Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 274 U.S. 588 (1927)
Content
274 U.S. 588
47 S.Ct. 720
71 L.Ed. 1219
LAWRENCE et al.
v.
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO.
No. 894.
Argued April 20-21, 1927.
Decided May 31, 1927.
Mr. C. B. Ames, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellants.
Mr. C. B. Stuart, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellee.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
This is a direct appeal from a decree for an interlocutory injunction entered by
the federal court for Northern Oklahoma. The plaintiff below was the St.
Louis-San Francisco Railway Company; the defendants the Corporation
Commission of that state, its Attorney General, and some citizens of Sapulpa.
The bill was filed on January 11, 1927. The case was heard on January 19, by
three judges under section 266 of the Judicial Code, as amended (Comp. St. §
1243), and was decided on the same day. No opinion was delivered.
2
The Act of February 5, 1917 (Compiled Oklahoma Laws 1921, §§ 3482-3485,
5548), prohibits a railroad from removing its 'shops or division points which
have been located at any place in this state for a period of not less than five
years without previously securing the permission of the Corporation
Commission to make such removal.' Railroad shops and a division point of the
St. Louis-San Francisco System, have been located in Sapulpa, Okl., since
1890. The railway indicated a purpose to remove these shops and the division
point to Tulsa. On February 19, 1917, the Corporation Commission issued,
upon complaint of citizens of Sapulpa and upon notice to and hearing of the
railway, a temporary restraining order enjoining the removal. The railway
acquiesced in this order, the commission retained jurisdiction of the cause, and
neither party took any action therein for nearly 10 years. In December, 1926,
while the restraining order issued in 1917 was in force, the railway, without
leave of the commission, and without making any application in the cause,
directed that the division point for passenger trains be changed in January,
1927, to Tulsa, and it indicated a purpose to remove its shops to West Tulsa.
Thereupon the complaining citizens of Sapulpa filed in the cause a motion
which, reciting these facts, prayed that the cause be set for hearing and that
meanwhile the commission prohibit the railway from making any change. The
commission set the hearing for January 17, 1927, and renewed the temporary
restraining order.
3
The railway brought this suit shortly before the day set for the hearing by the
commission. The bill charges that the Oklahoma act violates the commerce
clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause, and that, hence,
the commission is without jurisdiction in the premises. The sole prayer is that
the defendants be enjoined 'from compelling plaintiff to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission in the several matters aforesaid';
that is, the proposed removal from Sapulpa. The decree is broader than the
prayer. It enjoins the commission from hearing the cause pending before it,
from taking any other action therein, from making or enforcing any order
restraining the railway from removing its shops or division point from Sapulpa,
and specifically from putting into effect a contemplated passenger train
schedule on January 23, 1927; the schedule being intended to facilitate the
change of the division point. It enjoins the other defendants from participation
in any way in the proceedings before the commission.
4
The decree disregards the requirement of section 19 of the Act of October 15,
1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (United States Code of Laws, Title 28, § 383, p.
909; Comp. St. § 1243c):
5
'That every order of injunction * * * shall set forth the reasons for the issuance
of the same, shall be specific in terms. * * *'
6
It does not declare that the Oklahoma statute is unconstitutional, nor does it
state any other reason why the action enjoined is a violation of plaintiff's rights.
It does not recite, even in general terms, that there is danger of irreparable loss.
It sets forth no fact from which such danger can be inferred. It recites merely
that the case was submitted on affidavits and that:
7
'The court, having considered said affidavits and having heard argument of
counsel both for plaintiff and defendants, is of the opinion that the temporary
injunction prayed for by plaintiff herein should be in all things granted.'
8
Although proper practice demands that the provision thus prescribed by
Congress be scrupulously observed, disregard of the statutory requirement
concerning the form of the order did not render the interlocutory decree void.
Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 36, 40, 46 S. Ct. 14, 70 L. Ed. 151. It must,
however, be reversed, because the verified bill and the affidavits fail to supply
that evidence of danger of irreparable injury to plaintiff which is essential to
justify issuance of a temporary injunction. Indeed, it appears affirmatively from
the allegations of the bill and the facts testified to in the affidavits that
irreparable injury would not have resulted from the failure to issue a restraining
order before serving notice on the defendants, that the interlocutory injunction
should have been denied, except possibly as to the adoption of the new
passenger train schedule on January 23, 1927, and that otherwise action by the
court should have awaited the final hearing.
9
The only relief prayed for in the bill is that the defendants be enjoined 'from
compelling plaintiff to submit to the jurisdiction of the Corporation
Commission in the several matters aforesaid.' There is no prayer for general
relief. No right or interest of the railway would have been prejudiced by
participating in the hearing before the commission and awaiting the result
thereof. The railway would not thereby have waived its right to contest in the
federal court the validity of the Oklahoma law. Nor would delay in making
application to the federal court have subjected it to penalties under the
Oklahoma law. The earliest date on which the railway is definitely shown to
have proposed to take any action falling within the prohibition of the
commission's order was January 23, 1927, when the railway proposed to put
into effect the new schedule involving change of the division point for
passenger trains from Sapulpa to Tulsa. The hearing before the commission had
been set for January 17, 1927. It was clearly possible, and was perhaps
probable, that the commission would, after hearing argument on that day, have
modified its order, so as to permit the passenger schedule to go into effect. For
the matter of serious concern to Sapulpa was the threatened removal of the
shops and the freight terminals; not the proposed new schedule for passenger
trains. Moreover, if the commission had refused to permit the passenger
schedule to go into effect, the railway would still have had ample opportunity
before January 23 to secure from the federal court relief in that respect.
10
The broader permission to remove both the shops and the division point might
also have been granted by the commission, if it had been permitted to proceed
with the hearing set for January 17. The railway asserts that the removal would
result in an improved service and in economy in operation. If this appeared to
be true, it was the duty of the commission, under the Oklahoma law, to
authorize the removal, unless thereby the health of the employees of the railway
or of their families was imperiled. It is not to be assumed that the railway
proposed to remove the shops to an unhealthy location. And it may not be
assumed that the commission would have disregarded its duty. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457, 464-466, 34 S. Ct.
152, 58 L. Ed. 310; Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 267 U. S. 493, 496, 45 S. Ct. 409, 69 L. Ed. 753.
11
The facts alleged in the bill and testified to in the affidavits, show also
otherwise that there was not danger of irreparable loss to plaintiff within
established rules of equity practice. The railway had for ten years acquiesced in
the commission's order prohibiting removal. There had not been, so far as
appears, even a suggestion to the commission that the act under which the order
issued was invalid, or that the order was otherwise objectionable to the railway.
The advisability of the removal of the shops was a matter as to which the
railway officials had differed in judgment. The vice president in charge of
operation testified: 'We should have changed many years ago.' The president
assured a committee representing Sapulpa in December, 1925, that the city was
'the logical place for the terminal now located there, * * * that his company
was considering the enlargement of the terminals, * * * and that there was not
reason for any anxiety on the part of the citizens of Sapulpa as to the removal
of the terminals.' In December, 1296, apparently, the railway's officials
concluded that, in view of the changed traffic and operating conditions, the time
had come when the removal of the shops and division point from Sapulpa to
Tulsa should be undertaken, and that, with a relatively small capital outlay at
Tulsa, the removal would result, not only in improved service, but also in an
important saving in operating expenses. But there was no emergency requiring
the issue of an interlocutory injunction. To the railway the matter was not one
of vital concern. For it, time was not of the essence. The effect of the
commission's restraining order was merely to keep things in statu quo until the
final hearing in the federal court. The interlocutory decree set the railway free
to remove the shops before the case could be heard on final hearing. By ending
the status quo which had existed for 10 years, it exposed the city and its citizens
to danger of irreparable loss. The change subjected Sapulpa to grave and
immediate peril. Removal of the shops, which had been located in Sapulpa for a
generation, would probably affect property values seriously, and might bring
disaster in its train. It might ruin businesses. It might result in unemployment. It
might compel many of Sapulpa's citizens to seek homes elsewhere. On
application for an interlocutory injunction such considerations are of weight.
12
We have no occasion to determine whether the Oklahoma act is obnoxious to
the federal Constitution. But, as bearing upon the propriety of issuing the
temporary injunction, the fact is important that the controversy concerns the
respective powers of the nation and of the states over railroads engaged in
interstate commerce. Such railroads are subject to regulation by both the state
and the United States. The delimitation of the respective powers of the two
governments requires often nice adjustments. The federal power is paramount.
But public interest demands that, whenever possible, conflict between the two
authorities and irritation be avoided. To this end it is important that the federal
power be not exerted unnecessarily, hastily, or harshly. It is important, also,
that the demands of comity and courtesy, as well as of the law, be deferred to. It
was said in Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Georgia Public Service Commission,
267 U. S. 493, 496, 45 S. Ct. 409, 69 L. Ed. 753, that a law of a state may be
valid which prohibits an important change in local transportation conditions
without application to the state commission, although the ultimate authority to
determine whether the change could or should be made may rest with the
federal commission. And it was there said that the 'action of the company in
discontinuing the service without a petition' to the state body was 'arbitrary and
defiant.' Compare Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation Commission, 269 U. S.
278, 46 S. Ct. 112, 70 L. Ed. 273. To require that the regulating body of the
state be advised of a proposed change seriously affecting transportation
conditions is not such an obvious interference with interstate commerce that, on
application for a preliminary injunction, the act should lightly be assumed to be
beyond the power of the state.
13
The decree recites that a restraining order was issued on the filing of the bill.
So far as appears, the court also disregarded in issuing it the requirement of
section 17 of the Act of October 15, 1914 (Code, tit. 28, § 381, p. 909; Comp.
St. § 1234a). We think that section 17 applies to suits brought under § 266 of
the Judicial Code.1 Section 17 provides:
14
'Every such temporary restraining order * * * shall define the injury and state
why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice. * * *'
It provides also:
15
'No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the opposite
party unless it shall clearly appear from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified bill that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.'
16
Such facts do not appear to have been shown. They are not alleged in the
verified bill; and the affidavits in support were not filed until the hearing on the
interlocutory injunction.
17
The purpose of Congress in requiring that 'every order for an injunction shall
set forth the reasons for the issuance of the same,' was in part to insure
deliberation, and thus minimize the chances of error. It was in part to prevent or
allay the irritation naturally incident to interference by injunction with the
action of the state government. Congress did not require the court to
supplement the recitals in the decree by a fuller statement in an opinion. The
importance of an opinion to litigants and to this court in cases of this character
was pointed out in Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 675, 47 S.
Ct. 222, 71 L. Ed. 463. The importance is even greater where the decree enjoins
the enforcement of a state law or the action of state officials thereunder. For
then the respect due to the state demands that the need for nullifying the action
of its Legislature or of its executive officials be persuasively shown.
18
Reversed.
1
Section 17 took the place of section 263 of the Judicial Code, which was
of general application. The last sentence of section 17 (omitted from
section 381 of title 28 of the Code) reads: 'Nothing in this section
contained shall be deemed to alter, repeal or amend section two hundred
and sixty-six' of the Judicial Code. In requiring specific findings of
irreparable damage in the issuance of restraining orders, no alteration,
repeal, or amendment of section 266 was made.
47 S.Ct. 720
71 L.Ed. 1219
LAWRENCE et al.
v.
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO.
No. 894.
Argued April 20-21, 1927.
Decided May 31, 1927.
Mr. C. B. Ames, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellants.
Mr. C. B. Stuart, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellee.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
This is a direct appeal from a decree for an interlocutory injunction entered by
the federal court for Northern Oklahoma. The plaintiff below was the St.
Louis-San Francisco Railway Company; the defendants the Corporation
Commission of that state, its Attorney General, and some citizens of Sapulpa.
The bill was filed on January 11, 1927. The case was heard on January 19, by
three judges under section 266 of the Judicial Code, as amended (Comp. St. §
1243), and was decided on the same day. No opinion was delivered.
2
The Act of February 5, 1917 (Compiled Oklahoma Laws 1921, §§ 3482-3485,
5548), prohibits a railroad from removing its 'shops or division points which
have been located at any place in this state for a period of not less than five
years without previously securing the permission of the Corporation
Commission to make such removal.' Railroad shops and a division point of the
St. Louis-San Francisco System, have been located in Sapulpa, Okl., since
1890. The railway indicated a purpose to remove these shops and the division
point to Tulsa. On February 19, 1917, the Corporation Commission issued,
upon complaint of citizens of Sapulpa and upon notice to and hearing of the
railway, a temporary restraining order enjoining the removal. The railway
acquiesced in this order, the commission retained jurisdiction of the cause, and
neither party took any action therein for nearly 10 years. In December, 1926,
while the restraining order issued in 1917 was in force, the railway, without
leave of the commission, and without making any application in the cause,
directed that the division point for passenger trains be changed in January,
1927, to Tulsa, and it indicated a purpose to remove its shops to West Tulsa.
Thereupon the complaining citizens of Sapulpa filed in the cause a motion
which, reciting these facts, prayed that the cause be set for hearing and that
meanwhile the commission prohibit the railway from making any change. The
commission set the hearing for January 17, 1927, and renewed the temporary
restraining order.
3
The railway brought this suit shortly before the day set for the hearing by the
commission. The bill charges that the Oklahoma act violates the commerce
clause, the due process clause, and the equal protection clause, and that, hence,
the commission is without jurisdiction in the premises. The sole prayer is that
the defendants be enjoined 'from compelling plaintiff to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission in the several matters aforesaid';
that is, the proposed removal from Sapulpa. The decree is broader than the
prayer. It enjoins the commission from hearing the cause pending before it,
from taking any other action therein, from making or enforcing any order
restraining the railway from removing its shops or division point from Sapulpa,
and specifically from putting into effect a contemplated passenger train
schedule on January 23, 1927; the schedule being intended to facilitate the
change of the division point. It enjoins the other defendants from participation
in any way in the proceedings before the commission.
4
The decree disregards the requirement of section 19 of the Act of October 15,
1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (United States Code of Laws, Title 28, § 383, p.
909; Comp. St. § 1243c):
5
'That every order of injunction * * * shall set forth the reasons for the issuance
of the same, shall be specific in terms. * * *'
6
It does not declare that the Oklahoma statute is unconstitutional, nor does it
state any other reason why the action enjoined is a violation of plaintiff's rights.
It does not recite, even in general terms, that there is danger of irreparable loss.
It sets forth no fact from which such danger can be inferred. It recites merely
that the case was submitted on affidavits and that:
7
'The court, having considered said affidavits and having heard argument of
counsel both for plaintiff and defendants, is of the opinion that the temporary
injunction prayed for by plaintiff herein should be in all things granted.'
8
Although proper practice demands that the provision thus prescribed by
Congress be scrupulously observed, disregard of the statutory requirement
concerning the form of the order did not render the interlocutory decree void.
Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 36, 40, 46 S. Ct. 14, 70 L. Ed. 151. It must,
however, be reversed, because the verified bill and the affidavits fail to supply
that evidence of danger of irreparable injury to plaintiff which is essential to
justify issuance of a temporary injunction. Indeed, it appears affirmatively from
the allegations of the bill and the facts testified to in the affidavits that
irreparable injury would not have resulted from the failure to issue a restraining
order before serving notice on the defendants, that the interlocutory injunction
should have been denied, except possibly as to the adoption of the new
passenger train schedule on January 23, 1927, and that otherwise action by the
court should have awaited the final hearing.
9
The only relief prayed for in the bill is that the defendants be enjoined 'from
compelling plaintiff to submit to the jurisdiction of the Corporation
Commission in the several matters aforesaid.' There is no prayer for general
relief. No right or interest of the railway would have been prejudiced by
participating in the hearing before the commission and awaiting the result
thereof. The railway would not thereby have waived its right to contest in the
federal court the validity of the Oklahoma law. Nor would delay in making
application to the federal court have subjected it to penalties under the
Oklahoma law. The earliest date on which the railway is definitely shown to
have proposed to take any action falling within the prohibition of the
commission's order was January 23, 1927, when the railway proposed to put
into effect the new schedule involving change of the division point for
passenger trains from Sapulpa to Tulsa. The hearing before the commission had
been set for January 17, 1927. It was clearly possible, and was perhaps
probable, that the commission would, after hearing argument on that day, have
modified its order, so as to permit the passenger schedule to go into effect. For
the matter of serious concern to Sapulpa was the threatened removal of the
shops and the freight terminals; not the proposed new schedule for passenger
trains. Moreover, if the commission had refused to permit the passenger
schedule to go into effect, the railway would still have had ample opportunity
before January 23 to secure from the federal court relief in that respect.
10
The broader permission to remove both the shops and the division point might
also have been granted by the commission, if it had been permitted to proceed
with the hearing set for January 17. The railway asserts that the removal would
result in an improved service and in economy in operation. If this appeared to
be true, it was the duty of the commission, under the Oklahoma law, to
authorize the removal, unless thereby the health of the employees of the railway
or of their families was imperiled. It is not to be assumed that the railway
proposed to remove the shops to an unhealthy location. And it may not be
assumed that the commission would have disregarded its duty. Grand Trunk
Ry. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457, 464-466, 34 S. Ct.
152, 58 L. Ed. 310; Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 267 U. S. 493, 496, 45 S. Ct. 409, 69 L. Ed. 753.
11
The facts alleged in the bill and testified to in the affidavits, show also
otherwise that there was not danger of irreparable loss to plaintiff within
established rules of equity practice. The railway had for ten years acquiesced in
the commission's order prohibiting removal. There had not been, so far as
appears, even a suggestion to the commission that the act under which the order
issued was invalid, or that the order was otherwise objectionable to the railway.
The advisability of the removal of the shops was a matter as to which the
railway officials had differed in judgment. The vice president in charge of
operation testified: 'We should have changed many years ago.' The president
assured a committee representing Sapulpa in December, 1925, that the city was
'the logical place for the terminal now located there, * * * that his company
was considering the enlargement of the terminals, * * * and that there was not
reason for any anxiety on the part of the citizens of Sapulpa as to the removal
of the terminals.' In December, 1296, apparently, the railway's officials
concluded that, in view of the changed traffic and operating conditions, the time
had come when the removal of the shops and division point from Sapulpa to
Tulsa should be undertaken, and that, with a relatively small capital outlay at
Tulsa, the removal would result, not only in improved service, but also in an
important saving in operating expenses. But there was no emergency requiring
the issue of an interlocutory injunction. To the railway the matter was not one
of vital concern. For it, time was not of the essence. The effect of the
commission's restraining order was merely to keep things in statu quo until the
final hearing in the federal court. The interlocutory decree set the railway free
to remove the shops before the case could be heard on final hearing. By ending
the status quo which had existed for 10 years, it exposed the city and its citizens
to danger of irreparable loss. The change subjected Sapulpa to grave and
immediate peril. Removal of the shops, which had been located in Sapulpa for a
generation, would probably affect property values seriously, and might bring
disaster in its train. It might ruin businesses. It might result in unemployment. It
might compel many of Sapulpa's citizens to seek homes elsewhere. On
application for an interlocutory injunction such considerations are of weight.
12
We have no occasion to determine whether the Oklahoma act is obnoxious to
the federal Constitution. But, as bearing upon the propriety of issuing the
temporary injunction, the fact is important that the controversy concerns the
respective powers of the nation and of the states over railroads engaged in
interstate commerce. Such railroads are subject to regulation by both the state
and the United States. The delimitation of the respective powers of the two
governments requires often nice adjustments. The federal power is paramount.
But public interest demands that, whenever possible, conflict between the two
authorities and irritation be avoided. To this end it is important that the federal
power be not exerted unnecessarily, hastily, or harshly. It is important, also,
that the demands of comity and courtesy, as well as of the law, be deferred to. It
was said in Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Georgia Public Service Commission,
267 U. S. 493, 496, 45 S. Ct. 409, 69 L. Ed. 753, that a law of a state may be
valid which prohibits an important change in local transportation conditions
without application to the state commission, although the ultimate authority to
determine whether the change could or should be made may rest with the
federal commission. And it was there said that the 'action of the company in
discontinuing the service without a petition' to the state body was 'arbitrary and
defiant.' Compare Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation Commission, 269 U. S.
278, 46 S. Ct. 112, 70 L. Ed. 273. To require that the regulating body of the
state be advised of a proposed change seriously affecting transportation
conditions is not such an obvious interference with interstate commerce that, on
application for a preliminary injunction, the act should lightly be assumed to be
beyond the power of the state.
13
The decree recites that a restraining order was issued on the filing of the bill.
So far as appears, the court also disregarded in issuing it the requirement of
section 17 of the Act of October 15, 1914 (Code, tit. 28, § 381, p. 909; Comp.
St. § 1234a). We think that section 17 applies to suits brought under § 266 of
the Judicial Code.1 Section 17 provides:
14
'Every such temporary restraining order * * * shall define the injury and state
why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without notice. * * *'
It provides also:
15
'No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the opposite
party unless it shall clearly appear from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified bill that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.'
16
Such facts do not appear to have been shown. They are not alleged in the
verified bill; and the affidavits in support were not filed until the hearing on the
interlocutory injunction.
17
The purpose of Congress in requiring that 'every order for an injunction shall
set forth the reasons for the issuance of the same,' was in part to insure
deliberation, and thus minimize the chances of error. It was in part to prevent or
allay the irritation naturally incident to interference by injunction with the
action of the state government. Congress did not require the court to
supplement the recitals in the decree by a fuller statement in an opinion. The
importance of an opinion to litigants and to this court in cases of this character
was pointed out in Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658, 675, 47 S.
Ct. 222, 71 L. Ed. 463. The importance is even greater where the decree enjoins
the enforcement of a state law or the action of state officials thereunder. For
then the respect due to the state demands that the need for nullifying the action
of its Legislature or of its executive officials be persuasively shown.
18
Reversed.
1
Section 17 took the place of section 263 of the Judicial Code, which was
of general application. The last sentence of section 17 (omitted from
section 381 of title 28 of the Code) reads: 'Nothing in this section
contained shall be deemed to alter, repeal or amend section two hundred
and sixty-six' of the Judicial Code. In requiring specific findings of
irreparable damage in the issuance of restraining orders, no alteration,
repeal, or amendment of section 266 was made.
