifywith hit object (Bergson 1907:
1'17, see next se<:don) , The embryo and tMartist share the same intrnse con·
tdoumeu, in which there :is no space for reflective oonsdowmClll {if NCb is
that ill} 'because ofthe very adequacy of aclto id<:a. UnitA:1l in their
the embryo and the aJ'tillt Rem to be the two- poleli of pure con-
:\ciOU$1eM, the alpha and omega of cotisdOU$ness.
0ek:u2e agrees widl Ruyer wt developmentallllD'llewcnts are: •liuittJ. by the
embryo' and that It and
(DR. 249; itafu: added). uthe primarrwave of3CnWiration for
liring heinp, and in that respect if no other. 'the world ill, an egg' (DR
Unlik.e Freud and his fo1lowen, he rejecu Ha.ecke!'s recapitulationimJ and
affirms lite more strongly epigeneUr: theocy put forward by Von Bacr, wh6.
De.leuze says, 'mowed that m embryo not reproduce ana:w-al aduk
fonm belonging to other species. but experiences nr undergoo SWl:s
and undertakes movemeou; which lIIe nOl \liable for the but go beyond
the limits of the lIpecK'1l, getlm. order or class, and.can be SU&iained onlyby the
embl"W) iudf, UJKkr the (Qndidom ofembryonic liU:' CUR 249).
Oeleuze does not.e:x:pikWy affirm Ruyer'lI embryulogiad model of
behariatJr. 'The fact is that be tflu more toward$ position. which
me emtence of a virtual jpecielr. In 4MRitp-
etititm iuelf, he appeals ,0 embryology fur resources to help clarify me
tiotemporal variation whkh is capablC' of undergoing. 'Embrr-
ology already lruth that there lIIC $'jl$temaric mal
toniol'l$ and drifts. that ordv the embryo can gWlEain: an adult would be rom
apun by them. 'There :i'JJ"e for which one can only be a patiem. but
the patient in tum can onlybe a!arvn' (OR 118). The model of
i& being wed to demonstrate lhe spariotelDpOnl <:Ofl!Ittainta on
coMciou&neM. The correlative in an adult ofemhryo1ogia.l 'experience' ill the
nigbtm:lU"e: 'A nightmare is perhaps a (l!S'FChk dymunis:m rhat could be SU$-
tained neither awake 'RbT el.Ilm mt.fnI.:ms, but only in profound sleep, ina dT'e8Jtl-
less sleep' (DR 118).
Imtincmal Consciousneas
Is it possible to explaln lkrgllon's theory of instinct more minimally as a
acterizarion of 11 of cOmOoumes& with specific spanou:mporal
Perhaps thk would allow us to tum the question about the
heritability of insrinct. Why not take Bergson's smning point to be, as in the
Eutrj OJ( W Dot4 the irltlImial reladon of coosciOU&-
neu to dur.ttion? Let us lltart with an point du.mtion cannot
be articulated by the and yet is mnsciotw. 1'here thus exists
another cognitive faculty. inmidon, intelligen(e. Intuition, Bergson
clabnll, is the kind of cognition. 'We uae in nofi-intellectual aca of oon:tclOU.
nCR, such as sympathy. or aesdleti<: appreciation and -creation. For in&Wlce. a
fundamental feature of artistic is its effun to 'get WIde' me
that it depict:! (8eTgllon 1907: 177). There is an 'animism' which anbe found
in an: furms (although a Berg1on.ian would haft' to look bard to find it in
villUal ut}. The artiat ant!mpti to pup 'the intention oflifl!!, the
simple movement that runs through me lin.e3, that bind. them together and
gives them - in other wonk., to IDe delcriptiOIlll. paints
and fot'ms dlat render the WIpe ofthe thingdr;pK\ed.. He or she develops tIW
power by 'placing himselfbedr. within the obje<:t by a kind ofsympathy' (ibid.).
Perhaps, then, u ill possible to read 8ergllon as infening from intuition II.>
imotinCt in animals. In &his <::Me, he would be arguing ilOmething He
would be claiming. at IlIl:lM, W1 ifthere wma consd.ousne6l in animl!lI&. lhen
jt would not look like but
If one adds In llUppOrt the arpment, in the 'Inmxluction to Metaphysk.'.s' of
1903, to the e.t'kt:t that the of duration 'aIIoM one- to pal!lIl beyond
kl.ealitm 1& well :.l.'I realillm, to affirm the ew.:immet! of inferior and
lIUperj<Jt to w, though nevenhe1ess in a cermin !le.nlIe inrerior wUll, to m.a.k.e
them without difficulty' 184; t:ran.s. modified). then
Bergson's line of thought doer; not seem quite ilO improbable.
8erg!on's definition ofintuilion at 'irJ.uiDet that hall become
self-conscious, capaNe of reflecting upon its (176) mUll tbtte£ore be
reYersed to reveal its true meaning: inltinct ill. intuition become O'lIet'Whelm«l
66 67
with mterest. We do not knowwhat pure inilOll.ctual emw:ioumeu is .like.
Aesthetic: ill nOt really 'instinctual', predse]y becawe it {;.lW
apply the intuitional :IlW<k ofapprehemion to tmyobject. The anmmlk powc:r
pf sympathy can take anything as its object. mU$l thws be iVg\l1ng
from the in the c.;ue d hwnan innrition, back to an intuitional
specdicil:f that would be proper to InstinCt in non-intellectual living beings.
if One it! prepoued 10 make thai: irlrenmce. then one may further wer that in
aesthetic or fOmoti.l:maJ intulOOn 'we in ourseives - though Wider a
much wgtWT fhrm. and one t()() muC"h penelrated. with intelligence - lKlme-
thing ofwhat mUSl happen in the c()nsciousnesli ofan insect aL:ting bv instinct'
'I'his app1'OaCb b;u the benefit of a conception of instincmal
!hat leads Ull OUt of the domain of occult biology, With the SQmnambulist
model of di$SO(iation in mind, a speciclHlpecific instinctual consciousness eatI
be: hypothnized, in which each would 'fulfil it5e1f bV realizing a
e1tlJltmg schema in an external image. The biologiad origins of the instinct
.md it« triggering stimuli <:wld be accounted EMin the mechankal
way described by Lorenz. What would be addedW<'JUld be:an In'educib1e, 'tran-
scendental' synthem of When it is nOt occupied with rudimentarY
furma of adaptation; animal COnsciOOllle. would 'be the 'single-
minded' wmcioU$l\e.u that necelllmily attends ·imDnct The animal is a.
temporal being, ioiith a IICIlSe' of duration, but itt 1Crnrxmd experience is
moulded by the primQtdial form When II 'JigD:d {an Innate
Ire-iIISM«hani&m ((LV)) light! up in thr environment, the anil:nal knows
what it ha5 to do, It u th4i $ipal which. must be folJO'M:d up and enpged with,
a.ru:i no oti'Hrr, The animal who to COUIUhip by pairing off
mon.ogammmy and the child who tb t.1uIl fate are both captured by a
COi\Qngc:m in the emiromneIu wb)ch nm:ttbeles$ appem 04 ifit Iuu
lwa thcnl, The bearer of D t:.ndlanred,
by the sign:m. whicb they and which acliwre tht:i:r
behaYk>w'. Ioepa.r:mon of inu!iligent OOI'lildOUlmeR from instinctual 000'
Kioumesi w modificarkm of an original temporal of 000'
the n:1Orf; mr.e_nt the. more mmncwal
would be expcrien<;ed as a 'rnpmre' in the mccelltOOn of tin.'t.e,
in a pri.rmu'y di'lSOC:iabon. This pnuaJ fu:1d of
<;m nn'ef be but there D no
reason why il: should be roJed out.
ID this way WI!' {;.lW also maU !lerlIe of Berpm'i quasi-me060pbkal mgges.
tion that the brain lIhould he "IIiewtd a1 a for £oJ'lKiowmcss, which can
be rendered more lnktligibk by di8Unguishing empiricaJ. and tran.
scende'nw of owaty.m;. bw:in<t ill the mOllt 'in'mlute<l' form of intuition
in the M::DSC that Kit the mQII! 'mglt:-mindcd' rorm of JIOISibie COllliCtoUSnell5.
inwitiOft 11 th.e most 'evolYed' form of wdnet, as it::li
fiberat:.i.oD is only poulNe by the evolution. mer milliomof yem, of the
brain all
The rationalists too had lheiT 'third kind of dl-e under-
standing, their obscure methods of which already indicate that the
intuition they have in mind is nOL exact1v 'inrelkcroal'. Moro;(wu, thdli:: tVpelI
of cognition did. not dl$appear in post-Kantian modernity, it !sl'lM:ber their
5paces were mapped rlgoroWlIy" Bant, for insr.ance, the $pe:ci.tk
power of withoutseruiible wtuin()nll) :and
aesthetic ldeti (intuitions withmtt empirical concepbJ, Schelling
reintroduced mythical dliJIl;;ing md even 'cl.ai.noy.lmce', Perhaps
(';ontlciousnell!l is the baiJ for a. higher type of without which
intelligent COnsdl'USne5$ remains
How to Love the M.a:rvellom
it may be that Berg90n'5 text each of tbe:!e of the
'theory of insum:t. It might appear that Ioven of the would be best
adviKd to rdy on the last interpretarioo, but ;t is n-ore than p<*ible that
D<:&e'Ul-t' would have diilalJ"eed, Cen.ain k.ey m seem to rely
.IF:avily on theory fif imUnct _ Ii ·divining sympathy' - albeit cir-
S;tJ,mllpectly. Duri.ns Deleuz.e·s of Bergson', while be i:.s
6pOunding the llotiOO that involie& the a.etuaJJzation of
that £oemt m mmy of the footnok.ll refer hack to IJ.erg!on'$
reXlll Oft tnstlnc;t fa 100-4)• .Alth<mgh :inadnet. is on}y mentioned once in the
main teXt ofthC!Jie (ibi,(L J(3), if. is !:hat these pages make a lot
d senile withOUt some referen« to f5.erpm'! imUoa theory. Dting the
where IWrpon lila}'!> that goet (D work like consdou$1leu :and
memory' cut off from 10. latent 'save at one 01' twO polntli that are
ofvital l;OttCenl to the jUllt anlefi'. a foomote mggesting
(00t "theM! ptnmJ €ounpond kJ the outmnding pointli mat became detaChed
Q1: [organic Each line of differentiarlon or acroallsation
thus comtiwces il 'plan(C (plan) of that ta.ke6 up again in its own way a
vinu3l !lI&:tion Or level' How this analogy with memorv (with its
'dominant rcrollec.tioJl$') is mpposed to work. given mat the 'mem';ry' of ev0-
lution is located in the gene, is mysU!rioos.
IfDeleuu'$ biologkal a.pt>lication of the notion of \lirtualit¥ reSt\ quiedyon
an of Bergson'lI theory of lnJtin<:I, then this throws !lOme today's
appropriations of Deleuz.e'li 'biology of the -,irtu:d' into Can Ofte
defend the bialogkal significance of me viltual without appealing to thd
notion of instirn:.1.? It remairt& the <:ase, though, that did not exp1iddy
defend the strong intnpretalion of.Berp:m'$ mmnct theory in 'all iuglory. In
itself, the to lmtin<:t arc to the In
Instincts and fl'f,Stttutit.wlJ. where the thecrr nf droning 1I'¥Mpadly ii b2rder to
ignore. it is presenreo wtlboul a ddenc," from Delewe himsel£,
Perbapa nOI mren the Ql the man"elloUl ,oukt the monc \'enIDn 01
Berg!on'5 theory, In 1961. al the end of tbt! :9Gmnambull,tk
iI'l hill life, Deleure pubfulhed what 'IJIIla to be hiB fl.n;U reO«tion on the notion
of 1mtinct.. outside of the theory ot the 'death imtinct' in DifJmma and &:pm-
Ifm1; his Jungian f1mta1>la 'From to MDxhhim', De&am:'1
rdle<:dons on i.rlstim:t to another !oYerof the milt\'eDo'Wl. C. G. Jung. Thi5
anicle conr.ains an affirmation ofjung's modification of nobon ol
instinct. the theory of lll:'dlcty(:lell. Berpon it. not explicidy mentioned, but it
seems DeJeme is appeallng to thejungian dleory DC BTChet)'PCfi in order
CO the biological-component of the &rgsonian unWnKloUll.
Olapter 3
Deleuze and thejungian Unconscious
At the end of hi$ 'tomnambulistic' period (1953-61), :oeleWJe published his
anicle 'FromSacher-Masoch to Masochimt', which contll.in.a a. description and
an endonemern of a new theory of instir.ld., this time directly from
C. G.lung: .In3t.incts are limply mtem.al pereeption.s oforigl.nallmagell, appre-
hended in their own place M oit tUn smrt1 in layen of variable
depth in the uncorulciaus (1ft dt (8M I!U). 'T'his
statement i$ a of a paa.uge in Jung'! 'Instinct and the
Unconsdous', in London in 1919, In this lectureJung is to be foond
explicitly elaborating Berpon's theory ofilwinct. Indeed, Jung'lI tint WIe of
the concept of the out of anlntel"pt'elalion of thb Bergson'
ian theory. We alight upon one of a nwnber af n2.tUI'a1 roU15 bom Bergson-
i$m towardsJungianWn, helping to give un:eUlaibifuy to D.eJeuu's afBrmarion
ofJungianWn in me 19tH article} Onu It R seen that 'W'U, at 1ft'Jt al
one point in his philosopbkal career, a Jungian, b..ill problems witb Freud
become ;as does his who.k! theory of the W1COmcioUl.
1J.e}em,e turnll
to Jung pa.rdy in order to develop Bergson's weird wmnambu.lilltic
notion of instinCL ButJung'! nolioo of archetype will a150 provide him with a
!lUpponfur a. development of the new theory of wnsciot.lMleSll and cogn'ition.
derived from Kant. that i6\ presented in amI But in 3ddiuon
it should be remembered that Delel.l7.e boepn his career with one fool in tilt'
esoceril: mdition, and had already i.nheri.ted symbolist tendencies &om there.
Underground crouoven berweenJungianism :and occulliamwent on through-
out the twentieth century (c£. 1964; £..aDage 19'78}; bul it 'IJIIla un.usual
for a philosopher to pursue mem.
In what foIl.l:rM; we will try to undel:"!lRlld in more deWl why Deleuze
toJWJg'3 theQt)' of the Ul1(;QJUICi(lUll. Although Dclewc only aplK:-
itly aflir:m& Jung'. theory of the aN:betypal uncon&ciow in one reWivcly
obscure text fu>m 1961, Jungianism rontinues to shape his theory of the
unconsciouli right up to 1JfjJemIu ,,'ltd If Dekuu:'s work on
masochilml began as Jungian and lI<'aS explicitly 'depth p6Y(:hological', this
approach was aurled over to mid In a 'Note for the Italian
Edition of ¥ '?fSmse' (1976), DdcU2e says;
my book D1flm:ttt:t and R.tpditicn . , . aBplred to a cla.ssiGa! elevation at the
Arne time aa to :an an:b.aic depth. The sketch I ofa theory of Ul.teJUity
70 71
WB& marked by a depth. whether it w.a.'l U'Uf' Of £aI5e: intensity was
rising (rorn the depths , , , In ¥ of &-, however, the novelty for me
conu.ued in taking things from the surface. The notions remained the same:
'mulriplidl'y', 'singularity', 'U1u-nnty', 'event', 'infinite" 'problems'. 'para.
doxes' :and 'proportions' - but according to this dimension.
lTRM 65)
Anyone who has seriouslytried to a.cOOJ'llJIlOdate Delewe' S$WL'JJleTlts aboul the
WlconsciOI15 in Diffnma rJml with Freudianism will ha"-e realized that
the twojuIIt dan't fit. Putjwlgianism, in ;ill it!! archaic depth'. mto the equation,
and SOD'\(" illwninatiOl'l fin2Dy O<airS. However, it aJSO:5eefIU dear that Deleuze's
path to a theo,,¥ of the \lMonsaous was fairly rorruous; we will see in this
chapter how he brings "oom a 'Kantian-::Jungian liVJlthesis. -.round the
notion of 'UlKonscious Ideas'; in the fuIlowing chapter, we move from Jung's
notion of the symbol through to Kant's account of symbolism and beyond.
Airer 1%1 a flocad of publicatiQJl$ emerges from Deleuzc's hand <m
numerous subjects: the 40mnambulistk years are over. Delettze will go 00 to
excise aU explicit reference w jung in hi! later of masochism. and
when he ti.Ilb about archetypell and primordial images in Prowt a1Id Sigru
(19M), be will ornitJung's mune, It inappropriate, however, to talk of these
influences aI if they were 'skelewus. in the cupboard', In his 1993
'1b Hav-e Done with the Judgment of God', Ddt'uz(: remarks that all me
who carry on mthe tM:ntieth century Spinoza', aturnpt to criticize all
notions of 'judgement' (i.c. Nietzsche, Artaud, Lawrence and Kafka) 'could be
called !JYrn1xilists' (CC 134). Deleuze remams a 5YJIIbolist phi103opher. and. as
we will see in chapter 4, he' even devclopll a symbolist. con,eption of the un-
consciotl$. His popularity as a philosopher Mguably still rem on his adept
manipulations of symbols. Oelt'n1wrialization, nomadi:sm, de$iring-machine$,
smoom space. bodies withom organs. rhimmes: these conc:epal are also
symbols, and dtey can often just function as symbols.
Jung, Psychosis and the "fraruifonnation of Libido
Keeping in mind the points where the fracture between Freudian 'p$yCh<..,
analysis' andJungian 'analytical fint occurred wiD help orientate
U! in what fo1loM.. Ai Ylo-e have Been Ddeuze was not coming from a Freudian
background at a.l1. Deleu.ze will about jung arret having explored Hunte.
Berpm, Malinowski and the theory of instincts, along 'With esolericism; there
;n--e- no traces of interest in Freud. dellpi(e - OT, why noL. perhaps beatT&e of -
the o\l('rwhebning inte«:tt: in sexuallOYt: ill his earliest writings (cf.
con of Woman' from 1945; see Faulkner 2002 fOJ context), Other traditions
of thoughl about sexuality and the unconsciQUS appear to have been more
alive in than they were and Me tocl..-y. Paradoxically.
therefore, it b Deleuze's embrace ofJungianism that gives us dle dues to the
Qrigimof Deleu.ze', ideas about Freud and
For a of yean before srneeting FreudJung bad been W<lrking :at tht'
l:af'gest mental hOipital inSwitzerland. where his patientll were nmsdy working-
class psychotics. In 1907 he cemented his friendship and collaboration ...-ith
Freud by presenting bimwith his o{lJern.enli4 (1906), in which
he applied Freud's ofrepre!$ion, substirotion and displacement, md
compeIUatOry wish-fulfilment fO the flight of ideas in schi7.ophrenia. Jung
refused to follow Freud the whole way regarding sexu.<&l aetiology of psy--
chQplubology. Followinga period ofintense colh\boration wirh Freud over the
next few became deeply in the SOldy of mythology and
began to become C'<lminced mal jjQsrne ofbis psycllotic patients' fmwie! and
deliria contained mythological.rllOtffi which could tWt be explained in tImns
of In the meantime, hi$ dissatisfaaion with Freud's conap-
lion oClibido began tQ The initial disagreement 'between freud and
Jung blew up when i!8ucs converged at one point, i,l!'w tht:!leXUlIIit:y (If
In 191L Freud had attempted to further e.ucnd the rea<-h of psydwanalysis
by applying !lID a <::il&e of paranoid plYChosill, in his famouS :maIym ofJudge
&hITher's of My NervmJ.s /UJw.{f. This w.lS to be a cruria.I resl case fur
psychoanalysis: could a serious psychotic illness be explained. as neuroses had
been by Freud, strictly in terms of ileXl.l3l a.edo1ogy? In his EsJa,s om tM
Thwry Frwd had argued thal p8lIChoneuroses tnvariabJy involved
a 'regrclIIiQn' of libido bl«:k into earlier. infantile organWltiOOil of me libido,
Libido lurl be<:ome 'd3.lnlnM-up'. inici2lly due to present lack of SW::Ce$$ in
finding :it. suitable Dammed up libido h3lI no choice but to flow
bad along older, earlier channels 'upstream'.' In the !ace of a current lack of
outlet, it H,:turlU to any strong fixations it had developed at an earlier- infantile
libidinal stage. Sexuality has a p«uliar ,taIU'l in the process of org;u:tk devel-
opment whigber- animals, beca.us¢ its organic function is kept 'ill reserve'
until pubert,., unlike the ego-driYes, which develop contirwowly from birth:
it is thus left 1.0 its own deYice&, as it were, and occupies iuelfwith
satisfaction, based around fanmsy-activiry (SE 12: 222}. strong fixa-
tions at early sexual stages are possible, thus providing esr.ablished channels
for any hDldo that is repressed when the organic fwu:tion of sexuality is set in
motion in puberty, Fixations at oral and anal sl3go can become in
thi8 way. iniUating a variety of compensating neurQtU: behaviours (neumm as
the 'uep.dw: ofpervel"Sioo'). Freud'$ abou1libldo permits mm ti)
identify and articulate- early sexual stage&in the dliJd on the of
ob5ervadons of neurotic!. He admil5 that no amount of obser\l3tion of
children am lcll WI about what goes on in the posOl!ated ani and anallltap
of 5e1tU2lity. We t:all really only read me pgychic dmracter of these'stages back.
!t()JIl their in adult neuroocs.
In bib analysis of &.hrcber. Freud attempts to extend this modd to p6yChOAis
bY developing funhu hBaccount of me sexual 3taga He a
further Magt:. on the threshold of the transfurmation ofautoerotism to object-
comeJ i. time in the development oftbe iruiiYidual at which he unifies
hi&wexuaI drivef (which hitherto l!npgedIn aUl(H:conCactivities}
in order to obtain It and be begins by taking himself a.'l his own
lind only subsequendy proceeds from thb to tb.e choke <If3ODlt'
penon other than himldf III his- OQjecL (SF. 12: 60-1)
Freud I.his 'l'llU'CiJDU.m' •al:though be doei not dcw:lop hill views on
lhis until he 1$ forced into doing $0 byJung'JI critique:. What i'rel.ld is
COftu:med with here \$ the of a stage after n.a:rcissism, m whicl:1 the
md&idual moves 10 'the choice of m enemal with !limila£ gmiWs' In
Older to (l')()Ve from homosexual to a
of ll\exual and aim n:nut ()i(:C11S. All far III the aimis c.oncmned, hoIltOfll!X-
oat libido can becQme atIached to the and mUll channel irself uuo
'1QQa.I drivf:$, thtl$ contribul.ingan erotic fActor' to fritruWlip and romnuleship
, , , and to the love of mankind in genual'. This is an euential component of
the move to paranoid Freud mggem,
the fllllure of predpitates an imm«:di:ale
back to the botl'lOlleXWl.l (ta which the patient must abo
be dispoed, due to OOfIllIintlicm or early fixation). thm the social
drives. hl order to protect hiJrJs,e1f from thu Influx of homoteJWallibido, the
indi\idual 'detaches hlm&df' from 'the p<:Qp1e in his environment and che
external which predpiwes a further regreseion bad to w
immediatdy pre.::eding of rum:iatism.; '1M libido becomes.
auaehed to the e,o, and 15 tllled far the aggrandiument of the ego' Of mega-
lomania (SF: 12: 71, 70, '1t). ParanoilM: delusiolu are explained by Freud a& a
distorted attempt to return to the e:xremal world after perlOO of .narciAi\J.
tic Of, in Schrebcrian terms, ... the 'end of the 'World'. Afrtrr
explained par.mOOi, Freud 00 to roggest that in Khiltophrerna.
'tbf'c regressirnJ. extends not merely to . . . but to a complete
abandonmemof the otriea-Io¥e :and a l'ewm «() infantile aut.o-efQtism' (Sf:, 12.
77). liallucinat:ion$ and deliri2 in are Iikcwise pl'(lducu of the
attempt at:l 'reoon!t:nJction' ofrealil.y.
Freud strniPt awa.y oonfeued doubt about his own full( a 'With-
drawal of libido WllIlNffident to effect a. psychotic 'end of the world'. He 8ll'lJ\'
that if psJrll_, whkh In:roIves a radic:a1 breakd.own of the padent's relaOOll
to w;u co be e:xpbined in. this way, thai: would imply that the ego, the
agent responsible for .a rdaOOr.t to iuel! a1n::ady
on the presence of libido in order co function, And thi8 would
m.eDl the wIlapse of Freud's distinaion in kind between ego- and libidinal
proceti4leS, the reality and pleamre prim:ip1es. There were ftWU ways OUt: one,
W YentuTe that 'what we call of the libido (interest from erotic
source&) cQincidea with un.erest In peral' (Sf. 74: in CW B: 126);
thi& outcome would .tlgnify fallure toT Freud. as. idea thill piychoals might'
have specifically sexual uriolosr be refuted. The was to
boldly claim that the con.stit.udan of rt\lldilv bv me e was indeed df«ted
some of libido in im fully sex.u.al serute.
Freud proceeded to
the latter parh in hii 1914 paper on na.J."Ci!sislTl, where be {()I" me
existence of an o'ligimd which puts out i19 e:athex,e, onto 'f)l:!ject-
Hbido',6 JWlg the mher alternative we mentioned: the eoDetpt of
libido iuelf must be ttAinclude energy,
G1UI of tIu LWido W3.8 published in two parts m 1911
and 1912 and marked lung's- &eceuion ftomFreudian In it
roruendm apinBt the tatle'r alwrmt.t:iw mat 'reality is nOl undemood to
bP: II function' (fJ# B: 128). He ff'l:oiled from the idea that the '5e1Ue
of nl'Jility' wu gl:ner.ned from wlthin a purely For one thing.
'if that were 110, the IDtroVeniion of libido in the l'll:ria IenJe tnU$l as a
ft:8Uit the 10. of reality in the and, mdl!ed. a loa which could be
oompared witlt that of daIlefitiapraecQ'l', delIpke their inhibitions,
symptoms and anxieties, lllill have ;3 fum, pemap only
Mn «'reali,y'
jungbegins his otlUi theory oflibido with an atW:k on Freud:,
concept of in&.ntire and an argument fot a. disdnct or
'vegeta.tive' phlilM:' of Uhldo. prior to its ttan.sfonnation into iie:ltUality (ON B;
129; CW 102-11). He had theory of i.n&nft1e sexuatity from
the beginning (CWa; 4). WJU)e be rerognized the imponance ofscxu&tit¥ for
ado1escence and :mat.U1ity, and their be rejfiacd the
way Freud cha.raa.e.ri..r.ed the dmtes and pleasm-a of die inb.nt in tenns of
anaL oral and genital !leXl1aIity, It is indeed endem that the i.nfml geu
from the whole array of exprCMiomuf indud-
mg the oral drive in for i.nstan.re. It i!. aDo e'i'ident the
m&nt gf!fS pleasure from sucking al the brea6t. But jUllt because me infant
maDf wayi ofobtaining pleasure m:...m the: ofits sexua.1libido does
not mean that the pleasure the inf'ant &'fllI from sucking the breast is abo
\lexuat It ill. a pure co that sexwU libido is already at wom in
the iludduC of the breast. But if this amnot be proven, then one ;houJ.d not
aIU!mpt to mAle die illsue by alm.ply redefining plcuurl'J as aexuaI plealu:re. We
shOuld thUll drawbtckfromassuming that the .exual dri'Ieill preent fromme
first. fOl me dnld. It. could be thai. rhe pleasure of tueldng ar: the breMt relilly
isjust nutriti¥« mere migbt be an enjoyment specific to eating and drinking
(d. ONB: 129; CVIl4: 102-11}.
Jung points out dtU in c:'lMrtcaJ. times the Latin word liIidtJ had me IlIDI'e
genernhenJleof"plIlIIiom.wdeJinl' (CW4>; (CW4r 15;
ON .a 123). He ci.tC'I Cicero, who Ilcfines 'libido' 23 desire 'di:roxced from
reaaon and too violently a:rouaed .• , unbridled desire, whkb 11 found in aU
iOoh' (1lrf.w:tUa'll Iv."i. 12); and SaIJu8t, who youths who
invested. more libido 'in h:md!iome anm and horaes than in harlot.ll and
(The "KbT W1JI W). BefOre being BeXUaI. h'bido is paIlIIion, and
'U:JWlJly passion for It is desire or
abflorption in beyond the tall of although it nury
manifest Wielfali :Iexua1, evenwithin sexual libido there may be eomething dIat
points be'yond die ¢"xdtaWry .lim and the stimulating ol'/lect Of' fanClilS'f' l'he
""hole bod.. can be host to this 'psychic energy'; in a BttrlPotrilm in
tUm opts ill 'enlBrgt! narrower conC"epl of PllYehk energy £() broader one
aflite.energy, wtrich includes ·psychic:: energy" a.s a pan' (CW 8: 17, 1'0:
and theory that desire must be liUlicu1ated in terms of
16 not &(I W from theJwtgian theory o£ p$Ychi.c energy. On the one
hand, they condcmnJung for hil'idealilt dcviarion' (AO J281 from the troth
that Freud did uncO¥er; the prill1at:y of 1lCXU3lity in the unconscious, But on
the other hand, are generally happier Wlmg the term 'desire' (,uJung
had firtt suggemd), and many of the exampJel of intensive desire they use
cORlpletely repel brini'ink'rpfeted in temlS (If llemality. 'The s:u:isfaaion the
when he pluw; something intO an e.1edrlc socket or
divens lit !JU'eam of water can samet" be explained in terms of "playing
mommy and daddy, or by the pleasure of violating the cabo<;' (AO 71. and it
would be obviolJ5ly pwhing it to explain it i.n of lllI 'lI--elL Gwen
that rejects the lacltnian propamJ Ulat deiire u in the
specific sen&e thai: it eSS>!!nriaUy coNluueted around a primordial lou,
Dt!Jeuu:'s and use of th<:! teTIn 'gexuality' ill ofH".D to the charge
(again a.Iready made byJIDlg aga.iJnt Freud} that it rew on Ii mere
roanipubtion. Afl:f':r reviewing the construction Qf Malone's
:machine' ill Beckett', Dde'l.Jle and Guattari themselves ask 'wber.e in
thi! entire Cir(:uit do we find me production at: &e'XWl1 pkasure' (AO !)? In
(1917} Deleuze UtunlS lD his previous position: 'We do not
'in lJt'nernl rlw: $e1l:Wility has lhe role of an in the auemblages
of deli!l:lf, n{j.t mn it consUlll1:e$ an energy -capable of mmsfofln2.tion or (If
neutraliAtion and wbJimation. Se':ru.ality em only be thought of as one flux
among others, entering into conjun<:tiun other fll.lXC$' (D 101). It is not
clear that DelEme ever really left behind the m05t fundamental JW\gi.an
One woukf he forgiven for lWWning WI Jung would therefure go on to
eooclude dial there is no relation between psychotic libido and the constitu-
tion ofreality. SinceJung had conu:nd.ed that 'n:ality is not a sexual function' .
one mighc have expected him to numtain tho:! d.iikren.ce in kind bel:W'eCn
libidinal and reality functions; the 'loa of realh:y' woWd have nothing bJ do
with a widtdl"b1l1 of libido. Bmmcb an. usumption WQU)d involve a premature
Intrusion of Jntl.eadJun.f IQI!'S in the opposite direction: me
cotl$titution of re.alicy C4" be eJtplained in ffmll of a D'al'l!ilionnatitm of libidi-
nal b«aWt libidQ il:Sclf is not purdy lleXUal. Libufll) is vegetative.
sexuaJ, and can become in 'l1le individual i& nn. .. ofall
a biological reality, and lIDY '&erde of that emerges. for itself is a result
ofevents ill tts ·Reality· iI nOl: ncn con:stituredfor the
dl."W'Jopmg hwnan being aU lit once. and may be built up by a set ()l t1'ardtCJr-
mations of neutraJ libIdinal jW1g'f> explanation of how this happens
the MCb.oan.alytic theory of reality in lID t'nt:ireJy di.fi'erent dire(1jon to
the trajectories produced b>y- Freud's t.w:n to the primat:y of narciW.tm, Jung
posilll an orlgirlaL, biologically movement from nutririvlt self-
(building"l.Ip and reprod.'w:rion of the individmd body) to the
instinCt for the: pl'eiitt'Yllrion of the species (sex:ua.l reproductlQrti.
The!ii: are
biological phaset of a gen.er.d form.arive instinct for 'reproduction'. of which
the mt;eai\'f' side is fdt<iU 'de:sire' (CW B: 1.30). 'Wich the development of the
body there are QPtloed new of applicarion for the libido'
(CW' B: 132). Jung'. 11 fairly ob8cure and at
thi& f>(>int, and be about the leveh at which thu process is 1$
he evolutionary argumentli about functions.. or de5CripUoI15 of
endQgenous indiY1dual deYdapment, 01 metaphvsi.c.al arguments about the
nature of de$ire?ll'
Jung wntt:!J as if thl' third in which -a 'fun.ction of reality'
is Mt born.. corn;\$pond's lO a whkb ilIiuelf merelv a mIl
in the endopnom of lib1do.
However. Jung
remains... on the sur:tal:e. strictlv Freudian about wbleh aspect of seXualIty is
KspomIble fur fbi! rom, It iJ dte appearance-, within the domain of l>e'XuaJ
libido, of a particular ponron of' libido. that the need for
l:I"allSfurrnation, The ofareality411nr.Qon tina 0CCI.m/. due to a limit
that • tuilhll'a the field orsex.ua1ity. It Is ironiI::;, in fact, thatJung is
for his criticism& of Freud's 'poo5exm1i:sm' and for hm iJ:J&st.en<:'.e on
a3 oppmt'od to sexuality, when he spends most at the re.u of 'Tram-
and showing howeverytbing that Wrtlltitute$ humanity f$ the
result at: an onginal reprc!lSion of the: desire for mces[ with the morber,
Far from bdng a retreat from the Freudiart project of relating human mkure
in ilS .mtirety to $txu.alU.y, we shouid Bee that Jung'. le1Ct goes further fhan
Freud in attribuling w emergence of she: ltAelf 10 the aans-
formation <» mc.estuol;$ desire. where Freud In Tdem <md TGboo
relares lilin:wical manifestltiom of the incellt t.aboo to a in:ti.uttik:
fur weeK with the lI1odrer. jung comes to argw: apinat inferring the
lUI.tUre of a detire from the bisrorlc:al of a law that it.
\\o"hm. the child deHres from the modta, the .. forbids, and the
mother'$ own inrertUom, conscious or are an quite distinCt arid
neither am be inff!rred from me others.. further, e1U1 if die of
inc:es:t\JOU$ 1ibido wek the triF"of Ihe emerpnce of the reality-funaion. it if,
the mecnaniml of ontO terrain that that
function, FIaJd'lI inRmmce Oil one peralline or (lIe.X:U31) bbklitul
dntelopfJl.eot. Jung postUlates: _ initial tmd.ogenous phaIell of eN: libido, the
prtHexu:aJ nutritive and sexual, wKb diffeknt aims and Once such ill
duality is in place. the arises of a 'primary' Jung'!!>
propo8llL 1.$ rhat me third phax of !he libido, is
'" a 1M uxual fJAo.w b«k emw the.,.,..SifItIN41, as
a ft!Nlt qJ(1 lf1 &QII/t' Mf'td t?f It is 'by a rqretl8inn to the pre-
(that1 the libido bet';<>roe$ (CW 8: 151).
lung', argument here also h3$ the a<lv.wtage of filling :a gap in Freud'"
76 Dtleu:r.e and the Unamscious Deleu:r.e and theJungian Um01lScious 77
theory. For Freud, the encounter with the barrier against incest is inunediately
followed by a 'latency period' of sexuality, in which the process of sublimation
and adaptation to social reality is allowed to continue relatively Wlperturbed
Wltil puberty. Onlv then does libido really encounter the risk of regressing
back onto older paths, when a damming-up of sexual libido C3Ullell a regres-
sion onto forbidden incestuous desires, which in rum push the libido back
into older (oral and anal) libidinal formations.Jung sees a milIsed oppornmity
here: why not use regression from incestuOUl! libido to explain the shift to the
reality-principle itself? The function of reality would be produced by an
original transformation of the energy of incestuous desire so that it can be
released in the contemplation of an object that is now virtual: the vegetal,
nuoitive mother. InJWlg, there is no mysterious libidinal latency stage: rather
there is an initial birth of the reality-function, quite peculiar to itself, in which
reality appears in a first 'animistic' guise, charged by the repressed symbol of
the mother: the world as symbol.
The transfonnation of libido produces a corresponding transfonnation in
the way the world appears to the primal human being. Perhaps the reason why
it is so hard to remember one's childhood is because one's libidinal map is
plotted completely differently at the various stages ofchildhood, and the move
to new libidinal investments is equivalent for the child to stepping into a new
world. The repression of inceswous desire for the mother is the most impor-
tant of these transfonnations, because the repreSllion of sexual libido is this
time not aided by any endogenous, self·preservative tendencies. In the begin-
ning, saysJung, symbols do not yet appear in abstract fonn, but appear as the
rites and ceremonies themselves, conducted under the rule of 'magical
thinking', or omnipotence of thoughts (CWB: 48). 'A ceremony is magical so
long as it does not result in effective work. but preserves the state of
expectancy. In that case the energy is canalized into a new and produces
a new dynamism, which in tum remains magical so long as it does not create
effective work' (CW B: 46). Whereas in Freud, omnipotence of thoughts
OCcurs in the child when 'they sat.i5fy their wishes in a hallucinatory manner'
(SE 13: 83--4), for Jung ritual activities specifically involve the redirection of
libidinal activities onto new objects. jung describes the desexualization of
libido by means of the investment of images and symbols as producing a novel
st3le of e:t/J«t4ftCJ, in which 'the mind is l'ascinated and possessed by ... the
newly invested object' (CWB: 46).
Rather than being a hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, magical thinking is an
essential component in the tra.n8fonnation of the Umwelt into a world of
symbols. It is the first step in the animation of a 'reality' beyond the reproduc-
tive circuit of nawre. Symbolic thinking, it tumlI out, is precisely the means by
which a 'canalization', 'transition', or 'bridge' (CWB: 137) is made out of the
domain of inunediately sexual libido (or in Freudian tenDS, the pleasure prin-
ciple) into a 'beyond' of nature, a transcendent space or ontological clearing
within which something called 'reality' can be constituted. jung's prime
examples concern the historical genesis of the reality-function r.uher than its
genesis in the psychic life of the child. His claim is that the ancient material
elements, such as earth and fire, first become isolated for the human mind by
§erving as conduits for repressed sexual libido. Might not the origin of fire lie
in the redirection of repressed incestuous libido into the rhythmic boring of
holes into wood, or rubbing together of sticks, giving rise to the generation of
fire as a by-product? The material element, fire, is thus an actual indirect
product of displaced sexual The discovery of the powers of material
reality, the transition to the threshold of realit}', thus coincides with the emer-
gence of the symbol. lfreality originally appears as 'animistic', endowed with
mythical powen, this is because it comes into being through the repreSllion of
the mother-image. Reality is thus immediately symbolic, and is a by-product
of repressed incestuous libido. Nature i&lf (that is, nurturing nature) now
emerges as the vast, new symbolic object of a desexualized libido: no longer
just na.ture as nutritive Umwtlt, but nature as numinous symbol of the mother
(Mater fttJtunz).
Jung is concerned to depict a shift from the symbolic approach to reality to
the emergence of a 'directed' kind of thought, which 'adjusts itself to actual
conditions, where we ... imitate the succession of objectively real things'. This
directed thinking is now opposed to a 'non-directed', or 'merely associative
thinking ... a drBam Of" pluJntas'J thinking (CW B: The shift corre-
sponds to a son of progreSllive de-anirJltJtWn of reality, an attenuation of its vital
symbolic substrate: the symbolic origins of reality now appear as the object of
mel? 'phantasy-thinking'. This capacity for directed thinking intensifies with
historical devdopment: 'directed thinking was not always as developed as it is
at present ... The directed thinking of our time is a more or less modem
acquisition, which was lacking in earlier times' (ibid.)
jung develops an epochal account of history derived from sources such as
Bachofen and Crewer. Deleuze concurs that it is impossible to understand a
perversion such as masochism 'without taking up some strange historical per-
spectives' (8M 127); incredibly, he seems to endorse aJungian, epochal view
of history, with Anima and Animus as the main protagonists. In Bachofen's
epochal narrative, a pri.mewl 'MotheNight' is eventually replaced by a phallic
Law that gained ascendancy in Greece and Rome.
Masoch was an avid reader
of Bachofen, often making allusions to 'an epoch of beautiful Nature, to an
archaic world presided over by Venus-Aphrodite, where the fleeting relation-
ship between woman and man has pleasure between equal parmen as its only
law'. Why was the primitive, hetaeric and incestuous mode of existence
repressed? As we have said,Jung himselfwas ambivalent about this, and only
gained a consistent, if complex position later, after Trn1LSfurmotitms and s,mJJols.
So at this point, we can lend an ear to Masoch's interpretation of the repres-
sion of incest. Incestuous existence was not repressed at all, he says; rather,
'beautiful nature was thrown out of equilibrium by a climatic catastrophe or a
glacial upheaval' (8M 127). Only 'the catastrophe of a glacial epoch' can
account for 'both the repression of sensuality and the triumphant rise of
severity' (M 53).17 On Deleuze's and Masoch's fanciful acCOWlt, matriarchal
law w::u t'epbced by a brief, vanishing which is immonal:iztd by
'I'UIlOCh_ fur centum 'the Demetrian em dawned among the
Amarom and a strict sYDocmtk and agrkultum ordl:r; r.he
swaxnp$ were- drained; the lather or husband now acquired a cerWn Sl:.3.t'\U but
iresdll undeT the domination of the woman' (M 53). But this epoch
of 'preeariOWl splendour and co",ld nQt liil6t and the Amaronian
QrOer 'WllS overcome by futt.:e, with pal:X'im:ha1 law, which from now on
prohihi6 mce!i.t with the mother, undeT the threa.t of castraUon. Deleuze
cQncludes his epoch hilllory ominouSly: 'He who uueatth:s tho!:' AnUM
M this regression: an the more tmib1e for being repre'lllOO, the Anima will
know how to rom pa.triarchal st:rucrures ro Its own advantage and reditlc:ovcr
the power of the devouring Mother' (8M 127'..
Psychosis therefor-e .is a.bove all an ll.nadu-oni$m. Vo1w happeru in psv-
Chtollll; is a regression to the fust phase of the fUll\;t1Q\1 of [n psychQIA..
Jung claims, I a drripping r.1 the last qf 6f rmliJ't (iff
aMptalinn) mwt oj be npiacet1 bt; i;l..·l 1'I'Illdt of tdcptotilm (CW 8:
136). It cannot be iii Tegt'eSlJion from a. moment ohe:tual reprewon bac.kl.O
an earner se:mal sm.ge of omnipotent.. seJf..enclosed It
iuvol:vt1 a rt:grf$l!don which leads l:roaek from 3. secomb.ry. histori.cld fum:ooll
of reality to an 'mythiar function of reality, in wbichthe energy of
3tltUal libido was by magical means. For Freud, p!YcllOti4;; i#
taId.ng radical me:35tll'8 apiMt sexU3l anxiety, :md in particular agmm
anxiety about homosexuality. Ifthese is In rountenJ\Uli.
'it i$ not lib normal or nem:otic hUt is rather a component of II
diMinguisbed by it$ which can become unchecked b}'
reflective FI."'(Jm the ia.w!r point of Wew, p$YChosis
is an :iUlll.Chronistic ret.olJec.tioo. of .a namre imbeddedwith &)1nbob. It is as if
J'L'YChosU the appearance of individnal 5)11100& systems. cast adrift
from my coi1«ti'le value that the 1>}mbOOc: munml ofreality mighl have bad
I.n earUu. a«baic hiliwric:aJ epocbi,
But convenely ill it poI1l!Iibk ro foresee a complete de-animation of :nature,
when the retnnan1.ll of the symbolic origins of reality are entirely forced
underground into &.ntuy thinbng? 'The first level of reality would rowe
v.aniMled from the human being's rt:lationmipi to the world. ami
would be completely intcm.alized in the uncon!Kious. In tbllt t:aSe. the normal
human being would llQ( :an invrrted p<:J:"Vet't, .u thought, but a
p&;'(00tk. Rom Jung atld Oeleuze consider (albeit for different rea&Oo&}
modernity iIllelfas patbogt>nic, as an facwry fur the
prodocticrl of plYChotkB, A new hUitorkal epoch ill dawnmg. As capiQllmn
tIS defencelee our inner lIChwpbunia. rn.ore prone to
delirium, :a new libidinal prngIeMion ou:l only come about thrQUg:b A new
(d. CW8: There t. flO longer an;i'lhing :m:a£hronistic about
so::hiMpbrenia; its motley prb and .speech are s.igN of a being from
the future, .a tneMengeF from diatant. lunac 5Ocieliel, In ihe of it
Pri.UttIw, the Earth i€Self 11 Ix-C.QmUlg a &UCllite for
the re<:epOOn of oomOC forces, The schiwphrenk has been forced agaimt
melt' wiI1 to becOllU' a. a ronjuror of fo-rees; and conversely it :is
poMible to 1eamagain from Khirophrenic&how to be!- sorcerers, According to
the lIChizophrenic it. '3& dO!e as poIiIiible ro matter. to a burning,
lmng centre ofm3tUlY· (AO 19); they have entered, without knowing how, an
unbearable of 'cdi'l:lab: misery and glory e&.perienced to the fullest. 1iktl
a cry Wllpended Iill: and death, an intense feeling of In.nIIIdon.
of purl" naked illtCmlty stripped of all shape and fOrm' (AO lSi,
Neurosis and Psychosis
The neurotic tOO CArlJ10t help falling bad. Into the tim., childhood plane of
reality. but in a way that is completely difterem from the Freudian ronapt of
regreSllion..lUllg argues thai: Freud is COITee( to aay th3l are
in adole1lCence and young adulthood by failUNS to find an am1aIlove object.
For Freud this failure results in themUUtla.til>n of the Ulloomeious left
over from the Oedipus complex. The 3.CCtWiOOal rqlfeWoo cf ado1ellcero K:X
is the opportuniry for reprew:d, urH.:omdOUll fiDCom to resarfia«
and feed off supprell5ed. a.cr.u.ai tibldo, c.aUling "fIIlPtonJI, JWlI.
however, belie'fed that Freud bad the situatioo, He is Keptical
about whether persot'l3I traumas in the of DeUrotia ime any
solid causal role. }fu arguments agaimt Freud on this pomt are always about
wbether &aVality' i5 a mf.ticimt ouse for net1ltl:!l$. He N!"rel" sexual.
problems in the of the neuroses of the young. Uti
problemis thx the se:waI of!be nelD'OSil Vmostly likely Qrigi--
uted III adoIescel'llre (when the senml emerges) 7 and therefore tbar if
cause of saual lB':lIrolIe5 is to be sought in dilldhood, then it might well
be uOlHe!tual.
Inhis 1912lectuml on 'Tbe l1tem:yof Psythoanaljm
Jungtook up Freud's
retr.l.Ct1on (in 1900 in 'My VIeWS on the Part by Sexuality in the Aetiol-
ogy of the Neurosei'} of hit earlier view that actual historical traumas were
caWlaly producli.'Ye of n.eurosia.. Freud had stated that in &ct 'the patient's
(or imaginary memoricl!s) mOfdy produ«d in puberty', wing
'JnliI!'ml)rI.es ofthoe: own sexuallil.CtMty (infantile masturbation)' (Sf.
174).JUftfJ Fr:eud's qualiiiation ofhis trauma theory .u furtheT proof of
the of the idea of the sexual aetiology of neuroses. He
to traI..ll'Ila theory on the grounds that the incompalibi1ity of
.emaIideawiththeegocmnot:a«oWltforallt:raU.mal. let alone :all
we haft :seen that he obje<:ts to the infantile sell:UUl:lr
not;aU p1euwe jj lICnW. But be alto takes Freud's abanOOII.D'leD[ of
the seduction theory and hii embrace of the nooon duit fant:atllies
are nmer than real event» to bill argument for the pt'imacy of
For if Freud had adtnltted that f.mtasies are produ.:ed in
puberty, then one cannot be lflU'e they bave om:ytIting to do with infanq. Jung
claiml that the hysteric:: ·lltagc·ma.nage'8' bel" in U1'du to invdgk
the WW andintim:l.te preocr:upation with the details of ber life:
she die t('J() to enter' her fam:atworld (CW 4; 161-2). An
adole5cent girl might only IIC3rt to unw.mIon:ab!e around her tather when
ber exuallibido is blocked froot fu.lfilment in the ouuide world; the result of
her fl."mtradoD is that the father's behaviour beP to be interpreted II-'
sexual.)&lung aI.fo argued that chel'c art' many eases of neurom
.............om6 are entirelv abent until 3. breakdown comes about. A cntical
attitude' {CW 4:: %46} to nel.lll»1s WlU therefore necemry.
If there is no sufficient r-euon for reprc$$ion at the inflmt.ik level,
thenwe thould not necessarilv look for other p<*lble at the infantile
l.evd, bUl rather look at the that, in order tQ be all
certain have to be fulfilled- The aymbolbmQftlw: urUet'
l'!:'l1et\t hu to be relevant to the current problem. The prelC:l1( has 10 be II
critical moment:: 'it is usually the moment wben Ii new psychological adjuw
ment, that D, a new adaptation, ill demanded' (ibid.), It could therefore be
that it ill a &ilure of adaptation i1t 1M tI1at rcmcmatel tile donnant
memory. Psychopathological regreuion must be seen in the ftnt place
a a regte'lAion .frum an adolescent or adlik problem in rcal1ife. We are not
dm'rmi1ll!tl by original mmmas as Freud !llll"': :Ii a u:;wma exi!u in the pa.a. then
it can only exert its influence on ompr6'M!nt by its ..1dl omc:w:rent;
problem, From ado1esc-enc:e cmwards, we are to find out "'7It!f back to
O'I.U' past Iibidlnal investments in s.earch of aliblS fOT our pretCfl
failure to
resolve curtetlt libidinal problems.
But even in neurosis repressed se:xua.l libido ('all be c:bannelkd badinto the
f'undamenw. a.nimi:stic ofrealitY. prm'idinlJ for
the libido. In 'From to M:asocbiml' [)e1eu:zle wriIett th. lq
emth.eTefore reproach Freud fur having Jef1in the dark both the re:aJ
present in a lleUI'Olris and the tre3Sl.U"6 it can conWn. He: said thMFreud hlui
3. on "1t i$ nothing but . ...... (SM 133).
eben cites two fromJung: 'Hidden in the neurom il;l hit ofllOlt Uftde..
\'eloped personalty. a predou! of the psyche JatUng wbiclt a tnlm is
condemned to [and dse that .. to
lire], Apayd1oJogyof neur<lllili d1ar aees oo1ythe ekmeDuempomout
the baby -,ritll the 'in neurosis reside:s our :most relendets enemy
i1r MIT fril1tlIL" DeIeme that 'Uris it nO\. to n.Ue out 1hat ;l.
neurosismight be amenable to a.Freudim up toacert:ain point.
oot um ita rights M l1OOO M one begins 1.0 penmate inoo
me more pmtOOnd lIUa12 of the Of' equally as the DeurOOt:
.. and is tramlfOJ:Imld or widl.'. AFreudian in.terpreta·
don of bti DO'll'aidttyintwO ofcase. First.- where individuals are
'.wen.aled' in which 'lead a daDger-OWlly autonomous life'.
DdeU2e mlllO(;bistn 10 seJ'VC lIS :m example of thill, where the libidinal
life of me indMduai is completely amorbed in the production of a riwal
but and also haYe their theat.re! (d. DI
106). "I'here are neufoaa who 9:I'e burdened Ill/del
ewry their problem is to be reconciled with rhx la, to
reintegrat,e in cheir penoonality thOle very parul whidl t.hey have to
develop' (SM lSS). Although Del.euu will soon c:ease to use the of
'reconciliation' of 'reint.egra.tion' (which. among other drings. sill u:au:uiJy
with his elOteric theory ofthe eremaJ return; DR. 24l-4) > the notion that there
an:: ldeas,U:naget, and S)'!DboIs which 'tranllCend [+sse} every
remainS fundamenw for his conception of the pioceM of individuarlon in

hoDoh of il. 'seoooo binh'. rebirth or renailJsante iA fundamental to
from me beginning. The notion ball an e1!Oleric badground, going
bac1 toJ'lIkob BOhme's themophy. and. beyond mOO ideas of
the r.ranmligration of MlWs (DR241-4). In I.I'lI4Hittmd.J of
dial the 'tran8f'tgurarions' brought about by natu.raJ and lIl1i-
Ilcilll somnambuliMn are bebind 'the idea of rebinh among tM
IndJam, who,lilS describe themselves a! twice born' (MaJfatU
"V' Large tr'a(U ofjung's tmd (the work ofjung', (0
which moMfrequently releB) are devowi to the exposition ¢fa core
myth of rebirth which Junr in the badground of the mythologies
handed dawa by bBory. The myth 11 of 3. hero who entefll on a 'night sea
journey' into the m.atcmal womb in order to be reborn again in a new
mOl'TUI1l' ForJung, 1his A'Iiflh reconh the process th3t we have recounted
of an of tibido into human reality. But fui! myth
re¥OM!ll around an etIgetltiaJ fanwyof de'mration and rebirth that emerges in
proportion to the .....-eight attached to the maternal imago u of.
Either the hero psychotic and reanima.t:n naxure, or the libido 'sinb
back into ilS own depth&, into theJOW'te from which it has gushed furth, and
ttU'lU brac.k. to thai: point mtleawge, the umbi.liau, througb which it once
entered Into dUll body . , , rhet man baa become fur the world above a
phantom, then be pmakally de.ad Of in' (CW B: !83-4). 'The
world of and f.wtaly themselves d'um JUhsDtuie altogether for the
'upper world'. and block the movement of sexual libido. Either
way, the bero facC$ the dcYouring mother, who is 'not only devouring insofiIr
:lIB heT image" repreued. but in and by herself' (SM 136). The uncomcions
fantatia that 00. this COl.lt'Se all tend to an a.pocatyptic terminus: 'The
wiJh b diat the black warer of death might be the water oflile; that deub, wUh
iu(old embrace. might be the mother'. womb, just as the !lea de"flOU1"ll the 6W4
but brio. itfortb again out of the matL'maI womb' (CW B: 21lS), Deletu.e IIafS
th3t ]ung demonllms.ted. that incest algnifies the second birth, that is, to 8l1Y a
hemic birth, a parthenOJJenetD (entering a second time' info the m.aternaI
breast in order w be born anew or: to become a child apinY Cs.'f 12'9). In
Jung, incest hall become tornething quite different to what it is in Freud. Incest
is not even into the rather.lt We are
not URColUCioU&of deep mcatUOUil desires becaute theyare we are
unconJeioU5 of the fllta'ltfltg ar M1tS6of the symbol of 1nCflt.
The problem of the relation of to llb'idlnal fon:es cannot be lll)h;Ied
82 Deleuu and the UncOTIscious Deleuu and theJungian UnconscUms 83
in terms of libidinal economy alone. Where Lacanian psychoanalysis
attempted to resolve the relation of energetics to symbolism through recourse
to snucr:ural linguistics and anthropology, Jung and Deleuz.e mine the older
epistemological tradition of Kantian philowphy in order to account for the
validity of the autonomous space of symbols. What follows is an introduction
to Jung's theory of the unconscious, and a reconsnucrion of its relations to
Kantianism, as indicated by Deleuze. As already suggested, from 1961
onwards, Jungianism shapes Deleuze's theorv of the unconscious right up to
Differena and Repetition, which continues to resonate with aJungian 'archaic
depth' (TRM 65). For most of the 19608, Deleuze's investigations into the
unconscious revolve around a Kantian-jungian synthesis, based on the notion
of 'unconscious Ideas', but also pulling various esoteric themes into ia orbit.
In the subsequent chapter, we follow how Deleuze proceeds from Jung's
notion of the symbol through to Kant's account of symbolism, to a radicalh'
novel conception of the psychotic basis of all symbOlic reality. which, as
have seen. was the fundamental theme of Tf'ansjonnlJtUm.s and S:frnJ;Io/.s of the
Jung on the Unconscious
The term 'unconscious' has a series of distinct meanings inJung. Later on in
this chapter we will see that there is an important 'transcendental' component
to Jung's meory of the unconscious. However, before we encounter the
Jungian tranSCendental unconscious, we should draw attention to a series of
of the ego to the unconscious.. The process of individuation, claimsJung,
is structured by a series of phases of the development of consciousness, in
which the unconscious is encountered at each point in a different form. The
child has a somnambulistic consciousness dQlle to animal instinctual con-
sciousness but mediated by human institutions; as an adolescent the uncon-
scious becomes the 'sharlow'; during the love-relationship, the unconscious
becomes, as anima or animus, the end of activity; finally the unconscious
reveals itself as what Jung ca& 'Self', as a s'UijHlritJr OtJvrwithin the mind itself.
The unconscious appears as a paradoxical unknown 'Self': 'the ego is, by
definition, subordinate to the Self and is related to it like a part to the whole'
As a zero pole,jung posits an 'absolute unconscious' to designate the totality
of everything that is unconscious. 'Consciousness is like a surface or a skin on
a vast unconsciOU6 area of unknown extent' (CW 18: 8). Forjung, the uncon-
scious 'includes not only repressed contents. but all psychic material that lies
below the threshold of consciousness' (CW 7: 128). The unconscious is not
restricted to repressed mental content (as in Freud). the uncomc:i.ous
as the totality ofall psychk phenomena that 1.ack the quality of consciousness'
(CW 8: 138). In AiDft,Jung simply describes the unCOnscious as 'the unknown
in the inner world', in parallel to the 'unknown in the outer world' (CW 9ii;
3). This unconscious no longer has the 'transcendental' status of the previous
two versions. Even if one accepts a strong Kantian position about the self-
conscious subject, then one must accept that 'empirically' it always finds its
limit 'when it comes up against the unknoum. This cOruJists of everything we do
not know, which, therefore, is not related to the ego as the centre of the field
of consciousness' (ibid.). The unknown outer world, however, is ofless impor-
tance than the unknown inner world, which can also be thought of as the
Bergsonian 'virtual' aspect of the mind.
But for Bergson, Janet and jung, the unconscious was also fundamentally
defined in a rugatiw relatirm to me 'species activity' of consciousness, in a way
that has no parallel in Freud. Consciousness for these thinkers has a biologi-
cal function, to attend to the environment for practical purposes. Conscious-
ness is 'anention to life'. Therefore what is unconscious is always unconscious
in rr.latiun to an o.ctWe, ego. What is unconscious at any given
moment is what is inessential for the practical purposes of the ego; dreaming
must be inhibited simply because it incapacitates the activity of the active ego.
The unconscious thus can be taken as strictly 'relative' to the ego. Rut this
immediately gives rise to a paradox: how can one have a wgnitive fflatiDn to
what is unconscious? We have JUSt seen that the unconscious is 'the totality of
all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of consciousness' (CW 8: 133). If
the unconscious is entirely unknown, then we cannot enter into relation with
it. Thus whatever we have to say about the unconscious is what the conscious
mind says about if {CW 18: 7).!I\ The jungian unconscious contains an extra
reflexive level absent from the Freudian unconscious. For Freud, what is
uncoruJcious is what is repressed, and one is conscious only of the 'derivatives'
of the unconscious idea. For Jung, if one is obviously never conscious of the
unconscious, then one nevertheles& is conscious tIuJt one has an unconscious,
and that in itself can be important. The unconscious enters into relation with
the ego by appearing to the ego as the unconscious. Thus jung says that
dream-figures more often than nOl actually represent 'The Unconscious'. The
m;gor Jungian psychic 'agencies' - shadow, anima, animus, Self - are all
symbols ofthe unconscious. They are distinguished by the different modes of
relationship they present between the ego and the unconscious.
In his 'Tavisrock Lectures' (1935),jung gives an account of the differentia-
tion of consciousness, passing through the various relations of ego to un-
conscious. Consciousness first arises in an instinctual setting, attached to
instinctual adaptability. 'In early childhood we are unconscious; the most
important functions of an instinctive natme are unconscious, and conscious-
ness is rather the product of the unconscious. It is a condition which demands
a violent effort. You get tired from being conscious ... It is an almost unnatu-
ral efron' (CW 18: 10). Consciousness is derived from 'the intensity of
feeling,.n Hence there is a primacy o.Jfediue consciousness. Because children
are still instinctual, it is difficult to say that they have an unconscious: rather
their conscious activity is, as Ru:yer would say, a manifestation of the competent
actua.lization of their instineu. Up until the end of the first decade of life, the
child has a peculiar kind of consciomness, 'a consciousness without any con-
84 Ikleuz.e and the]ungmn UnamscWus
lciausnesa of the tflO: But then, suddenly 'ro.- the first time in their lives they
know uw. they thenaelves are experiencing, that iliq' are 1IJoking bal;k QVC'r a
past m which theycan remember thing!! happening but C3mlot remember that
they were in them' ICW 18; 8). The ego first during a sudden, profoWld
expene.nce of In)' states belong to me, although I don't
rtmember them !2$ mine. The s-eem for dWociarion are thus set up as soon as
1 identify myself as 'I'. & Kant saw. the 'I think· will nevtr coim:ide l\'lth the
'ego' or 'self'.
'I"hc Other does not first appear a5 superior. It appears firu in me form of
a shadowof inationality over the child'll attempt to order its priorities. The
fonn taken is the negative of the form raken by egoic consciousness. The
uncon&ciow lint appean » what is excluded by me adaptive perfunna.l:lCe1!
of tfle. ego. H the taSks of dle conscious ego are narrow and adaptive, the
unconscious appean u an adverSiUY. Thus at a certain crucial stage in life
{from adolescence to early adulthood), the repressed cont(::nts (If the mind
are indeed the dominant f3<:e of the unconscious. The potential £Or inero-
version is present at every stage of life, butJung accepts that the 5mge of the
ieYllal instinct ill a particularly vulnerable moment.lnJung's view, Freud fails
to see that the lteXUai aetiology of many neuroses is connected to the period
of adolescence. when the world ofinD:'O\"et"ted fantasy become!! flooded 'trith
the sexual eDei'g)' that is denied immediate expression in the actual world.
The pwage from childhood to adolescence has in"uJ"-ed abe gradualacqW'
sinon of skill and rompcu:nre in pracrical ma.tters, 2nd me kicking-in of the
sexual imtinet represenb die tim real challenge to the ego. Where .Freud
!OllW the guilt tied to masturbation as due to the re-emergcnce of incestuous
f.mt.allies. for Jung the more important point is IMt the ensuing retreat into
ona.nisti<: introversion is itself productive ofdissociation. As.IM r.IS the organ-
illation of the ptyehe is concerned, d1e important factor is not the sexual
drive i_leo but the extent of the dissociation produced by the emergence of
the' sexual innirJct, which the synthetic 1I£tivitics of intclligent con-
sciotUnCS$.. Moreover. the power ofimtinct does not onlyappear
in the fOrm of masturbation: other 'thematic' forms of the 5CIUlIl instinct
(snch as rivalry or couruhip behaviou.n) mipt also mani&:st
diModated characrerisUC3, that rouJd eDlUinto conflkt with the ego.
Frotn onwanIa. when the oppOOtion between ego and the
UDCOJUIciou.o; has lint been established. the Ullcrm.sdoUS is the 'shadow'. What
Freud cdJed 'wompatible Ideas' thUi tint of all appeal'" as the ideas. of an
inCOlQpatible 'IIeJr. 1'he shadow manother MlJ, Jekyll to Hyde: anotller lives
in!Iidl! me. This is of coune made 'po!II!l',lbJe by the d.i.s8ociating, somnambulistic
capabilities of COO8Cioumess.. Because dissodarlon u attended by a peculiar
lhOUKh naJ'l'OW Slate of oomcioumes& (this iJ what Freud overlooked), the
&badow 1& finIt con<:d'w!d as <II tplWter psyche.
The W1i.'f to the !barlow Is not to Nl'pretla it. but to attempt to bring
it tothe fu11eM in the world. 8y being incamared m reality,
it loses the features it had :accrued through being inhibitro, and light5 up the
world from within. When a sutrlect seeks to realise the sexual instinct in reality.
it is guided by a pre-existing image which renden the world the al1::l1a for the
realisation of the sexual in.stincL But it is not so much Im-e is
JY.fYclwtic. rather that love is terminal rea!izaJ:ion of the sexual imtind in
hwnan bei.nga. ForJung, when the subjea fAlb in 10\'e, he or she encoumen
the Wlconscious in a new fonn - as anima or animus. They no longer repreM
the unc<mKWUi, but activelyfollow their irTaIional.anracUon to another being
through toits concluskJn. All othen disa:ppear, and the external world is euen·
riallyreducM to one other penon (the minimumfur a world). But the uncoo-
5Clous now takes on a. different form: the subject comciouslypun;ues means to
an unconscious end. Nobody knows nthy they f.ill in with .a
penon. For Dcl.eure in T>iJfnma and f.rm is the centrnl
of unconscious, and eYtm has iu own ',yrnhe*! of time'. But the pursuit of
love to its end Te$Ulu in the lover getting more than they bargained for.
I..ovt-lw an 'end" that is. it has a p;tlwbich is not necessarily an end in the
lIeflIe of a of the relationship. At the end of love, a. new, final furm
of the unronscioWl We! shape. This is the form thatJung <::4lls the Self
In ill final funD, the unoonKious appears as an inner Other, the meaning of
whose utterances. whether gMmin dreams or through 'active imagination',
has to inrerpret.. But for the unconscious 10 appear Q$ unoonscious, it must be
symbolized. The dream III always a hieroclYPb which COIltmns about
the dreamers indi:riduatron. A dream is never a J)IIObollc representa-
tion of an old wh. It addreues the dreamer it B a vital communication.
.Every dream is a report onme cum:nt iUmation ofindividuation. Hence ctreams
aR mtrUuicaDy reflerive in chat they present the mQject's predicament in the
fum) of a hieroglyphic, lnterior drama. 'I>reams are nothing but self-represen-
tations ofrhe psychic process' (CW 7: 131), '5elf.reflexh.iry' is thus conceived in
a fundamentally different way (0 the Kantian model of self-consciousness, In
dreams, my umonsOous Self portrayl the state of my individuation
in enigmatic tcf'l"O!l. A dream is reflexive in the sense that a play within a play (a
double dr.unadzariOll) iii reflexive.!!>
This notion of the WlOODlICiowi as the 'superior' subject reappears in various
pIaL:es in Dck:ure. In and Oeleuu discu.sses Nietzsche's
claim that we: live in the: of the 'modestyofcOllllCioUllllelS': 'To remind con-
3dou.mess of necessary explains, 'is to take it for what it
is: a symptom' This is indeed an allusion to Freud', demand that 'we
emancipate 0tlf1clves from the impoctance of the symptom of 'being ron-
KiOUll' (SE 14: 193), but Dcleuze'.s t:rliYeClOry here is not fundamentally
Freudian. Delewe continues that con..,,:loWlnCllll is 'nothing but a syntpt.Om of
a deeper u;msfonruuion and of the activities of entirely nOlHpirltuaI rorce:'!' ,
Wbat is this process of 't:ran.rd"ormarlOn', which wU1 be IOllledUng other than
reprellllion and the struggle wilh the return of the OeJeuze's NVI-
:.sdJ.e and Ph.ilmopkJ is deeply teleological in deplcdng a twofold
historical and ethical movement through the night of nihilism, and towards
individuation. 'produces the individual as its fma] goal, where spe<:iet
itself i1I NF 1"', while the rest (If the individual is their capuity
m affirnl the eternal r¢turn of 'he same. In the rled!ive p:w:age. Delewe then
Consciousness is defined less in relalion to exteriority (in termS oftht' real),
r.blmID reladon to (ID tenn$ This distinction is t'Henmu
wa general too<eplion of and the WlCOll$Cious, In Nietll!ebe
it; the conscioumes.'l of an inferior in relation to a
'JUptIDor to whkh tu- is lSUborc:Dnated or into which he is 'incorporat¢d',
Con$ciOlL'metl$ is neYeT but the cofUlClomncss ofan .egoin
relation IX) a iIeIf which is not itself conscious, (NP 39}
The$t: wot'dl mi:rtM the opening pages of A«m,. where the uncomciow
is defined 31 an unknown \relf \he ego is, by definition, subordinate to the
ge)f and is related co tllike :a pan to the whole' (CW 9i: 5). At we wtn see
ibonly. tbeTe is:a. 'mpeHgo' in Delell2'.e, but it is nat com:eived in Frc:!udian
(ennll, and is closer m this jungian superior 'Self'.
The final phase of indMdWilrion (in whidJ. according tolung, thfl ego and
Self are related as earth 10 mn In the iYiCem) also impb il m:il.1 over-
coming atthe negative Rlati01\$hip co uncomdOUll. The following
could eaWy have been written by DeJenze. wilh it! emphasl$ <m the
and posiri,,'lty. as wt:1) as 'superiority'. of tMUJlconsdom.
Thoe unoonscioUJ is nat just a ret:epta.:.Ie but is the matr:II of me 'IlB'Y thinlP
dlat the mind would like to Ix: rid of. We amgo a w::p funbef' and
!13'" mal. I.he unconlll.i.ous actually £«'31eS 'Ml:II contenm ... it to me f..>r
more important to fmd out wh3t really the activity of me
uro::.ooliciOWl. The pooitive function of lhe unCOnscioUi is, in !.be main,
merely dis\wbed by ;and thi$ c:Mtll'I"blulce of iu natura.! activity iii
perhap$ th¢ mott importl1l'l.t llOun:e of the pll)'(:hogenic illneue:fl,
(CW8: 364)
Jung's Theory of Instinct
In mul mut 1M LimiltJ. his breakdlrough of
1911-12, Jung de¥elop; a recapitulatory model of uneonJl("iow repedrioo.
However. be !lOOn abandooed (M theory fur a meory of'uche-
lYJlC$' generated in part from 8crpm's tbeory of instinct. Jtmg's 19191ecturt-
00 '!nlltina and me Unconsciow.' Wti delivered at a symposium in London
with the title, jointly Ofga.nizerl by the Mtish Sodety, the
Aristotelian Society.::md the Mind Some <If the propoMnts
ofth;: theoryofilUtlntt. such .as W. H. R. WUIiam McDougall :r.nd
Dfeve:r were at th-e S'fI'lPOiium, andJung', paper is in pan a.
to an earlier paper by Riven. This gar:hering in 1919 coincide; with the peak
of thl!!: inllt:incMhoory of the tint de{;a<!cs of the twentif:t:h ClmD:llY, since a
laW'1. B. Wauon published his fllJll(lU$ behavioUlilit au.adL on the very notion
orins1:iI:Kt. causing instinct theory to retreat into the marlOW!, until its revival
at me hand!. of the ethologists. Unl.ike the other speakers. JWlg relatively
MW to the theory ofinstinct. and he lenaciotl&Jy held to the theory he adopted
at the conferente throughout thc- beha-viou.rist and indeed until the end
of lri!l career, Thu. le<:ture is siguitleatl t for any a«QUl.1.t of die development of
Jung" thought. the very term is introduced fOT m(: fint lime
in thu le-cture
,\$ an example of m8tilU;t, jung beginSl with the YlKCil mom's 'inCfedibly
refined institld of propagation' {CW8: 132), In a complex opem:ioo happening
only once Ul iU life, modI its ewinside a plant whose fl:ow.mI openfor
one Hawamllud. an instinct be explained?.Jung:makes a confl:t!it!d
cri1icitm of Darwin's explanation of insrintt a.nd dlren sap that 'other ways. of
de:rivi:ng from Berpon's philosophy. haw m-:ently been put
fotward, laying StTC$$ on the f3ctMof intuition' (ibid.), Om M: hope thatJung
win male any further &eMe of Berpon', theory? ln01itioo, Jv.ng expWnt, 'iJ. an
unconsciow process in that its mult is the irruption inm cotllcioumeu of an
UDconsdow conten't, .a r.udden or "hunch·'.lung lI.lso • that it
hlel a process.of perception·, but that 'the perception isum;Qnl!ci(lU$', InU1ition,
more is th(! 'UI'lCOO!lcious, parpo$i\le apprehension of ll. highly com-
plicated situarioo', The notioo af lm 'unconscious apprehension' does not
Jl'l.ilk.eo senft', but If we thlt]ung makes the- eftor at a fflUlt of W influ..
CRee af Bergson (who:.Uso makes wne error, cr, p. 56 above), dim wt: a.n
a1SQ hQp.e that our OOl"'l"«uon of Bergson'I theory in the last chapter might also
smoothen our reception ofJung's them')' of lntitinct.
Having eglltblished a Bergsonian fu!:mework for hJ£ theoPf of. instinct. jung
now imrodUCe$ the possibility that the accompany the actualiza.
tion of instinct could be 'Q. priori, inborn funns of "intuition'" (CWS: 133),
Just as we have been oompeUed co postulate the concept of an instinct deter·
mining or- 'regulating our COrl5CIoUi 1J,O, in order to account for w
uniformity;aad reguWity of our peKepdons, we must have to the
coo("epl of a factor determining the mode of apprehension. It ill
this faaor whkh I call or primordial irrIatJe. The primordial
iJIlace might suit4l.bIy be: deticrlbed as the instimti of iUIlj; or as the
self-portrllil: of thE inldnct, in eucdy the 83IIle way at cooiCioumew it an
in'w.vd perception of the ol!jectlve Iifu..proces.lO, (ibid.: 136)
b thiIjUltt Iii hapb;uard 80ldering together ofBergscmian and Kantiarl
!lions, 'W:ithOut real thought. Of is Jtmg getting at liOJDething? What po&:sible
connection could there be berow.een Berponi3n mtnition (symparhy) and
Ranti;m forms <if intuition and time)? Before we follow up this
possibility, we ueed ro briefty e.umine tM more traditional appr'Oacl1es 1'0
the notion ()f ardlet)'pe. in. otdet' to the origiDality ofDelewe'$
trajt:(wry through. these ideas,
Biological Models of Archetypes
The fact: malm the late 19205Jung his ll(tfion ofan:berype within
the Ipec:UiC COllEen of :II synthem of me and Kantian notions of
intuidon has been Itnngdy <JVf:r1ooked byJungi,am,. have tended to f«wo
on me relation of the theory of to the opposition between Dar-
winism and 1..am.lu:ckimt. The problem of how exactly 'archetype'S' :might be
l:nherired has dominaU!d the llteni:ure.jung's !It:iW9Dent.! on an:hetype5 are
obscure, and are on a DUl'DheT biological, pbenom-
enological, metaphyfieat, tm.nllCendentil. historieaJ. De'lewie IBlkY have come
a::J"()S&Jung'& aodon of archetype while researching the theme of repedtion.
'Not only are apparently, impreal:ons of !:¥pial
but. at the same time, mer behave empirk;aUy!.ike agent! that
rrn.d the repeWion ofthes.e same expeJienc4l.' (CW 69-70).
In th{': to<:QmeJunggcnera.ted a number ofdifferent about
htrwand·wby a.rehetyplllimages (:aIIUII1ing they exiIted.) were repeated 3Crol'llI
millennia in individual Jungian& have never been cetta.m about
bow to inmpret his theory of :m:betype!l. Some bse l1lJUed that there ill no
:real theory w. archetypes. and to suggest that the lern1 ill anything omer than
metaphorical is to panicipaft in 11 ronspirat:y wMlle time is up
1994). Othen, mc.:h 'lIS Anthony or Jean IC.w:»t, have broken down and
vepar.w!'d out Jung'& nriou£ fNmulatioM of the nature of archetypes and
mOlJiCn to detend one of the formulat.i<:m! inthe .light of <:ontcmporary evolu-
tionary theory or psycOOlogy (SteYem Knox fOOO,).'f'f
From his first explonuloDli of the impc:IlKlnai 'Wat aware
that the easiest way to account for wu to present them as aauallt.-
in.herited phylogenetic I."etidues. Afu':r aU.,1..ama.rdiJm WD oot at aU foreign to
ply(:bOlWalysis - it w:a:s becoming increasingly €enttal to it. In T-. aM 1bboo
.F:reud had arsued for 'the of dUpofitions' (Sf. 1.li: i&8):
the C'o"ent of the killing of the primal father had altered the make-up
of the minds of the deecendanb, even if such diJpositions 'need to be
tome ann of impcrm in the I1fe of !.hili indMdual before they caD be roused
intoacn.WDPCrabon' (ibid.). In
theorytbQt in psychology
gmetil' (CWB: IS); 'i$ich handin band with When
in his J917 euay 'On the Psychology of the UncomcioWl' Jung safll that 'It
seems to me lblt the oripl {of the archetypes] can onty be explained by
_WIling lhem to be depo5itll of me constantly repeated experiences of
humanit:y' (CW 7: 69), nothing could be more lamlll'Ckian.
In the aame lathe had alreadywarned off!lUCh an interprewion:
'I do not by any means use:rt the inhftitanee of ideas., but only of me possi-
bility of sw:h ic:reall, ",iili:h is somethingdit'fe1:ent' (C'W?: 65), In llUS he was
even more dtplidt: 'h on no lU:COunt be I:maglned r.hat there ale $\I(;h
thingll lIS id«u.. Of mat there caD be no quemon' (CW 10: JO). Ibus
from the beginning it looks as ifJun, W8ll to dmv a.
between 'archetypes as such" a5 gmetic and ':arclietypallmagei'.
which these diapofition&in imaginaryform at the ootogenetic level. In his
19M essay 'On the Essence of the Psychical', he continued to rake this anD-
L2marddan line: 'Att;het)lpeS are typical formI of belm400r which. once
become oomciol.ls, Aatutally present as tmd
thing else that a content of <:onll(iouane8$' (C'W8: 221). He holds that
they are of ideas md. images, not dlemse1vel and
(ibid,: 251), In dUt -,JW11 on to correlate thete innate $tr'UC'tW"e$ with
the etholOBkal of 'inborn "patterns of behavlwr'" and :ir. .. tbk
a.pproach that habeen ala.en up by AntltOll'}' Swvem, who chat
sbOl.1ld be lUldentDod u'phyjop:oetically acquired. genome-bound uniu of
intOnnadon which prognwmc the lndividuai to beha\'e in certain spedfic ways
while permitting such behaviour to be adapted appropriatelv to environmental
circunumnc:es' 00>' Foc inswu:'e, the in8tina for attachment ill
accompanied by the archetype of the mother;. In 5tevelJll
and Price luneR mal what e'\'!t'1ludonary pl)'ChoJoPts refer to as
'evolved psycbological mechanisma' {Di!.wd au.}. or 'psychobiological
mlIpOllIe patterns' (Paul Gilben) are lJilin1at.ely identical to I'tbat jung lfU i»
lacing widl his notion of archet}'pe. 'An:hef.)'pel are as
units which C"\IOtved through natural ededion and wl:tith ¥e fur
determining the behavioural characteristics ..well u the and c.ognime
typkaJ of human beinp' (Ste"nI and Price 2000: 6).-
ifJung was already retTac:ting in 1918 h1s l..amareIWm !iuggesrion
of year that archetypeS are 'depoili!l of the comtandy repealed
experiente$ ofhumanity', then. hill turn to BeTp:m in 1919 ind.ic'.un tlw. he
al50 was reluaant to go down iii. Darwinian path. 'MoreO'RT, deJpite his
more inclinedSIalerM!D1liI bter on, • late as 1955jungstill opted
(0 explain the distinction and Image in terms
consistent ""ttl hb earIet· approllldt, even referring 1.0 the prover·
bial wasp and '1bislCrm is not meant to denote an inherited idea,
but .rather an l.nherlt«l ·lllOde of functioning. corresponding to the
inborn way in which the chid froto the eu. the bird bu.iIds i1:5 ne'8t..
a ceriain kind of wasp Jtin.p the motor pngtioD of the and Nit
find their way to the Bertnudal.ln other'WOrds. it is a. "pattern of behamur'"
{CW 18: !)l8),5 The echo ofFahre:and Beqpon's 1'IIlIIiIp Iha.tJung baill.
not hinwelf entirely from his earlier ideas.
Some concempo.rary Ju.ngia:ruI argue that Me DOl geneticaDy
programmed but are i:mk:ad llpariou:mpor.al lICIrenwa Ulit .in the
his 1918 paper 'The BDte of the ills
*r that there <:an be 'no queaUOl1' of .a. I..amarctia:n of
thatJw'lg g\':le$ on to say that 'there are, paq;ibiJi.
ties ofide», .,JW'iDt'i co.ndilicmll for 'I'Irls has bMn to
:indi<:a.tle tttm:Jung t.awm.rs a view of ardletypes.
Befure t1.1tDing to a recent eumple of thiw. vie'w. it is worth recalling that ewM
Kon.rad :I...orenz, who b2d rmgor about Jung's work. 'became
90 91
receptive to an of the arrhetypes which itreSSed the function of
the imagination in £he of insbll(:tual beha";Qu.r,$li He CaJDe to
grant that Jung's thwry could be defended for human beings, on condition
that the images unrlenwod phenomena. The key
differem:e between animal and human being is thaI 'man has the power of
vi$uali$3tiDn' (EVID1S 1975: 59}. It is the human cognitive capacity for
imagination that (be innate mechanical schema. (0 find symbolic and
imaginary expTeWon. '[The] innate' .eleating mechaniMD ' .. combined with
the human fu,cu)tr of ..1su3lising dreaming about a situation - resulu in
phenomenal reactions which are more 01' IcSll identiud withJung'$ concept of
I mink archet:ypes are innate releasing mechani$il\il invested in
visualiIlaoon, in the fantasY of !.he individual, MaP I:an, mhis fa.tuasy, perfunn
wi&h hi:m6elfwhich an animal QnI1ot' (ibidJ.
In Arr.kdjpt, AU4dJ1'MIi. An.a.lJris:}trtrgio.n tm4 .. Mind
(2003). Jean Knox generates a developmenw theory of a1dletypeJ as
schemas. Relying on collabora.tiW: work. saentlsUand de'llel-
she the earliest in the child's deYelopment of
itS iniormatlon-proces5ing capabilities are structured by basic. 'image
(ruch .u path. up-dOWJl, containment, force. pan-whole, link; see Mandler
1992: 591), so that although 'there may be nO' thing 3$ an archet)pal
mother', !.hen: it itwcad 'an comainment' (Knox 67),
Thus althougb l'l.1.taChment i.i as for Knox 3Jl il ill fur Stevem. for the
fonner the Jpccitially a:n::hetypal cm:lcriburion to attlchment ill mediated by a
set of condition&. 1ntlKtU'e attachment, for instance, is 'likely ro
activate the i.n:l.tlgt' of "f()f'(:'e'" or (ibid.: 68). There is much
to J:&ommend Rnox.'!l emphasis on the non'Conceptual spatiotemporal
cOlldioons <Ji. dl"'¥elopmcmt. but her rtmdWlion Is extreme: she that
exclusion of repre&f::ntanonll from gtmetit inht:ritance
that :ill s:ym'bok content of the archetypes be thtown out.- leaving ju!t
spatiotempolid structureS, But whatever JUll3's notion of archetype wa$y it
to bave involved a lot more than mere sp:adotempor..il gestalts.
ttitici2:es fur attributing' too much content' to arche--
types, and proposes that '''Mother'' is 3 oonc('pt, but w(' image !iChema of
the bodily experience of held and the accompanying
pbysiological liefill2.dons of 'lor'3.l"Dlth, t:Ommrt and security. are not initially
(Knox 2003: 64).
There is an Oppositioli between 'repre.Sifntalion and 'intuition' at work here
which un be problema.ti.red :and tn\IlSf:ended by appealing to Kiimti:an philos-
ophy, by whkh bom Jung :and Deleuz.e were influenced. Although
Knox :and other Jungian! frequently acknowledge Jung'& debt to Kant, they
usually overlook the structure chat Kant givu to tognition - not just
conC«!ptual rcpresentatio1u and Intuitions. but also JdeaJ. the that
stimulate the mind in w fim pia.ce. For both lung and O<'leuu, I.be notlol'l
0( Idea is an eeendal component of Kant's (and their own) cheaty of Cl:t8n1'
don. Untkr cenain ClrCWll8tanCe$, Ide:u even 'detennine the shape of &pEe
and time, to' the pgd1r that the entire world appears to Oecotlloli:' an egg, .an
embryologkal jl?Jl!lOrJurn which serves all the stage of the 'wbde the.3,l:res' of
individuation {cf. Leibniz 1714: # 75; also DR 2441. .
InstinCi:$ and the Imagination
These 'a priori, inborn fOrJm of "intuition"" Dy! jung, are 'the of
perception and apprebension. whkh the Q primideterminants of
all psYchic processes' (ibid..: 133). Au a.rt"hC'type thU$ cannot be an in
the empiricalllen!le. but Is rather an (1 structure, a way of
Hving mspace and time, The $paboternporal fol'1m which con-
"tram percepriOIl and appreb.ensi.:>n, allowing to fulfil itself in its <won
Jl.lSt &'l wt' been compelled to the (.'Oflc-ept of an imtinct deter-
mining or regulating our conscious actions, so, in oruer }Xl acrOOni for the
unifofnut)' md Qf OW' perceptions, we must have ro tilt.
concept of a factor determining the mode of apprehension. It
tJ:u. bt;tor which I c.alJ the archetype or primordial iJ.lrage. 'the pnmord.m.l
i.mage' might suitably be de&cribed as the i7Uti7ld's ofifs#, or aa the
self-portrait of We umin.c:t, in exacdy me same war as (()neciousness uan
inward perception of!.he lif.e-proceSll. {Ibid.: 1$6)
At this. poinI in jung'$ work., therefure, the concept of aJ:cherype is a
cally spatioremporal struet:ure of perception. Ina 1918 essay, 'The R.)le of the
Unwndous' ,Jung specifies lb. archetypes are 'in.I:we ofideas, d
priori conditiorn for ... Though thel1e innare oondiri01l3 do
not produce any CQIlteilU of the\' give definite form to (ontentA
that have already been fCW 10: 1O} 'I'he mention of' a priQri corr
ditions for fantasy-prodnctit;m' can be deciphered as; ge!lrurlng to a pOll&ible
connection with Kant's theQry of ptodu.::dwo imagination.
In Di/J1mWlmIi in hill work on Kant, spends consider-
able time mowing the role of me producr:lve il'll.alJ'inarion in delerItrining the
Jbape ofspace and time for the' finite beill¥' Deleuze's aim is to show how the
prodw::tiw: is ultimately a receptade ror the of prolr
tetMtic ldeu, beyoad the nonns ,of the oonCCl>luaJ CouldJung
he pointing, however oblicurely, to :lome poliIlible synthesis of
instinct and Kandan productive imagination? Even though Jung's theor-etical
iU'e obecure, Deleuze would certainly M'l'e real them interest.
and the faa r.haJ: he went on to take up the theory of arcber:ypet (panphraang
this same lect.ure ofjung's) indicat£'S thar he an opport'lmh:y for theoretical
:W.wnce here. Gtven the probk'ms we in 8erpon'£ thMl)' of
imtina., i:r is possible that Deleuze perceived that a Jungian modification of the
set':ond imtint:t mlgbt be the wa:y [0l"JI!r.lJ'd
MoR' :u:tltely, in order tOr the insliru:t l:Q romwmnatt- itseH" through
of the image, f'epreaentatiornd (;onKiowness
'lWukl to he Now thit suppression obl,i(lU&Iy be more
problematic in human beings., whose ctm!!ciowmetll ia dominated by
genu and its habits. Like 8l:rg!0Il and Deleuze, Jung also believes that humall
beings do not have mstinctJ in me lIa1ne way that animals qo. In fact., 'it is pm
man's turning awar &001 i.rurlnct - his opposing hiImelf to inmnct - that
cre-citei comciouaneu' . CM.Iizcd cOrulCiou&ness emerges with the differentia-
tion of the ego mat if. the result of an increased on lnt:elJigem. (;Ofl.
oc1oum.es4- ForJung, the consequence of the differentiation of1:he ego is the
tendentia1 •dc-<ti«crentiation' of instinct. He: seems to have two main models
fur the .mb&ilIu:nce of instinct in hwnan beings. On the one hand.
he ro maintain that b\srlnCf.I penist in to egnic
so thal instinCt ia always in a relation of homeo5Wk 'rompemarion' with inae),.
ligence. But In 'The Relations of the Ego to me UnooDlldoWl' ijung 1935) and
"The St3ges of l.J.&' another model that is perhaps not iJKomistent
with the former, but has more sopbilllieatian.
It can be argued that De1euze takes up this model in his theory of
problematic lde;l$ in and &pt!tjtitm. Odt:WiIC's insight i!J to lee bow
!:hit .mggeedon can be connected up wbh Jung's eb"ewhere that
in humans take the form of which ttan.sce'Ild the capa-
bilities Qf intelligent coMcioumeu. neleure mOW'll bow Kant'!> thfflry of
problematic Ideas \$ narrow gap through which the i1utincrual image
can return - by right - to baunt human i:nteUiglmce.
Thisjungian conttplion as {;onsi!tent with the leut florid interpretation. of
Bergson's theory of iosUnct in the' _ .chapter. When the intelli..
gence enoounteIs a problem, a pp would open up fur the return of lin
'iNtinct that bas bec.ome dWnt.erelted, telkolUcious, capciblt of reflecting
upon it6 object' (Bergson 1001: 176). SomnambuliWc ComcioUlll1ess, there..
lOre, is not necessarilyjust produced by I:t'aUl'nalic events, but also :Ml!elU itself
by e.xpJoiting the problematic: hola in mreDigence, re&}'l()uding creatively
through the lmagination. If there inlll:illCtual periodidtiei and
at work in human be1ng, then they can only be activated under
panicuIar ideal and intuitive conditions.
Kant, Jung and Sub-Representative Intuition
lung indioua in a of places that he undeman£k himllelf to be a
I.lmtian in hi! app:roach to the mind; he e'¥eIl claimed thlll nobody eoold
undentand his. wow withOut having first undentood thdr ba.
Despite his terminological Obscurity and careleslne!ill, Jw:&g may h<m.: betm
the only plIyCholo1fist w set about consmJ.cting a 'tramoc::endental· theoryof the
unconKiom. In his 191? T:niJtocl; in Londoo> he b \\)
the conformity of his notion of the uncorulcious "'ith .Kantilm
'The ego is the subject. of all penonal a.e:t.5 of The relation of ll:
psychic CODlCnt to ego furms the criterion of its fur no
content can be corulCioull it to a subject' (CW 8}.1n
order to count ;u representatkm3, aU must potential.ly be able
to be brought into rebtion to a ClOfIJlcious ego, Kantian phUOllOphy is often
held to be inimical In :a. theory of the u:n<:oDliCi<1Ut>. FOt' Kant, there: ill a tran..
an '1 think' that mUlt ;M;oompany an my reprellentatioru;
(Kant 1'182/1787: .8131). v.rd.bdmWundt. a influen<:ed by Kant'll
meaty of d-wtlSciousnes& or state& that the very idea. of an
'uncomciom representation' Vm:luUuTlf) is incoherent, as it is
mlpolllible to of a reprellentation that nobody h4'J (d. Wundl
1908-11: m, !54-6. 489). There are lUlconllC10Ull physiological RaUlS, but
these du not involve represenmtions,
Juog and Deleuze are sensitive to this charge, dur: their own inoorpt>
radomof the pbilolIophy of Kant.. To the ftnt counlle1"S with
the parry that the unconscious must in mat case be amsideret1 CO be
sub-representative: 'it. is not a question of MrepresentaUonI" but of sketebes,
planll or images' (CW 8: 1$). Deleuze too talks of the necessity of '!lub-
represencational dymuniams' beneath representational thought (DI 98; d
2M}. Deleure':s aM is first of all a book a,ga:i.lut
iatitm, and in it DelelUA! puts fonGrd the theory !hat 'spatio-t.emporal
dynamum,,' are llt the basis of the dynamics of the psyche. The problem of
the unroosdous would therefore be badty posed as long u it is fran'l¢d in
te:l'ms Qf repretentadon. On the In.mofwh;t.t we halle gleaned from Bergson
about haNe a new quettion: :Are pamve syntheses or spariotemponl
dymmtilml ttte, Me seeIDJI unlikely: a&
lk!rgsollllB.'Y'. it iJ perfe(;tIy poll$ible to be e:ooscious of duration and in dis-
(lrd.er.l of time such as paramnesia. the mbje<:t does not bck cODllCiousness.
On the other hand, if these spariotemporal bctors are in therrtllelves non-
<:onrepma.J, then they also annat be rendered for conscioU8D.e1J8
(mediau:d by t:0Ilttpttra.l no:rm.s). We can aeti\-"Cly marripulate representa·
dons in die mind; Delltuze might even admit, with Kant, mat in a formal
we are the JUbj«t of our conceptual Bul when it
comes co spatiotemporal &CION. his point is that we are S'td1ft!ct tD tl»mL Time
passes, duration accumulal1el. memory elndes us. d6j:l w immobilizes us,
space (distance, rises and m.tIa, wrtigo) encloses ar threateN nil,. without
our being abJe to do anything :Wout it. The apocalyptic thought of the end
of me world, md the it intpmes on the pJ1CtlUl( moment, ill an
example- of a spatiotemporal dynamism in experiCnce1il.
Thele ways of in.habiting space :and time are overlook:d in normal ex;peri..
encE:, as there space and time tend to be subordinated to me f1t1»
timJ neemof the understanding or intellect.. But their pure fl)l"IIlA are mible
at the I.imiIS of normal experienre. DelelJ.l'.e oonrellds that they are 114
t:ial for understanding biological development M they are foe lMnW
den. The embryo lives through in the womb wbicb
would destroy adult organi.snu; .$imibrly, the llWTOtic and are
<::aught up in spatiot.emporal tba1 pre<lude the continuation of a
p:ractieal elOSlenc.f. 'in effe<:t. 3 pure !pau!YlempQr.d
d}'1umiml, witb ne«:lliary participation in the forced movement, can be
experitmcM onht at the borders of liveable, tmder conditions beyond
which it would entUl the death l)f any weU-conSbtuted subject endowt'd with
independen<;e and <!nmty' (DR 11S), Deleu:re con€e1\1es of these dynamisms
as dhttt 'dramaciAdon.$' of Ideas or problems intO the medium of span> and
time. When they are lived through. the consciOU!lness involved is that of A
dream. 'If the (spatiotcmporal} dynamism is externdl t() concepn. and, all
such. a schema it is internal to ldelU and as $ut:h. a drama or dream'
(ibid.). If Oeleuze'g, theory 1$ defell.liible. then it is of immense importanCe:
net ontv doet it solve foUl old enigma in Kant's (thus helping to
complete Kant's Copernican revolution), bm it £1m illuminate the sp:uiotem-
poral stIUClllJe of mental disorders, an imprompm, but all too
rare example of what il 'larval ili in the tfucW1iWI1 afret' his paper 31
the French Society for Philosophy in 1967 (''11K' Method of Dnmarisation');
Take the C3lle of:an o1:»essiYe ClIfllpuWve" where the bep5
handkerchie& and a;re perpemallycut. fint ill twO. tMn halves:are
tut the cord for the bell in tbe dining room regularly shortened,
and the ben gell'J t:l.mer to the ceiling; everything gnawed at, miniat.urised.
put intO OOUll. This is indeed a drama, m the Km;c: that the organ-
ises a agitateS it, while in thuipace he an Idea ofthe UJl.COU-
scious, An ang:tY fit is a dr2matisation chat brval {Dr 108:3'1
Ius a spatiotempOral (Qnn: the shrinking and CUtting of
the bdI are a$fllUiote1nporal dynamism, and are 'lived' at a different level than
the evel;'day of the patient. 'Everyday life is full of dramari'lat:ions.
Somt' psyrnoanalym ll.iIe the word, I believe, to deilignat:e the mO\'emenrs by
...i\kh logkaJ thought Is dis&oIved In pure spano-temporal determinaooIU, lU
in (Dl 108).
'Kant, Jung and Super-Representative Ideas
WuuduJ..so r.ril.ici1:e5 hif teadler Fe.;hner', 'l11}'Stical intllition' of mpen::omci.OUl
:md subcoNci.ous mental states, which he say! borders on the hypothesis of
double WtuclOUSlle:l1J.:lIl This lau.er is impossible a plurality of ('.QI"l.
'wQuld have to be mnwmneow;ly PRSetlt in one and the
inmvid:u:al' (ibid.: In his 1954 essay 'The Nature of the jung
give! a review of the h:im:lJ:y of 1M ooriOIl of the lJIlCOOlIt('ioU$ mCetman phi·
losophy and p$ychology, refe:rring ;u length to Wundt's tare rejec:rian of the
con<:ept; (CW 16:!-5), There he 10 Wundt's charge about double
consciou.mMl, He Wundt fur not $Uing that conllcionsness em
alternate without
Although De1elli:e did llot respond {Q Wundt.,. his on the merely
formal, empty stnJI::ture of the l:r.'inIKendentlll ruJJj«:C. as to the empir·
la1 tgV DR58. 87) would have helped hUn disarm the objection, The syn-
thesi1lttg !It'.fUCtUl'e of cOnscioumesl bY Kam maY include a plurality
of empirical egos or selves. The artinldes of the ego may change oYer a
liferime, for lmtantt, Of' even in a m.gle day; a& long at! some 501"t of Il}'IIthesis
ootween these egos can be made, there i:> no contradiction to Kanliatt epi$te-
moJogy. In Karl AmeIits's rormut.ation, persi5tent reprellentation of3l1 -r
need not be the representation ofa permanent "1
(Ametik.$ 2000: 1M).
However. [)elelUe does have an aa:Qum of me 'super.egok' destination of
Cognition. In the 'paradox of inner sense' in dIe (If l'urt RP.I.stm, !<ant
had claimed that the &ct that I mwt experience everything p;t.'!Sively under th.e
lbnn of time indeed suidtv precluded any encounter with a 5pOt1Wlt'OW '(
t!link'. DeIClUe infers from this that 'the subject can .. , represem l'tHrwn sport.
tant>Jty only at! that of an Other' (DR 58'!. Deleuze thU$ sugg'e!t5 that il is the
very In:lpollliil>tlitv of appropriating the 'I think" il;i one'$ own thai: Elli ow the
guararllet' of l.tJ; purity, and it is thi5 that helps us ascend from Jtage of
ol1eclon to that of 'r.epetil:ion'. In Differmce and &prl:itwn I>eLeuze I:U1'm (0
Rkoeur's aCCOunt of the :relauon of to the tJ:1il.rJSCelldnw '1
think', Ricoeur that Freud's aa:ount of narcissism that any
cidence of the '1 think' with its owtl being 11> open to $l:I1lpiaon that it i£
a false. narcissistic rio 'As liOO«t U the aporlktlc trn.th, I tJsiM. 181R unem:i.
it is blocked by a pseoolH:\'idtm<::e; an abortive Cogito has ttken eN:
place of the fim ttulh of refiectton, I think. I tmr.. 'Deleuze and Rkoeur agree-
that the fundamental of Kant's.. HusserI's and Freud's theories of sub-
jectivity is. that there is no of the '1 think' - it is apodlcm: yet at the
same time always inadequately presented. There Ii alwaya the J:lOI58wility that I
am decrivcd about the purity of any act of self<onsr.kJusness. Ricoeur sta,l;e$
th:at this peqx:tlDl introdures ;3 fraettlre (fii.rm:) into the
relation the 'I think' and the 'I a.m' (Rkoeur 1965: 878). [)e}elUe
takes up thi! notion (){ a fr:Lctured Cogito in Ricoeur and relat.es it to Kant's
theory of the: In the !«tiQtl on the ParaIogUmli in the first Critique.
Kant too emphaMreI thaI W disjunction of the formality of die 'I think' frow
any experienceatselfbood. OJ from any substantiall1otion of the selL
Delewe ro follow Kant in ascribing any syntheu:s of represenl:U.ion
(i.e, apprehension, reproduction oc recognition) to the '1 think'. The umb of
the Kantian 'I think', Dde\W:. ill that it is too ptm for this kind of
:at:ti'tttY, should rather be te!erred back to the 47ntbeses
aboill by the ego (d. DR. 98). MO$t of what we caD our 'mooghu' are
Some of these are not rell1Jy thoughts at all. bm: are .lJIIJOciadomofthe
imaginatiOl} derived from habit and l,Ilemory. Some of what WIt caD 'thoughts'
mP thougbl3. but are not yet beCllU!le they are In a logk of
recognition or represemaiion that Is irself :it too4 of the pracdcat need for
attention to life, Although DltJeuze appea.rIl to be tahng Wi in a diret;aon that
very fur from com::eption$ of the Unti.an ot' &:int
hln1Bl!1f also that the t:r2.f1!Cendenta! ill nOl to be conlh.1led with the
sclf. What we usually refer to as 'I' 15 for Kant just the clmpirical self, As far
the t.ranIlCendenw 'I' b concerned. we Otlly tNer meet a mere 'consciousness
ofsvnthew' _That is: the mere awareness that there is a synthetic process going
OfL 8y denying m i.mmedtate awarenelS of 'our' identity with the subject of
this synthetic proceu, Kant is thWl asking us to mMe on iIit:Jltijic5ti<m ",-ith the
3Ctive 1k)Ul'<:e of this synthesis as an Other. 'The can .•.
It$ own lporuaneity only lill tbat ohn Oilier' (DR 5,8). To paraphrase
San" the subject would tbm be the 'lou, He. She or It that thinks: but never
the mM (.elf or ego). Moreover, as a tmnscendenml philowpher, DeleW"£ ree-
ogn.lzell that he lIlill needs $ome po!lllibility of an active, spontaneous subject,
in Qrder to pound the uititnatc unity of syntheses. .But Deleuze statea that the
ultimate nature ('in and for itself') of this active gyntherlis is in fact only
revealed in the thotJlbt of the eternal retu.m. In rm.d
Deleu:ze openly Nitemcb.e'. notion of eternal return as the
bon' or Kantian ethks. He write! that 'the eternal return givea tboe will a rule
u rlgorottl at the Xlmdan one , •• As all e&d.::31 thought, the eternal return is
the new fonnuhnwn of the pr.t.Ctp synthe$U: ,INaliIl, will it <1
wa, JhIJt ymi rJJso unll (Nt> DR 7). modification (dilt-
CWlsed on p. 37 above) does not coUapse the super-egok aspeC( of
me notion of eternal return, but it doer. place It beyond lhe reach of law.
In J.);jfmmt and OOlUlnlcfJi a relationship of super-nprn-
sentariortril '.J>roblematic Ideas' to sub-representarlonal spatiotemporal inten-
sitie., mediated by conceptual represenwion, The path of individuation
invoh:a '3. lem exercisell' (J( the mind au:ried OUt
breyf:ond represenr.aUoo, in which un<:OI'laClOUS Ideas to
!hape and mmape the eontd.oumeM of the subject (who 13 both a tbin.king
and a plWive 'The notion of the Idea i$ altio to be bmd
inJung, as weD as in RanL
[n 'The S«qo of Life' Jung writes that while 'd'ie lite of cMJi!led
man' hall become by at the expense of inllbnel, mtelJi..
gena: iuelfbu its own limits, which in turn alll)'1olll inIlidnetual to
return. The problem with ia that it mcOW1ten.
intractable problems. 'h is the growth of <'''Onac1OWlnmlll which we thank
wr the exktenc:e of problerm . Allohl il$ we are lltiI b1 nature
are llnCotUICIDUS, and we live in dle !JeCurity of inmnct which no
problems' (GW 8: 3'8a). Jillli'li Il1UMlie in this ldendfL-
cation of a of human irueUipt:t!t r.brouIh wbich the
irulai:ru::wa1 futm of (On!lCiousneM ow rewrn. lakes upJung'. model
in hi! theory of problematic Ideu in SNl 'W;u, DOt 0Ire of
the most important points ofJa:mg't theory be fuwld here; the force
of "queuiofling'" in the unoomcious, the «mceptioo ofwe .. an
of "problcm6" :wd "wU'" Drawing 001 the
led. Jung to the of a pt'<JCei5 of dlffttenciacion more profound man
the (see ('1'ltJ! tJte mul tJw UII"",·
(DIt.: HI). Tuthd away in dooUlOU!. this is :an impoItant tctierenee.
taking us beyond Deleuze', more e<qlliril intellectual in lW; rlwiOfT
Qf problematic Ideas, to Kanrian and Leibnizian coneeption& of non-repre-
sentational thought,
:Bmh. Jung and Delcuze appear to that PfOCe'iIj of indMdwuion
is driven by a series of 'I\Ilth problem! wb.i.ch tie '\UKQllKWwJ' in
the rtlllC that they elude the w:tMty of •.•
unconscious . . . COD(ef1lII probleml and queuiQNI which can never he
tn the great appositions or the 0YeI'3.D effects that are ttllt in con·
scitmmellS' (DR 108), A problem am dude conJciousflew in a very panicub.r
way. A real problem ill a pecutiar kind of cognitM: Ul dlal the thin.keT
is never surewbether they have correctly posedthe probkm. The problem may
be in teml6, but if it reaDy • II problem. cJu:.n ane
bas to tre:lt one's represeutaQona1 framing t:Jf the problem _ and
leep returning to the 'underlying' problem. on the lookout for a
freSh perspective_ There .. thus a aenae in which agen\lineproblcm i8 >J>Ub..
reprellentational', <:'ren if it is wlVQlib 1t
is a problem it has O<>t found a place within .rM 11£
dOD, NOW; it roDIdoosnes is defined through the capacity ibr'
then it is wlid to mne that problems are 'unconlldous.' in the
aria teWJe that ill they hOlt"er ouuide the order of
()ne cannot be COtllK'ious (If them in the llliUDe way U ODe conadous of an
ol:?iect of a ronceptwlJ representation. The problem breaks through first tV 3.
problem jlr conscious representation. and then (Jf a problem dw. to
lIOIDething neglected in the very conceptuaf hienrchy itself, the acdvation of
which 11 bound to spell 3.n ordeal of some sort.
does not rnak.e it dear bow mongIy we are to take the notion of
'problem' here. There are perhaps three powers of mtr3Ctability to- a. problem.
FbI. could be empirically problematic. due to a lack of empiricai
tot inAantt. Second, there can be prob1em& Of' ordeals that are
pan:ic:ul&r 10 a pa.nkubr stage ofindi:vid:uation. Leaning on Bergson's theory
ofdumtion, roggc5lll that individual development is punctU31ed by a
se'ries of intemive thresholds whkh must be oW'r<:ome to reach me next
plateau of inten.lity, Third, an [<lea can be 'problemadc' in the Kantian rnm·
!ll:cndemal aen5e,juzt as the Ideal QfSelf, World and God are intrimically and
'ptoble:matie roncepra', because their oqjecta cannot he known or
expemll£ed. but ne'I>'eI'the1eu tnust be tJwugIJt (Kant 1782/1787: A254/BS10),
But be>i'ond thMe le'feb of intnlclabiliry - empiric:a1, tranKendental and
genetic - there 18 a final approach to the 'prob1emadc' unconscious: !IOIlIt: sort
of contemporary. lttheologica1 a cak:uiWl of the c:osmoe •
Problem: there are recurring aIlWllons in Oeleuze to the traditions of Neopla>
ronimJ, Henneticism, the Renabaante magie, the occult. but a1waylt In the
<:.ontnt. of the death of the God ormonotheism. Here we shall fOCUI briefly on
the empirkal and transeendenml senses of 'problemj. In the folWwing two
dlapters. we wiU proceed taw:iI.rd.I the 'e:soteric' di.mensionfl of the problem.
and attempt to shed light on Deleui:c'. suggestion thatJungianismis
ically to IA:ibnimn
'The empiri('ult inurpretation j! the most general in scope. and the lea...t
1>0 is l.tiefW to mtroduce the buk Idea. According to thrs
Ulterptl.$tti<m we could say that anythingcan be a pt'Qb1em ali long fJ$ it eludes
representational cognition for period of duration. This it; a rnan'Ve con·
ception ohmromciol1S problerns, Thm, if a fiell5ation, an or an image
resisted subsumption byc.onsdous then forJung and Deleuz.e.
that would initiate tbe attt:mpc [.() exprclill it in the non-representational meam
ava.ilable to the (unage or symbol. dr<!Am or or general
di!ltoniorul of the field). An 'cannol be perceived aT
'repre-sented'. in contraSt to the perceptible psychic phenomena'; it .\$ 'irrep-
reseTJubJ.e' (CW 8: 436). Once a rauOi'lally problem is hit upon,
however, 'the deeper \.avem of the uncoMam.l$, the primordW are
activated and the traJUf'ormatJon of the pen<inality can get lJll(\er \Oo-ay' lCW8:
44I}, The impersonal. archefYPal uncon&Ciow, is awakened when the 4Ul:!ject
finds themselves 'in an 'impossible' ... tn liuc:h $l[uatious., if they art'
lleriW$ enough, archetypal dreams we lIkely to ocCW' wfilCh POint a
possible line of advance one would have thought of h. is this
kind of Mtu300n that constellate the anhety}:'Je' with the .grea.teit regulariCY'
(L'W 8; 440).
In 'l'n5tinCl and the UncOnKi0U8',]ung tends to acknowledge Platonic
origins of the notion of archetype 3ll 'pure fonn' or .Idea, and reports that he
h3$ t:.a.ken (he term itself &om Hellenistic (the and earh'
Cllri3ti.an philosophy (SIAugusUn.e and Dlonysius the
ebewherr he refers to Kant's theory <lIS another influence. ]ung'$ ref.
to Kant" umn 'archetype' lnoo.w.,tenl and milleading, but :rome
of them suggest that did in bet have aft 00scu.re apprehension of what be
needed frolll Kant's philosophy, For after having in the on
in£tiru::t that Kam reduced the Platonic to the. categories of the
understanding, in PS'J'Jw/ogioU T'JIttfS (1921) he IJoetl 00 to quote the relevant
paMages in ltatll about Ideas. in :rnppon of his QWn notion of an.:h¢types, He
cites Kant'" definition in his 1Agi£ of Idea a& a 'rational concept who!ioe
object is Ilot to be found in experienJCe' and which cont.ll.im the 'aTChetype
[lhbUdl of the me .:>f lbe understanding' (CW 6: 438, d. ct. Kant 1974:
97) 'fJ for K3tJl, he says, an Idea is 'a trn:rl.Kcn&nta1 which $ liuch
the boun4h of the expenencC!llble' (CW -138}.:Kant sugge/ll:'l that
Ideas are 'problematic coru::epts', their cannot be known or
experiena:d. but fI'tUS1be thought (Kant 1782/1'787; MS41B310).
Jung explicitly tires K3nt', warning that 'altboop we must say of dle o::an-
SlCendentll \;Qftcept.s of ft".aI$011 dl.a.t tbej art Ufetu. dI:Js is not by any means
to be taleu as signifying lila! they are SUp«f}UOUll and "oid' (A329/B386).
Although lde'dll may only be a.s Kt 'comtitudW!' £01' our
nperienoe. in a ,erue they are COl1lltitu.live of the internal stroeture of
thOughL Ideti are necessary conditioN of thought. if of Kant
C'fIen Sugges13 that tfH:re shQuld be a final Tt-amcendental Df:ducrion of
beyond the centrAl Dedu<:tinn of Categories (A669/twj91). Dekw:c's ron-

uiburion is to nOlke bow much weight Kant is quiedy putting on the
theory of Ideas.. In Dijfrnmt.:f1arui. &ptt.iiftm, he seizes on Kant's mggescon ihat
Ideas are to be taken :IS 'problematic OOl'lcq>u'. and goes on to ll'Uggest that jf
ldea$ are 'problematic' that might be becallllC 'conveneh-, problems are Ideas'
(DR 168). PerMpt mCTe ...e notjUlt ttk.u - perhaps evc;ry genuine
l4L$ the struct:J.u1e thaI Kanf auribl.lted to Ideas.. Perhaps the activityof conceptual
<:6 intellectual is itM::lf already conmlioned by another type of c0gni-
tion: ihe poeing of proble.rr6. After all, didn't Kant 5aY in the Prebce to the tint
that 'reason ... Jtal'1ll'e to answer itl questions' (Kant 1787:
Kant Dn'l!He:w:d to remind us that JdeauTT e1lsentially 'problemaric'. Con·
pm1»ems are Ideas. Undollbcedly, he sbO'li1's that Ideas lead WI into
fuIse problema, but this is not their mOl.!t profound if, .accord·
ing to Kant, reason does po$e &lse problems and uK:Idore itself pet! rise
to illusion, this is becaUlle in the tint pLu:e it is the faculty l)f po$i.ng
in (DR 168)
TIlls introdUCe!> a radicaJ new dimenllion intQ Kantian thought, all it meanJI
that knowledge and experience are not. ultimately to be Ken in terms of me£e
di.tcretf :JCU but a.Iwa;'s in termIi ofsolutions to problems. Estab--
lished KnO'iliedge. in other worm, .iii really nothing bur realm of
lhhed solutions. If IdeM are to be thO'llghr. p.rirnarily as problems. um implie6
mal they must ame3.dy have their own and (onn as prob/imt.9 that
$tand sU'Ucrur:aIly ouWde achieved empirical 'feeding' and even
conditioning knowkdge. 'A proposition com:eived as a response is always a
part.i<::ul:.lr :rolution, a case comidered for judI. a!:lfltra£dy and apart from the
superior synthesis which relates it, along with other to a problem 85
piOOlem' (DR 1&7). hi dlfs!Sente, Delcuze contends that probleml u-anscend
their 1lOlutiorn;. and even after they h:.rtIe solved saWfaoonly by science,
they $till retain their power to pr<Y'fOke thought.
Rut what llCOOWlU fur thiI poairive power of pmb1am or Ideas, though?
Surely not wcry problem is M:ructul"tld in thi! wa.yf Although hal a.
complex and der.ailed theory of how problemll Qr Ideas are sttucr:ured, hi! ill
elu!live wlwJ it comes to gMng Sometimes it WJ if every
'dOIrulin' of ol:!jem has its own 'Single problem, SO Uw there is CI of
phYSla, a problem ofbi.ology, society. language. !:he psyche, etc. (d, DR 184£.).
F..aeh <>f these domaim is the field for a disrinet di.lIcipline that with Ii
distinct, probkm. But Deleuze followingJung, that there
are problems proper to the uncOIUCiow as weD, and wbkh drive the path of
Uldilliduation. 'The I.1m;onsciOUll. . ooncems problenu and questions in their
dilferentt in kind from answerwoIudom' (DR 108), It is this line of thought
we will Co.now M-re. e:lpti<;it re.terence w jung's theory of
can serve as a guide. Jung is aIlIo convinced an eternal 't:J'aIUl(:endence'
car. be ascribed to problern.6; 'The seriow prob"letnl1 in life ..• are never u.1:ved.
100 l()J
If ever dley should appear to be k i.<l11Ute sign that lIOtnethlnf hill$ been
Io.t. The meaning and of a probiem seems to fie not in itll solution
burmourWOlkJng at it incessantly' (CW B:
Birth, Death and SexuaJ DilIerence
we ha\'C c:beJUftp. and Kantian origins of fH:lew:e's theory that the
unconllclow mw be tabn as the site of 'prob&ems', rather than Freudian
chives. But at one point in muJ. Dclewe goes on to
chat ifW'e want to find out what the true problems of the uru;<>fI.!dow
are, we nevenbelesi to IlU"n lo a uniqul!' IeJ;t in the Frew:hM oorpt.U., b's
'Serual Tbtoriei<>fChildren' of 1008. he affitmsJun,g's problematic
<m:r Freud's oppoaidanaJ t;;onception of unconllci0U5 drive vs.
conscious ego> Dd!:lU'e IleVcrtbcl_ writta that 'birth and de>ltb, md the dif·
fcreru::ebet'ften these1tts, are the comp.k:x. themes of before the;.-
are the simple terms of m opp<»itkm' (DR F« a brief moment in this
text, Freud had argued tlw. the duld's w» a fundamental
ph. of its psycb.osa:ual to the point dl<1t 1he child's fantasies
about taatrarion and ineat am he }:)a(:k to iUl queadons and theorie!
about. mown hinh and iu sex.ual identD¥. This theory did not iaat long,
perhaps becawJe Freud liOO11 realm:d Ita pImirnity to lung's more
appf03lCh co un«tfi$ciOWl.!9
In 'The 8e:x:'ual Theories of ChUdrm' Freud cbiJ:nJ tbat the ({Ueationing
pl'OCeS4 in the child is UIIla1Jy inlt:igated byJ.i.r.drywith &ibliDp. <the product of
a vital exigency, .as though minkin. wert entruited with the tu1. of preventing
!.he rectlJTlm(eofsuch eveDt!t' M the binh ora rm1 (SE'9= 213). Newtthcless.
'the ehild'lt thinking soon independent of this and hence-
furw:atd goes on operacing as a. self-sustained drive for Freud gQel!
00 to allot extremely i:mponant rule [Q theie adventut'e!. in thought,
daiming Wtl the 'nuclear ofnemomill brought into being by their
repR'll5ion. The child that the parents' explanation of birth through
stOr:ies about lIttlrU and 10 l<>rth is a and is furced to theorize on ia
own about the of its ownbirdl. In Jungian terms, Frewi
dellcribes the emergence of a split between conscious and in
temu of iii 'The let of viem which are bound up with
being "good", but a1Io with .... cetilllldon of reflection. heroine !he dominant
while lhe other 1ICt, fur which the child'lwnlk
has obtainedfresh evidente, but which are not suppollCd to .count.
become the $Upprea&ed and "unwmcious" ones.. The nuclear complex of a
newwu is in this way brought into being' (SF. 9: 2H). At this point, the
naclear COO1pJeX Unot yet identified with the this identifi·
cation linally comi.t:l« about 1n the Rat Man case history of 1909. This account
of the of the nudear complex 18 mikinslr different to the lal:lJ!r
in tbal it:. supmthatt.be fimo't!)ect of primal repreeon iI the qu.
doning, tbeorizln8 1ICti¥ity of tJxo child. not its incestUOus
account of the genesis of the even implies that tM of the
UJl<:OnKKJu& &Omehow oontinuetl the questioning and problem:aWing accivUy
of the <:hil(l. During the period from 1906 to 1909, Freud had
come the influence <>fJung's views, and fu1d begun to admit that
might be a plUl'llfily of·complexCi'. some of being soda1 or e\'e\l pnm.
iional, not just ($eC Freud's 1907 2ddiuOWl to 'l"m of
EW'ryflqj SE 6: 22-.lt). 'Sexual MllYit prob:abtr the high-waW'
mark of .'reud:! tnt1:uen££< by]Wlg, and points ta'll\Wdt the kind of theory
we have been extracting from Jung in &he preceding paga. Nevertheless,
Freud's framework for understanding primary proce.. as too m.eclIanistic to
make: nmclJ senle of the paaibitity that the unconscious might ilXJf be prob-
1emarizingr md nothing funheT of it. Although Freud a on
'The Drivefot' tcnQWkdge' in the 1915 VMIlion oftbe 17mIeW01Jf.miNnem, ttl
he there reduces to the dri:\fe. to a. combination of the fOr
tnMltty and scopophilia (SE 7: 194).
Thm turn f.D Freudrs notion of 'lleXUa.! is not at all an
enbrace of Freudi:.mism. but amounts to a contInuation of hii Jungian ren-
deacla From our rurrent penpective, Freoo.', $ugption that children only
imtiallv come to 1hrougb me ofc.ertain
(where do 1 come from? wiry are and girls dit:'rer.enl?) cannot
but Ittnind \Ill of t:h.e- problemadc Ideal that hO'lt\l!r outside of
Like 'bow does It world begin,' or 'are there gods?', these problems mdn:
fundamental thoupt. but cannot be answered by empiriCB! cog-
nition. The light oCintelligent cOllllCiowmCllS has Ipn:adi:ngout upon all
the p.nu::d<:al activities of the dilld, but now it come; up apinst II realm of
darknmwhicll cannot be further pettettated. The i.ntiftent <>fthe child
borf:s. a hole into itll empirkal (onceplion of the world, arousing a thinllM
that cannot be by the anlWr'elll tha( lU'e 'available f'rotn social
of the
'The child is a metaph)'llical being', say and GwuWi in
but 'iJuJ is (2)> orphtm' (AO 49). One of the profoundlyanfi.psydlo-
analytic: of is that 'parmtal fipre&are in no lIt"lt)' organ.
isen' of. the libidmaJ at war;' in the child. but 'rather indUCtOlll or
WmuU oharyin8, impart lhat triggt:r of an mti:rety different
n:amre, are e:radowed with what amounDto an in.diif:uencewith
reprd to the lAimulus' (AO 92). In the chUd • <:QmpleWy
prtlOCQIpied by the lrign! emitt.ed by the parenlll to the chUd. III V.
l..aam a dialectic <>f infamiIe desire which neceuarily rowardll
in an aberrac:t, dia.lec;ticized of the OedIpus compln. Rut
Oeleuze and GuaJ:mri lbe'lle parental • in ethological teJ":m$ »
t.rigIering stimuli of autQuomOtt& But are othet atimuli, and
other processes, and multiple milieus for the of fbe!le
In nne ofhDi luminoualate OPuscules on the theory:af the1Jl1CONCioua, 'Wh:al
Olildren Say', DereW'e the point: 'The !ather md D:lOIher are not
the coordinates of everylbing d:w is in the unoontcioUA. 'J.'bcre il
ne'ilCt' a moment when children are not already plunged intO an actual milieu
in whieb are moving about. and in which the as peJ."SOO.J $imply
play th-e rok-!l of openen or closers ofdool'll, guardians of tf1rellholds,
ton or dist'onneaors of (CC 62). 'Doubde!lll one can M:i.rwthat, in the
beginning m, stimulus - the Oedipal inductor - is a real OIgani.:r.er. But
bcliffing" an operation of a (ODlICious or namn:, an extrinJlic.':
perception rather than an operation of the WlCOtUciO'US upon iaelr (AO 92\.
It ito not necessarily that anything has been. into the child's llnc.on--
(un.leM there has Ii crn.uma). Rather. the child is continually prob-
:asking questions of the world and. taking the lat:ter's hesit.a6om in
lmS'iftring very ,mowdy. 'What does it mean to be ativcl What does it. mean lO
breathe? ""'bal am p' Theae questions hate nothing to do with the libido in
freud's sense.
Chapter 4
The World as Symbol:
Kant,jung and Deleuze
For some occupant.'! of the twentieth-century esoreric underground, Jung's
emphasis on symbolism was the key 00 an understanding of sexuality which
surpassed Freud's in range and richness. In his 1916 review of
andSymlJols in Vanity Fair, Aleister Crowley wrote 'let us that the tedious
and stupid attempt to relare every human idea 00 sex has been relegated to
oblivion; or if you prefer to put it that way, that we must now interpret sex in
vaster symbols' (Crowley 1916: 79).1 Sexuality and esoteridsm had often gone
hand in hand in the nineteenth 00 twentieth century. Johann Malfatti's
"1'M Anarchy and HWarth, ofKnowledge, for which Deleuze wrote an introduc-
tion in 1946, is a perfect example. An extravagant blend of nature-philosophy,
numerology and Tantrism, this book (entitled MtJt.lusis in French) was held by
Rene Guenon to be in pan responsible for initiating the French occult revival
in the late nineteenth century. This curious work contains disquisitions on the
anima and animus, the hennaphrodite, the world-egg and the 'subtle body';
all sexo-cosmic themes that occur in Jung and Deleuze. An altogether differ-
ent approach to sexuality is going on here than in psychoanalysis. According
to this line of thought, Freud's approach overlooks certain fundamental
aspects of human sexuality, such as the fonns of consciousness involved in
sexual desire and its paths to consummation. the relation of sexuality to the
supersensible and the symbol. In his memoirs, Jung writes:
In retrospect I can say that I alone logically pursued the two problems which
most interested Freud: the problem of 'archaic vestiges' and that of sexual-
ity. It is a widespread error to imagine that I do not see the value of sexual-
ity. On the contrary, it plays a large part in my psychology as an essential-
though not the whole - expression of psychic wholeness. Rut my main
concern has been to investigate, over and above its personal significance and
biological function, its spiritual aspect and its numinous meaning, and thus
to explain what Freud was so fascinated by but was unable to grasp ... Sex-
uality is of the greatest importance as the expression of the chthonic spirit.
That spirit is the 'other face of God', the dark side of the God-image. (Tung
1961; 192)
From his earliest work, Deleuze can be found seizing upon and investigating a
series of bizarre and idealist ideas about sexuality. As wen as Sacher-Masoch's
[ can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, 'My dear Jung, promise me
neYer to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all.
You see, we mwt make a dogma of it, an unshakeable bulwark.' He said that
to me with great emotion, in the tone of a &ther saying, 'And promille me
this one thing, my dear son: that you will SO to church eYery Sunday'. In
some astonishment I asked him, 'A bulwark - against what?' To which he
replied, 'Against the black tide of mud' - and here he hesitated for a
moment, then added - 'of occultism'. (Tung 1961: 173)
accounts of ritualized sexuality, and lung's anima and animm, Deleuze
develops ideas from Ferenczi's notOrious recapitulationist fantasy 1luJlo..ua
(1924), and, after writing on Malfatti'& nineteentlHentury Tantric Nf.Ihlr-
phiJ.osophie in his earliest phase, continues to develop Malfatti's theme of the
esoteric sexual symbolism of the hermaphrodite, through Prou.st and Sips and
intO Anti-Oedipus itself. All these references make use of ideas about sexual
cOJlilCiousness which are quite different to Freud. Here too, sex is interpreted
in 'vaster symbols'. ForJung and Deleuze, all sexuality has an occluded super-
sensible dimension. We cannot be excused from citingJung's recollection of
an encounter with Freud at this point:
Dekuu and the Unconscious
In Deleuze's use ofJung in his 1961 'From 8acher-Masoch to Masochism' and
afterwards, we find sexuality itself swept up and mingling with these very dark
tides. In the later version, Coldness and CroeUy, Deleuze writes that 'there is a
kind of mysticism in perversion: the greater the renunciation, the greater and
more secure the we might compare it to a "black" theology where
pleasure ceases to motivate the will and is abjured, disavowed, "renounced

the better to be recovered as a reward or consequence, and as a law' (M 120).
This is perhaps especially true of the first, explicitly Jungian version of
Deleuze's theory of masochism. In the early article, the central thesis is that
male masochism must be conceived as a perverse realization of the fantasy of
incest - on condition that incest is taken in its 'more profound' significance as
a symbol of rebirth, asJung claims. Deleuze builds onJung's reformulation of
the psychological import of the incest problem in order to claim that
masochism is a symbolic operation by which enjoyment is obtained from the
punislunent that is received for the violation of the lawof the father, through
the punishment being undergone for the sake of the mother, whose image
guides the 80n towards a <second birth'. the future world-historical birth of a
'new man' outside the patriarchal order. This self-punishment of the
masochist is achieved only by the maintaining of a regressive re-actualization
of a primordial of the mother. Deleuze sums his thesis up in a bold for-
mulation: 'It is the image of the Mother. it is the regression to this image.
which is constitutive of masochism and forms its unity' (8M 130).
Throughout this text, there is an emphasis on 'primordial' or 'original'
and symbols, with Deleuze going so far as to say that 'in truth, all as
symJJol in thI (SM 131). But at the same time, masochism is a
perversion and not a neurosis. MMochism is a direct ritualization of sexuality, a
living fantasy, whereby the masochist deliberately harnesses his sexual forces in
reality, not repressing anything hut at the same time transforming his libido in
the service of a higher end. Masochism for Deleuze is a d1'ama.tization of the
Idea of rebirth, where the sexual relationship becomea the vessel for a living,
symbolic incarnation of the ideal meaning of incest.
In the last chapter, we sawhowJtmg claimed that the primary layer of reality
is 'symbolic'; in this chapter, we explore the notion of symbolism in more
detail. Mter examiningJtmg's theory of symbolism, we will turn to De1euze's
attempt to gt'Otmd his ownJtmgian notion oCthe symbol in Kant's aesthetics.
Finally, we will be obliged to return to Deleuze's early remarks about the
esoteric approach to symbols in his preface to Malfatti, which are shown to
underlie and make more intelligible Deleuze's later, 'mature' suggestions
about the nature of the symbol.
Jung on Symbolism
The seeds for Jtmg's decision to make a break from Freud were sown in 1909
on the journey back from the USA, after having spent seven weeks solid with
Freud on a lecture tour. Jung's disagreement about the primacy of sexuality
had been festering away in the meantime, and Freud's reluctance to submit to
dream analysis increased the tension of the voyage. ThenJung had a dream
which made a deep impression upon him. There are three accounts of this
dream, all conflicting in some respect, but I will give the version to which
Deleuze and Guattari refer. Jtmg was wandering down through the levels of a
large, complex rococo house, and reached the cellar; but this led to another
cellar, which appeared to be of Roman origin. A hole tmder a. slab led in. tum
to a tomb filled with prehistoric pottery, bonea and skulls. The dust was tmdi&-
turbed, and he felt that he had made a great discovery.! WhenJung told Freud
the dream during the voyage bome, Freud was chiefly interested in. the sk.ulls:
'He returned to them repeatedly, and urged me to find a wish in connection
with them.' Freud says the dream indicates a single death wish, against his
(Jtmg's) wife. Jtmg was surprised and pointed out that there were several
skulls, not just one' (Bennet 1966: 64).& Deleuze and Guattari cite Bennet's
version of the story more than once as an example of Freud's monomaniac
strategy of interpretation (d. ATP 30; D SO). If Freud could claim to have
'deconsttucted' the drive, his interpretations nevertheless tended to regroup
the drives and their objects arotmd one single psychogenic drama.. Dream or
symptom elements were always reduced to the jamHioJsituation of the patient.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is this stress on the familial which is at the
root of Freud's inability to deal with psychotics, whOle fantasies and halluci-
nations tend towards the cosmic and metaphysical. It is much harder to relate
the forces which assail the psychotic to the symbolic matrix of the family.
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that when he insists that it ill important that
there were MlJeml skulls, not just one or two, Jtmg has himJJelf a.lready
' I ~
' , . ~
The World as SymIJDl: Kant, jung and Deleuu
descended to the level of unconscious activity inhabited by schizophrenics.
Schizophrenic fantasies and hallucinations, they claim, tend to involve 'multi-
plicities'.4 Freud's Wolf Man shows the same trajectory when he dreams of a
number of wolves observing him from a tree. Freud reduces the multiplicity of
wolves to one wolf, and then says that this is a displacement of the tather, but
the multiplicity of wolves already indicates that Freud's starting premise is
problematic. The indeterminate multiplicity of wolves (or skulls) introduces
two further interpretative possibilities, which lead us towards a purer concep-
tion of the proper activity of the unconscious. First, it raises the possibility that
it is something about wolves or skulls tJurmulvts that has become an issue in the
dreamer's unconscious. In this case, wolves or skulls might have nothing to do
with any personal memory. This is significant as it suggests that the uncon-
scious process ofdreaming can also be populated by impersonal contents; nOl
everything in the unconscious is related to repressed representations. The
wolf no longer appears primarily for representational consciousness but for a
special symhclU type of cognition. Dreams too are composed of symbols, and
therefore must be interpreted in a way that is proper to symbols. The second
way of interpreting the multiplicity of wolves involves appeal to the particular
ethology of the wolf, and the nature of the 'pack'; we return to this in the final
chapter. For the moment. we Stay with the notion of the symbol. Deleuze's use
of Kant's notion of symbolism is predated by his use of Jung's notion of
symbolism. So we should look closer atJung's definition of a symbol before we
press onward to Kant.
Jung's critique of Freud's concept of symbolism is crucial to his critique of
Freud and is explicitly taken up by Deleuze in his Jungian phase. Deleuze
argues that 'symbols do not allow themselves to be reduced or composed; on
the contrary they are the ultimare rule for the composition ofdesires and their
object, they form the only irreducible data of the unconscious ... The irre-
ducible datum of the unconscious is the symbol itself, and not an ultimate sym-
bolised. In truth, all is .rymhol in the unconscibw, sexuality and death no less than
anything else' (8M 131). Following jung, Deleuze identifies symbols with
'primordial' or ·originallmages'. 'It was not left to [Freud] to grasp the role
of original Images'; this was to be Jung's contribution. In examining this
debate, it is important to keep in mind that Jung's prime subject-matter of
discussion is the dream-image or the visions or hallucinations ofpsychotics. At
que!luon is how to approach such images and experiences.
The first point inJung's critique ofFreud's conception of symbolism is that
Freud has been using the term 'symbol' incorrectly:
The essential thing in }'reud's reductive method, is to collect all the dues
pointing to the unconscious background, and then, through the analysis
and interpretation of this material, to reconstruct the elementary and
instinctual processes. Those conscious contents which give us a due to the
unconscious backgroWld are incorrectly called symbols by Freud. They are
not true symbols, however, since according to his theory they have merely
the role of signs and symptoms of the subliminal processes. The uue symbol
diffen essentially from this, and should be understood as an expression of
an intuitive idea that cannot yet be Connulated in any other or better way,
(CW 15: 70)
Common parlance unhesitatingly uses white as the symbol of moral inno-
cence, and black as that of moral evil. We at once observe that the idea of a
dma causal relation between the symbol and symbolised is not essential to
symbolism, Material whiteness is no more an effect of moral innocence than
moral innocence is of material whiteness. This is enough to set a. gulf
between the concepts of symbol and of symptom, or, as we prefer to say. of
effect-+;ign. The symptom proves the existence of its cause; the symbol does
not prove that of the symbolised. (Dalbiez 1936: II, 101)
Dalbiez's exposition emphasizes the causal nat:ure of sign, as opposed to the
non<ausal symbol. However, the Freudian might object that Freud's account
of symbolismwas only strictly causal while he upheld the seduction theory (the
theory that actual infantile sexual traumas caused neuroses). From 1906
onward, Freud argued that neuroses were rooted in infantile fimtasies rather
than actual historical situations,6Jung's version of the critique (which he came
up with in the 192(5) might be able to escape this objection,
In Psychological Types, Jung presents the distinction as between semiotie and
symbo& modes of interpretation. 'Every view which interprets the symbolic
The World as Symbol: Kant, lung and Deleu.z.e
In his exposition of Jung's critique, E. A. Bennet cites R.oland Dalbiez's
hjchoo1UJl"jtic Method and the Doctrine ofFreud (1936), which contains a detailed
critique of Freud's innovations in the theory of symbolism, influenced by
Jung's critique, which he says 'reaches the heart of the question' (Dalbiez
1936: II, 103). Dalbiez's two-volume work was the first subsrantial evaluation of
Freud's work in France, and we will see that there is little doubt that Deleuze
himself also read it and was influenced by it. It is worth turning to it first.
because it is somewhat dearer !.han Jung's own account, al!.hough more
resuicted in its range, Dalbiez's bone of contention is that 'Freud has com-
pletely modified the usual meaning of the word 'symbol'. Psychoanalytical
symbolism constitutes !.he exact antithesis of ordinary symbolism , .. whereas
the ordinary symbol implies no direct causal relarion with what it symbolises,
the Freudian symbol is essentially and by definition an effect of what it
symbolises' (Dalbiez 1936: II, 102, cited in Bennet 1966: 41). Dalbiez argues
that by always referring symbols back to actual penons or events from
personal history, Freud introduced a confusion between the concept of symbol
and that of index or As Bennet puts it, the way Freud conceived the
symbol 'was tantamount to claiming it as a substitute for the real thing'
(Bennet 1966: 42). But in bringing about this slippage, Freud occluded. an
entire set of functions which had up until then been attributed to symbols.
Dalbiez writes:
expression as an analogue or an abbreviated designation for a boom thing is
st'I'IIi6tic' (CW 6: 474), Jung cIariftes this by specifying that interpretation is
semiotic when a symptom or dream-ima.ge is 'reduced' (ibid.: 479) to a. signi-
fier of repressed sexual events in the patient's history; Freud's approach
resolves the image 'into its memory components and the underlying instincwal
processes' (GW 7: 81). The problem is that Freud takes the lIemiotic interpre-
tation ofsymbob to be the only one, overlooking the fact that the notion of the
symbol has had an important history in aesthelia.
It is possible that the
distinction between symbol and allegory is relevant for the psychiatric under-
standing of symbolism. The distinction between symbol and allegory has a long
and complicated history in aesthetia, but it is perhaps its development in
Schelling's work on mythology that is most relevant for undentanding Jung's
and Deleuze's approach. Schelling argued that symbols functioned in a di.ffer-
ent way to allegorical images or scenes - which required knowledge ofan actual
esoteric 'key' which relates the elements to a historical or mythical narrative.
The power of religioWl and mythical images did not come from their allegori-
cal funclion. As Beach puts it, 'the funclion of myths in religions was not to
impart infonnation or to reach an intellectual understanding of the world, but
rather had something to do with lltimularlng a special kind of psychological
response within the listener' (Beach 1994: 34). It might be similarlyposaible to
'listen' to dreams in two different ways. On the one hand, as referring to
concrete past events, and on the other hand as addre5lling the listener in the
present. jung makes an analogy with Kant's distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgments (the former clarify, while the latter amplify; Kant
1782/1787: A'1/Bll); too must be approached 'synthetically' as
well as 'analytically' (GW 7: 80-9; d. SM 1M). Although the semiotic inter-
pretation may somerimes be appropriate for cenain dream interpretations,
dreams and all symptoms frequently contain symbols which migflt well be
addressing the subject directly with a problem or enigma to be solved in the
present, by an act of synthesis.
If we do treat our unconscioWl as a superior Other, then we have to listen to
its cryptic statements very carefully, just as we listen carefully to a piece ofmusii::
bv Beethoven or Stoclthausen. Moreover, since the dream addresses WI in the
present, addressing our current libidinal state, the symbol might equally be
ttying to communicate something of which we are not yet conscious. 'We know,
from abundant experience as weU as for theoretical reasons, that the uncon-
saoWl also contains aU the material that has fIOt yet reached me threshold of
conllcioWlness' (CW 7: 1%8). A common but important instance of this can be
found in apparently premonitory dreams of miscarriage. More generally,Jung
that symbols are used when 'the chosen expression is the best possible
description or formulation of a relatively unknown fact. which is nonetheless
known to exist, or posmlated as existing' (CW 6: 474). The symbol, taken as
symbol, expresses something to which existence might be attributed, but whose
nature is indeterminate.
It expresses some enigmatic aspect of reality, which
cannot be reduced to being the 'sign ofa definite and generally known under-
lying process'. It is not just dreams and psychosis which produce symbols: art,
humour and religion all use symbols to communicate messages that cannot be
uttered in nonnal, representational language, but which concern problematic
rMlilies wbich directly concern us. These images need to be 'amplified' (CW 7:
81). 'Once embarked on the task of examining the dream-mat:erial, you must
not shrink from any comparison' (CW 4: 145). Symbolic images are communi-
cations, and in dreams often OCcur intensively in sequences, like a sequence of
riddles given by a demonic super-ego, always 'superior' to our ego, which we
must use 'all the conscious means at our disposal' to crack.
At another level, symbols also testify to special 'synthetic' processes in the
unconscious itself. Jung stresses that the unconscioWl operates by condensing
unCOnscioWl material into an enigmatic symbol that 'synthetically' expresses
each of the sides at work in the current psychic conflict. Thus although Freud
appears to give equal weight to both displacement and condensation in The
] n ~ of Imams, his model of the psychic process forces him to give
primacy to the fonner, insofar as dream-distortion in general operates through
the displacement of psychic intensities across the derivatives of a repressed
reprelentation (cr. SE 4: 177). Jung's emphasis on the role of condensation in
symbols suggests that condensation involves a different kind of synthesis,
perhaps involving something like the 'condensation of singularities' Deleuze
di.scusses in relation to the detennination of the Idea in Dif.fermu and &peti-
tion: in an initial apprehension of a problem, we discover 'the varieties of the
multiplicity in all its dimensions, the fragments of ideal future or past events,
which ... render the problem solvable'; then 'we must condense all the
singularities, precipitate all the circumstances, points of fusion, congelation or'
condensation in a sublime occasion, Kmms, which makes the solution explode
like something abrupt, brutal and revolutionary' (DR 190). The unconscious
is creative and 'arnplificatory' in Kant's sense that the positive syntheses of the
unconscioWl produce '1IeWcontents' (CW8: 364), which cannot be reduced to
their previously existing analytic elements.
)t is interesting that in his first seminar Lacan suggests that some of the Wolf
Man'5 symptoms mWlt be classed as psychotic rather than neurotic. He does
not just fantasize about castration, but hallucinates a bleeding finger. 'At this
point in his childhood, nothing enticles one to classify him as a schizophrenic,
but it really is a psychotic phenomenon we are dealing with' (Lacan 1953: 59).
Lacan suggests that the Wolf Man is ftJredosing the Oedipal position, rather
than repressing it into the unconscious (ibid.: 43). He acts as if the symbolic
order (in Lacan's sense) did not exist and has no claim upon him, and thus
surrenders all protection against the deceptions and distortions of the imagi-
nary. In his seminar on the psychoses, l.acan argues at length that what.
distinguishes the psychotic from the neurotic (which includes the 'normal'
person) is the latter's entrance into the intersubjective order of linguistic
communication. The phenomena of perception and imagination remain the
same in each case - everyone is regularly subject to distortions of perception
and internal voices - but the neurotic has intersul:!jective and symbolic or
The World as Symbol: /(o,nt, jung and Deleuze
lin81Jistic criteria for what counts as real. Reality is a shared phenomenon.
guaranteed by mutual recognition, so hallucinations can be brushed off if
nobody else verifies them. The inteTSubjective conditions of language are so
deeply ingrained that internal voices are simply interpreted as inner dialogue
between self and one's 'significant Other', 'I' and 'You' (Lacan 1955: 51). In a
nutshell, 'what chara£terises a normal subject is precisely that he never takes
seriously certain realities that he recognises exist' (ibid.; 74). The WolfMan is
psychotic because he takes wolves so serioU8ly.
We will see in chapter 6 that Deleuze and Guatl:ari imply that the Wolf Man
was a lycanthrope, and that he was therefore quite right to take his wolves
seriously. Eighteenth-<:entury descriptions of epidemics of lycanthropy stress
the state of trance or dissociation that occurs in the preliminary stages.
followed bv the frenzy of the feeling of transformation.
In other words. for
Deleuze and Guattari, the Wolf Man does not necessarily have a latent
psychosis. Instead. he is a manifest lycanthrope. Ultimately. the classification
of certain symptoms as neurotic and psychotic obSLructs the interpretation of
symbols. The question is whether certain symptoms or fantasies that are tradi-
tionally classified as psychotic should be defined gnoseologically at all. or
whether they in fact bear witnellS rather to different lewls of unconscious
activity, which may emerge in psychosis orneurosis. We have seen that in 'From
Sacher-Masoch to Masochism' Deleuu endorses Jung's view that 'Freudian
methodologies are appropriate mainly for young neurotics whose disorders
are related to personal reminiscences and whose problems are about recon-
ciling themselves with the real (loving, making oneself lovable, adapting, etc.).
without regard for the role of any interior conflicts' (8M But on the
other hand, 'there are neuroses of quire another type which are nearer to psy-
chosis' (ibid.). Conversely, as Deleuze points out in Difference and &petitWn.
schizophrenics can exhibit what appear to be obsessional symptoms: 'Consider
the gesll.lra1 or linguistic repetitions and iterations or stereotypical behaviours
associated with dementia or schizophrenia. These no longeT seem to manifest
a will capable of investing an oiject within the context of a ceremony; rather
they function like reflexes which indicate a general breakdown of investment'
(DR 290). For Deleuu, the real line of demarcation will be between different
levels ofthe unconscious. UkeJung, he believes that there is an autonomous,
productive activity which is proper to the unconscious itself. This productive
unconscious is the motor of the process of individuation. It is this level which
is characteristically in psychosis. but which can also appear in
neuroses under certain conditions. On the other hand, unconscious activity
appears in distoned, inverted form, when consciousness approaches it in a
retM:titH! attitude. Here the unconscious is not met on its own tetmS, and
consciousness is concerned 'reconciling [itself) with the rml (loving, making
oneself lovable, adapting, etc.)'. rather than with individuation. Again, this is
characteristic of neurosis, but the psychotic will inevitably be profoundly
concerned at variousjuncwres with problems of adaptation.
Deleuz.e and the Unconscious
Kant's Theory of Symbolism
[n 1961 Deleure fully affirms Jung's notion of symbolism, but by 1963 he has
nevertheless turned to Kant for a fuller explanation of the nature and impli-
cations of the symbol. In the psychotic process, it would appear, there is some
sort of liberation of the productive and reproductive imagination from the
practical nonns ofconceptual representation. What needs to be understood is
how the mind functions upon this release, independently of the processes of
reaction which characterizes neurosis. In Kant's CritiIJue ofJudgment, Deleuze
finds a purely aesthetic account of how the imagination becomes immanentlv
reoriented to the symbol when it breaks free of the normative rules of t h ~
understanding. But although Deleuze does not taLIc. here about the S!J"Ibols of
t ~ 'Unconscibw, the turn to aesthetics is consistent with his insistence that the
productions ofthe unconscious should be examined in art and culture as wen
as in psychopathology, and that the two might be harder to separate than it
appears. Deleuze's rum to Kant for a theory of symbolism in fact gives the
Jungian theory of symbolism a finner epistemological grounding. It also
produces an unexpected transfonnation of the Jungian claim that it is the
symbolic layer of reality that is re-activated in psychosis. Kant reveals another,
more subterranean destination of the imagination, beneath the functions of
conceptual representation, in the apprehension of the world as symbol.
Nature becomes a book of symbols. At that point, in the last part of this
chapter. we shall to plunge back intO Deleuze's earliest writings on poetic and
occult uses ofsymbolism. For the mysteriousJohann Malfatti in his Math&sis, to
which Deleuze provided the foreword for its first republication in a hundred
years. nature itself is hieroglyphic, an expression of the body of a tripartite,
living divine reality.
Deleuze's Kant's Critical Philt.uophy (1963) affords an unusually large place to
Kant's notion of symbolism. In the fourth of his 1978 Kant lectures. Deleuze
still accords supreme importance to Kant's theory of symbolism, and he
suggests that it is behind his own suggestions about the spatiotemporal
'dramatisation of Ideas.' At this point in Kant's work. we find the 'schematism'
of the imagination lured away from its function in the process of knowledge
and empirical perception, towards another destination: the schematizing
imagination 'risks being overwhelmed by something monstrous, which Kant ill
the first to analyse, to my knowledge. It is symbolism' (Fourth Lecture on Kant,
2).H Two important things appear to be happening here. First, Deleuze's tum
(Q Kant to develop the notion of symbol suggests an attempt to ground the
Jungian approach to symbolism within a more rigorous theory of cognition.
jung himself docs not refer to Kant's aesthetics, although we will see that the
latter is consistent with his notion of symboUsm, and even, with Deleuze's m o d ~
ifications, powerfully augments it. Secondly. with the notion of symbolism, we
are now seeing another front opening up in Deleure's attempt to unearth the
internal hierarchies of cognition, and to the elicit the hidden ends of cogni-
tion, beneath conceptual representation. Parallel to Deleuze's attempt to push
T ~ World as Symbol: Kn,nt, jung and D8/ntu
moral be
our own.
To what are we dedicated if not to those probletns which demand the very
transfonnation of our body and our language? In short, representation and
knowledge are modelled entirely upon propositions of consciousness which
designate cases of solution. but those propositions themselves give a com-
pletely inaccurate notion of the instance which engenders them as cases,
and which they resolve or conclude. By contrast, the Idea and 'learning'
express that extra-propositional or sub-representative problematic instance:
Kant's theory of schematism in the direction of a theory of'spatiotemporal
, symbolismwill be the due to the narrow set of conditions lmder
which the dimension of 'Ideas' can be 'presented' to the mind, overriding the
limits of the conceptual lmderstanding.
We have seen that Deleuze deploys his conception ofIdeas in ways that move
beyond Kant's theory of cognition towards a theory of the lmConscioUll, He
claims that Ideas must be taken to be 'necessarily unconscious' (DR 192). It
looks as though Deleuze is synthesizing Kant withJlmg's theory that cognition
is unconsciously molivated by 'problematical states' (CW8: 391), Ifthis is even
half-right, then it is clear how radically non-Freudian Deleuze's notion of the
lmconscious is. If Ideas are unconscious, they are so in a very specific and
restricted sense. They are not unconscious in the Freudian sense that they lie
outside consciousness ttmt court and can only be known by their 'derivatives',
Rather they are 'unconscious' only in the sense that we cannot be conscious of
themin the way we are conscious of empirical things or representational states
of mind, by virtue either of our capacity to have intuitions of them, or even to
m;lke judgements and inferences about them. The Idea is both more and lesa
unconscioWl than Freudian repressed representations. It is more unconscioWl
as we cannot even make secure inferences about it on the basis of displaced
'derivatives', It is less unCOnsciOWl in the sense that Kant's expanded theory of
cognition allOWll us to conceive of non-representational types of cognition.
Symbolic mought is exacdy one such type of cognition; artistic creativity is
anomer. Kant's theory alloWll one to open up the theory of 'the unconscious'
to accommodate highly specific types of cognition that cannot be recognized
bv the Freudian model. For Deleuze, the Idea is a destination of cognition that
dvates representational thought while being UfJtonscWw to it. This aUOWll
Deleuze to introduce a teleology into the theory of the unconscious which is
again foreign to Freud. To say that we are unco118ciowdy motivated by an Idea
is also to say that our actions are guided by an nut which remains only implicit,
which can only be explicated or unfolded, as we will see in chapter 6, under
certain conditions.
The end ofcognition only becomes fully conscious in the
state of 'repetition', but afterwards it is forgotten immediately, and conscioua-
ness once again becomes inadequate to the Idea.
As with jung, cognition and affection must be situated within a process of
individuation, during which we 'learn' (always to the cost of our ego and
representation) about the forces which really guide us, and then attempt to
take charge of them.
the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation of conscious-
ness. (DR 192)
Deleuze turns to Kant's aesthetics in particular for an account of the role of
the imagination in this process of individuation. 'The imagination discovers
the origin and destination of all (the1activities [of cognitionJ" a 'suprasensi-
ble destination, which is also like its transcendental origin' (DI 6S). Kant
suggeStli that we are first made aware of this destination through the exceed-
ing of representation in the experience of the sublime in nature, which then
opens up the more complex and profound possibility of the 'reflection' of
natural symbolism in the imagination. If the Ideas cannot be then
they can be given a 'presentation' (Darstellung) al" Ideas. 'According to Kant:.
the Ideas of reason can be presented in sensible nature. In the sublime, the
presentation is direct, but negative, and done by in natu.ral sym_
bolism . . . the presentation is positive but indirect, and is achieved by reflec-
tion' (Kep 59). If the encounter with the fonnless sublime enactll the gmuis
of the moral destination of all cognition, beauty itlielfaJso carries with it a ha1f-
concealed moral dimension: 'beauty is the symbol morality' (Kant 1790: Ak.
3D1). However, Deleuze suggests that the ulti.ma.te destination of cognition
and affection is perhaps less straightforwardly moral than Kant himself
realizes, 'Aesthetic judgment finds itself referred to something that is both in
the subject himself and oUtliide him, something that is neither nature nor
freedom and yet is linked with the basis of &eedom, the supersemible, in
which the meoretical and the practical power are in an unknown manner
combined and joined into a unity' (Kant 1790: Ak. 353). There is a third
po6&ible kind of presentation in artistic geniw, which gives rise to a specifically
artistic symbolism. There the possibility arises of the mORt 'adequate' kind of
presentation of the Idea; the artist is responsible for 'the creation of another
nature' (KCP 59). In this other nature, 'invisible beings, the kingdom of the
blessed, and hen assume a body, and love and death allSume a dimension that
makes them adequate to their spiritual meaning' (01 67/66). How could our
interest in the of the Idea not be intensified and altered in nature
by such glimpses into another world? Morality is inevitably contuninated by
an and myth; the form taken by the Kantian agent's hopes and desires will be
shaped as much by the Bible, Shakespeare and Milton, as by abstract rational
principles. Our mtmlstin the rea1i2ation of moral freedomforces us to explore
other worlds, where we can contemplate love and hen in purer outline than in
our own. And this in tum forces WI to elaborate our moral world, the mundus
intel1igihWwhich 'Kant speaks of, Deleuze concludes: 'If we are destined to be
moral beings, it is because this destiny develops or explicates a supersensible
destination for all our tiaculties' (0169/68).
The affinnation of this third possibility produces an 'aesthetic turn' in
Deleuze's work. and allows him to qualify the Kantian emphasis on the moral
aspect of the Idea.. If he retains a teleological conception of individuation
dlroughout his work of the 1960s, the activity of the artist is always the highest
!). It

ity is
ch is
1 the
ss of
pt to
The World as Symbol' Kant, lung and De1euu
---- --
form of individuation, not only because in artistic creation the individual
achieves the most elaborate kind of self-differentiation, but also because the
,,:,ork of art gives individuality itself its most elaborate and solicitous expres-
Sion, We care so deeply about good art because each work brings into exis-
tence an aesthetic 'world' whose existence is no less real for being entirely
'spiritual', Deleuze's book on Proust is the most exquisite expression of this
transmutation of Kantian moral finality into aesthetic finality. •Art is the
finality of the world, and the apprentice's unconscious destination' (PS 50).
We must now turn to the details of Kant's theory of symbolism. The theorv
is situated within a complex argument about the beautiful and sublime
nature and art. It is presented in a section devoted to the 'Deduction' of
aestheticjudgements, after Kam has explored the two 'Analytics', of the Beau-
tiful and the Sublime, and it introduces SOme important modifications to what
has gone previously. In the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kam has argued that
beauty arises because an object produces a hannonious accord between the
faculties of senSibility and understanding. so that a feeling of universality is
attained without the understanding having to determine the object conceptu-
ally. This not only releases the imagination from its reproductive function. but
its productive role too is liberated from conceptual representation. The imag-
ination's absorption in ".Jlediue jUtlpment upon the object is radical. with the
consequence that the empirical world can seem to disappear in aesthetic
contemplation. Now, in the Analytic Kant argues that the pleasure produced
by the beautiful aesthetic object (whether natural or artificial) is disinterested,
because it is the /tYrm of the object that is reflected upon; we are strangely
indifferent to the actual existence of the thing depicted. However, in the
Deduction Kant proceeds to point out that we are nevertheless in some sense '
deeply invested in the experience of contemplation, Something matters in
aesthetic experience, so that it is never enough to accept that the experience
is just an illusion. It turns OUt that for Kant this strange interntwe have in the
beautiful is precisely directed towards its symbolic aspects. The beautiful is
ultimately not just indifferent, 'aesthetidzing' pleasure, but is, as we have
mentioned, a 'symbol of morality', Although Kant's emphasis is on symbolism
in nature. Deleuze suggests that our interest also extends to the symbols
produced by the artist. In Kant's Crilii:al Philosoph" and a contemporaneous
essay 'The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics', he brings out the hidden
mgectory that moves through Kant's CriJilru.t and which relates the
dimension of the aesthetic to that of the Idea. via the path of symbolism.
Kant's analysis of the sublime first of all uncovers a moral dimension to
aesthetic contemplation. Our sense of awe at the sublime spectacles of form-
lessness and deformation in nature do not simply arise because our productive
imagination is striving to synthesise something too inunense to take in aU at
once. Something else happens when 'the imagination is pushed tv tlu limit of
its power' (DI We realize that it is our capacity for reason which in
truth is motivating us to 'unite the infinity of the sensible world into a whole
... The imagination is forced to admit that aU its power is -nothing in relation
Deleu:ze and the UncO'nSciuus
a 'pac
When human beings began to think, they were, as is well known, fon:ed to
explain the external world anthropomorphically by means of a multitude of
to a rational Idea' (ibid.).14 Deleuze argues that Kant is here providing a
model for the gme.sUof dle relations of the faculties.
Imagination finds itself
newly by the violent apprehension of its ultimate relation with reason.
Whereas the schematism of the imagination is ordinarily subjected to the
categories of the understanding, in the event of the sublinle it is reoriented
toWards the Ideas of reason: 'The accord of the inlagination and reason is
effectively engendered in this discord.' Unlike the beautiful, the accord of the
faculties only emerges from a prior discord between inlagination and under-
standing. The pain or unease caused by this discord of the faculties is in turn
resolved by a higher-order pleasure: 'Pleasure is engendered within pain.' In
Kant's aesthetic of the sublinle we encounter an entirely different model of
pleasure and pain to Freud's energetic model. Not only are pleasure and pain
derived from an analysis of cognition, rather than vice vena (cognition as an
emergent property of the process of libidinal discharge), but they are given a
teleological significance which is of course lacking in Freud.
'The inlagination surpaMeS its own limitations, in a negative way it is true, by
representing to itself the inaccessibility of the rational Idea and by making this
inaccessibility something present in sensible nature.' However, if it is the Idea
which is making itself present here, that indicates that the formlessness of the
canyons, ravines, and mountains found in nature, the deformed billowing of
douds and fire, are ultimately oa:mit:m.s for this presentation. One might
expect the falling away of form and order in nature to lead to the opposite of
the beautiful - the ugly or monstrous - but in fact the fall into the formless
abyss is an occasion for the appearance of something unanticipated. The
colossal puncture in the sensible world tears open the heavens and reveals this
world as other than we had taken it to be. The sensible world is no longer a
realm of limitation and finitude, but the scene for the realization of the Idea.
a space for incarnation.
The sublime is less an experience of something .out there'. which is in itself
awe-inspiring, than a lJrojet:tion of our own destination within the realm of
sensible nature. 'It is only in appearance, or by projection, that the sublime is
related to sensible nature' (ibid.; cr. KCP 58). This use of the model of pro-
jection is important, as it helps emphasize that we are unable to encounter our
freedom face-to-face, but can only first 3£cede to it by projecting it onto
nature. We must first experience reason as Other, as appearing in the formless
abysses of nature. The model of projection is nOl found in Kant's text, and
brings out the idea that there is something unconsciDw in our experience of
the sublime. We don't see our own shadow in the abyss. Deleuze's remark
recallsJung's idea that the unconscious is first encountered through a projec-
tion onto the other (the shadow): 'Projections change the world into the
replica of one's own unknown face' (CW 00: 9). Freud also ventures a similar
idea in The ofEverydnty

I' of
I the
il}' is

I the
I the
1 the
:8 the
:>n to
mit ()J
ch in
The World as Symhol: Kant, lung and Deleu.u
personalities in their own image ... I believe that a large pan of the mytho-
logical view of the world, which extends a long way into the most modern
religions, is MIlling but psyc1uJlogy projet:;ted i.nto the aternal wurld. (SE 6: 259,
itself' '
Deleuu and thB Unconscious
However, Freud's later development of the concept occun mosdy within the
conteXt of paranoia. Projection involves the disavowal of some /HJrIit:ttlar piece
of reality. Schreber disavows his (supposedly) homosexual desires with the
result that 'what was abolished [awhOOenj internally return.s from without'
(SE 12: 71). Therefore,Jung's use of the term to de!ICribe the projection of the
IJntonsaow ttmt cou.rl is closer to Deleuze's use of it here. The 'unknown inner
world' is and first encountered outside, in the shadow.
But this line of thought also raises another important issue which is only
implicit in Deleuze's reading due to his concenaation on the systematic
argumentation, rather than on the process of 'transcendental formation' or
'transcendental culture' iuelf (01 61/62). The model of projection usually
points towards the overcoming of projection through an incorporation by the
subject of their alienated aspect. But in Kant and Deleuze something more
complex and interesting occun. The subject never recuperates their projec.
lion; rather the projection is itlielf transformed into aMtMr 'alienation': this
time. the world as symbol.
Once the Idea has been presented in negative fonn in the sublime, it does not
disappear. or simply wait for the next sublime experience to occur. Nor is the
moral sense simply awakened, leaving the aesthetic sense behind. A transcen·
dental formation has occurred, which means that the subject is transformed.
Therefore although Kant begins the Critique ofJuJ.gment with an analysis of the
disinterested nature of the contemplation of beauty, it turns out that this
analysis is an abs:trtJi:tinn from the whole story about beauty. Once the subject has
undergone the experience of the sublime, their experience of btauty win also be
altered. Beauty is not the same after the sublime. The imagination has been
awakened to its destination in the Idea, and this now adds an undercurrent to
all experiences of beauty. What this means is that the unconscious projeeticm of
the Idea into formless nature is now expanded and changes in nature. Now 6ll
oj natufl1 is potentially ani.ma.ted by the Idea. But because we are not yet 'self·
conscious' of our role in the of the sublime, when this unconscious--
ness is transmitted to the rest of natUre (formed and beautiful nature, that is),
it can no longer be called a projection. We now appear to find ounelves in
nature; nature appears to tLddl WI through its symbols. In our experience of the
beautiful, we are now reading the Book of Nature. If in projection we made
ounelves Other. now. rather than reincorporating this Other, we truly.forgt!l that
this Other is ourselves. The model changes from to recollection, and
only thus does a 'return to self' come about. To read the symbols in the Book of
Nature is to m:ollea ow-selves. to re-find ounelves i.n the objett.
Kant specifies that the indireCt presentation involved in symbolism operates
through analogy. 'Symbolic presentation uses an analogy ... in which
a double function: it applies the concept to the object of
a senSIble mtu1tJon; and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects
on that intuition to an entirely different object. of which the fonner object is
only the symbol' (Kant 1790: Ak.152). He gives the example of the symbolic
presentation ofabsolute monarchy as a hand mill: 'For though there is no sim-
ilarity between a despotic state and a hand mill, there cerWnly is one between
the rules by which we reflect on the two and on how they operate.' What the
despot is to the people. the miller is to grain; the aymbol functions through an
analogical correspondence between hand-mill and state. Another example is
the white lilyas symbol of innocence (Kant 1790: 3(2). Deleme writes that 'the
white lily is not merely related to the concepts of colour and flower, but. also
awakens the Idea of pure innocence, whose object is merely a (reflexive)
analogue of the white in the lily flower (Kep 54).' Deleuze emphasizes almost
the same example as Dalbiez does in his d.iscmsion of symbolism in psycho-
analysis. The white lily is an example of an analogical symbol: 'What innocence
is to the mind corresponds to what whitenes& is to the body' (Dalbiez 1936: II,
For Deleuze, Kant'!! notion of symbolWn provides the key to the problem of
howthe imagination becomes set free from the understanding. Ifthe 'schema-
tism' is the bask non-repre!lentational matrix of the unconscious, then it finds
its ultimate unconscioWl 'destination' in symbolism. Kant's distinction
between symbol and schema in the CriIique ofltulf!:mnt is to be found 'among
the most admirable pages in Kant' (Fourth Lecture on Kant, 8). Where
schematism sketches out the spanotemporal correlate of a pure concept.
symbolism uses the same type spatiotemporal correlate 'not in relation to the
corresponding concept A, but in relation to the quite different concept Bfor
which you have no intuition of a schema. At that moment the schema ceases
to be a rule of production in relation to its concept, and becomes a rule of
reflection in relation to the other concepL So much so that you have the
Kantian sequence: synthesis refers to a rule of recognition. the schema refers
to rules of production, the symbol refers to rules of reflection' (ibid: d. Kant
1790: Ak.. 352). The destination of the imagination thus lies in reflection.
Kant's concept of reflection here is based on the notion of reflective judge.
ment, which he opposes to determiningjudgement; it obviously has little to do
with reflection in the cognitive sense. But perhaps there is, on the other hand.
a connotation of the ,",","in the notion that imagination finds its destination
in 'reflection' upon symbolB in nature. The symbol is a mirror, or a frozen
image. because it is finally a precipitate of the unconscious activity of the
productive imagination. But what happens when the subject finally 'finds
ltself' in the symbol we have still to see.
Let us now follow in more detail the path taken by Kam. pursued by
Deleuze. through the Oritilfue of }utJgrn8nt to the concept of symbolism. H
aesthetic contemplation is capable of giving Ideas of reason a sensible presen-
tation (as has been shown by the case of the lIublime) then a certain kind of
interest can be WlCribed to iL For 'reason also has :an interest in the objective

59. j
, or

1t to
tis) •
Ths World as S,mbol: Kant. lung and Deltuu
reality of the Ideas; ie. an interest that nature should at least show a trace or
give a hint that it contains some basis or other for Wl to assume in its products
a lawful harmony with that liking of ours which is of oJl 'nterest'
(Kant 1790: 3(0). Once we are captured by the claim of reason, how can our
experience of beauty, as well as the sublime, not be accompanied by a deeper
interest that goes beyond any sensuoWl interest in the existence of the partic-
ular beautiful object? Aesthetic experience must somehow also be the vehicle
for a 'ratiLrn4t intemt in tJu tucord of f1mdtutions with mudisiflr
terested pltwufi' (Kep 54). DeJeuze stresses that it is important to acknowledge
mat this special interest does contradict the disinterestedness that is essen-
tial to the aesthetic in general. 'It is a question of an interest that is connected
to me judgment {of the beautiful] synthetically. It does not bear on the beau-
rifuJ as such, but on me aptitude of nature to produce beautiful things' (01
64/65). It is not a sensuous passion, but a peculiar passion of reason that is
borne by aesthetic pleasure. 8ut this is a conceptual distinction; how could
they avoid being confused in practice? The only way in which disinterested
pleasure in a beautiful object and rational interest in that same ol'!ject could
finally avoid being confused (resulting in one submerging the other and
covering over any evidence ofits existence) would be if 'the interest connected
with the beautiful bears upon determinations to which the sense of the beau-
tiful remained indifferent' (0165/65). And it happens that there is a gap in
the aesthetic experience of nature, where mis interest can make itself fell. In
me disinterested gense of the beautiful, me imagination reflects the form only.
It cannot reflect upon mere colour, mere sound. 'On the contrary, intemt
connected to the beautiful bears upon sounds and colours, the colour of
flowers and me songs of birds' (ibid., italic added). That is, it reflects upon the
'free materials of nature' (Kep 54).
It is just this 'remainder' of the beautiful that serves as the vehicle for
symbolism, for the indirect. but now positive presentation of the Idea (KCP 58;
For example, we do not merely relate colour to a concept of the under-
standing which would directly apply to it, we also relate it to a quiU different
concept which does not have an object of intuition on its own account, but
which resembles the concept of the understanding because it posits its
object by analogy with me of the intuition. (Kep 54)
The basic condition of the significance of the analogy between the white
body of the lily and the Idea of pure innocence is mat the whil.eness itself be
animated by our interest in Ideas being incarnated. It is 'primary matter' that
is at the source of me production of symbol.'l in nature- (DI 65/65). The iden-
tification of this materia pri'fMis a delicate process, as it mWlt fall outside of me
'formal' accords found in me disinterested sense of me beautiful, while not
falling into the 'fonnlessncss' found in sublime nature. Can it be done?
Deleuz.e writes that. 'Kant even defines the primary matter that. intervenes in
the na
or eva
The co
(Kant 1
- minute c
might ha
like these
from the'
the u
of the id
space of'
vein in
of thoug
the natmal of the beautiful: fluid matter, part of which separates
or evaporates, while the rest suddenly solidifies (the formation of crystals) '. In
# 59 of the CritiI{tu ofJudgment Kant gives an account of the 'fm of
nature' which indicates that primary matter is something more than mere
quality, as the examples of colour and soood might have led us to think.
'Under the described circumstances, formation then take place not be a
gradual transition from the fluid to the solid state, but as it were by a leap: a
sudden solidification called shooting; this transition is also called crystalliz.o.t:ion.
The commonest example of this type offormation occurs when water freezes'
(Kant 1790: Ak. 348). Kant invokes a process of format.iun. and even uses the
precise example to which Deleure so often appeals to illustrate the inltinsive
nature of quality. The freezing of water is a properly intensive process, as it is
both durational and involves the crossing of a threshold (or
Kant's reflections on the connection between intensive nal:Ural processes
and symbol-formation are extremely suggestive. He notes that 'many such
mineral crystallisations, e.g., spars, hematite, and aragonite, often result in
exceedingly beautiful shapes. such shapes as an might invent; and the halo in
the grotto of Antiparos [in the Cyclades in GreeceI is merely the product of
water seeping through layers of gypsum' (ibid.: 349). Given the traces ofreli-
glous symbolism left in the grottoes of Lascaux and other sites, Kant's theory
suggests a hypothesis that certain nat.maI environments might be rich in
symbolic 'potential'. Ifabsorption in reflectivejudgement tends to liberate the
imagination from its subordination ooder the norms of empirical, determin-
ingjudgement, the descent into the crystalline world of the grotto may" have
provided the conditions for a fOooding moment in 'transcendental culture':
the transition to a new a priori synthesis between the productive imagination
and the symbol. The Hall of the Bulls at Lascaux is filled with concretions of
minute calcite needles which produce exceptional optical effects, while the
entrance to the Chamber of Felines is encrusted with mondmilch.
The Idea
might have been concretely incarnated for the first time in stalagmite caverns
like these. before the enraptured eyes ofshamans and priests lately descended
from their sublime mountain sancruaries. In the opening pages of 1>i.fft:mu:e
and &petition Deleuze suggests that 'the meaning of the grove, the grotto and
the "sacred" object' (DR 2) can only have emerged through an apprehension
of the identity of change and permanence in nawre. In the liquid silence of
the grotto, then. behind the faces of the formed crystals and stalactites, ace the
traces of a universal process of intensive transformation.
What completell the
synthesis of image and symbol is the total impression that one has entered a
space of intensive transformation. The grotto itself is a crystal. In pursuing this
vein in Kant's later thought, Deleuze is consciously mining the Romantic line
of thought that followed on from Kamianism and altered its direction.
'Navalis, with his tourmaline, is doser to the conditions of the sensible than
Kant, with space and time' (DR 222). Novalis, as well as being the archetypal
Romantic poet, also trained as a mining engineer, and saw in crystallization
'schemata of inner transformations' (Novalis 1977: III: 389) more profound
ce or

s' (DI
:hat is
'r and
:elt. In
our of
de for
:CP 58;
:lSits ip
:.er· ...at
hile not

The World os Symbol: Kant, Jung and Deleuu
Schema and Symbol
Let us probe funher into Deleuze's account of the relation between schema
and symboL We know that Deleuze never just interprets Kant for reasons of
pure scholarship. His aim is always to transform Kantianism for his own
purposes, and in Kant's theory of symbolism he glimpses an opponunity to
introduce a very far reaching innovation. We have already seen that De1euze
finds in Kanrian schematism a pure, apriori and productive use of the imag-
ination which produces fonns within what might be termed the 'free mate-
than Kant's schematism, which he thought restricted merely to 'outer sensi-
~ ~ ~ ' . Kant's schematism of space and time remained at the level of merely
visibfL roles of the order of manifold space or of extemive objects' (Novalis
1977; II: 390), Crystalfonnation ill intensive in the further sense that it is punc-
tuated by geometrical sinp.lt:niJ:ia; these singularities are nevertheless precipi-
tated by duration. But if crystallization is the key to the 8chemadam, and if
'every body has its time - (and] every time its body' (Novalis 1997: l ~ ) , then
crystal fonnation can also unlock the fonn of consciousness itself: 'The
interior resonance of consciousness - ofrepresentation under all its forms - is
that of a crystallisation, of a foqnation and a diversification' (Novalls 1966;
285) .18 Deleuze cites Novalls as one ofhis two main influences among the posl_
Kantians (along with Solomon Maimon) (01 114), but if Novalis's excavations
of intensive transformation are closer to the conditions of the semible than
Kant's theory of space and time in the Critique ofPuR &ason, then pe.rhaps he
does not get that much closer than Kant himself, when he descends into the
crystal grotto in the Critique ofJ ~
Deleuze's interest in Novalis may arise as much from his conception of a
'magical idealism' as from his ideas about time and space. Novalis identified a
kind of 'transcendental poetry' from which 'a tropology can be anticipated
which comprehends the laws of the symbolit: comtruditm of the transcendental
world' (Navalis 1997: 57). His reflections on the schematism meet up with an
appreciation ofthe power of symbolism, the combination ofwhich ushers in the
final, 'magical' form of idealism, after Fichte (ibid.: 107). 'If you cannot make
your thoughIS indirectly (and accidentally) perceptible, then do the reverse -
make external things directly (and arbitrarily) perceptible ... Make external
things into thoughts ... Both operations are idealistic. Whoever has them both
perfectly in his power is the fIUlgical idealisf (ibid.: 126) . Philosophically,
Novalis's project is rooted in the attempt to synthesize the productive imagin-
ation with symbolism, the positive but indirect presentation of the Idea. To the
extent that DeJeuze's project (at least up until Differmu and Repetition) tends
towards the same end, it too is a magical idealism. The difference is that
Delew..e's post:Jungian theory passes through the theory of the unconscious.
The task of producing an (J priori synthesis of the productive imagination with
the symbol and with artistic creation is an attempt to chart the ttnctmSci.oworigin
and destination of cognition and affection.
the full
- f
Deleuu and tAt Uncomciotl.S
rials' of the spadotemporal manifold itself. Deleuze reminds us that Kant's
theory of space and time is TOOted in his early theory about incongruent
counterparts, which already suggeslS that space has an inner, intensive form
(the division between left and right. above and below). Deleuze suggests that
the schemati8m points t:owa.rds a 'dramatization' of Ideas in the intensive
experience of space and time; he rests his case on instances from psychiatry
(e.g. the obsessive who shrinks the belkope). However, in his 1965 essay on
Kant's aesthetics, Deleuze qualifies his use of the schematism, and suggests
that another component is required for this model of the schematism to
truly work. 'The imagination does not schematise by itself ... It does so only
insofAr as the understanding determines or induces it to do so. It onl"
schematises in the speculative interest., as a function of the
concepts of the understanding, when the understanding itself has the
legislative role' (DI 58-9/60-1). Although Deleuze attempts to liberate the
power of the schematism. by emphasizing Kant's remark that it is a product
of the pure imagination rather than the understanding, he also acknow-
ledges that other conditions need to be in place for this liberation to
proceed. It is not enough to show that the schematism already has some
autonomy from the operations of the understanding; some other positiwtask
needs to be given to spatiotemporal schematism if it is to reveal another des-
tination. 'It would be wrong to scrutinize the mysteries of the schematism as
though they harbour the final word of the imagination in illS essence or in its
free spontaneity. The 9chematismis a secret, but not the deepest secret of the
imagination'. Left to its own devices, he clai.ms, 'without a concept from the
understanding. the imagination does something el!!e than schematizing. In
fact, it Tt!fteets'. In other words, it symbolizes. Symbolic cognition no longer
determines objec1B but permits the reflective contemplation of objectt;
oUlSide merely their conceptual significance. 19
If we relllrn for a moment to our initial discussion of symbolism in Freud
and]ung, we are perhaps nowable to glimpse the concrete effects of Deleuze's
development of a Kant-Jung synthesis in the theory of symbolism. The cross
can be taken as a first example; another important example will be introduced
shortly. Contra whatJung called the 'semiotic' approach, the cross cannot be
reduced to a sign of the event of the crucifixion. but instead functions for the
Christian as a. mandala for inexhaustible meditation or 'reflection'. In Kant'S
own terms in the Critiqlu ofjutlgmmt., it is not entirely clear how the ccou func-
tions all a symbol, as it does not seem to be a free formation of nature.
However, we have seen that Kant also gestures towards a theory of intensive
formation and rranllformation, which can be taken up in Deleuzian terms. On
the full Deleuzian model, then, the crOllS is the synthesis of two elementaryspa.-
tioternporal, intensive schemati.sms - on the one hand, veilical ascent and
descent and on the other, horizontal tension between opposites. As
the cross is much mon! than the sum of two By virtue of its implied
porential infinity. it divides space itself into four compartmenu, as weD as pro-
ducing a fifth point. the centre. The synthesis is thua genuinely amplificatory
The World as Symbol: Kant, Jung and DeJeu.r.e
(as l:he logical sense ofsynthesis in Kant requires) insofar as these supervening
determinations do not pre-exist the synthesis. The cross is l:herefore a multi-
plicity (or a 'manifold') as well as being a synthesis. Now, as this multiplicity, it
is capable of determining the entirety of space. It can divide up the whole of
space. But this in turn takes it out ofspace, as it thereby becomes a pure, a f1riori
spatial determination;.a schema in other words. In other words. the cross func-
tions as an iIkal multifJl.if:itJ. But let us now stop to reflect. What does it mean
to say that all space can be determined by the form of l:he cross? There is
nothing that subjects JPaa Welfto this form, or to any other (the circle, for
instance). So where does it find a truly 11n1J1etit: a primiapplication? In fact, its
sphere of application emerges only when it becomes a 5'jmhDl of a non-actual
Idea. We will develop the question of the role of the Idea in the next section,
but let it suffice to mention theJungian interpretation of the symbolic nature
of the cross here, where its significance finally comes from itJI capacity to give
a symbolic (albeit abstract) form to the goal of the process of individuation
(reconciliation ofconsciousness and the unconscious). As a symbol, therefore,
we can perhaps see why the cross both predates and eKceeds Christianity.
What is true of the cross is also true of incest, albeit at a higher power, at a
more complex level of individuation:
Incest signifies a personal complication only in the rarest cases. Usually
incest has a highly religious aspect, for which reason the incest theme plays
a decisive part in almost all cosmogonies and in numerous myl:hs. Rut Freud
dung to the literal interpretation of it and could not grasp the spiritual sig-
nificance of incest as a symbol. (lung 1961: 191)
Freud had difficulty dealing wil:h the fact that 'incest is traditionally the pre-
rogative of royalty and divinities' (ibid.: 151).
In these cases, incest reveals another dimension: as a symbol of rebirth.
Incest symbolizes the convergence of two tendencies: temporal regression to
the site of one's own binh and sexual reproduction. Incest condenses these
two tendencies into one synthetic image of rebirth, or giving birth to oneself.
Again, it is an image which assumes a fnWri status as a schematism or dramati-
zation insofar as it synthesizes l:he past and future into one moment. Hence,
again, ilS function lies in ordering the process of individuation. Once it has
assumed it!! (J priori status as a genuine symbol. it is invoked as a symbol of an
ideal telos. the hierogamy between consciousness and the unconscious.
But let us now return to our line of argument about the consequences of this
synl:hesis of schema and symboL Kant specifies that the kind of reflection at
work here is not only a fnWri (as the judgement 'This is beautiful' also is) but
~ objects th.emselve.s (symbolism is absorbed in l:he free materials of
nature). Rut in that case, the productive imagination we first encounter in l:he
schematism really does find a new, positive and objective determination in the
function of symbolism. A genuine transcendental deduction is taking place.
It is through symbolism that the schematism is liberated from the l:aSks
au i
imposed by the understanding, becoming the vehide for the presentation of
the ideal. Before turning in detail to the role that Ideas play in symbols. we can
already observe that from a systematic point of view, such a reorientation of
the cognitive functions is extremely significant. Il suggests that, beneath the
Transcendental Deducrion of the Categories (which shows how an a priori
svnthesis between pure concepts and pure inruitions guarantees the rule of
representation), there is another, more subterranean Deduction, between
schematism and symbolism, pure imagination, and pure Idea, which hollows
out a passage beneath the sphere of self-conscious, conceptual representation.
There is a passage from the pure productive spatiotemporal matrix of the
imagination. taken by itself, through to the imensive transformations pre-
sented in the 'free materiah of nature', which in turn provide a receptacle for
the Idea. Deleuze's excavation of Kant's texts has resulted in the discoverv oc'
a secret Transcendental Deduction. running underneath the architectonic of
Kant's whole theory of cognition, a vein of gold apparently leading away from
the order of representation that rules on the surface.
But in order to truly follow this vein, we must also bring about some modifi-
cations in our usual conceptions of Kantian subjectivity. Already the suggestion
that there are dual trajectories of cognition at work in the apprehension of
symbols shows that Kant is no longer presuming a unified, self-conscious
subject The imagination reflects on the symbol, while reason is simultaneously
interested in it. How can these two activities take place at the same time? Why
don't theyjib against each other? The analogical strucrure of the symbol is the
key. Ifreason's interest is satisfied by the symbol, the latter nevertheless remains
an indirut presentation of the Idea. As &r as the s u ~ e c t is concerned, they are
eng3ged in reflection on a beautiful symbol: they are not Cb1I.SCiottsly aware thar
the beautiful object is symbolizing an Idea. In the conscious experience of
contemplating the white lily, one is simply absorbed in and fusdnated by the
lily, but one does not know why. Does it not follow that if consciousness is taken
up with the reflection by the imagination arid understanding of the object.
then reason's 'interest' in the object is uncon.scious? Kant's whole line of thought
points to a splitting of the cognitive subject, with the reflecting subject left
unaware of why it is interested in the lily, while reason pursues its paMion
unconsciously. With the move to the symbol, Ideas are no longer just objects of
thought, but are indirecdy presented in nature. The activity of reason has
therefore changed in nature, and that is why we can now talk of an unconscious
passion of reason.
We have already seen that something like this follows from our account of
the movement from projection to the symbol. The very movement from pnr
jecrion to the animation ofthe whole of narure through symbolism meant that
the subject had now truly alienated itself within nature, and become other to
itself. Now, whereas the model of projection had analogies within both
Jungian and Freudian psychoanalysis, this new model of the wodd as
illuminated book of symbols has no Freudian correlate. Here it is only
the Jungian account of archetypal symbols that finds a potential K:a.ntian
TN! World as Symhol: &nt, lung and Deleuze
Symbolism and Esoteric Mathesis
Deleuze's work is littered with references to Symbolist literature (Gerard de
Nerwl, Mallarme, Villiers de rIde Adam, Rimbaud, Barbey d'Aurevilly,
Sacher.Masoch) and he grnnt!l symbolist aesthetics more credence than would
most of his generation. In 'To Have Done with Judgment' (1993), Deleuze
returns to his early interest in symbolism, remarking that Nietzsche, Anaud,
Lawrence and Kafka all 'could be called symbolists'. Referring to Lawrence's
account of symbols (which incidentally was based on Jung'S), Deleuze
describes the symbol as 'an intensive compound that vibrates and expands,
that has no meaning, but makes us whirl about until we harness the maximum
of possible forces in every direction, each of which receives a new meaning by
entering into relation with the otheI'5' (CC 134).
Deleuze already had an interest in symbolism. before his tum toJung, as is tell-
rifled by one of his 'repudiated' articles from the 1940s.
In 1946, Deleuze
explanation. Kant's transcendental!:heory of symbolism shows the conditions
under which symbolism assumes significance ror cognition, and !:hus offers a
tranIlcendental grounding for !:he tum to symbolism in Jung (and Delcure).
Kant shows how the subject necessarily confronts the world in an unconscious
aearch for symbolic meaning. The task ofJungian psychology is 00 show how
lhe subject adwnces precisely from a projective relation to the unconscious to
a symbolic relation. ButJung also supplies the conclusion to this movement,
which is not spelled out in Kant. 'Individuation' finally occurs when !:he ego is
able to affirm the fact that it has been, and will continue to be, merely an actor
in a symbolic drama that has long it.
This Kantian cOlUltruction of the 'symbolic order' provides a genesis of the
development ofthe unconscious. But if the model of projection tends towards
a paranoiac experience of the unconscious, the symbolic model does appear
to tend towards what appears to be a psychofi& reconstruction of the world. As
an unconscious seeker ofsymbols, the subject must not only experience its life
and the world in the mode of recollection, there is an inexorable and isomor-
phic tendency towards the paramnesiac immobilization of experience. When
the enteI'5 the panunnesiac vortex of psychosis, the world inevitably
bursts aflame with meaning. The subject henceforth has a leading role to play
in a drama whose significance is bo!:h undeniahle and obscure. Because the
synthesis between schema and symbol is so far-reaching, and can potentially
become autonomous of the norms of the understanding, it tends towards a
psychotic reconstruction of reality. Butjust as Freud claims that love is a fonn
of psychosis, on the model developed in this chapter, we must admit that any.
glimmer of beauty or sublimity only flares up because it brings with it a f.riBson
of this danger. The symbolizing subject cannot help but experience itself as an
actor wandering through a drama larger than it; at each encounter with a
crystalline image, it cannot completely suppre8ll the question 'what does this
mean, what is this thing trying to tell me?'
wrote a for
bearing the
one Dr Joh
wrote 'Ma
Malfatti's M.
Anamhie u
[Studies on
to MedicineJ
Universe, Or
('Only in the
sophical noti
tectonic of
Egg in Life')
sexuality fro
the Double
French editi
the tint essay,
tion in 1946 .
Who is this
nor does it a
In the ABCin
tion for auth
admits to ha:
ones who h
in Deleuze's
duction to M
occult them
'mathesu' ap
weird emp
interest in so
second birth
ideas found .
'sorcery' in
subjects to
tionship betw
how to relate
Malfatti is .
physician in
Schelling's pr
(Leaky 1965: 1
Deleuu and the Um:onscious
a to a ,new French edition of a wod of esoteric philosophy
bearing the tide Matkesis: (]I" Stutli8s on the Anan:h, and HWrm:h, of by
one Dr Johann Malfatti de Montereggio.2l! DeJeuze was twenty-one when he
wrote 'Mathesis. Science and Philosophy' for the first French edition of
Malfatti's Matlusisfor a hundred years.
The original textis entitled Shuiim f1ber
AntJ1t'me und Hiemrthie tUs Wmens, mit bestmtierer Bt:z.iehung auf die Median
[Studies on the Anarchy and Hierarchy of Knowledge, with Special Reference
to MedicineJ, and contains five separate but interconnected studies on esoteric
numerology ('Mathesis as Hieroglyph Or Symbolism of the liiple llie of the
Universe, Or the Organon of the Ancient Indians'). nature-philosophy
('Only in the Process, Not in the Product'), an application of the nature-philo-
sophical notion of embryogenesis to the whole of human life ('On the Archi-
tectonic of the Human Organism, Or the liipJe llie in the Egg and the liiple
Egg in Life'), periodicity in ('On Rhythm and 'I)tpe, Consensus and
Antagonism in General, and Particularly in Man'), and, finally, on human
sexuality from the perspective of the esoteric notion of the hermaphrodite ('On
the Double Sex in General and on Human Sex in Particular'). In the first
French edition of 1849, the entire book has been given the abbreviated tide of
the first essay, La MatMu, and the edition to which Deleuze adds h.ia introduc-
tion in 1946 is a revised translation of this volume,
At first sight, the problem seems to be the obscwity of Malfatti and his book.
Who is this Malfatti and by what strange route did the yOWlg DeJeuze come
upon his work? The name is not familiar from histories ofWestern philosophy,
nor does it appear in histories of Gennan thought in the nineteenth
In the ABCinterviews, Deleuze and Parnet discuss Deleuze's Wlusual predilec-
tion for authors so obscure that there are not even cults devoted to them. He
admits to having a kind of 'mania' in his youth for obscure authors, especially
ones who had written litde. and admits that he derived prestige from it (ABC,
'L comme litterature'). Given that Malfatti's name does not appear ever again
in Deleuze's writings, we could be forgiven for thinking that Deleuze's intro-
duction to MaJfatti's Matkesis is merely a youthful dalliance with the occult. But
occult themes run throughout Deleuze's work: not only does the term
'mathesis' appear at crucial points of DiJfermce and RepetitWn, along with a
weird emphasis on the esoteric use of the mathematical calculUll, but his
interest in somnambulism, the notion of the world as an egg, the theory ofthe
second birth and the recurring image of the hermaphrodite all refer back to
ideas fOWld in Malfatti's book. We will examine the pages on magic and
'90fcery' in A 1'hcu.5and Plateaus in the final chapter, as these are distinct
subjects to mathesis; nevertheless, it will be impossible to overlook the rela·
tionship between them. Deleuze really did look everywhere for ideas about
how to relate to the WlconscioUll.
Malfatti is indeed obscure, but not completely obscure, He was a Viennese
in the Gennan Romantic tradition, and an early convert to
Schelling's project to synthesize 'Brunonian' medicine with NalJD1lhilnsophiil
(Lesky 1965: 10; d. Tsouypoulos 1982); he was sought after as a physician, and
The World as Symbol: Kant, Jung and Delew:.e
became personal physician to members of Napoleon Bonaparte's &mily, and
to Beethoven (Alonan 1999), He was one of the main proponents of mes-
merism in Vienna (Gauld 1992: 89; Faivre 1996: 53), Studies on tJu Anarch, and
HieraTr:h, ofKfWWledge was his second book, published thirty-six years after his
first, Entwurfliner Padwgenie am der Evolutilm und Reuolutilm des Lebens [Sketch
of a Pathogenesis out of the Evolution and Revolution of Life] (1809),
Although it is true that he is rarely referred to in histories of Naturphilosophil>
and therefore seems a thoroughly marginal figure in intellectual history, his
portion of fame does not rest only on his sraws as a physician to royalty and
great a.rtists. His Anarch, and.Himm:hy acquired a certain degree of renown in
another, more subterranean milieu: the occult circles of fm-de-siUle France.
When Rene Guenon, the leading esotericist of his time, reviewed the 1946
edition ofMalfatti (whose book was 'one of those which is often spoken about.
but which few have read'), he acknowledged the historkal value of the re-
publication, due to 'the considerable role that this work and others of the
same genre played in the constitution of occultism at the end of the 19th
century' (Guenon 1947: 88). As David Reggio has shown, Malfatti's influ-
ence is fOWld most explicitly in the work of one of the leaders of the
movement of Marrinism, Gerard Encausse, otherwise known as 'Papus'
(Reggio 2004; on Marrinism, see Harvey 2005).24 The eminent:e grise of Mar-
tinism, Stanislas de Guaira. possessed a copy of Malfatti's Mathesis ('an
extremely curious and rare' volume, Philipon 1899: 85), and had planned
to complete his three-volume opus TJu Serpent ofGenesis with an account of
Mathesis (hut he died of a drug overdose at the age of 36, the b09k remain-
ing unfinished),
The YOWlg Deleuze begins his preface by stating that although it is essential
not to forget the concrete practices deployed in Indian civilization, the 'capiral
interest' of Malfatti's book lies in its general reflections on mathesis, which can
be of use even to our occidenral mentality, where a dualism between philosophy
and science has prevailed.2!i The main applications of Mathesis mentioned by
Deleuze are in the fields of medicine and poetic creation. Deleuze acknowl-
edges that his account' of the relations between mathesis, science and philoso-
phy will inevitably leave him on the 'outside' of mathesis, but he nevertheless
thinks that it is a philosophw approach that can show how mathesis can
continue to remain 'one of the great attiwdes of the mind [ l ~ r (Deleuze
1946: Ix). He promises to criticize the arguments which philosophers have
always been tempted to make against mathesis, and also says that Malfatri's text
affords us the chance to reflect anew on the meaning of the word 'initiated',
which refers to the individuating encounters with the 'principal human reali-
ties, binh, love, language or death' (Deleuze 1946: xiii). 'The key notion of
mathesis is nothing mysterious', he insists, 'it is that individuality never separates
itself from the Wliversal, and that between the living and life one can find the
same relation as between life as species and divinity' (xv).
The esoteric technique of mathesis is also presented as a solution to the
'anarchic' dualism between mind and body which eats into every fonn oflife
Del.ev.u and the Unconscious
objecti .
to quali
in the SJ
reality 0
itself. In
age. The:
monks a
The sy
lematic l
and knowledge. Mind-body dualism is 'anarchic', beClUl8e sensible qualities
can no longer be correlated with the physical quantities that constitute them.
In endeavouring [() provide explanations, science had to eliminate sensible
qualities to get to the object of thought, which is purely quantifiable. 'When
one arrives at H20, there is no more water' (xvi). Conversely, philO!JOphy
analyses cognition and knowledge in such a way that actual facts about the
physical world are held to be irretewnt. Philosophy is 'reflexive analysis where
the sensible world is described as a representation of the knowing subject'.
Deleuze notes that the opposition belWeen science and philosophy goes
beyond the simple opposition of :object of thought - thinking subject', What
really happens is that in both cases the sensible world is being referred to a
tJwught beyond it: in the case of science, to thought conceived as purely objec-
tive, in the case of philosophy, to thought conceived as an act of the subject..
'The object of thought is not onlY like the thinking subject, it is also
k object" like the sensible object: this is a new depth of opposition' (ibid.).
Colour, for instance may be 'subjective' in that its sensible appearance does
not belong to objects themselves, which can be reduced to mere vibrations.
Nevertheless. it also has its own oijectivicy. 'It is given to the individual.
without reference to anything but itself. The individual knows well enough
that things have not waited for him to exist' (xvi-vii) , If a three-dimensional
shape has three visible sides, then it will have at least six sides in total. Con-
versely, the six sides of the cube appear in three dimensions. There are intrin-
sic detenninations of space and colour. We thus have a new duality within tM
phenbmenon (of colour, space and time, etc.). The task is then to rela!e the
objectivity of phenomenal colour to its subjective, sensible appearances. This
would require that 'the object of thought be led back to the sensible, quantity
to quality. Let us remark in general that this reduction is itself what is at work
in the symbol.
Deleuze here connects with an esoteric lradition which upholds the specific
reality of the symbol, where symbols ace even monI real than passing reality
itself. In 1946. Deleuze had dedicated his article 'From Christ to the Bour·
geoisie' to the esotericist and medievalist Marie-Madeleine Davy, whose studies
in twe1fth<entury medieval philosophy were centred on the idea that medieval
culture involved an initiation into symbolic truths which were only compre-
hensible to those who had been initiated.!6 She shows how medieval philoso-
phy articulated a series of 'degrees' of the love of God, which would each
involve an iniliarion into the deeper truths implicated in the symbols of the
age. There were 'secret' levels to symbols which could only be accessed by
monks and kings (Davy 1977: 104).
The symbol has a 'double depth' (xxiv). Not only does it have a phenome-
nal appearance (dimensions, shape, colour. etc.); further, using teChniques of
numemlog, one can construct an entire 'system of correspondences' that
provides us with exactly what we are looking for: an interiorized doubling of
matter and meaning. The symbol satisfies thought andsensibility; once a prob-
lematic thought has been expressed in a symbol it has been immortalized, and
lily, and
of mea-
uter his
tory, his
altv and
nown in
De 1946
. the re-
s of the
he 19th
's influ-
of the
of Mar-
'm ('an

lich can
)ned by
esis can

tti's text
Iiriate4', :
xiOD of

\ to the
l\ of Iffi: ':
The World as Symbol: Kant, lung and Dekuu
Mathesis, broken into its substantial elements, that. is to say. redoubled into
metaphysics and mathematics, lost the living milieu of sacred unity. In the
first of these sciences, its spirit, deprived of all basis, was absorbed into
purely ideal logical forms. and in the latter, it left behind (as its corporeal
image) only mute hieroglyphics and uncomprehended symbolic figures
[chq]m] , which only preserved a pure quantitative signification. From there.
through this disastrous division, idealism and realism arose, like elements
contrary to one another, still searching for their point of union; mathesis
had ceased to be the universal science of life. (3)
With the decline of the original unity, a long history of occlusion foUowed,
during which it was only possible to 'undo this dualism ... by means of a certain
exaltation and a unitary act of transfiguration. similar to that of our spiritual
and corporeal procreation' (4). Immediately, mathesis is related to the sexual
act. It is not at all clear which notion is stnnger: the idea that sexual reproduc-
tion should have anything to do with some quasi-mathematical type of thought,
or the idea of 'spiritual procreation'. In case we were in doubt that we have
heard correctly, Malfatti goes on to specify that he is talking of 'an act during
which results, at its culminating point. in a double erection [utte double in?dion),
on the one hand towards the divine. and on the other hand toward! narore' (4).
We need to take a step back. Let us start again by asking what this 'mathesis'
for r.
lJeleuu and tN! Unetmsciow
there is nowhere else to go. Where the qualities of the s u ~ e c t of science are
eliminated by explanation, 'the symbol is such that what symbolises is now the
sensible object. with which the knowledge that it symbolises is completely iden-
tified' (xix). The symbol, properly understood, is therefore double. 'The
sensible object is called symbolic, and the o ~ e c t of thought. losing all scien-
tific signification, is hieroglyph or Number (c1JijJm)' (xxi). 'The symbol is the
thought of nui'lWr bectnMmasible object (xxiii). Deleuze gives the example of the
flag as symbol of the nation, where a sensible object is posited as an incarna-
tion ofan object of thought. This ohject is the knowledge (savoir) that it incar-
nates. But not everything is a symbol; and only certain special things are tnle
Malfatti tells us that the 'mother-idea' of his studies is 'the unity of science'
as speUed out in 'the mystical Orpnonofmathesis of the Indians' (ibid., xxvii).
In his opening remarks to the first srudy, on mathesis itself, he assens that
metaphysics and mathematics originally maintained a living unity in ancient
India. If we look hard enough, we can find in mathematics the 'mute debris of
a spirimal monument' (6). Mathematics did not begin as a formal science, but
functioned as an essential part of an integrated system of esoteric knowledge
about the body and its forces. Its origins were obscure, as everybody who has
ever encountered 'mathesis' has regarded it as something that cannot have
been created by human beings (1).
Without saying how it happened, Malfatti straightaway laments the loss of
this original knowledge:
is. In his fascinating 8UlVef of occultist philosophy, the surrealist Sarane
Alexandrian connect!J Ma.lfatti's account of 'mathellis' with an older occult tra.
dition of 'arithmosophy'. The notion of mathesis, he tells us, is used by the-
ologians and occultists to denote the conjugation of metaphysics and
mathematics in a scientia IM, or science of God. For instance. in 1660 the
bishop of Vigenavo, Juan Caramuel, wrote a Mathesis m.u.Imt. in which he
declared that 'there are numerous questions in the philosophy of the divine
which can nOl be understood without matheshl' (cited in Alexandrian 1983:
112). Frances A Yates, the scholar of the Hermetic tradition, has brought to
light a tradition of 'mathesis' that first fully emerges in European thought in
the work of Ramon Lull, but which has influences further back in Anbic
alchemy and the Hennetic writings of thi.rd<enwry Alexandria. Yates's aim
was to show that Giordano Bruno wall burned at the stake not because of his
affirmation of Copemicanism, but because of hhl attempts to initiate a 'new
religion of Love, Art, Magic and Mathesis' (yates 1966: 371; Yates 1964: 354).
In his introduction, Deleuze places Malfatti in a more mainstream philosoph-
ical tradition, reminding us that, despite his mind-body dualism, Descartes too
dreamed of a mo.th&sis universDlis (as reponed by Baillet in his biography).
Deleuze could have cited other earlier and later philosophical sources, such as
Leibniz or Novalis (both important [0 his work). Leibniz searched for an o.rith-
metim ullivmalis or scientia grm.eraIU, which would allow one to deal with all
possible permutations and combinations in all dhlciplines. Leibniz's interest in
mathematics was subordinated to his desire to find a way to formulate all
possible variation and change. Novalis in turn toolt up the project of an aritA-
metial unitJmalis (Novalhl 1966: UI, 23-25; Dyck 1959: 22). This universal
mathesis was to include 'all mental operations, volitional and aesthetic expe-
riences, and all knowledge' (Dyck 1959: 93). [n his account of arithmosophy,
Alexandrian also discusses the later revivals of mathesis in the nineteenth
century, bearing the imprint of Kant's influence. The most notable figure in
that later trndition is Hoene Wronski, who is one of Deleuze's central refer-
ences in his avowedly ' ~ o t e r i c ' discussion of the caiculWl in Differmu and Rep-
etititm. Alexandrian writes that 'Wronski holds, in occult philosophy. the place
that Kant holds in classical philosophy' (Alexandrian 1983: 133). Mter
Wronski and Malfatti, philosophical interest in mathesis declines, and the
works of Papus and Guaita are notably lacking in philosophical references
(apan from to Wronski and Malfatti themselves). But the promises made for
mathesis were very great Deleuze cites Malfatti's daim that 'mathesis shall be
for man in his relations with the infinite, what locomotion is for space'
(Deleuze 1946: xv).
For a definition ofmathesis, Malfatti himself refers us bad to Proclus's Com,..
mentary on tAt FJTSt Book of Eu£lid's Elent.mts. where the relation between
mathesis and mathematics is made explicit. Proclw is one of the most inter-
esting Neoplatonists, and was a toWering figure in fifth-<:entury Alexandrian
culture. Some have speculated that the Jewish development of the cabbala
originates in hhl thought, and there are similarities between hit ideas and
:e are
is the
~ true
s that
10 has
. have
oss of
d into
fn the
I into
~ have
-e' (4).
The World as Symbol: Ko.nt, Jung and Dekuz.e
According to the tradition, the Pythagoreans recognised that everything that
we call learning is remembering, not something placed in the mind from
without, like the images of sense pictured in the imagination, nor transitory
like the judgments of opinion. Though wakened by sense-perception.
learning has its source within us, in ow understanding's attending to itself
... This, then, is what learning [math.esis] is, recollection of the eternal ideas
in the soul; and this is why the study that especially brings us the recollec-
tion of these ideas is called the science concerned with learning ['IIIO.tM-
matike]. Its name thus makes clear what sort of function this science
perfonns. (Proclus 1970: 46)
Produs adds that this capacity is achieved with the aid of the god Hennes
(Thoth) who 'through ow searching tum.s us back on ourselves', and
'through our birth-pangs perfects us', leading us to the blessed life (47). With
his notion of mathesis, Produs goes further into the esoteric ideas found in
Plato's texts about reminiscence. ProcbJS was a practitioner of theurgy, and
developed ideas about 'astral bodies' within the Neoplatonic tradition. Bm
these ideas and practices would JX>SSibly not have arisen had not the notion of
reminiscence produced a powerful motivation for the development of a
theory of the unconscious. Matlwis is remembering truths that one has buried
in one's mind, but which for some reason have been forgotten. Mathematical
and geometrical truths are in the mind, and all a 'teacher' needs to do is to
show the student how to remember.
Deleuze and the Unconscious
those of the Hennetic writings. Proclus' discussion of mat/resis reminds us that
the word itself is Greek for 'learning'. Proclus' book is a commenrarv on
Euclid. but he is particularly concerned to show that while mathematics'is of
intrinsic interest, more profoundly it is also 'the science concerned with
leaming' (mtJIhematike) (Produs1970: 46). Plato's M8n0and Phaedohadshown
that the nature of mathematics leads us hack to a fundamental philosophical
question about the nature of knowledge. The ideal foons of mathematics
cannot be derived from the world of appearance - so how does one tUscO'IJiIYor
even learn the truths of mathematics and geometry? Produs is explicit about
the implication: the mind can ~ e i v e these foons from nowhere but itself. In
the Menu. Plato suggests that it follows that what is described as 'learning' in
these cases must be a recollection: 'If you take a person to a diagram. then you
can show mostly dearly that learning is a recollection' (Plato. Ph(UtU! 73b).
'Learning' is really the recollectilm of truths that have been forgotten: a, remi-
niscence, an anamnesis, an unforgetting - an overcoming of amnesia. It is
necessarily so because one can neither learn what one already knows. nor
learn what one does not already know (for how could one recognize its
validity, or even know what to look for?). For ProchlS too, mathematics is the
product of mathe.si.s, 'the recollection of the eternal ideas in the soul'. Malfatti
cites the Latin text of Produs, which begins with the statement that 'Mathesis
(disciplina) reminiscnalio est: mathesis is the discipline of reminiscence.
But. if this is right. then conversely the mathematical fonDS discovered can
themselves he put to use in the recovery of further eternal forms derived from
them. In fact, in the TIt1UMIJ.S,
Plato constructs the soul out of all the mathematical forms, divides her
according to nwnbers, binds her together with proportions and hannonious
ratios, deposits in her the primal principles of figures, the slraight line and
the circle, and sets the circles in her moving in intelligent fashion. All math-
ematica1s are thus present in the soul from the first. (Proclus 1970: 14)
The goal of Proclus' account of is therefore to restore nwnber and
geometry to their original metaphysic.al meaning (Malfatti directly foUows him
on this). But Produs draws a further implication which is not yet crystal clear
in Plato's writings.lfmathematic.al forms are ultimate realities, they must have
their own ontological form, their own kind of reality and even their own
'movement' - insofar as geometry, for instance, has its own geneses (for
instance in the detennination of conic sections, to which Delewe refers now
and again), or insofar as mathematics can generare iUl own series. This math-
ematical reality and movement must be distinguished from the realities and
movements found in physical reality. Proclus makes a distinction between at
least three kinds ofcognition: that based on the senses; that based on the intel-
lect, which is motionless; and that based on intuition, which can discover the
special ·movements' that are proper to the forms. but which are not like
physical movements. The mind that intuitively contemplates the pure fOIIDJl 'is
not motionless, like that of the intellect, but because it!! motion is not change
of place or quality, as is that of the sense, but a life-giving activity, it unfolds and
traverses the immaterial cosmos of ideas. now moving from first principles to
conclusions, now proceeding in the opposite direction, now advancing from
what it already knows to what it seeks to know' (16). These fonnal movements,
or 'living fonns', are different in kind from sensible movements. If there
are inrervals and series in mathematics, these are not to be modelled on
empirical spatiotemporaJ intervals and series. 'Our sense perceptions engage
the mind with divisible things', but 'every divisible thing is an obstacle to our
remming upon ourselves' (46), Similarly, the fonned things we project in OUT
imagination risk separating us from the formation that is proper to ideas
themselves. When we 'remove these hindrances', we can become 'producers
of genuine knowledge' (46). The forms are 'living and intelligible paradigms
of visible numbers and figures and ratios and motions' (15). 'Before the
nwnbers, the self-moving nwnhers', says Produs, just as 'before the visible
figures the living figures' (ibid.).
remarks that the knowledge and techniques of mathesis were kept
secret for two reasons. The first reason was because great truths are wisely pro-
tected from profanation (6). The Christian fathers were incapahle of restrain-
ing themselves from attacking oriental mysticism, and so secrecy has been
necessary. But Malfatti gives a more profound reason: the Organon has been
The World as Sy'111JJol: Ko.nt, lung and Dekuu
sus thal:
1rary on
Ltia is of
led with
UCI.1Ve1' or
cit about
itself. In
then you
edo 73b).
j; a remi-
It is
ows. nor
.gni.ze il:S
ia is the
. MaJfatti
ind from
g to itself
mal ideas
Lg [matM-
s science
i Hermes
.ves', and
47)_ With
found in
'urgy. and
ition. But
notion of
Ilent of a
las buried
:0 do is to
kept secret because it positively cannot be communicated in words. The Vedic
tradition, Hennelism, NeoPlatonism and Renai&sance alchemy all instead
communicated their ideas through hieroglyphs and symbolic numerology.
Of these symbols, Malfatti writes: 'It is necessary that the spirinW intuition
that one discovers in them to be perceived in the shortest space of time, and
also that the phyaical apparitions obtained through efforbl undertaken should
also take place in the minimum possible extension' (6). The mind seeks
adequ.a.te knowledge of eternal truths. The only way to gain adequate know-
ledge of such an o ~ e c t is by means of an intuition which can be spatiotem-
porally contracted into a symbol and which can be contemplated in the
'shortest space of time' and in 'the minimum possible extension' . Onlyin such
a case can unity be seized. in diversity in a glance, where the 'general life is in
the panicu1ar life, and vice versa',
In the introduction to the study on mathesis, Malfatri suggests that the loss
of the discipline of mathesi.s was countel1lCted by one fundamental tendency
in human beings. It remained possible to undo the dualism between quality
and quantity, metaph}'llics and mathematics, through a temporary 'combat' or
'ordeal' that leads in each case beyond the stale of individuality. That is, it is
possible to overcome the duality 'by means of a certain exaltation and a
unitary act of transfiguration, similar to that of our spiritual and corporeal
procreation; an act during which, at its culminating point, this double
erection [atte double mttkm] is joined in one part to the divine, in the other
part to nature, without, however, being able to remain there. To dwell there
too long would in effect lead to the exhaustion and death of the individual'
(Malfatti 1845: 4). How are we to understand this splendid 'double
erection,?28 Malfatti could be referring to some special kind of sexual tech-
nique; perhaps some further physiological and mental excitements of the kind
offered by unorthodox medical traditions. such as Jkunonianism or alchemy.
are involved. But the sexualized ontology, or cosmic sexuality, also refers back,
more profoundly, to the ideas of the esoteric wing of Indian religion, Hindu
Given that to dwell in a state of double erection for too long would lead to
exhaustion and eYen death, how did 'the Brahmans' manage to maintain
themselves in the perspective of matbesis to such an extent?
The answer is straighcforward. This people consecrated their whole exis-
tence to the contemplative life, at the price of the greatest individual
sacrifices. of the most complete abnegation, exemplified in the numerous
gytnn080phers and solitaries who inspired the highest admiration among
the Greeks. That is how and why they could attain the highest elevation and
maintain their spiritual transfiguration by the reiteration and exaltation of
their acts. (Malfatti 1845: 4)
In a footnote Malfatri remarks that the prophets produced their prophecies
through this act of r.ransIiguration, as did the saints their divine intuitions. He
cites Dionysius the Areopagite, who describes how, once one has been pene-
trated by the rays ofdivine oracles, it is necessary to proceed with 'sobriety and
sanctity' so that we can 'adapt to these eminent. splendoun of divine things'.
Malfatti then remarks that:
That which, in the contemplation of life, was attained in principle
the mortification of the senses, by the abasement of the individual, has been
8ulMect to renewed research in our times (although rarely with enough
purity and elevation) through the means of a sonof artificial anticipation of
death (animal magnetism). The same fact has long been observed in the
case offonuitous alterations of health, which have for their particular effect
the concentration and momentary elevation of the somatic life of the indi-
vidual In the first case it is called artificial somnambulism, in the second
case spontaneous somnambulism. (Ma.If3.tti 1845: 4-5)
For Malfatti, there is something ecstatic about this proceu of self-heaIing
through natural somnambulism, Whereas Schopenhauer believed that the
prime example of natural somnambulism was in instinct in general, for
Malfatti, natural sornnambulWn too needed to be understood as an ecstatic
state. Such 'transfigurations' lie behind 'the idea of rebirth
among the Indians, who, as one knows, describe themselves as twice born'
(Malfatti 1845: 5), The implication here is that spontaneous somnambulilm
emerges in a person's psychological life like a rebirth, and demands a tech-
nique to mediate the reiteration and exaltation of this change, What fIOuods
very much like madness or a psychotic breakdown for Malfatti becomes a
precious oppommity to advance to a higher stage of equilibrium, In the same
passage, he cites Hippocrates's dictum that 'something divine is hidden in ill-
nesses', Natural and artificial somnambulism tap into the same forces at work
in the disciplines of the original 'Brahmans'. The Indians discovered 'the
admirable mystical Organon of mathesis' as the means of reiterating and
exalting their acts following their 'second birth', Contemporary nature-philo-
sophical medicine should therefore return to Indian tradition in order to
make known the secrets of this method of mathesis. 'What an astonishing
advantage man has drawn from the night-side of his life: w open up
sleep {SOI1U1Vil], by means of a st:at.e of vigil (the vigil of sleep [Ia 'fNI!ilIe
du sommeil.I), the highest, most hidden l1lItral region: this is what the magnetic
development of clairvoyance and ecstasy demoWltratell to us, in the same way
as the natural life of dreams' (M.a.1fatti 1845: 153).
MaJfatti's Anan:hy an.d Himm:hy of KfI.OllIi8dge is like a Book of the Dead
charged with lanuillm, It suggests that under the appropriate, somnambulis-
tic conditions, the internal symbolic structure of the universe may be divined
according to a. theosophical conception of the microcosm. In BOhme's theos-
ophy, the course of the world, its development in nature and history, was
undersrood as the manifestanon of a drama taking place in God himself, The
human being is a microcosm, in that it contains every level of physical, organic
T1u! World os Symhol: Kant, Jung and D8kuu
ion of

: loss
it' or
, it is
nd a
and psychic differentiation that exists in the macrocosm. In his later work,
Schelling developed a nature-philosophical theory of 'potencies'. according to
which the increasing accwnulation of dialectically interrela.ted levels of being
(physical, organic, telluric, uranic) could be proponionally related to each'
other in an e8<?teric calculus, With Malfaw's somnambulistic techniques, the
mind becomes a 'spiritual automaton', guided only by the symbo1i8m of
numbers and bodies. Whereas conscious thought is determined by self-
conscloUllness, if consciousness is relaxed through natural or artificial
somnambulism, then the result of unconscious proceSllefi can emerge into the
mind and be compared and evaluated mathetically. At the limit, then, uncon-
scious thought is determined sub-representatively or subliminally by the play
of the 'potencies' (Beach 1994: 182) or 'living numbers'. The hierarchy of
potencies in the body and spirit are free to determine themselves and the
microcosm expresses the macrocosm.
In his introduction, Deleuze gives two variant suggestions about what the
'essential symbolic operation' might. be. On the one hand, following Malfatti,
he says that 'in the double depth of the symbol, [mathesisl fu1fiIs itself as the
living art of medicine, continually establishing a system of increasingly
intimate correspondences, in which ever more individual realities are to be
found enclosed' (xxiv). But what he actually discusses is the 'cssentialsymbolic
operation' of the poem, with one of the supreme statemenu of symbolist
poetry, MalIanne's AWn! EvantiUl, as exemplar.
The poem is presented as the product of Mallanne's fascination by the move-
ments of his wife's fan. An air of twilight creeps ow:r her as she flutters the fun.
'dLmJ, Ie coup prislmnier 1'UUle/L'hmiuIn ~ ' . The lines are not directly
translatable, but Deleu.ze indicates that he is imagining the unfolding and
refolding fan, as if the fan were the symbol of an enfolded, implicated world, as
jf it were 'the sceptre of shores of rose stagnant on evenings of gold', As if,
within the shores of (O$C, there is an inner, intensive landscape, with rose-lit
sceptres of kings and priests. Mallanne'll poem is addressed to his wife as
'riuewe' (dreamer). Symbolist aesthetics is sometimes accused of embodying a
contradiction between a 'ttanscendental symbolism' which would express pure
Ideas and a symbolism which would express feelings. But what happens in
Mallarme's poems is an expression of the Idea in its intensive, pre-individual
fonn.lfthe brain is the vessel for the involution ofvirtuality, the poem is in turn
the most evolved ronn ofinrolution, where the folds of evolution and involution
achieve their maximum hennenc interiori1.3Jion, to the point that the world
itselfis the merely material guise for Madame Mallarme's fan.
The Sexual Act of the Divine Hennaphrodite
The last study of The Anarch, and Hierarr:h" of K1ItJWledge takes up another
central symbol of Hermetic and alchemical thought: the hennaphrodite,
whose scintillating image also penneates Deleu.ze's work.. In the CriJ.i.qtJ8 of
JuJ.gment. Kant says that 'the ideal of the beautiful (is] the humanfiguwl (Kant
1790: AIL 'An ideal of beautiful flowers, of beautiful furnishings, orota
beautiful view is unthinkable. But an ideal of a beauty ... that has the purpose
of exislence within irseIr - an ideal symbol in other words - such an ideal
could only be found in 'man' (ibid.). For MalfaUi and DeJeuze the supreme
syrnlxJl in the seme just explained is not simply 'man', but the hermaphrodile,
no matter how rare such a figure is in the actual world. The rarity of orchids
and gold enhances rather than diminishes their symbolic value. But in any
case, according (0 Malfatri, the 'hermaphrodite' is a 'living symbol' in a very
special sense.
In Anarch, and Hiero:rch, MaHatti can everywhere be found arguing deliri-
oWlly that sexual polarity is present in all the forces of the universe. Even more
deliriously, he goes on to infer that the separate sexes themselves are not to be
spared from this polarity, and that sexual polarity is in tum to be found within
each sex. "'Man is dupl8x, aM if man wne not dupl£x, theR UKJUlD, be no senso.titm.",
the incomparable Hippocrates once said. In two sepazated bodies live man
and woman, and each one however possesses in itself the body of the other,
each one is in irself Androgyne and Gynander at the same time; it is only a
prevalence of one over the other which separates them and differentiates
them , .. It is for that reason that a sex.ual separation of the body was neces-
sary, both parts remaining masculine-feminine and feminine-masculine'
(Malfatti 1845: 168; d. 164).
So as in Schelling's laler theosophical thought, me world is the body ofGod,
and we are its coming to consciousness. The human being is a microcosm, in
that it contains every level of physical, organic and psychic differentiation that
exists in me macrocosm, in a more interiorized or virtualized form. But in
aruJ Hierarchy it is as if Schelling's final theosophy comes tD completion
in a hallucinatory Tantrism, in which the living body of God, in its most
complete self-development, itself appears in hermaphroditic form in human
sexuality, where the coming-to-divine-eonsciousness becomes identical to the
psychosexual attainment of spiritual 'bisexuality'.
MalfaUi generates the relations of polarity and power at the 'telluric',
'magnetic' or somnambulistic and 'asual' [.si.tUml] or ideal levels of differenti- .
arion. The intestines are the zoo-vegetable envelope of 'telluric' forces; the
heart is the animal envelope of the magneric atmosphere, while the brain is
the envelope of the astral soul. Each of these anatomical divisions is conceived
as an embryo or egg, developing in parallel with the others. There is the
stomach egg, with its satellites of liver and spleen; the breast-egg, with its satel-
lites oflungs and kidney, and the head-egg with its satellites of eye and ear. The
roadie egg develops at each level in triple form, but is only fully born with the
psychosexual attainment of the state of hermaphrodite, in which a polarized
"double body' with a 'double sex' expresses analogically all macTOcosmic
relations of power in perfect microcosmic form.
Perhaps all that Malfatti means by this 'hermaphrodite' is the sexual couple
itself. In the sexual act, the double body finally achieves a 'momentary
reunion' that amounts to a complete self-consciousness, a perfect doubling or
later work,
:cording to
:ls of being
ed to each
"liques, the
llholism of
by self-
,r artificial
'Ie into the
len, uncon-
by me play
res and me
ilt what me
ng Malfatti,
itself as the
aze to be
ial symbolic
)f symbolist
>ythe move-
ters the fan,
not directly
folding and
r.ed world, as
gold'. As if,
with TOse-lit
, his wife as
express pure
happens in
>em is in turn
ld involution
lat the world
up another
ne cTititfue of
:figure' (Kant

The World as Symbol: Kant, lung and De/ew;e
of the
De1.euz.l! and the Unconscious
We live under Samson's prophecy: 'The two sexes shall die, each in a place
apart'. But mattera are complicated because the separated, partitioned sexes
coexist in the same individual: 'initial Hermaphroditism', as in a plant or a
mail, which cannot be fertilized 'except by other hermaphrodites'. Then it
happens that the intermediary, instead of effectirig the communication of
male and female, doubles each sexwith itself: symbol ofa self4'erti.lization all
the more moving in that it is homosexual, sterile, indirect. And more than
an episode, this is the essence of love. The original Hermaphrodite contin-
uously produces the two divergent homosexual series. (PS 80)
reflection. The virtual, opposite-8exed body of each is incarnated in the other.
'Through an effort. an act in which the relativity of the sexes neutralise them-
selves, the sexual couple can 'approach for a moment the hermaphroditic
state' (168). On MaIfatti's somnambulist model, the sexual act does involve a
peculiar kind of consciousness. in which male and female finally attain a
hermaphroditic species consciousness.!Ill The deepest level of consciousness,
therefore, the most ~ level of consciousness, therefore. is discovered in
the act of sexual coupling.
However, he also insists that each person is already a doubled body. The
human being is psychically and sexually 'duplex', 'The double body is a twin
and bisexual' (174). If one is already a 'hennaphrodite' insofar as one is (in
some sense) both female and male, anima and lJftimus (166.181), then in the
sexual encowlter a hermaphrodite takes another hermaphrodite as its o ~ e c t .
In that case, sexual cotW:i.ousness would be the fulfilment ofself-consciousness
because one's object is an incarnation of an image that must remain virtual in
oneself (due to the actual preponderance of male or female biological attrib-
But as a symbol Malfatti's hermaphrodite also suggests an original sexual
matrix for all sexual relationships. Heterosexual relationships already im-
plicate within them a duplicity, in that the anima in a man can also be in a
iove-relationship with the animus of the woman. The full polarity of hetero-
sexuality involves the love of a man-woman for a woman-man. In AnD-
Oedipus, the 'vegetal theme' of hermaphroditism reappears: 'everyone is
bisexual, everyone has two sexes, but partitioned, noncommunicating, the
man is merely the one in whom the male pan., and the woman the one in
whom the female part, dominates statistically. So that at the level of elemen-
tary combinations, at least two men and two women must be made to inter-
vene to constitute the multiplicity in which tra.nsverse commwtications are
established' (AO 69). This relation is actualized in the couple if one keeps
Malfatti's hermaphrodite in mind. Nevertheless, for finite beings, there
remain the three possibilities of sexual love: heterosexuality, and male and
female homosexuality. Within each sex alone, there can be no essential
privilege of heterosexual or homosexual object choice, only a combinatory
of possible relationships. In fact, Deleuze sa}'S that homosexual relationships
even have a privilege.
Indian religion, Tantrism and esoeericism experimented with homosexuality
long before it became an issue of the State: it was not just pan of the
autonomous combinatoryofsexes and their relations, but by virtue of its steril-
ity creates the conditions for what Malfatti calls a 'spiritUal amnion'. the womb
of the ideal. However, homosexuality may take many different forms: a het-
erosexual couple may behomosexual insofar as the male loves the male in the
other. while the female in turn loves the female. Alternatively. the physical
sameness of the other body in actual male homosexuality, say. may be com-
pensated by the pretence of two virtual lesbians - and vice versa. At the other
extreme would be the celibate, creative h'ermaphrodite with his or her
'amniotic effigy' (Malfatti 1845: 186), the creative work. With the liberation of
the double-sexed hennaphrodite, in whatever form, the gates are opened for
the human being to become a libidinal microco&m. no longer symbol of mater
Mtum, but of the cQ&mic body of God, the 'Tantric egg' (ATP 15:i), or what
Deleuze and Guattari rechristen the 'body without organs'.
~ other.
~ them-
volve a
.t:tain a
ered in
iy. The
sa. twin
.e is (in
1 in the
lItUa1 in
d attriJ>.
I sexual
ady im-
be in a
In Anti-
"fone is
mg, the
~ one in
to ineer-
ions are
le keeps
:so there
laie and
n a place
.lant or a
. Then it
cation of
lore than
~ contin-
The World as Symbol: Kant. lung and Deleu.ze
Chapter 5
Jung, Leibniz and the
Differential Unconscious
'Problems and questions, .. belong to the unconscious, but as a result the
unconscious is differential and iterative by nature: it is serial, problematic and
questioning' (DR 108). In his 1980 lectures on Leibniz, Deleu.ze says:
it is Leibniz who first proposed this great idea., this first great theory of this
differential unconscious, and it has never gone away since. There is a very
long tradition of this differential conception of the unconscious based on
minute perceptions and minute appetitions. It culminates in a very great
author, who, strangely, has always been poorly understood in France, a
German post-Romantic named Fechner. He is a disciple of Leibniz who
developed the conception of the differential unconscious. (Third Lecture
on Leibniz, 12)
For Bergson, Fechner was the psychophysicist par excellence, onc;: of the
founders of the 'reign of quantity'. But although he is largely remembered in
this way toclav (every psychology textbook has a chapter on Fechner's psy-
chophysics), Fechner is a multifaceted figure, being also the author of
numerous works both satirical and esoteric, ranging from a treatise on 'The
Comparalive A ~ , ofA ~ (1825). through the Little Book ofLife after Deatll,
to later works on the psychology of plants. I But Deleuze also states thatJung is
a Ihird figure in Ihis 'differential' tradition of the unconscious. There is a psy-
chology with Leibniz's name on it, which was one of the first theories of the I
unconscious. I have already said almost enough about it for you to understand I'
Ihe extent to which it is a conception of the unconscious which has absolutely
nothing 1:0 do with Freud's. , . [However] in the lineage that proceeds from
Freud, some very strange phenomena will be found, [which] return to a
Leibnizian conception' (Third Lecture on Leibniz, 9). Deleu.ze s a ~ he will tal.k I
about this later, but unfonunately he only devotes a short paragraph to fol-
lowing up what happens in 'Freud's posterity' (ibid.: 14). He s a ~ : 'For
example, inJung, there is an entire LeibniZlan side, and what he reintroduces,
to Freud's greatest anger - and it is in this that Freud judges that Jung has
absolutely betrayed psychoanalysis - is an unconscious of a differential type.
And he owes that to the tradition of German Romanticism which is closely
linked also to the unconscious of Leibniz' (ibid.). This is the most problematic
of Deleuze's suggestions, as although here and there Jung does mention
Jung also twice cites a remark of Fechner's about the necessity of an idea of the
'threshold of consciousness' for understanding the unconscious:
In his lecrnre 'Instinct and the Unconscious', Jung also introduces a:thres-
hold' conception of the unconscious familiar from Leibniz (although
Leibniz's name is not mentioned);
I define the unconscious as the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack.
the quality of consciousness. These psychic contents might fittingly be called
'subliminal'. on the assumption that every psychic content must possess a
certain energy value in order to become conscious at all. The lower the value
of a conscious conrent falls, the more it disappears below the threshold.
(CW8: 133)
139 lung, Leibniz and the Differential Unconscious
We mav define the unconscious as the sum of all those psychic events
which are not apperceived, and so are unconscious. The unconscious
contains aU those psychic events which do not possess sufficient intensity
of functioning to cross the threshold dividing the conscious from the
unconscious, Thev remain, in effect. below the surface of consciousness.
and flit by in subliminal form. It has been Known to psychologists since the
time of Leibniz that the elements, that is to say the ideas and feelings,
which mak.e up the conscious mind - its so-called conscious content are
of a complex nature, and rest upon far simpler and altogether unconscious
elements; it is the combinations of these which produces consciousness.
Leibniz had already mentioned the pm:eptions insensibla - those vague per-
ceptions which Kant called 'shadowy representations' , which could attain
to consciousness only in an indirect manner. (CW 3:
the idea of a psychophysical. threshold is of the utmost importance because
it gives a firm foundation to that of the lIDcOnscious generally. Psychology
cannot abstract representations from unconscious perceptions, nor even
from the effects of unconscious perceptions . . . Perceptions and represen-
tations in the state of unconsciousness have, of course, ceased to exist as real
ones ... but something continues in us, psychophysical activity. (Fechner
1860: II, 438; cited in CW 8: 164, 166)2
Leibniz's theory of pelius peruptiqw, as well as Fechner's threshold notion of
the unconscious, it is hard to see these discussions as decisive for Jung's theory
of the unconscious.
In his overviews of the history of the concept of the unconscious.Jung does
mention the important rote played by Leibniz, There had been talk of the
unconscious long before Freud. It was Leibniz who first introduced the idea
into philosophy' (CW 8: 102; cr. CW 16: 139). In a lecture of 1914,just after
the break with Freud. he says:
It the
)f this
::d on
u:e, it
! who

.1' the
s psy-
or of
a psy-
11 talk
.0 fol-
In an important passage from ThJns.furrnobons and S,mhols of the LibiJD, Jung
discusses the unconscious in tenns very similar to Leibniz. Jung discU88es the
possibility that the ideal creations (for instance, poems or art) of somebody
undergoing a psychotic break might contain 'presentiment[s) of the future'.
The patient might be subject to 'one of those thoughts which, to quote
Maeterlinck, spring from the 'inconsdent superieur', from the 'prospective
potency' of a subliminal synthesill'. In a footnote he expands in the following
Doubtless the unconscious contains material which does not rille to the
threshold of consciousness. Analysill dillsolves these combinations into their
historical determinants ... Psychoanalysis works backwards like the science
of history ... History, however, knows nothing of two kinds of things, that
which ill hidden in the past and that which ill hidden in the future ... Insofar
as tomorrow is already contained in today, and all the threads of the future
are in place, so a more profound knowledge of the past might render
possible a more or less far-reaching and certain knowfedge of the future. Let
us transfer this reasoning, as Kant has already done, to psychology ... Just
as traces of memory long since fallen below the threshold of consciousness
are accessible in the unconscious, so too there are certain very fine sublimi-
nal combinations of the future, which are of the greatest significance for
future happenings insofar as the future is conditioned by our own psychol-
ogy . . . From this comes the prophetic significance of the dream long
claimed by superstition. (CW 5: 50, 5ln.)
Thill passage seems perfectly acceptable as an amplification of Leibnizian con-
ceptions ofthe unconscious, particularly of the passage from the New EwJy! on
the ~ panttJ (Leibniz 1765: 54-5; d. p. 42 above). However, Jung
himself does not put it in such a context, and also says at the beginning of the
passage that 'this time I shall hardly escape the charge of mysticillm'.!. Never-
theless, the claim that 'the unconscious also contains all the material that has
not yet reached the threshold of consciousness (CW 7: 128) ill not in itself
mystical as long as the 'productivity' or 'positivity' of the unconscious in its
relations to the ego is undel"ltood in its complexity.
It ill possi.ble hut not likely that these sort of passages provoked Freud's
'greatest anger', and that he thought they 'absolutely betrayed psychoanalysis'.
But Freud does not ex:plicidy express any anger about this aspect ofJung's
thought. Freud's greatest anger (if that is the right word) withJung seems to
have been about his resistance to the sexual theory (see, for instance, SE 14:
58-66, 79-80). His main bone of contention against Jung does not seem to
have been against his reviwl of Leibnizianillm.
We saw that Deleuze indicates that in the work OfJWlg, 'some very strange
phenomena will be found, [which] return to a Leibnizian conception' (Third
Lecture on Leibniz, 9). This is -vague, but there is one last due. In summing
up the contributions of the Leibnizian conception of the unconscious to
Deltuu and the UnconscWw 140
Synchronicity: Acausal Synthesis
'Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle' is a late work of jung's,
published in 1952 in a volume entitled No.tuR'rltltirungundP.s,dre {translated in
1955 as The I ~ ofNtJture and ITyche, along with a paper on 'The Influ-
ence ofArchetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler', by the ph)'llicist
Wolfgang Pauli, who had won a Nobel Prize in 1945. Despite the credentials
of JWlg's coUahorator, .Synchronicity' is probably the work which has most
contributed to Jung's reputation, in some quaners, as a raving New Age
madman. He claims to have discovered an 'lU:ausal' principle which allows us
to discover a certain senu or meaning in certain coincidental relationships
psychology, Deleuze also UlleS the example of rumour: 'You can grasp the
concept of singularity ... on the level of thought-experiences of a psycholog-
ical type: what is dizziness, what is a munnur, what is a rumour?' While the
example of dizziness refers back to Leibniz, the ex:ample ofrumour might wen
refer toJung, who wrote 'A Contrihution to the Psychology of Rumour' (CW
4), and who says, in his essay on UFO hysteria., that rumour is an essential
mechanism for the activation of archetypes. Rumours of UFOs might arise
from a 'primary fantasy originating in the unconscious', 80 that 'an archetype
creates the corresponding vision' (CW 10: 313). However, he adds there that
the relation between archetype and the romOW' cannot be understood as
causal: 'the meaning of the rumour is not exhausted by its being explained as
a causal symptom; rather, it has the value and significance of a living symhol'
(CW 10: 387). We have already encounteredJung's subtraction of the dimen-
sion of causality from symbolism. But hereJWlg seems to want to make a more
radical claim: the process of activation is not an objective causal mechanism,
and, it would seem, is also more than a triggmng of a latent subjective poten-
tial. 'To these two causal relationships we must add a third possibility, namely,
that of a 'synchronistic', i. e. acausal, meaningful coincidence - a problem that
has occupied men'. minds ever since the time of Geulinc.z;, Leibniz and
Schopenhauer' (CW 10: 313). Jung claims that the correspondence of arche-
type and rumour must be understood as a properly acawal process. It would
seem, then, that in our pursuit of references to make sense of Deleuze's claim
that there is a differential unconscious in the work. ofJung, all the evidence is
pointing us to the phenomena that Jung classed under the term 'synchronic-
ity'. In fact, it turllS out that the only substantial references to Leibniz inJung's
work occur in the context of the latter's exposition of synchronicity. Now,
Deleuze never explicitly refers to this concept in his work. So it remains moot
whether these 'very strange phenomena' refer to manifestations of archetypes
in general, or to so-called phenomena of synchronicity. The fact that Jung's
investigations into synchronicity are indeed an investigation into 'strange phe-
nomena', and the fact thatJWlg only really lU:tively Ulle9 Leibniz's philosophy
in his work on synchronicity suggest that it is the latter. There are other
considerations that will also come up when we explore this line of thought.
Jung, Leibniz. and the Difft:rentiol Unconscious
between causally disconnected events. 'Evidence' is supplied from the
domains of parapsychology (ESP), astrology and dreams to apparently luggest
that these acausal connections are really 'out there', that there is a mysterious
dimension of correspondences at work beneath our superficial, everyday
experience, and which is perhaps located at the micropbysica1level only acces-
sible to quantum physics. ButJung's theory of synchronicity is in fact open to
another, less 'realist' interpretation.
For most of the essay, Jung is COntent to reduce parapsychological phenom·
ena to projected expressions of the collective unconscious. In a key passage.
he concludes that 'synchronicity is a phenomenon that seems to be primarily
connected \\ith psychic conditions. that is to say, with processes in the uncon-
scious' (CW 8: 511). Moreover, his central arguments are built on philosophi-
cal texts and arguments, not on direct evidence of parapsychological
phenomena.. nor on quasi-6Cientific speculation aboUt quantum indeter-
minacy. jung claims that an essay on fate by Schopenhauer 'originally stood
godfather to the views I am now developing' (CW 8: 427), and in later pagel'
there is a disquisition on theory of pre-established hannony. Jung's
discussion emerges oUt of the philosophical context of the problem of
psychophysical parallelism, and he considers the 'principle of acausal
connection' to be a contribution to that problem. His basic definition of
synchronicity is a philosophical one: the 'coincidence in time of two or more
causally unrelated events which have the same or a similar sense [Smng¥'haltJ'
(CW 8: 441; trans. An event occurs in an objective sequence of
events which has a 'parallelismof sense' with an event in a subjective series, yet
lacks any causal connection with it. There are ample indications that jung
intends his core idea to be interpreted at a 'transcendental' rather than a
realist or a merely psychological level.
Jung begins the text by questioning the range of the framework of
universal causality, Causality is defined as the regular correlation of events
under repeatable conditions. On this model, causality becomes a 'statistical
truth', incapable in principle with dealing with 'unique or rare events' or
'exceptions' (421):5
The experimental method of inquiry aims at establishing regular events
which can be repeated. Consequently, unique or rare events are ruled out of
account. Moreover, the experiment imposes limiting conditions on nature,
for its aim is to force her to give answers to questions devised by man, (CW
8: 422)6
Jung notes that causality is usually put in opposition to 'the world ofchance'
(423), but he immediately states that, as a rule, it should always be taken as
possible to reduce what appear as chanu correlations down to universal
causality, (In the PWjsics Aristotle had suggested that the perception of
'chance' depends on the expectations of the perceiver.) The appearance of
an event as random is not enough to suggest that it is truly unique or
singular; regularities might in principle be discovered if one looks widely
enough. But ifchance events are not 'acausal', then what could possibly fulfil
the conditions ofbeing the 'unique or care event' which exemplifies acausal-
ity?7 Jung states that 'acausal events' may only be assumed to exist 'where a
causal connection appears to be (ibid.: 424). Jung seems ro
want ro suggest a strong sense of inconceivability here. In his 1951 Eranos
lecture on 'Synchronicity" he sets out three t¥J>es of connection in which
causality is inconceivable (CW 8: 526). The fint and second types give him
the notion of 'synchronicity', but the third is not synchronous at all, and
lung's classification of it as synchronistic is quite intriguing.
The first type of acausal connection gives us the basic form of synchronicity.
It is inamtei.vablt that two simulttJneous events have an immediately causal
connection. This is obviously true; a simultaneous relation is by definition not
successive; so what? Jung goes on to specuy that he is concerned with 'the
coincidence in time of two or more causally unrelated events whi4:h ho.ve the
same (1f a similar sense, in contrast to 'synchronism', which simply means the
simultaneous occWTence of two events' (CW 8: 441). Hence 3. connection can
be synchronous without being synchronistic. With this type, Jung seems ro be
primarily interested in coincidences between the objective, causal sequence
of events on the one hand, and the subjective sequence of internal events
(subjective trains of thought and desire) on the other. Thus this type of
synchronicity occurs within the experience of one What they see with
their senses has an acausal correspondence with what they are thinking. We
will qualify this later, but it is probahly easiest to start with this model in mind.
We should note that, formally, the definition of this first type of synchronicity
is identical to the fonnula invoked in rigorous theories of psychophysical
parallelism, such as that found most fiunousiy in Spinoza. For Spinoza, to
affirm pa.rallelism between mind and body is to treat causal relarions as only
occurring in each heterogeneous series (mind or body), not betuwn mind and
body. Parallelism is thus a way of getting out of the problem of the mind-body
relation that dogs Cartesian dualism (how is the imma.terial mind supposed ro
affect the body. and bodies in general, and how is the body supposed to affect
the mind; the problem that led Descartes to his famous postulation of the
'pineal gland'). Thus, in Spinoza's theory. the connection between mind and
body at anyone given moment is indeed strictly speaking 'acausal', The
difference between Jung and Spinoza is that the former clearly has in mind
correspondences between series which are not only different in kind
(Spinoza's Thought and Extension. or mind and body), but which contain
different contents. For Spinoza, ideas are ideas of the body; what one is
thinking about parallels one's bodily state. jung never says this. and his
examples show that he is concerned with subjective series which are more or
less diverge'llt from series.
The second main type of acausal connection concerns mental events which
occur simultmeously with physical events, and appear to be related (insofar as
they have a similar sense), but again can have no direct causal relation. this
n the
" stood
lern of
tion of
.r more
ence of
nell. yet
at Jung
than a
IIOrk of
cnts' or
r events
l nature.
an, (C\oV
taken as
ption of
.ranee of
uque or
Jung, Leilmiz and tJu DifJmmtial Utuonsciow 143
time because their spatial separation makes such a relation impossible. Jung
cites Swedenborg's vision of the great fire of Stockholm, whUe he was two
hundred mUes away lit a pany in Gothenburg. Swedenborg was himself on his
wav home from England to Stockholm. He told the 3.'lSembled guests of the
progress of the fire as he saw it bappening, exclaiming reliefwhen it was over,
and that it had not damaged his own house. His description of the coune of
events was then confinned over the next few days by messengen returning
from Stockholm.
The third category of acausal connections is that of precognition, where a
mental event is correlated' with a succellSive physical event, but cannot be
caused by it, either because of spatial distance or because of temporal dispar-
ity (the physical event in question has not yet happened). Jung gives the
example of a student who dreams about walking through a Spanish city which
he has never visited. Later he visits the city. and experiences everything which
was played out in the dream, down to the last detail.
Does synchronicity e».st in any Conn, or is all this jUllt a thought-.experiment?
Here are two of the main examples given by Jung. The first is from Jung's
clinical practice, the like of which he says had nOI bappened to him before,
nor had he experienced anything like it since: 'Ayoungwoman I was treating
bad. at a critical moment, a dream in which she was given a golden scarab.'
The scarab, Jung had mused. is the Egyptian symbol of rebirth or renewal. In
an Egyptian Book of the Dead. the dead sun-god metamorphoses into a
scarab, which then, at the last station of the NethelWorld. 'mounts the barge
which carries the rejuvenated sun-god into the morning sky' (CW'8: 4!9). The
symbolism of the scarab arises because of iu practice of rolling bits of dung
into small baILs imide which the female deposits its eggs (Stevens 1998: :i50).
This is already enough to make the sca.rab an unsettling presence in a dream
(for aJungian). But nothing prepares for what happens next inJung's account
though. 'WhUe she was telling me this dream I sat with my back to the dOlled
window. Suddenly I heard a noise behind me, like a gende tapping. I turned
around and :taw a flying insect knocking against the window-pane from
outside. I opened the window and caught the creature in the air as it flew in.
It was the nearest analogy to a golden scarab that one finds in our latitudes, a
scarabeid beede, the common rose<hafel', which contnry to its usual habiu
had evidently felt an urge to get into a dark room at this particular moment'
(CW 8: 438). A patient ofJung's had died ofa heart attack and his wife had
come to see Jung. She recounted a coincidence that was haunting her: just
before the deaths of her mother and grandmother, she had wimessed a crowd
of birdll alISernbling outside their respective houses. Just after having com-
pleted his treatment withJung, hee husband was returning home after a visit
to the doctor for a check-up on his heart. He collapsed in the street and was
brought dying back to his home, where his wife was waiting for him in a state
of anxiety - because a flock. of birds had begun to crowd outside their horne.
as soon as the husband had left for the appointment.
Both of these examples are of the fint type of synchronicity. They involve a
144 Deleuu and tilt Unconscious
'coincidence in time oitwo or more causally unrelated events which have the
same or a similar sense' (CW 8: 441). Two heterogeneous series of events
appear to coincide inexplicably. The patient in the first example sees what she
has dreamt (in her subjective series) actualized in the external world (the
objective series). The example is slightlydifferent in that the two series
are 'suQiective' and 'objective' in a looser way. The patient's wife has a series
of deaths in her immediate family (the subjective series), and each death is
accompanied by an assemblage of birds in die external world.
In each of these examples, there is an acausa\ connection between mbject
and object whicb gives rise to the impression that Nch an event is fllll!lL It is
not only that the patient is experiencing the unfolding of her own fate by
dreaming of the scarab, but nature itselfseems to be conspiring in her £ate, by
sending the scarab to knock on the window. Examples such as these are legion
inJung, and he often writes without irony of his own experiences of fatedness.
While engaged in painting a picture of a dream image with the horns ofa bull
and the wings of a kingfisher, Jung was 'thunderstruck' to find a newly dead
kingfisher lying in his garden. He takes this as proof of 'psychic objectivity, the
reality of the psyche' Gung 1961: 207-8). As further proofofJung's occult ten-
dencies, we need only recall the incident of the IpOOkery in the bookcase (see
note 3, p. 217). At moments such as these, the distinction between and
world cannot but break down; the world no longer seems indifferent to the
patient, but the patient is part of a drama that is greater than they can com-
prehend. The chasm between subjectivity and oQiective, neutral order appears
to be somehow bridged, and the subject feels oddly 'at home' in the universe.
In his essay on 'The Uncanny' [Das Un/uimli.t/J6], Freud begins his own dis-
quisition onfatednen and all things weird by remarking on the double meaning
of the word hei"llit:h. Whereas heimlit;h can mean 'homely' and 'intimate', it can
also mean 'concealed, kept from sight, 80 that others do not geno know of or
about it, withheld from others' (SE 17: 223). The word heim&h therefore seems
to include a meaning which is identical with its opposite, un/uimlit;1J. Freud cites
a passage from ScheUing's Philostiph'j of which he says 'throws quite a
new light on the concept of the lJnJuIimJUh. for which we were certainly not
prepared'. Schellingwrites: 'Un/uimlUh is the name for e\lerything that ought to
have remained ... secret and hidden hut has corne to light' (Schelling 1857:
649).9 For Freud, such 'uncanny' experiences are essentiallya return to primary
Mrrissirm. This is ultimately what should have remained hidden, but has come
to light. And indeed, what could be more narcissistic than experiencing a coin-
cidence as fate? Jungian synchronicity at first sight would seem to be nothing
more than an excuse to raise narcissistic supentition up to an Q f1rimi principle.
ForJung, the appearance of a dead kingfisher on the lawn after a dream about
a kingfillher-man is a momentous 'rupture in time'; for others, such an event by
itself would be a cause for mere amusement, but the idea of a psychologist
taking it deadly seriously would unleash a wave of hilarity. (Freud himself
remarks that the 'unintended repetition' one finds in the uncanny can easily tip
over into comedy (SE 17: 231, 246).)
as two
on his
of the
lfSe of
here a
not be
les the
; which

into a
e barge
9). The
B; 350).
lC from
flew in.
ltudes, a
tl habits
de had
her: just
a crowd
og com-
er a visit
and was
n a state
it home,
involve a
Jung, Leibni:. and the Di.f.{ertmtial Unconscious 145
A comparison between Freud's and jung's ideas about fate and the
uncanny will therefore be apposite here. Is synchronicity narcissism? Jung's
theory of synchronicity competes with Freud's theory of the uncanny in
attempting to explain the same psychological phenomena. There is an
added motivation in examining this relationship, as it was in his essay 'The
Uncanny' (1919) that Freud first suggested the idea of the death drive as a
compulsion to repeat. The death drive thus has origins in Freud's discussion
of fate. Freud withdrew from some of the more intriguing suggestions
ventured in 'The Uneam/y', and ended up affirming a materialistic,
dynamic conception of the death drive in &yond the Pkmu:re Principle, pub-
lished a year later. In effect. Deleuze follows up the relationship between fate
and the death instinct by twuing to Jung's theory of synchronicity, which
takes up where Freud left off.
jung's investigations into synchronicity were also investigations into the
'paranormal'.wJung appeals to 'the mass of facts' engendered in studies on
'psychical research', along with]. B. Rhine's more recent experiments on ESP.
which are held to furnish 'decisive evidence for the existence of acausal com-
binations of events' (CW 8: 432),II But he goes on to deny that these findings
direcdy imply telepathic communication between two individuals, 'It seems
more likely that scientific explanation will have to begin with a criticism of our
concepts ofspace and time on the one hand. and with the unconscious on the
other' (CW 8: 435). Although he spends some time examining the possibility
of acausal at the microphysical level, he concludes, as we have
seen, that 'synchronicity is a phenomenon that seems to be' primarily con-
nected with psychic conditions, that is to say with processes in the uncon-
scious' (CW 8: 511). He tales his task to be to search for the 'tertium
ccmparationis' of significant coincidences, which he claims 'rests on the
psychoid factors 1 call the archetwes' (CW 8: 515), Before saying any more
than has already been said about archetypes, it is worth emphasizing this
search for a 'tertium quUf, or 'third thing', which guarantees tha.t the conjunc-
tion of two contingent events can hear a distinct, but acausal 'sense'
Schopenhauer and the Lines of Fate
Jung says that Schopenhauer's essay 'Transcendent Speculation on Apparent
Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual' is 'godfather' to his views, and it
does help to explain where he is coming from. There Schopenhauer develops
the idea that strict fatalism is confirmed empirically by cases in which future
events are predicted in Stales of 'magnetic somnambulism'. second sight and
dreams. Fromsuch divinations, Schopenhauer contends, 'it follows not merely
that events occur with complete necessity, but also that they are in some way
determined beforehand and objectively fixed, in that they present themselves
to the eye of a seer as something existing' (Schopenhauer 1850: 203-4). This
suggesrs a special kind of fatalism, which he calls <transcendem fatalism'. This
kind offatalism does not arise from theoretical arguments about detenninism.
but from experiences, Schopenhauer is also interested in how the sense of
fatalitv can arise through a process of retrospection which conjures the sense
that 'the course of an individual's life, however confused it appears to be, is a
complete whole, in hannony with itself and having a definite tendency and
didactic meaning, as profoundly conceived as is the finest epic' (Schopen-
hauer 1850: 204). In this retrospection on the course of life, it appears that
everything 'had been mapped out and the human beings appearing on the
scene seem to him to be performers in a play' (20.5). Schopenhauer here
reflects on the experience of patterns in the course of individuation, which
was one of the phenomena which led Freud to link the concept of repetition
and the death drive in &yond the Pleastl;R1 Principle. Freud writes of his impres-
sion that those subject to repetition compulsion are 'pursued by a malignant
fate or possessed by some daemonic power' (SE 18: 21). The phenomena
Schopenhauer, Freud and jung have in mind are roughly the same, but
whereas all three thinkers agree that the fate of such cases 'is for the most part
arranged by themselves' (SE 18: 21), only Freud specifically contends that it is
also 'determined by early infantile influences'. Although early infantile expe-
riences are obviously the first act in the drama, the repetitions themselves do
not come about because of the infantile experiences. The structure of fare and
repetition can be examined independentlyof the specific events of childhood,
because whoJever infantile experiences occur, the unfolding of fatal repetition
will take place. ' .
Schopenhauer likens the empirical observation of the separate coincidences
and fatalities in our lives to the contemplation of a recurrent anamorphic
figure, which requires the use of a special conical mirror in order to be seen
distinctly. He correlates this anamorphic figure with Kant's notion ofan 'intel-
ligible character', distinct from a person's empirical character. But this intelli-
gible character is held to be outside space and time, merely nownenal. How,
then, does Schopenhauer think that this 'secret and inexplicable power'
actually effectively appears in the phenomenal world, if this latter world is
ruled by strict determinism? IT an event occurs in the chain of physical causes,
that is all there is to it. and there is no need to postulate some 'intelligible
character' behind it On the other hand, Schopenhauer takes intelligihle char-
acter to be something noumenally real and freely chosen, and which can thus
ground the attribution of responsibility to the empirical character who acts
within the phenomenal realm. At this point Schopenhauer ventures two
important analogies to get across the idea that a single event may simultane-
ously belong to two different series, the objective series of representations,
and the subjective series of the world taken as will. 'Objective and subjective
connection exist simultaneously and yet the same event, as a link in two quite
different chains, exactly fits them both' (220).
Schopenhauer then suggests that although every event has a distinc£ place
in a causal chain, because these chains are articulated in spau. ·there are
numberless such chains side by side' (215). On the one hand, mese chains are
relatively independent, and each event may be said to involve a convergence
·/: and the
ism? Jung's
l1ncanny in
'here is an
• essay 'The
h drive as a
s discussion
;tic, thermo-
'inciflle, pub..
)ClWeen fate
1idtv. which
)Us into the
m studies 011
\ents on ESP.
acausal com-
nese findings
also 'It seems
iticism of oW"
,scious on the
me possibllitv
's, as we have
nimarily con-
n the uncon-
r the 'tertium
'rests on the
ring any more
phasizing this
It the conjunc-

n on ApplU,"ent
lis views, and it
haue.. develops
n which ftiwre
cond ,,,,,unCi
lows not'merely
.re in some way
iC): This
t fatalism'. This
llt determinillm,
lung. Uibniz and t.he Differential Unconsciow
of a multiplicity of separate chains. But on the other hand, 'many causes now
operating simultaneously, each of which produces a different effect, have
sprung from a common cause higher up and are, therefore, related one,
another as great-grandchildren are to their great-grandfather'.
Accordingly. all those causal chains, that move in the direction of time, now
fonn a large. common, much interwoven net which with its whole breadth
likewise moves forward in the direction of time and constitutes the coune of
the world. Now if we represent these individual causal chains by meridians
that would lie in the direction of time, then that which is simultaneous, and
for this reason does not st2nd in direct causal connection, can be every-
where indicated by parallel lines. Now although all thins situated under the
same parallel circle do not directly depend on one another, they neverthe-
less stand indirecdy in some connection, though remote, by virtue of the
interlacing of the whole net or of the totality of all causes and effects that
roll along in the direction of time. Their present co-existence is therefore
necessary; and on this rests the accidental coincidence of all the conditions
of an event that is necessary in a higher sense, the happening of that which
fate has willed. (Ibid.: 215)
Deleuze and t ~ Unconscious
Thus 'nothing is absolutely accidental' (216), for there are acausal correspon·
dences between series that are grounded in a higher unity. The telling of
fonunes by cards or the reading of coffee grounds all arise from the convic-
tion that 'it is possible to know from what is present and clearly before [our]
eyes that which is hidden by space and time and thUll is remote or in the
future' (216).
Schopenhauer also uses the analogy of the dream to further his point. He
distinguishes between two types of 'obscene dream', one of which is accom-
panied by a successful nocrornal emission, while in the other, there seem to be
no end of obstacles put in the way of reaching the same attractive women as
feature in the first type of dream. As in each case, though, it is our subjective
will which is responsible for the dream, the internal obstacles that appear (or
not) are products of oW" own fatal character. :JUllt as everyone is the secret the-
atrical manager of his dreams, so too by analogy that fate that controls the
actual course of our lives ultimately comes in some way from the will (218). It
is exacdy the same in 'the great dream of life'. IT space, time and causality are
ideal structuring forms, and the matter of our sensations depends on our
sense organs. then our experience is not much different in nature from a
dream. There is only one subject of the dream, and that is 'the will-to-live'.
There is only one difference between life and a dream. 'In the great dream of
life', the others one interacts and consorts with are also dreaming subjects,
inhabiting their own dream.
It is at this point that Schopenhauec introduces the implicidy Leibnizian
framework of pre-established harmony (it is this that presumably inspired
Jung to discuss Leibniz in 'Synchronicity'). 'Amutual relation occurs since not
AIl the events in a man's life are connected in two fundamentally different
ways; first, in the objective, causal connection of the course of nature;
secondly, in a subjective connection that exislS only in relation to the
individual who experiences them ... Now those two kinds of connection
exist simultaneoWlly and yet the same event, as a link in two quite different
chains, exactly filS them both, in consequence whereof one man's fate is
always in keeping with another's, and everyone is the heroofhis own drama,
but at the same time figures also in that ofanother. All thu is ofcourse some-
thing that surpasses OUl' powers ofcomprehension, and can be conceived as
possible only byvirtue of the most marveUoWl preestablished harmony. (220,
also cited in CW8: 428)
Thus the subjective and objective series are related by an event, an 'object = x'
that appears differently in eam series. A person can cause an event that has an
impact on another's life, but that other will interpret the meaning of the event
in an entirely different way, suitable to his or her own purpose&. The event or
object that circulates in the two series guarantees a peculiar harmony between
them, but each series remains different in kind.
The pattern of fate only becomes runy visible at the hour of death. &:hopen-
hauer writes that we are 'forcibly driven to tum away from life to arrive at a
regeneration by a Caesarian operation, flO to speak' ·At the hour of
death, all the mysterious forces (although really rooted in ourselves) which
determine man's eternal fate, crowd together and come into action.' AIl the
repetitiol11l and fatal correspondences which have strue1J.J.red one's life are now
only does the one figure in the dream of the other exactly as is neceM3rf, but
abo that other figures in his dream. Thus by virtue of a real harmlmiil
pme.stah1ikJ everyone dreams only what is appropriate to him' (219). Sexual
intercourse is thus not fundamentally different from a nocturnal emission.
The other, the 'object' is not, however. a complete figment of the dreamer's
imagination - but nor is it an autonomous, mutually recognized other either.
It is more like an incubus or succubus. If this phantom has some othernets
that seelTlll to transcend the dream, that is not beca.use they are a 'real' person,
hut because we do not know what this other might iuelfbe dreaming. What I
desire from the incubus or succubU!l of my dream must, however, correspond
in reverse to what they d.esire from the image that I project into their dream.
Rut the projection in each case is unknowing and unwilled, so that there is
never any mutual recognition, as the two perspectives remain pennanently
mutually excluded from each other, in a perpetual asymmetry.
Although the subject of the drama is always the will-r.o-live, &:hopenhauer
abo wanlS to say that each individual will has different Thus each
individual will enters a drama., and plays a particular role, which will only
become clear to them at the point of death. they pass through repetitions
of their role, or different performances of the same role, they at last see the
pre-detennined nature of the great dream.
149 Jung. Leilmu. and the Differential Unt:onsciow
>oint, He
IS accom-
'em lObe
,romen as
>pear (or
eccet the-
urols the
, (218). It
wility are
.s on OUl'
'e from a
ll-to-live' .
dream of
eUing of
e convic-
>re [our]
>r in the
le every-
l1der the
le of the
ecu that
at which
, inspired
since nOl
l!leS now
ct, have
ted one
Synchronicity, Immanence and Possible Worlds
Towards the end of spinozo. and the Problem of Imm4fUmCt (1968), Deleuze says
50mething that, within the confines of a book about Spinoza, appears as quite
myst£riow. He is returning to the issue of psychophysical parallelism in
Spinoza. As we know, Spinoza has a peculiar stance on the issue of pa.ra.Ilelism
as, on the one hand, he holds Thought and Exten&ion to be attribut£s of sub-
stance which have a strict parallel and corresponding relation to each other.
but on the other hand, he says that there are an 'infinite' amount ofattributes.
played before the dying individual, as they realize exacdy who they will always
have been. Schopenhauer describes the hour of death as a day ofjudgement.
but also as a moment of 'crisis', and also, intriguingly, of 'palingenesis'
or rebirth. For Schopenhauer, as for Kierkegaard and Deleuze, rebirth
involves a refolding of t£mporal experience; the difference is that. as Sc:hopen-
hauer is a. strict Kantian about time, treating it as purely ideal, the reorienta-
tion of our t£mporal experience in rebirth is ultimately an exit from worldly
time. From a transcendental perspective, 'past and future contain mere
concepts and phant:wns' (Schopenhauer 1818: 279). If there is any progress
in life, it is as the progressive revelation of one's et£mal, intelligible character.
Hence at the hour ofdeath, to realize who one will have hem is really to realise
who one always already was. At that point, the flow of time can fall away as an
illusion, and one can finally identify with what one has always already been.
But this is where the palingenesis becomes possible, as the closure of the hour
of death brings with it the possibility of an exit from phenomenal time. The
dying person is finally free to perceive that 'the present is the essential form of
the phenomenon of the will ... That which, empirically apprehended, is the
most fleeting of all, manifests itself to the metaphysical glance that sees
beyond the forms of empirical perc.eption as that which alone endures, as the
nunc Jtans of the scholastics' (ibid.). Ifwill is noumenal reality, and time, space
and causality are jwt the ideal forms of representation, then the will is strictly
speaking timeless; but because the will is Act, it can also be conceived more
concrct£ly as an et£mal Now, nunc sUlm. For Sc:hopenhauer, there is no form
of mediation between the eternity of will and the temporality of the'phenom-
enal world; hence the apprehension of the eternity of the will is only fully
realised a.t the hour of death. To 'return' to the phenomenal world would be
in any case simply to lapse back into phenomenal
Jung Criticil.eS Sc:hopenhauer on one point. 'The idea that the simultaneous
points in the causal chains, or meridians, represent meaningful coincidences
would only hold water if the first cause really were a unity. But it were a multi-
plicity, which is just as likely, then Schopenhauer's whole explanation collapses'
(CW8: 428). This is not true, though, as Deleuze tries to show.Jung's own expo-
sition of Leibniz (CW 8: 499-506) fails to take advantage of his philosophical
resources. There is a. sense in which the world can be composed of a multiplic-
ity of series and still be a sit£ for synchronicity.
Deleuzt and the UnwnscUrw 150
It is true that in SpinOla, infiniry simply means 'non-limiration', so by absolute
infinity, SpinOla pemaps only means 'the set ofwhkhever unlimited attributes
there are'; in that case, there may in fact only be two afwr all. Nevertheless.
there ill something mind-boggling in this parallelism, as formally it suggests
that there are a plurality of attributes, all without direct causal relation ro each
other (which would imply limiration; d. EIP6), but all expressing the same
substance. In Spinuz.a and the Problnn of Expression, Deleuze shows that he is
interested in precisely this possibility when he suggests that Spinoza's notion
of parallelism opens up 'the rich and deep world of nmu:o.usal
(SPE 326). Compare the followmg passage with those we have seen from
Schopenhauer andJung:
One feels that the soul and body have at once a sort of identity that removes
the need for any real causality between them. a heterogeneity, a heteronomy,
mat renders it impossible. The identity or quasi-identity is an 'invariance', and
the heteronomy is that between two varying series, one of which is corporeal,
the other spiritual .. Nowreal causality enters intD each of these series on their
own account; but the relation between the two series. and their relation tD
what is invariant betWeen them, depends on noncausaJ correspondence. Ifwe
then ask what concept can account for such a correspondence, that ofexpres-
sion appears to do so. For while the concept of expression adequately applies
tD reat causality, in the sense that an effect expresses its cause, and knowledge
of the effect expresses knowledge of its cause, the concept nonetheless goes
further than causality. since it brings a correspondence and a resonance into
series that are altogether foreign to one another. (SPE 327)
The seventeenth-cenmry rationalist project of constructing a philosophy of
.immanence' was deeply implicated in a specific tradition of pantheism, and
had its own specific 'danger' in me latter idea. ·It claims to penetrate into the
deepest things [Ie plus profourulj, me 'arcana'. to use a word of which Leibniz
was fond. It at once gives back to Nature its own specific depm [11 redon1I4 aItl
nature une ipaWeuT qui lui tst proper] and renders man capable of penetrating
into this depth. It makes man commensurate with God. and pUt!l him in
possession of a new logic: makes him a spiritual automatDn equal to a combi-
natorial world' (SPE 322).
Deleuze's ensuing argumentation recal.l5 Schopenhauer's two models of
parallelism. the dream and the globe. We saw above how Schopenhauer
first suggests a parallelism of multiple independent series, and then goes on to
reslrict himself to a parallelism of will and representation. In
Deleuze, the order is reversed. He starts wim a discussion of psychophysical
parallelism (Thought and Extension). and then moves to a generalized
picnu-e of an infinity of attributes each in a relation of npetition tD each other.
FoUowing Jung, it is no longer a globe or a collective totality that is being
envisaged, but a plurality of independent series, each resonating with each
other, but retaining their individual srates of development.
151 Jung, Leihnk and the Differential Unconscious
-e a
own expo--

. (223);
n mere
) realise
ty been.
he hojU"
me. The
:d, the
hat sees
as the
is strictly
red more
::mly fully
would be
:leuze says
Irs as quite
1l1elism in
lWS of sub-
: attributes.
What Deleuze seems to effect in the last chapter of spi'1£f1l.lJ, and the Problem
ofb:ftre.ssirmand in more detail in the philosophy of difference expounded in
Dilfmnt:e and Repstition is a Spinozist conversion of Leibnizianism. an
immanent Leibni.zianism.
Moreover. at this point in S/Ji'1£f1l.lJ, and the Problem of~ it is also par-
ticularly apparent that Leibnizianism is playing an unusuaJIy important role in
Deleuze's interpretation of Spinoza. After all. the 'problem of ex.pression' is a
Leibnizian problem rather than a Spinozist one; the term hardly appears in
Spinoza. In an important letter to Martin Joughin, the English translator of
Spinoztl and tAt Problntt of~ Deleuze writes:
D6lJJuu and the Umonscious
Leibnizianism after the Speculative Death of God
Leibniz imagines that before the dawn of the world God faces an eternal set
of logically possible series, from which he must select a subset of series that
are not only possible (non-self-contradictory) but ~ CompolSibility
is weaker than logical possibility; something is compossible only with some-
thing else, and is therefore contingent upon whimother realities might exist.
To exist. therefore, something must not only be possible (non-self-conrra-
dietory), but compossible. To explain why something exists requires a coun-
terfactual account of how other realities do not exist, be£awe they are not
compossible with each other; that is, that they IJ7lIIprevented from existing, by
some other thing(s). But the question demands to be pushed further back,
as Leibniz has not only to account for why aworld might exist. but why this
one does. Why is this set of compossibilities actuali:zed? Leibniz cbims that the
criterion for this selection is the 'best' of all possible worlds. When he
analyses what 'the best' or 'most perfect' might mean, he states that it is 'that
combination of things ... by which the greatest possible number of things
exists' (RusseU 1900: 295; cf. Leibniz 1697: 151). IfA has the potential to be
compatible or combinable with more things than B, then A will exist. It
follows that the sufficient reason ofan eKistent reality lies in the 'proportion'
or 'degree' of potential complexity producible bY iL This calculus of com-
possibility would be the true ratioof the world. The best of all possible worlds
can be determined ideally through a reciprocal and complete determination
between possible series, according to a differential calculus based on their
potential contributions to a world with the maximum complexity and conti-
the hope of making substance turn on finite modes, or at least of seeing in
substance a plane of immanence in which finite modes operate. already
appears in this book. What I needed was both (1) the expressive character
of particular individuals. and (2) an immanence of being. Leibniz, in a way,
goes further than SpinOla on the first poinL But on the second. SpinOla
stands alone. One finds it only in him. This is why I consider myself a Spin-
ozist. rather than a Leibnizian. although lowe a lot to Leibnii. (SPE 11)
nuity. It is the fonnulation of thi.s geometrically based combinatory, this
calculus of compossibilities, that leads Deleuze to say that Leibtili 'discovers
a play in the creation of the world' (DR 51).
In Leibniz, this play in creation is of course subordinated to a theological
hypothesis. The infinite array of possibles must all eternallysubsist in the mind
of a God who reflects upon them, 'selects' the best, and then lets them pass
into space and time. Being eternal, God's mind can weigh all poSllible
outcomes, and thus judge the potential complexity of each possible series in
conjunction with any of the others. God is not.. then, responsible, for instance,
for the sinning ofAdam; God is at most responsible for selecting for existence
the world in which Adam sins, according to the criterion of the best.. This
world did not 1u.we to happen. In other po!l5ible worlds, Adam does not sin. But
is this theological fonnulation the only way Leibnu's theory can be conceived?
Deleuze sees resources in Leibnu's theory for a reformulation of the 'realm
ofIdeas discovered by Kant. As we have seen, Ideas in Deleuze's sense involve
the identification of problems for cognition. But Leibniz's theory, because it
recognizes a 'play in creation', can mow us how these problems can be deter-
mined. Leibnu shows us from the outset that it is the wrong way around to
seek an original monadic essence of Adam, dictating either that he must sin
or that he must resist temptation. Rather, he says, there are 'several Adams'
that are Logically possible.1
More profoundly, Leibniz suggests that in the fint
place one must conceive of a 'vague Adam' in which no decision is yet made
about what Adam will actually be and do. Thus we can say that there is an Idea
of Adam, a problem of Adam. But what are in basic elements? Should we
simply say that the vague Idea ofAdam is made up of poSllible series, which can
be treated as individuals or monads? No, there is a more basic level. Vague
Adam is rather composed of a number of - to be the first man, to
live in paradise. to give birth to a woman from himself, to sin, to resist temp-
tation (F 59-61). Prior to the determination ofcompossibility according to the
principle of the best, it is not so much that Leibniz merely presupposes a dis-
tribution of logically possible series; rather he must be understood, according
to Deleuze, as presupposing fint of all a distribution of lhe 'pre-individual
singularities' which make up the deciding points of difference between those
series (DR 245-6, 279-80).lt is these that make up the Idea and that indeed
make it a for a consteUation of singularities may branch off into a
number of possible series. In this case, whether the
Adam that is selected for existence actualizes either the fourth (sin) or fifth
singularity (resistance to temptation) will be of immense importance for the
world in which he is selected. 1\ro different 'worlds', two divergent series, issue
from the result of that
In Leibniz's own scheme, God calculates that the world ofthe sinning Adam
must be chosen and Adam's nocturnal twin, 'good Adam', must be banished
for ever. However, the model of the 'vague Adam' indicates the perfect
conceivability or rational transparency of the divergent or incompossible
series that branch off ideally in forking paths from each ideal conjunction of
,Ie in
'is a
)1' of
ng in
'cady t

1\, an
la1 set
is that
. exist.
re not
ing, by
. back.
hy this
len he
is 'that
d to be
:'Xist. It
If com-
'n their
:t conti-
lung, Leihniz. OM the Differential UneonstWw
Synchronicity and Repetition in Jung and Freud
Is synchroniCity narcissism? Or is narcissism synchronicity? The first half of
Freud's essay on 'The Uncanny' is devoted to a reductive analysis of E. T. A.
Hoffman's story about the Sandman to a fantasy about infantile castration
anxiety. Rut after complf'ting this analysis. Freud goes on to produce some
fascinating reflections on fantasies of living doUs and doubles, and on experi-
ences of fateful coincidences and repetitions. He alights upon the theme of
doubling and repetition as fundamental to experiences of the uncanny. We
singularities. ·With Leibniz', suggests Deleuze. ·it seems to us that in the first
pltu:ethere is a calculus ofinfinite series ruled by convergences and divergences'
(F 61). Such an ideal calculus seems quite autonomous from lhe doctrine of lhe
best, as well as from the theological hypothesis of the selecting God.
For Leibniz, we live in the best of all possible worlds, and everything that
happens in it is selected for its cumpossibility with everything else. Deleuze's
final gambit is that the death of God does not destroy Leibniz's metaphysics,
but liberates all its possibilities. Deleuze thus attempts to wrest the 'play in the
creation of the world' from the hypothesis of divine selection. Leibnizianism
after the death of God - and after the fracture of the 'I' - implies tIu afftrma-
tUm of int:ompossible lJJO't"ItU. The problems which guide our cognition and affec-
tion are problems 'in themselves'. In fact it is as if Leibniz's system not only
survives, but even only comes to bloom, after the death of God. For if Leibniz's
principle of the best is taken instead as a possible solution (albeit a highly
generalized and abstract one) nested within a primary matrix of Ideas, taken
now more stricdy in the Kantian sense as focal. horizons for thought, then we
are able to step out of metaphysics and into transcendental philosophy.
Without reliance on a pre-established, designed harmony between thought and
world, the world is precisely restored to us as a matrix ofproblems, for which the
solutions have not been prepared in advance, but which orient or provide a
horiwn for the ultimate purposes of our thinking. Problems, vague Ideas, are
thus affirmed as the true of reason. The 'vague Adam, a vagabond, a
nomad, an Adam -= x' can indeed be understood as 'common to several
worlds' (LS 114) but it attains a powerful determinacy of its own at the
moment that it is seen as a fmiblem that framM multiple solutions, and serves as a
witness to an aboriginal 'play in the creation ofthe world' (DR 51) - that is, of
this world taken as the body of the absolute, hierarchically organized in levels
of interiorization.
For Deleuze, individuation is first of all a biological process, and then a
psychic one (DR 256). In psychic life, individuation occurs when the imagin-
ation, faced with problematic Ideas, attempts to invoke the power ofintuition.
For Jung, dreaming, love, ·active imagination', and esoteric experiences are
the media and tools of the individuating person (the individw:l/lIl, we could call
them). For Deleuze it is art, love. masochism, intoxication, esoteric experience
and revolutionary consciousness.

Delew.e and tJw UnctmScwus 154
should briefly recount hill line of thought here. as he moves from a reductive
artalysis of the double in terms of narcissism, to a more ambivalent analysis of
repetition, which finally seems to lead him (0 JlO6it compulsive repetition as a
primordial force in the psyche, thus opening the way to the invention of the
death drive.
Freud approvingly cites Otto Rank's hypothesis that 'the 'double' was origi-
nally an insurance against the destruction of the ego ... This invention of
doubling [is1 a preservation against extinction' (SE 17: 235). Ideas of the
double 'have sprung from the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary
narcissism which dominates the mind of the child and of primitive man'.
Freud elaborates then on Rank's theory of the narcissistic component of the
double. The double proceeds to become an object of fear, because of the sur·
mOWlting of the stage of narcissism, artd the construction of the ego. Thus
insofar as the rerum to narcissism is repressed, the double becomes an ohject
of fear, but insofar as a return to narcissism promises the attraction of a return
LO the omnipotence of moughts and the surety of an immortal soul. the
double is an object of attraction. Hence the feeling of the Wlcanny
ambivalence about a regression to primary narcissism. 'The quality of uncan-
niness can only come from the fact of the "double" being a creation dating
bad to a very early mental stage, long since surmounted - a stage, incidentaUy.
at which it wore a more friendly aspect. The "double" has become a thing of
terror,just as, after the coUapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons'
(ibid.: 236).
However, narcissism is invoked not just to explain the double as a rudimen-
tary form of self-preservation through multiplication. For Freud, there are two
other aspects of narcissism that are relev.mt to experiences of me Wlcanny.
First, any Wlcanny experience involves a blurring of the usual demarcation
between reality and imagination. This alteration recalls two other fea.tn.l"es of
Freud's account of primary narcissism, which in fAct turn out to be inconsis-
tent. On the one hand, there is the omnipotence of thoughts. In me stage of
narcissism, me child has the ability to 'satisfy their wishes in a hallucinatory
martner' (SE 13: 83-4). But on the omer hand, the coUapse of the distinction
between ego and external world surely must result in a certain passivity, insofar
as there is no formed ego to be omnipotent in the first place. Freud says that
he is pursuing the idea that uncanny experiences involve La harking-back to
particular phases in the evolution of the self-regarding feeling, a regression to
a time when the ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external
world artd from other people' (SE 17: 236). But the idea of a collapse in dis-
tinction between ego and external world is incompatible with the idea of
omnipotence of thoughts. IS
However. as if unsatisfied by this regressive account the uncanny, Freud
goes on to probe deeper into the origins of the act of doubling, through
exploring other instances of the uncanny. In certain experiences of apparent
coincidence, me presence of a 'factor of involuntary repetition ... forces upon
us the idea of something fateful and inescapable' (SE 17: 237). which can
I the first
le of the
ing that
a.y in the
t eaffi:rnw-
nd affec-
not only

a highly
'as, taken

,then we
ilosophy. t
;>rovide a
:deas, are

i3bond, a
r' ,
o several
m at the
erves as a
that is. of
i in levels
Id then a
le imagin-
,ences are
rsL half of
ofE. T A.
luce some
on experi-
theme of
canny. We
Jung, Leilmiz and lhe Differential Unamscious
For it is p05Sible to recognise the dominance in the unconscious mind of a
'compulsion to repeat' proceeding from the drive impulses and probably
inherent in the very nature of the drives - a compulsion powerful enough
to overrule the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind
their daemonic character; and still very clearly expressed in the impulse8 of fj;
small children ... All these considerations prepare us for the discovery that ~ t
whatever reminds WI of this inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as
uncanny. (Ibid.: 2M)
Although he admilS that the notion of repetition is explored 'in a different con-
nection' in BeJmul the PlsasunPrincipk. it is striking that the type of 'unintended
recurrence of the same thing' (ibid.: 246) discussed in 'The Uncanny' - the
experience of flue - is not really covered in the later work. The discussion in
'The Uncanny' appears to he converging on the thought that the experience of
'involuntary repetition' is not necessarily to be seen as a trigger for a regression
to a particular state, but as the bUI'llting-through of a compulsion to repeat that
is autonomous of the pleasure principle. The 'sense ofhelplcssness' or pauivity
that results from the 'unintended recurrence ofthe same thing' is a result of the
yielding to this power of repetition, which is 'probably inherent in the very
nature of the drives'. There is also the suggestion in this passage that 'the com-
pulsion to repeat' nms through the whole 'evolution of self-regarding', so that
Freud would be looking towards a principle of autonomous doubling, which
would connect up with his previous remarks about psychic doubling.
neither be reduced to a regression to a state of narci!l8ism, nor to facton of
chance. Freud recalls an occasion he went walking in a provincial tDwn in Italy.
and found himselfin its red-light district. He hastened to leave the street at the
next turning, and wandered some more, only to find himself led involuntarily
back to the same street, where his return was now attracting unwanted atten-
tion. He hurried away again. only to arrive by another detour at the same place
again. A feeling of the uncanny overtook him at this moment. An uncanny
impression can abo arise with numerical coincidences. Implicitly rec:a1Iing the
supentitions about the number 61 he had shared with Jung after the latter's
emba.rra8sing 'spookery' with Freud's furniture, Freud states that if we come J
across the number 62 a number of times in one day - 'if two such events, each
in itself indifferent, happen dose together, or if we come across the number <, ".
62 several times in a single day' (ibid.), we do feel this to he uncanny.
He remarks that what is common to such experiences of the uncanny is an
'unintended recurrence of [aj situation' resulting in a 'sense of helplessness
experienced in some dream-states' (ibid.). The 'involuntary repetition' gives
rise to the sense that we are helplellSly caught in a fateful and inescapable
pattern of events, beyond our control. Freud then states that he is reluctant to
trace the uncanny effect ofsuch occurrences back to infantile psychology, and
says that he must refer the reader to his new work Be,ond the PlMJsuRi Pri'TKifJ/e, J",-
which he has just completed.
It is uue that in .se,ood tlu! Pleasure Freud does write of his imprell-
sion that those subject to repetition compulsion are 'pursued by a malignant
fare or possell8ed by some daemonic power' (Sf. 18: 22).ln this passage, he dia-
cusses repetition in terms of fate. 'We have come acrou people all of whose
hwnan relationships have the same outcome ... The man whose friendships
all end in betrayal by his friend ... the lover each ofwhose love affairs with a
woman passes through the same phases and reaches the same conclusion'
(ibid.: 21}.lfwe take into accOWlt ca8es1ike these, says Freud. then 'we shall
find courage to assume that there really does exist in the mind a compulsion
to repeat which overrides the pleasure principle'. However, Freud goes on to
say that dafJite the impression of daemonic fate that accompanies instances of
repetition, 'psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the
most part arranged by themselves and detennined by early infantile influ-
ences' (ibid.). Moreover, as Deleuze complains, the death drive is reduced to
the model of a return to inanimate matter. Finally. in 'The Uncanny' itself
Freud withdraws from the path opened up by his suggestions about repetition
and retreats to his position that 'an uncanny experience occu.rs either when
infantile complexes which have been repreued are once more revived by some
impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been sunnounted seem once
more to be confirmed' (SE 17: 249).
[t was recalled earlier that Freud begins his discussion of the uncanny with
a quotation from Schelling's Philosoph, ofM,tIwltJgj, which he says throws new
light on the concept of the uncanny, 'for which we were certainly not
prepared'. Schelling's passage says that' UnMimlieh is the name for everything
that ought to have remained ... secret and hidden but has come to light'
(Schelling 1857: 649). HFreud had followed up this reference. he might well
have found more than he was prepared to see. The context for Schelling's
passage lies in a discussion of bow Homeric poetry had first emerged because
Gt-eek culture had managed to transcend the hitheno dominant culture of
religious mysteries through interiorizitzgthem: 'The Homeric Age was first able
to conceive of that purely poetic narrative of the gods after the actually
religious principle had been hidden in the interior and thus allowed the spirit
to turn freely toward the outside' (ibid., cited in Beach 1994: 228). But what
was at the core of the mysteries themselves according to Schelling? Nothing
other than a dramati2ation of a spiritual rebirth, whereby the aspirant retrneed
or recapitulated the developmental process of the history of mythical
consciousness itself. culminating in a 'regenerative catharsis' (ibid.: 2:\9).
What was internalized in Homeric poetry was already itself a recapitulative
intemalization. Moreover, Schelling strelllled the paradoxical temporal logic
involved in this recapitulation. The process of repetition culminates in the
realization that what has been repeated only finally exiSts for itselfin the inter-
na.lization of the repetition. The mythical drama of rebirth is the unfolding
and then final destruction of rebirth tIS a myth, which gives rise to a properly
interior rebirth through the internalization of the whole process itself. The
Homeric fate that is played out in sunlight and open sky in the OdySSllJ, then,
.cton of
in Italy,
et at the
e latter's
fie come
nts, each
my is an

uctant to
.logy. and
nind oCa
il enough
the mind
:lpulses of
overy that
rceived as
nny' - the
;CWI8ion in
>erience of
repeat that
or passivity
esult of the
,n the very
t 'the com-
ng', so that
ling, which
lung, Leibniz. and the Diffl!Tf:1l,tioJ UnconscWw 157
i& itself an inverted repetition of a drama of rebirth played out in the darkness
of the mysteries, But this drama itself, taking place in the entrails of the past.
was already a circle of self·interiorizing repetition. 'Greece has a Homer pre--
dsely because it has Mysteries, i.e., because it has succeeded in completely con-
quering the principle of the past, which in the Oriental systems was still
dominant and on the surface. It has succeeded in putting tha.t principle back
into the interior, i.e.• into secrecy. into the Mystery (out of which, after all, it
had emerged in the first place)' (Schelling. ibid.). The 'principle of the past'.
of the already-there, the fated deja vu, is interiorized, and revealed as having
its fate only in repetition, Ultimately. it is fated only to be repeated. So the
kernel of what 'should have remained hidden' i& not simply narcissism, an
abstract concept which falls apart once it Is made concrete, but the principle
of repetition itself.
We have seen thaL a Heimljehkeit is also generated by Jung's notion of
synchronicity. and, as with the Freudian uncanny, it also involves the revelation
of a Geh.eimnis. something previousJy hidden from view. Although it can involve a
de facw regression to narcissism, it also poinu towards a species of transcenden-
tal immortality, deju1'ecven ifaborted. The pathology of the psychotic broadcasts
the message of the eternal return - that death is not the problem, but the immor-
tality of our actions - in magnified form. The psychotic is immohilized by their
encounter with finitude, and, by sparializing temporality, they find themselves
thrown into a drama which appears to have already been written. and in which
they are a pawn. Deleuze andJung suggest thai. there is a psychotic moment in
the culmination of every process of individuation. Or more precisely, the
neurotic only proceeds along the path of individuation by encountering the
same processes that engulf the psychotic. The theatre of fAte adjoins the 'theatre
ofterror' (DR 18) ofschizophrenia, in which the unconscious is poised to appear
'in person'. unleashing distortions of spatiotemporal reality.
158 Deleuze and the UnamseWus
'ss i
Chapter 6
The Occult Unconscious:
Sympathy and the Sorcerer
One of the most powerful passages in Deleuze's oeuvre comes at the end of
Bergsimism, when he sets forth his version of the Bergsonian vision of the place
of the human being in the universe:
It could be said that in man, and only in man, the actual becomes adequate
ro the vinual. It could be said that man is capable of rediscovering all the
leveb, all the degrees of expansion {detente] and contraction that coexist in
the virtual Whole. As ifhe were capable of all the frenzies and brought about
in himself successively everything that, elsewhere, can only be embodied in
different species. Even in his dreams he rediscovers or prepares matter. And
durations that are inferior to him are still internal to him. Man therefore
creates a differentiation that is valid for the Whole, and he alone traces out
an open direction that is able to express a whole that is itself open. Whereas
the other directions are dosed and go round in circles ... man is capable of
scrambling the planes, of going beyond his own plane as his own condition,
in order finally to express naturing Nature. (B I06)I
Deleuze finnly situates Bergson in the tradition of Schelling and Hegel. for
whom the human being must ultimately be Wlderstood as the ctmting tv CMl-
sciott.mess of the Wliverse itself. Of course, this model is much older than
Gennan Idealism, as it is the central schema of the Hermetic philosophies of
the Renaissance and theosophy. In his article on Malfatti and in his references
to Wrorudd's esoteric we of the calculus, Deleuze relates himself more or less
explicitly to this tradition, but in his work on Bergson, Deleuze tends to restrict
himself to relating Bergson to Schelling and German Idealism (Ol 36, 50;
Deleuze 1960).
Bergson's cosmic tableau of the hierarchy of beings in the Wliverse emerges
most clearly in his last work, The Two SoufUS ofMorality and Religion. In CrMtive
Evolution, he had for the most part rested content with detailing the divergent
development of the ilan viIol into two Orders of life. The hymenoptera were
in effect equal to human beings, insofar as both represented the furthest point
of development of the tendencies of instinct and intelligence. The Two ~
may be read as Bergson's belated investigation into the specific development·
of the human order of life. There is a dear asymmetry between the insect and
human realms, if one takell seriously the notion that 'life' is defined by its
creativity and open-endedne!lS. For in that case. the instinctual mode of life
may be taken as a I.o.pu in evolution. Insects have 'lapsed into the somnambu-
lism of instinct' (Bergson 1 9 ~ 2 : 209), whereas conscious intelligence, in
breaking away from instinct, opens up the possibility of unforeseen develop-
ments through cultural development. If 'the creative effort progressed
mccessfully only along the line of evolution which ended in man', then the
human being in effect gained access to a privileged possibility: to transform its
consciousness in such a way that it becomes the form in which the 'ilan vital
gains self-consciousness' (8 lU). This is not to say that human beings are the
one and only biological form which can attain this privilege. Bergson quite
carefully says that through 'the act of placing in matter a freely creative energy,
it is man, or some other being oflike significance - we do not say of like form
-which is the purpose oCthe entire process ofevolution' (Bergson 1932: 211).
To criticize Bergson and Deleuze for anthropomorphism (or worse, of
'humanism', an almost completely meaningless term) is to miss the poinLjean
Hyppolite (following Hegel) says that 'man' merely expresses the sense of
being, and that (following Heidegger) man is therefore the 'place of being',
rather than a biological genus ora self-conscious subject (Hyppolite 1955: 20).
For Deleuze, the human being is simply the site of 'the interiorlsation of
ditference'. In the important final pages ofDif/I!Ir!nUand &peti.Jitm (before the
Conclusion), Deleuze COIUtruetll a hierarchy of the domains of actualization.
derived in large part from the work of the philosopher Gilbert Simondon.
There are three domains: physical, biological and psychic systems, In fact, it is
only in psychic systems that we effectively meet with the noumenal nature of
intensity, through the interiorization of difference. 'To the extent that the
individuating helOTS form a kind ofnoumenon of the phenomenon, we claim
that the noumenon tends to appear as such in complex systems' (DR 256; d.
DR 261). In physical systems, the process of individualization 'happens all at
once, and affects only the boundaries' (DR 255). 'The pbysical individual
crea.tes and prolongs itself to the limit of the body - for example. crystal' (01
88). In tum, 'a biologittl system receives successive waves of singularities and
involves its whole internal milieu in the operations which lake place at the
outer limits' (DR 255); these 'successive waves' are progre!lSive and durational.
But, Deleuze continues, 'What is the formula for this 'evolution'? The more
complex a system, the more the values peculiar to implii:;atiqn appear within it'
(DR 255). This implication, involution or interiorization of difference is
accomplished only in 'paychic systems'. which attain a completely virtual body
through the preservation of the past in the synthesis of memory. 'Complex
systems increasingly tend to interiorise their constitutive differences .. The
more the difference on which the system depends is interiorised in the
phenomenon, the more repetition finds itself interior, the less it depends
upon external conditions which are mpposed to ensure the reproduction of
the "same
differences' (DR 256). Deleuze thus finds a new way to defend the
Hermetic idea that the microcosm contains the macrocosm.
The passage from .Berg.wnismexalting the powers ofhumanity is thrilling, but
160 Ikleuu and the Unconscious
not eve
of life
lee, in
len the
an vital
are the
n quite
2: 211).
lI'Se, of
ense of
55: 20).
ttion of
fore the
:act, it is
ature of
that the
ve claim
256; d.
ns all at
stat' (01
ities and
e at the
he more
~ t h i n it'
renee is
... The
I in the
letion of
fend the
Iling, but
The Occult Unconsciow: S,m.pathy and tlu! Sorr:;erer 161
it also becomes more enigmatic the closer one examines it. We might ask how
and why the human being (or the being that occupies its place) brings about
in itself 'everything that, ellewhere. can only be embodied in different
species'? IT the power of humanity arises through its intelligence, then what
has this re-embodiment. of di£ferent species got to do with intelligence?
Indeed, Deleuze suggesUi that it is in dreams, rather than intelligence, that the
human being 'rediscovers or prepares matter', And what are these 'frenzies'
ofwhich the human being is said to be capable? Deleuz.e's eulogy to humanity
in fact seems to have nothing to do with more traditional accountJI of the priv-
ilege of humanity over the rest of nature. Where are reason and intelligence
In the closing pages of Bergsonism, where this passage resides, Deleuz.e is in
effect teasing out the logic of Bergson's theory of the distinction between
humans and animals. It turns out that it is not intelligence, after aD, which
marks out the distinctiveness of human beings, bm rather the possibility of a
mntegration of instinct and intelligence. We should now follow how Deleuze
draws cenain consequences from Bergson's philosophy ofhumanitywhich are
not even explicitly affirmed by Bergson himself.
Sorcery and the Difference between Human and Animal
To say that the human being brings about 'everything that, ehewhere, can only
be embodied in different species' can only refer, once again, to instinct, as that
ill what is embodied, in durational cycles, in the di£ferent spedes. Now, we have
seen that Bergson believes that intelligence is the dominant tendency in
human beings, which leads them away from instinctual activity. In human
society, however, there is an •equivalent of instinct' in the. 'f3bulating
function', a notion, as we saw, that Bergson borrowed fromJanet. The fabu-
Iating or story-telling function necessarily fills the gaps opened up by intelli-
gence, and provides fictions to fill the question of the ends of intelligent
actions. Bergson's account of filbulation is pre-dated byJanet's theory of fabu-
lation in his Evolution of Memqry. For Janet, the fabulating function is a devel·
opment of the power to narrate or give accounts of what is presently absent:.
In the first myths and epics, the power of memory is used fo'rfabulation, giving
rise to 3. specific enjoyment, which, if unchecked, can be transfonned into
delirium, and the myth being taken as founding (for a society or individual).
For Bergson, however, the notion of fabulation is connected with a residue of
instinct within human life. At every point where intelligence comes up against
its own limitJI, there arises a 'compensation' on the part of instinct (8 108).
This notion of compensation is clearlyespoused by Bergson in The Two Sourus,
but is also reminiscent of the Jungian version of the opposition between
instinct (or archetype) and intelligence. But it has a more specific function in
Bergson's thought, Deleuze gives two examples of how a 'virtual instinct' can
arise and enter the problematic gaps of the intelligence: social obligation and
Take, for example, obligation; It has no rational ground. Each particular
obligation is conventional and can border on the absurd; the only thing that
is grounded is the obligation to have obligations ... and it is not grounded
in reason, but in a requirement of narore, in a kind of 'virtual instinct', that
is, on a counterpart that nature produces in the reasonable being in order
to compensate for the partiality of his intelligence. (8 108)
In this case, it is no longer a particular instincroal exigency which guides the
obligation, but rather the instinctual need to have obligations in general. In
other words, it is an 'instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious.
capable of reflecting upon its object' (Bergson 1907: 176); only the Jqrm of
instinct remains. Avirtual instinct is a 'counterpart that nature produces in the
reasonable being in order to compensate for the partialitv of his intelligence'
(B 108). Deleuze does not say any more about obligation, but thar there is
more to be said about it emerges when we look at the second example,
religion, which reveals the foundation of obligation. Vinual instinct is in fact
!:he 'creator of gods, inventor of religions, that is of fictitious representations
.•. As in !:he case of obligation. each god is contingent. but wbat is natural,
necessary and grounded is hauing gods; it is the pantheon of gods' (8 108).
Again, Deleuze's remarks are brief, but we can connect up bere withJanet's
argument about the porential delirium of the fabula.ting function, which
exploits the impossibility of verifying certain narratives of past events. On the
Bergsonian model, memory is preserved as a whole and is not in itslIlfordered
chronologically. Janet suggests that fabulation can run riot through the past.
scrambling chronology. and returning with a completely mythicized past.
What would plug this delirium, on Bergson's account? In the end. it must be
reflecred instinct. Epic and myth are closely linked with gmealogUal claims in
ancient history. The delirium of myth is controlled by stabilizing it 1:.0 serve
genealogy as a reflected biological form of the vinua1: lineages, races, blood.
The form of instinct would thus allow the mythical narrative 1:.0 assume a 'bio-
logical' form, albeit a reflected one. Instinctual consciousness is therefore still
possible at a collective level. just as the wasp has a peculiar kind of 'species-
consciousness', the consciousness of the early Greek would be structured by
the dramas of Olympus as racial myths.
Social obligation is referred back to mythical fabulation. which forms the
foundation of human society through the reactivation of instinct. Deleuze's
argument does not stop there, however, a1!:hough it could have done so. In a
move that proves the decisive role of dialectical thinking in his thoughl,
Deleuze claims !:hat !:he preservation of 'virtual instinct' in this manner does
not yet demonstrate any fundamental difference in kind between human
beings and animals. For 'the societies !:hat he forms are no less dosed than
animal species; they form part of a plane of nature, as much as animal species
and societies; and man goes round in circles in his societyjust as much as the
species do in theirs or ants in their domain'. The difference between ants and
men is nOl so great, especially if we are prepared to assume some lIOn of
162 Deleuze and the Unum.scWus

.ct" that
ides the
leral. In
furm of
es i1l.the
there is
is in fact
(B 108).
:1. which
•. On the
the past,
red past.
must be
claims in
to serve
:8. blood.
ne a 'bio-
efore still
:rored by
onns the
e so. In a
mer does
n human
)sed than
:al species
lCh as the
1 ants and
Ie sort .of
TJu Occtdl. Unconscious: Sympathy and the Sorcerer 163
consciousness in lower organisms. Although the human work.er is different
from a worker ant insofar as it is blessed with intelligence, when it encounters
the limits of inrelligence, it reveals itself as resting on instinct after all, If an
indiVidual resists social pressure, then this is by virtue of his intelligence, while
if an individual conforms to society, then he does so likewise through acqui-
escing in the stories and fables he is told, There is still no possibility of
escaping the plane or circle of nature, and we remain caught in an endless
oscillation between individual and social pressure,
Deleuze is quite dear that the requisite 'third thing' is not intuition, as 'in
fact., we must on the contrary carty out a genesis of intuition, that is determine
the way in which inrelligence itself was converted or is converted into intu-
irion' (B 109-10), This is a bit of an obscure formulation, as we have seen that
instinct itself must be already taken to be intuitive, so there is no for a
'genesis' of intuition in thalrespecL However, Deleu:re's claim is more specific:
it is to determine how imelligma can be converted into intuition. That is, not
only must instinct itself be affected by intelligence, thus becoming 'disinter-
ested, self-conscious. capable of reflecting upon its object', but inrelligence
100 must have the possibility of being inrernally altered by instinct. This is a
pure specuIative-dialecticaI formulation: not just intelligence in instinct., but
instinct in intelligence.
Again. as with Hegelian phenomenology, we have to scan the horizon to see
if there is a suitable object to serve as locus for this dialectical identity. Deleuze
says abruptly that there is only one candidate. 'Only emotitm differs in nature
from both intelligence and instinct., from both intelligent individual e80ism
and quasi-instinctive social pressure' (8 110). But it is not any sort of emotion
which differs in nature, as Deleuze suggests. Egoistic passions and the aesthetic
pleasures of fabulation both involve emotions which are 'always connecred to
a representation on which it is supposed to depend' (ibid.). Nevertheless,
emotion can in principle be separated from these representations. 'It
precedes all representation, itself generating new ideas. It does not have,
srrkcly speaking, an object, but merely an essena that spreads itself over various
objects. animals, plants and the whole of nature'. This is an odd conception,
but we can already see that the notion of sympath, must be lurking in the back.-
ground here, Emotion is being related to the capacity for sympathy; it appears
as a kind of fJ/I&iversal SJmpatk" made possible by the reflection of instinct out
of its panicularity, In Creative Evolution Bergson had already hinted that
instinct could become 'disinterested' in human beings. Emotion then appears
to be some sort of process of 'identification' with instinctual attitudes, which
nevertheless does not extend to fully incarnating them. In The Two Sources,
Bergson uses aesthetic 'identification' to get across what he means here. A
piece of music which expresses love does not express for a particular
person, but a love that is 'ideal', insofar as it does not belong to the person
who has it, but the person who has it participates in an essence. Music 'does
not introduce these feelings in us; it introduces us into them, as passers-by are
forced into a street dance' (Bergson 1932: 40, cited in 8 110). 'To each
member of a. closed society, if he opens himself to it, it communicates a kind
of reminiscence, an excitement that alloW!! him to follow' (8 111).
Universal S'JmpfJt}ry is the intuitive basis which allows for the idenlification
with others. Conscioume!l8 has been universalized, so that it no longer belongs
to one ego, but due to the ability to adjust the 'level' of consciousness
(between conoaction and relaxation) now asswnes a power of di.8sociation
that allows us to enter the conscious perspectives of other beings.
Furthermore, this un.iverIalization of consciousne!l8 extends all the way to
the animal world, and to life iuelf. Without an object. emotion is 'an asena
that spreads itself over various objec15, anim.ah, plants and the whole of
natUre' (110). Deleuze often describes the peeu1iar feeling of sympathy with
animals. Which child has not looked into the eyes of a dog or horse and felt
overcome with a flood ofmelancholy? Deleuze frequently alludes to a passage
from the novel ADfqn RAser by the German pre-Romantic writer Karl Philipp
Moritz, who 'feels respomible not for the cal'lleS that die but before the calves
that die and give him the incredible feeling of an unknown Nature - afJed
(ATP 240). (Deleuze uses the term 'affect' here to denote emotion, rather
than affect in the strictly Bergsonian sense.) H emotion is a 'spiritual' (or even
daemonic) event rather than the firing ofneumDS, it is because it is necessar·
ily referred to an unknown Nature. The emotions of love and art are not like
affects that belong to 'known' or empirically sensed nature (such as the inten-
sities attached to ordinary sensations). Love rather refen to the unknown
Nature ofthe other (inJungian terms, the anima or animus). Fear is only ever
an 'affect' in the proper sense of the word when it refers to an unknown
n.ature. Love, fear and art all participate in a flow of emotion which emanates
from our relation to the unknown in nature. TheJungian terms we developed
in chapter 3 allow us to specify that the most profound unknown nature is
unknown inner na1ll.re - the Wlconscious, the mind beyond ego. Unknown
nature is only powerful to us when it refers to an unknown inner nature:
'nature from within'. Affect or emotion is therefore the intensive movement
of this unknown nature, and is 'the unconscious' in its pure, intensive form.
We know that Deleuze always begins on the principle that the highest serves as
the clue to the most fundamental ('the nownenon tends to appear as such in
complex sy5teD1.!l'), so it is an which reveals the e!l8ence of this feeling most
clearly. Musk is the privileged example of wriversal !I}'I1lpathy. Here, universal
!I}'I1lpathy is at ib most 'active'. But art and music are refined forms of univer-
sal sympathy. Everything that has been said so far leads Deleuze to suggest that
it is this universal sympathy which can claim the special ontological statm of
lifting us out of the closed cycles of nature. Because emotion in itself is pure
intensive quantity, it is the elan vital in person (the noumenon appearing within
the interior). In a sense, emotion is the 8ubstance or s u ~ e c t (in Hegelian
terms) of the Absolute. The goal of the occult tradition is tD a!l8ign a mathais
to the microcosmic currents of intensive quantity. allowing for a potential
mastery of the domain of pure virtuality. Bergson hi:m&elf cl.aims that it is the
mysticwho is the final subject of pure emotion. 'At the limit, it is the mystic who
(or at
in the
DeI.euu and the Unconscious 164
'. 1;-
:lIe of
t ld felt
.ot like
: inten-
lwre is
-c fonn.
such in
ng most
~ t t h a t
status of
r is pure
t it is the
The Occult Unconst:Wus: Sympathy and the SorCl':f8f' 165
plays with the whole of creation, who invents an expression of it whose
adequacy increases with its dynamism. Servant of an open and finite God
(such are the characteristics of the ilaft vital), the mystical soul actively plays
the whole of the universe, and reproduces the opening of a Whole in which
there is nothing to see or contemplate' (B 112).
H the passage from Bngsonismhas been kept in mind, pemaps we are not so
unprepared for this conclusion. In The Two Soums. Bergson identifies mysti-
cism with 'frenzy'. However, his theory offrenzy is quite specific and needs to
be briefly recounted (see Lawlor 2003: 85-111 for a general overview). For
Bergson, frenzy is a fundamental possibility of human cognitive and affective
life, We have seen enough of Bergson's philosophy to know that he identifies
two fundamental 'tendencies' in life - duration and matter. 'In the general
evolution of life, the tendencies thus created by a process ofdichotomy are to
be found in species different from each other', 80 that evolutionary lineages
which develop intelligence do so at the expense of instinct, for instance. The
kingdom of the hymenoptera is opposed to the kingdom of humanity. Never-
theless, even if one line - intelligence or instinct - wins out evolutionarily, a
tension between the two tendencies still exists when it comes to 'the evolution
of psychical and social life' because 'here the tendencies. born of the process
of splitting, develop in the same individual ... can be developed only in lIUC-
cession' (Bergson 1932: 295). Human psychological development. therefore,
proceeds through an alt8mation of instinct and intelligence. Whereas the
development of the human infant proceeds through formations shaped by
instinct, the period of early adulthood is devoted to the cultivation of intelli-
gence, while the development of instinct (for instance. the sexual instinct),
conversely, is frozen at a certain stage. Now Bergson 8uggellts that if one of
these tendencies gains an unmoderated power over the other, and assumes a
development autonomous of the other, then frenzy is the result. 'The mere
fact of taking up all the room imparts to each of them such an impetus that it
bolrs ahead as the barriers collapse one bv one; there is something frenzied
about it' (296). Intelligence completely uprooted from instinct is frenzied,
while instinct without any sort of power of modification through intelligence
(or at least habituation) is also frenzied. There is no longer an internal barrier
in the counteraction of the opposing tendency, and so a careering freef.all
comes into being. This duality of tendencies appears to be permanent, and the
best one can do is oscillate between them. avoiding the frenzies that come
about when one becomes dominant.
Mysticism is nevertheless something more than the mental disequilibrium
one might expect if it dwells at the 'dream-pole' of human cognition and
emotion. It is not idle dreaming, but taps into the sow-ce of life. The IlI}'lltic's
visions are 'a systematic rearrangement aiming at a superior equilibrium'. It is
superior, Bergson says, because there is the possibility of action, of realization.
Bergson makes clear later that mysticism is a type offrenzy (298). So the con-
clusion is clear: if there is a correlate to the Hegelian 'substance ... I U ~ ' in
Bergson, a coming-to-consciousness where the noumenal is expressed in pure
Slates of interiority. then it is embodied by the mystic. Mysticism, which is iden-
tification with the Natura natltrans, points towards a superior equilibrium, and
the mystic is not at alI bothered if people accuse him or her of being mad.
But the very extremity of the mystic's existence forces Berg!lOn to downplay
i1$ nonnativity. A society of mystics is not possible, and Bergson's di!lCU!lsion
turns to a novel account of the general conditions for society. But Deleuze
insists thai. it is this interval of emotion - apparently apprehel1llible in its pure
fonn only in mysticism - which iuelf 'defines a variability appropriate to
hwnan societies' (B Ill). Contra Freudian expectations, the Deleuzean
individuant is no longer caught within the conflict betWeen instinCt and intel-
ligence, hut has gone beyond this dualism wwards the articulation ofan inten-
sive map that maket! possible the o1UrnaJ;ion of impersonal powers of intuition
in mathetical relationship with eat:h other. The v.uiability in human societies,
in other words, must ultimately be traced had to the vicissitudes of deploy-
ment of this creative emotion. The condition of any hierarchically ordered
society is therefore the management or distribution of frenzy.
But mystical frenzy isJUSt one form offrenzy. More speeifica1Iy, society is con-
ditioned by an oscillation between twO types of frenzy. Writing in 1932,
Bergson 8uggeS1ll thai. 'comfort and luxury [have] apparently become the
main preoccupation of humanity ... We have seen the rue for comfort pro-
ceeding faster and fallter ... Today it is a stampede' (298). The pendulum has
swung in the opposite direction to 'the Middle Ages, [when] an ascetic ideal
had predominated ... Here already you had frenzy' (ibid.). These two frenzies
recall Jung's two poles of extraVersion and introversion. On the one side, the
frenzied extraversion of conswner society, with solitude banished to outer
darkness. This is a kind of frenzy of intelligence, in that intelligence itself
becomes separated altogether from its instinctual ballast. On the other side,
the frenzied inrroversion of monks and shamans, who have gone beyond all
earthly need for human contact. Any society will veer towards one of the
fren.ries. Bergson concludes: 'We propose to designate law of twofold.frr:n%y the
imperative demand, forthcoming from each of the two tendencies as soon as
it is materialised by the splitting, to be pursued to the very end, as if there was
an endl' (296).
Despite the fact that he sees no end to this oscillation. Bergson does accord
value to the return to the 'simple life', which led to the dismissal ofhis late phi-
losophy as quietistic. But in the terms of his argument, things are less straight-
forward. If mystical life is being identified with frenzy and with the
disequilibrium of the senses, it seems somewhat humorous to call it a 'simple
life'. Moreover, despite the ontological expressivity of the mystic, he or she
cannot in the end be described as an empty vessel through which light pours.
In the footnote to the crucial passage with which we started this chapter,
Oeleuze even refers us to 'the man who tricks natUre, extending 'beyond' the
plane and renuning to a nanuing Nature' (B 135). Once again, Bergsonism
in Deleuze's hands is revealed to be a superior Neoplatonism: for the ability of
the mystic to become Natura noturansis achieved only by going against NoLttra
true id
:h isJ4en-
iutn. and I :
5 ~ ' {-
downplay 'i'
t Deleuze
n its pure
)priate tp
and intel-
:an inlen-
)f deploy-
ety is con-
in 19!2.
come the
mon pro-
fuluro has
eetie ideal
e side, the
I to outer
~ n c e itself
,ther side,
Jeyond all
.ne of the
iJremy the
as soon as
fthere was
oes accord
lis late phi-
ss straight-
with the
t a 'simple
he or she
ighL pours.
is chapter,
eyond' the
Ie ability of
:irut Natura
The Occult Unam.w:iow: Sympathy and the Sorcerer 167
natuml4. There is a 'life' of nature which is prior to nature itself. 'Nature ...
is the name we give to the totality of compliances and resistances which life
encounters in raw matter' (Bergson 1932: 311). The coming to consciousness
that Deleuze describes in the passage only occurs through the tricking of
nature as it tuttuJl/:y exists. There is a higher Nature, beyond actual nature.
Bergson himself already admits that there is !IOmething 'unnatural' about uni-
versal sympathy. 'Man outwits nat:l.J:re when he extends social solidarity into the
brotherhood of man ... he is deceiving her', because the maintaining ofinter-
group hostility is essential to evolutionary development (Bergson 1932: 57). It
is as true today that the figure of the mystic still drives Darwinists into a fury.
He or she is an unnatural figure, who no longer confonns to the established
laws of nature (that is, the laws of established nature). Now, when Deleuze
ventures that frenzy involves 'scrambling the planes of nature', he is in effect
exuerbating this aspect of Bergson's argument. But in doing !IO, the mystic's
rrue identity is revealed. What Deleuze shows is that in any case, Bergson is not.
ultimately talking about mystics, but about sorcerers.
In the mystic's exaltation, says Bergson. things are seen on a vast scale, but
through the lens of a simplicity that allows the mystic to act decisively. The
mystical soul has access to 'an innate science, or rather an acquired igno-
rance', which 'suggests to it straightaway the step to be taken, the decisive act,
the unanswerable word' (232; trans. modified). But Bergson himself denies
that mysticism is equivalent to or comparable to magic, which he instead
presents as a kind of deluded belief in the omnipotence of thoughts (as Freud
had done in Thtem and Taboo) (Bergson 1932: 167). Although he recognizes
rhe role of heightened emotion in magic, his main focUll is on its lamentable
inability to bring about change in nature. The sorcerer is the one who curses
his rival rather than attempting to challenge him physically. He turns imp&-
renee (the inability to control weather, for instance) to his adwru:age, gaining
personal power through exploiting gaps in human knowledge and technical
capacity. He takes associative rules (such as the substitution of part for whole,
or the association of like with like) and applies them, with the help of the
intrinsic delirium of the fabulating function, to events over which he has no
power. The !IOrcerer is a mere shadow of the mystic, who is on the contrary a
'genius of the will' (58). But the problem is that all the attributes he ascribes
to the mystic can also be attributed with even more justification to the
magician. First, the 'unna1:lJ.Tal' panidpation of the mystic in life seems only to
come into its own in magic and sorcery. The sorcerer takes the shon cut to
wisdom, over the saint who subordinates his meditations to theological prin-
ciple. Second, Bergson's statement that mysticism involves a frenzy recalls the
statements of sorcerers rather than those of saints. The active cultivation of
frenzy is central to the practice of magic, on any account. In his Magi.ck in
T1I.mry and Prtut.iu, Crowley writes that the secret of magical invocation is to
.tmjiarn.e tkyselfin fYrayini ... Just as the poet, the lover. the artist, is carried out
of himself in creative frenzy, so mUllt it be for the Magician' (Crowley 1973:
251). Third, Bergson'5 claims about the frenzy that is proper to duration and
Man is therefore not primarily the mtional animal. nor even Mmo tUSthetiau,
but is before and above aU else, the magical animal. In the substantial section
And what is this creative emotion, if not precisely a coam.ic Memory, that
actualises aU the levelA at the same time, that liberates man from plane or
the level that is proper to him, in order to make him a creator, adequate to
the whole movement of creation? This liberation, this embodiment of
cosmic memory in creative emotions, undoubtedly only t:akes place in privi.
leged souls. It leaps from one soul to another, 'every nowand then', crOll8ing
closed deserts. But to each member of a closed society, if he opens himself
to it, it communicates a kind of reminiscence. ali excitement that allows him
to follow. (B Ill)
Deleuze and the Unronscious
creative force of the iltm vitallead, as Deleuze suggests, to the idea of unna.tu.nJ.l
participations in other forms of life (the 'scrambling of the planes of nature').
For if the frenzy proper to capitalism is a frenzy of the intelligence, then con-
venely medieval frenzy is a frenzy of instinct. We know that intelligence is
opposed to instinct. and that the latter involves the power of sympathy. So every-
thing pointll to the conclusion that the frenzy of mysticirm proceeds via a revival
of the power ofinstincmal sympathy in univenal fonn. It therefore involves the
scrambling ofthe planes of nature from the beginning. Ifthere is no doubt that
the history of magic is filled with tales of charlatans who exploit impotence in
order to gain power, legions of charlatans, at the same time it is ako host to a
tradition of son:ery which precisely involves an affective tranJIformation into
animals, and an acquisition of their pawen. Mystia do not actively identify with
animals, but sorcerers do. Thus, by his own lighb, Bergson is unjustified in
distinguishing mysticism from sorcery.
Deleuze's insight here is 10 suggest that the connection between Bergson's
theories of frenzy and instinct allow in turn for a philosophical defence of
sorcery, rather than mysticism. There is no other choice but 10 descend
further into this weird underworld that is opening up beneath our feet. For if
emotion is what distinguishes the human being from the animal, this power is
the precipitate of a subttaetion of interest from instinct. Bergson is gesturing
towards an 'innate science' that would be proper to 'sorcery': a science which
could manipulate the flows of emotion through frenzy. If emotion is the
sublimation or Auj1vJJu.lIfof instinct and intelligence, then it is no wonder that
man is capable of such frenzies. The instincts (and, if we follow Jung, their
archetypes) retain their independence, but now there existll a being that can
bring about in itself successively 'everything that, elsewhere, can only be'
embodied in different species'. Deleuze is drawing the consequences of
Bergson's andJung's suggestion that some son of reintegration between each
half - instinct and intelligence - is possi.ble, and that to achieve tha.t would be
to finally earn the right to claim that the human being is a distinctive being In
the order of life. Deleuze insists that this is the privilege of the human being,
and this alone.
T/w Occult Unconscious: Sympath:j and the Sb1'CI!reT 169
on sorcery in A Thowtmd Plateaus, Deleuze at last fully draws the consequence
of his earlier tentative suggestiom about the participation in the frenzies of
natUre. The paradigm shift that is under way here is most starkly exposed in
the 'Conclusion' to the book. under the heading 'Rhizome'. After summing
up, in a highly condensed passage, their theory of multiplicities - a concept
that was fundamental to Deleuze in Dif/n'eIUe and - Deleuze and
Guatt3rl conclude by quickly listing lhe three ways in which multiplicities can
be One never encounters a multiplicity 'in person' except under the
following conditions. The division is as follows: multiplicities can be expressed
passively, actively, or in theory. We have already been using this distinction
between passive and active relatiomhips to the uncon.scious. On lhe one hand,
the pt.u.srverelationship to lhe unconscious is the path of individuation, which
is articulated around a psychotic moment, at the heart of every neurosis.
Deleuze thinks that normality rests on a hidden psychosis or deliriwn, which
is encountered at one point of lhe individuation process. But this crisis in indi-
viduation in rom is only resolved by taking an attWe approach to the uncon-
scious. Delewe and Guattari - who refer to themselves in the plateau on
'Becoming-Animal' as 'we sorcerers' - are able to conclude that 'at the level of
padws . . . multiplicities are expreMed by psychosis and especially schizophre-
nia. At the level of pragmatics. they are utilized by sorcery' (ATP 506).
Given Deleuze's and Guattari's astonishing conclusion. it is perfecdy
possible to read their ideas about drugs and secret societies in lhe plateau on
'Beooming-Animal' as coming from within that general tIadition. 'Becoming-
Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible' is, among other things,
a late modern occult treat:ise.
The hwnan being. in its most active essence,
alien and anomalous even to itself, is therefore most purely expressed in the
sorcerer, the only successfuJ. madman - so successful in fact that he is the uni-
versal object of horror. and excludedfrom history. But the very act ofexposing
this primal, mad conjuror of forces, at the edge of society and history, as the
figure behind the veil of repression is itself an act of historiography. Our his-
torical perspectives our inverted. The witch-hunts did not occur in 'the middle
ages', as is commonly thought, but began in earnest with the publication of
the Mal.l.ew MaJefit:mvm in 1484, and ended in the late seventeenth century.
They occurred in the Renaissance. One of the witnesses of the death at the
stake of Giordano Bruno in 1600 recounts some of the eight heretical propo-
sitions which Bruno refused to recant 'that there are innumerable worlds;
that magic is a good and licit thing; that the Holy Spirit is the anima mu1ldi.;
that Moses did his miracles by magic in which he was more proficient than the
Egyptians; that Christ was a Magus' (yates 1964: 354). A contemporary list of
censured propositiom in Bruno's work includes the claims lhat the infinity of
God implies the infinity of the univel1le, and that the stars are angels. among
others concerned with the creation of the human soul and the motion of the
earth. It was Bruno's hermeticism that was repre!l8ed before all else, and which
resurfaces again, in shifting baroque disguises, in Leibniz, Spinoza, Schelling,
Jung and Deleuze.
then con-
Iigence is
, So every-
volves the
lQtence in
,host to a
irian into

lStified in
efence of
, descend
eel. For if
s power is
on is the
mg, their
?; that can
1 only be
.lences of
\feen each
would be
e being in
laIl being,
nary, that
1 plane or
iiment of
::e in pp.vi-


The themes of sympathy, becoming·animal and sorcery are interlinked, and all
come together in the famous Chapter on 'Becoming-Animal' in A 'lhbusa/nd
PlaUaus. Deleuu and Guattari introduce their strange theme of 'becoming-
animal' with a reference to an obscure Amerit:an film from the 1970s, Will4ni,
which ponnys the descent of a man into a society of rats. 'Who has not known
the violence of these animal sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if
only for an instant, making one scrape at one's bread like a rodent -or giving
one the yellow e y ~ of a feline?' (ATP 240).
The relationship between man and animal 'has been constantly misunder-
stood by psychoanalysis, because psychoanalysis is unable to see in it anything
but all-too-human Oedipal figures' (CC 54; ct. ATP 259). Freud's patient,
Sergei, had a dream of 'Ox or !leVen' wolves observing him frOm a cree. In his
interpretation, Freud reduces the multiplicity of wolves to one wolf, adding
that this is a displacement of the father. But the multiplicity of wolves already
indicates that Freud's starting premise is problematic. We have already seen
that wolves may first of all function as symbols. But the indetenninate multi-
phd!)' ofwolves. say Deleuze and Guawui also has potency for other reasons.
Although the wolf tends to be a lone animal, it also assembles in packs. This
pack-fonn of sociali!)' is scarcely a social organizl:aion of the Conn taken by, say.
primates. A pack of wolves is a strange society of lone animals. The French
word (fa meu.te) Deleuze uses signifies more than 'pack' (which would more
appropriately translate the word haw), Meute is a term from htmring, rather
than ethology. It may be a natural organisation or a domesticated organiza-
tion, as in a pack of foxhounds, Second, meute can also be used to described a
crowd or mob of people in pursuit. Third, the er.ymological roOl of meute is
moovoir'. Deleuze classes In. mt1Ue.S among l£s clas$l$, l£s peopln, In. 10il!.S, l£s tIUllieS
(DI 275) which provoke delirium. This gives the impression of a swanning
presence around one. as if being chased by spiriu or demons. When the Wolf
Man faces a nIl11Jtt of wolves, he is aM:fused in peculiar way; it is as if a group is
singling him out personally, turning to him and saying: Hello Sergei, we've been
waitingfor you. If s time to aiffll with US now.
The discussion of 'becoming-animal' begins with a comparison between
Jung's and Levi--SrraUM's approaches to cases of apparent 'identifications' with
animals, whether it be in dreams, fantasies, or in hallucinatory episodes.
Deleuze and Guattari state that there are two !)'pes of 'analogy' that are
involved in the Jungian and structuralist approaches to animal symbolism.
Jung's use ofanimals is restricted insofar as he relies on merely external resem-
blances between images, and is regulated by the linear logic of individuation
(certain symbols only appear at certain stages of life, like the whale and
rebirth). Also, Jung's approach only seems to concern 'animals as they are
treated in the great divine myths, in such a way as to extract from them series
or structures, arche!)'pes or models'. and overlooks the 'more demonic
animals'. The relation of analogy is falsified by these resrrictions. ~ t r a u s s
nd all
nity. if

. In his

easons. .
is. This
by. say,


d more
.' rather
cribed a
met.Ite is
the Wolf
group is
tJ{j'Vi IHlen
ous' with
that are
tal resem-
male and
; !hey are
lem series
The Duult UnromcWUS: Sympathy and the 171
abolishes analogies of resemblance and fOCWleS on strUctw-al analogies only.
'A man can never say: 'I am a bull, a wolf ...', but he can say 'I am to a woman
what a bull is to a cow. I am to another man what the wolf is to the sheep" (ATP
236). However, both Jungianism and structuralism leave one panicular phe-
nomenon unexplained:' 'alongside the two models ... there is still room for
something else, some!hing more secret, more subterranean: tJu $urr;.eret' and
becomings, expressed in tales [nldtsJ instead of myths or rites' (ATP 257). So
what is not being explained byJungianism or struCturalism is a specific set of
U'ansformations found moSt distinctly not in psvchopathology or tribal
custom, but in magic or sorcery. '·We believe in the existence of very special
becomings-animal traversing human beings and sweeping them away, affect-
ing the animal no less than the human.' The first example, to set the &Cene for
the rest of this chapter. is the becoming-bat of the vampire. "From 1730 to
1735, all we hear about are vampires" (ATP 237); neXf up is the lycanthrope.
another creature not often seen in clinic today. Such transformations provide
the material for the notion of 'becoming' (devtnirl: 'SU1lcturalism does not
account for these becomings ... A correspondence of relations does not add
up to a becoming' (ATP 237).
'We do not become animal without a fascination for the pack' (ATP 239).
Fascination itself is a magical term, again connected with animal t:ra.nSforma-
tion. Crowley refers to 'the arts of 'fascination' in its proper sense - the word
comes from the Latinfascinum', i.e. witchcraft (Crowley 1917:
32). Traditionally. the art of fascination was said to involve the working of
magical effects by means of visual 'emissions'. One alchemical text from the
fifteenth century by AlOt18O Tostado links the hypnotic gaze of the basilisk to
the visual power of wolves and menstruating women (Newman 2004: 203). But
this somniacal gaze is imbued with virtUality rather !han actuality. Crowley
goes on to compare the blind fascination of love with the magical arts of fasci-
nation: 'You transformyourself, like ,zeus into swan or bull, like Lucius into an
ass, like the Egyptian magi into an hawk. swallowor ibis, or like the Syrian into
a dove, and by this means compel the desired otMect to your anus.' This
ness of magical fascination defines magical divination itself. the attainment of
visions through programmed, ritual intoxicalion.
Delewe and Guattari insist that these becomings-animal are not imitations
or identifications, because 'they are perfectly real' (ATP They qualify:
'But which reality is at issue here?' Their subsequent explanations are obscure,
but some light emerges when they explicitly relate 'the principle according to
which there is a reality specific to becoming' to 'the Bergsonian idea ofa
istence of very different 'durations', superior or inferior to 'OUl'8', aU of them
in communication' (ATP 238). In his 'Introduction to Metaphysics', Bergson
suggests that his method also allows one to pass beyond the opposition
between realism and idealism, and 'to affirm the existence of objects both
inferior and superior to us, though nevertheless in a certain senlle interior ro
us' (Bergson 184; d. B 77). If our conscious duration can include
simpler instinctive durations, which are in tum components of periodic cycles
(for instance, respiration, sleeping and waking, menstroal cycles), then it
might be that consciousness itse1f can be altered so as to be able to select
various durations and their associated spatioternpornl dynamisms. BecaUlle its
being is in time as weD as space, the human being has the ability to alter its
'!peed', and participate in a vast range of 'fluxes'. In principle, it has the
power lO isolate the rate of deterritorialiution for any entity, to assess how
much energy it ill not JUSt using but generating. The human being, by being
capable of scrambling the planes, in principle possesses the eyes of the world.
On the one hand, its body is composed of 'inferior' durations, but on the
other hand, its very capacity to divide its consciousness points to the possibil-
ity if not necessity of a 'superior' synthesis, beyond the partial integrations of
the ego. In their remarks on becoming here, Deleuze and Guattari are effec-
tively redeploying Bergson's theories about duration and cosmic time within a
renewed theosophical and pantheistic esotericism.' Deleuze's turn to a discus-
non of sorcery in A 'I'howt.md Plateaus marks a return to hill early interest in
esoteric thought In The Atlan:hy and Hieran::h'j ofKf1bl.IIUrilge MaIfatti generates
the relations of polarity and power between the various human organs, and
then goes on to relate them to a 'double body' with a 'double sex', a spiritual
hermaphrodite, with its organs each in relation with an aspect of the cosmos.
As in Schelling's later theosophical thought, the world is the body ofGod, and
we are its coming to consciousness. Deleuze iterates that' I!€SIas'j is precisely the
act through which the individual raises itself to the level of the species'
(Deleuze 1946: xxii). But this ecstasy will not be our own species conscious-
ness, but our possible participation in other species consciousnesses. 'Before
the fall, Adam existed as humanitas' (xxii). But MaUatti rejects the residual
traCes of Christianity in the theosophical tradition, and returns to the sexual-
ecstatic aspects of Indian mysticism, laying out a vast sexualized ontology,
culminating in the 'hermaphroditic' consciousness of the human sexual act.
What ill remarkable is that aD of these ideas resurface in disguise in one of
Deleuze's valedictory texts, 'To Have Done witbJudgment', publillhed in 1993.
There the 'body without organs' (which is a phrase from Anand, another
occult-intoxicated artist) is illuminated by its esoteric roots: 'The body without
organs is an affective, intensive, anarchist body that consists solely of poles,
zones, thresholds, and gradients. It ill traversed by a powerful, nonorganic
vitality. Lawrence paints the picture of such a body, with the sun and moon as
its poles, with its planes, its sections, and its plexuses' (CC 131). Lawrence's
Fantasia of the UncffflSCious contains a chapter entitled 'Plexuses, Planes and so
on', which is based on an esoteric account of the 'subtle body', made up of a
'vital magnetism' organized in dynamic polarities."
The sorcerer is the ideal microcosmic being, exposed foe better or worse to
'the very forces of the universe' (Lowry 1947: 189), exposed to aD the waves
and spasms that pass through the body of God. At the dose of his case study
of President Schreber, Freud remarks that Schreber's 'rays of God' are
'nothingelse than a concrete representation and projection outwards oflibid·
inal cathexes' (SE 12: 78); they are 'endopsychic perceptions of the processes
lJeltuze and the Unconscious
then it
_0 select
cause its
alter its
has the
leSS how
\1'f being
Ie world.
t on the
a.lions of
Lte effec-
within a
a discus-
Iterest in
;ans, and
. cosmos,
:;ad, and
;, 'Before
: residual
le sexual-
mal act.
in one of
lin 1993.
, another
of poles,
I moon as
lesand so
Ie up ofa
rworse to
the waves
case study
God' are
The Occult Umonsciow: Sympathy and Uu! Stmerer I 73
whose existence I have assumed . . . as the basis of our explanation of
paranoia'. In his seminar on the psychoses, Lacan adds that in Schreber's
theory of the divine rays the reader may 'vaguely see something that isn't
totally diJlerent from what I teach about the way one has to describe the func-
tioning of the unconscious' (l.acan 1955--6: 27). Both psychoanalysts allow,
amazingly, that a psychotic can have 'endopsychic perception' of their uncon-
scious forces. In A1lti-Ottlipw, Schreber is one of a gallery of schizophrenics
who are said in language that reminds us of the Bergsonian magician to be
able to 'scramble all the codes' (AD 15). The schizophrenic is 'homo natum'
(AD 5), the 'celibate machine' who 'gives birth to a new humanity or a
glorious organism' (17). 'The being who is in intimate contaCt with the
profound life ofaU forms or aU types of beings, who is responsible for even the
tarS and organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast
into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of the machines
of the universe' (AO 4). Beyond the polarity between schizophrenia and
paranoia, therefore, there is a dynamic oscillation between schizophrenia and
sorcery, as passive and active expressions of intensive multiplicity. One of the
most famous boob of medieval magic was Al-Kindi's On llays ur A 1'Iuory of
M4gi£al Am.. 'Each star possesses its proper place in the machine of the world,
which is different all the others ... The rays of stars vary,just as the aspects and
properties of stars vary ... The rays of all the stars operate diversely upon the
things of the world according to the diverse properties of things themselves,
seeing as everything is born and subsists thanks to the rays' (Al-Kindi 1977: 82,
84). The language of invisible rays runs through both magical and psychotic
writings. Deleuze's appeal to the language of 'flows'. 'intensities', 'force' and
'power' is rooted in that curious convergence; Deleuze uses philosophy
(specifically rationalist philosophers such as SpinOla or Leibniz) to subordi-
nate the hideous couple, psychosis and sorcery, to reason.
Sorcery of Capitalism
In a recent essay entided 'Deleuze's Last Message' &eng-ers has cast illwnina-
lion on Deleuze'lIlast te!tt with Guattari, Mat is Philosophyt, a text that many
find both obscure and 'conservative', because of its defence of a strict demar·
cation between the three disciplines of philosophy, science and art. Stengers
emphasizes that the authors' real answer to the question 'what is philosophy?'
lies in the fonowing paragraph of the book:
Thinking provokes general indifference. It is a dangerous exercise neverthe-
less. Indeed, it is only when the dangers become obvious that indifference
ceases, but they often remain hidden and barely perceptible, inherent in the
enterprise. Precisely because the plane of immanence is prephilosophical and
does not immediately take effect with concepts, it implies a sort of groping
experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very
respectable, rational, or reasonable. These measures belong to the order of
dreams. of pathological processes, esoteric experiences, dnmkenness, and
excess. We head for the horizon, on the plane of immanence, and we return
with bloodshot eyes, yet they are the eyes of the mind. Even Descartes had his
dream. To think is always to follow the witch's flight. (WP 41)
Stengers is of course aware that taking up this 'answer' to the question 'what
is philosophy?' 'may well mean facing such accusations as irrationality, super-
stition, and regression' (Stengers 20(6). but that it is necessary nonetheless. as
she proceeds to demonstrate. Stengers is a philosopher and historian of
science (among other things. she co-authored the groundbreaking philo-
sophical book on non-linear thermodynamics, La NOUVBlle AUiance [translated
as Order out of Chaos), with Ilya Prigogine in 1979), and has recently flown In
the face of the increasing dominance of scientific naturalism by translating
into French the works of the American nco-pagan witch and political activist
Starhawk. Her interest in 'sorcery' appears to arise in part from an increasing
interest in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, and not directly from her work
on hypnosis and somnambulism (Chertok and Stengers 1992). In a recent
work, La SarcellBrit Capitaliste (CapittJlist Sorcery), co-written with Philippe
Pignarre. Stengers channels these aspect& of Deleuze and Guau:ari's project
towards a future 'counter-sorcery' against the necromantic techniques of con-
temporary capitalism. They claim that capitalism itself can be thought of as a
'system of sorcery without sorcerers' (Pignarre and Stengers 2005: 59), cease-
lessly presenting us with 'infernal alternatiyes'. They argue that there is a real
sense in which contemporary capitalism does notJUSt want your body. but your
soul. Instead of calling for a practice of'demystificarion' (as in traditional
critical theory), they call for a practice of counter-sorcery.
There is of course a tradition within Marxism which compares the experi-
ence of the commodity to a bewitchment by a fetish. In CapiIal, Marx had
argued that there is a fetishism that is proper to commodities in general,
insofar as they posses6 !he power to fascinate the observer, and make them
forget that their value is intrinsic to them, rather than being produced by
labour. The desirability ofcommodities arises from their power to fascinate, to
suspend empirical reality and embody the quality of transcendence. The struc-
ture of fetishism is 'We know what it really is, but all the same', and laek
argues that the 'posanodem' subject is fundamentally cynical, obeying the law
in order to have the pleasure of enjoyment of the commodity. In order to
counteract this tendency, Ziiek invokes a psychoanalytic discoW"5e of trauma:
we must recognize that the enjoyment involved is itself a response to a
traumatic and contingent encounter. The approach of Pignarre and Stengers
is quite differenL H commodities have the power to fascinate us, then that is
because we ourselves have the power to fascinate and be fascinated. and
capitalism has seized upon this p o w e r . ~ For capitalism, the unconscious exists
first of all as a force to be manipulated. By restricting di.scussion of the Wl-
conscious to the discourse of psychopathology, psychoanalysis has been
unwittingly complidt with capitalism. When a salesman or manager (or an
Deleuze and the UnconsGio'US
The Occult Unconscious; Sympathy and the Sr:m:erer 175
academic or writer, for that matter) becomes devoted to advancing their
career at any cost, their soul has been stolen or capmred. When one is forced
to take place in workplace 'bonding' exercises, a level of humiliation is
involved which in some ways surpasses physical oppression. 'It no longer
concerns a pseudo<ontraet - your labour time against a salary - bUt a capture,
"soul and body''' (Pignarre and Stengers 2005: 182). When a consumer is
targeted through stimulating their sexual desires. they are being manipulated
by sorcery. and made to act like somnambulists. Sorcery happens and is hap-
pening. The notion of sorcery is therefore defensible, not least because one is
forced to defend oneself. Practitioners of sOTcery have a simple advantage:
they can defend themselves against fascination. If we are bewitched by
capitalism, then perhaps we have something to learn from the witches. The
modern hennetician has to break into the arsenal of the sorcerer in order to
defend their theosophical vision,6
Vampires, Intoxication and Night-Consciousness
In Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Serbia in the earty eighteenth cenmry there
was indeed something of a vampire epidemic. There were many tales of the
undead crawling out of their graves, terrorizing the local population and having
to be pubtically executed and laid to rest. Numerous learned swdies on vam-
pirism appeared in Latin and German between 1728 and 1735.
The reasons for
this collective panic are stitt not dear. Even at the rime. sceptics maintained that
the 'undead' were really victims of premature burial. who had either been
struck down by cholera or the plague, or had ingested some unknown poison.
Another sceptic claimed that: vampire hunters were under the influence of
opium (lntrovigne 2001: 603). Rut theological and esoteric explanations were
also proffered. thus heightening the controversy. Some theologians claimed
that vampire phenomena, alongside lycanthropy and sorcery, were real, and
that vampires were corpses animated by demons or the Devil himself. Michael
Ranft, on the other hand, explained me teeth marks on the insides of coffins as
due to the failed attempt of the astral body to depart from the corpse. In a 1732
article entitled 'The Dead Eat and Drink'. J. C. Dippel appealed to 'the prevail-
ing esoteric wisdom of the time, [that] humans had three souls (vegetative or
astral. sensitive and rational)'. This view had been kept alive in Renaissance
Germany by the Paracelsian tradition of medicine. Ranft and Dippel advanced
the idea that me astral soul remained for a while in the body of the deceased,
and could - under particular circumstances - be seen by others and be mistaken
for a vampire' (Introvigne 2001: 6(4). With his Dissertations SUT les apparitions
(1746). however. Dom Augustin Calmet intervened to absolutely deny the exh;-
tence of vampires, a position that was gladly taken up by the Church. Although
the Roman Catholic Church accepted the existence ofghosts (souls confined in
Purgatory, and the damned in Hell), they denied that suc.h souls coUld rewrn
to earth, whether in the bodies of the dead or living. To affinn otherwise was to
tilt tow.m:ls esoteric theories of the astral body.
The roaring sea is not enough to reveal the nablre of unconscious perceptions,
as we can remain "Stoically on the shore. buttressing the wind, but our souls are
still dosed to any further repercussions of the din. Hence it is necessary to seek
When the very beautiful coincidence of principles and experience occurs,
philosophy knows its moment of happiness, even if it is personally the mis-
fortune of the philosopher ... So it is necessary Cor experience to show me
that under certain conditions of disorganization in my consciousness,
minute perceptions force open the door of my consciousness and invade
me. (Third Lecture on Leibniz, 9)
Deleu:ze and the Unconsciow
Disappointingly, Deleuze and Guattari do not otIer an explanation of the
vampire phenomenon. But the wave of vampire terror coming from Eastern
Europe at this point perhaps can be related to baroque developments in ideas
about the soul happening at the same time. It is perhaps significant that m ~ t
of the tomes written on vampires during the 1730-5 period were published in
Germany. The phenomena of somnambulism were just beginning to emerge
into public conllCiousness. The scholarly treatises on vampirism seem haunted
by the idea that the soul could be entrapped in the body at death. One
vampire investigator cites the case of the scholastic philosopher Duns &otus,
who, it is reported. WlU taken for dead and buried. after having fallen into a
trance-like swoon (ciied in Sununers 1929: ISO). The question of the survival
of the soul after death had been undergoing baroque development in
Leibniz's philosophy at this poinL Leibniz complains that even the Cartesians
have 'accommodated themselves too much to the prejudice of the masses by
confusing a long Jiupor, which arises from a great confusion of perceptions,
with dMlh strialJ sfwJking, in which aU perception ceases' (Leibniz 1714: 208;
d. 1714b, #14). But if the experience of dying is akin to swooning, might not
death itself, by extension. be a prolonged swoon. 'Death can only be a sleep,
and not alasting one at that: the perceptions merely cease to be suffidendy
distinct' (Leibniz 1765: 55).
Dizziness, swooning, dying. In dizziness. and as [ swoon, my consciousness
"relaxes'. and I am 'invaded by minute. perceptions that do not become for all
that conscious perceptions'" 'Every time Leibniz speaks of Ideas. he presents
them as virtual multiplicities made of differential relations ~ d singular points.
which thought apprehends in a state close to sleep, stupor, swooning, death,
amnesia. murmuring or intoxication' (DR 213). In his 'Monadology', Leibniz
sa')'ll that 'What we call generatian.s are developments [dewloppemens) and
growths, as what we call deaths are envelopments [Enveloppmen.sJ and diminu-
tions' (Leibniz 1714b: 222, # 73. trans. modified).!! For Fechner in the Littl8
&ok ofLife after Ikath, death marks the end of physical development, but the
beginning of an envelopment to varying degrees in other, future lives. After
presenting Leibniz's philosophical arguments for the existence of uncon-
scious perceptions Deleuze describes how Leibniz might have gone about
finding the experience which confinns the concept:
n of the
in ideas
lat 11)05t
.ished in
,tho One
s Scot:us,
~ n into a
~ survival
ment in
<l3SSe8 by
714: 208;
light not
~ a sleep,
ne for all
,g, death,
, Leibniz
ensl and
the Little
[, hut the
Yes. Mter
)f uncon-
ne about
:e occurs,
,show me
ld invade
fSOWs are
II'}' to seek.
~ " ' I
The OcC'ldt Umonscious: Sympathy and the Sorcerer 177
out these unconscious perceptions, by 'slackening the tension' of conscious-
ness. Leibniz's euJJ!lul might have first occurred after being clubbed in the head,
perhaps by some impatient empiricist. Perhaps he found what he was looking
for: at such moments, Deleuze venl1.1reS. 'the philosopher says: everything is fine.
ids as it should be'. Philosophy, at last, can begin. With another blowto the head,
or another bite from the vampire. the philosopher's double begins to stir.
This detached, somnambulistic soul passes through the 'weird tales' of the
nineteenth and early twentieth cent:ury. Deleuze refers at thisjuncmre to Poe's
famous 'The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar', which tells the story of a ma.n
who willingly undergoes the expe.riment of being mesmerized at the point of
Poe later published the story in England as a hoax, first as 'The Last
Conversation of a Somnambule', and then again in a pamphlet entitled Mes-
merirm in ArliI:ulo Mortis [in the state ofdying], which presented the 'astonish·
ing and horrifying narrative' as a 'plain recital of facts'.1ll The story
encapsulates the transition in the attitude towards death that had come about
,ince the emergence of somnambulism. If Leibniz was the first philosopher of
the unconscious, it took the emergence of somnambulism into the common
culture of the nineteenth century to give concrete shape to the basic idea he
had articulated. Poe's story crystallizes a newfound terror that is waiting to be
thought in this period. As we have 8een, many thinkers increasingly related the
function ofconsciousness to practical adaptation to the environment. But the
reality of somnambulistic phenomena pointed in another direction entirely;
the somnambulistic unconscious was one step removed from the body and itt
tasks of adaptation. Could it be that sonmambu1ism was the ltey to the
immortal soul, whose very existence had begun recently to be put in doubt by
pragmatic and materialist explanations of consciousness? Poe's story draws the
unfortunate consequences of this train of thought: if there is a soul, then it is
not in itself conscious in the way that we know from our practical experience.
In the eighteenth century, the soul is rediscovered in somnambulism, but it is
disoriented. no longer attached to the 'function of reality' (in janet's tenm),
lacking the ballast of the present (in BeIglion's). It has a 'life' of some sort; it
is liued in a certain way. Without the constraints of the empirical body it is
something horrific and demonic, perpetually in flight.
Vampires are ludd somnambulists, dreaming while awake, refusing to shut
their eyes when they dream. In one of his last texts, 'To Have Done with
Judgment' (1993), which can be treated as a final summation of his most
original ideas, Deleuze contends that the power of dreaming can be harne!llled
and 'surpassed' by artificial meanJl. He claims that Nieusche, Lawrence, Kafka
and Anaud 'denounce in the dream ... a state that is still too immobile, and
too directed, too governed'. Perhaps the basic reference here is BergllOn's
theory of dreams. which ill expounded in some detail in Cinema 2. If the liber-
ation ofvirtuality is triggered by the dream, the dream always remains tethered
to actuality. It is only a panialliberation of the mind, as its freedom is always
limited by its ballast, the body paralysed in the bedroom, its consciousness
remaining always at the mercy ofthe stimuli that filter through the disengaged
senses (the flickering curtains. the banging coming from the flat above. the
television murmuring downstairs). From the perspective of Bergson's later
theories about mysticism (and even more so from the perspective of Deleuze's
diagnosis that Bergsonian mysticism is really sorcery), dreaming has to be seen
as a passive apprehension of the virtual. and hence an inadequate approach 10
it. Dreaming taps into a power of virtuality, but does not attempt to harness it.
Deleuze goes on to turn vehemently on those who model their explorations of
the unconscious on the dream: 'Groups that are deeply interested in dreams,
like psychoanalysts or surrealists. are also quick to form tribunals that judge and
punish in reality: a disgusting mania. frequent in dreamers.' It is no accident.
insinuates Deleuze, that 'the question of judgment is first of all knowing
whether one is dreaming or not'. Guattari too is to be found saying 'dreams are
fundamentally reterritorialization activities' in a fascinatingjoumal from 1972.
Our subjective attitude to the dream necessarily occurs in two stages: first, we
are passive spectators of the unfolding of the dream, while it is happening: but
then, by virtue of our immediate dissociation from the dream upon awaking. we
are necessarily always separated from it, and thrown back on the position of
decoding it. Our hopeless desire to find the meaning of the dream commits us
to a futile chase after its 'shadows' and doubtful appearances.
In the sequel to his Confessions ofan opium-Eater, De Quincey claims that 'the
object of that work was to reveal something of the grandeur which belongs
potentldUy to human dreams' (De Quincer 1845: 132).13 Dreams are indeed a
gateway to another world; the problem, therefore. is how to get through that
gateway. H one has gOt to the poim where one has discovered an and creation
to be the only acts of perfection possible for human beings, then the frame-
work has changed: we no longer seek to judge life or to get past its illusions to
a single truth. hut rather to commit ourselves to the task of creation. Dreams
bear with them hints of secret powers - divination, complete recall, resurrec-
tion of the dead. The 'big dreams' of which Jung speaks. leave the dreamer
shaken, sometimes for days. And as we have seen, there is more to nocturnal
consciousness than dreams, as the night is fined with other phenomena; night-
mares. noctumal emissions produced without physical stimulation, sleep-
talking. sleep-walking. Is it poSSible for consciousness to 'become adequate to
the night'? Deleuze goes on to say that'once we leave the shores ofjudgmenl,
we also repudiate the dream in favour of an 'intoxication'. like a high tide
sweeping over us. What we seek in states of intoxication - drink, drugs,
ecstasies - is an antidote to both the dream and judgment.. Whenever we tum
away from judgment towards justice. we enter into a dreamless sleep' (CC
At first sight, the reference to 'sleep without dream' [sommnJ. sans me] might
seemto indicare deep sleep. undisturbed by dreams; in other words, profound
unconsciousness. To have done with dreams in this case would be to get a
refreshing. untroubled sleep. But we know that from a 8ergsonian perspec-
tive, there are no dreamless sleeps, only sleeps in which dreams are not
recalled. Deleuze goes on to draw a distinction (invisible in English. which
Deleuze and the Unccmstious
f wher
that sl
but ra
we con
The ca
or psyc
sis. the
plane 0
e, the

: seen
lch to
.ess iL
ems of
ens are
rst, we
Ig; but.
ion of
nits us
at 'the
deed a
ions to
; night-
. slec}F
luate to
gh tide
we turn
:] might
:0 get a
are not
'. which
The Occult Unconscious: Sympathy and the Surcerer 179
uses 'sleep' indiscriminately) between sommeil and tIurmer. 'We are not asleep
[dornum.s] during this sleep without dream [.sommm sans 7'Cue)'. The two words
have different Latin etymologies: domtW refers to the state of physical sleep,
whereas somnio is translated 'I am dreaming'. It is cue that the ambiguity is
there even in Latin; somnium is a dream or vision, whereas somnw can simply
mean 'sleep'. But the latter can also refer to death, as well as dream and sleep
alike. Somnio and dormW can therefore be taken to refer to distinct concepts.
Somnio of course survives in English through the addition of in
'somnambulism" but the words somno1.ency, or somnolent do not capmre the
visionary aspects of the Latin and French terms. Perhaps an obsolete English
term, somniation. comes dosest to Deleuze's meaning here, in that it inserts a
current of activity into visionary states.
In the nineteenth century. when drug use was legal, it was nevenhelcss
veiled in polite company by me use of euphemisms, of which 'sleep' was
favoured among those of a Romantic disposition. Coleridge tells us that he
composed 'Kubla Khan' 'in a profound sleep' (Lefebure 1975: In
notebooks, he writes of the 'somniacal magic ... superinduced in the active
powers of the mind' (Coleridge 1838: III. 397). Mordecai Cooke's classic work
The Seven Sisters ofSleep (1860) classes opium, hashish and other drugs under
the rubric of 'sleep'. In literature, there is often more to the word 'sleep' than
mere dozing. But it would be foolish to look for direct 'translations' between
terms when we are dealing with esoteric discourse. It could be nOt so much
that sleep, reverie or somf1U!il serve as euphemisms for succumbing to narcosis,
but rather that they are the supreme conditions of the visiol1!l of successful
narcosis. 'Even me Buddha had to sit' (Huston Smith, cited in Regardie 1968:
26). De Quincey says that me opium-eater 'naturally seeks solitude and
silence, as indispensable conditions of those trances, or profoundest reveries,
which are the crown and consummation of what opium can do for human
nature' (De Quincey 1821: 81-2), Is drug experience the privileged state of
soroniation, then, different in kind to dreaming?
In a 1978 intervention on the theme of drugs, Deleuze argues that the psy-
choanalytic mood cannot capture the most basic feature of the drug experi-
ence. 'The failure of psychoanalysis in the face ofdrug phenomena is enough
1.0 show that drugs have an entirely differem causality ... My question is: Can
we conceive of a specific causality of drugs and in what sense?' (TRM 152).
The causal model of psychoanalysis was premised on the idea that 'desire
invests a system of mnemic traces and affects'. Neuroses, dreams, psychosocial
formations (for instance, myths) were an treated on this causal model, which
dated from Freud's earliest work. The advantage of this model was that
through it psychoanalysis managed to escape the established models of social
or psychological causation. Deleuze further clarifies this point in A TlwtLsand
Plllteaus, where the discussion of drugs is further expanded. For psychoanaly-
sis, the libidinal investments at work in the unconscious are always inJemtd
from their supposed symbolic derivatives. Freud's 'schema still relies on a
plane of organization that can never be apprehended in itself, that is always
concluded from lIOmething el8e, that is always inferred, concealed from the
system of perception: it is caUed the Unconscious' (ATP 284). The uncon-
scious 'stands in molar opposition to the perception-eonsciousness system'.
Insofar as they are unconscious, the primary libidinal processes (desire) are by
definition not themselves perceived. The unconscious is 'transcendent' to the
plane of perception. Now as it stands, this point is not yet a critique of Freud.,
since Freud has perfectly good reasons for stating that the contents of the
unconscious can only be inferred, and Deleuze and Guauari do not attempt
to engage with these reasons here. The problem, they say. is that 'with druBll'
there is lIOmething very unique. where desire invests the systl!m of
tWn' (TRM 152). They go on to say, in a concluding p:wa.ge that is finely ca1i-
brated to cause maximum howls of outrage, that 'druBli give the unconscious
the immanence and plane that psychoanalysis has consistendy botched',
adding in parentheses that 'perhaps Freud's famous cocaine episode marked
a turning point that forced Freud to renounce a direct approach to the
unconscious' (ATP 284).
There are at least three heresiesjostling in this one splendid sentence. First,
there is said to be a 'd#r!dapproach to the unconscious'. To those schooled in
psychoanalysis, such a claim would be a simple oxymoron of a particularly
idiotic kind. Second, drugs are said to give access to the unconscious in a more
profound and 'immanent' way than psychoanalysis. For the same people,
reading the discussion of drugs in .A Thou.sand Plateo.u.s in English. where 'Sf
tkogueI is translated as 'to get high', this claimwill appear risible. Third. Freud
is said to have had more insight into the unconscious during his early period
of personal and professional experimentation with cocaine. It is often said that
the decisive turning point in the development of psychoanalysis is Freud's
renunciation of hypnosis and affinnation of free association. But Deleme and
Gualtari clearly !lay that the real, original. 'turning point' in psychoanalysis is
Freud's renunciation of cocaine. Ifwe take this passage seriously- that is, ifwe
take it as moce than an attempt to gratuitously wind up Freudians - we get a
pure measure of how far from the Freudian universe Deleuze and Guatwi
are. Drugs aUow one to ,.Iimtmi s own - without an analyst:. and
without compromise. Even though it is true that Freud crossed the Acheron in
exacdythe same fashion in his 'cocaine episode', it is hard to imagine any view
more opposed to psychoanalysis, both theoreticaUy and institutionally.
in mind Deleuze's rools in the 'lIOmnambu1iat' theory of the uncon-
scious (Bergson,Janet andJung) helps to make some sense of the idea of a
'direct relationship with the unconscious'. The psychoanalytic mode! of the
mind does indeed involve a strict, 'molar' opposition between the uncon9Cious
and the perception-eonsciousness system. This ent.ailiJ that there is no dynamic
space left for the possibility of altered statI1:s of In psychoanalysu>,
one is either conscious of $Omething or one is not, and it is beside the point
whether there are dilI'erent kinds of consciousness. For the other tradition,
though, which emphasizes the model of dissociation rather than a basic
dynamic opposition between consciousness and the unconscious, the possibil-
180 Deleuu and the Unconscious
I the
) the
f the
~ m p (
. cali-
I the
e and
get a
t, and
of the
. basic
The Oceult Unconscious: Sympathy and the Stm:m!1' 181
it}' ofdifferent kinds of consciowness is the key to understanding the structure
of the mind. Ifwe bear this in mind, then the dmg experience presents itself
as simply the starkest illusDiltion of the potential for alternation belWeen dif·
ferent kinds ofconsciousness, and is particularly potent as an example because
its sole condition is the ingestion of an external, physical substance. No
complex pathogenesis is neceMary.
It is trUe that the psychoanalyst. who is supposed to he the expen on the
non-rational motivations that flow through individual and collective life,
does have a blindspot with regard to drug use. Psycboanalysts themselves
repon that there has been an ovelWhebning failure in the attempt to treat
drug addicts with psychoanalysis (Brickman 1988). It is trUe also that the
prohlem ofFreud's involvement with cocaine remains unresolved within the
psychoanalytic tradition. But whether drug experience can in any significant
way provide a direct encounter with the unconscious is another question. 'It
is our belief, announce Deleuze and Guattari, 'that the issue ofdrugs can be
understood only at the level where desire directly invests perception, and
perception becomes molecular at the same time as the imperceptible is per-
ceived. Drug:s then appear as 1M agent ofthis becoming. This is where p h a r m a c ~
analysis would come in, which must be both compared and contra.sted to
psychoanalysis. For psychoanalysis mwt be taken simultaneously as a model,
a contrasting approach, and a betrayal' (ATP 283, italic added). Psycho-
analysis is a betrayal of the direct approach to the unconscious, through
'vital' drug-experimentation - that is the claim.
But what 'W'aS betrayed? Surely not the potential of cocaine for mental self-
exploration? In fact, the remark about Freud and cocaine is somewhat prob-
lematic. as it rests on Deleuze's and Guattarl's claim that distinctions belWeen
hallucinatory and non-ballucinatory drugs are 'secondary': 'Change percep-
tion: the problem has been fonnulated con-ecdy because it presents "drugs
as a pregnant whole free of secondary distinctions (h.a1lucinatory or non-
hallucinatory, hard or !loft, etc.). All drugs fundamentally concern speeds.
and modifications of speed' (ATP 282). Leaving aside the notion of 'speeds'
of perception for now, it is bard. tD see how one could claim that non-
hallucinatory drugs such as cocaine afford a 'direct approach tD the
unconsciow' at all. In the Cliniuzl HaruJ1Jook of ~ Drugs, 'Drugs of
Abuse' are divided between 'hallucinatory' (LSD, psilocybin, cannabis,
mescaline), 'stimulant' (cocaine. amphetamines) and 'sedatM:' drugs (opium,
heroin). It is hard tD understand how a drug whose main action is as a 1ltiIn-
ulant could allow one to 'approach' the unconscious, unless Deleuze and
Guattarl mean that cocaine pennit:!l the taker to approach a certain
condition of 'unconsciousness of self', of lack of critical reflexivity about
one's own OT others' utterances. But that would not appear to be the kind of
unconsciousness they have in mind. They do not (I think) mean that drugs
give one the chance to approach an apotheosis of narcissistic obliviousness.
The truth is that what Deleuze and Guattarl say about drugs in these pages
only plawibly applies to hallucinogens. IfFreud's theory oCthe unconscious
was significandy influenced by his intensive use of cocaine during the 18905,
then it is likely. as Peter Swales (Swales 1983) hall suggested. that it was by
providing Freud with insight into me quantitative aspects of the rising and
falling of sexual libido, all wen as of general vital energy. Freud used cocaine
both as a sexual stimulant and a medication for depression.
But there were other examples of drug use and experimentation in the late
nineteenth cenwry which could conceivably have been 'betrayed' by me
dominance of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century. An entirely different
approach to drugs, based on experience of hallucinogens, was a feature of the
landscape of French psychiatry at the fin tk mete. Whereas in Britain, studies
on cannabis were restricted to the pages of medical and pharmacological
journals, in France they appeared in respectable journals of philosophy and
in periodicals devoted to hypnosis and psychotherapy, Bergson's work
emerges from chis atmosphere, and he discusses drug experience several
times, first in the context of his theory about the 'dream-pole' of conscious-
ness, and later in the context of a discussion of the transcendence of empiri-
cal consciousness towards impersonal consciousness. When Bergson t.a.Ib of
the 'expansion of consciousness', drug-experience is providing him with one
of the models for what this is like. In the USA. philosophical enthusiallts of the
'anaesthetic revelation' (in the words of Benjamin Paul Blood, an early
psychedelic transcendentalist in the Emersonian tradition) tended to relate
drug-experience to religious experience, or specifically to a revival of
pantheism. WilliamJames's famous remarks about his experience on nitrous
oxide (including his climactic realisation, 'at last I undersl3lld Hegel') are
related to this tradition; James underwent a conversion from empirical psy-
chologist to metaphysical pantheist around the time of his drug experiences.
Deleuze can be understood as the latest avatar of this line of thinking.
But Deleuze and Guattari's contention about the role of drug experience in
securing 'immanence' is also more fundamentally endebted to Henri Michaux
(1899-1984), the Belgian poet, writer and painter. Michaux is a unique figure
in French letters, and in A Thousand PlaUaus he is cited all the pre-eminent
European explorer of altered states of consciousness, 'more willing' than the
Americans 'to free himself ofrites and civilizations, establishing admirable and
minute protocols of experience' (ATP 283).14 Michaux, however, only turned
ID writing about drug experience in the mid-fifties, over thirty years after his
first publications, and eight years after the death of his wife. He had experi-
mented with and written in passing about drugs since the 19208, but it was only
in 1956 that he published his book on mescaline, Mirade, which was
foDowed by a series of other drug-related writings, including Infinitll TurlJu.lence
(1957), Knowledgethmugh tkeAbyss (1961) and TheMajurOrtltlalsoftheMindand
Cottntkss Minor Ones (1966). Michaux's grief in the aftennath of his wife's
death (from injuries suffered her nightgown had accidentally caught
fire) may have been a condition for his later urge ID plunge headlong into
experiments with mescaline, which he believed to mimic the effects of schizo-
phrenia. At the time (LSD had only just been synthesized) mescaline was
Deleu:ze and the Uru;onscWus

31 of
) are
1 pry-
lee in
,Ie and
'ter his
as only
ich was
s wife's
ng intO
ine was
The Oc(;ult Unconsdow: Sympathy and the St:ffurer 183
thought by a number of psychologists 1:0 be the drug that mosl effectively
simuJated schizophrenia..U According to Jean-Pierre Martin, the author of a
recent biography of Michaux, 'Michaux was looking for a psychotropic which
would not immobilise him and which would pennit him to approach madness'
(Martin 2003: 517). On his fourth experiment with mescaline, a 'calculating
error' with the dosage led him to conswne six rimes the normal dosage,
leading to the experiences which are recounted in a chapter of Miserable
Mimde called 'Experience of Madness'. Martin draws the conclusion: 'Wasn't
it precisely this risk that he was looking for? Without having planned it, the
error ofdosage was a necessary station, even ifhe had 1:0 pass through 'horror'
and 'atrocity' (these are his words)' (Martin 20'03: 519). In his drug experi-
ments, Mkhaux apparently did not think of himself as fleeing from harsh
reality, even in the aftennatb of grief. He refused the sedative attractions of
heroin or morphine, and although he regularly used hashish, his most valued
drug was mescaline, whose euphoric effects seem to be frequently accompa-
nied by ten'Or.
It is mostly the drug writings to which Deleuze and Guattari
refer, but the singularity of Michaux's experience begs for caution in any
interpretation of the results of his experiments.
The epigraph to Michaux's third drug-themed collection reads: 'Drugs bore
us with their paradises. Let them give us a little knowledge instead. This is not
a century for paradise.' In their discussion ofMichaux in A 1"htJttsand Plateaus,
and Guattari suggest that Michaux successfully distinguished drug
visions from hallucinations or delirium by isolating a properly 'molecular' type
of perception, different in kind from the 'molar' type of perception (in which
apperception synthesises a totality, under conceptual norms ofrecognition).17
Molecular perception, suggests Michaux, occurs on condition that the 'speed'
of cognition and affection is modified. In what sense, one may ask, does
thought have a 'speed'? And in what sense, further, do chemical and vegetable
substances affect this 'speed'? In a scribbled fragment, Coleridge had already
noted this capacity of drugs to alter the 'speed' of consciousness: . the tn.arotl-
lous velocitj afThought & Image in certainfuU 1tances' (Coleridge 1957: 4.108).
According to Deleuze and GuattMi, The MajM Ordeals oft1u Mmd and the Count-
less Minor On£s is the book in which Michaux takes furthest his 'analysis of
speeds, molecular perceptions, and 'microphenomena' or 'micro-operations"
(ATP 543, n. 70) .18 In T1uI FDId, De1euze makes dear that he sees Michaux as a
follower of Leibniz, exploring the movement 'from waking to dream, and
from conscious perception 1:0 minute perceptions . . . Reminiscences of
Leibniz are frequent in Michaux: fog and giddiness, Lilliputian hallucinations.
minute perceptions speeding over a tiny surface, spontaneity' (F 155, n. 20) ,19
In all these obscuringll of thought, Deleuzc conceives !.he object of appercep-
tion as imploding into partial durations and repetitions, the whole object
thrown into shadow. For Deleuze, Michaux's great Leibnizian panta
is also host to the interior, 'inferior' and 'superior' durations uncovered by
Bergson. He seems to believe that at some fundamental level, Leibnizianism
and Bergsonism are compatible, and he presents Michaux as !.he psychic
explorer of this uncharted region, in pursuit of an ideal integration or a
'mastery of speeds' (Michaux 1956: 1 5 ~ ) . ' l O If thinking cannot 'grasp itself
(Michaux 1966: 4), according to Michaux, that is not just because of the
henneneutic circle, or because it cannot grasp iIB own conditions, but also
because it is conditioned by minute operations of thought which are too
nUnute, too slow or too quick for it to be able to apperceive. While our practi.cal
consciousness ill attuned to a particular ~ with fixed thresholds, the world
of lower microphenomena can be opened up under certain exceptional
perceptual conditions, 'under the microscope of a desperate attention, when
the mind - monstrously excited. for example, from the effect of large doses of
mesc.a1ine, iill field of vision altered - sees its thought as particles appearing
and disappearing at stupendous speeds'. The acceleration of single lines of
thought, moreover, a.ppears to be paradoxically experienced at another level
as a dowing down or suspension, insofar as the movement becomes 'absolute'.
So, in a first moment, thought alters iill relative speed, tatehifJli up with move-
ments which previously surpassed it, and of which it has been unconscious.!l
The experience of the nightma.rish speeds of mescaline provokes Michaux to
conclude that 'man is a slow being, who is possible only a result of fantastic
speeds' (Michaux 1966: 23). But in a second moment, this Jlpeed of thought
can conversely be described as a 'slowing down', in the sense that hours, days.
or even centuries appear to be lived in the space of a quarter of an hour.
Coleridge and De Quincey both talked of passing cmtuMin obscure regions,
before returning back to the demands of empirical reallty.22
But are Deleure and Guattari right to give the impression j:.hat Michaux
detaches himself decisively from the traditions ofritual and religious drug use?
He says that, in the West, we have 'forgotten the names' (i.e. the divine
names), and that for those who lack gods there is only 'Pullulation and
Time'.2! But Michaux nevertheless often himself explicitly submits his phar-
macological voyage to esoteric ends.:l
Deleuze's repeated returns to the image
of the 'witch's flight' to describe Michaux's trajectory can- why not? - be given
a literal interpretation: 'To think is to follow the witch's flighL Take Michaux's
plane of immanence, for example, with its infinite, wild movemenill and
speeds' (WP 41). In one writing, Michaux ingenuously replicates the actual
conditions for a witch'5 alpine voyage.2S Perhaps Michaux's work, therefore, is
not itBelf the fundamental reference for Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of
drugs and the unconscious. Throughout this book, the esoteric theories
of Leibniz, Schelling. Wronski. Malfatti and Fechner (not to mention those of
Bergson andJung) have been shown to be behind some of Deleuze's more
obscure formulations about the unconscious and individuarion. It is in his
theories about the unconscious that Deleuze shows himself to be allied to the
occult, hennetic tradition of pantheistic thought. As it happens, one also finds
explicit reference to a 'direct approach to the Unconscious' through the use
of drugs in the French occult tradition. For instance, in the central work of
late French occultism, Stanislas de Guaita's 17u Temple of Satan, we hear that
'hashish ... allOWl'l the Unconscious to manifest itself to an astonished con-
Dekw:.e and the Unconscious




to ,

The Occult UncMl.Scious.. Sympathy and the SlYfCer'tN 185
sciOWlness - and the soul. contemplating itself in its own mirror, reveals itself
positively to itself' (Guai12 1891: 370). Guaita, who comidered himself a
<magician' rather than a 'sorcerer'. considered that the magician had to learn
the techniques of the sorcerer for his own knowledge and protection, Drugs,
Guaita reponed, were one of the main weapons in the sorcerer's arsenal,
(As mentioned in Chapter 4, he died of a morphine overdose at the age of
thirty-8ix). Other prominent Western occulti.slll offer variations on the same
theme (Crowley 1908; Regardie 1968; Grant 1972). Drugs and sorcery have
gone hand in hand throughout history; the ethnobotanist Christian Ritseh
infonns us that 'many magicians copsider plants the primary instrumenlll of
magic' (Ritseh 1992: 17), The persistence and even growth ofoccultism in the
period of modernity suggests that there is something wrong with the idea that
drugs are a contemporary pathology only insofar as we lack a 'set and setting'
for their use (as the participants in the rites of Eleusis had, for instance.
according to Wasson's thesis), There have been a surfeit of secret societies
(both within the capitalist and working classes) at work even throughout the
twentieth century (the Nazis saw fit to assassinate the leader of the Martinists
in France). The secret society, founded in a complicity between members,
provides the social fonn for the extension of the somnambulist unconscioWl
beyond the asymmetrical relationship involved in therapy, through the
adoption oftheurgic ritual,2li
Deleuze follows Kierkegaard in understanding humour as the pursuit of a
questionable idea to its consequences, regardless of opprobrium.
The idea
of a 'pharmacoanalytic' approach to the uncomciOWl will strike many aJi' at
least dubiow, if not direcdy laughable. But one can equally take succour from
the fact that there is evidence that notjwt Freud, butJung as well, had more
than a casual involvement with this very line of research. Jung's first reflections
on the meaning of 'alchemy' in his commentary on The StJi:ret of tlu! Golden
Flower were possibly premised on introSpective imaginative techniques condi-
tioned by drug-use (d. CW 18: 751). It would be a mistake tn treat this as a
marginal, or slighdy grubby. aspect of the modem theory of the unconscious.
Deleuze and Guattari state that drugs give US immanent access tn the uncon-
sciow, so if both Freud and Jung used drugs for similar purposes, then we
would be looking at a complete upheaval of our established ways of under-
standing the unconscious. Pursuing this line of enquiry might also shed. new
light on the great paradox of how the founders of psvchoanalysis and analyti-
cal psychology constru.eted their theories. A reflexive par.ldox has often been
noted in the founding of psychoanalysis. 1fans£erence is supposed to be intrin-
sic to psychoanalysis, and yet Freud somehow managed to analyse himself.
JungWlU the first tn advocate that every analyst themselves be analysed, but his
own development of his theories only carne through a periOd of withdrawal
and a 'confrontation with the unCOnsciOWl', In his writings on alchemy,Jung
became more and more implicit about the role of drugs in exploring the
proceS8 ofindividuation, It would appear that. he was advilled by his closest col-
laborators that his explorations of alchemy would bring the statWl of 'analyti-
cal psychology' into disrepute. Instead, it has been left to the occult lrUlition
to discuss this aspect ofJungianism more or less openly.
Del.euz.t and the Unconsciow
The Somniacal Imagination
In 'To Have Done with Judgement' itself, Deleuze gives two examples of
5MI'LmeiI:. intoxication and insomnia. On the face of it, these are two very
different states. The tonures of the insomnia£ seem to be far removed from
the ecstasies ofthe intoxicated person; moreover, i7lSOmnia is surely a negative
teon, and really means the inability to physically sleep (hence indormio. would
be a more appropriate' teon). What could there possibly be in common
between intoxication and insomnia? Things become more mysterious when
we tum hack to Difference and RepetitWn. and recall Deleuze's powerful and
haunting remark about nightmares. 'A nightmare is perhaps a psychic
dynamism that could be sustained neither awake ?UIf" even in dreams, but only in
profound sleep, in a dreamless sleep' (DR 118). In Di.fJermt;e and Ri!petil.ion,
sleep without dream seems to be equivalent to the sleep of nightmares. In the
nightmare, Deleuze explains, the sleeping subject is comparable to the
embryo in the egg, being twisted and tUIlled about, always on the verge of
being tom apart. The nightmare takes us beyond the dream-image, as night-
mare-images carry an intense Yisc.eral affect. No longer seen through the gJ.ass
of the dream, they threaten the mind physically from within. The subject of
the nightmare feels that they will be destroyed unless they wake up immedi-
ately and reUlm to the actual body. But the body is paralysed, ~ d the doorway
into the present is locked, and so, in flight from the nightmare, the subject has
to struggle to get back. into the body.
But this makes the reference to insomnia more perplexing, not less. For
surely the state of insomnia is the exact mirror image ofthe state of nightmare.
The insonmiac wants to escape from actuality and plunge insensate into virm-
ality, but the virtual body refuses him entry. The insomniac and the subject of
a nightmare are both banging in a frenzy on the same door, from opposite
sides. The somniacal nightmare is thus opposed to the in-wmniac incapacity
to sleep. DeleU2e makes some strange literary references here, though,
Maurice Blanchot says that only insomnia is 'adequate to the night'. But Kafka
writes of sending his 'dothed body' across space to the country, while he
remains insomniac in bed. Kafka's nighljourney almost sounds like a witch's
flight.. 'The insomnia£ can remain motionless, whereas the dream has taken
the real movement upon itselr (CC 130). Insomnia therefore is not just
indr.lrmio., but can itself take up dream-consciousness and deploy it in a new
way, Insomnia, rather than a sleep without dream, would seem to be a dream
without sleep. . The . . . dream has become the gtuJrdwllt of insomnia' (130).
Insomnia is an insib!p, or an msomnia (in the sense of 'enjoyment'), in that it.
like the nightmare, liberates somniacal visionings from their encasement in
the dream. Sommeil rraverses the night and inhabits it with a frightening clarity
which is no longer day. but the lightning-Flash rl'.&l.airl. says Dcleuze.
nples of
YlO very
ed from
us when
rful and
[tonly in
'S. In the
: to the
verge of
as night-
the glass
.lbject of
less. For

'lID viruJ-
ubject of
while he
a witch's
las taken
not just
in a new
a dreiUn'
m lha:tit,
The Occult Unconscious: Sympathy and the S{)fUll!7' 187
Insomnia lacks the raw visionary power of the nightmare, while the nightmare
lacks the vigilarlce, the ghosdy agency, retained by insomnia. But perhaps
there is a state in whicb somniation appears in a pure form, with ilB visions
finally divested of passivity and lability. Here Deleuze retur'rul to intoxication,
which appeared at first to be his main topic, before the detour into the
phenomena of nightmare and insomnia. He now says iliat the peyote rites
described by Artaud and ilie songs of the Menearl forest described by
Lawrence 'are not dreams. but states of intoxication iivrnse] or sommar. We
have to go to Mexico to discover the meaning of sommllil, where the dream now
really does 'take the real upon itself'. It is the peyote rite. and
Michaux's Western rendering of it, which takes the dream OUl of sleep and
into somniation. 'The dreamless somniation in which one nonetheless does
not fall asleep, this insomnia nonetheless sweeps the dream along as far as the
insomnia extends - such is the state of Dionvsian intoxication, its way of
escapingjudgment' (130).
Although Deleuze refers to Blanchot's text on the night, Lawrence's chapter
on 'Sleep and Dreams' seems more relevant. 'We have to be very wary of giving
way to dreams', because the dream is an proce$S and is therefore
impolled to the spontaneous forces of mental Jjfe; 'that which is lovely to the
automatic process is hateful to the spontaneous soul' (Lawrence 1923: 170,
169). H one dreams of incest, that is because incest is a pure formula of repe-
tition: the repetition of the child's love for the m'other on the 'upper plane' in
a sexual love on the 'lower plane'. 'The dream-proce$S loves its own automa-
tism' and has a tendency to 'force everything to an automatic-logical conclu-
sion in the psyche'. This is consistent with the 8ergsonian model of dream as
repetition. but brings out the sterility of the repetition to which the dream
tends. Lawrence even suggests that the mind changes its activity at night-time.
ceding its attention to life and submerging itself in a consciousness of the past.
At night, the mind 'collects the results of the spent day into consciousness, lays
down the honey of quiet thought, or the bitter-sweet honey of the gathered
flower. It is the consciousness of that which is past. Evening is our time to read
history and tragedy and romance - all ofwhich are the utterance of that which
is past. that which is finished, is concluded: either sweetly concluded. or
bitterly' (Lawrence 1923: 172). However, dream. reverie, history and romance
are srill not, in Deleuze's words, 'adequate to the night'. There are nocturnal
activitie:s different in kind from nocnrrnal passivity or diurnal activity;
Evening is the time also for revelry, for drink, for passion. Alcohol enters the
blood and acts as the sun's rays act.. It inflames into life, it liberates into
energy and consciousness ... That life of the day which we have not lived.
by means of sun-born alcohol we can now flare into sensation. conscious-
ness, energy and passion, and live it out. It is a liberation from the laws of
idealism, a release from ilie resuicrion of control and fear. It is the blood
bursting into consciousness. [Thus the] active mind-consciousness of the
night is a form of retrospection, or else it is a form of impulsive exclamation.
direct from the blood, and unbala.nced. Because the active physical con·
sciousnC1lS of the night is the blood-con!!Ciousness, the most elemental form
of consciousness. (173)
Drea.m<onsciousness is either dominated by empirical retrospection (the
combing of the day's residues) or else yields to a Ilterile repetition of the past.
How impoverished the dream looks when compared to the consciousness that
actively becomes 'adequate' to the night, through intoxication or sex. How
astonishing it seems that psychoanalysis, with it! molar opposition of con·
sciousness versus the unconscious. cut off conceptual access to the kinds of
non-egoic cowciot.l.me.ss that grant the mind an activity that is no more ruled by
the reality principle than by the economics of the pleasure principle. 'Sex is
our deepest fonn of consciousness. It is utterly non-ideal, non-meow. It is
pure blood-eonsciousness. It is the basic consciousness of the blood, the
nearest thing in us to pure material consciousness. It is the consciousness of
the night, when the soul ill almostasleep' (Lawrence 1923: 173). The smnnuilof
sex, whether heightened by intoxication or not, is the liberation of the virtuaJ
body, the subjugation of the actual body by the virwal body, a spatiotemporal
'dramatization' where it is not the body that rules the mind, but where the
somnambulistic mind rules the body.
Deleu::.e and the UncMUCWus 188
Notes on Sources
By the time Deleuze finally comes around to affirming a Freudian concept (the notion
of the death instinct in CtJUlnm aYlll CfllllltJ. a 1967 interpretadon of 1I'Ia3OChiJm), it is
impossible not to detect the Delew:ian 'humour' with which it Is treated. Freud's death
instinct, we are told, is a tranllCendenlal concept, a condition of temporal (M
'There iuJwayu "one dies" more profound than "I die", and it is not only the
gods who die endlellSly and in a variety of ways; as though there appeared worldi in
which the individual was no longer imprisoned within the pel'lOnal fonn of the 1 and
the ego, nor the singular imprisoned within lhe limits of Ihe individual' (DR. 113).
Whatever this means, it has nothing to do with Freud or The use of the
Lacanian concept of tile 'phallus' in the same: riling a famous
passage lLbout the phallus from Lacan's SmiMTon thePurloifllJd lAt.et-, Deleuze then says
'the plWing present which bears away has never been better opposed to the pure
past which perpetually differs from itBelf and whose universal mobility and universal
ubiquity cause the present to pass' (DR. 102). Behind 'the Laan.ian veiled form is
Bergsonian paramnesia. WIlen their doctrines are affirmed by Deleuze. Freud and
Lacan always serve as muks for other forces.
2 Deleuze', approach to the problem will involve attention [0 special kindi of consclOUl-
which are 'unconscious' only in the reslrictled sense that they are unconsD()WI til
representational thought.lnlllinct is held [0 involve a peculiar type of consciowmesa, as
does masochiml or psychosis. Deleuze streDeli that these tendencies involve liwd .-
Timas. He is opposed to the view ofmany contemponu"f theorists (from the Frankfurt
School to Hardt and Negri) that all subjective experience is always already penelr.lted
by either representation or the biopolitical imprint of late capitalism (or, at worst. by
both of these). Much of Deleuze's most creative thought is foclJled on articulating a
(Xl"itive account of the autonomous processes of the unconscious. Instincts and intu-
itions, experiences of love, intoxication. esoteric experiences, breakdOW1lB, dreams and
nightmares all involve 'dramatimtions' which are relatively independent of our
everyday representational activity, and involve wha.t Deleuze and jung both call 'inw.
vidwlIion'. The lurking political claim here iJ that to act as ifpt'OCClllleli of individuation
do not exist (as the aforementioned thinkers often do) is self-defealing, and robs the
agenl of the strength [0 throw the dice in other domains. To recapture for theory and
practice the positivity common to procesaes of individuation might even require
making some strange alliances with more 'esoteric' traditions of thought (which were
not always a.uociated with the right, especially in France). Deleuze cenainly does not
appear [0 have been afraid to make this move.
3 cr. M 16. In an intel'Viewjust after the publication of Deleuze explained
that 'we didn't think for a minute of writing a madman'/I book, but we did write a boot
in which you no longer knowwho is speaking: there is no buis for knowing whether it's
a doctor, a patient, or some present, palt, or future madman speaking' (01219). With
that book. Deleuze and Guatlllri probably achie'Vt'd their dubious aim. On 'humour' in
Deleuze. see 'Humour, Irony and the Law' in M 81-90.
Chapter I: The Pathologies or rUDe
French psychology was highly active at this time; other noted psychologists cited by
Bergson indude Theodule Ribot (1839-1916) and. Alfred Binet (1857-1911).
2 In 1935Jung wrote that 'My own coune of development was influenced. primarily by
the French school and later by Wundt's psychology. Later, in 1906,1 made contact with
Freud, only to part company with him in 191iJ. after seven years of collaboration, owing
to diHerences of sclentitic opinion. It was chiefly oonsideratioM of principle that
brought about the separation, above all the recognition that psychopathology can
never be based exclusively on the psychology of psychic disease, which would restricc it
to the pathological, but must include normal psychology and the full rangt of the
psyche' (CW 18: 773-4). In his article 'From Somnambulism to the Archetypes: The
French Roots ofJung's Split with Freud',John Haule notes thatJung's 'French heritage
is almost suppressed as some kind of secret' (Haule 1984: 242).
3 The explicit objection was that Bergson had omitted the most fundamental aspect of
human temporality: our consciousness that we will die, at some indeterminate date in
the future. It was held that Bergsonism was unable 10 recognize the phenomena of
al'llCitty that arises from one's relationship with one's d(':3th, and that colours. through
dread or anticipation, the whole of our experience of time. Heidegger takes BergllOn to
be no more than the latest heir to a very traditional concept of rime, which was inaugu-
rated by Aristode. For Aristotle, time is 'the number of movement': it provides the quan-
titative backdrop by which the successive movements of ph)'5ical bodies are measured;
Bergson does nOl deviate: from that model (Heidegger 1927: 501), HAristol1e treats the
Auman experience of time iI5 a special case, then it is only withm a framework that is
appropriate for aU living bodies. The internal changes of organic bodies (as distinct
from their external, spadal movements) involve a development from potentiality to a
state of folfiDed actuality. Heidegger argues that both of these concepdons of time
(ph}'lical and developmental) ace inappropriate for analysing human temporality. At its
ron:. human te:mpor.ality is related to death: my experience of past, present and future
is ultimately articulated. in relation to my death (which will happen at some indetermi-
nate furure date), and I can either flee from that fact, or consciowJy take it on. For Hei-
degger, BergllOn covers over the relation of time to finilUde, and thus ends up affinning
a notion of time as an abstract Heraclitt:an flux of duration.The existentialist critique of
Bergson WlIlI echoed. by the Marxist aadition. For Luk.lics, Bergsonism was nothing but a
'recourse to the sut;MeCbye immediacy ofapprehension, grow(n] into a philosophy based.
on radicaUy irrationalist intuition' (Lukacs 1962: 26). The accusation that Bergsonism is
just a philosophy of 'immediate intuition' still lingers today; il is false, as Deleuze shows.
Walter Benjamin, on the other hand. appeared to have read 8etgson in detail, in oon-
junction with his studies of Proust Like Heidegger, Benjamin also point! out the
apparent suppression ofdeath in Bergson, although Benjamin's problem with this is not
that lkrgson covers over a fundamental existenlial ItUth about the individual's relation
to death, but that he leaves himself without any way of undersGl.llding the impommCt: of
tradition, whose precariousness is due 10 the ever-present po!Iiibility of destruction and
forgetting, 'The fact that death is eliminated from Bergson's tlmit isolates it effectively
from a historical (as wen as prehistorical order) onier •.. The "unStfrom which d(':3th
has been eliminated has the Il'Iist:rabie endlessness of a semft' (Benjamin 1939: 185).
Thus, the ol!jection that Bergson failed to acknowledgt the role of finiuuu: in human
temporality is cormnon 10 both Benjamin and Hei.degger.
4 Deleuze's use of the concq>t of intensity pbys on each of the foUowing thrtt registen;:
(1) the intension of a concept, its essential meanirig; (2) intensive tnagnitudca, such as
temperatures and tonal relations; and (3) sensible excitation (inten&e feelings). For
Deleuzc's most extended discu.uion of intensity, see chapter 5 of Dlf.fenmu mul Repdi-
5 A15 Bergson says of evolutionary change. 'each new piece really requires ... a complete
190 Notes on Soorces
recasting of the whole' (Bergson 1896: 169).
6 Bergson contends that dod.-Iime does not really measure time, but rather imposes a
type of measurement that is more suited to space, to extension, onto time:. We can
measure the data of our experience 'extensively', so that we divide wngs into their
separate poaiUOflll, and then measure their distance from each other in cemimeues,
mette., miles from each other. If we divide one of these extensive quanalies. the units
that have been divided still remain me same. If we: divide a football pitch in half. it
doesn't chtJ,. tM nalu_of rbe: two halvC$. If we increase a space, we simply add more
space to it. Spatial extension is thus homogenous, and change in .spatial extension can
be termed mere' difference of degree' , in that the nature of the space divided or added
never changes. But duration does involve changes in nature, or 'd.ifIerences in kind'
(see B 37-43).
7 Even though Bergson savs that 'every sensation is altered bv repetition' and that 'the
same feding, by the mere fact of being repeared, is a new feeling' (Bergson 1889: 131,
200), this would seem to only reallv hold for I1nt repetitions, not every subsequent rep-
etition of a sensation. The threshold nature of duranoll would come out more dearlF
in the case of sensations that had been repeaLed a number of times.
13 In fact, the account in Cinema 2 is probably Deleuze's most accessible and complete,
and ir helps clarify obscure points in his earlier illl:erpretations in Differ·

9 These two forms of memory should not be confused (Bergson, 79). First, take the
leanring of a lesson: When Ileam a poem, I aLtempt to learn it by hean. When it is
learnt, I can repeat it as a whole, without thinking of the d.iM:rete times during which I
learnt it. But now jm't this more 1ik.e a habit man a memory? The 'memory' of the
poem is not lillked wim any past event, and is more truly 'a part of my present, ex.acdy
like my habit of walking or of writing. It is lived and acted, rarber than represented'
(81). Habits are nothing more thana 'series ofmechanisrns, wound up and ready, with
reactions to external stimuli ever more numerous and more varied and answers ready
prepared to an ever growing number of possible solicitations'. But there is another type
of memory. The memory of tJ1dI, successive reading, on the contrary 'has 9W'/It of the
IllaJ'b of a habit' (80), Each reading of the poem is a definite, separate event. My
English teaCher w.u wearing a cordomy suit one day, and the next week she read the
poemwith a cold. 'It is like an event in my life; its essence is to bear a date, and conse-
quently, to be unable to occur again , .. ThQugh my effort to recall thii image becomes
more and more easy as I repeat it, the image, regarded in itself, was necessari1y at the
outset what it always will be' (SO}. This kind of memory involves us 'remounting the
dope of our past'. In other words, this is true memory. or memory proper, ralher than
'habit-memory', which is ullimately analysable into habit. Habitual consciousness 'no
longer the past to US, it ads it; and if it stitt deserves the name of memory, it is
not because it COIl!leTYeS bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into
the present moment' (82). But these are two totally dilferent processes, The first
process, learning a lesson, 3&a habitual action, can be cl:wed as a species of adapwion.
Abeingwhich did nothing but fulfil its biologic.a1 instincts would require nothing more
than 'habit-memory' in orner to fine-tune its instinetual
10 The 'reality of the past' can be explained by appeating to a 'causal' or 'direct' lheory
of memory, loch as that advanced by C. B. Martin and Max Dcuueher in their influen-
tial 1966 paper 'Remembering', In a renewed effort 10 undennine me nolion that
memories are simply weak representations, me authors attempt to prc&enl the neter
sary conditions of a propel' case of remembering. Wirhout acknowledging Bergson's
analysis, they confirm his distinction between habit-mcmory and memory proper, but
they point 10 a third problematic case, 'remembering tllDl. 'He remembers how to
swim' is different from 'He remembers going swimming', which is different in l:I.Im
from 'He remembers that he went swimming'. Thev argue thai. f'CfDembering in the
isIS citro by
primarily by
contact with
inciple thaI
,thalogy can
.dd restrict it
range of Wl'
hetypes: The
'ncb heritage
\lal aspeCt of

nenotnena of
.}UB, through
.es Betgson to
'h was inaugu·
ides the quan-

:ode treats the
newark thiu; is
es (as distinct
>tentWitv to a
"liOllS of time
lporality. At its
eot and future
.me indetermi·
,it on, For Hei·
h up affirming
alist critique of
!J nothing but a
lilosophy based
It 8etg80nism
Delcuze shows.
:l detilil, in con·
points out the
n with this is not
vidual's relation
e importance of
de!itruclion and
1£es it effectively
om which death
<min 1939: 185).
liwde in human
g three registers:
gttitudes. such as
Sf: feelings). For
r-eand Repdi-
ell ••. a complete
Notes on SQUrcts 191
!lecond seme must be t.a.ken as causal: 'a pel'llOn can be said to remember something
happening or, in general, remember I16mething direcdy, only if he has observed or
experienced it' (Martin and Deullld1er 1966: 168). But surely the problem of the relia-
bility of memory, as psychoanalysis shows, ariset out of OUT inability to distinguish
b e ~ n what are real memories and what are fantuies, or on the other hand, what
merely appropriatiOrL'l of other's reports into my own narrative of my life. An analysis
of the third case, 'remembering IMJ, helps to bring out the notion that the causal cri-
terion is a necessary condition for memory proper. 'Remembering that' can be used in
two IIeDJleS: one may remember thatJulius Caesar invaded Britain without ha'iing been
present at the event itllelf; a1temalively one may remember that one had an English
le&ll6n, even though one remembers nothing about it. The fonner type of 'remember-
ing mat' involves no causal reference, but the latter rype, even though itlacb detail,
conforms to the criteria for remembering in me lleCond senile (or memory proper) in
that it involves some fragment of diTIld memory. Thus Martin's and Deutscher', point is
that if memory proper exists, it occurs through the operative effect of a past experi-
ence. A condition of memory proper is that trlJr.Gof past events continue to have effects
in the mind. In 'Persons and their Pasts', Sydney Shoemaker t.ak.e1l up Martin's and
DeuliCher's initial proposition that memory has a 'prmous awareness condition': he
says that 'a c1aim to remember a past event implies, not merely that the rememberer'
experienced .uro an event, but that his pl"etent is in some way due to, that it came abom
iIetlJuwof, a cognitive and sensory lICite the rememberer had at the lime he experienced
the event. , .. It is part of the previous awareneas condition for memory that a veridi-
cal memory must not only correspond to. but must abo stand in an appropriue taWIJt
rt:lationship to, a past cognitive and selUOry state of the rememberer (Shoemaker 1970:
272). There is perllapa a senile in which Bergson and Dcleuze share something with
proponents of a causal theory of memory. But it is quite hard to isolate this sense. The
fact that pre'Yious events hmJt o.cttuIJly MfJpenIItl certainly may be said to give them a
'realil)". insofar as in principle they now pennanendy have potential '00 exert influence
over sublequent evenb (even though, in themllelves, their reatiq is now virtual).
However, Ma.nin and DeulJicher conclude their di8cussion by ~ t i n g rhat this causal
power of memory-traces must be neurological. which is obviously not the condysion
that Bergson would want to draw. Furthermore, for both Bergson and Delwze, the
operative dIect of the past is not 'causal' in any linear IIeftle. As has been sugge5ted,
their model is not causal at all, but is dose to the Leibnizian model of actualization, The
primacy De\euze give!! to the notion of temporal I)'Ilthcsis is also relevant to mis
II In a footnote to the paIIlagc where Deleuze cla.ims that 'pure memory has only an onto-
logical significance'. Deleuze refers to two texts by Jean Hyppolite which are said to
al13clt 'psychologistic' interpretations of Ma/J4r tmd Memory. But in these texts, Hyppo-
lite does not defend a substantially ontological 'iiew of pure memory, but in mct what
can only be called a transcendental interpretation (or at leaS[ a 'p08t-Kantian' inter-
pretation, as Hyppolite is ob'iiousiy ultimately a Hegelian mther than a Kantian). Hyp-
polite says ''Memory is not merely the mechanical reproducdon of the past, but sense'
(Hyppolite 1949b: 1(7). If pure memory is ontological, then, it is so in a very specific,
post-Kandan sense. In Deleuze's important re'iiew of Hyppolite from 1954, be noles
that 'Being, ac.oording to Hyppolitt:, is not l!SUl'IU, but 1inUI (DeleuT.!! 1954: 193);
Dcleuze goes on to say that 'FoUowing Hyppolite, we recognise that philosophy, if it has
a meaning, can only be an ontology and an ontology of sense'. What, then, i.B 'senile'?
The simplest definidon is to be found in Deleuze's 1978 own Kant IcclUres, where he
.!I3ys that for Kant, 'there is no longer an essence behind appearance, there is rather a
sense or non-.ense of what appears (First seminar, p. 5). This signifies 'a radically new
atmOflphere of thought, to the point where I can say that in this respect we are all
Kandans'. After Kant, we no longer look for a substantia.l essence behind appearances,
192 Notes un SOUTCl'.!
rved or
Ie relia-
d, what
.Hal cri-
; detail,
'per) in
point is
! effects
n's and
on': he
I veridi-
e causal
:r 1970:
fig with
them a
'le, the
)n. The
to this
said to
.et what
I' inter-
I). Hyp-
)l semi
e notes
jfit has
lere he
-alher a
l1ly new
but take a different approach: we say 'something appears, tel1 me what it signifies or,
and tbiJ amounts to the same thing, ten me what its condition is' (ibid.). Thus ifHyp-
polite atlacb pllyChoiogislic interprelatioJIJI of Bergson, he does 10 from a post-Kantian
idealist perapective. rather than a subatandal-ontological one. For Hyppolite. Hegel is
the only philosopher who anives at a consistent, poIlt-Kantian 'ontology of sense' and
thus elirninates aU anthropological, merely empirical coordinates from phllOllophy. In
the other essay to which Delcuze refers 'Du Betglonisme Ii I' emrentialiJme' , Hyppolite
implies that the taet that 'Bergson defines philolOphy in this fonnula: "philOllOphymust
be an eJl'on to transcend the human condition'" (Hyppolite 1949a: 458) ma.kes him
closer to this Hegelian ideal than his existentialist heirs, who remain caught in merely
andlropological claims. All tbiJ is to.say that Deleuu', reference to Hyppolitc mppom
the transcendental interpretation of Deleur.e's 8ergsonism. For further evidence of
Delcuze's fundatnental Kanlianism, ICC my 'The Vertigo of Philosophy: Deleuze and
the Problem oflmmanencc' (Krrslak.e 20(2).
The idea of the integral preservation of the past is dearly bound up with the pervasive
spiritualism that gripped Paris during this period. Janet, whose father Wllli a spiritualist
philosopher, wrote that 'everything that has existed sti1I exUlll and endlll't':1l in a place
which we do not understand, to which we cannot go' (cited in Ellenberger 1970: MS).
He confeflsed: 'I am not absolutely certain that the past is dead and gone, and I have a
weak spot {or WeUa' novel TAA Tirrte MadUru:. Aday will come when man will know how
to walk in the past in the same way as he now travels through the air. One day he will
be able to ma.kc voyages in the past and will search in the past for eventll which have dis-
appeared and for people who have died, in order to bring thembad into the present'
(Janet 17). With the invention of a 'paleoscopc', marveUous advenwres in time
will be possible which exceed the tales ofJules Vente, not to menlion the impoverished
imaginations of the of the day (d. Janet 1928: 491; on the paleoscope, .see the
other references in Ellenberger 191(l: 555). Janet concluded a series of lectures at dle
Universily of London with the expectation that one day, man might make the same
kind of progress in time as he has done in space rhrough the conquett of the natural
world (Janet 1920: 164).
13 'Human reality by which lack appears in the world must itself be a lad. For 1acll. can
come into being only through lack; the in-itself cannot be the occasion of lack in the
in-i.tself. In other words, in orner for being to be lacking or lacked, it is necessary that
a being make itllelf its own lack; only a being which lackJ can IJW'PlI88 toward the lack'
(Sartre 1945: 87).
14 There are neuroscientific hypotheses that can be interpreted in dle light of BetglOn''''
governing thenry. Bergson's theory of the two 'jets' of time might be biken to be incar-
nated in two separate Ilet5 of neurons, evolving in tension with each other. The cerebral
mechanisms dlat instantiate the preservation of dle past for the future would have to
be relatively in&uIated from the attentional and perceptual prtlCe!llleS, The neuroscien-
list Jonathan WJnIOn suggests that infonnation essential to the llW'Viwl of a species is
gathered during the day it later reprocessed into memory during REM sleep (WJnIOn
1990: 42). Dreams, lIlI Sreven& and Price put it, •could be dle means by which animals
update their strategies for surviwl by reev:aluating current experience in the light of
strategies funned and tested in the past. This is done when the animal is asleep as it is
only during sleep that the brain is free of its outer preoccupations and able to perfonn
I:hilI vital activity' (Stevens and Price 2000: 221). There is a common electro-encephalk
rhythm (theta) to dreams and 00 behaviour related to the surviwl of mammals, so
dreams might be respon&ible for preserving memories relevant lO the latter. Thus there
could be a diurnal cycle of mnemonic preservation which is proceessed independently
of adaptive behaviour. Winson concludes that
there is an unconscious, and dreams are indeed the 'royal road' 00 its understand-
ing. However, the charncteristia of the unconscious and associated processes of
functioning are very different than Freud thought. Rather than being a cauldron of
untamed passions and destructive wishes, I propose that the uncomciollS is a
cohesive, continually active menwstrucwre that takes nore of life's experiences and
reacts accordingly to iUl own scheme of interpretation. Dreams are not disguised as
3. of repression, Their unus.ua1 character is a result of the complex
35IlOcialions that are culled from memory. (48)
15 Deleuze writes that pure memories are 'like Leibnizian possibles ... lry[ing] to become
embodied, cltcrt[ing] pressure to be admitted, 10 that a full scale repression [n-.foo/e-
Ili8nt] originating in the preaent and an "attention to life
are necessary to wud off
w;elell or dangerous. recollections' (B 72); although at first sight this loou like a
dynamk account of repression, this impression is mWeading, Leibniz does sometimes
say such things as 'everything possible demands that it should exist' (cited in Russell
1900: 296; Philos&Phischt SchrijUn, ed. Gerhardt VII. 194). But his argument is ontologi-
cal. First, it is based on the claim that existence is nQt a 'perfection' or 'auribute'. as
that would 'add something new CO things'. So there mll$l be an a
demand of essence rnilhin essence to exist. But thi.s claim, by itself, can onlv hold up
within pre-Kanaan rationalism. In effect, Kant pushes Leibniz's point further in tW
critique of the Ontological Argument: if existence would add something new to
essence, that means that existence cannot be attributed to essence 4t all, whether as
propertY or as 'tendency', Hence existence is IIOmething else altogether; you can onlv
say something exists if you can have a possible inNltion of it But Leibniz also says that
'the possible demands existence ... in proportion to iUl possibility or according to the
degree of im essence' (ibid.),
16 Deleuu's reference to JItlml JlWfIImtalUltJ is to Leibniz. who also claimed that 'body 'lacks
memory', and makes a further step rowaf'ds the revolutioruuy, modem idea that the
funcOQft of the mind iA to synthesize elements across time. In an early disc.ussion. he
No conal:US without motion lasts longer than a moment except in minds. For what
it conatlJ£ in a moment is the motion of a body in time. This opens the door to the
troe distinction between body and mind, which no one has explained heretofore.
For every body is a momentary mind, or one lacking recollection, because it does
not retain its own conams and the other contrary one together for longer than a
moment ... Hence body lack!! memory; it lackll the perception of iUl own actions
and passions; it lack!! thought. (Loemker 141; G W, 230)
All the reference to amatu.s indicates. Lcibniz is concerned with desire here. In the
ellipsis, he writes 'for two things are necessary for or pain - action and
reaction, oppo5ition and then /wmMnJ - and there is no scnJation without them'.
17 Deleuze presents this argument a number of t:ime6 across the whole range ofhis early
writings, but that in most of them he gives somewhat different acoounUi of it. In lVl4t-
udte art.tlPki./o.soplrJ, for inilan<:e, he does not even mention that it is an argument from
Bergson, silently passing it off as Niet:1Xhe's; we wiD .see in a. tnoment that he also adds
two other important premise.s to the argument which cast the Bergsonian argument in
a different light. The nearest Deleuze gets to J.\erp>n's ac::1Ua1 argument is hU citation
ofthe previOUII passage in a footnote ro and the accompanying claim that 'if
[the pasd were not constituted immediately, neither could it be reconsdwted on the
basis of an ulterior pfe$(')nt' (859). However, even there he neglects to mention the
specific Bergsonian arguments quoted above for the impossibility of fixing the past
after it has passed. Deleuze's first 1956 article on Bergson ('Bergson, 1859-1941') also
has the same Cannulation: d. DI !9. 8ut strangely. Dc-leuze', second HI56 article
('Bergson's Concept of Difference') omits the explanation altogether. as it opts for a
different argumentative srraregy for defending Bergson's theory. Instead. of starting
with duration, heterogeneity and memGry. and then proceeding to Bergson's biology
(as does), it starts with a quasi-biological account of 'the vinual' and moves

from then'! to memory. So when we get to the part on memory, instead we get this: 'Pure
memory is virtual became it would be absurd to seek the mark or the past in something
actual and already realiJled; a memorv is not a representation or something, it repre-
sents nothing, it is', and then 'It does nor have co wait for perception co diJlappear, ir is
not subsequent to perception' (01 44/55). Deleuze's strategy in this latter article puts
an inordinate amount of weight on Bergson's theory of instinct. The versions in Proust
and SigtIs (PS 57-8) and Differr:nu and RtpItilWn. itself are also weak as they do not make
the point about l'lJtOnstiwtion. There, Deleuze's version of Bergson's argument instead
looks as ifit is relying on the claim that 'if a new present were required for the past t£I
be constitutro as past, then the (ormerpresent would never passand the new one never
amve' (DR 81). We get uimilarsort ordaim in Proust andSp: 'Hthe same moment
did not coexist with itself as present aridpast, it would never pass, a new present would
never come to replace this one' (PS 58). 1am afraid I cannot find any meaning in these
claims as explanations. As explanations, they seem to appeal to a crude 'physics' of time
which it is impossible to evaluate. At best they seem to function as assertion.; which
means that the explanation must be found eJsewhere. Tht: central explanation seems
to me to be this: the past must be oontemporaneow with the present li«4we the
conrent of each past cannot be delimited immediarely it has passed, and mwt
both remain open to reinterptttation as well as continuing co be w.uJlUL But the con-
8O:Iuence of taking this interprelation is that it would seemthat 8eIgson's model of the
consDwDon of the past really involves the cOIUititution of the past as what wi1l.lu:ve bem.
the past as future anterior. There are some indications that Deleu1C thinks chat this is
where the main weight of the argument lies. In hiuecond article on Bergson from 1956
('Bergson and the Concept of Difference') he remarks that 'in a different way than
Freud, !hough just as profound, Bergson saw that memory was a function of the fuwre,
that memory and wiU were the same function, that only a being capable of memory
c:ould tum away from itB past, free itself from the past, not repeat it, and do something
new' (01 45/56). When DeleuU' concludes in &gsoni.m that 'in other words, each
present goes back t£I itself as past' (8 59), this indicates mat he h.as a complex tempo-
rality in mind.
18 In the theoretical section of Stud.ies in H'jSIeria (1893>, the functional radonale for the
need to distinguish perception from memory was first given by Breuer: 'The perceptual
apparatus, including the sensory areas of the cortex, must be different from the organ
which stores up and reproduces in the form of mnemic images. For
the basic essential of the function of the perceptua.l apparatus is that its status qlUl ante
should be capable of being resoored 'with the greatest possible rapidi\.)'; otherwise no
proper further perception could take place. The tssential of memory, on the other
hand, is that no Nch restoration should OCI':Ur but that every perception should create
changes that are permanent It is impossible for one and the same organ to fulfil thelle
two ronuadiccory conditions' (SE 2: 188, 1890.) However, whereas for Bergson the
presel"Vlllion of the past requires something more than a neurollcientific explanation,
Freud's early theory ofmemory is a theory ofhow physical events are in nervous
till8Ul!. 'A main characteristic or nervous tissue is memory: that is, quite generally, a
capacity for being permanendy altered by single occurrences' (5£ I 299).
19 The Bergsonian temporality that structures the introVersion/extraversion distinction is
already visible in Jung's breakthrough work, T1lIiIISfO'mllJtion.s and Sym/JoJs of tAe UbUIo,
where he makes a division between 'two kinds of thinking'. 'Directed' thought, which
.adjusts itself to actual conditi ons, where we ... imitale the mccessi.on ofobjectively real
things' is opposed 00 a 'non-directed', or 'merely a.wxiative thinking ... a dream or
pM1IJ4s'y th.inIWI.g (CW Ii 18-20). Directed lhinking serves the practical orientation to
the future: it 'creates innovations, adaptations, imitates reality and seeks to act upon it.',
while phantasy thinking, on the contrary, turn.3 away Crom thU tendency, 'scts free sub-
jective wishes, and ill, in regard to adapralion, whoOy unproductive'. Jung adds that
luldron of
dOllS is a
sgui.sed as
: complex
) ward off
oks like a
in Russell
ribule', as

Iv hold up
her in his
19 new to
u can onlv
;0 says that
ling to the
:a that the
'WIllon, he
I. For what
loor to the
ger than a
wn l\ctioru;
In the
of his early
'it. In Met-
his citation
aimthat 'if
Itro on the
19 the past
1941') abo
956 article
t opts for a
of srarting
'n's biology
Notes on Sounes 195
whereas the material of the tint kind of thinking comes from movemenlS presently
occuning in the actu.a.l world, 'the material of these though" [in the second kind of
thinking] which nuns away from reality, can nawralJ.y be only the put with ill thoU&aIld
memory-i.mages' (ibid.). The schema iJ thus highly reminiscent of Bergson's dualism
between perception and memory in M4tII!r
20 The late Kant was preoccupied with I:lU8 problem of rebirth in his &Jigiim within tht
LimiU ofRlastm Almtt.
21 In ilS early fonnulation in Nitb:sche rmdPhilowplrj, what Lacan <:aIled 'the Perspective of
the LutJudgment' is lltiU at work. Eternal fel11m only manages to invest tAU moment
to the fullest on condidon that it is on the reboundfrom the furthest limit ofthefuture.
Nicwche's idea of eternal return is an unstllble mix of atheism and theology (one
might be tempted to argue that it is the point al which atheism and theology dialecti-
cally collapse into each other). Theology is not abient from a concept whOle intended
dfect is to establWl how the great drifdng wastell ofa material univene deprived of anv
teleological fuI6lment, any moment of redemption, might forever recombine in the
llaIDe way in the infinite pusa.geway of time, d:lus opening them to 'vertical' totalization
- or, contemplation sub !J1'tiIlIItmIUtJn.t On the 'Stoic' view of the eternal return, the
moment aa:ainJ a kind of eternity by virtue of itll absolute, identical singularity: in the
great cosmological circle revolving in infinite time, each panicul.ar combination iJl
repeated infinitely many times. this interpretation mi.IIscs out are 'the two themes
mast profoundly linked to eternal return, that ofqualitative metamorphosis and thal of
quantitative inequality' (DR 242). The willing agent of the eternal mum wills it only
on condition of 'becoming an other'. The penpective of rhe Last Judgement must
rherel'orc be problematized by the thought that 1will inevil.llbly look. back on my reso-
lution or act of will all partial, because 1 will have been ignorant of the future come-
quences of that resolution. The goal ofbeing able to say 'I willed it thus' about311y past
action impliCll that the content of the 'thlli' will never at any futuI'r point budge retn>-
spectively. 'It will always have meant this': what 1 will today I will also condnuc EO will
tomorrow - 41lSwillI have done with half-willing and will integndly. But I:lU8 is ex.acdy
what iJ excluded by Deleuze'.I Bergsonian theory of the past. The point of that was that
on principle we never know until later what the concent or implications of any
are. Hence integral willing is an illusion.
22 Leibniz's relalionship with Hermetic lind myslical philosophy has been di.sawed in
Allison Coudert, LMni:t and tht K.a1JIJaJDA (1995).
23 Completed in J705, but Leibniz withdrew it from publication foUowing Locke's death
in 1704; it was first published in 1765.
24 Take Thomu Reid's Bmvc Officer Paradox. As a boy, a brave officer had once been
flogged for robbing an orchard. Later in life, he commilS a brave deed as 311 officer,
3lld at that point, remembers hisjuvenile crime and punishment. In advanced life, he
is made a general, and remembers the brave deed, but has now forgotten the floging.
On Locke's account, the boy is the same person as the brave officer, 3lld the general is
the same penlOn as the brave officer, but the general is not the same person as the boy
who was flogged ('Reid 1785: 114).
25 Jolley's concluding sentence also sugge8tll a confusion, for whereas Locke's aiterion is
that the ability to remember put evenllJ guanmrees pel'llOnal idenlity, Leibniz
claims that untOnSCious memoriCll should also be induded as m.arkcn of identity. As
JoUey himself says, for Leibniz, 'at every moment in his history a. perrlOn is II1ICtJ'IISciouIy
'remembering' every previous Slllte'. But this actual uncotlllCious identity, if such emil.
could not ICClI.red by means of personal, conscious identity and would depend on some
future 'improvement' which would allow that we can integrate all prcvioUlly uncon-
scious stlltell.
26 Fechner, another of the great disciples of Leibni%, and founder of a psv-
chophysia inseparable from the spiritual mccbanisms of the monadic soul, docs not
196 Notes on SOUtUS
hesitate to develop classifications endle&llly, from vertigo or diuiness to luminous life.
In them he envisions the three ages of man, with an their poasibilities of regression
and damnation, through which Fechner himself pIlIIleS as a monad, reduced to his
dark room or his sombre depths, up to the digeative swarming of lilde per·
ceptions, but also, expanding towareb the power of a resurrection. of an _enl
towards an inteJUive light. Few monads fail to believe theD1llelves damned at cenain
momentt of their existence. When their clear pcn:eptions are gradually m.tin·
guiJhed, when they recede into a night, compared with which the Life of the lick
seema singularly rich. But with freedom there comes a moment where a soul recon-
quen itself, and can lIAy to ibdf with the astonishment of a ronwltscenc:: my God,
what did I do in an these yean? (F 93; tr.ms. modified)
27 Goethe, Napoleon, Luther 'still live among us, thinking and acting in us, as awakened
creative individuals, more highly developed than at their death - each no longer
restrained by the limitations of the body, but poured forth upon the world which in
meir Lifetime they moulded' (Fechner 1886: !U). HCJWe'Vet', Fechner doeB nOl stop with
this culluml immortality, but rather deduces another kind of spiritual that he
says is propel' to the third age of man. What might be left over at the end of rhe second
age of human existence, when sensible intuidoll.8 ccue to be poaible?
Even now, me more thoroughlyall my senJCS lIl'e dosed to external things, the
I withdraw into the gloaming of the outer world, the more aware and bright will be
my memory life, and thinga long forgotten will come bad. to me. Death, on the
omer bmd, doel nothing but extinguiab the lfenRI entirely and for aU time, so that
aU pouibility of reviving them is also extinguished, No dosingof me eyes during our
lifetime can be so profound, no awakening of memoriel so luminous as in death
... All the force which is dirided between the life of intuition [Aruchautmgtll!lllml
and the life of memory in this world. becomes, in the next, the
property of the life of memory only, and our present Life of memory owes itll
weaknellll to the very filct that the lifeofintuition here belowcJ.aimI the greater pan
of the strength thai: is bestoWed upon us by the higher spirit. Complete remem-
brance of the former life will begin only when mat life lies entirely behind us, and
all remembmnce during that lifetime is but a brief preview of what lies ahead.
(Fechner 1851: Ill, 16; traJU. modified)
In the Liitl.e.BooC, Fechner writes that any strivings of the human being to perform good
actions which wiD never be rewarded in this life can only be made intelligible in the
light of a that every action will .somehow be recorded:
The repenlance that arous.es in us an unfathomable distress for bad actions, even
though they bring us no disadvantage here, rise from haunting presentiments
[tJllnet'Idn.I ofwhlll aU thi.s will bring to us in that world in which the fruit
of our slightest and most hidden ac1ivity becomes a part of our troe self, Thia is the
greatjustice ofcreation, that every one makes for himself the conditiolll of his future
Life. Deeds will not be requited to the man through exterior rewards or puniahmentt;
there is no heaven and no hell in the usual sense of the ChrUtian, the Jew, the
heathen. intowhich the soul may enter after death •.. But after [the soul] has paIIIled
through the great transition, death. it unfolds itselfaccording to the great
unalterable law of namre upon earth. (Fechner 1856: M)
28 In a chapter on 'The Grand Arcmum of Death' in his KIj 10 1M My.stlrilr, EIiphas Levi
During embr?onic Life it to [the embryoJ thll1 the placenra was ita body, and
it Wl1ll in fact itt special embryonic body, a body useless for anomer life, a bodywhich
had to be thrown aft'ti an undean thing at the moment of birth. The body of our
human life is like a aecond envelope, uselellll for the third life. and for that reason
we: throw iu aside at the momenl of our second birth, Human life c:ornpared to
Heavenly Life is veritably an rmbryo. When our evil pauioJU till us, Nature m.iscar.
ld kind of
's dualism


lpective of

,logy (one

I ,ine in the
'elUI1l, me
riLy. in the
Jinati6n is
ri&h only
nent must
n myrese>-
ute COWIe-
ulany past
nue to will
111 Wall that
lSCUMed in
once been
an officer,
;:ed life, he
pend is
as the boy
crilerion is:
ity, Leibniz
identity. Ali

lilly uncon·
. of a pay-
Notes on SOU1U5 197
ries, and we are born before our time for eternity, which exposes us to that terrible
diBsolution which StJohn calls the second death.
Levi then says that 'according to the constant tradition of ecswics', the 'abortions of
human life', which have a human form, but always lopped and imperfect, are prevented
from rising to heaven by a 'moral wound' which they have contracted in the course of
their life. 'These wounded souls are the larvae of the second formation of the embryo
... Frequently they auaeh themselves to vicious men and live upon their lives, as the
embryo lives in its mother's womb. In these circumstances, they are able to take the
most horrible fonus to represent the frenzied desires of those who nourish them, and
it is these which appear under the 6gures of demons U) the wret.ched operators of the
nameless works of black magic. These larvae fear the light, above all the light of the
mind' (Uvi 1861: 202). We cpme ba£k to Deleuze's rel.ation to occultism in chapter 6.
29 f have not been able to trace the term 'metaJchematism' in Leibniz; in me passage cited
above, Leibniz uses the French word 'm.etammpfJDsI. Deleuze may be referring to the
'schemauc' imitations of God mentioned in 'The Monadology', # 83.
ChaptEr 2: 'l1le Wasp'. Sympathy for die CaterpiUar
An English-language bibliography (Murphy 1996) preserves the detaih of Deleuze's
first phase ofpublitMion, which include a preface toJohann Montereggio de M.alfato's
Mat/u$i.s, or tht Anan:h., aM Hil:raKh'j ofKfll1UIltdge. an important book in the Ia.te nine-
teenth-centnI)' French occult reviwI, diseussed in cllapters 4 and 6 below.
2 Deleu%e only makes a few references toJanet in hi. work, but they are important ones
(cC. DR: 144; and C2: 51).
3 It was the second of a series enrided T8Xle$ lit Doeumtnts PJu.lo.Joflh.iques, published by
Hachette under the general editorship of Georgu Canguilhem. The latter had himself
edited the first volume, &soifLl It (1952). I do not know whether Deleuze
himself chose the exact combination of the concepts of instinct and institnDon for hili
volume, but the former was already of interest to him in hiJJ Berpn and Hume studies,
while the concept of imlillltion had also played an important role in the lauer.
4 However, Ddeuze's :il5S(';rtion in the introduction to the volume that animals inhabit
'specific worlds' or 'milieus' probably contains an implicit reference to von UexkUJI.
The only author in IJUtinas and InstitutitmJ who is in any way attached to the discipline
of ethology is F. J. J. Buytendijk, who contributes two extracts. The first selection is
entitJed 'Instinct and Organi&ation', on the relationship between anatomiWstIUcture.
organization and instinctive action (1 Be I: # 24, PSJ€hologiuJe$ Animaux, 1920), and the
second is on 'Instinctive life and Beauty', where Buytendijk suggests that beauty is a
'luxury' of organic nature, extending beyond the principle of sexual selection (# 46
from Us diffmnu:e.s essemiA/JL;f des jtJ/M.titm.f rJe l fJDmme lit • Lmimaux, 1930). In
an early article, Lorenz criticises Buytendijk for entertaining a 'vitalist fantasy' about
animal behaviour on a par with Jung's speculations (Lorenl 19!J9: 31). Buytendijlt was
also heavily influenced by phenomenology. For a stimulating discussion of Deleu.ze's
relation to UexkUll and ethology, see Ansell-Pearson 1999:
5 See Fletcher 1968 for a sympathetic survey of this group of think.en.
6 The one passage from IfLltinds IJtul Institutions on the topic of 'Instinct and Reflex' is
from Kurt Goldstein's TM Organism, and it is a critique rather than an endoTllement of
the notion that reflexes can be isolated as independent entities, without regard for the
wholeness of the organism (lBe f: 31). Again, Deleme's editorial policy shows itself to
be profoundly out of line with mainstream developmenu in the theory of instincL
7 In an informative interview, he AyS about this period, 'f know what. I was doing, where
and how I lived during those years, hut I know it only ahstTacdv. rather as if someone
else were rel.ating memories that I believe but don't really have. It's like a hole in my
life, an eight-year hole ... There are catalepsies, or of somnambulism (des tspeus
de .\'()Ill_mbul£rmel over several yean, in mOlll. lives. Maybe it's in these boles that
198 Notes on SDUfUS
movement takes place' (DeIeuze 1990: 189). The mention of$Omnambulism is intrigu-
ing, as (on the evidence of /ruiiftds and lrutiltdioru) it suggests that Deleuze was notjust
researching the concept of tornnambu.limI during this period, but also Iivi.ag it as a
problem. The eight"'}'eaI' gap begins after the publication in 1953 ofEmfMitirlllllnd Sub-
jediviI.y (Ddeuze's study of Hume) and lfi.ftWts and IflJt.ittJtimu. At the end of the eight
years, in 1961, Deleuze published two very different articles, '1..Lacretius and NaturaIi!llTl'
and the first piece on llllIlIOChi!lIT. The anomaly in Deleuu's account of his 1JOIllJWJl-
buliltie phase is his publication in 1959 of'Smse and Value', an extract from his forth-
coming Nietzstlle reprinted more or less complete as part of the book. in
1962. Deleuze's tint work on Nietzsche thus emerges in !he sixth year in the eight-year
gap, three yea.rs flricr to his affirmation ofJung. The two 1961 l:eXU appear to be so
opposed that one would think they had different aumon, The first text argues for a
philosophiC31 naturalism that OI/ercomes the religious appeal to myth and fate, and the
second is a Jungian depth-psychoJogicai voyage into mythical history! However, it
ihauld be noted that the Lucretius essay contains references to meJungian concepts of
animaand animus. The fact. th.at Deleuze's eight-year hole waA brought to an end by the
publication of two texIS in such tension with each other is exlreOlely intereating from
both philosophical and biographical poinu of \'lew.
8 Making an implicit alIUo1ion to Kant's distinction between two types of zero in his essay
on 'Negative Magnitudes', BergiOn writes that 'both are equal to zero, but in the one
case the zero expresses the fact that there is nothing, in the other that we have two
equal quantitiei of oppoUte sign which compenQte and neuttali.te each other'.
9 Deleuze also appeals to chis notion of consciousneu in 'Bergson and the Concept of
Difference' (Deleuze 1956b: 57), and it lurks under the surface in DijftJf8fla llnd TUpett.-
/Jim (DR 284).
10 Following BergiOn. Ruyer claims that this non-intellectual knowledge, or
more exactly, QYS Ruyer, a non-perceptual knowledge, in mat its knowlMge does not
rely on senJIory infonnation coming from outside. He mggests that we ihould fint turn
to semantics for help with regard to the issue of knowledge. In European lartguages,
there are some uses of the term 'knowledge' which are closer to the meaning of 'power'
Ruyer note5 that the English and German say 'I can swim' (jt pt:ux nagerJ,
whereas the French say 'I know howto swim' <it sa.i.s nager). 'Know-how' is indeed a bor-
derline case between knowledge and power. When I say I know h.ow to swim, I don't
mean mat I can articulaCL! i15 rules intellectually or conceptually. A1ternlltL:ly, when I say
that I can swim, I don't mean that my ability to swim is a purely physical power. We
undel'1iitand by this notion of power '3 psy<:ho-physiological ¥competence", an "effective
knowledge"' (Ruyer 1959: 167). It is neither intelligent learning nor purely physical
behaviour, This is the sense we need to have in mind when we are dealing with inslinc-
llJallrnowtedgc. SergiOn cl.aims the W3ip 'knows' how to paralyse the caterpillar. 'No,
reply the positivist biologists, it is quite simply that it can do it mechanically. Given the
structure of the organi!llTl with the sting, and the structure of i15 victim's organism, 'it
jabs where it an', The Peckhams make it seem as if the Sphex blindly rummages,
scoring a hit by acddenr, but then learns precision through habituation, But why, then,
does the Sphex use its sting when faced with the caterpillar or the aicket in the first
place? There is no 'knowledge' here, the positivist biologist. .-etons, it is simply that a
5el1sorv stimulus releases 3 series of 'micro-powers' located in the nervous sYstem
(powel'1ii in the stricdy physiologic:al sense, that is).
11 A.. R. UiLey criticizes Bergson for incoherence in even auempting to defend the notion
of unconscious instinctual knowledge, 'Knowledge, we might say, has two feahJre./l in
panicular. it is associated with consciousness, and it requires a certain connexion. of an
admittedly controversial kind, between knower and known' (Latty 1989: 145). But
instinct is (mostly) unconscious, and although Bergson argues that instinct embodies a
special kind of direct knowledge which it focused on matter rather than relation, it is
'lat terrible
, prevented
e course' of
he embryo
j"es, as the
to take the
them, and
!tOl'll of the
light of the
I chapter 6.
assage cited
ling to me
If Deleu:re's
ie MalfatJi's
Ie late nine-
-ona.nt ones
ublished by
}eT Delaue
uion for his
line smdies,
nab inhabit
on UexkUll.
Ie discipline
selection is
'al Sl11Jcture,
20), and the
t beauty is a
eclion (# 46
!.IX, 19W). In
ntasy' about
tytendijk was
of Deleuze's
nd Reflex' is
IOfllement of
egard for the
s iftc>meone
a hole'in my

;e holes
Notes on Sources 199
hanito what knowledF withoqt reb.tions, formal di1lcriminations and concepfli
would be, A knowledge without diatance (the application of univenlll! concepts to tItU
thing implies some awareness of the gap between knower and known) is no knowledge
at all. Bergson likens the enactment of an ilUtinet to the 8O!IUWDbulist who 'acl1l his
dremn'. But if'uncollllciousness may be absolute' in the somnambulist, how could the:,..
realty enact a dream in the external world? 'Does the 8OIW18ID.bu1ist avoid obltacla
because his eyes are open and he has some son of 'lUbliminal' perception of them, or
not?' (Lacey 1989: 146). Bergson is aWng us to iuJa«ine some miraculous hannony
between the mindscape of the sleepwalker and the environment in which he is walking.
Lacey's problems can perhaps be reKJlved if a precise distinction is made bel:W'een the
lllnJCtl.U'e of inttinetual collllciousnellS and that of intelligent consciousness.
12 At the beginning of his career, '"-mdt had argued that the lower cognitive
exhibited a hierarchy of unconlldoUi thus synthesizing data for Che higher
activity ofjudgement at the level ofconsciousnell!l (Diamond 1980: 31-8; Hatfiek! 2003:
100). For irultance, at Che most buic level, perceptiona were synthesiD:d out of senlla-
lions through unconscious inference:s. However, his defence of unconscious inferences
was qualified: 'this process is unconscious, and we can infer it only from those clemenII
which enter into conlldousness. But when we trandate it into conscious termS, it ta.kes
the form of an The mJtr-is the process that joiIU il1lelf to ICmra-
tion, giving rise to perception' (Wundt 1862: 65; dted in Diamond 1980: 32), But later
he denied that unconscioUi pTOCell8l':i were carrien of logical syntheses, and he elEplie-
itly denied the existence of uncollllcious mentalltares which he rtduced to physiologi-
13 In 18M, there is record of a visit by MaJfaoi to the theosophist Franz von Baader, with
whom he diIcu.ued the decadence of medicine due to mat.erialism. Both YOn Baader
and Ma1fatti saw in anima1 magnetiml the proof of the incoJteClness of mat.erialism,
and agreed Chat Moaner himself had been an 'an:h-materi.aliJt' whose therapy could
only be understood properly within Schellingian pantheism (Faivre 1996: 5!).
14 Lucie, a patient ofJanet's, had periods of 'somnambulism' in which .he was completely
absorbed in her activiry (whether it be eating or bookkeeping), but was oblivious to
everything else. These IiOmnambulic activities were dissociated from the rest of her con-
lldousneu. But the diJllociarion of her mental faculties went further than this, :uJanet
found separate 'personalities' enche.rged with different mental faculties. Lude 1
depended on visual infonuation, while Lude 2 depended on taeliliry. It was in this state
that Lude regularly adopted a po&tu.re of terror, which repeated her precipitating
Inluma, in which abe had been frightened by two men hiding behind a cul13in. 'To
have one's body in the posture of terror is to feel the emotion of terror; and if this
po.lI:ure is determined by a subconscious idea, the patient will have the emotion alone
in his consciOUllness without knowing why he kds this way. afraid and I don't know
why", Lucie can say at the beginning ofher aisis when her eyes take on a wild look and
her anna make gestures of terror. The unconscious is having its dream; it llCes the men
behind the curtain and puts the body in a posture of terror' Oanet 1889: 409; cited in
Haule 247), Freud had criticized the nodon of 'lUbconscioUSDess' as it implied that
there was another consciousness somehow beneath the surfiIce, butJanet's conrepdon
of the IUbconildous here shows itself rooted in the IiOmnambulist model. TM
is /uMng its dnitmJ: there is a state of consciousness going on, but it is trancelike
and dissociated from a1I other psychological interestll.
15 Alfred Binet was working concurrently witbJanet on this approach to mental pathol-
ogy. In his AltmJOmu of f1Ie (1892) he wrote of the division of conJlCiousness:
It is not an alteration of sensibility, but it is rather a peculiar attitude of the mind -
the concentration of attention on a sinF thing. The result of this state of concen-
tration is that the mind it absorbed to the exclUBion of other things, and to JUch a
degree insensible that the way ill opened for automatic actions; and thae Ildions,
200 Notes on Sources
201 Notes on Sources
becoming oomplieatOO, as in the ptuMing case, may aJil>ml: a psychic char·
acter and CONltitute intelligences of a paralIitic kind, existing side by ride with the
normal penonality which U not awa.re of them. (Binet 1892: 93)
16 Although &hopenhauer u IlOmetimes seen as marerialist or nihilist, his theory of will
makc& hima peculiar IOrt of vita1i.&t, for when he talks about the will, he always refers
to an 'inner force': 'Ak. the very grade, the wiD maniIest[s} itself as a blind
impulse, an obscure, dull urge, from all direct knowableness' (I, 149)
17 Oddly, in his citation of this in I'llSands tmd Deleuze deletes the ref·
to insects (I &: 127-8).
18 One of the UD'W3l1ted consequences 01. Ruyer', theory, however, is that it appears to
make the existence of homosexual love impossible to explain. Nevertheless, Rufer
implicidy makes available a potential interpreradon of homosexuality through his
recourse to the biology and myth of the hermaphrodite; in chapter 4- we will see that
Deleuze himself opu to take up this poISibllity.
19 Dclcuze lakes up Bergson's attempt tD define life in predominandy terms
(against the grain of neo-Darwinian definitions of life as the of genetic
material). It ua Platonizing tn.iIta.U to treaI: life as ifit the result of purely genetic
delerminanm, outside of the spaliOlemporal conslnlints that are imposed on the genes
during the process of devdopment. In &rpmism, Deleuze eontends dw evolution
'does not move from one actual term to another aetuaI term in a homogencoUl URi-
linear series, but from II vinualrerm tD the heterogencous terms that actuaIiIe il along
II ramified series' (B 99-1(0),JUltbecause genes are 'ideal' entities dots not mean that
they coexist in an ideal neaIm akin to logical possibility, from which aaual series are
simply selected for existence, The movement from the virtual to the acnW requires a
tranliCendenlal account of the 'spatio-umporal dynamisms' that allow for the actual-
i.r.adon of ideal genene combinations, The relation genes and environment
more profoundly determine diIcm:e anab:mtiJ;al mui tlif&S1uJlds at which
change in function comes about. Delt':uze citt".S the debate between Geoffroy Saint·
Hilaire and Cuvier over the cla.uification of anatomical t':lcments. Against Cuvier's
empirical approach to the problem, Geoffroy argues that the basic unit of biology
should be abstract, purely anatomical and aromic elemenu, independent of both fonn
and function (DR 184). These atomic elemenl.'l 'are linked by ideal relations or recip-
rocal detenninadon: they thereby constiture an 'essence' which is the Animal in itself
(DR 185). Here the elementl of the Idea are not genes, but anatomical pacts. The
relation between an Idea and iu aetWI.lization mirron the relalion between anatomical
elements and the aaualizalion in embryonic development. However, Deleuze thinks
that Geoffroy's method can be tranafcrred direcdy to genetics. Insofar as genes act
in relation to other genes ... the whole C011Jututes a w.rwali.ly, a potentiality' (ibid.). In
evolutionary theory, the combination of genetic effects is determined by assesmlent or
adaptive function, DeleUlC lleelNl to accept such 11 ¥iew when he writes 'the genesis of
development in organisms mUll therefore be undentood as the aetualisalion of an
essrnce, in accordance with variOUl speeds and reasons detennined by the milieu, with
accelerations and interrUptions' (DR 185/241). In accordance with evolutionary
theory, then, the dift""erential relations between elements are guided by the exigencies
of adaptation (me '1pCeds and rralIOnJl derennined by the milieu'). However, Deleuze
makes the anti-Darwinist point that all this happens 'inclependendy of any U'llIllIfonniJt
prassage from one actual term to another' (ibid.). The constraints on anatomical
change allow for the determination of ideal, fixed inva.ria.nu at a virtual level. Conu-ary
to traditional '6xism', it is nOl species thctnllClves which are' 'fixed', but rather the
points that COl18lnlin morphologic.al change. and which can be determined
autonomoualy at a virtual level (the universal Animal) prior tD their actualization.
'Furillm and evolutionism rend to be reconciled to the extent that movement does nOl
go from one actualrerm to another, nor from general to particular, but - by the inter-
lIS to this
'acts his
ween the
Ie higher

of sensa-
to lIeItG-
1e expI.ic-
Ider, with
n Baader
Ipy could
oIivious to
" asJanet
Lucie 1
this sute
rtain. 'To
nd if this
ion alone
I the men
); cited in
plied thal
roM UfUOl'r
aI pathol-
Ie mind-
,f concen-
to IIIJCh a
'C actions,
mediary ofa detenninant individuation - from the vinua.l to its acwali.w.ion' (DR251).
20 In the preface to InsrJrlas aM Ins'ituIit1n.s Deleuze says Ihat that problem of instinct is:
'How does the synthesis of tendencies and the oiject that satisfies them corne about?
The water I drink does not resemble at aU the hvdrates my organism lacla. The more
perfect an instinct in its domain, the more it belongs to me species, and me more it
seems to constiune an irreducible power of synthesis' (DI 21).
21 The paralysing instinct of me wasp would thus be an example of inteUecrual intuition.
Perhaps we can finally understand the real reason for Spinoza's hobby of obseJVing
spiders fighting - they are exemplan of the blessed life.
Chapter 3: DeIeuze and the JUDgian UDCOIJId.Qus
This relatiollllhip between Bergson andJung has been noted before, but still remains
relatively unstudied. See Pete Gunter'. informative article 'Bergson andJung' (1982),
which is a more general oveJView of the connections.
2 It is worth pointing out that Deleuze'5Jungian essay was not publlihed quiedy in a par-
titularly obscure place, but in Atgufl'leJW, one of the most innovative Frenchjournals of
me time. Deleuz.e dearly has a higher view of Jung's work than is common among
3 A term used by Theodore flournoy in Frtnn lruJ.14 to W! Plmut Man (1899) to explain
bow mediums and spiritualists could apparently recall in detail ancient mythological
and religious motifs to which they had had no access. The proeesa of cryptomnesia
occurs when 'certain forgotten memories reappear in the subject to see in them some-
thing (quoted in Shamdasani, 2003: 128).
4 The process of regression is beaulifuJly ilIwtrated in an image used by Freud. The
libido can be compared with a river which, when it meets with an obstruction, gets
dammed up and ca:u.sea an inundation. If this river has previously, in its upper
reaches. dug out other channels, these channels will be filled up again by reaeon of
me damming below . . . The river has nol flowed back into the old
channels, but only for as long as the obstruction la&u in the main stream ... [These
channels1were once stages or srations in development of the main river-bed, passing
possibilities, traces of which still exist and can therefore be wed again in times of
flood (Jung, Theory ofPsyi:1uxJ.tuJ1yIis, in CW 4: 163)
5 In the Schreber c:ase history itself, Freud leaves the alternative open, although he re-
emphasizes his commitment to seeking sexual aetiology·by suggesting that since the
paranoiac still 'perceives the external world and tll.kes into account any that
may happen in it', it is more probable that paychosis can be explained by a 10&5 of libid-
inal interest (75). Rut who would deny that the psychotic has the capacity for percep-
tion or registration of change in the external world? The function of reality mwt
involve something more than that. Moreover, Freud himself appeared to accept at me
beginning of the argument that psychOllis involved a 10&5 of 'reality'. Oearly this point
only problematizes further what is required by a psychoanalylic account of the relation
to the external world or to reality.
6 Freud developed his account of the emergence of reality in two main directions. The
fint lrajectory lends itself readily to the kind of daboration produced byFerenczi in hill
'Stages of me Development of the SeIlJle of Reality', in which the 'sense of reality' is
gradually built up through the mechanisms of of libidin.aJ.ly invested
objeeu into me p4Yche, and projection of such ol'!iecu outside the ego if they are pro-
ductive of unpleasure. (Ferenczi, 1913: 22M; and 'Introjection and Transference', ibid.:
47f.). In his 1925 paper 'Negation', for irultance, Freud writes 'What is bad, what is alien
to the ego, and what is external are, to begin with, identical'. The second tngeetory is
f:3.k.en up by La.can, wbo insists that we first of an must remember that the human child
is 'born prematurely', and SO any w:k of saDsfaction is always already Wlderstood 35 a
Iadt of care, related to the enigmatic tkJrire of the other who has duty of care. There is
208 Not8s on Sources
no self1mdoeed std:e of 'primary narci$sism'; rather, narciasiml concenu the identifi-
cation with the image of another that one would like to be. If 'reality' means anything
in this context, it must refer less to some putatively •external world', than to .other
people', that is, to the coherence of the symbolic order. as ideally undenvritten by an
pact of mutual recognition.
muI s,mboZs oj till Libido was 'written at top speed ... without regard to
time or method ... The whole thing came upon me like a landslide that cannot be
Stopped: it was the of all those psychic contents which could find no room.
no breathing-5pa.ce, in the constricting annosphere of Freudian psychology and its
narrow outlook' (CW 5: xxiii). The book is indeed bizarrely structured, with passages
of theory conlinuaUy being intclTUpted and unbalanced by lengthy outbreaks of mythl)-
logical and etymological excavation, the reader being left to draw his own conclusions
about where the book is going and how it nright all hang together. It is perhaps best
read 3.5 the description on two leveu of a process of psychic regression. one particular
and the other uniYef"llal.lt announces itself3.5 an analysis ofa £ext writteTl and published
by a young American woman, Frank. Miner, who Jung claims later went on 1:0 develop
schizophrenia. Psychosis is characterized by Jung (initially following Freud) as
ing a process of regression to an earlier psychic Psychosis demon.&traleS a partic-
ular kind of regression - loss of the 'function of reality' - a.nd, according to a
psychoanaJytic logic we will examine in a moment, it thus promises in tum to hold the
key to the very grnesis of this reality-function. The guiding method and purpose of the
book is thus to retrace the genesis of the higher cognitive processes through the mirror
of a complex process of regression of libido: the book is subrided 'A Contribution to
the History of the Evolution of Thought'. The particular fantasies of Miss Miller are
thus the door through whichJung ttavelJ back in time to reoover the traces of the uni-
versal genesis of the human psyche. Wandlutlgm und Sym.bolI d8r Libido was origin.al.ly
translated by Beatrice Hinkle in 1916 as hJch.olot:'1 of tM In 1952 Jung
revised the book substantiaUy and reissued it as !YJmhole tier Wa1liIllmg; this was first t:ra.n.s-
lared in 19563.5 SymIxJls oj Tmnsformatinn (trans. R. F. C. Hull, Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity PreS8, 1967, 2nd edn). Unless othelWise stated, I refer here to the reprinted
r:ranslation of the first edition (Princeton: Princeton Univemty Press, 1991), which
makes up Appendi.Jc. B to the ColltJ,;l8tJ. Worlrs ofJung. However. in order to preserve the
sense of the original German tide. I refer to it in the main text 3.5 muI
s,mI»Lt oftill I.ibitlo, but in the foomotes it is referred to by its English tide, Psychology "j
the CltlaJ'llSdow.
8 Lacan suggests that withJung 'we come upon a very traditional mode of thought clearly
distinct from orthodox analytic thought Psychic interest [or libido in Jung's general
sense} is here nothing other.than an alternating spotlight, which em come and go. be
prqjecr.ed, be withdrawn from realitr, at the whim of the pulsation of psyche of the
$ul!ject' (Lacan 1955-4: lIS). Lacan proceeds to criticize this conception for 'iliunri·
nat[ing] nothing in the way of mecha.nisms'. Ifucriticism on this point is unjmt, 3.5 we
will see. He overlooks the mechanism !:hat is reaJly at the heart of Jung's essential
insight in mul Symbolr of tIIIl..iM48, and which is the 'uansfonnation' that
reveals the true interest ofJung's genetic conception as a whole: the case of the third
phase of the libido, that of'desexualisation'.
9 'In nature', he asserts. 'this artificial distinction [between nutritive and sexual phases]
does not exist'
10 Sometimes it can seem thatJung genuincly undel1ltands this primal. self-differentiating
libido 10 be an objective, biological process. However, Jung' aIJo adopts Kantian,
Schopenh.auerian and Bergsonian po6itions on the nature of this primal libido. So, in
Kantian mode he will call the libido 'a complete X, a hypothms, a model or
.:ountel", [which] is no more concrelA!ly conceiftble than the energy known to the world
of modem ph)'llics' (CW 4: 124). But then he will allow himself a quast-Schopenhauer-
a par·
laiS of
L The
I, gets
IOn of
Ie old

oe5 of
he re-
ee the
15 that
I must
at the
I point

5. The
iin his
dity' is
re pro-
" ibid.:
:5 alien
:tory is
"" as a
here is
ian conception of a a will to live' (CW4: 125), according to which
we are pennitted to think the thing-in-il!elfin general through an analogy with our own
non-phenomenal aspect, the will. Jung admits that tbi.I conception of libido it 'a bit of
psychologiod "dunlll.ri.mI*', fa. throwing of psychological perceptions inlD material
reality' (CW 8: ISO). Jung's appeal ID Bergson's &n vitIJl adds a certain amount of
furthtr confwlion. For a lA.U'Vey of the influences on Jung's apeculative endeavou.rs.
chapter g of Soou Shamdasani'! Jtmg mill the MMmg of Modmt is indispensa-
II For immnce, the tranlition from the sexual to the dCHlexualized stage iI explained in
these tenm: 'part of the energy required in the production of egp and sperrna haa
been tranllpos.ed into the creation of mechanisms for allurement and protection of !he
young ... The differenliated libido is hencef'onh ... This now presup-
poses a very different and very complicated relation ro reality, a true funclion of reality,
which, funcoonally inseparable, is bound up wi!h the needs of procreation' (CW B:
129, 133). Jung'. account indeed suggests a more ethological approach to the libido
than is to be found in Freud, for whom the drives have a blind, repetitive chamcter, So
if nulrilive and scxuallibido in some sense guide the orpnism in its navigation of the
UmwtIt, then what need is there for II separate 'function of reality'?
12 One ofJung's most powerful critiques of Freud is his argument that it is fallaciOUll to
infer the narure of a desire from the historical existence of a law that rq»resses iL It is
in a letter to Freud thatJung most clearly draWl the conclusion:
The large amount of free-floating anxiety in primitive man, which led to the
creation of taboo ceremonies in the widest sense (totem, etc.) produced among
other things the inarst I4boo aa weD ... Incest is forbidden n.ot bK4ust at is dtI:ri'tlld but
beClUJe the free..floating anxiety regressively reactivates infantile material and tums
it into a ceremony of atonement (aa though inttst had been, or might have been
desired). (Freud/Jung 1975: #' 315J)
This will be exactly Deleuze's and Guattui's argument in AntHJaJipus. 'The law tells us:
You shall not ma.ny your mother, and you shall not kill your father. And we docile
subjedll say to ourselvea: SO that', what I wantedl ... One acts aa if it were possible to
oondude directly from psychic repuuion the nature of the repressed, and from the
prohibition the nature of what is prohibited' (AO 114). Deleuze and Guattlri don't
refer to this letter (which was not published until 1975), but make oblique reference to
other IJILiSllgcs inJung where the &arne point is made, albeit in 11 carieatural form, with
somewhat leti logical force. In aMS'jfflbolr t)j 1JuJ LibidIJ, Jung writes that
incest probably never possessed panicularly great significance as such, because
cohabilation with an old woman for all possible motives could hardly be preferred
to mating with a young woman. It JW:eDlS that the mother acquired inCestl10US sig-
nificance only retrospectively ... Incest prohibition can be understood, therefore,
aa a result of regrel8ion and as the result of a libidinal anxiety, which regressively
atta.d.s lhe mother. Naturally it is difficult or impossible to say from whence this
anxiety may have come'. (CW 8: 396)
Deleuze and Guattari write that 'Freud couldn't abide a simple humoroUll remark by
Jung, to the effect that Oedipus mlllt not really exist, since even the primitive prefers a
pretty young woman to hiI mother or his grandmother. Ifjung betrayed everything, it
was nevertheless not by way of this remark' (A-O 114).
In his cenll'a1 chapter on 'The Transformation of the libido', Jung highlighll the
example of fire, inviting the conclusion that in the last instance reality as such, tran-
scendence pure and simple, i.lo conSlituted aa the accidental by-product of an illicit, di»-
placed act of mailtlll'balion.
]4 Th.iB diltinction is made in 'On the Two Kinds of TItinking' , the opening chapter of the
book. Directfd thinking 'creatf:S innovations, adaptations, imitates reality and seeks to
act upon it', while mnmsy thinking, on the contnuy. IW:n$ away from tbi.I tendency, 'sell
204 Notes on SOO'TCtS
205 Notes on Soun;es
free subjective wishes, and is, in regatd to adaptation, wholly unproduClive' .Jung adds
that whereas the rnarnUl of the tint kind of thinking comes from moYementl presently
occurring in the actual. Mind, 'the material of these thoughts [in the second kind of
thinking] which wms awayfrom reality, can naturally be only the pillS! with its thousand
(ibid.). The lIChema reaJ1s 8ergIon's dualism between perception
and memory in Mauer MId MnuJry.
15 The de-animalion of reality would thus correspond tn a tendency to complete d.e-tlexu-
aJisation at the level of directed. thinting (and not jUlll: the 'quasi' desexualization of
animistic reality).
16 Deleuze also mers to Pierre Gordon's SIs tmdlUlip:m, which recounts an equally spec-
uJative primal history populated with Hyperboream and Amazolll. For Deleu.t.e's
comments on 8achofen in arati C1WltJ, see M 52-3. Deleuz.e also continues to
mer tn Gordon's book right up to A T!wu.stlnd PlaWw..
17 Thus, says DeleU2e in ColtlDM.! MId at the origin of civillza.tion lies the effect of
the Cold on the sexual ingrinct Both the sexes arc impoverished by the advent of the
Ice Age. The males beaune physically coarsened, leas sensitive, seeking to rediscover
their dignity in the development of thought. This had an elTect on the females, who
could !lot but become 'ICIltimental' at seeing such brutes try tn think.. The sentimental
Amazon is a new figure in history, and exerts a fascination upon the subordinate male.
This fascination is intensified by the Amazon's sudden displays of 'severity' at the sight
of coarseness. A t.ra.nIfonnation in oon&cioumess comes about, in which the ICKes
interact in an entirely new way. Deleuze refel1l to hypotheses about the glacia.I period
elsewhere in his work., thus his ill.listence that 'the glacial periodwas wholly responaible
for the transformation' of sexuality and coll.lCiousness (M 54). He even identifies a
'freezing point, the point of dialectical l1'3lIm1utabon, a divine latency corresponding
to the catutrophe of the Ice Age' (M 52).
18 On this reading, Freud's imisr.ence on lexual aetiology finds its application in patiems
who experience sexual problems in their current life, beaUSt: thcy cannot help but
interpret their past in terms of their ICxual frustrations. In other words, Freud's method
tallies first of aJ) with the 'neurose.s of the young', who are indeed both obsessed with
sex anti to restricdons on their access to it.
19 AI. fil1lt, in 'lmflS..fonnIJlimu MId Symbols of the Libidojung argues that the transition from
nutritive to sexual libido rcsullll in the mother being taken as the first sexual object. But
in the .same wod he ends up denying that incestuous sexual desires have pre-eminent
importance in psychosexual development (CW8: 396-7).
20 The passage in square brackets is omitted by Deleuze. Deleuze cites these passages as
coming from a cort'CSpondence between Jung and R. LOy ('Some CnJdaI Pflints in Psy-
cboa.na.l)'llis: A Correspondence between Dr. Jung and Dr LOy', ON 4). However, the
passages actually come fromJung'lI notoriow 19M essay 'The State of PsychothenlPY
Today' (ef. CW 10: 167-9). Deleuze's article also contains reference to a 'deeper uncon-
scious which encircles Ull in a tie ofbtood' (SM.128). OnJung's relatiOIlll with the Nazis,
see the remarks ofAndrewSamuels in 1'MPolitical PsycAe (Samuels 1993: 287-316); also
Grossman 1979, and the conection Lmgtring S1UJlltJws: FmuliIm.s anti Aftti-
(M.aidenbawn &: Martin 1991). Aside from mentioning the important p3MIlge
in NiIIutIut MId I leave aside here the queltion of Deleuze's poIIible views
about Jung's relationship with Nazism, but this queldon should be dealt with. One of
the complaints about Jung's comments in the 1984 essay concerns his claims about
racial differences inJewish and 'Aryan' psychology:
TheJewish race as a whole - at least this is my experience - an unconscious
which can be compared with the 'Aryan' only with reserve. Creative individuals
apart, the average Jew is far too conscious and differentiated to go about pregnant
with the of. unborn futures. The 'Aryan' unconscious has a higher poten-
tial than theJewish: that is both the adY.Wtage and the disadvantage of a youthful.
I bit of
unt of
of the
ter. So
of the
ou.s to
iLl! is
III the
,ble to
m the
nee to
I, with
us sig-
:e this

ing, it
15 the
, traIl-
it, dill-
of the )} ,-
y, '1Ie1ll
neas not yet CuD}' weaned from barbarism, In my opinion it lwbeen a grave error
in medical psychology up till now to applyJewish categOries - which care not even
binding on all Jews - indiscriminately to GellI1anic and Slavic Christendom. 8&ause
of this the most precious sc:aet of the Gennanic peoples - their creative and intu-
itive deplh of soul - has been aplained as a morasi of banal in.t3ntilism, while m\'
own w.arning voice has fOf decades been of anti-5emitiml. This suspicion
emanated from Freud. He did not understand the Germanic pi}'che any more than
did his Germanic followel'll. Hal the formidable phenomenon of National Socialism,
on which the whole world gazes with astonished eyes, taught them better? Where
was that unparalleled tension and energy while as yet no National Soci.ali.sm existed?
Deep in the Germanic psyche, in a pit that is anylhing but a garbage-bin of unreal·
izable infantile wishes and unresolved Iamily resentmenlS. Amovement that grips a
whole nation must have matured in evety individual all well. That is whv I say thaI
the Germanic unconscious contains tensions and potentialities which medical psv.
chology mwe consider in its evalualion of the unconscious, (aN 10: t66\
One of the many reasons this paasage is so horrible iJl that it sounds like an invocation
rather than a description of libidinal fOfces. In the seclian on theJudaic priest in
u.t:he afId Philosoph" Deleuu can be found taking up the issue of racial 'types'. In Niet·
lSChe, he claims, 'race only ever intervenes as an element in a as a factor
in a (OlIlpkxwhich is physiological but also psychological, political, historical and Bocial,
Such a complex is exactly what Nietzsche cal.Is a type' (NP 125). Deleuze's motto for
dealing with race is Rimbaud'lI 'I ama beast, a Negro ofan inferior race for all eternity'.
In the orphanic unconscious, 'b0.5t4td no longer designates a. famiIia1 Slat.e, but the
process or drift of the races'. JUll as a conscious bastard's unconsciow fantuies will
tend towards it!enlificadon with other lineages than their adopted family, so there are
basllU'd lines within 'molar' races. Deleuze'$ politics is profoundly influenced by ArnQld
Toynbee's focus on 'creative minorities', which usurp civili.zations.
21 Deleuze's piece on the theme of islands concerns a coUeaive and individual 'second
birth' (01
22 Jung proposes the same solution to this paradox of the unknown as was tQ be later
tak.en up by Uvi-5trauss with regard to the Melanesian term mtJII4. Referring to.
Huben'lI and Mauss's claim that IlIIlMshould be rak.en as a 'category' in a quasi·Kantian
sense, Jung went on to interpret numa as the primitive form taken by the concept of
'psychic energy' (or libido in its expanded. IIense) (CW8: 61-6; d. CW 9i: 89,155). Levi·
Strauss objected to the predominant conception of mQfjQ as an essentially 'primitive'
category, which abo happened to be Jung's conception. 'Far from charaa.erising
certain civilisatioN, or archaic or semi-archaic SO<3lled K Stages" in the of the
human mind, might be a function of a certain way that the mind situates itself in the
presence of dUngs', in particular thinp mat 'do not yet have a common name' (Uvi·
Stra:uSi 1950: 54). In fact, 1lIIlna, insofar as it qualities an unknown oqect, has the same
function as a teno like 'thingumajig'. MQfW should therefore be treated as a 'floating
signifier' which gives a na1llt to t1rI cUw ofUMnown and as ,n entili&s. Uvj..
Sttauss argues in explicitly Kantian terms that the floaling signifier (or 'zcCl>6Yll1bo1')
is the condition of possibility fur llOdaI organization. MauSi Wall right to 'invoke the
notion of flID'Was grounding ttrtain (56), and Uvi-SUlIUSS
sets himself the task. of purifying this fundamenlai category down to a basic 'object" x'
which grounds the relation of mind to world. 'The sole function' of 1lIIlY14 'is to fill a
gap between the signifier a.nd the signified, or, more exactly, to signal the fact that ...
a relationship of non-equivalence becomes established benveen signifier and signi!ied'
(56). Levi-Slr.WSS, in fact, criticizesJung in the same eway for inadequately purifying his
conception of the symbolic character of the unCOnsciOUII, In both Mauss andJung, 'the
unconscious is conceived as a symbolic ¥tem; but for Jung, the unCOosciOUl i$ not
reduced to the system; it is 6lIed CuD of and even filled with symbolized things
206 Notes on SOU1'US
which form a kind of subwatum to it'. He then briefly criticizes the notion of arche-
type on the grounds that it is impossible to see how it could be innate or acquired, 'ff
it is innate, one must object thaI., without a theological hypothesis, it is inconceivable
that the content coming from elCperience should it; if it ill acquired, the
problem of the hereditary character of an acquired uncon.sci.ous would be no leu
aWeBOme than that of acquired biological features' (Uvi-Strauss 1950: 36-7). The
former objection is. weak, as it does not even address lhe biological aspects of the
type. Despite these criticisms ofJung by Levi-Strauss,Jung fllllkes the same basic move
in his conception of the unconscious (although Lacan is the first to explidtly take up
this theory within psychoanalysis) (Laan 1966: 690). His notion of the 'unconscious'
functions exactly like mcma: we have a relation to the unconscious only insofar as some
fluid entity stands in for the unknown.
23 Jung's argument is by the analogy he draws between the minds of children and
'primitives' such .. the Pueblo Indians. Even if the two are proved to share similar
trailS, the differences between the two would undennine the analogy.
24 Because of the dominance of the ego at this stage, the shadow is often projected onto
an other. The unconscious thus tint lends to appear in projected form. Lacan's eaPy
work on paranoiac identification also goes in this direction.
25 In an important passage in CinemtJ 2, Deleuze the of cinematic renet;·
ivity (the film within a film) in a wav that can be extended to all images, induding
dream images. To have a component in a film or image an often leem like a
quick. way for the artist to escape from the inadequacy of their work (it's bad, but he
krwws that it's bad). Reflexivity it; no guarantee of superior inr.ell.igena at
inruition, and in contemporary 'visual culture' it could be said to have become its
opposite: an unthinking reflex. Deleuze says that if reflexivity is succetiRul in film, then
it is always grounded in a 'higherjustification': 'It wiD be observed that, in all the arts,
the work within the work has often been linked to the consideration of a surveillance,
an investigation, a revenge, a conspiracy or plot' (C2 77). subsequent refer·
ence to the play within the play in Hamlet is probably the key example here. The play
within the play is reflexive in a specific sense. Rather than putting the whole play in
question marks, so that the spectator lItands outsidI the whole play, the play within the
play thTUJiI1l the ipectator deeper into the play, so that they are now installed in the
whole play (as spectators in the playit&ell). The play within the play tells the truth about
the spectators, and about the whole play, but it does so by dqricting the lruth of the
dramatic events from a more distant, yet more interiorised perspective.
26 'The flowers of the yucca plant open for one night only. The moth takes dle pollen
from one of the flowers and kneads it into a little pellet. Then it mitt! a second flower,
cuts open the pistil. lays its eggs between the ovules and then stuffs the pellet into the
funnel-fhaped opening of the pi.lllil, Only once in its life does the moth carry out this
complicated operation' Oung 1919:
27 Following a survey of secondary literature on the archetypes, Jean Knox has recendy
proposed that there exist four fundamental models for making sense of me notion of
archetnJe, all of which can da.im support fromJung's writings (KnOll: 30-0):
1. As 'biological entities in the form of information which ill hard-wired in the genes,
providing a set of imtnJctions to the mind as well as to the body'.
2. As •organising mental frameworks of an abstract a set of rules or instroctions
but with no symbolic or reprClentational content, so that they are never directly
3. As •core meanings which do not contain representarional content and which there-
fore provide a central symbolic signifiance to our
4. As 'metaphysical entities which are eternal and therefore independent of the
It seems that there is considerable overlap between the last two models. The examples
a grave error
care not even
[dom. Because
ctlive and intu-
lism. while my
This lIuspicion

)na! Socialism,
better? Whert'
ialism exilted?
of unreal-
:nt that grip; a
whv I sav that
:h medical P"'-
: an invocation
c priest in roel·
types'. In Niet-
ling. as a factor
:ical and social.
L\l.e'1i; motto for
fOT all eternity'
I state, but the
.IS fantasies will
ill', 1IO lhere are
need by Arnold
WlIS to be later
/I. Referring to
a quasi-Kalllian
the concept of
i: 89,153). Levi·
tia1Il' 'primitive'
\ characterising
evolution of the
ates itself in the
on name' (Levi-
has the same
ed as a. 'floating
:WId enti!i.fs. Uvi-
)r 'zero-5fl11bo1')
It to 'invoke the
and Uvi-Strauss
basic 'ol!iect = x'
m47IQ 'is to fiji a
the fact that , . .
ler and lignified'
tely purifying his
l&S andJwtg, 'the
lconscious is not
ymbolized things
Notes on Soun:es 207
for the third model are Plato's and Kant's Ideas, which both have a transcendent and
etemallltlWS; moremeT' these species of Idea are not really 'repre8C11lational', as Knox
5emlll to think. Our represenm.tional concepts participate in and are guided by Ideas,
but Platonic or Kantian Ideas thcmlIelvea do not function like conceptIJal representa-
tiona. We can therefore reduce these two models to one essential one, that ofarchetype
as Idea. As none of these models is neussariJy incoMistent with each other, it may be
that all can be defended, and organized into a systematic theory; on the other hand it
may be that only one or I:W(), or none, of the models is defenJlible. I will lUggat that
Delew:e'll philosophy can help to make sense of each of each of these three models.
28 Knox cI.al.mi that Stevens does not c o n s i s ~ d y maintain the distinction between arche-
type as such and archetypal image, as he 'suggests that the former can be located in the
limbic system of the brain and illustrates this with the mother-child archetypal system,
a concept which llUggeSls that the archetype-aHuch conm.ins specific represenm.lional
content rather than being purely an "innate neuropsychic potential'" (Knox 2003: :i2).
It may be that if one clarifies the notion of instinct, this confusion (ifllUch there is) will
29 For Stevens, a passage such as this indicates the complemenm.rity ofjungianism wi!h
ethology. He suggests that the e!hological account of the sign stimulus that trigers the
release of an instinctIJal motor pattern is practically idenlical toJung's theory of arche-
typt.ll. 'Having been neglected fur the greater part of this century, the archetypal
hypothesis is being red.iscovered and rehabiJjtated by thOle psychologists and psychia-
trists who have adopted the ethological orientation (0 their subject matter and allowed
an evolutionary perspective to illuminate their thinking' (StevenS and Price 2000: 8).
30 In ethology, there are only instinctual gestalts in a restricted sellle. In his early easay
'The Comparative Study of Behaviour', Lorenz complained that when Jung refen to
innate behaviour patterl'l8, he 'proceeds fro,n !he assumption of innate gestalt ruga,
rather like pictures perceived, and indeed assumes that a 'projection' of such picturea
into the morocsystemcan lUe placel' (Lorenz 1939: 29). But there are onlyinalinctIJal
gatalts in a restricted sense. When attempting to understand how a lledgling'. inmnc-
tive potential to fly is triggered by seeing the patterns of pl1.I11J.3if: undt:r !he mother's
wing, !he ethologists insisted that the triggering power of the image mould be distin-
guished from the instinctual motor activity that follOW'll it. The two ll4pedll of the
instinct do not resemble each other. When Lorenz showed how easy it was to trigger a
goIlIing's instinctive feeding mechanisms by presenting his own face rather than its
mother's, his conclusion was that the trigering image needed only to conform to the
vaguest schema (two eyes and a mouth). The turkey's 'bird of prey' schema is
composed ofdill£rel:e geometrical elements (with, for instance, quantitative constraints
on relalive head size) In thenuclves, the various features characterizing a slimulUlllitu-
alion or an object had neither wholeness or gestalt. They could be analysed into
discrete stimuli, whose eliciting effect was strictly summative. It was also important that
the schema was presented at the appropriate lime in the animal's neurological devel-
opment, which underlined the rudimentary c.h.aracu:r of the i.mage schemu. Strictly
speaking, therefore, there is no need for 'images' at the animal level. 'In an animal you
can demonstrate very dearly that innate respomes are a combination of single
I'ClpOnses to smaJ1, simpl.e slimulUll combinations, each of which has an eliciting eft'ect
in itself (Ewm 1975: 59). Lorenz did come to grant that jung's !heory could be
defended for human beings, but only 00 condition that !he images were understood as
developmental phenomena.
31 One of the Jruior problems with jung's work is !he frustrating lack of tenninological
preci8ion. We have alrc:-.u:ty seen that instinct presupposes a son of consciousness, so
lung must here be talking about egoic, reflexive consciousnellll in particular. But as we
have seen Bergson and Delew:e are also prey to this ambiguity.
32 After all, why should rhe: psyche: be conceived as a compensarory, negative feedback
208 Notes on Sources
mechanism, when Jung seeJDlI in general to be c>pJlO$OO to purely mechaniod concep-
lions of the mind? Moreover, in and s,.oou of tAt LiINlo, jung had
aKribed the emergence of human thought to the op;oriI1J of a homeostatic process: if
anything, the process of desexuali2:ation is a positive feedback process, which incrcues
the dift"ere1lce between Bell.ua! libido and thought. See my 'Rtbirth through Incest',
cited above, for more on desexualization. It is not clear on the compensatory model
ex:acdv wAy a homeostatic procetl5 should eventually inrervene.
The opening words of the Oriliqut ofI\ml R#tJMm lay out the Uaion: 'Human reason has
the pecuIia.r fate in one species of itll cognitions that it is bw'dened with questions which
it cannot d.ismiss, since they arc given to it as pfoblems 1"1 the nature of reason itself,
but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every apachy of human reason'
(Kant 1782/1787: Avii). .
:w The example realis the phenomenological psychiarry of Eugene Minkowski and
35 In the 1911 edition ofPriru:ifJla Wundt expands the section on
anonWous mentalstatt.s to d.iscusII ofDnlams, but Freud is taken to
be me latest advocare of me tendency, already pretent in the Schelling .chaol, to look
to dreams and hypnotinn for a 'liberation of the soul': 'It ill a remarkable sign of the
times that mis mystical dJ'eam.psychology should find itll mOlit enthusiastic fonowers in
neuropathology' (ibid.: 686).
36 In Plato, me pure foIIDS are what are most real, in the sense that they arc erernal and
seifilUfficient; the worid of appearance is defined by impermanence. There are many
forms, to the point that Plato ball to ask whether-everything (noljustjustice, but dirt)
has irs own eremaJ idea. In the Hellenic age, the multiplicity of Platollic fonDS is given
order through drawing up a hiefllJ'Chy 6( reality; the tenn 'archetype' nowrefers to one
of the fwimotdWlforms (for instance, the original fonn of fire in the Ctnpvs Hem'Ultieum).
As with Plato, me archetype remains the object of a IpCcial tJi.simL Jung wants to rel:lin
the Platonic notion that the archetypes are what have most but he recognizes
that the history of modem Western philosophy is the .ItoI}' of the dacent of the Ideas,
the coUapse of the objectiYity of Ideas into subjectivity. 'From Dcscartcs and Male-
branche onward, the metaph,siod value of the "idea" steadily deteriorated. It became
a "thought", an internal condition ofcognition' (CW8: 186). The sense that archetypes
are realities stllrtS ro fade, and they become the producrs of cognition. Jung goes on to
say that this shift is 'dearly fannulated bySpinoza: "By 'idea' I understand a conception
of the mind which the mind foIIDS by reason of its being a thinking thing., II
Def. He then adds that Kant in tllm 'reduced the archetypes to a limited number
of ategories of the undentanding'. From Deleuze's perspective, with these last two
remarks jung begins marclUttg 01£ in eK.aCtIy the wrong direction, Ifjung's aim is to
preserve the 'reality' of ldeaa, in this pallII3gC he overlooks two possible allies, SpinO:D.
and Kant. Deteuze's work on these two thinkers puts rightJung's mistake here, and in
faa helps to slref1gthen the possible philosophical buis for jungian archetypes.
37 Oddly, the translation of Tp has it that the archetype is of 'the practical
employment of reason'. However, this concepOon is in any case not exactly wrong, as
the archetype does ultimately have a practicallilatui, as Kant makes dear in the Critiqtur
of Am R.fr.uon (A569/M97). Ifjung had cited other uses of the renn lJrbild, in the
Criiiqtu ofl\ml RJJa.wn (d. A317/8374;A569/B597). he could haw: pinned it down to
being another tenn for the Idea of God. The archc:type of the understanding seems to
refer to the ultimate horiwn that encompuses and totalizes all our partial claims to
knowledge. It is the image of absolute totality. One can see whY jung did not play up
this aspect of Kant's theory, all it means that there is on.Iy one archetype. Kant himself
could have Itretched to three posaible archetypes, inasmuch as there arc three hallie
Idcaa: those of Self, World and God. Each of !hese is 'primontial' with regard to its own
kind of cognition, and nothing ill to be gained from reducing the first two to the Iaw:r,
"I Ideas,

'hand it
gest that
11 arche-
in the
I system,
:lOll: 82).
'e is) wiD
ism with

I allowed
}(JO: 8).
mers to
s butinc-
Ie di'lIin-
'S of !he
trigger a
than its
m to the
:bema is
ulus situ·
'Sed into
tant that
::al devel-
1. Strictly
ima.I you
Jf single
ng elfttt
could be
mess, so
Notes on Sourus 209
210 Notes 1m SOU1US
even if they are subordinate to it. The Self represenlS the thought of an ultimate
ground for thinking in general; the World represents the thought of an ultimate P
ground for empirical representation; and God represents the whole of reality or tile lllS
n'alWimum (d. A397). Each corner of thill ideal t.riangle is necessary for a full mapping '1
of the absolute. These three Ideas are each distinguished from ocher universal conceplS
by virtue of their radically unconditioned namre, which makes them unavai.lable to
experience, yet neces.sary as 17!plohve Ideas which guide and constrain our cognitive
conduct. The Self, for instance, is an Idea rather than a concept or an empirical inm-
ilion, becaus.e fellSOn demands the representation of an absolute to which all
thoughts can ultimately be attributed, even though it is not possible to prove the exir
tence of such a sut:;ect. Kant's Idea of God, on the other hand, does not so much rep-
resent the necessitv (or a transcendent creator, but rather 'is a tr.rnscendental ideal
which is the ground of the thoroughgoing detennination that is necessarily encoun·
tered in everything existing, and which constiunes the supreme and complete material
conditiofl of its possibility' (A576/B604). Thill 'material condition of possibility' is a
necessarv mought if we ate to integrate the piecemeal knowledge we have of the world,
but it is nOl poll6ible to argue from the concept of the: supreme being to me existence
of such a being (as the Ontological Argument claims to dol. as we can only say that
someming exists when we possess me evidence of empirical intuition.
38 Kant'S ronception of problematic Ideas can in fact be taken in a strong sense, so that at
the highest point, it concerns Ideas which are not just beyond experience yet somehow

transparently avai.lable for thought, but whose vel)' enunciation ill problematic for
thought all weD, becaus.e they cannot be affirmed by an idenlical sut:;ttt. Take the Idea
of God. On the one hand, the e"istence of God cannot be deduced from the concept
of God, which leaves it a merely regulative idea. But on the other hand, U 300n as we
surrender God to the status of a regulative fiction, then we are no longer i'ealIy thinking
about God. but about the coherence of our own knowledge. Hence God is an 'impos-
sible', problematic concept in a strong sense. In order to think the Idea of God ade-

quately - i.e. in a way that does not reduce God to an object of knowledge - one must
already 'know' him or it. l:.
39 The article in which chis theory is eKpounded, 'The Sexual of Children', is
written during the period of coDaboration wimJung. Freud writes that 'It is one of me
most v.iI1uable results of our psychoanalytic investigations to have discovered mat the
neuroses ... have no special mental content that is peculiar to them. but that, asJung
has expressed. it. they fall ill of the same complexes against which we healthy people
struggle as well' (Sf: 9: 210).
Chapter 4: T'b.e World u Symbol
'We ought not to be surprised to learn that OrJung ofZwich balked at some of Freud's
conclusions. Instead of rc:laling will to sex, he related sex to will. Thus all unconsciously,
he has paved me way for a revival of the old magical idea of me will as the dynamic
aspect of the self' (ibid.: 78).
2 In hill 1925 Cornwall Seminar,jung simply talks of 'skulls' and describe! two ceDars 00
top of each other (c!. Jung 1925: 2!). In his 1961 autobiography he writes that there
were two human skulk. but does not mention there being two cellars Oung 1961: 183).
E. A. Bennet's W1uJt ju.fl{f 1leallJ Said (1966) contains another account again of the 5tOI)'.
and it is Bennet's version to which Oeleuze and Guattari refer. Jung told Bennet the
story in 1951 and asked Bennet to report that the dreatn was about his own house.
3 All versions also have a slighdy account of what happened when Jung told
Freud the dream during me voyage home. In me eartiest account, Freud sayt that the
dream meant that there were two people thatJung wanted dead and buried (hence the
two ceDars). In 1961 Freud is chiefly interested in the two slwlls, andJung had a .!ll:rong
sense that Freud was pushing him to suggest a death wish concerning two people. Jung
ol:!iects to Freud on different grounds in each of the lKcounts: in the tint version, he
protests that in any case there is a level below the two cellars, and in the second he
that he ill married and really doesn't have any death wishes at present.
.. Deleule and Guattari do not mention thatJung has a multiplicity of different versions
of this dream and of the conversation with Freud. But Jung's inability to remember
whether Freud suggested that he had a death wish against his wife or against his parents
unforwnately does ,not help prove anything.
5 Deleuze. implicidy takes up this distinction in andRilpttition, but reinterprets it
within the context of the theory of intensity. 'The sign is indeed an effect, but an effect
with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, qt.I4 sign, the productive d.iMymmetry, in
the other it tends to cancel it. The sign is of a completely different order to the symbol;
nevertheless, it makes way for it by implying'an internal difference' (DR20, translation
modified). We will see how intensive signs 'make way' for symbols first when we lW1l
below to Kant's remarks about symbolillm in nature.
6 In Difftmma and Deleuze appears to change his mind about the efficacy of
this Jungian critique of Freud. He writei that 'a decisive moment in psychoanalysis
occum:d when Freud gave up, in cenain respects, the hypothesis of real.
events, which would have played the part of ultimate disguised teIlllS, in order to sub-
stitute the power of fantasy which is immersed in the death instinct, where everything
is already masked and disgui&ed' (DR 17). But there is more to this statement than
meelJJ the eye. First, Freud changed hiB mind about the role of real childhood events
long before he adopted the theory of the death drive (in 1920). WhY. then, is Deleuze
correlating this clwlge with the introduction of rhe death drive? As we wiUace, it tums
out that after criticizing Freud's notion of the death drive from aJungian point ohiew,
Deleuze later changes his attitude towards it. The theory of the death drive, argues
Deleuze, is what allows Freud to move to a purely symbolic theory of repetition: 'Rep-
etition is in essence symbolic; symbols or simulacra are the letter of repetition itself.
Difference is included in repetition by way of dkgui&e and by the order of the symbol'
(ibid.). Thus the death driYe allows Freud to move to a theory in which sign is tran-
scended by symbols, and fantasy is never reduced to real situations. In other words,
Fuud overcomesJung's objection and is ultimately in agreement with him with regard
to the notion of the symbol. However, Deleuze's reading is tendentioUll. We. will see
that what DeJeu:ze finds in Freud's death drive is almost entirelv what he has himself
put there, and in fact he remains much more Jungian than Freudian; hence it is no
surprise that he returns to his critique of Freud from Aflti-DetJ.ipus onwards. Deleuze's
enthUlliasm for Freud is shortlived, lasting from 1967 (Cc/.d'MSS and C11JLlty) to 1972
at the latesL
7 'The analysis which the literary historian makes of the poet's material is elClKdy com·
parable with the methodofpsychoanaJysis' (CW4: 146). This is said in 1912, whenJung
still classed himself as a ·psychoanalyst'.
8 Thi" is reminiscent of Kant'll qualification of the Cartesian which he says really
refers to 'an indeterminate empiricaJ intuition' that 1exist as a thinking being, rather
man pointing to an immediate connection between thinking and existence (whkh
would allow one to infer that everything that thinks exists) (Kant 1787: 8422). Just as
the self is an Idea for Kant, rather than a concept, the symbol is image of somerhing
that exists, but whose nature is indeterminate.
9 Certain kinds of psychic material mean next to nothing if simply broken down, but
display a wealth of meaning if, instead of being broken down, that meaning is reinforced
and extended by all the consdoUll means at our diaposaI - by the W<alled method of
amplification. The images or symbols of the collective unconscious vield their distinctive
values only when subjected to a synthetic mode of treatment (CW 7: 81).
10 See Olarloue Otten's L'CiJ1llJm¥J Rtader (Otten 1987), which oonta.ins exlnlct8 from the
major medieval texts on lycanthropy. The _ prefix of lhe term 'werewolf' originally
an ultimate
)f an ultimate
Qr the ens
a full mapping
{ersal concepu
unavailable w
" OUI" cognitive
empirical intu-
ct to which all
prove the elCis-
,t so much rep-
endental ideal
ssarily eneoun·
lplele material
possibililll is a
Ie of the world,
;) the existence
n only say that
.ense, so mat at
:e yet somehow
roblematic for
. Take the Idea
.m the concept
"' as soon as we
really thinking
od an 'impo$-
ea of God ade-
1.ge - one must
)f Children', is
'It is one of the
)vered mat the
ilt that, as Jung
healthy people
,orne of Freud's
I unconsciously,
as the dynamic
S two cellars on
"rites that there
uog 19tH: 183).
'ain of the story,
old Bennet the
OWII house.
.vheo Jung wid
lId says that the
tied (hence th('
fig had a strong
Notes on Sources 211
indicates the Old English 'man', so that werewolflimply means 'wolfman'. Wolves
were the most common bel¥t of prey in med.iewJ Europe.
11 In the same way that the sublime at each Wiant to overwhelm the imagi-
nalion's act of synthl!llis, the operation of symbolism and gymbolisation threatens at
each imtant to overwhelm this other act of imagination which is the schema. So
much so that between symbolism and the sublime, there will obvioUIIly be all sorts of
echoes, as if they brought about the emergence of a sort of pund Ifim4.I which is
irreducible to knowledge, and which will Wlltify to something else in UII beUdes a
simple f.lculty of knowing. Feel how beautiful it is. (Ibid.)
12 Of COIlJ."lie. Hegel'. of s"w is perhaps the best-known philosophical
example of such a teleological conception of unconscioUII activity. AI; the end or each
phenomenological.movement on the winding path to full sclf-t:onscioumeu, a new
object 'presents it!lelf to consciOUllDess without its underslanding how Ibis happens' JIO
that the dialectic al'Wll)'S proceeds 'behind the back of conaciowness' (Hegel 1807: 56).
Qtations are from D. W. Smith's translation of this essay in 5: 3,2000; the
second reference is to this translation.
14 'Our imagination IItriveil to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute
totality as It real idea' (Kant 1700: Ak. 250).
15 Deleuze's aim (particularly in the 'Idea ofGenais' essay) is to show that in the CriIifut
of.fudpJmt Kant changes his transcendental method from an analfais of the condilions
ofcognition to a proper genesis of the relalions of the faculties. Deleuze claim.s that Kant
had thus already answered the ca1Ill or Malmon and Fichte for a genetic account of cog-
nition which would avoid the f.artuaI, qlJa&i.empirical premises by !:he analyses
of !:he conditiON of knowledge and practical reason. critique in general ceases to
be a simple anutilioningin order to become a ttalUCendental formation, a t:ranilttnden-
t3l culture, a lI'lU\SCeodental genesis' (DI61/62). Delew.e's argument it restricted to fol-
lowing the chain of deductions and geneses in the third CriliqtuJ, but here I fOCl.ll on the
phenomenological (in Hegel's sense) aspect of the geneses; that is, the transilions as
they tlkeplace in thesubjea (!:he 'formation' or the mO\'allfntof'culture' in the sense
of BiltJImf' rather than the genesis as such). Deleuze's lusgcsdon of a 'ttanscendent31
wrore' already implies this phenomenological moment (al!:hough only in Hegel's 5e1llie
that a 'for-dtNubject' can be distinguished from 'fQC-U!I' the philosophers).
16 See Norben Aujoulat's LastmlZ: Movenumt, Spaa and TilW for an account, with photo-
graphs, of !:he crystal formations at l.ascaux (Aujoulat 2005: 42-7). He writell thai 'the
conjunction of these calcite deposits and the aurochs head theme, which is found as
many times as this concretion exists in La.scaux (i.e. seven), is quite remarkable' (46).
Hearths and lamps were used to illuminate the caverns.
17 Eliade luggellts that streams, g.illeries of minell and caves served initially as symbols of
the Earth-Mother (he alerts us to the etymology of the orade at Delphi - 'delph' is
Ulerus in Creek). If that is true, !:hen •everything that lies in the beDy of the earth is
alive, albeit in a SI2.te of gestation. In other words, !:he ores extracted. £rom !:he mines
are in iiOme 'Wll'f embryos:. !:hey grow slowly III though in obedience to some temporal
rhythm other than that of vegetable and auimal organisms. They nevertheless do grow
- they *grow ripe" in their LeIluric darkness' (Eliade 1956: 42). In !:hese terms, !:he
alchemist can be called an accelerator of embryonic development. He accelerated the
speed ofdevelopmenl., precipitated the crouing of thresholds, and discovered intensive
18 In Now.I.is's descriplion of the ascent of !:he miners into 'earth's dark womb' in H,;nridt
l1t1fI {)jI.mlblglm (Novalis 1802: 19), a hermit tells Heinrich that 'You miners are almOSt
astrologers in revene , .. To them !:he &ky is the book of !:he funu-e, while to you the
earth reveals monumentll of!:he primeval world' (ibid.: 86). Thesuspended time of the
CI"flitalline cavern would no doubt provoke the explorer to wonder if he has found
h.imle1£ back inside the womb of the earth.
212 Notes on Sources
213 Notes on SOUfUS
19 Schelling went on to develop the distinction between schema and symbol. A genuine
symbol iK a 'representation of the absolute with absolute indifference of the universal
and the particular'. In other words, d.arifielI Beach, 'it simultaneoUll.!y represents a par-
ticular object or image lIS standing for some universal idea, while it also reprcsenli the
univenal idea, in turn, as being concretely active in some panicular or event'
(Beach 1994:
20 Deleuze poinli out that this why the d.iscuss1on of symbolism occun within a 'Deduc-
'The problem of a transeendenbl.l deduction is always oqective . , . But if we
consider the judgment of the sublime, we am llt:t': th.u no ol:!jective problem of
deduction is posed in this regard. The sublime is indeed related to objecl&, but onl].
through a prqecdon of the ,tate of our soul; and this projection is immediately
possible, because it is directed toward what is fonnless or deformed in the
, .. [Tlhe great difference between the sublime and the beautiful is that the
pleasure of the beautiful resull& from the fonn of the oltjeet. Kant saya that this char-
acteristic is enough to ground the necessity of a "deduction" for the judgment of
wte. No matter how indifferent we may be to the existence of the ol!ject, there is
nonetheless an in nJmion to whkh, em tht oo:a.rionofwhich we experience the
free harmony of our understanding and our imagination', (D! 65/64)
21 In the French bibliography of Deleuze', writings (published at the end of nt lNJ.sm
I.slimd, a coUection of early articles), all texts pllbliahed prior to 1953 arc otnitred,
apparently in. accordance with wishes expressed by Delewe prior to his death, An
earlier American bibliography containJI a list of an initi3l group of writings, published
from 1945 to 1947, when Ddeuze wu in his early twenties (Murphy 1996). These
writings are on quite disparate lIuljecta, but themadcally can be grouped under two
headings. The first are the somewhat musings on sexuality, centred on a
pronounced cult of woman (e.g, 'Descripdon of a Woman'), The second group is
composed of two curious artides from 194:6 which are hard to categorize, but which
have lIOmething in common: the article on Ma1fBtti and 'From Christ to the Bour-
geoisie' was published in the literaryjournal &ptJtt. and combines C$Ol1':ric, elitist polit-
ical ideas with a dialectical accoWll of the relationship of Christian 'interiority' and
modem capitaliat bourgeois
22 Caned 'jean' in the French tr.uJsJation; sometimes also caI1ed 'CiOYllDni'.
23 It is not a fWiori a mislake to take a philO!lOphical text written by a twemy-one->yeaJ'Old
seriously, There are rare examples of writings by exaemely young philO!lOphers .tudied
today in their own right, perhaps the best comparison being Schelling, who produced
some extrnordinary and powerful wrilings at the age of nineteen, slill studied
today by august and bearded philosophers and historians. Schelling's case is more
extreme than Deleuze's, as he ceased to pubIiih anything after the age of thin:y-four,
and irultead developed hiK ideas solely in lec!l.ll"CS 0YeT the next thirty years. Deleuze, of
course, remained a prolific wriler right up until hi& suicide in 1995, at the age of
seventy. Deleuze'& motiwtiol\8 in. retraedng hill 'acknowledgement' of these ali. and
what in particular he might have wanted to disown, could only be un<:OYC:red through
a combination of intelleclUal biography and speculation,
24 PapUII appended a detailed analyaiK of MaIfatti'. MtJtht:ris to his 1894 medical dissena-
non L'AlII.lttlfIUt pAiJo.wphitJut rt K$ and in his enauing occult works he contin-
ued to refer to Malfatti at crucial poinli. Rcsgio notes that another Martinist, Paul
sedir, gave lect1IJ'et on Malfatti at the turn of the centlU'y to the AlIIIIitiIs orpn-
ization in Paris (Regio 20(4). The new edition of AfilMhy tmil for which
Deleuze the introduction wu iJlIued in a limited edition by a smaI1 publishing
house, Griffon d'Or, which published boob mostly on occult themes in the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War. They published a number of boob on Martinism.
The mediCYalist Marie-Madeleine Davy edited a series entitled 'Sources and Fires'
th photo-
that 'the
found a.I
ble' (46).
; absolute
e earth is
he minOl

58, a new
2000; the
Ie t::ntiqw
cc:a.ses to
ted toful·
us on the
ISilions lU
he imagi-
-eaten. at
liema, St>
.u sons of
which is
besides a
1', Wolves
(Sou1m' eeJewe) for Griffon d'Or. Deleuze had dedicated his article 'From Christ ro the
Bourgeoisie' to her, and had attended intdlectual soirees hosted by her during and
after me war (atrended by Pierre KlOll.SOW5ki,Jacques Lacan Paulhan). In the
book. series directed by her are listed a book on palmistry (with a preface by Davy
hersel.f), CyriDe Wilczkowski's Man and tile ZDdi&: &say on Syntlte.lu, selee-
tiOI1ll from Paracelsus,Jean Richer's 1947 book on the esoteric significance of the works
of Gerard de Nerval., Strindberg's Ifl.J'er'tw and, rather on its own. Lucien Goldmann's
Man, COmmunity and the W()r/d in 1MPkilJJsopll'J of Immanuel Kmu.
25 In Rene Guenon's negative review of the Delew:e-Malfatti volume, he criliciz.es
Malfatri's knowledge of the Indian tradition for being based on fragmentary and inac-
curate infomwion. As chis tradition was 'little known' dwing the nineteenth century,
writen such as Malfatti seem to have been concent to invent a spurious symbolism which
made up for their lack of knowledge of the 'aue symbolism' (Guenon 1947: 88-9).
Ddeuz.e's approach can be seen as directed agail1llt Guenonism, in !:hat he does not
believe that ma!:helis and esoteric philosophy must neutlSariJy be rooted in original,
pure tradilions. Mircea Pliade claims that the decline of the occult in France can be
partly attributed to the influence ofGuenon, so DeJeuz.e's affumaJion ofMalfarri's work,
with !:Lis insistence on the relevance of mat1wis for science and philosophy, can be seen
as an attempt to rescue OCClIlt philosophy precisely through the affirmation of irs most
syncretic tendencies. Guenon had been initiared to a number of occult 'on:lcn' in
France (he had been inid:ated into !:he Martinist 'order' before breaking with Papus and
departing in 19(0), only to be disappointed with all of them for their synaetism and
patchwork ofvarious occult sources, not all of them demonstrably ancient After coming
ro the conclusion that the only genuinely alive esoteric tradition of thought and practice
was to be found in the East, he became a Mmlim in 1912. He published excoriating cri-
tiques of contemporary theosophy and spiriwalism, and in lMO moved to Egypt, where
he tived. until his deaJh. He inaugurated an approach to esoteric history which he called
'Traditionalism' and which was founded on the Thntric view of cosmic-historical cycles.
The Western world was irredeemably decadent, and had enttred 'Kali fuga', the end of
the cosmic cycle, a period charae.terized by dissolution, spiritual anarchy and revolt
Nothing could be done to Inerse the process, and the best the individual could do was
r«onnecr with properly traditional sources of wisdom or convert to Islam or the Indo-
Tibetan tradioon. 'Guenon denied not only the aumenticitv of modem Western so-
called occultism but also the abilitv of any Western individual [() Olnt:aet a valid esoteric
organization ... He pointed out that any endeavour to Pl'llctise any of the occult arts
represents, for contemporary [Western] man, a serious mental and even physical risk'
(Eliade 1974: 66). Guenon', influence led to an increasing emphasis on searching for
•pure, traditions, tlhtolved from any charge of syncretism. Guenon is most critical of
Malfatti's presentation of the correlation between symbolism and number, which he
takes to be arbitrary both in choice and in their ordering: Malfatti has devoted himself
[() discovering in the symbolism that he happens to have at hand 'things which are cer-
tainly not there'. It is this approach, Guenon suggt.$I.S, which has been unfortunately
most influential. Malfatti's work is flawed in exacdy the way that the occultist
tradition is flawed. Occultism relies on inadequate infomwion. strives to overcome tra-
ditional interpretations of rytllholism, and conjures up 'an assemblage of
without the least solidity'. The principaJ interest in !:he republication of the book, there-
fore. is that we can now refer these occultist vices back to their Cuenon is silent
about the young philosopher Deleuzc's altempt ro find philosophical significance in the
text in question.
26 The second pan of her Iflitin,tibn Ii 14 symho. roman (originally published as E.uo.i JUT
la s,mbJ. romtm in 1955) is entitled 'The Royal Road of the Symbol'. She is heavily
endebted ro E1iade and Jung's conception of me rytllbol, as well as Husserlian phe-
nomenology. For Eliade. 'the symbol reveals certain aspects of reality - lhe most
214 Notes 011 Sources
Ruyer went on to suggest that Bergson's theory of instinct nevertheleas perfectly
describes the actual.i2ation of the sexual inlItinct in human. beings. Bergson's argument
far the presence of sympathy involYed an invocation of the phylogenetic unily of the
wasp and caterpilIar, but Ruyer now claim.s that this unity is mudl better situaled at the
level of the egg, the very lim stage of ontogenesis, using the model of embryological
con.lciOUSlless. He appea1a to vegeCII hermaphroditismin on:ier to get hiIIl1tnmge idea
afloat. The male and t.he female of a dioecious species are two distinct organism8. The
male and female argans ofa monoecious species are formed in two regions of the ll3IDe
embryo' (Ruyer 1959: 177). Monoecious (haploid) planlll grow unisexual male and
female Rowen on different pans of their bodies, while hermaphroditic organWns grow
t.heir male and female pans in different regions of the egg. With dioecious (diploid)
plano and an.imaIB, Ihe sexually different orpriB llIIStlIDe aspatially dislinct existence in
different vehicles (male and female). Ruyer r.ak.es tbia to indicate that between her-
maphrodilism and sexual ditTerentialion it ill but a BmalI stq>: the organism
itself into two rebdvely autonomous pam now separaled in space - each of which, nev-
ertheless, in Bergson's words, 'continues the wort of orpni.sarion·.
Chapter 5:Jag, LeIhDk aDd the DlffereutWUIK:OD8doua
lOne of these early worb wall J.Nfmsivt for C1IDImt, written in 18S2 at the height
of the Eu.ropean cholera epidemic. In it Fechner pre:sents a series of ingenious prolec·
live measures Jar the rampant cholera bacterium in illl !ItnIlIKIe againJt the human
species; the work. lWIJ the most popular of Fechner'. worb, running to four ed.ilions
(Lowrie 1946: M). The Litt1t Boolc ofLifr fJjt4r /hadI. iJ the only work mentioned by name
in Dcleuze's discussions of Fechner.
2 However, he qualifies hill support of Fechner's JXlIIilion by stating that 'this conclusion
[the last sentence in the above citation] iJ a little incaulious, because the psychic
process remains more or leu the same whether COnsciOU8 or not. A "representarlon"
exists not only through its 'representedness', but - and this is the main point - it also
emlS in its own psychic right' (CW 166n.).
S The fact is that Jung interpreled these 'prospective potencies' in a biZiUTeIy literal
manner. He wall not aveIV: to atttibuliIlg premonitory powen to himself either. In
Memoria, I>rr4ms (1M&fUditms,Jung recounts, with remarkable ingenuousness, a lito!>'
about a demonstration of hill psychic powen in front of Freud. On a visit to Vienna in
1909, he had solicited Freud's views on parapsychology, but had been met with a
complete rejection of the whole field. As he listened to Freud's objections. he fell a
stnmge llensation in hill diaphragm, all if it wall becoming a red-hot vault of iron. The
next moment then: was a loud crad: in the bookcase, and Jung ttiwnphandy
exclaimed, 'There, that is an example of a »ailed catalytic exteriori.lation phenome-
non'. Come on, Freud retorted, 'that is.heer bosh'. 'You are mistaken, Herr Professor',
saidjung, 'and to prove my point 1now predict that in a moment there will be another
loud reportl' And lUTe enough, says Jung, another detonation went off in Freud's
bookcase. jung commenlll that he knew beyond all doubt that the noise would come.
'Freud only ltared aghast at me', he admits Oung 1961: 179). In a letter to Freud of2
April 1909, directly after the book.oue incident, Jung admib to feeling ,JlllfilMlts tf tA-
about hill 'spookt:ry' with regard to the book.cue. Nevertheleas. he ia
adamant that there ill something to it, and proceeds tojustifYits possibility in the tenns
he wiD later used in t.he from and SJIIflds cited above: 'If there
ill a 'psychoana.lysill' there mUlt also be a 'psychosynthesis' which create.s future evenlll
aa::ording to the lllUIle !awl' (Freud/Jung 1974: 158]). In hill next leW!1', Freud ill cer-
tain.Iy none too p1eued about 'the poltergeist business' (139F), but responda by pre-
senting hiJ own speculations on numerical coincidences, with reladon to his fear of
dying between the ages of 61 and 62, He condudea 'Consequently, I shall receive
further news of your investigations of lhe spook. complex with the interest one accords
217 Notes on Sources
y thought
'Utta mag-
fIer" Power
:nch phe-
,t before
tel', ritual·
}40). On
'i Europe
names of
1828), for
!fset with
mode of
of other

jon. JXJP-
>Se 'mYSb'
[Stall (the
d], 1818)
'ch needs
mding of
llerest in
m. As for
umbel:" of
,eU as his
of John
umph of
of which
to Iibera-
is theory.
ecome a
mer, the
ilture, an
,thin the
218 Notes on Sources
to a channing delu.sion in which one does not oneself participate' (ibid.).
4 Jung uses Sinn or Sinngehalt in such passages. In philosophy since Frege and Husser!,
this tenn has often been translated as 'sense', in dislincDon to Bet:.l.eutung (tr.malated as
11 In
'reference'). The English tenn 'meaning' has been held to be too overdetennined and
amhiguous, while 'sense' is al&o etymologically clOller to the original Gennan, Frege and
Hllsserl clarified this distinction by stating that the Bedeutv.ng of an expression is the
thing to which it refers, while the Sinn is the 'idea]' content which is invoked by the
expression, and which cannot be reduced to ics reference, 'Sense' allows one to make
intelligible how the expressions 'morning star' and 'evening scar' ean continue to be
distinguished. even though we now know that both expressions refer to the same
ol:!iect. There is no indication that lung was familiar with the work of Frege or Husser!,
but I will translate Sinn as '!tense' to avoid confusion in what follows, because in the
passages where Deleuze alludes III synchronicity, he uses the French term UIIJ (sense),
which has been translated as 'sense'. Although De1euze's ¥ oj&nse could theorea·
cally be translated as LogU ofMl!l.I.ning, 'sense' has been used because the Frege/Husser!
distinction is important to him. Obviously there is more in Deleuze's use of the concept
of 'sense' than there is in Jung's. but I will be suggesting that Deleuze's use is at least
compatible withJung's. While not wanting to put any philosophical weight on this. I see
no reason not to translate Jung's 'Sinn' as 'sense' for the pwposes of our discussion, th.;
5 In 'S)'nchronicity' itself,JungargueB that 'natlJJ"allaws are which means
that they are completely v.LIid onlywhen we are dealing with ma.crophysical quantities'
(CW8: 421). It looks like instances ofacausality will therefore be prim.arily inslarlced at
the miaopho;sicallevel. But in Jung's helpful 'Resume' to the work.. included in the
English translation of the Jung and Pauli volume, but not published in the Ct>l18t:t.tJd
Works,lung simply argues that 'since causality is a it holds good onJy on
average and thlLS leaves room for which somehow be experienceable, that is
to say. maL I try to regard synchronistic events ai aclUJlIa1 exceptions of this kind' (lung
and Pauli 1955: 144). First, the claim about the statistical truth of causality is not con-
neeted with 'maaophysical quantities', but with 'averages'. While micropftysical quan-
tities cannot be experiencM, exceptional singular events clearly can. Second, he even

stateS straight out that these exceptions must be expenenceable. The reference to
quantum indeterminacy gets the essay off to .a bad stan.
6 This passage has an almost exact correlate in Deleuze', Dif/erma and &paiti.on (DR
7 Presumably 'unique Of rare event' really means a unique or rare combination of two or
more events.
S Kam attributed 'the greatest weight' 1:0 this incident (which took place in 1756), in a
remarkable letter to Charlotte von Knobloch of 10August 176iJ (Kant 1999: Ak. 10: "7) .
He look ca.re to have !.he details of the incident confinned III him by a friend who had
quearionM those present at the fateful party in Gothenburg seven years before.
However, In 1766, Kant published Dmanu ofaSfmit SIler, a satire on Swedenborg'lI meta-
physical speculations, in which he mentioned the same tale again in less elevated tones:
'The reader will probably aik what on earth could have adduced me to engage in such
a despicable bu.sinall as that of spreading fairy-tales abroad, which every rational being
would hesitate to listen III with patience - and indeed, not merely diAsemina.ri.ng them
but acrually making them the of philosophical investigations. Howew:r, since
the philosophy, with which we have prefaced the work, was no less a fairy SIllI'I from the
of metaphysics, I can see nothing improper about having them make
their appearance on the st2ge together' (Kant 1766: Ak. 2: 356). The relalions between
Swedenborg, Kant andlung are discussed in detail in Bishop 2000.
9 Freud finds the reference to the passage in Daniel Sandt-n's WOrIerbtJ.dl der Deut!t:hen
spr(U;Jw. The passage is from the twenl}'-eighih lecrure of Schelling's late lecture series
on mythology, published posthumously.
10 The contemporary selection of 'key readings' on synchronicity is actually entil.led lung
Oft and 1M it comains an excellent introduction to Jung's
writings on sync.hronicily by Roderick Maln (Main 1997).
11 In these experimenb, two face each other, while one IUmS up one-by-one a
series of twenly..five cards which the other cannot see. There are five sets of five cards,
each set bearing a slaT, &quare, circle, wavy lines, or crOll. The other then bas to
guess the symbols as the first one looks at them. Rhine found that some scored
higher than was probable.
12 The model here echoes the model used by Kant from his earliest wrilings. The fact that
this model of a 'third' which grounds the synthesis of contingent tt:I1TIlI w:u wnlim.lous
in Kant's writings from his early radonalist period through to his critical period is wonh
noring here, as any sU1dy ofJungand Deleuze will aL<io have to be alert to possible points
of between ralionalism and KUllianism. Deleuze returns to Leibnizian
theory after Kant in order to reclaim from leibniz a theory of the unconscious. Jungian
synchronicity similarly mines the pre-Kantian rationalist tradition of leibniz and Male-
branc.he in the wake of Kant's emphasis on spatio-temporal finitude. Following Leibniz,
the early Kant had contended that if there was to be a principle of sufficient reason, it
had to function independently of the principle of contradiction; the principle mal
'everything must have its fl:'llSon' must be, in Kant's latt:r critical terms, synthedc rather
than analytic. Kant's first metaphysial work, the New of the Fmt Prtnapl£s of
Metu.(JhysUaJ. Cognititm, is an attempt to reformulate Leibniz's two principles. Wlult is
sought in the principle ofsufficient reason is the 'determining reason' for non-neeCSllaIy
(I.e. synthelic) conjunctiOl'lS between sul:!iect and predicate (Kant 1755: 1:392). How
does Kant dea1 with the optiOI1i left open bv Leibniz for providing an ultimate ground
for the selection for existt:nre of 'synthetic' or contingent possibilities? Throughout his
philosophical career, Kant wi.Il often a.ddre8a the situation formally by simply saying that
1I!fIUirts a thiT4. 'Where is the third thing', Kant asks in the lint Critique. 'that is
always requisitt: for a synthetic proposition in order to connect with each orner OlDcepts
that have no logical (analytical) affinil}'?' (Kant 1781/1787: A259). Synthesis for Kant is
always a contingent wnnection, as opposed to the analytic connections involved in
logical statements of conceptual identily or inclusion, Being sen&ilive to me problems in
accounting for Ol.UIality (which were already apparent before Hume's criticisms of the
concept), Kant refused to slatt: that the answer to what grounds the empirical synthesis
of contingent l'!venlli is simply 'causalily'. Before Hume's contt:ntion that causality could
not be derived from seJUe impressions, Leibniz had n:jected the reduction of the
relation of ground and consequent tQ the real relation of causalily because of miagivings
about sub!;tlnce-6uhswlce intt:raction; this was one of his reasons fur affirming pre-
established harmony. Thw the whole problem was that causality itself had to be
accounted for, as did the gamut of other non-derivable coocepa such as sub!;tlnce,
causalily, existence, possibilily. necessily, ele. Kant's aJ.lSWer as to the ultimate nature of
the tertium qW4 would vary throughout his career but the 'triangular' structure of &yR-
thetic tl priDri cognition will remain constant. The development of the critical project
arises out of Kant's renovation of the 'principle of sufficient reason' (or, as Kant put it.,
'detennining reaJOn') in the 'pre-critical' Whereas the $l:alus of this 'principle'
in Kant's early writings remained unclear, by the time of the critique, the 4 f.'riori rules
that govern synthesis are taken to be two sets of pure fonm, aetualized by the
the pure fornu of space and time, and the pun concepts of the undel1ltlnding (cue-
gories). In the firlIt Crilique time (AI55/BIMI and then C'Kperience in general
(AI57/8196) are said to be the 'third things' that guarantee a f.'riori &yRthesis; more
complex 'thirds' follow in the ensuing ,
13 But at this point II contradiction arises in Schopenhauer's theory of death. For, on the
one hand, death is the apotheosis of the win because it brings with it the extinction of
peI1lOnai idenuly, and identification with the wi.Il as ineluctable, Hence
palingenesis occurs when the ego dissolves, md the subject identifies itself with the
ld Husserl,
ansJated as
. Fregeand
18ion is the
ked by the
11' to mate
tinue to be
, the same
or Husserl,
wse in the
!IU (seJUe) ,
Id theoreti-

he concept
e is at least
n this, I see
'\Stlnced at
ded in the
he DJlleded
od only on
'ble, that is
and' (Jung
is not con-
'sical quan-
,d, he even
ference to
ion (DR
n of two or
1756), in a
\k.. 10: 47).
us before.
onal being
ating them
rever, Irina!
Notes on Sources 219
impenonal will, The will is ultimately undifferentiated; there is only One WID, In his
reileclion 'On Death and ils Relation to the Indestructibility of our Inner Natl1re' in
the second volume of the The World as Will mul Schopenhauer identifies
the IUl:!ieet, laken in ioelf, with this impersoual will: 'The 1, , , is the dark point in con-
sdousncsa, just as on the retiD2 the precise point of entry of the optic nerve ill blind,
the brain itsclf is wholly insenaible, the body of the tun is dark, and the eye 8eeI every-
thing except itself' (Schopenha:u.er 1844: 491). But on the other hand, he also upholdll
the dOClrine ofetemal, intelUgible cbaracter, which implies t:bat there is aome fonn of
noumenal rlifferenliation between 'l:ypes ofwill',ln the essay on fate, he speculates that
'at the hour of death, the mysterious forces. , . which determine man's eternal fate,
crowd together and come inoo action', J-uda$ always will have been Judas beca.u&e he
wasJudas: Ii space bad beffi made for JudaJ in the cosmic scheme of things.
14 The classic discussion ill in the fint letteT to Arnauld, May 1686 (Le:ibniz 1686-7: 72£.).
15 Following Lacan's aiticisms.jean Laplanche argues that Freud'8 postulation of 'a hypo-
thetical initial Slate in whkh the organism would form a dOlled unit in relation to irs
surroundings' (laplanche 1970: 70) is incomisk'nt with two fundamffil3.1 Freudian
theories: (1) tlutt the first fulfilment ill a repef.ilion of an 'experience of Illtimclion' in
relation to an olrjta, and (2) that there is no initial 'idenlity', only a primary
Iitm with others, Laca:n and Serge Ledaire teased out two kinds of identification (with
me 'ideakgo' and then me 'ego-idea1'), which were already at work in the paper on
nare'-ism itself (Lacan 12'9-42), tacan's theory of the imaginary is an attempt
to sort out this ltDlItahle OICilIation infreud between 'monadic' and 'idenlificatory' nar-
ciuWn, bv giving the OIIcillation dialectical form. So the reduction ofdoubling and the
uncanny to primary narcissisDl in 'The Uncanny' iJ problematit,

tries cc
only Ix
of 'psy
the phy
5 AdamC
saw that
of psycb.
6 Citing St
an ace of
f chOo
to pro
An., w,
NoUs on SOU1U'$
a.plet' 6: '!be Occult UnOOlllldous
I Rergson hlmllelf ttfeh to Spinola here in the relewnt passage; 'It might be said, by
ilightly distoning the tenm of Spinoza., that it is to get back to IUJt1mz that we
break away from MtunJ (BeflPOll1932: 58), The difference between Bergson
and SpinOla here is that there is no 'breaking away' from 'natured (n.at.ure as
product) in Spinoza,alI Dew.awNatutuisin itJlelfetemal. Bergson iadea1ingwith finite,
temporal 10 the bre.alting away from nature all product involves a genuine
an.n.iIm with nature: in order to be 'instaJled in the mobiJe ttaJity , , , 10 grasp it
intuitively, , . it must do ioelfviolence, reverse the dittclion of the operalion by which
it ordinarily think.ll' (Bergson 1908: 190), Normal1y, the mind operates in the lIeMce of
adaptation. But when uting intuition, the mind has to tum back on illlelf, do violence
to irs intelligence.
2 Very little has been written on Deleuze and Gwuwi's unusual ideas about sorcery. See
Lee (200!) andJacquea-Chaquin (1982), Their influence is to be found most power-
fully hitherto in the incendiary sufi m)1lticiml of Peter Lamborn WIlson (alta. Hakim
Bey), whose writings can be found at www.hermelic.com. a also Bey
3 Guslav Fechner's pantheism also involves the affirmation ofi.nkrior and superior con-
sciousneases. and this may provide the trey to undentanding bow Deleuu would go
about n:conciling Bergson and Fechner, who initially appear to be opposed. At the
outlIet of F.lImtmtt Dj Fechner says that two species of psy-
chophyRa: 'inner' and 'outer' psycboph,-sia. Whereaa the oiject of outer psy-
chopb)'Sics is to relate external ph,-sicaJ ltimuli to menial sensations, the of inner
psychoph,-sia is to relate the stimuli of the nervous f)'Iltem In our sensations. His con-
centration on 'outer psychophysics' a.rises becaU5e he admits that 'it b only this part
that is available to immediate eltperiencc' (Fechner 1800: I, 9), In 1800, study of the
nerrous systemwall in its infancy. But Fechner nevertheless stipulates that '!here can be
no development of outer psychophylia without conatl.nt regard 00 inner pi)'-
chophysies, in of the fat( that the body's external world is functionll1ly related to
the mind only by mediation of the body's intema.l world' (ibid.). Once the pouibility
of inner psyc.bophysia is taken into account, it ia possible to correlali! the relations
beaw:en external and internal OlIlUre in more delail, because one can, .110 Fechner
believes, envisage a hierarchy of 'nervous systems', from me most &im.plc to mOAt
complex, that panlIeil the developmc:nt of types of conscioumesa, to the relatively
lIDCOn.sdOUS to the one can postulate in the case of
divine beings.
4 Robert Montgomery IICllteI that 'if one were forced to described the thought of the Later
Lawrence in one word, that word would have to be During the period
from Womm in1.hueto his death, the important new influences on him were theosoph-
ical, and his mOllt important writings were balM on ideas drawn from the080phical
sources' (Montgomc!), 1994: 168). Lawrence's account of the dwJJlfas ill borrowed from
a curious esoteric interpretation of the Book of Revelation, TIuJ
(1910) byJamell P!)'ae, a member of Madame Blavauky's group of The08Ophlsts. .Pryse
reads the Book of Revda.tion 'U a veiled lI£coWll of occult anatomy, derived from
ancient Th.ntric .IIOun:ell (see Tmdall 1949). For instance, the 'seven breaths' and 'live
winds' of John of Paunos are related to the seven lIJtIv(U and me five fmmtJs. In
Tantrisrn, 'kundalini' dcnolC$ yital energy. symbolized as a Serpem, coiled arolIDd the
spine, While this energy initially appears to be sexual, it is able to move up three
pathways (ncidis, which Pryse translates as 'pipes' or 'tubes') in the body, changing in
nature ti it develoJlll' On the one hand, the NSAumM ill the pipe leading from the
spinal cord up to the cra.niwn, while idd and fMgala, corretpOnd to the left and right
vertical pathWll)'ll of me sympathetic nervous system (Pryse 1910: 19). The gnostic yogi
tries to awaken eaclI of the seven tlaaknis or 'nerve centres', which are ammged in
ascending order up the spine, The central path of 'serpent power', the susAumna, can
only be activated through the creation of polarities betM:cn ida and J1ingoJtJ. which are
symboliled 'U moon and sun. Pryse ia happy to call the claaknis 'nerve centres' or
'ganglia', and even suggests that readers of hit work should have a dclailed knowledge
of 'psycho-physiology' (6, 15). 'The esotericist, refuaing to be confined within the
IllUTOW limits of the senses and the mental faroIties, and recognizing that the gnostic
powers of the lIOul are hopelessly hampered and obscured by irs imperfect inst.rulDent,
the physical body, himself to what may be tenned intensive self-evolution, the
conquest and utilb.ation of all the fol"Ces and faroIties which lie latent in that fontal
OlIICnce within himaeIf' (8).
5 Adam Curtis, in his television series 11r.t Cmtury of1M St!lf, and Eli Zaretllky in his lItUdy
TAt oftM Sotd (2004) have shown the role played by psychOllJlalysis in the devel-
opment of contemponu-y consumer capitalian. In the hands of Freud's brother-in-law,
Edward Bemays, became a tool for the analysis of motivation and the
discovery and manipulation ofthe vulnembilities ofworkers and consumers. Capitalism
saw that psychoanalyais could be UIed for the pI.lJpOlIeS oflIOrcery long before the critia
of paychoan.aIysis claimed that it amoWlted to a 'pseudo·.cience'.
6 Citing Starha.wk. Stengers then admits that 'pronoWlcing the word "magic· is already
an act of rIllljIic' (Pigna.rre and Stengers 2005: 181),
I ch()()lle to take the risk of using the term 'magic' just as wiiChei do take this risk.
For them, the very tiu:t of naming what they do as magic is already an act of magic,
producing the experience ofdiscomfon which makes perceptible the power over US
of the consensual funetiOIll of the lived. And if thosr contemponu-y wite1les took
upon themselves to call themselves witches, IJUCh a shocking name, it was in order
to produce the living memo!)' of the Tnne of Burning, the desuuetion of the Great
An., which did happen at the very epoch when Man as the majority lItIIndard came
to impose converging, consensual functions ofthe lived, explaining away as illusions
and supenlilions every active divergence but the three mrviving onell, philosophy,
science and an. (Stengel'52006)
.Ire' in
iI fate,
IJlW! he
: 72£.).
I to its

l (with
leI' on
y' nar-

lid, by
ure 3lI
rasp it
lice of
'I' con·
i1d go
\t the
.f psy-
I' psy-
.II part
of the
r psy-
ted to
Notes on Sources 221
7 Within one year (1732-3), twenty books and articles were published on the .ultject in
Gennany. I cite the &Orne of the list from Montague Summers's The mEurope. Dt
mastit4lilme nwrluonnn in turmdi.I lWer (Leipzig, 1728); Disserlatio de san-
guisugis (lena, v.:m dim oder Mmschemmcgtm (Leipzig, 1732),
&stmdert NaehridJ.t v.:m d.men VQfII/1yrm. (1732), UiIw It
rrpertus iUlfrdie (Nuremburg, 1732), de Iwmmibtu post
IJItJl'tem vuIp tlictis Vamp,- (Leipzig, 1732). There are lieVera1 more
(Summers 1929; 132). Summers cires several works daring bad to the late sixteenth
cenwry, and aDo emphasizes the groundbrc.aking work of Philip RDhr in his lJisJ:ertatio
de (1679). Michael Ranft, author of De
noted in his later 1734lreaWe on vampires that 'at the last Easter fair in Leipzig it was
impossible to enter a bookstore without seeing something about bloodsuckers' (cited
in Introvigne 2001: 6011.
8 In Mew's and Garber's cran.slation of t.h.is p;wage. 'enveil.Jl>pe' is tnnslated as 'involve',
and in the preceding passage is rendered 'enfoldings·. See the Uitmi1
L.exiam (Finster It aL 1988) for a selection of funher examples of 'development' and
'envelopment'. 'Envelopment' is a term that Leibniz tends to use in logie.al contexts,
for instance when be cla.ims that 'according to me, [al complete individual notion
envelops relation$ to the whole series of things' (Leibniz 1686-7: 69: trans. modified).
9 As he lies dying and unconscious, the hypn0ti5t asks him questions. 'M. Valdemar, do
you still sleep?' 'Yes', he responds, 'still asleep -dying: The hypnotist uks him the same
question a final time, but at that moment his eyes roD upwards and he dies, As the
nunes prepare to administ:t:r to the body, a hidt:ous 'iibration begins ro emanate from
hilljaws. The dead M. Valdemar begilU to speak.. and to make a belated reply to the hyp-
noti&t's final quettion: 'Yes; - no; -I Mvtb«nsleeping-and now-now-lamdead..' M.
Valdemar is now caught in this position. hut further efforts at communication with him
fail, as if he seemed no longer 1.0 have 'sufficient volition' to speak. 'Death (or what is
usually termed death) has been a.rrt5ted by the mesmeric process.' In the course of the
next seven months, the hypnotist continues to visit M. Valdemar daily, and fina.l1y
resolves that the best coorse of action is to re-awaken him from his hypnotic Hate. As
M. Valdt:mar begin& to re'iive, the hidt:ous voice emergu- once more: 'For God's sake!
- quick! - quick! - put me to sleep - or, quick! waken mel - quick! - [ SI1lJ to'JO'U I/uUI
am dMId! Just as the hypnotist appears to have succeeded in revi:ring M. Valdemar, his
body insread crumbles and rots away within the space of a minute (Poe 1845: 350-9).
10 It was subtitled 'An Astounding and Horrifying Narrative shewing the extraonlinary
power of mesmerism in arresting the progress ofdeath'. The advertisement on the Me
page read: 'The following astonishing narrative lint appeared in the A1lttritan
a work of some standing in the United States, where the C2Se has excited the mo.st
intense interest ... The n.a.rra.tive, though only a plain recital of facts, is of &0 extraor-
dinary a nature as almost [0 sUI'Jl3.SS belief, It is only necessary to add. that credence is
given to it in America, where the occurrence took pIaa' (Poe 1846).
II In his journal of 1971, Guattari writes about his anxieties about being catapulted into
fame by He had not published any books before 1972, the year Anti-
Otd.ifnu appeared., and wrote the following note: 'IRJPC-ible to tum bad:.. Fear
because of this diary - that I bavt! been !:aUn roo far. Until now I had an exit, always,
some kind of accommodation with the local socius, But widt and Schizophw-
ni4, I have become - I have been - toppled over into what is irreveI'liible' (t;uattari
2006: 3(5). This diarv is intriguing because it begins in Le Bruse:, a toWn in the South
of France in Touton Bay, where the Deleuze and Guattm families were staying dwing
the summer while was being finalized.. It appears to be pan of &Om.e agree-
ment made with Deleuze; Guatta.ri remarks on the reaction of Deleuze'$ wife Fanny In
hU diary while she types it up ('l thought she found it to be in poor taste'). Guattari
gOl!!S on to report that he keeps having dreams about 'Lacan and desks'. It ench with
Lacan 'chasing out some rebels that I had only half followed', and with Guattari con·
cemed that 'I didn't know how to go back to his dealt without getting yelled at'. The
next day he writes. 'Another dream about Lacanl This is inWle'. Guattari doesn'l
attempt to intelpret either dream. In the first, his relation to Lacan is highly ambiva-
lent; on the one hand, he is facing the master behind the desk., but on the other hand
he himself ill trying to 'go back.' to Lacan's desk.. Disgu&ted with his unconscioUl,
Gualtui concludes t.W!.t 'all this confinns me in my idea that dreams are fundamentally
reterritoriali13DOn activities, cotUuration, protection against the most brutal machinic
incidence of desire. Fundamentally right-wing ErOlt activities.' After che second dream
about Lacan his reaction is more violent: 'I have oedipal rot sticking w my skin ... The
more I become disengaged - the more I try to. become disengaged. - from twenty years
of Lacano-Labordian comfort. the more this familialist carcass enfolds me seeredy. I
would rather admit anything else!'
12 Deleure cites Artaud's writings on cinema 31 a further instance of che descent into the
dream in order to capture romething beyond the dream. He exprcaaes his wish to writ('
a fUm screenplay which would
ignore knowledge and the logical connection of faclll, and would search beyond. in .
the occult and in the uacb of feeling and thought for the profound motives. che
active and obscure impul5es of our so-called lucid acts, while always !!l4mtamingtheir
evolutions in the domain of sources and apparitions. It is to show how far the
scenario can resemble and aDy itself with the IlUCha9tics of a dream without really
being a dream itself, for example. It is to show how far it restores the pure work of
thought. So the mind, left to itself and the images, infinitely semitised, determined
to lose nothing of the inspirations of subde thought, is aD prepared to return to its
original functions, its antennae pointed tow:uds the invisible. (Artaud 1928: 6!)
In his mort pieee 'Sorcery and Cinema' , Artaud suggests that the ability of fUm to eter-
naJiz.e movements can be uaed to promote it new non-representational type of thinking.
Its images have 'virtual power' that points UI toWcU'ds the 'depdlA of the mind'; 'essen-
tially the cinema reveals a whole occult life with which it puts U!I directly into cont.aet'
(Artaud 1949: 66). Raw cinema is opJl'Ollf:d to narntivc cinema, and is suited to express-
ing a. 'tnrning-point in human thought' that has occurred in late modernity, in which
the power of the symbol has been occluded. After this unspecified I11rni.ng-point,
'language loses its symbolic power and the mind tires ofa succession of representations.
Clear thought is not enough. It allocates a world which has been utterly consumed'
(ibid.). Deleu.ze's whole Cinema project, wich its claim that cinema is the means
of discovering 'spirituallife' h31 its seed in Artaud's reflections on cinema.. With the
help of cinema, in which acton themselves become symbols and no longer (as on the
stage) mediate and obscure the symbolic power of the drama, 'we soon realise that this
over.familiar life which has l(lIlt aD its symbols is not the whole of life. So today is a time
for sorcerers and sainl5, a better time than ever before. An imperceptible substance is
taking shape, yearning for light. The cinema is bringing us nearer to this substance'
(ibid.). This 'imperceptible wbstance' seenu to be related to the body without organs,
an esoteric subtle body which senses acausal sympathies with the world which it
inhabitli. Artaud's way of using the dream to reach visionary states is profoundly
occullist. He concludes has the potential to present a 'plastic, oqea:ive and
attentive examination of the inner ulfwhich has hitherwbeen the exdU3ive domain of
the "IDuminali". Cinema is a democratization of sorcery; it a.eizes occuIl powen from
the hands of magiciaN and sorceren.
13 De Quincey continues; 'The condition of human life, which yokes 80 vast a. rruUority to
a daily experience incompatible with much elevation of thought, oftentimes neutralises
the wne of grandeur in the reproductive facu.lty of dreaming, even for those whose
minds arc populous with solemn imagery.' According to Dc Quinrey. the reproductive
faculty of dreanling II inlernaDy I"t'.lllricted by the demands of the present, but to an
subject in
mOw san·
ojg, 1732),
), Uisw lit
inibw JXill
prig it was
ers' (cited
, 'involve'.
he Uilmi4
nent' and
Ill1 norion
iemar. do
I the sarne ,
ea. As the'
nate from
1 dead,' M..
l with him
or what is
nd finally
: Slate. As
od's sake!
•yot.I tluJl. I
lemar, hill
n the 6nl
the mOltt
o ex.l:I'aor-
-edence is
.died into
year Anti·
k.. Fear -
it, always,

Tie agree-
Fanny to
, Guattari
Notes on SOUTCeS 223
almost intolerable degree in industrial.ized .rociety, the noise and speed of which tends
to .DIlOther the creative imagination. which requires silence and withdraMl1 to emerge.
14 We shaD see in a moment that I'.hk evaluation is slightly mWeading, as Michaux WllJl
indeed intet'eSUd in situating dmg experience within ritual settings. So OeleU2c and
Guattm:i are more likdy to be saying that Michaux's approach to the religious lIigni.fi..
cance of drujp WllJl conditioned by a preliminary jrrM/MII with regard to the teXl! and
practices of the world religions. Delane and Gualla.ri cite wil.h approvall.he conclusion
of the literary biltorian l.aIie Fiedler, whose book TM&tumoj tht Vaflishing A-"mn
(1968) set forth 'the poles of the American Dream: cornered between two nighlnl.:l.reli,
the genocide of the Indians and the slavery of the bIacb, Americans conslnlcted a. psy_
chically repressed image of the black as the force of affec[, of the multiplication of
affects, but a socially repre&led image of the Indian as 5llbdety of perception, percep-
tion made increasingly keen and more finely divided, slowed or accelerated' (ATP
28!). By being a sophistieatr:d representative of an already established tradition of
re.llearch into drugs, Michaux was able to avoid these traps and gain access, as it were,
to the 'drug in itself', the Soma an lich.
15 See the chapter 'Experience de la folie' in MinJtle (translated as 'Experimen-
tal Schizophrenia'). In his book on Michaux, Malcolm Bowie cites a number ofstudies
from the 30s to the 50s which worked from the premise that mescaline produced arti-
ficial psychoses (Bowie 193).
16 Mescaline is synthesised from peyote. Many of the drugs as.rociated with shamanism
(peyote, ayahuasca. salvia divinomm) are acknowledged to be devoid ofattraction from
a hedonistic perspective.
17 It appears to be Michaux who coins the idea of a 'molecular' unconscious: 'Everything
in thought is somehow molecular. Tiny particles that appear and disappear. Particles in
perpetualassocialiollll, dissociations, reas.rociations, swifter than swift, almost instanlll.-
neeus' (Michaux 1966:
18 The authon specify the first eighty pages of this book, which corresponds to pp. 1-61
of the English tranalation. These pages end with the single word sentence 'VISions'. to
which is appen<bl the blank footnote, 'of which no tJace remains',
19 Deleuze', reference to 'Lilliputian' perceptions refen to the work of the French psy-
chiatrist, Gaetan de Oerambault, who used this concept in his account of toxicorruuUc
delirium. Oer.unbault speda.li.sed in the analysis ofdelirium, and in the first decades of
me twentieth century wrote exl.en.live1y on the hallucinations associated with use of
alcohol, chloral and ether. His aim was to produce a differential analysis of the actions
of various intoxicants in order to isolate different cerebral functions. In 1M Fold
Deleuze cites his diJlinction between the types of confusion in alcoholism and chlora1-
ism. Whereas the mind of the alcoholic plunge, into a profound and general 'obscu--
rity', it is as if the mind of the chloralic is 'llurrOtmded by a veil', in which 'the play of
folds produces an unequal transparency' (Oerambault 1942: 204). Oerambault noted
that chloral addicts often hallucinated that the walls were decorated with veils of
detailed arabesques (compoKd of spidel'll, flowen or inscriptions), in flat relief. Also,
·there is a wiling tendency towan:Is striping, strialiOIlll, latticing' (ibid.: 251) in chJo-
ralic hallucinations. These 'veils' are the result of the rising to the surface of minute
marb or lines, ampli.fied into lattieed networb. In f2ct. it is I'.hk mrging up of'micro-
scopic' perceptiollll which makes chloral hallucinations 'non-global and intermittent',
tugeting particular zones of perception at particular moments. The judgment of
chloral usei'll is not wholly affectbi (as is that of the alcoholic, whose con.sciollllness is
profoundly 'obscured'), but is rather a 'mixture of lucidity and somnolence'. Halluci-
nations thUl tend to be 'microscopic' and even 'pointillisle' (196-7). Insects swarm in
and around the 1Ikin, phantom odoUl'll 3lld tastes rise up and dominate consciousness;
one addict becomelI paranoiac about the MOUI 'powden' he iK:t':S everywhere in his
home (170). The framework U indeed Leibn.izi.a.n: halludnalioD1l emerge through a
NoUs on SOUfUS

23 ,
'swarming' of microscopic perceplions which threaten to overwhelm the
global contours of appen:eplive conJclOUBness, and which disappear just as rapidly as
they arise. Working with chloral and ether addicts had revealed another kind of micro-
500piC perception beneath global percep£ion of ol:!jec:ts, in which the munnuring bad-
ground of perception came to the surface. OerambauJt uses the nolion of 'lilipulian
hallucinations' (deri\'ed from Leroy) to describe hallucinations in which the dimen-
sions of are altered while romenring their relative proportions (250); insects
become enormous while people shrink into tininess. In his private life, Oerambault was
obsessed with veik and folds and hirI putirlle of composing photographs of women
dressed in Islamic coverings were tint aeized upon by psychoanalysts as evidence of
• fetishistic tendencies in !heir author. Deleuze opposes !his reading. 'If Oerambault
manifests a delirium, it is because he diKovers !he tiny hallucinatory perceptions of
ether addiCQ in the folds of clothing' (F 58).
20 In a letter to EnutJiinger, Alben Hofmann, the discoverer of ISD, writes in a similar
vein: ·these magic substances are themselves cracb in the infinire realm of matter, in
which the depth ofmatter, its relalioll5hip with the mind, becomes particuJarly obvious'
(Hofmann 1980: 157).
21 Intensity incteatlC!l along with speed, an intensity revealing and emphasizing the
speed already there, a speed now seen as much more considerable !han previously
supposed, an intensily which brings to perception the images (and rnicro-impulscs)
o!herwiae imperceptible, vague, and remote. The drug the subject conscious
of many other l:rlUlsilions and also of desires, which become mdden, violent, light-
ninglike impubion.. (Ibid.)
22 In his discl.lll8ion of unconscious perception in The1VJIt.l (F 155 n, 19-20), Deleuze refen
to another literary text, a shon piece byJean Cocteau ostensibly on dreams, but for
which the occasion is an 'internal voyage' while on nio-ogen protoxyde (f1roto19d.e
II 1lIWl8). Cocteau is administered the drug by a dentist lIlI an anaesthetic. "Doctor, take
c:a.re,1 am not asleep', he mutters; 'but the journey begins. It lasts for centuries. I reach
the fint uibunal. I am judged. I pass. Another century. 1 reach the second tribunal. I
amjudged. 1pass and 110 it continues. At !he founetn!h tribunal I understand that mul-
tiplicity is the sign of this other world and unity the sign of ours (Cocteau 1957: 55). On
returning to unified conaciousness, he knOW! he must forget everything that he baa
seen: 'I see unity refonning. What 11 borel Everything is one'. Cocteau goes on to spec-
ulate about !he difference in kind between wakingand dream consciousness in general.
What strikes him is that the dreaming consclOUBness does not feel astonishment at !he
remarkable things teen in dreams, or at the speed wi!h which he can come to 'know'
things. Freud borrowed Fechner's insight !hat !he dre2m ill another stage or scene (ean
flm.II.t!m &1I4up1a1:.), wi!h entirely different laws to normal cotUcioUtlness. But Cocteau
emphasises the normality or 'naturalness' of dream consclousnexs ('the dream ill the
sleeper'. nonna! existence', 56). and the regularity of the a1ternalion between waking
and dream ('I take advantage of it to live adoub1e life', 57).
What is certain is that this enfolding [plitnr],!hrough the mediwn of which eternity
becomes liveable to us, is not produced in the same way as in life. Something of this
fold unfolds [0uUJtu tIt.asit! diJ ulI# s, tU/Jlie]. Thanks to this our limits change,
widen. The put, the ful:1.l.re no longer exist; the dead rille again; places COtUtnJct
themselves without architect., withoutjourneys, without that tedious oppression that
compels US to live minute by minute that which the haIf-opened fold mows us at a
glance. Moreover the aIDlospheric and profound lighb\estl of the dream favoun
encoWlten, surprises. knowledge [r.DtIMWlJrIUS], a namralnexs, which our enfolded
world (I mean projected on to the surface of a fold) can only ucribe to the super-
natural. (57; tnmB. modified)
23 see Oda.vio Paz's preface to Miserable Mi'nJdI!: 'Battered by the gale of metealine, sucked
up bf the abstract whirlwind. the modem Westerner finds ab60lutely nothing to hold
;0 pp. 1--61
VISions', to
Particles in
,st instanta-

I' of studies
oduced arti-
;rench psy-
Mith Wle of
the actions
n The Fold
nd chloral-
'the play of
);lwt noted
ith veils of
relief. Also,
il) in chlo-
. of minute
) of 'micro-
tennittent' ,
dgment of
:iousness is
c'. Halluci-
15 swann in
here in 1m
through a
ihkh tends
to emerge.
ichaux was
eleuze and
,OUll signifi-
e texts and
'Ig Aflltrican
lCted a psy-
)Jjeation of
>n, percep'
aled' (ATP
radition of
. as it were,
on to. He has forgotten the names, God is no longer called God. The Aztec or the
Tarahumara had only to pronounce the name, and immediately the presence would
descend, in all hs infinite manifestations. Unity and plurality for the ancients. For us
who lack gods: PuUulation and TIme. We have lost the names' (Paz 1967: x).
24 Michaux had an intense interest in magic and occultism. See his 1941 collection 'In the'
Land of Magic' (from which Deleuze dtes a prose poem about the 'twenty-tWOfolds' of
human life (Michaux 1968: cited in F 93); as well as The Mojm l>rtUia/s oflht Mind
itself, which ends with disquisitions on Tantrism, inspired by The SerpentP_byArthur
Avalon (John Woodroffe). Michaux W3S the editor of Hermes, a journal of religious and
esoteric ideas in the late 19308. The reference to !he 'paradises' afforded by drugs may
thus refer not only to Baudelaire's essay on Artifidal ParodistlS, but alw further back to
the alchemical use of the symbol of the 'tree of life' (which can allude to itJl psy.
chotropic properties). In a passage that is like a numbed, a thousand-times repeated.
recollection of James's anaesthetic revelations of pantheism, Michaux ingenuoush
insists that he has indeed seen 'gods in their thousands':
The incredible, thatwhich I have desperately desired since childhood. that which was
apparently excluded and which I thought I would never see, the unparalleled, the
illilccessible, the excessively beautiful, !he sublime which W3S forbidden me, the
incredible has occurred. I HAVESEEN THE GODS IN THEIRTHOUSANDS. I have
received the gilt of wondennent.. They have appeared to me who W3S without faith
(who did not know the faith of which I was capable). They were there. they were
present, more present than anything else I have ever seen. And it W3S imp<Jli&ible and
J knewit was impoNible and yet. And yet !.hey were there, lined up in their hundred.&
next to each other (but behind them were thousands, barely (X:rceptible, and there
were many more than thousands, there was an infinite number). They were there.
these calm and noble beings, suspended in !he air by an apparendy natural fonn of
levitation, in gende movement where they stood. These divine beings and myself
were alone together ... I had not lived in vain. (Michaux 1964: 57)
The poet frequently discusses his work. as an ex.ploraaon of 'magical' or religious states
of reality. According to Michaux's gnostic ¥ision, we are all 'prisonen', possessed in
flashes by the desire to find of stonning heaven: for 'prison displayed is prison
no longer' (cited in Ben 1994). Michaux also thought of writings as 'exorcisms'. and
even as maledictions or curses, caUing his work 'poetry for power'. Something like
'magic' W3S needed in order to countenance !he ordeals of the mind', a
of magical writing which would 'ward off the surrounding powen of the hoslile world',
so that 'evil is progressively d.is&olved, replaced by an airy demoniC which he
informs us, is 'a marvellous state!' (Preface to Ordeals, Exomsms; in Michaux 1994,
25 In The MojmOrdlal& t'! the Mind, Michaux describes a long-held interest he had in taking
indica at high altiwde'. where he could contemplate a mountain skyline. He
prepares himself over a (X:riod of days, and then consumes the substance. However, he
miscalculates the time while he is having dinner, and by !he time he ventures out into
the landscape, it is night, and the mountains have disappeared in the darkness SW"-
rounding the remote location. Dismayed. he has no idea what to do. At length, he rai.sa
his head up to look up at the night, and he feelll h.iInself sinking into the black sky full
of scars. 'It was extraonlinary. Instanlaneously stripped of everything as though of an
overcoat, I passed into space. I was projected into it., I was hurled into it, I flowed into
it. I W3S violendy seized by it, i.rresistably ... An utterly unsuspected marvel ... Why
hadn't I known of it earlier? After the fil"5t minute of surprise, it seemed altogether
natural to be borne off into space' (Michaux 1960: 92). Whether by design or not,
MiChaux has replicated the conditions for the witch', flight: hemp, a mountain-top,
and a night full ofstars. Michaux's experience here is notjust similar but perhaps eYen
identical with the witch's flight.


Notes on SQurces
26 The original founder of what became known as Maninism, Martines de Pasqually, insti-
tuted a secret society devoted to rheurgic ritual under the influence of the fly agaric
27 Deleuzc's opposition to masochistic humour and sadistic irony is based on
Kierkegaard's distinction between humour and irony, which is in tum endebled CO
Hegelianism. In the PhilDsopky ojRight, Hegel had written that the subject reaches the
position of irony 'when it &1WI'lIS itself a! that power of resolution and decision on
[matters of} truth, right, and duty' (Hegel, PhilDsopirJ ojRight, # 140). nut when '5tJbjet:.
livity tUclam i&lfto be absolflJi, this 'ironic position' becomes dialectically idenlicaJ with
evil. 'It is not the thing [Saclll] which is excellent, it is I who am excellent and master of
both law and thing; I plt.ltJ with them &Ii with my own caprice, and in this ironic
in wbich I let 'the highest of things perish, I mmly tnjDJ mfJII1if.'
Kierkegaard initially developed his m!unction between irony and humour by reference
to a Danish Hegelian,J. L, Heiberg, who chara.c.terized humour as 'content overreuh-
ing the current fonn' wherelly content is 'enriched ... lly forcing IlB to see anomalies
we hadn't seen before' (Hannay 2001: 59). Rather than the extra.cting hi.m.aelf
from the empirical domain through appeaJing to an aJways higher. abstract principle of
the act of humour involves following the law t.o thllSter in order to subvert
it. The transgression of law is procured through an exaggerated fidelity to the Law. It
accepts that there is no other choice but to conform to the constraints of the law, but
pursues an idiosyncratic project through legitimate c.hannelll, aJways conceaJing its
clandestine end, in the expectation that any general laws are too universal to have fully
a.crounled for every eventuality. Humour thUII seeks the last 14. beyond even the
'superior' laughter of irony. But the last laugh is not at all bitter, because it also signaJs
the triumphant achievement of its c1ande.uine goal._
ec or the
ce would
!:S. For us
In 'In the
I f£llch' of
-rback w
o its psy-
leled, the
me, the
lOut faith
hey were
lnd there
:re there.
fonn of
Id myself
l>US slateS
.sessed in
is prison
lIDS', and
hing like
, a genus
Ie world',
which he
IlIl( 1994.
in taking
.yUne. He
wever, he
• out into
mess sur·
,he raises
:k sky full
19b of an
,wed into
... Why
n or not,
Notes tm Sources 227
The dates in the fil'llt set of bracutli refer to the original date of publiCilion, except for ancient
and medievailOurces, where the date of the translation used is given.
AJexandrian, Sarane (1983) HistfJim de ltJ phiJqsofJ/lie 0I:CIibe (Paris; Seghenl).
AJ·Kindi (\977) 'Des rayons au theorie deUrIa magiqUell', in Sylvain Matton, ed. La Map Af'Il1N
(Paris; Bibliotheca Hennetica, 1977).
Allison, Henry (1996) 'On Naturaliaing Kant's Thmscendental Psychology', in
(Cambridge; Cambridge University Press).
A1tllWl, Gail S. (1999) FtJtall.i1lk TIu Curious aM the 1'uNJ (Florida:
Amerib, Karl (2000) KIJJIt and the FoJII (If (Cambridge; Cambridge Univenity Pres$).
Antell Pearson, Keith (1999) GmJaifJlll Lift: TJu l1ijJtJmIa and tif1.WIJuu (London: Rout.
Aran, Max, Courrier, RDben and Wolff, Etienne (1969) EfIlmit:m.nn' ltJ St'ZfIIIJiIi (Centre Culturel
International de Cerisy-la-Salle, 10-17Juillet 1965) (Paris; Pion).
Anaud, Antonin (1928) 'Witi:hcnl't and Cinema'. trans. Alutair Hamilton, in AflIIminArUnuL: C8t-
ltdtd WOIlb: Vo.Iu.IIIe 'T1m!i! (London: Calder &: &yam, 1972). ,
-- (1949) 'The Shell and the Oergyman', tranll. A1uwr Hamilton, in A1Ito1U1I AftIJIld:
Col1tIt:.tMl WMts: Voluw n-(London; Calder Be Boyan, 1972).
Ariyeb, Grorge N. (966) AlKmdi: 1Ml'IiiIM"/JIw'oftheArobs (Rawalpindi: hlamic R.etearch Inlti·
AtH0u1at. Norbert (2005) Latt/lW;; Spoa and Ti-. trans. M. Street (New 'Vork: Harry 1".
AY:l.lon, Arthur [SirJohn Woodroffel (1919) 11u &rt-tl'otm' (NewYork: Dover. 1974).
Bachofen,J,J. (I97S) MytIl, &ligioo & Motiur Righ4 (Princeton, /I{J: Princeton University Press).
Badcock, Christopher (1994) hychnlJan»jnil:m: the NIIIJI of Dtwurirt aM FmuJ (London;
- (2000) PsJtWngj: A Critical lMrJduaiofl. (Cambridge; Polity Press).
Baldwin,James M3rk (1902) ed. DidUmary tif alld (New Peter Smith).
Barlet, (1888) 'Iniliarion', tra.I1I. A. P. Morton, in PapUfl, T1I8 T4fllt of the 1lIWmi-
mu (London: George Redway, UI96).
Barron, Frank (1987) 'Bergson and the Modern Psychology of CrnUvity' , in A. Papanicolaou and
P. A Gunter, cds. lind MOO- T1IovgIlI. (Chur: Harwood).
Barzilai, Shuli (1999) L.ac4n aMtJu MQ/I6o/Oripu (Stanford: Stanford Univel'llityPrCllll).
Baugh, 8ruce (l99!) 'Deleuze and Empiricism' , inftmrrIol tifIJu British Soci6J lor 24:
I, 199'!!.
Beach, Edward Allen (1994) 1M1'IJimdes tfGo4(s): Sduili-t$ PIIilllsoJIhJ ofMytAolngJ (Albany: State
Uni\'l:rsity of New York Prall).
Beck, Lewis White, 'Kant's Letter to Herz', in E. FOl"lller, ed. Kt:mis .D.td1l€liorls
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
Beer, Th., Bethe, A. and Uexkll.ll,]. von (1899) 'VorschIase zu einer objebivierenden Nomenkla-
wre in der Physiologic: des NervensystelTlll', in 19.
Belt, David (1994) 'Introduction' to Henri Mt1IJ>tS (Michaux, 1994).
Benjamin, Walter (1989) 'On Some Mot.if:s in Baudelaire', in trans. H. lobn (New
York: Schocken, 1968).
BenneL, E. A. (1966) MatJuftlRMllySaid (London: Abacus. 2(01).
Benlilaud·Vincent, Beml1dette and Stenge1'5, IsabeUe (1m) A History ofC1umti.slry. U2nL D. YllD
Dam (Cambridge, Maaa: Harva:n:i UnivenDlV Preas, 1996).
Benz, Emit (1968) TV o[GmMfI RDtNmtic tran.s. B. R. Reynolds and E.
M. Paul (Pennsyl.'llania: Pickwid.• 1983).
Ikrgvon, Henri (1889) Aft Es&aJ 1m I1wJ DiIt4 Iftm.J.I4tUm e'IltIIW 21.. alld
F1rJ6 Wil.t iranI. F. L. Popon (London: Allen Be Unwin. 1913).
- (1896) MIlIiIIr4'llll Memot,.trans. N. M. Paul &W. S. Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1994).
- (190!) 'Introduction to Metaphyaia" in TJu CtMlive Mifut
--(1907) CrttIliwEfIIllvliIm, tranl. A. Miu:hell (London: Macmillan, 1911).
-- (1908) 'Memory of the P!"eaent and Faile Recognilion', in MirutEfIn/:Y, trans. H. Wildon
Carr (London: MacmiJIan, 19!O).
--(1919) trans. H. Wildon Carr (London: Macmillan, 1920).
- (1932) Tzoo Sowus ofMuroity and RiJ/igitm. trans. R. Aahlcy Audra and C. Breretoll (New
Vorlc Ocubleday, 19M).
-- (1934) 11u! CnaIive MiNl, trans. M. L. Anemon (London: Philoeophical Library,
!ky, Hakim (2003) TAZ: T1Ie PotIIic T-n.11Jl (New
York.; Autonornedia)
Binet, Alfred (1892) of tranl. H. G. Baldwin (London: 1896).
Binswanger, Ludwig (1952) Le Cas SI6tI.m1It WJan: .IW'I! It.I tranl.
J. Verdeaux (Bmges: Deldk de Brouwer, 1957; reprinted, Paris: Monfort: 2004).
- (19!i6) SfpundFrrIu.d: ofa ttans. N. Guttrman (NewVork: Grone Be
Stratton, 1957).
- (1957) 'Jflimdtlditm tranll.J. Needleman, in}. Needleman, ed.
World: SMt«l PtlfJm ifLtlbJigBinsttHMgw (London: Souvenir Preas, 1975).
Bishop, Paul (1999) ed•./wIt mCImtMts: A (London: Routledge).
- (2000) and lrwitilm in Kallt, Swt.tlimborg andJunt (LewiIIton, NY:
lampeter: E. Melen PreIII).
--(2002) }u!8(of AJISWl:!" t/)Job (Hove:
Boon, Marcus (2002) 1M Roa4. of Exm.t: A History of WriItrs on Drt.tgs (Cambridge, Mass. and
London: Harvard Univc1'5ity Pre!l1l).
Borch:Jacobsen, Millel (\ 991) UJam INAbsol'llUMOStIJr; trans. Douglal Brick (Stanford: Stanford
Univel"!licy Press).
Bowie, Malcolm (197'1) Henri - A SItM1J ofhis LibITary Wmtl (ODord: Clarendon PreM).
Brickman, Bernard (l988) 'PlI)'dloanalysiB and Substance Abt.lSJe: Towards a More
Approach', reprinted in D. L. Yalison:, ed., Es.tenti4l PIlfJm lWI Atldiaitm (New Vork; New¥on
UniveIllity Press, 1991).
Brown. Robert F. (1971) n, LaItr of SdulJing: T'ht lrIflwma of Bat1mu on tJu Wids of
1809-1815) (London: Auociate<\ University l'rc::acs).
Brown, Smart (1998) 'Some Occult Influences on Leibniz's Monadology', in A. Couden.
R. H. Popkin &: G. M. Weiner, eds. 1..IJiImiz. and I1ItIipm (Dordreclll': Kluwer).
Rudge, E. A. Walli. (1899) EtrJpttmI MDgic (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner &: Co.).
Buller. DavidJ. (1999) 'DeFreuding Evolutionary Psychology: Adaptation and Hurnan Motiva·
tion', in Valerie Gray Hardcasde, ed. WAR.Bie/eg1 Ml!ltf (Cambridge, Maa.: MIT
Burkhardt. Richard W. Jr. (2005) Pattmu of l1MJrui,or. Kmwvd Lurrrv.. NiJw TmlM7fm, au IN
FO'II.'It4infifEt1lDltJgJ (Chic.: Univenity of Chicago Press, !005).
Buyrendijk. Frederik (1968) W_1l: A VIlW, irani. Dennis]. Barret (NewYork: Ass0-
ciation PretIll).
Cahagnc:t, LoW. (1849) flu (Paria).
Canguilhem, Ckorgea 1'JuNI'IffMl and the tran•. Carolyn R. Fawcett (NewYork:
Zone Boob, 1991).
- &!Ililv et Uttil.IJJlaS: t.- dwi.Us et /JrfsI'!tJ/5/Kl' G. (Paris: HlKhette).

Capek. Milk (l973) 'Leibniz 011 Matter and M4!mory', in I. Lecl4!rc, ed. The PbilM<tfJh' of!J:iJm.i1.
and the Modtm World (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univel'!it)' Press).
Carl, Wolfgang (1989) 'Rant's First Drafl!l of the Deduction of the Car.egories'. in E. Forster ed.
1(Jmfs DlldtUlimlJ (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Cavell, Marcia Mintl: FtrnnFteu.dUJPlWbsuphy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press).
Cha.:omac, Paul (1926) Elip/I4s UrJi: IU mI+tma (Paris: Chaoomac).
Cherook, Leon and Stengel'll, IIIlI.b4!lIe (1992) A 0ritiqtIl of Rell&mt: H'J/"MSis at a sa.-
liji£ PnIblmt1, trans. M. N. Evans (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
ClmmbauJl., Gaitan de (1909) 0ewni1 cd. Jean Fretet (Paris: Presse$ Universiuires
de France, 1942), Vol. 1.
Cocteau,Jean (1957) TMDifficu.IJ:J of&ing, Inns. E. Sprigge (London: Peter Owen, 19(6).
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor LiImJry &tMi.flJ, ed. H. N. Coleridge (London: William Picker-
-- (1957-1962) 1'Iu! ofSamtul Ta,Jm- Colt:ri.Ilge. ea. K. Coburn, 2 double vols. (London:
Cooke, Mordecai (1860) SeMI Si.ut7s ofS1lJlP: P()jJu1ar HiJUJry ofllu StWn Non;w.s oflJle
Kildd (London: James Blackwood).
Copenhaver. Brian P., ed. (1992) HIJI'f1IttiaJ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Coudert, Allison (1980) AliAIttrj: SlIme (London: Wildwood House).
-- (1987) 'Elixirs', in M. Eliade;, ed. EAqr.loiJ*lia of Rr.Ugi.mt (New York: Macmillan);
reprinted in L. E. Sullivan Hidilm TrtIiJIj; Magic. AltJlem, tJfUi, IN 0uulJ (New York: Macmil-
-- (1995) and the KiJNxJlah (Dordrecht: Kluwer).
Crowley, A1dster (l90B) 'The Psychology of Hashi.h', ill Rt:gardie (1968).
--(1912) 'A Description of the Ca.rds of lhe Tarot', in I; 8.
-- (\916) 'An Improvemellt Upon Psychoanal}'llis', in 'I"Iu &uivaJ of MtJP:It lind oIJIer Essays
(Tempe: New Faf.::on, 1998).
- (1973) MDgidt (London: Routledge &:: Kc:pn Paw)
Dalbiez, Roland (1936) MetJwtl IJ.1lJi the Doctmu oj crans. T. F. Lindsay
(London: Loogmans. Green &: Co., 1941).
Dalcq, A. M. (1957) UJ Gfmtr-aJ crans. J. Medawar (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sitY Press).
Kurt (l9&>a) 'The History of Introspection Reconsidered', in]oumaI of IN HisUJry of IJIe

-- (1980b) 'Wundl and the Two Traditions of Psychology', in R.. W. Rieber, ed. WiUubn
aM IJIe MaJUng of a Scienlifoc Psyt;iuJ/bffJ (New York: Plenum Press).
Darwin, Charles (1859) The Origin (London: Penguin 1982).
-- (1958) Darz.tifl, 1809--1882, ed. Nora8arlow, (London: Collins).
Davy, MarieMadeleine (1977) L' a14 sym/Jofique I'lIIIIIJfU (Parit: l!1ammarion, 2nd edn).
De lancre, Pierre (1607) ik tles et (Paris: Aubio-, 1982).
Deleuze, Gilles 0945) 'Description ofWnrnan', trans. K. Faulkner, 2002.
--(194&) 'Mathese. Science et philOliophic', in Fren.:h edition of Malfatti (1845).
--(l946b) 'Statement and Profiles" trans. K. Faulkner, 2003.
-- EmpiricistA All F.wJ, O'/l Humis n--y of HufIl./m NIJJ.tm, trans. Con-
stantin v, Boundas (New York; Columbia Universit}'Press,l99I),
--i I953b) l1Utift£U tlt illSliltotions (Paris: Hacbelte). Preface in Of.
--(1955) 'Review ofJean HyPpolite, Logique et Existence', in Jean HyPpolite, ¥ and ElCit·
I.i!na.. tnus. uonard Lawlor and Amil Sen (Albany: State University of NewYork Press. 1997).
-- (1956) 'Bergson, 1859-1941', in DI.
-- ()956b) 'Bergson's Concept of Difference', trans. Melissa Mc.M3hon. in John Mullarltey cd.
T1J.e NmJ (Manchester. Manchestt:r Uuivel'!it)' PrelI8, 1999). Also in Of.
-- (1960) 'CoUI'S inedit de Gilles Deleme lIur la chapitre In de L'Eooillliim
LTi4trid, in F. Worms. ed., AJUUllils /1: Dtieuu., 14 Pill,
231 Bibliography
(With Felix Guauari)
-- (1972) and trails. Robert Hurlev, Mark Sc:em &Helen
R. Uinc (London: AthlQne 1984).
-- (1975)KajM: TOI.IHWd /I Mffuw Ltlerottlrt" trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis; of Min-
nesota Press, 1998).
-- (1980, A T1wusaIId PI.aUaus: CapIlali&m aM trans. Brian MaBSumi (Minneapo-
IiI: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).
(1991) Wh6t Graham Burchill & Hugh Tomlinson (Londnn: Vel'llO, 1994).
(With Qaire Parnell
--(1977) trans. Hugh Tomlinson &: Barbara HabbCljam (New York: Columbia Uni·
Press. 1987).
(1997) L' de Gi1l&s .DtI.tuze (video), dir: P-A, Boucang (Paris: EditioruJ de Montpar-
--(1961) 'From Sachc:r-Muoch to Masochism', tra.nB. C. April 2004.
-- (1961b) Ie naturalisme', in I, 19tH,
-- 096t) Ni8I:t.WIe alld trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone. 1983).
--(1963) 'The Idea of Gcnesia in Kant's Aestheua', trans. D. W. Smith. AnpII.W5:.3, 2000.
--096!lb) Klll7.tJ CrilWdPhiJDS<JPhJ, trans, Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone,
-- (1964) PwtIsI ;md Sip.s, lrlInS. Richard Howard (London: Athlone, 20(0).
--0966} trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Habberjam (NewYork: Zone Books. 1988).
(1967) Cold'll8SS aM Cnldty, trans. Richard Howard. in (New York: Zone 8o<>ks.
-- (1968) tranl. P. Pauon (London: Athlone, 1994).
-- (1968) in PhiJDSlJ/*J: tranl. Martin Joughin (N<e'W York: Zone Boob,
-- (1969) 1NJ l.AJp: ofSmse, lrans. Marl Lester et aL (London: Athlone Press. 1990).
-- (1972) 'How do we Recognise Str\lCUlralism?' trans. M. McMahon &: C. J. Stivale, in
C. J. StivaJe ed. 1NJ TlW-FoU. Thi.tughl tlfDtI.etiu;md (NewYork:: Guilford PreM. 1998).
-- (197!l) 'Nomad Thought', trans. D. Allison. in David B. ed. 'I'Ju New NiIlJ:u£l.,
(London: MIT Press, 1985).
(1978) 'Four Lessons on Kant', trans. Melissa McMahon, pUblished on 'Deleuze Web'.
-- (1980) 'Lcibniz' Seminar. trani. C. StivaJe. www.webde1euze.com.
(198l} Frorit:u &em: IU la (Paris: Editions de Minuit), traruI. D. W. Smith
JIll Fta.nci.I &Ictm: 1NJ ¥ ofSi!f1s1Jlilm (London: Continuum, .
--(1981) tran,. Roben Hurley (San Francisco: Qty Ughlll,l988).
-- CWma 1: 1NJ MbVeI1lIInt Iflll.l(e. 1ra1lS. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbal'a Habbetjam
(London: Athlone Pre9II, 1986).
-- (1985) emma 2: The trans. Hugn Tomli.nson and Barbara Habbetjam (London:
Athlone PreIs, 1989).
--(1988) •A Philoeophical Concept', tran,.Julien Deleu7..e. in E. Cadaw.. ed. W1w Cm!ta IJfti:r the
(London: Routledge. 1991).
--(1988) 'I'Ju JiWd: 1..IibflUIJM W &l:roquH. tran,. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nerola l'res3,
(1990) l!'uu.fparlnsl, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University
-- tl99!) E'.J.saojs Cri.li.c.a1 aM trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco
(Minneapolia: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
-- (1995) 'Immanence: A Life ... ',trans. Nick Millett, in TIwiry. Ctd.ft.m! alld&lciay 14,1997.
--(2002) Desert./slands aM0tAer TQtls, 1953-1974, ed. D. Lapoujade, trans. M. Taonnina (New
York: Selmolext(e). 20M),
Two Rtgi1lUS of MaJ.NSS: Ttz1s afI.d 1975-1995. ed. D. Lapoujade, trans. A.
Hodges and M. Taonnina (N<e'W York.: Semiotell.t(e), 20(6).
1 Mullarkey ed.
ll't, trans. Con-
E. Forsccr ed..
ldon: Collins).
: Aubief. 1%2).
&g'j (Paris: PUF,
Jxfnrd Univer-
T. F. Undsay
vols. (London:
. Univ<':l"lIitAires
Mass.: Harvard
I. 1966).
Nilliam Picker-
l1.: Macmillan);
.York: Matmil-
1UISLs 41 a Sctm-
De Quince,., Thomas (1821) of an English opium EiM6 (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books. 1987).
- (1845) 'Suspiria de l'rofundis', ell.ttaetin De Quincey (1821).
Rene (1644) 'Principles of PhilOllOphy', traIlA. John Gouingham, Robert Stoothoff and
DUgald Murdoch, in The ofIHst6l1is, I (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univelllity Pre!Ia, 1985).
Diamond, Solomon (2001) 'Wundt Before Leipzig' , in 1l W. Rieber Wil.Wm K;mdt 4ftlI11v
ofIi StVnIijit: (NewYork: Plenum Presa, 1980).
Drever,James (1921) ImtiDd ill Man (Cambridge: Cambridge Univel'llity Press).
Dyck, Martin (1959) NuvolI.s (North Carolina: Chapel Hill).
Eliade, Mircea (1956) T1I.t FOflluM the Ctutiblt, tranll. S. Corrin (NewYork: Harper; 1971).
- (1974) 'The Occult and the Modem World', in Omdftsm, aM CtJlttmll FiUJliIJm
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976).
-- (1987) 'What i, Alchemy?', in M. Eliade, of /W.igiMl (New York, Macmillan),
reprinted in L, E. Sullivan, HilUm 1luth.J: Map:. IJM 1111! Omlll (New York: Macmil-
Ellenbel'ger, Henri F. (1970) The oj the T1I.t 1fi&tDry aM Evollllion of DyAamu:
(London: Penguin Books).
- (1995) &,mt.d the lJMl.IIseitlw: ofHtmri F. FJWergtr iii 11v Histmy of ed. Mark
S. MicaJe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Un.iversity Presa),
EncalJllle. Philippe (1949) ScitrIaJ.1 0a:tdIes (Pam: Oeia).
Esrohatodo, Antonio (1996) AItriIfHistmy oflJrvKs, tnml. :Kenneth Z. Symington (Vermont: Park
Street Pre!Ia).
Evam, Richard (1975) K.omutJ Lomr.z.: T1I.t Mtm aru1 HU Idlas (New York: Ihn:oun Brace
EvoIa,Julill8 (1968) 1'111 Yllp ofPowtr. TMItnl, SWIi, arull1vS«m WIIJ> tranll. G. Stucco (RochC:llter,
Vermont: Inner lhlditiom). [Fim Italian edition. 19251.
-- (1969) Em arul tilt M,Wria of LIiw: lIu Mlllap4JSia Of SI:f (Vermont: Inner
Traditions, 1991)
--(1971) lUGdfldiun to Map: RW4lsmuI ProaiuJl for the MtlpS. tnma. Guido Stucco
(Rochester. Vermont: Inner Traditiooa. 20(1).
Fabre,jean-Henri (1918) Tilt WmulMt oflfUtiftct, trans. A. T. de Mattoi and B. Miall (London: T.
Fillher Unwin).
-- (1920) (Pari!; Vol. n.
Faivre, Antoine and Hanegraff, Wouter J (1998) 'Introduction', in Woi!S/.mI EsottriI:iml. tm4 Uu
&iena ofRJIigioo (Gnoslic.a 2) (La.rven: Peer.ellll·
Faivre. Antoine (1996) P1lilo5ophie tU lo. 1IIJtUt!: Phyliqut s.tJafe It siirM (Paris:
Albin Michel).
--(1998). 'QueatiOI1.tl of Tenninology Proper to the Study ofEsoteric Currenti in Modtm and
Contemporary Europe', in A. Faivre Be W. J. Hanegyaff eda. Esottirid&m and 1111!
qjRtligitm (GnOlluca 2) (Leuven: Peeters).
fecbner, GuttaY Theodore (18gtj) 'The Litde Book of Life after Death" t:rans. M. Wadsworth. in
G. T. Fechner Lift ofti:r1JlatJt (New York; Pantheon, 1ge).
-- (ISS}) Zend-Avesta: Uber die Dinse do Himmels und desJeneem (Leipzig: Vou); parts
traI.Ulated in FdlvI; Lip 1tft61l1rdd1, tnna. M. Wadsworth and G. Jolas (NewYork: Pantheon.
--(1860) F.IemtmU qj Volume I, traIlA. IL E. Adler (New York: He'Ilry Holt, 1966).
- (l860b) E1ImmMd6 Volume D (Leipzig: 8reitkopf Be Hanel).
- (1875) Ia- wr SdiOpjuflgr tmd IJmwith.lIl"'If/.Sl,lfSdIirJue d6 (Leipzig: Bre-
itk.opf Be Hi:nel).
- (1879) Die der (Leipzig: Breitkopf Be Hartel),
- (1946) Jl8litUIfl qj a S&ditnuftom Gtul8v Th. F«.IIJIer, ed. Ie t:rans. W. Lowrie (New
York: Pantheon) (Includo extraela from On tbt Hp.1 Good, NtmfUJ qr 1111! P1ydric Lift of
Pf41ttJ, Urid-Awsta, CoMIJnIiIIg Soe&U, The 7'Jm" MoIitJtJs, aM 11v na,.w.w amIro. 1111! Nip4
Vi<IoJ) .
232 Bihliograph)'
Ferenczi, Sandor (1913) 'Stages in the Development of the Sense ofReali ty' , in Ferenczi, Fml em..
lI'ibwiIm.s 10 1I"lln6. EmestJonea (London: Kamac, 20(2).
- (1924) Th4I.tusa.. A 'l'JI,eorj /ifGmitalllJ (London: Maresfield Library 1989).
Finster, Reinhard; Hunter, Graeme; McRae, Robert; Miles, Murray &: Seager, William. eda. (1988)
Ui/miz. LD:iam (Hildesheim: OIIl'W-Weidmann).
F1etther, Ronald (1968) Ins.tind itt M.tm (London: Unwin).
Freud, Sigmund (192") lRtredudimt II lflI tnlnI. S.Jankflevitch (Parill: Payotl.
- (l955-1974) 1MSltmtImdEdititm oftIw Ct1mpltII# WtrisofSigrmmIl 'JInrud. ed. James
Stnu:hq in coUaboration with Anna Freud aBIiItA:d by ADx Stracbq and Alan 'I;Ion, t:ranlI. j.
StnIchey, 24 vola. (lDndon: Hogarth Prell and the Institute ofPlllychoanat,m).
--(1987) A FI1.flIMy: 0rJwviem /if tilt '1trJIn.sf1lf'tlf1t'A trans. Ibe Crubrich-5imitis
(Cambridge, Maas.: Hanrani Univemtf Prete).
Freud, Sigmund andjung, Carl Gulla\' (1975) 1'fII Fmul/juRgUUmtraIls. RaJph Manheim and R.
F. C. Hull, ed. William McGuire (London: Routledge).
Gardner, Sebastian (1991) 'The Unconscious', in Jerome Neu, ed. 1M It;
JiFnul (Cambridge: Cambridge Univenicy Pre:Illl).
Gauld, Alan (1992) A HiI'tory t" (Cambridge: Cambridge Univel"lily Prell).
G1aaenapp, Helmuth von (1000) of 1JUli4 {Das DttJI.sdltr tranJl. S. Ambike
(New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relalions, 1m).
Goldstein, Kurt (19!9) '1lu A Ho/isJir; AptJrrKzdI. III BiDI.tJr1lJf!rivf4ft- &16 in
MIm (NewYork: Zone Boob, 1995).
Gordon, Pierre (1949) S. and tranl. Rente and Hilda Spodheim (New York: Social
Science:ll Publiahenl).
Gould, Stephen jay (1977) (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard Unl'
vel"lity PI'elIlI).
Grant. Kenneth (1972) '1lu MIIIfiaJl RevivoJ (London: Muller).
Guaita., SWliaias de (1890) Au iIUil du (Paris: Cacri). First edition 1886.
- (l89l) U SiIIf-i tU la pMM.l: u T. MSatIm (Paris: DumUe, 1915),
Guattari, Fl!lix (2006) TIll Po;m. tran8. Kilina Golll1llll (Nc:wYork: 8emiol.e][t(e».
GuCnon, Rene (1947) Rmcw of J. M.alfatti de Montereggio. LtJ MIJl1It.se, reprinted in
Rm4w (Paris: Villain et Relbomme,
Gunter, Pete A. Y. (1982) 'Rerpon andJung', reprinted in P. Bishop, ed. Jaflf itt. Umitrxis (999).
Haage, Rernard D. (2005) 'Alchemy II: Antiquity-12th cenwry', in W. Hanegra.a.II, ed.,
DiaiDnary oJGnD.W: tmd (Leiden; Brill).
Haeellel, Ernst (1874) 1M.Evolwiml ifMa'JI, tl'3nt.J McCabe (London: Wat1.ll, 1905).
Hallward, Peter (2006) Out /iflhis World: lltIIu%l and tIw ofCmJliorJ (London: Venol.
Hanl12Y, Alauair (2001) A (Cambridge: Cambridge Univenrity Press).
Harvey, David Allen (2005) atIIi PolW:t itt. MoUrn Ft-tutu (Dekalb:
Northern illinois Univemty Prete).
Halfield, Gary (2003) 'Plychology Old and New', in T. Baldwin, cd. TIll Call1bridgrl Hislory ofMotlItm
1870-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univel'llicy Prell).
Haule,John R (1984) 'From Somnambulism to the Archetypes: The French Roo13 ofJung's Split
with freud', in P. Bishop, ed.}tmgil'l (1999).
Hegel, CeollJ Wilhelm Friedrich (1805-6) HtglIl tmd tIw Hu_ spiriI.: A of tJIl jetuJ
Lttd.vnJs tm t1uI of Spirit. tran8. L. Rauch (Detroit: Wayne State Univenity Prell,
- (1807) 1M ofspirit. tnlnI. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford Urtivemcy Preu, 1977).
- (lMl) ifltighJ.. ed. and tran8. A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
Univenrity Prall,l99l).
--(l84{}) 'LiJt:tunJ:f OIl tJv HisIBry tlfPIIi1DsopJty, yolume m. uana. E. S. Haldane and F. H. SimMOIl
(London: Kegan Paul,l896).
Heidegger, Martin (1927) 1WfIgIm4 TillV, trans.). Macquarrie and E. Robinson (Oxford: Black·
well, 1962).
Heidelberger, Miclw!! (2004) NIJt.wf from Guuav v-JiJr FtdI_ and hil: PfIJt:Iwtihy.riml
tnlnI. C. K10hr (Pittllburgh: UniveBitf of Pill.burgh).
l, 11166).
: Inner
ie (New ,
It (Paris:
\ern and

rt Brace
Int: Park
Hofmann, Albert (1980) LSD: My Probkm ChiJil (New York: McGraw-Hili).
Holland, Eugene W. (1999) DeI.e!J.'u a'I4 lfllroduailm 1.11
(London: Routledge).
Hone,Joseph (1971) W. B. Y«us 1865-1939{London: Penguin Books).
Hopkins (1982) 'Introduction: PhilO8Ophyand Psychoanalysis', in FMays OK Freud
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Horder, T. J. ' Wilkowski,J. A. and Wylie, C. C. (1985) A History (Cambridge: Cam·
bridge Univel"llity PrClilJ).
Howe. Ellie (1972) TN ejtJu Gelilerz DIWJ'1I (London:
Hughes, Ted (1997) T.jmm 0rJi4 (London: Faber Be Faber).
Hume. David (1"9) A 1ftdliu o{Ht.eman NIJttmI (Oxford: Oarendon Prl:$$, 1888).
Hyppolite. Jean (1946) Gerusis and oj HlfJIls of Spi.riI, trans. Samuel
Chemiak andJohn Heckman (Evanlwn: Northwc:ste:rn University Pre., 19'14)
--(l949a) 'Ou 8ergsonisme Hexistemialisme', in]. Hyppolite. Rpm4t 1.4 pemtt
(Paris: PUFI Quadrige. 1991, vol. I).
-- (l949b) 'VarioUJI Aspects of Memory in Bergson'. trans. A. V. Colman. in Uonard La.wlor
1'IIe C1ralImgt of&rpmism (London: Continuum, 2(03).
(1971) icriI.s 19J1-196$('1lIme1 & 0) (Quadridge: PUF).
Idel, Moshe (1%8) KiJbIKJlaA: New (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univenity Press).
Introvigne, Massimo (2001) 'Anwine Faivre: Father of Q:;ntemporary Vampire StJJdies', in
'Richard Caron, Godwin. Wouter Hanegraaf and jean-Louis VieiUard-Baron, eda.
GnoJts & (Leuven: Pecten).
Ja.cque!rChaquin, Nicole (1982) 'Introduction' co Pierre de Lancre, Tdbltau de de5
!lI(lIlvaUt o. Ill. d.mlonl (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne).
Jann. Dse (1994) 'On the Origin of Romantic Biology and il.'l Furdler Ikvelopment at the Uni-
versity ofJena between 1790 and 1850'. in S. Poggi an!! M. BoMi, eda. in Sa.mt..e
(Dordrechc Kluwer).
James, William (1909a) A Pluralislit: UnilAll'.'ill (London: University of Nebraska PreM, 1996).
-- (100gb) 'Confidences of a Psychical Researcher' ('Final Impreuions of Psychical
Researcher'], MetMriaJ a'lUl SlwlUs (NewVork: Long:m.a.ns. Green, 1911).
(1911) 'A Pluralistic M)'stic', in a'lUl Sludits.
Janet, Pierre (1889) L' automiI.tisme (Paris: Evreaux).
--(190!l) La tNJsessWns eJ. lo. psydtmlJlhUt. vols. (Paris: A1can).
-- (1920) 'La Tension psvchologique. ses degt"t'e8, ses Olldllations', in BriliJ.h jOl.ll"fUJl ol
MddiallSedUm, Vol. 1(1920-1).
-- (1924) 'Les Souvenirs Iniels', Arc:hWt:I III vol. 19, 1925.
-- (1928) L' tl.t La m8miJjre lit tl.t lo. noUImdu le.mfJs (Paris: Chahine).
Jankeleviteh. Vladimir (1959) Henri.B87gstm (Paris: PUF; orig. edn. 1931).
Jolley, Nicholas (1984) Leilmi.r.i2n.d Lndlt.-\ Slud, ojtJuNewEssays un Hu_
Clarendon Press).
Jung, Carl Gustllv. 'TIw: Co/Jtat.d Wmis ofC. G. jung, trans. R. F. C. Hull, ed. Herbert Read t1 oJ. (New
York and I'rinceton. Bollingen Series 20,1958-821),21 vols.
--(1961) MtwIMiLI, Dnlams, &jliJailMs, InUls. R. and C. Winston. ed. A.J:affe (London: Fontana,
1967) .
--(1973) Let.tm 1: 1906-.J9.5D. trans. R. F. C. Hull, ed. G. Adler (London: Routledge).
Jung. Carl Gustav and Pauli, Wolfgang (1955) 0/Nattm 1J'IUll1le [t.ra.nslation
of u'lUl PJ,c1ul, J952J, trans. R. F. C. Hull and P. Silz (London: Routledge Be
)(egan Paul).
Kant, Immanuel (1763) 'Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negatille Magnitudes into PhilO!lQ-
ph)". in 1755-1770.
(1772) 'Letter to Marcus Hen', in CorrtJpIl1Jl1Jma, trans. A. Zweig (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univel"llity Press, 1999).
--(1772) Aralhmpokigyjmma Pm1!lofVIiIUJ, trans. Viewr Lyle Dowdell (Carbondale and
Edwardsville: Southern D1inois Univenil}' Pras.1978).
-- New Elw:id.tJJ.iofl en l1le ml of CogoJi.liMI. ill
234 Bibliography
235 Bibliography
1755-1770, trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
--(178111787) Oriri'ltlUf1Vt&osim, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cam·
bridge UnivenilV Press,I997).
-- (1790) of (including First Introduction), trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Cam-
bridge: Hacken,l987).
Kerr, john (1994) A MIlSl Mefhod: The Slur! Dfjtm.g, Fm.ul, and Sabma spi8lrein (London:
Sindair-8tevenson, 1994).
Kenlake, Christian (2002) 'The Vertigo of Philosophy: Deleuu: and the Problem of Immanence',
in RoiIlcal PhiJosDphy 113, MayIjune.
-- (2004) 'Rebirth through Incest Deleuze's EarlyJungianism', in Angelaki:juumalo[/he n--
Hu_ni&s. 9: I. .
(2005) 'Transcendental Cinema: Dekuze. Time and Modernity', in Radical PhiJosopiry 130,
March!April 2005.
Kierkegaard, Soren (184301.) j01umfllS ClimaI:w. trans. Howa.rd V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Prince·
ton, N); Princeton UnivenilV Press, 19851.
--tl84!lb) A IImtuT1! in PryeJwlDgy, trans. Howard V. Ho.ig and Edna H
Hong (PrincetOn, N]: Princeton University PrellS, 19831.
(l843c) Eil.1ur!Or, lI'l1J\S. Al3Iltair Hannay (London: Penguin Books, 1992).
(1844) TJu C<ma:ps of trans. Reidar Thomr.e (PrincetOn, N]: PrincetOn Universicy
Press, 1980).
--(1844) trans. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong, (Princeton,l'{J: Princeton
Univeraicy PrelliS, 1985),
KlOll8OWllki, Pierre (1969) NitWthl'. aMIIu Vu:iDw Cin:U.. trans. Daniel W. Smith (London: Athlone,
Press 1997).
KnOIt, Jean (200') AtwA"IMnt, Aooly.w: }trngJ8fl hJr.1loJbgf and IIu E1IIIIpIt Mirul
(London: Brunner-Routledge).
Kohn, Marek (1987) NIPt_ia: On H-m (London: Faber &-: Faber).
Lacan,Jacques (1951) 'Intervemion on the Transference', inJ. Mitchell andJ. Rose, -ed&, FttIlinif14
(London: Macmillan, 1982).
--(1953-4) I: FnnJJ Papm l1fI, trans. john Forrester, ed.Jacques-Aiain Miller
(London: W. W. Norton &: 00.,1991).
- (l954-5i SemiftllT //: Tht EgD ill Fmud's 1'Iuw1ry and mIIu T&:hflique of trans.
Sylvana TOIlla8eIli, ed,jacques-Alain Miller (London: W. W. Norton &-: Co., 1991).
-- (1955-6) &minar IH: The trans. RU!i!leli Grigg, ed.jacques-Alain Miller (London:
--(1956-7) l...8Shninam, Li:unI (ParilI: EditionsduSeuil,I998).
Unpublished translation by Conn.ac Gallagher.
- (1959-1960) TJu EIJIia of The f>f}1JIiIfUi!S 1.A&oo, &DIe VII, trans. Dennis
Porter (London: Rout:lroge, 1999).
(1966) &nt.s. trans. Bruce Fink (London: W. W. Nomn &-: Co" 2004).
(2001) Attms kriLl (Pans: Editions du Seui\).
Lacey, A. 'R. (1989) &tgson (London: Routledge).
LaD.age, AltaJ. (1978) 0«uJt A Df.Jtmgi.tm and lll8 Mildem Qabalah
(Minnesota: Uewellyn Publications)
LaIande,Andti (l960) ed. 8th edn (Pam: PUF, 1900).
Laplanche, jean (1970) LijI and Df4I4 hi trans. J. Mehlmann (Baltimore: johns
Hopkins University, 1976).
(1989) New fur crans. D. Macey (Oxford: Blackwell).
Laurant,jean-¥ierre (1992) VJklhume CJrretien snFrtmuQU 'X1'X£SWd4 (Paris: L'Age d'homme).
Law1or, leonard (2003) The of (London: Continuum).
Lawrence, D. H. (1m) FII1ll4ritz of tile and arulllu (Har·
mondswortb: Penguin, 1971).
Lee, Matt (2003) 'Memories ofa Sorcerer. Notes on Gilles Deleme, Felix Guattari, Austin Osman
spare and AnomaloWl Sorceries', in Jm,;maI.'M/he of MagH;, 1.
nco Philosc>-
ridge: Cam·
':ng (Oxford:
)()ndale and
a Psychical
at the Uni-
m: Fontana.,
ddal.. (New
Lard Lawlor
(oudedge &:

Sl1.ldiea', in
lamn, eds.
Lefebure, MoUy (1974) S.utl A BondtIfr afopiwn (London: Gollancz).
Leibniz, Goufried Wilhelm (1686) 'Discoune on Metaph}'lriCll', in F.r.sa,s. tranll- and
ed. R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolill: Hackett, 1989).
--(l686b) 'ASpecimen ofDi.lcoveries about Marvellous Sccn:llI ofNamre in General', in PhilD-
sopIri£al ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (London:j. M. Dent, 1m).
--(l686--7) 'Letk:nl to Amauld', in
--(1697) 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things'. in Pllil&ophk.aJ.E.uap..
- (1710) tJ:anlI. E, M. Huggard (La Salle: Open Court, 1985).
--(1714) 'Principles of NatUf'e and Grace', in
--(l714b) 'The Principles of PhilOiOpby, or, The Monadology', in Phi.losopJUUJl E&s4'p.
<1765) NtIJ! lm1MHtf.fNJfI trans. P. Remnant andJ. Bennett (Cambridge:
Cambridge Unm:l'lIity PreI&,1996).
-- (1969) PIUlosop1liml. Po.f1m 4flll LtIters, trafl$. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: D, Reidel Pul>-
Leaky, Ema (1976) T1u VllmM Mmical St:MtJl I)/IM 19th Cmlury (Baltimore: John. Hopkins Uni-
¥emty Pn:sa).
Le Vay, Simon (1993) T1u SA-.l Brain (Cambridge, M.a.IlI..: MIT Preu).
Levi, Eliphas (1896) 71uJ KLyojtJu trans. A. Crowley (wndon: Rider, 1959).
I.bi-StrallSll, Gaude (1950) IfttmdtJtliJJfl /I) 1M Won\ ojMaral Matill, rrans. Felicity Baker (London:
Roudedge 8c Regan Paul, 1987).
-- (1958) Sl:ruduml trans. Qair:e JacobAon and 8rooke Gll1ndfest Schoepf
(London: PenKUin Books,
Iby, Bernard-Henri (1977) Ls BarlJarit jj Vas. HUM" (Paria: GI'Ullet).
UpowIId, ZbigniewJ, (1990) lJeirium: Acr.c.IIJ SIata (Oxford: Oxford University Praa).
Locke, John (1690) All Essay Omumm, HU1III.lII ed. Roger Woolhouae (London:
Penguin Books. 1997).
u,gu:. traIl$. R. S. Hartmann and Wolfgang Schwan (Indianapolill; Hackett).
Long, CharlC$ H. (1987) 'Cosmogony', in M. Eliade ed. TIu ofR6lipm, 4.
Lorenz, Konrad (l9!9) 'The Comparative Study of Behavior', in K. Lorenz and P. Leyhll.llllen,
ofH_auAnimal '&1lavibr. All VUw, tranl!. 8. Tonkin (NewYork: Van
Nostrand Reinhold, 1973).
-- (1950) 'Pan and Pa.r:e.el in Animal and Human Societies', in StwUt:s in AnilllGl and H1A'JII(J'I
2, trans. R. Martin (London: Methuen,197l).
1.oIIllky, N. O. (1936) 'Three Ch.apten from the: History of Poliab Messianism', in Intemaoonal
Philosophical Library (1'tagut:), vol. n, no. 9.
wwry. Malcolm (1947) lhuI6rJu V&lumo (lDndon: Penguin Books. 1962).
-- (1996) Sumun UmW CD1IId«l Ltitttws (Jf Mo1aJlm lArury, e:d. S. E. Grace (London: Jonathan
Cape), 2 \'alB.
Lowrie, Walter (1946) ed., R.rlIgioft of II &itmtiJL Selections from GU!ltaV Th. (New York:
Pantheon BooIl5).
Lucie-Smith, Edward (1972) Sym/JI1I.isl An (London: ThamC$ 8c HUlbon).
Luk.icll, Georg (196!) TMDtsmu:t.Wm of tranI. Po Palmer (London: Merlin Prca;s, ]980).
McGowan, Todd (2004) 1MEnd(JjDi.ulJJiJjtu:timt, Loamand 1ME-PtfS«itt} IJj
(Albany, NY: State Unift:nity of New York. Pr_).
McGuire, William and Hull, R. F. C. (eds) (1980) . C tmd Encoufttm
(London: Picador).
MdnlOllh, Christopher (1972) EJjpIaas l.ioi and l1tI Fmu:h Oavlt Rzvival (London: Rider).
McRae, Robert (1976) l..filmiI.: PImlJ'lItm, aM. Thou.gfu (Toronto: Univel'llity ofToronto
Maidenbaum, Aryeh and Marcin, Stephen A. (em) (1991)
and (London: Shambhala).
Main, Roderick (1997) ed. jfmg MI. and INParmumnol (London: Routledge).
Malfatti de Montereggio.Johann (1809) EfIIvN.fjIIilItrr /JUS dtr EvolutUm w.ul &oolufitm
dG l...tiNm.s (Vienna: Wappler and Beck).
--(1845) Stwiillll fJhIr und Hi1!rardU4 dG wm.ms. _ bt.sontItIm atifilU MttJicm
236 Bibliography
237 Bibliography
(LeipJig: Brockhallll). Thula. into French lIS .tIU" la frI.ilIIlN. /lU QlI4fl:/Ut et dela
SI:iIMr (Paris: Editions du Griffon D'Or, 1946).
MalinOWlki, Brani&law (1927) SlJt4ft4 mStlmgttSocii!tJ (London: Routledge).
- (1929) TIM&:wal 'Lift iJfSisrJtIfG • N",.WaIcm (London: Routledge).
Mandler,Jean (1992) 'Howto build a baby D: ooncepl:l.la1 primiti_', in R#vW99: 4.
Martin. C. B. &: DeulScller, Max (1966) 'Remembering', in Revilw 75: 4.
M.anin.Jean-Piem: (2005) Hmri MiduI.wt: (Paris: GaUimard).
(1985) ed. Tht Com/Jl* Lt#mofSiptm4FmuI to (Cambridge, Maet.:
Ihrvard Univenity Preta).
Meiilner, W. W. (1962) 'The Problem of Pliychoph)'liQl: Bergson's Critique', in]tII.I7'1U1l of GmmJl

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1945) The of tram. C. Smith (London: Roul-
ledge, 1962: rev. 1979).
Michaux, Henri (1956) Mimdt, trans. Louise Vareae and Anna Moschovakis (New York:
Review Boob, 20(2).
--(1964) Iftjiflilg 2nd edition, trans. M. Fineberg (London: Calder &: BovaIB, 1975).
(1966) ThtMajor OrfIeulsiJflluMtNt f!l1Iu Mi_OIu:s. Irans. Richard Howard (New
York: Harcourt Brace, 19'14).
-- (1968) &Iet:UtJ RWli. trana• .R. Ellman (NewYork: New Directionl).
-- (1994) 1lmftItm MOlAIS: An HIMi MiduJ'UZ 1927-1984, ed. D. Ball (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Preta).
Miller,Jacque.-Alain (1900) 'An Introduction to Seminars I and U', in I and lI,
cds. .R. Feldstein, B. Fink. and M.Jaanua (Albany, NY: State Univeooty of New York Prellll).
MiltDn.Jetrry B. (1993) 'Theory and Data Pertinent to the Reialiolllhip between Heterozygosity
and FilDeM', in Thornhill (l99!l).
MinkoWllki, Engine (1932) 'u des hallucinations et Ie probleme de J'espat:e', in
lion PIyJIi8triqw. IV (2): 3.
- LiwtI. aM tranll. N. (EvaDllton:
Nonhwear.em University Preas, 1970).
Monrgomery, Robert E. (1994) T.W D. H. I...Bwrma: .BIJlnuI andAn(Camhridge:
Cambridge University Preas).
Moore, F. C. T. (1999) 'Magic', inJ. Mullarkey, ed., Tht NtIJJ B6gJmI (Manchester: Manchester Uni-
veI'llity Preta. 1999).
Miiller, Niklaa (1822) GItJubera, Wi.ssm 1md KHlW tier a1Jm HiMw (Leipzig; EditiON Leipzig; 1968
Murphy, Timothy S. (1996) 'Bibliography of the WorkllOfGilla Deleuze' in Patmn (1996).
Nietz8clle, Friedrich (1878) HU1Nl7I IIil kID HtJ.-. trans. R. J. HolUngdale (Cambridge: Cam-
hridge University Preas, 1986).
-- (1881) tranl. .R.J. HoUingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University PreM, 1997).
-- (1884; fourth volume 189%) TIIUf spau 7Dro.thwtra, tranl. .R. 1- HoUingdale (London:
Penguin Books, 1969).
- (1887) 011 1M oJMI1fTI1.s. trana. W. Kaufman (NewYork: Vintage, 1967).
--(1967) 17It Will III Por-, tranI. W. Kaufinann and ItJ. Hollingdale (NewYork: Random House).
Novalia (1802) Htiaridi von 0ftmlInI!m, traruL. Palmer Hilty (D1inois: Prospect Heights, 1992).
(1966) WIIie, Gerhard Schulz, ed. (Miinchen: Beck,I969).
- (1984) to 1MNiP4 t.ran!I. Dick Higlllll (NewYork: McPherson" Co.).
-- (1997) lrans. Marpret Mahony 5toljar (Albany: State University of
New York Prellll) •
Otr.en, Charlotte F. (ed.) (1987) A L'jtG'AI1rrof1:J Rm.tler: mWaum Gt.dR.ifl! (New York:
Syracuse University Preas).
Ovid. Irani. M.lnnea (London: Penguin Boob, 1955).
Padoux, Andre (1990) VIi4:: 17It Dmuf1I of. Won:l in Stlt!t:Ud HtNt" T4'IIhs, t.ran!I. J. Gonlier
(Albany: SUNIJ).
--(2002) 'What do we mean by Tantrilm?', in K.A. Harper and ltL Brown, eda, TIM RDl1tII oj
nr:.um (Albany. SUN\').
rsity P.!88).
e (London:
ReideJ Pub-
. of Toronto

(New York:
"",York: Van
opkinl Uni-
:r (London:
r:al', in JlIIilo.
l; tram. and
Papus (1894) 'La Doctrine d'Eliphu Levi', Appendix to Eliphlli Levi, 1.4 Liurr dLs Sf1limde!m (Paris:
Chamuel, 1894).
(1901) What is OuuIlismhrans. F. RDthwell (London: Rider, 1913l.
Pauon, Paul (ed.) (1996) Ddeur.t: A CriBaJI R.6tJder (Oxford: Blackwem.
Paz, Octavio (1967) 'Introduction' to Michaux, MisertJM# Mirade (N\': NewYork Review of Books,
Peckham, George W. and Elizabeth G. (1905) W4IfJS SoOOl afI4 SoliUlry (Westminster: Archibald
Constable &: Co.L
Penna, Antonio Gomes (1988) '8ergson'$ Critique of Fechner', inj. Broiek and H. Gundlach G.
1: F6dmer and PsydwlDgJ (Passau: Passavia UnivenriutlVerlag).
Perry, Marvin (1996) Am.oUl _lhe WesllJrn Tradition (New Yort.: Peter Langl.
Philipon, Rene (1899) Stallillas 4e GtuJila eI. omilte (Paris: Darbon).
Pignarre, Philippe & Stengers, Isabelle (20051 1.4 capilalisie (Paris: Decouverte).
Pippin. Roben B. (1987) 'Kant on the Spontaneil.V of Mind', in 17:
(1989) HtgrIls ldilaJism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pressl.
PLato (1956) and MDW, traans. W. K. C. Guthrie (London: Pen!fllln Booksl.
Poe, Edgar AJlan (1845) 'The Ful'll in the Case ofM. Valdemar', in E.A. Poe. The FalloflheHDUSI
o!UJherand Other (!...ondon: Penguin Books, 1986).
--(1846) ioI At1ict.IlD Mortis (!...ondon: Short &: Co.)
Prndines, Maurice (1943) T11lue 4e ghI#rtJIt (Paris).
Price, H. H. (1941) 'Henri Bergson', in of lite Soci4tJ ft1r PncAwl &uarr:h, vol. XLVl.
- (1942) The!WrrJI ftrr Truth: MJ Lifefor Rawth (London: Collins).
Prochl$ (1910) A Com\01lll'fl.t8ry 0'1 liteFmt BooII ofE'UdidsE1tmmtJ, tr.lnll, G. Morrow (Princeton,
Princeton University Press).
Pryse,James Morgan (1910) TIlt (London:]. M. Walkina).
Rioch, Christian (1992) TItIlJidfmt.q.ry of SacrlId and MagiaJl PltmtI, trans. john Baker (Dorset:
Prism Press).
Regardie,lsrad (1964) TheAI1 and (Cheltenham: Helios, 1971).
- (1968) lWAwtrJ liteSttmt; An hiI:rodut:linn to AleUttr CfTlfJIII:,'$ /1'1 t1u I'J! H4ShWI
(Minnesota: Uewellvn Publications).
Reggio, David (2004) 'jean MalIatli de Montereggio: A Brief Introduction', article published at
http://www.goIdtmiths.ac.uk/depanmenl$/hiRory/ne:ws--evenlll/ mal&t1Unlro.php.
Reid, Thomas (1785) 'Of Mr. I...ocke's Account of our Personal Identity' (from Chapter 4, 'Of
Memory', in F.l.sf¥JS 1m th4 Powm of Man), reprinted inJ. Perry, ed. ItlmUij
{Berkeley; University of California Press, 1975},
Ricoeur, Paul (1965) FmuJ. and Philost>jllr1" An &si.ly on lntlrfml.ab.tm, trans. D. Savage (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970).
Ridley, Matt (1993) The RMl QuM1: Sa: tmd lite EvtJlulfqn of H'IlfIIIlfl NaI:U.f't (London: Penguin
Roudinesco, Elisabeth (2000) Jaet{WJS Laum & Co.; A History of in FrIJ1lU, 192'-1985,
tJG.ns. jef&-ey Mehlman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),
Rowland, Susan (2002) jJmg: A FIJtIini..st &uisi.tm (Cambridge: Polity).
Ruse, Michael (2002) 'Evolutionary Biology and Teleological Thinlclng', in A.. Anew I!t aJ., cds.
Nt/li Essays in the lif and BiI:II4tD (Oxford: Oxford Universil.V
Russell, Bel'1:rand (1900) The ofL..ribniz (London; Routledge, 1992l
(1910) 'The Monistic Theory of Truth', in PhilM<l/IhUaJ Essays (!...ondon: Longmans, Green
&: Co).
(192l) ThtAncUyPs of Mtnd (!...ondon: George Allen &: Unwin).
Ruyer, Raymond (1958) La gtIIIbe dLs furmes virJallllJs (Paris: Plammarionl.
--(1959) 'Berpon dIe Sphex ammophile', in &vtu tUMito:pIrJ. et de MIMJIe, 64: 2.
-- (1988) 'There ill no Sulxonscious: Embryogenesis and Memory', trans. R. Scott Walker, in
fMgmts 142 (Summer).
238 Bibliography
Samuels, Andrew (1993) 11re PllIiIil;lJl hyclae (London: Routledge).
Scbelling, F. W.J. (1857) Sdmmtlklll 00/. 12: tW (Stutlgan.:j. C. Col-
- (1994) afJd the EfJdgallltIJfTluory: '!M£t EJslllJS by F. W. J Lr:lns. Thomas Pfau
(Albany: State Universicy of New York PretS).
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1850) 'Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Oelibera.l.enest III the
Fate of the Individual'. in PlJ11Ifia afJd vol. I, trall8. E. r. J. Payne (Oxford:
Oarendon Press. 1974).
-- (1844) Till WmidlLl Klll and 2 Vols, trans. E. F.1- Payne (New York: Dover,
Sedgwick., Mark. (20()4) Against the MOIUrn World: Tn:uJitiMu.Ilism and thI Semt lnull«twJl. HuJ.bry 1)/
I1u TW81ltilth Ge>Itwy (Oxford: Oxford UnivenitvPress).
Shamdaaani, Sonu (1990) 'A Woman called Fl"3nk', in Spring: A]uumal ofArr.hIiyptand CtJ.i.tli.re. vol
-- (1995) 'Memories, Dreams, Omissions', reprinted in P. Bishop, ed.Ju1lfI11'1.
-- (2003) ]'Imgand tJw Maktng ofMOIkm Ps'jclloltigJ (Cambridge: Cambridge Universicy Press).
Shoemaker, Svdn¢f (1970) and their Past', in A.lIIfl'riam 7: 4
Siorvanes, LuClll (1996) Pmdw: Ne&-Pl6tcmlc and SClil1lU (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-
versicy Press).
SjOvalI, Bjorn (1967) hfl:holotrI of T8I1.IIO!I: An AnaI,sis of .f'ierre ]tmI1s of 'Ten.sion hr-
trans. A Dilton (NOlllll':dts: Scandinavian University Boob).
Smith,Jonathan Z. (1987) 'Sleep', in M. Eliadl':. ed. 1'heEfIlylo/hmlJOjIkligiutl. rot. I! (New York;
Macmillan, 1987).
Smith. Daniel W. 'Gilles Deleuze and the Conditions of the New' {unpub1i8hed artidel.
Spriel, Stephen (1966) 'ucryptogramme Lowry', in La Lmm vol. 5,July-AugtJ$l.1960.
Stengel'll, Isabelle (2006) 'DeIeUZl':'S Last Message', ava.ilabll': online at IkcalciLr:lnce.c.om.
SteVens, Anthony (1998) A.1i4dnts Clue: AGuUk 10 ""SymbolJ ofHu_nIcinJ (Princeton, !'{J: Prince-
ton University Press}.
-- (2002) Revi.fjt«J (London: Routledge); orig. edn 1982.
Stevens. Anthony and Price,John (2000) EvoItttIonary PJychitury (London: Routledge).
Sutloway. Frank (1992) Fm.I.d: 81"of tAt Mi-fJd (Cambridge, Mus.: Harvard Univenity Press,
Summel'll, (1929) The Va., in El.I'ro/Je (Wellingborougb: AqlWian, 1980).
Swales, Peter J. (198,3) Frrud. CN,QW and St:WIJl a-mtry: The RDliI of in
if1M Libidl> (privately published by the author).
[Tannery,Jules] (1875) 'La m4':5Urt des ilensations. R.epofl!Cll apropo:s du loga.rithme des sensa.-
tions', in RiTJue S€ienli.fi<rw. 2e serle, 4e .lonee, No. 43. [Article appeared anonymoUBly.)
Taylor, Eugene (1980) 'William James and C. G. Jung' in AfPIUal of Arr.httypal
andJungiml ThovgIu, vol. 20.
-- (1996) W&I1iam ]4_ ()It ItejofJf1 tJw MiJ1!in (PrincelDn. !I{J: Princeton
University Prm).
Taylor, Kathlttn (2001) SirJoh WoodnJfft, Tmum and &ngal (Richmond: Cunon).
ThomhiU, Nancy (1989) 'The E\'olutionary Signifiamce of Incest Rules', in and SocioIN.ll-
ogy, 11.
- (1993) ed. The N4tI.mll JlistlJrJ of and (Chicago: Chicago Univel'llity
Thorpe, W. H. (1979) T1v. 0rigJm .mJ. Rise ofEt1lolbtI (London: Heinemann Educational Boob).
Tinbergen, Niko (1951) The Stt.u1'J ojlnsti1ta (Oxford: CAarendon Press. 1951).
Tindall, William York (1939) D. H. l...o:turenu f.f Swaft his Cm» (New York; Columbia Universit\'
T80uyopoulos, Nelly (1988) 'The Influence ofJohn Brown', Ideas in Germany" in W. r. Bynum &:
R. Porter Bl'u_iatlisllJ tn Britain and Ev.mpe (London: Wdkome Inltitutt for the History of
Uexkii.ll.Jakobvon (1926) trans. D. L MacKinnon (London: Kegan Paul).
Bibliography 239
-- (19M) 'A Stroll through the Worlda of Animals and Men: A Picture Book. of Invisible
Worlda', ualU. Caire Schiller, in Schiller, lfUliMiwIJIIwviDtir (NewYork: International Uni-
venities Prl':lltl, 1957).
Ub.nov, Ann (1997) Jung and Religion: The OppoIing Self', in P. YQung-Eisendrath &:
T. Dawson cds. 1M Io}tnlg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Prea).
Van Haute, Philippe (2002) Lat'.an'J 'SulJvomIm!' oflh8Subj8d, tranl. Paul Crowe
Be Miranda Vankerl/. (NewYork: Other Press).
Van Haute, Philippe and Tomas (2004) Cunfiuiim IJj Ttmpts: TM IJj In
Fretul. JimIrIa:i and LiIpIm&du (NewYork: Other Pre!lII).
Verbacghe, Paul (2004) On &mgNfJI'fNJI au0Ih8rlJi.vmIiIrs.: A Manll4l Clinical
l:l'aI1S. Sigi Jottkandt (NewYork: Other Pn:u).
Viatte, Auguste (1928) Us MlmIS du (hris: Honor! Champion, 2 vols).
Vick.eI'l, Brian (1984) 'Analogy Ilnd Identity'. in B. Vickers, ed. 0ct:u/l1J'lld St:i.tmIific In Ih8
(Cambridge: Cambridge Unillersity Preu).
Waddetl,L Augustine (1895) 1MBlJIltlJUnrIofTtIJtt, I)r LtsmtJi.rm (London: W. H. Allen).
Warrain, Fr2nds (1925) L' Af7IIIJltm mitDpIIysiqIMI it8bIiI "OJ/Jri.s la Loi tlt Criatiim til Homi
(PariJl: Alan).
Was&erstrom, &eYen M. (1999) aJt6 &ligWft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Pre!lII).
Williaml, Thoma.l A (1975) EliphM Uvi: MJJ.lItr of Ocalbim (Albama: Univenity of Alabama
Wilson, E. B. (1925) TIJ" CtIl ill IJftd HmtlitIJ (London: Macmillan).
Wilton, Hor.u:e Hayman (1828) 'A Sketch of the ReUgious Sects of the Hindus', reprimed in
Kbrits, Vol. 1/i, (London: Triibner Be Co, 1862-1877).
WillJon, A. U:alie (1964) A ....· TIJ" ltilollJj hu/ia in Gmum .RmJi4RtiMn (Durham:
Winton, Jonathan (1990) 'The Meaning of Drea.Illll', in AlI'III'ium, 264: 5, Nov(!fllber.
Wolpert, Lewis (1985) 'Gradients, POliition, and PaLtern: A History'. in T, Horder tl Ill.
Wronski, Hoene: (1847) MMioItu- 6V ri{tmIU Db.soltie tit/. M.c-m(Paris),
-- (1878) Prosfw:tw tlt la IJ1Js8lw a son (Paris: Depot des de
WWldt, Wdhelm (1862) Btimitt.t Itir T1wniII tlIIr (Leipzig: Winter).
- (18611) iikr Mmsmen. tmd TiIimMlt (Leipzig: VOBlI),
-- (1892) L.tdt.lm 1m Hv._ aM Aftimol trans. j. E. Creighton and E. B. Titcbener
(NewYork.: MaA:millan, 1894).
- (1896) lJu.tUIus l:l'aI1S. C. H.Judd (Leipzig: Engelmann. IS97).
-- (1908-11) (Leipzig: Engelmann).
Yal:e$, Frances (1964) Gion:/;nI(l Brt.!M _ Ih8 HmJII!W:. Thldititm (Chicago: University of Chicago
--(1966) TlJ"ArtD/MemiJry (London: Routledge).
Zeltner, Hennann (1954) SduiJling (Stuttgart: Frommanns).
Zifek, Slavoj (1989) (London: Verso).
-- (1998) 'The Cancrian Subject versua the Cartesian Theater', in S. iiiek. ed., C¥o and Ih8
U-cious (Durham: Duke University PreIs).
(200I) EfJjGy JllW' ltlUJlW Laam in HIJlIywood. au Ow, 2nd edition (London: Rout·
- (2004) Orpns wiIIaout Bodi4: D.IJiruu aM (London: Roudedgc:).
240 Bibliograph,

Sponsor Documents


Forgot your password?

Or register your new account on INBA.INFO


Lost your password? Please enter your email address. You will receive a link to create a new password.

Back to log-in