Manning Defense Exhibits

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Fort Drum Classified/Unclassified Installation Campus Area network (ICAN) Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) (February 2010)
The Department of Defense and the Department of the Army, specifically, AR 25-2, requires that all users must sign an AUP before being granted access to any Army Information System In addition, failure to sign or abide by the AUP is grounds for demal or termmation of access to Army Information Systems and willful violation of the terms of the AUP are potential grounds for pumtive actions under the provisions of AR 25-2 For ease of understanding the AUP is subdivided into a number of sections each addressmg a specific requirement or subject area Personnel are cautioned to carefully read each section since their behavior is bound and governed by all portions of this policy

Purpose: This document sets forth the expected Rules of Behavior and the Acceptable Use Policy for all users of systems connected to the Fort Drum Unclassified and Classified Installation Campus Area Networks (ICANs), Virtual Pnvate Network (VPN) remote access capabilities. Outlook Web Access (OWA) electronic mail, network or enterprise services, and all other Information Systems configured and managed by the Network Enterprise Center (NEC) Fort Drum NY Basic Agreement: As an Information Systems (IS) user at Fort Drum New York, I will adhere to all security rules prescribed in this document

References
Department ofDefense Instruction 8500 2, Information Assurance (lA) Implementation, 6 February 2003 DoD Regulation 5400 11-R, subject Department of Defense Privacy Program, 14 May 2007 Memorandum, Department of Defense, 18 August 2006, Subject DoD Guidance on Protectmg Personally Identifiable Information Memorandum, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 21 September 2007, Subject Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information AR 25-1 Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology, 4 December 2008 AR 25-2 Information Assurance, 24 October 2007 AR 340-21, The Army Privacy Program, 5 July 1985 AR 380-5 Department of the Army Information Secunty Program, 29 September 2000

DOD STANDARD MANDATORY NOTICE AND CONSENT
By signing this document, you acknowledge and consent that when you access Department ofDefense (DOD) information systems 1 You are accessmg a U S Government (USG) mformation system (IS) (which includes any device attached to this information system) that is provided for U S Govemment authorized use only 2 You consent to the following conditions a The U S Govemment routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this information system for purposes mcludmg, but not limited to, penetration testing, communications secunty (COMSEC) momtonng, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (Cl)

DEFENSE EXHIBITj \ for identification PAGE ADMITTED: PAGE OFFERED: PAGE of PAGES

investigations b Atanytime,theUS Govemment may inspect and seize data stored on this information system c Commumcations using, or data stored on, this information system are not pnvate, are subject to routine momtonng, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or usedforanyUS Govemment-authonzed purpose d This mformation system includes secunty measures(eg,authentication and access controls)toprotectUS Govemment interests notforyour personal benefit or pnvacy e Notwithstanding the above, using an information system does not constitute consent to personnel misconduct, law enforcement, or countenntelligence investigative searchmg or momtonng of the content of pnvileged commumcations or data (mcludmg work product)that are related to personal representation or services by attomeys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants Under these cn^cumstances, such commumcations and work product are pnvate and confidentiaL as further explained below (1) Notliingmthis User Agreement shall be interpreted to limit the user'sconsent to, ormany other way restnct or aflecLanyUS Govemment actions for purposes ofnetwork administration, operation, protection, or defense, or for commumcations secunty This mcludes all communications and data on an information system, regardless of any applicable pnvilege or confidentiality (2) The user consents to interception/capture and seizure of ALL communications and data for any authorized purpose(mcludmg personnel misconducL law enforcement, or countenntelligence investigation) Ifowever, consent to interception/capture or seizure of commumcations and data is not consent to the use of pnvileged communications or datafor personnel misconducL law enforcemenL or countenntelligence investigation against any party and does not negate any applicable pnvilege or confidentiality that otherwise applies (3) Whether any particular communication or data qualifies forthe protection ofapnvilege, or IS covered byaduty of confidentiality,IS detenmnedmaccordance with established legal standards and DOD policy Users are strongly encouraged to seek personal legal counsel on such matters pnor to using an mformation system if the user intends to rely on the protections ofapnvilege or confidentiality (4) Users should take reasonable steps to identity such communications or data that the user asserts are protected by any such pnvilege or confidentiality I^owever, the user's identification or assertion ofapnvilege or confidentiality IS not su^icient to create such protection where none exists under established legal standards and DOD policy (5) Auser's failure to take reasonable steps to identify such communications or data as pnvileged or confidential does not waive the pnvilege or confidentiality if such protections otherwise exist under established legal standards and DoD pohcy l^owever,msuch cases theUS Govemment is authonzed to take reasonable actions to identity such communication or data as being subject toapnvilege or confidentiality,and such actions do not negate any applicable pnvilege or confidentiality (6) These conditions preserve the confidentiality of the communication or data, and the legal protections regardmg the use and disclosure of pnvileged mformation, and thus such communications and data are pnvate and confidential Further, theUS Govemment shall take all reasonable measures to protect the content of captured/seized privileged communications and data to ensure they are appropnately protected f i n cases when the user has consented to content searching or momtonng of communications or data for personnel misconducL law enforcemenL or countenntelligence investigative searching, (Le,for all communications and data other than pnvileged communications or data that are related to personal representation or services by attomeys, psychotherapists, or clergy,and their assistants), theUS Govemment may,solely at its discretion and in accordance with DoD policy,elect to applyapnvilege or otherrestnction on theUS Government's otherwiseauthonzed use or disclosure of such information g All of the above conditions apply regardless of whether the access or use of an information system mcludes the display ofaNotice and Consent Banner ("banner") Whenabanner is used, the banner functions to remind the user of the conditions that are setforth in this User Agreement, regardless of whether the banner descnbes these

conditions in full detail or providesasummary of such conditions, and regardless of whether the banner expressly references this User Agreement

ArmyStandardAcceptal^leUsePolicy(AUP)
Asansert^f^an information System (^S),^^itt adhere t^ the f(^ii^^ing security ruies: 1 Iknow that the use and access to DOD information systems isarevocable pnvilege lunderstand that AR 25-2 IS punitive in nature and that violation of those paragraphs identifiedmAR 25-2,paral-l(^),page2may be punished as violations ofalawful general order under Article 92 of the Uniformed Code ofMilitaryJustice (UCMJ) or under other disciplinary, administrative, or contractual actions as applicable 2 lunderstand thatfailure to follow acceptable use and best practices jeopardizes the secunty of the information, the IS, the network, the Army, and DOD, and may cause irreparable harm, loss ofcntical information, or nsk soldiers^ lives andlwill only use the system for ^^OfficialUse^^and^^AuthonzedPurposes^^ Iwill use Army information systems(computers, systems, and networks)only for authorized purposes 3 lhave completed the user secuntyawareness training Iwill participate in all training programs as required, mclusive of threat identification, physical secunty requirements, acceptable use policies, remote access standards, and malicious content and logic identification, and incident reporting Iwill become cognizant of non-standard threats such as social engmeermg,phishing, SPAM, and other emerging threats 4 lacknowledge that certain activities are never authorized on/^rmy networks These activities mclude personal use of govemment resources involving pomography or obscene matenal(adult or child),copynghtinfnngement (such as the shanng of copynghtmatenal by means of peer-to peer software), gambling, the transmission of cham letters, use of systems for personal financial gam, unotficial advertising, soliciting, or selling except on authonzed bulletin boards established for such use,or the violation of any statute or regulation lam prohibited from unauthonzed accessing, stonng, or transmitting prohibited content for example pomography, cham-maiL bogus threats, copynght protected, etc) Iwill not forward cham emaiL or distnbute virus wammgs Iwill report chain email or virus wamings to my lASO and delete the message Iwill not attempt to run sniffer or other hackerrelated software on the system 5 Iwill take no actions that alter the secunty configurations or disable Information Assurance (IA) secunty safeguards or circumvent the secunty mechanisms of the IS Iwill not attempt to access ormodity data, crack or change passwords, or use operating systems or programs, except as specifically authonzed 6 Iwill not download, mtentionally install or use unauthonzed or malicious code, backdoors, purge tools, password crackers, or fileshanngsoftware(mcludingMP3 music and video files), peer-to-peer(P2P) software or games onto my Govemment computer,GovemmentlTsystem,or network Iwill not install any software or hardware to any computer or connect or relocate any device(eg,aclient, or workstation, server,Removable or Fixed Storage Media,pnnter, switch, hub, or wireless devices)toanyArmy network or Information System without pnor wntten approval of the Fort Dmm Installation Information Assurance Manager (11/^), NEC Director, or Fort Dmm Designated ApprovmgAuthonty (DAA) 7 twill meet and maintain required secunty investigations, clearances, authonzations, and mission requirements, and appropnately be granted access to authonzed information and services 8 Iknow what constitutesasecuntymcident Iflobserve anything that indicates inadequate secunty for this system,Iwill immediately report It to the lASO Iwill comply with secunty guidance issued by my SA or lASO I will follow procedures to report secunty violations and incidents,abnormal behavior,system or application errors, suspicious activity,chain e-mails,spam,virus wamings, missing equipmenL or the presence of unknown installed programs in accordance with local policy Iwill immediately report any discrepanciesmsystem operations following any anti-vimsdefimtion update, protective secunty application configuration, system update orfailures 9 lhave been issuedaCACor another identifier and authenticator(user ID/password) to authenticate my access to govemment resources or computer accounts At^er receiving them a Iwill not allow anyone else to have or use my authenticator lam responsible for all actions conducted under my account As the only authonzed user of this account,lwill protect the account(s), the authenticator(s), and all information from disclosure and will use any local or remote access pnvileges granted to me to perform authonzed tasks ormission related functions Iwill apply these same secunty standards when accessing or processing any mformation as granted through remote access usmgagovemmentprovidedorpersonal-owned system lam responsible for all activity that occurs under that identifier whilelam logged on Iwill protect the PIN

and/or password that authenticates the identifier b I f l a m assigned an individual user accountlwill not permit anyone else to use the account assigned me c Iwill never reveal my individualPlN and/or password to anyone, except to authonzed NEC support personnelfor troubleshooting purposes only lunderstand thatlwill receiveanew password after the troubleshootmg has been accomplished If my account is toaclassifiednetwork,lwill protect the password at the highest classification level of the network d If technically capable of domgso,Iwill immediately change the mdividual password issued to me on my first log-in-regularly thereafter as directed Iwill ensure my password meets currentFort Dmm and Army directives(eg,length, character seL no prohibited sequences or combinations) e Iwill not store my CAC PIN or password on any connectmg device or on any magnetic or electronic media f Iwill never leave my computer unattended and logged-on, unless secured by an appropnately PIN/password protected screen saver set to activate after 3-5mmutes of inactivity g Iwill always remove my CACtrom the computer system when departing my work are, even if only for bnefpenodsoftime h Iwill log off my computer system at the end of my duty day 1 Iknow it isaviolation of policy for any userto seek to mask or hide their identity,or to seek to assume the identity of another j If my account is onaclassified network,Iunderstand that my authenticator is classified at the highest level of information on that network, andlwill protect it in the same manner as that mformation Iwill change my autbenticators to meet existing policies k IflamamemberofagroupaccounLlam responsible for all activity whenlam logged onasystem with that account 10 lunderstand there are many more procedures, official regulations and policies applicable to information-system operations, and this certificate IS onlyashort summary to stress key points

Handling Media and Output
1 Iwill properly mark all electronic correspondence where it apphesmaccordance with AR380 5Chapter 4, and AR 380-19 Iwill properly mark, encrypt, and control output and removable media whilelam using any system to mclude pnntedmatenalsmaccordance with AR380-5 andAR 25-2 2 Iwill check all storage mediafor malicious software and scan for viruses before loading on any system

Training
lunderstand that the DoD and Department of the/^trmy have mandated initial and recumngtramingonavanety of topics related to use and protection of Information Systems and Sensitive Information Specifically,lunderstand that 1 Imust complete initial Information Assurance (lA)Awarenesstrammgbeforelcan obtain access to any classifiedorunclassified Information Systems atFort Dmm 2 Imust complete lAAwareness refresher training annually 3 Imust complete trainmg on protection ofPersonally Identifiable Information (Pll) on an annual basis 4 Imust complete any additional traming as directed by the DoD,Army,or NEC 5 Iwill establish an account on the/^rmyTrammg and CertificationTrackmg System (ATCTS) to ensure my trammg is properly entered and tracked https//atcusarmvmil/iastar/ 6 Irealize that failure to complete all prescnbedtraimng is grounds for termmation of access to allFort Dmm Information Systems

Classilied Information Systems
If connected to the Army SECRET IntemetProtocol Router Network (SIPRNET) orworkmgonastand-alone classified system Iknow 1 My system operates at leastinthe US SECRET,"system high" mode of operation for SIPRNETand at the highest classification level for the mformation processed on the stand-alone system 2 All media, devices, and output from classified systems must be marked and handled lAWAR 380-5 3 / ^ y storage media used on the system immediately becomes classified and protected at the system high leveL regardless of the implied classification of any data tx^ntained on it(until declassified or downgraded by an approved process) 4 Imust protect all printed output at the system high level until I , or someone with the requisite clearance personally reviews It and classifies (grades)itappropnate to actual content 5 Iwill not enter mformation mto the system if the information IS ofhigher classification level than the system 1 will not enter information that IS propnetary, contractor-excluded, or otherwise needs special protection or handlmg, unless approvedmwnting by the Fort Dmm Designated ApprovmgAuthonty (DAA), NEC Director, or Fort Drum Installation Information Assurance Manager (11AM) 6 OnlyUS cleared personnel withavenfied^^need to know^^are allowed unescorted access to the system 7 Storage media may not be removed from the computer area without local commander approval 8 Iflmust transport classified matenallwillhavemmypossessionavalidFort Dmm Conner Card, DD Form 2501 and all classified matenal will be packaged lAWAR 380-5 9 lunderstand the classification boundary between classified and unclassified networks and systems requires vigilance, and thalForeign Nationals and personnel withoutacurrent clearances and valid ^^need to know^^are not permitted to view screens connected to the SIPRNEToroperatedmastand-alone mode

Telework and Remote Connection Rules
IflperformTelework or use the NEC provided Virtual Pnvate Network (VPN) 1 lunderstand that any government computer being used for telework orremote access must employ the NECprovided Virtual Pnvate Network (VPN) client and must connect through and authenticate with the Fort Dmm Domain Under no circumstances shouldagovemment provided computer be connected toacommercial Intemet Service Provider (ISP) without using theVPN 2 lunderstand that any government computer being used for telework or remote access must employ data encryption to protect Sensitive Information on the hard disk The system must employ the NEC configured Microsoft WmdowsEncryptedFiles System (EFS) for protection of all sensitive data

Network Access
1 Iwill not connect any equipment to the Fort DmmlCANs without pnor wntten approval from the Fort Drum Designated Approving Authority (DAA), NEC Director, or Fort Dmm Installation Information Assurance Manager (11AM) 2 IwillNOTalter any network drops onFort Drum 3 Iknow thaL to the greatest extent possible, network cables will not be extended beyondadistance which can be constantly observed by the user 4 Iknow thaLwhile in gamson, systems will only be connected to authonzed, NEC-provided network drops and equipment 5 Iwill always logon to and authenticate through the Fort Dmm domain, unless performing off-line processmg where no network connection is available ^ At no time willlaccess the Intemet onagovemment Information System without first authenticating through theFort Dmm domain or obtammg pnor wntten approval from the Fort Dmm Designated ApprovmgAuthonty

(DAA), NEC Director, or Fort Dmm Installation Information Assurance Manager (IIAM)

Handling and Protecting Sensitive Information (SI) And Personally Identil^al^le Information (PII)
Sensitive inl^c^rmatit^n is ^e^net^ as: Any mformation the loss, misuse, orunauthonzed access to ormodification ofwhich could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct ofFederal programs, or the pnvacy to which mdividuals are entitled under5USC 552a (The PnvacyAct), but which has not been specifically authonzed under cntena established by executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept secretmthe interest of national defense or foreign pohcy Sensitive mformation mcludes mformationmroutme DOD payrolL finance, logistics, and personnel management systems Examples of sensitive information include, but are not limited to, the following categones ^ FOUO,maccordance with DOD 54007 R,is mformation that may be withheld from mandatory public disclosure under thcFOlA ^ Pnvacy data is personal and pnvate information (for example, mdividual medical information, home address and telephone number, social secunty number)as defined in the PnvacyAct ofl974 This is referred to as Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 1 lunderstand that ALL Sensitive Information must be protected from unauthonzed disclosure and thatlwill do so by utilizmg the encrypted file folder provided for me on my govemment provided computer 2 lalso understand that any loss of Sensitive Information must be immediately reported tomy Chain^fCommand lAWthe Fort DmmPolicy Memorandum, 09-15,Personally Identifiable Information

UseofEmployeeOwnedlnformationSystems(EOIS)
Employee-owned information systems (EOISs), media devices. Personal Electromc Devices (PEDs), Mobile Computmg Devices (MCDs), or related technologies are prohibited for any classified use, and should be prohibited for sensitive information access or processing or operating in areas where this processing occurs EOISs, MCD,and PEDs must be authorized/registered with command secunty personnel when earned into restncted or secure areas and the required control measures have been verified 1 Iknow the use of employee-owned information systems (EOIS) IS prohibitedfor stonng, processmg or transmitting classified or Sensitive Information 2 Iknow that any use of an EOIS for ad-hoc(one-time or mfrequent)processmg of unclassified,publically releasable information IS restncted and must have pnor approval from the Fort Dmm Designated Approvmg Authonty (DAA), NEC Director, orFort Dmm Installation Information Assurance Manager (11AM) 3 lunderstand that any employee owned mformation system (EOIS) usedfor ad hoc performance of official duties, to include checking Outlook electromc mail via the web(OWA), must haveaOepartment of the Army approved anti-vims application loaded and configured for constant vims detection 4 Iknow thaL that if approved for ad hoc use, EOISs processing official data will comply with all secunty provisions of AR 25-2 Computer owners will implement Information Assurance (lA)countermeasuresrequn^ed by AR 25-2,specificallyAVandlA software and updates, or be prohibited from remote access Ifdataistemporanly stored on an approved EOIS,it must be deleted at the end of that day^swork session All processed or stored data will be removed from the EOIS and personnel will sign compliance statements that the data was removed 5 Iwill scan all data processed from an EOIS before inclusion or introduction mto the network or any government IS 6 Iwill NOTperform any remote accessfor remote management from an EOIS

Once you have read and understand all requirements listed above fill out the identification blocks below, sign (either digitally or manually), then save and upload the document (in PDF format) to the Army Training & Certification Tracking System (ATCTS) at the
f o l l o w i n g web site: https //ate us army mil/iastar/

Rank/Full Name: Organization:
Acluiowledgement: I have read the above requirements regarding use of DOD information systems. I understand there are many more procedures, official regulations, and policies applicable to information-system operations, and the above is only a short summary to stress key points. I understand my responsibilities regarding these systems and the information contained herein and that failure to abide by the rules could result in revocation of my user privileges and network access and that punitive or administrative disciplinary action could be taken against me. My signature below constitutes my acknowledgement of and agreement to abide by these rules. Sign or Insert Digital Signature in the block below:

DSN: E-Mail:

lASO/Security Manager Certification: The user named above meets all training and clearance requirements for network access. lASO Name/Rank/Signature Security Manager Name/Rank/Signature

Date:

Date:

r m . GUANTANAMO FILES

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^ b y both Dostum and the Americans to * e r e killed were tied up at the time they Sorters were briefed that "only" eight rt being shot after the uprising started. ^ proposed by Luke Harding, is more st, because a photographer "saw the Iters whose hands had been bound by f southern part of the fort," and that • T s cut the scarves from the hands of •Alex Perry noted, "some of the dead lance soldiers used scissors to snip off less significantly, because so many of y was suppressed until the Pentagon 'ts in 2006—also talked about being

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Yerghanek and Qala Zeini On Sunday, November 25,2001, as the uprising began in Qaia-i-Janghi, a far larger group of Taliban soldiers—at least 4,500, but possibly as many as 7,000—made their way from Kunduz to Yerghanek, five miles west of the city, where they surrendered to General Dostum. What no one either knew or cared about, however, was that among the surrendering soldiers were hundreds of civilians who had been caught up in the chaos or who were fleeing the hard-core al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters making a last stand in Kunduz itself. One of the most vivid accounts of the surrender was provided by three young Britons who fell into this latter category. Twenty-fouryear-old Shafiq Rasul, 20-year-old Asif Iqbal and 20-year-old Rhuhcl Ahmed—childhood friends from Tipton in the West Midlands— , had traveled to Pakistan in September 2001. Iqbal was making arrangements for his forthcoming marriage to a young woman in Pakistan, Ahmed was his best man, and Rasul was planning to do a computer course once the wedding was over, but soon after their arrival, when the invasion of Afghanistan began, they made the fateful decision that an exciting adventure awaited them over the border, just a short bus-ride away. Using the money they had brought with them, they planned to provide humanitarian aid to Afghan villagers, a mission that also involved the adrenaline rush of being in a war zone, and, they hoped, the opportunity to sample the Afghans' enormous naan breads. Up close, however, the war zone was more frightening than they had anticipated. At risk from both US bombing raids and the Taliban, who were deeply suspicious of young men wandering
19

028334

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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around without beards, they tried to return to Pakistan inata^i.but were instead taken to Kunduz. As the first groups ofTaliban soldiers began to surrender, they clambered ontoatmck that was leaving the city,but the vehicle wasimmediately shelled, and almostevetyoiie on board was killed. W^ith nowhere else to turn, they surrendered to Alliance soldiers who took their money, tbeir shoes and their warm clothes, and marched them toYerghanek.^ Yery few of those who made their way to Yerghanek—70 at most—were eventually transferred to Guantanamo.Of these, onlya handful have spoken about theitexperiences,and none were in the first convoys that set offforShebergban on tbe Sunday. Overwhelmed by tbe sheer numbers of people flooding ont of the city, Dostum was obligedtokeep thousands of them marooned in tbedesert while he arranged additional transportation over thenext few days..^sa result, neither tbe men fromTipton nor tbe others who ended up in Guantanamo—including Abdul Rahman,a2:^yearold shopkeeper from Kunduz, and Mohammed Saghir, a 4^ year old woodcutter from Pakistan's ^ortbWest Frontier Province—had any inkling of tbe grisly fate that awaited them. W b i l e t b e v a s t c r o w d ^ o f fighters andciviliansweredisarmed, Dostum's men recruited driverstogo to Qala Zeini. an old fort on tb roadbetweenMazareSbarifandShebergban,wberetbosetransported from Yerghanek were transferred into containers for tbe last stage o^ tbe journey to Sheberghan^. One of the drivers, who was in tbe fort wbenaciinvoy of prisoners arrived that evening, said that, as soon as the ^orthern.^lliance soldiers began stripping them of tbeir turbans and vests, tying tbeir hands behind tbeir backs and transferring them to tbe containers, some of tbe prisoners—those who were familiar with recent Afghan bi.story—realized that Dostum was planning to kill them Since 1^^7,wbenabrutalU^bek general had first seen tbe viability of containers as cheap and convenient killing machines, murderingl^2.^0 Taliban soldiers by leaving tbcm in containeisin tbe summer sun, tbey bad becomeafamiliar weapon of Afghan warfare When tbe TalibantookMa^areSbarifinl^^^,tbeydisposedoftbeir conquered enemies in the same fashion. According to one of tbe drivcrs,afew hours after tbe convoy bad set off from Qala Zeiiii, tbe prisonersstarted pounding on tbesidesof tbecontainers,sbouting,^^We'redying.GiveuswaterIWearebuman,

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^m:^t^^^r^^^,"^t^^Fii^^ bebind"Tbreeyearslater,baving been transported from Sbebergban to Kandahar and then to Guantanamo, Abdul R^abman's nightmare bad stillnot come to an endln bis tribunal, repeating bis story as be bad so many times before, be was obliged to refute allegations that be bad bougbtacar for theTaliban while wcaringaTalibanst^^le turban, accompanied by bis personal security force of fourTaliban soldiers, explaining that this wasastory that bad been conjured up by tbe men who falsely imprisoned him in tbe first place Pinally, someone believed bis story, and, after 40 months in detention, he was released in April 200.^.^ Mohammed Sagbirfacedasimilar ordeal.The woodcutter was also amissionary with jamaatalTabligbi,avast worldwide proselytizing organization whose annual gatherings in Pakistan and Bangladesh attract millions of follow^ers.Qver tbe years be bad been involved in numerous preaching missions to Afghanistan, but on this occasion he and nine other missionaries were seized by i^ortbern Alliance troops. Saghir was also held foranigbtatYergbanek,wberebe^^witnessed wounded and injured men buried alive with tbe dead,"and was then taken to Qala Zeini and herded intoacontainer.^Tbe journey took five bours,"be said.^Tt was dark, hot and suffocating as there was not enough air in tbe container, l ifty out of tbe 2,^0 prisoners died on ^tbe^way."Unlike Abdul Rahman,bowever,it took Sagbir less tbanayear to convince tbe Americans of bis innocence, lie was one of tbe first three prisoners to be freed, in ^ovember 2002,and was tbe first e^-Guantanamo prisoner to speak in detail not only about tbe horrors of detention in Afghanistan and Guba, but also about tbe death convoys.^ Tbe tbrcemen from Tipton waited for another day until tbeir transportation was arranged, and in tbeir case tbe container lorries came at nigbt,and tbe wbolesotdid spectacle wasilluminatedby spotlights operated byUSSpccialPorccs soldiers. Once tbe doors were sbut,tbeirordealfollowedanow familiar pattern. ^^Tbey'd herded maybe ^00 of us into each container...packed in so tightly ourknees were againstoiir chests," Asif Iqbalsaid, ^^aiid almost immediately we started to suffocate."As with some of tbe previous journeys, ventilation was provided by northern Alliancesoldiers, who made sure that tbeir humanitarian gesture was accompanied by more killing.^We lived becausesomeone made boles witbamacbine

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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THE GUANTANAMO FILES

THE CONVOY OF DEATH

23

ig been transported from Shcberghan tanamo, Abdul Rahman's nightmare his tribunal, repeating bis story as he vas obliged to refute allegations that iliban while wearing a Taliban-style rsonal security force of four Taliban IS a story that had been conjured up oned bim in tbe first place. Finally, after 40 months in detention, he was lilar ordeal. Tbe woodcutter was also ilighi, a vast worldwide proselytizing nerings in Pakistan and Bangladesh er the years he had been involved in Afghanistan, but on this occasion he : seized by Northern Alliance troops, at Yerghanek, where be "witnessed i alive with tbe dead," and was then into a container. "The journey took k, hot and suffocating as there was Fifty out of the 250 prisoners died ihman, however, it took Saghir less ricans of his innocence. He was one freed, in November 2002, and was :r to speak in detail not only about mstan and Cuba, but also about tbe waited for another day until their d in their case the container lorries urdid spectacle was illuminated by al Forces soldiers. Once the doors I a now familiar pattern. "They'd b container ... packed in so tightly sts," Asif Iqbal said, "and almost ate." As with some of tbe previous led by Northern Alliance soldiers, itarian gesture was accompanied by omeone made holes with a machine

gun," Iqbal said, "though they were shooting low and still more died from the bullets. The last thing I remember is that it got really hot, and everyone started screaming and banging. It was like someone bad lit a fire beneath the containers. You could feel the moisture running off your body, and people were ripping off their clothes." When he finally awoke, be realized that be bad not drunk anything for more than two days, and was seriously dehydrated. Using a cloth, he wiped the moisture off the wall and began sucking on it, until be realized he was drinking tbe blood of those who had died. "We were like zombies," he said. "We stank; we were covered in blood and tbe smell of death. Shcberghan As tbe survivors spilled out of tbe container trucks at Sheberghan, they discovered that, although the mass executions were over, the conditions at Dostum's prison were almost unspeakably grim. Thirtyfive hundred prisoners were crammed into a space that could only reasonably hold five hundred, and in order to sleep they took turns on the floor, squeezed together in four-hour shifts. Food was also a problem. Shafiq Rasul recalled that each prisoner received a quarter of a naan every day, and a small cup of water, and that sometimes prisoners fought over the food. Twenty-four-year-old Sulaiman Shah, an Afghan used car dealer, was another of the many innocents swept up by the Northern Alliance. On his release in March 2003, he mentioned his time at Sbebcrgban, where, he said, "life was inhuman, all the prisoners bad diarrhea, some had tuberculosis, there was no food for days at a time and we were subjected to beatings and torture."* Despite Sbab's appraisal of the ill-health of the prisoners, medical attention was non-existent. Rasul recalled, "There were people with horrific injuries—limbs that bad been shot off and nothing was done. I'll never forget one Arab who was missing half his jaw. For ten days until bis death he was screaming and crying continuously, begging to be killed." To make matters worse, reporters were swarming around Sheberghan, but for tbe most part they were blind to tbe suffering of the prisoners. "All they seemed to be interested in," Rasul said, "was if any of us knew the American Taliban John Walker Lindh." No one realized that Lindb was not even in Sheberghan. Instead, he

028337

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000004

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receivedinjuries to their eyes in this manner, that "ibree brothers were blinded,"andtbatmanyoftbeprisoners—himselfincluded—bad tbeir noses broken by tbe soldiers, lie was also one of tbe first prisoners to describe bow^ tbe pri^^ners'copies of tbe Koran were regularlyabused. lie explained that some of tbe soldiers "treated tbe Koran terribly," dropping copies in tbetoiletbucket,scrawlingobscenitiesonitspages, and tearing out pages which tbey used to shine tbeir shoes oriowipe out tbe toilet bucket, and added that tbey also cursed Allab and tbe PropbetMobammed onaregular basis. Tbe abuse of tbe I^oran was also noted bytbc BritonsTarekDergoul,SbafiqRasul,Asiflqbaland RbiibelAbmed,andbyFbsaniillab,a2^yearoldAfgban(rcleasedin March 2003),wbosaidtbatsoldiers in Kandahar hit bimand taunted bim by throwing tbe Koran inatoiletB' Some of tbe other Bahrainis also bad vivid tales to tell of tbeir treatment at Kandahar. Isa al Murbati(wbo,se capture is related in Gbapter 12) said that be was "shackled toapole outside in very eold weatber,"andtbat,"everybour,US military personnel threw eold water on ^bim^ while be was shackled to tbe pole"lIe explained that this took place every night foraweek, and added that on one occasion be was taken to an area away from tbe other prisoners, because Red Gross representatives were visiting tbe camp, and tbe authorities did not want them to see bim lt was also clear that al Murbatiwasnottbeonlyprisonertobee^poscdtotbee^tremecold. TbePakistaniinterviewedbyllti^anRigbtsWatcbsaidtbat"beand other prisoners were occasionally taken outside and forced to lie on tbe frozen ground until tbey were numb with cold."^^ Abdullah alNoaimi"witnessed other detainees being bitten by militarydogs,"andsaidtbat"afemalesoldier,uponlearningtbat^bisj brotberlivedintbeUSA,tbreatcnedtokillbim"Flealsodevelopeda urinarytractinfectionandcamedownwitbafever, which madebim vomit and left bim unable to eat, but explained that, when he was takentotbeclinic,"amilitarydoctorallowedamilitarypolicemanto injectbimwitbanunknownsubstaiicc.W^benbebegantobleedasa result,tbedoctorandtbepolicemanlaugbed"FIewastbenplacedm isolation ft^rsevenweeks,andwas ignored bytbemedicalstaff,even though bis eyes were yellow and there was bloodmbis urine, and addedtbatadoctortoldbim,"you'reabouttodieandtbere'snotbing weeandofeiryou."^^

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rilefirst20 prisoners arrived at Guantanamo on January 11, 2002, :ft;r 3 27-hour flight from Afghanistan. Three days later, a second J-,i, containing 30 prisoners, touched down, and by early February, 21(1 prisoners had arrived in Guba, and another 237 were awaiting rr.inspfttation from Kandahar. " I call the journey to Guantanamo 'the loumey of death'" the Kuwaiti Adel al-Zamel explained in December iiji}6. "I discreetly wished that the plane would fall to end the pain I lelt.*" Many other released prisoners also described the misery that ,. experienced on the flight. Shafiq Rasul, who explained that the prisoners were transported in what be and bis friends from Tipton described as the "three-piece suit," consisting of handcuffs attached io a metal belt and leg irons, said that be spent the whole journey m extreme pain because tbe belt was digging into his side. "When I rinally got to Guba," he said, " I lost feeling in my bands for the next S I X months."' it's still not certain when the administration's Wild West bravado gave way to a realization that, not only would there be prisoners in '.hi.- "War on Terror," but that, in order to exploit them as they saw ht, they would need to be detained outside tbe jurisdiction of the US >-"Oi]rts. On November 28,2001, the Pentagon was reportedly looking at plans to imprison captured terrorist suspects at Guantanamo or on the Pacific island of Guam,^ but the catalyst was an extraordinary Piece of legislation that was announced on November 13. Acting in his cspacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services, and without consulting Congress, President Bush issued a Military Order declaring

028340

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000007

GU.^^T^^^^^^^t^^I^I^N^

Flamed Ahmed explained, "Tbe questions were always the sarney if Iknew Osama bin Laden or someone of bis inner circle, wbatlwas doing in that region, who my contacts were, wberelbad fought, etc. This went on for two orthree hours. They asked tbe same questions in different ways.They finally told me that iflwasn't more cooperative, Iwould never see my family again."^^ Initially, tbe conditions of detention were tbe most severe obstacle facing tbe prisoners, prompting Asif Iqbal todeclare that "the restrictions that were placed on us when w ^ e were in our cages were probably tbe worst things we bad to endure." Importing tried and tested tactics from Afghanistan, theautborities prevented tbe prisoners from talking to one another and tbeir cages were permanently floodlit. "Ispent tbe first month in urtersilence,"Mobammed Saghir said after bis release, and Flamed ,^^medadded,"In tbe morning tbey woke us up at^o'clockwitbasongbyBruceSpringsteen,^BornintbeLISA,'wbich tbey played at full volume through tbe loudspeakers."Tbe prisoners were allowedabandful of meager"comfort items"—twotowels,a blanket,asheet,asmall toothbrush, shampoo,soap, flip-flops and an insulation mat to sleep on, as well as two buckets, one for water andoneforuse.^saurinal—but if tbey wanted to defecate tbey bad to be escorted to^portaloo by tbe guards,wbo unshackled one of tbeir bands, but kept an eye on them the whole time. This was not onlya.source of humiliation for devoutMuslims, but also,as Shafiq Rasul explained,"very often tbe guards would refuse to take us to tbe portaloo outside and therefore people started to use tbe buckets in tbe cells.Many of tbe people who were detained in Gamp^-Ray were ill, often suffering from dysentery or other diseases and simply couldn't wait until the guards decided they would take them to tbe toilet...The smell in the cell block was terrible."Asiflqbal also described how, in the first few weeks, tbey were "not allowed any exercise at all,"were only"allowedoutfortwominutesaweektobaveasbowerandthen returned to the cage,"and were often only givenaminutc to eat their food before itwas taken away.^^ Although many prisoners said that the everyday violence that was cc^miiionin Afghanistan was not replicatedinGuantanamo,they explained that tbe psychological pressure was more intense, and that tbey were absolutely terrified during the brst few weelcs in Guba. Shahq Rasul explaincd,"During tbe whole time that we were in Guantanamo,

028341

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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028342

Defense Reciprocal

Discovery

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134

THE CU.^NTANAMO FILFS

i#@vid Hicif*. The men from Tipton described al-Dossari as having mental health problems. "He used to shout all the time," they said. "Tbe guards and tbe medical team knew he was ill. Whenever soldiers would walk past bis cell he would shout out and say things to them. Not swearing but silly things. He would impersonate the soldiers. One day he was impersonating a female soldier. She called the officer in charge, [who] came to the block and was speaking to Juma." Rasul continued: There were usually five people on an ERF team. On ihis occasion there were eight of them ... The first man is meant to go in with a shield. On this occasion the man with the shield threw the shield away, took his helmet off, and when the door was unlocked ran in and did a knee drop onto Juma's back just between his shoulder blades with his full weight. He must have been about 240 pounds in weight... |he] grabbed his head with one hand and with the other hand punched him repeatedly in rhc face. I lis nose wa.s broken. He pushed his face and he smashed it into the concrete floor ... There was blood everywhere. When tbey took him out they hosed the cell down and the water ran red with blood Wc all saw it.-' In late April, Gamp X-Ray was closed down and the prisoners were moved to a new, purpose-built prison, Camp Delta. Made our of shipping containers, the camp consisted of blocks of 48 cells, arranged in two rows of mesh cages separated by a narrow corridor. .Although the new cells were a small improvement—they were slightly larger than Gamp X-Ray's cages, and each had a wall-mounted steel bed, a toilet and a tap—there was no improvement in the prisoners' general living conditions. The cells were cold at night, the piped water (from a desalination plant) was yellow, the lights still stayed on all night, and giant "banana" rats turned up to replace the snakes and scorpions that had plagued them in Camp X-Ray. The cells were similar to those in the US's notorious Supcrmax prisons, on which they were modeled, but there were still fundamental differences: not only had the inmates of America's harshest prisons been tried and convicted of crimes, they also, for the most part, were allowed regular visits by family members, and had unlimited access to books, TV, music, pens and paper. In contrast, the Guantanamo prisoners were still held in a legal limbo, with no access to lawyers, no access to tbeir families, no books apart from the Koran, no other forms of recreation, and no notion of when, if ever, their detention would come to an end. What none of them knew at tbe time was that the worst was yet to come.

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

028343

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1^4

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and w^as treated foratraumatic brain injury and discharged from tbe military in ,^pril 2004.^ "Setting the Conditions" Although the abuse described above was directed atpiisoners who were presumed to be significant suspects, it's clear that many other prisoners who have not spoken about tbeir experiences also suffered brutal treatment. Not everyone was abused by their interrogators ot picked on by tbe guards, but the new regime tc^k as Its starting point the presumption that tbe majority of the prisoners had sc^mething to hide, and came upw^ith new forms of abuse, in an attempt to "break"tbem, which,accordin^gtoafotmetinterrogator,w^ere applied to one-sixth of the prisoners in Guantanamo^ in other words,to at Icastahundred prisoners. Heexplainedthat"whennewinterrogatorsarrivedthey were told they had greatflexibilityin extracting information from detainees because tbe Geneva Conventions did not apply at tbe b^se."^ Describing this period, Shafiq Rasul, Asif lqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, who were rarely subjected to physical btutality, said that tbey became aware of the changes when the frequency and the length of their inter rogations increased, and explained that they were each interrogated on about five occasions in 2002, buttbatfroinlanuary2003 until their release in March 2004 tbey were subjected to over two hundred interrogations.Tbese kinds of figures have been confirmed by other prisoners, including, to citejustafew examples, thcMoroccanYounis Ghekhouti,who was interrogatedover 1,^0 times,the Frenchman Khaledbin Mustafa,who was interrogated overabundted times, and—to demonstrate that thechangcsw^ere not c^nly directed at prisoners whow^cre regarded with great suspicion—a2^yearold Afghan, Abdel Rahman Noorani^released in luly 2003),w^ho said that he was "badly punisbedlOB times,"and added that"during his 20 months at Guantanamo, his captors bad chained his bands and feet and had beaten him witbametal rod on his legs and back. W^bat made theprisoners' experiences even more disturbing, howevet,was the new framework in which the interrogations were couched. Before the interrogations, prisoners w ere frequently moved into isolationblocks,where they remained for days,weeks, or even months, and where the air conditioning was usually turned up full,

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ers who spoke out in 2004—either bods" or because they "objected to nd badly-run system"—added that m and Rage Against the Machine, )f babies crying and the television nich the jingle consists of repetition k place while the prisoners were Several described how, when they nterrogation, they were actually left often forced to soil themselves as a ;hat the authorities came up with a You have a reservation"—and added y for a month in 2003, and that he urs. "Eventually," he said, "I'd need d try to tilt my chair and go on the h a one-way mirror. As soon as I wet ? in yelling, 'Look what you've done! aken back to his cell for three hours, egan again. The prisoners were also ce, tied with an especially short chain 1 the floor. "After a while," Dergoul ltd hear the guards behind the mirror, ig, knocking on the walls. It was not t was just about trying to break you." uantanamo in October 2002, a few vas almost immediately subjected to led and left in a room for six hours, officer would enter the room to laugh lim until he urinated on himself, and aning fluid over him and used him as mess." As if further humiliation was "not provided with clean clothes for on."' ored techniques was sleep deprivation, aking the prisoners whenever they fell oving them repeatedly from cell to cell ;. Abdul Malik al-Rahabi was subjected

to prolonged periods of sleep deprivation, David Hicks was subjected to sleep deprivation "as a matter of policy," and Mourad Benchellali explained, "Wc were treated differently depending on whether or not we responded to questions. Those who did not 'cooperate' were awakened every hour with the aim of preventing them from sleeping at all costs." The prisoners who were moved from cell to cell—the "frequent fliers," as the men from Tipton described them—included the Kuwaiti Fouad al-Rabia, who, they said, was picked on like all the prisoners who had spent time in the US, and was moved every two hours, leaving him "suffering from serious depression, losing weight in a substantial way, and very stressed because of the constant moves, deprived of sleep and seriously worried about the consequences for his children." Mehdi Ghezali was "deprived of sleep for about two weeks by the constant switching of cells and interrogation," and Isa al-Murbati was "moved from cell to cell in the Tango and Oscar [isolation] blocks, typically on an hourly basis." As a result, be said, he was "never able to sleep for more than short periods." Mohammed Khan Achakzai, a 24-year-old Afghan businessman (who was sold to the Americans by the Northern Alliance after the fall of Kunduz) said on his release in March 2004 that some prisoners had been deprived of sleep for up to 45 days at a time, and one particularly unfortunate Yemeni, Mohammed Ghanim (who was in the first group of prisoners captured crossing from Afghanistan to Pakistan in December 2001, but does not seem otherwise significant) was apparently moved between cells and blocks every two hours for a total of eight months, as a result of which he lost a lot of weight—and, presumably, found it increasingly difficult to keep a grip on his sanity.'"^ The authorities also made use of prisoners' phobias, either through the use of dogs, as in the case of Saad al-Azmi, who was bitten by dogs while being hooded, or, as was more common, through sexual humiliation. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed explained that it happened "to the people who'd been brought up most strictly as Muslims," and that they were frequently so ashamed that it took them some time to tell their neighbors about their experiences. Although the men from Tipton were referring primarily to the Gulf prisoners, very few of them have spoken about their experiences, although the Yemeni Yasin Ismail reported that when he refused to talk during an interrogation, a female soldier entered wearing a tight T-shirt. "Why

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to hood them, to beat them mercilessly, to hang them from the walls of their cells for days, to set dogs on them, to lead them around the cell block on leashes, to pile them up in grotesque naked pyramids and, on one notorious occasion, to place a hooded, dark-robedfigureon a box, with his arms outstretched, and with wires trailing from his fingers. Schtesinger's report was critical, but, as in other reports commissioned in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, be pointedly refused to gaze up the chain of command to investigate where, ultimately, the responsibility lay for authorizing these techniques. Echoing Bush and Rumsfeld, who blamed the abuse on a "few bad apples," Schlesingcr concluded that it was the result of "Animal I louse on the night shift," although he conceded that "techniques effective under carefully controlled conditions at Guantanamo became far more problematic when they migrated [to Iraq] and were not adequately safeguarded."'' Noticeably, however, the changes authorized by Rumsfeld did not meet with universal approval in Guantanamo. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed noted that many of their guards, who kept them briefed about developments in the camp, "felt ashamed of the Army that these things were going on." More crucially, several major players in the US administration were also dismayed. Colin Powell's State Department remained implacably opposed to all the developments that sprang from the jettisoning of the Geneva Conventions, and Colonel Lawrence Wiikerson, one of Powell's Chiefs of Staff, was particularly incensed by Rumsfeld's note about standing for eight to ten hours, telling Jane Mayer, "It said, 'Carte blanche, guys.' That's what started them down the slope. You'll have My Lais then. Once you pull this thread, the whole fabric unravels." The most trenchant criticism, however, came from two of the biggest law enforcement agencies, the FBI and the Naval Criminal Intelligence Service. The NCIS's battle was led by Alberto J Mora, the Navy's general counsel, who was informed about the abusive environment at Guantanamo in December 2002 by his colleague David Brant, who was overseeing a team of NCIS agents working with the FBI. In contrast to the military interrogators and the CIA—who were seeking to "break" al-Qaeda, and whose road to torture was paved by the highest powers in the land—the NCIS's mission was to seek out evidence that could eventually be used in military tribunals and civilian courts. Brant told Mora that the military interrogators, most of whom

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THL^t^^^^r.^^^^^^^^^^^ ^edtohidicroiisallegatioiiswhose vbicb were clearly im^I^^^^^^^^ 33 y^ar old Pakistani, w^how^as small storem Pakistan Cangbt ling to Afghanistan to look for ^rghan and another three yoats instbatbew^asiiotamilitary idrassas,"tbroughwbichbewas -da,andtbatbehadledthisvast .^rabalQaidaoperatives"-^iti intilhewascapturedinKunduz. ^d,"The person who madethese doc^sntevenbaveabraiii,"and rd Member told biiii, " I don't ragrcat general,ortbis person ^come with you onamoment's lin October 200^B^ ^wascapturedinPakistan while ^ 1 foot in Afghanistan, also had gations,w^hich included claims ^^^,andthathewas"asenior B' in contact with Osama bin e w ^ board, the source c^f these ^.^cxplainedABoard Member dentified you as belonging to him for details he w^as unable er bizarre allegations involved reportedly caught smuggling le managed to keep the money basement of the Qala i-langhi uw^ari, who responded to an wheiehe was "in charge of tbe asked one of the prisoners 4and was told tbat"tbe camp ^ve were obtained through ough General Millcr'smuch kinder on tbe informers than

^^^|^Tt^I^I,B^I^tl^FB^^I^FB^I^Fi;;i;;ii^IT^^

coercion—allowing tbeni to move to Gamp 4, wbere tbey shared dormitories with nine cithers, ate communally and w^crc allowed to playsporistogethet—wasjiisiasdaniagiiiginicriiisoftbevahieoftbc intelligence pioduccd.^^ numerous prisoners w^ere,ol course, aware that other prisoners were telling lies in tbe hope of being released, but Miller was oblivions to it, proudly telling David Rose that bis ^raduiitcd system of 2^^ cxtra"comfortitems"for cooperative prisoners h^d contributed to tbe 1^00 percent increase in intelligciice under his w:itch,all of which,he maintained,w^as"eiiornioiisly valuable intelligence,"wbichwas"distributed around the world.' Ihis was clearly nonsense—Anthony Gbristino said that be saw no dramatic improvenieiitintliequiility ofthe intelligence, bul noted iinincreasein quantity and an attempt to "improve the w^ay it was packaged"—but although it was more piili^tablc to sell bribery as tbe key tactic that bad apparently transformed Guantanamo, the blunt truth w^as that coercion—cc^mbinedwitbacreduloiis approach to "evidence" on the part of tbe authorities—bad playedamore prominent part.'^ It's uncertain quite bowmany prisoners were presented with patently false information that they either refuted, leading to horrendous punishment, or accepted under duress, producing self incriminating false confessions, but the examples of several of tbe British prisoners suggest that both the scenario und its responses were w^idespread h was in Guantanamo, under Miller's command, that Omar Degbayes was unexpectedly confronted withagrainyvideoofChecbenmilitants, in which,it was alleged, he wasapromincntplayct, even though It has been established thatthe man in the video was i3ctuallyamilit^nt who died in Chechnya in 2004,^^ and it was under M i l l e r t b a t ^ ^ ^ ^asul,AsifIqbalandRhuhelAhmedsnddenlvfoundthemselvesunder^ intense suspicion when another grainv video surfaced purporting to show them in the crowd atameeting between Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Attain Afghanistan. In tbe case of the three men from Tipton,Britisb intelligence agents, having been useless up totbatpoint, i^finallv intervened to confirm that Rasul'salibi—that he was working in an electrical store in tbe WestMidlandsattbetime—was thetruth, and not, as alleged,adevious cover story concocted byahardeni^d terrorist. I bis, in turn, led to tbeir release, but not until all three meii cracked under the pressure and "confessed" that tbe allegation wa^ ^^rue.Inasimilar scenario, Ahmed Errachidi, tbe Moroccan chef, was

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ationsaccounts to public scrtititiy or al Matrafi has also come from ihAymanBatarfi pointing onttbat, ^ing relationship with the Taliban, tiaiiitarian work, and both Batarfi tbe organization was regardedw^ith its Saudi hnks. What has largely iMay 200^, an audiotape from bin called intodoubt by US intelligence, sin Guantanamo—alMatrafi and ^hatsc^everw^ithal-Qaeda.^Noneof what h^is probably counted against ^he discovery, in Augu.st 2002,ofa yal-Wafa in Kabul,which inclnded , fuses ^nd terrorist guide books," ig to do with him is unknown. His at the organization had no links to repeatedly said we have no terrorist fficial or non governmental, IS free Iqiiarters. We are only helping the

idnapping,4'B'-year-oldMamdouh imQuetta to Karachi when it was ,icked from his scat asasuspected ^o jail for three weeks, interrogated itircd" by the Pakistani authc^rities. ^fl^,drifted to Europe and settled cameacitizen,marriedaLebanese ranacleaningbusines.s.He later c^f Sydney, but became "chronically isability benefit. In summer 2001, "heset off for Pakistan to look for imily over to join bim, but when he ;i the Americansthatthey had caught ibibadmitted that one ofhisreasons

for leaving Australia was because be was"cau^bt between police who .suspected bim of terror links and an often hostile Muslim community that was sometimes suspicious of bis activities,":^nd these suspicions were triggered afteravisit to the US,w^ben he met followers of tbe ^^yptian born cleric. Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. Also known as ^he "Blind Sheikh,"Abdul Rahman wasamajor source of inspiration for Gsama bin Laden,and was scrvingalife sentence for his role in the 1^^3WorldTradc Center bombing andaplot to blow-up several NewYork landmarks. Habib'stroublcs began w^benliestayed in touch with Abdul Rahman's associates in NewYork on bis return to Sydney, and spoke out in bis defen.se. but although there w ^ a s nothing in bis activities to suggest that he was actually involved in any kind of terrorist activity, as soon asthe Americans fecund out about bis history they rendered him to Egypt. For six months, he was "suspended from hooks on the walls w^hile his feet rested onarotating metal drum that delivered electric shocks,""kicked,punched,beaten witbastick and rammed with what can only be described as an electric cattle prod," and handcuffed and left inaroom that gradually filled with water until it was just beneath his chin."Broken"by the Egyptians, he madea number of false confessions—in particular, that he "trained several of the Septemberllhijackers in martial arts i^nd bad planned to hijack aplane himself"—which were theniised against bim after he w^as transferred toGuantanamo,via Afghanistan, in ]une 2002.^ In Guantanamo, he continued to be treated brutally, and several prisoners reported his suffering. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed said that be was "in catastrophic shape, mental and physical," and that, asaresult of his torture,"he used to bleed from his nose, mouth and ears when he was asleep."Habib also made allegations about bis treatmcntin Guantanamo—inparticulartbatbewas"smcated with the menstrual blood ofaprostitute"during an interrogation—and complained vociferously about being kept in solitary confinement in Camp Echc^:"Thcy use every possible ^way] to make me crazy.They put mc in isolation all the time.Inever sec tbe sun.Inever have shower likeahumanbeing.lnevcr have soap.Inever have cup to drink.I nevertreatedlikeahumanbeing."Giventhiscatalogofabuse,andthe allegations against him,it came asasurprise to everyone—including the Australian authorities—when he was released from Guantanamo in January 200.^,and returned to Australia asafrec man.^

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THt^GI^^NTB^NA.^OFtL^^

^GH0^T"I^I^I^ONFI^^.^NFl^F^^t^FTI^I^I^O^^

^^.^

ir one of them"to meet Osama bin then swore allegiance to Osama bin It and influential al Qaeda member." ^ toimplicateSlabi inall manner of Ressam's plot to blow-up Los Angeles cfalscly confessed to being part of tbe dan, and explained that, although he gto find work as an electrical engineer, mists, and rctiiriied to Mauritania in ^pt under constant surveillance by the Iw^entlbad people right behind me .Isaid what the heck^ This is not the the Americans in November 2001 has It as if he w^as an unknown quantity Canada,he badbecn investigated in in Senegal on his w^ay to Mauritania ^been questionedon two occasions ytbree FBI agents and "another guy ^"inMauritaniainFcbruary 2000, man.^merican agent took part in an Slahi, threatened tobringin"black

Americans were enormous.There wasahysteria in their behaviour." Unwilling to def^ the Americans, the Bosnians then arrested the men, but afterathrec-montb investigation, in which they conducted extensive searches oftheirapartmeiit^, their computers and their documents, they found "literallynoevidence" to justify thcarrests. The SupremeCourt ordered their release, and, with rumors circulating thatthe Americans wercgoingtoseiBc them anyway, the Bc^snianlluman Rights Chamber ruled that they had tbe right to remain in the country and were not to be deported. On the night of Januaryl^,2002,ahuge crowd of supporters gathered outside the prison in Sarajevo to protect them on their release, bm riot police dispersed tbe crowd with tear gas, and at dawn, as the men emerged, tbey were seized by American agents, hooded, handcuffed and rendered to Guantanamo. Since arriving in Guantanamo, the embassy plot has never been mentioned. Instead, the six men have been subjected to relentless allegations that they were associated with al Qaeda. Although they all traveled to Bosnia to support Muslims during the 1^^2^^5 civil war and w^erc then granted citizenship, they married Bosnian w^omen and spent the next six years working with orphans forvariousMuslim charities, including the Red Crescent, and, in the case of Lahmar, an Islamic scholar, the Saudi High Committee for Relief, and there was no evidence that any of them maintaitiedasideline dealing with intemational terrorists. According to their lawyers, the source c^f the f^lse allegations wasl ahmar'sembirtcredex btother-in law, who ran a"smearcampaign''against bim. Another allegation made by the .^ericans—that Belkacem made seventy phone calls to Afghanistan after ^^lland was "thetopal-Qaeda facilitator" in Bosnia—has never been substantiated, and there seems no doubt that all six men are innc^cent. Manfred Novak, the UN Special Rapporteur onTorture, explained, "It's implausible to say that they are enemy combatants. They werefightersduring the Bosnian war, but that ended in 1^^^. They may be radical Islamists, butthey have definitely not cc^mmitted any crime."'' Despite this, they have been treated brutally in Guantanamo. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhubel Ahmed reported that during Geoffrey Miller's tcnurc,"They were treated particularly badly.They were moved every two hours. They were kept naked in their cells. Tbey were taken to interrogation forhouts on end. Tbeywereshortshackled for

aordinary and unprecedented story nthe US embassy in Sarajevo asked ^nian citizens of Algerian origin—40iyearoldSabirLahmar,34-yearold Mustafa Ait Idr,.3^-year-oldLakhdar udellaalHajj—becau.seofasuspicion blotto bombtheUSembassy.The ofadiph^matic note, which contained gation, and tbe Bosnians refused to ^eatened to close their embassy and inless the men were arrested. Human ic noted tbat"the threats from tbe

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te, and bad received dentaltreatment nhis case at least, Guantanamo was ocraticvalues."Kakaiwillultimatelv educated Afghan citizcn,"Norwii^^ participate in political change, engage urn to herding livestock. The choice abased on options he would not have inaino."'^

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

The First Challenges Thefirstlegalcballengeto Guantanamo began assoon as tbecamp openedonlanuaryll,2002 Withinaweek,a"CoalitionofGlergy, LawyersandProfessors,"includingformerAttorneyGeneralRamsey Clark,filedahabeaspetitiononbehalfoftheGui^ntanamoprisoners ltwasdismissedamonthlater,largelybecausethepetitionershadno relationship with theaccused,butbytbentbecourt'scomplamthad alreadybeenaddresscdBreakingtbroughthestrictsecrecysurrounding Guantanamo, theidentitiesofthreeoftheprisonersbecamekriown, andwiththesupportoftheGenterforConstitutionalRights(CCR), theparentsofShafiqRasul,AsiflqbalandDavidHicksfiledsuiton behalfoftheirsonsR^si^^^^^^s^beganitslongjourneytotheSupreme CourtonFebruaryl^,2002 Notingthat,despiteregularinterrogation byllSagents,thetbreemenhadnotbeencbargedwitbanoffense,put beforeatribunal,orgivenaccesstolawyers,thcpetitionchallengedthe legality oftheNovember 2001 MilitaryOrderauthotizingindefinite detentionwithoutdueprocess,describingitas"unconstitutionalanda violationofinternationallawB'JosephMargulies,oneofsevenlawyers involved in the case, explained the significance ofthe petition: "We distinguish ourselves from terrorists only by our commitmentto the ruleoflaw,andthelawisperfectlycleartbatthePresidentcan'torder aperson locked up indefinitely, w^ithout legal processUnlessthe US saysthelawissimplyamatterofconvenience,sometbingwearefree toignorewhcneverandwhereverwecboose,wehavetochangewbat we're doing in Guba."^
^^7

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hos^ital^were watching, "the guards took tubes from one detainee, and with no sanitization whatsoever, reinserted it into the nose of a different detainee. When these tubes were reinserted, the detainees could sec the blood and stomach bile from other detainees remaining onthetubes.^^^ ^^icall^alpitactice With these methods—and the use of five '^restraint chairs^" which were ordered in December—^the authorities succeeded in convincing thema^ority of the hunger strikers who were holding out in early ^annary 200^ to give np their protest by theendof the month, and by Marchonlyafew young Gulf prisoners, including Ghassanal-Sharbi, werestillonstrike.^^ltwasnoriceable, however, that both the methods nsed and the complicity of the medical staff raised uncomfortable t^nestionsabot^t the role of the doctors in Guantanamo which had, up tothatpoint, largely been concealed, even though numerous prisoners had spoken aboutthe various ways in which, instead of maintaining ^pt^fessionaltlistancc, the tloctors and medical staff were intimately inv^ol^ed in every aspect of the prison'^ t^perations. This had been apparent in a general sense fron^ the beginning, when the prisoners were rei^uired to take unknown dmgs on a regular basis. Sha^t^ Rasul, Asif l^bal and Rhuhel Ahmed described an incident in August 2002 when medical staff toured the cell blocks asking the prisoners if they wanted an injection, "although they wonldn^t say what it was for.^ They said that toost of the prisoners refused, but the medical staff then returned with an l ^ F team who forced them to have the injections anyway. Ahmed said that the drug made him feel ''very drowsy,^ antl adtled, ^Ih^^e no idea why they were giving us these injections, ft happened perhaps a dozen times altogether and I helieve it still goes on at the camp. You are not allowed to refuse It and you don't know what it is for." Abdullah al-Noaimi told his lawyers that within his f^rst few days at Guantanamo he '^was injected with an unknown substance which made him depressed and despondent. Fie was unable to control his thoughts and his mind raced. Fle was also unable to control his body and fell to the floor." He was then placed in isolation for three days, where medical staff adntinistered an nnknownmedicme "that tnade him feel drunk," until he refused to take

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tiy both Dostum and the Americans to 'ere killed were tied up at the time they TWrters were briefed that "only" eight rt being shot after the uprising started, i proposed by Luke Flarding, is more it, because a photographer "saw the Iters whose hands had been bound by > t southern part of the fort," and that -'rs cut the scarves from the hands of Alex Perry noted, "some of the dead iauce soldiers used scissors to snip off less significantly, because so many of y was suppressed until the Pentagon Its in 2006—also talked about being
id.'*

(l^Y) J ^ k ^
3 T^^ CoMi/oy o/'Dg^^A

Yerghanek and Qala Zeini On Sunday, November 25,2001, as the uprising began in Qala-i-Janghi, a far larger group of Taliban soldiers—at least 4,500, but possibly as many as 7,000—made their way from Kunduz to Yerghanek, five miles west of tbe city, where tbey surrendered to General Dostum. What no one either knew or cared about, however, was that among the surrendering soldiers were hundreds of civilians who had been caught up in the chaos or who were fleeing tbe hard-core al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters making a last stand in Kunduz itself. One of the most vivid accounts of the surrender was provided by three young Britons who fell into this latter category. Twenty-fouryear-old Shafiq Rasul, 20-ycar-old Asif Iqbal and 20-year-old Rhuhel Ahmed—childhood friends from Tipton in the West Midlandshad traveled to Pakistan in September 2001. Iqbal was making arrangements for his forthcoming marriage to a young woman in Pakistan, Ahmed was his best man, and Rasul was planning to do a computer course once the wedding was over, but soon after their arrival, when the invasion of Afghanistan began, they made the fateful decision that an exciting adventure awaited them over the border, just a short bus-ride away. Using the money they had brought with them, they planned to provide humanitarian aid to Afghan villagers, a mission that also involved the adrenaline rush of being in a war zone, and, they hoped, the opportunit>' to sample the Afghans' enormous naan breads. Up close, however, the war zone was more frightening than they had anticipated. At risk from both US bombing raids and the Tahban, who were deeply suspicious of young men wandering
19

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n
nc
WS

around without beards, they tried to return to Pakistan m a taxi, but were instead taken to Kunduz. As the first groups of Taliban soldiers began to surrender, tbey clambered onto a truck that was leaving the city, but the vehicle was immediately shelled, and almost everyone on board was killed. With nowhere else to turn, tbey surrendered to Alliance soldiers who took their money, their shoes and their warm clothes, and marched them to Yerghanek.' Very few of those who made their way to Yerghanek—70 at most—were eventually transferred to Guantanamo. Of these, only a handful have spoken about their experiences, and none were in the first convoys that set off for Sheberghan on the Sunday. Overwhelmed by tbe sheer numbers of people flooding out of the city, Dostum was obliged to keep thousands of them marooned in the desert while he arranged additional transportation over the next few days. As a result, neither the men from Tipton nor the others who ended up in Guantanamo—including Abdul Rahman, a 2J-year-old shopkeeper from Kunduz, and Mohammed Saghir, a 49-year-old woodcutter from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province—had any inkling of the grisly fate that awaited them. While the vast crowds of fighters and civilians were disarmed, Dostum's men recruited drivers to go to Qala Zeini, an old fort on the road between Mazar-e-Sharif and Sheberghan, where those transported from Yerghanek were transferred into containers for the last stage of the journey to Sheberghan. One of the drivers, who was in the fort when a convoy of prisoners arrived that evening, said that, as soon as the Northern Alliance soldiers began stripping them of their turbans and vests, tying their hands behind their backs and transferring them to the containers, some of the prisoners—those who were familiar with recent Afghan history—realized that Dostum was planning to kill them. Since 1997, when a brutal Uzbek general had first seen the viability of containers as cheap and convenient killing machines, murdering 1,250 Taliban soldiers by leaving them in containers in the summer sun, they had become a familiar weapon of Afghan warfare. When the Taliban took Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, they disposed oftheir conquered enemies in rhc same fashion. According to one of the drivers, a few hours after the convoy had set off from Qala Zeini, the prisoners started pounding on the sides of tbe containers, shouting, "We're dying. Give us water! We arc human.

w< wt su: tn op

Ab frc he his rez rac wa on the Pa; the see the wh up, Af{ / she frei nig the he! dirt anc wej wet "W air, arri

III!

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behind."Threeyearslater, having been transported from Sheberghan to Kandahar and then to Guantanamo,Abdul Rabman'snightmare had still not come to an end. In his tribunal, repeating his stc^ry as be had so many times before, be was obliged to refute allegations that he had boughtacar for theTaliban while wearingaTaliban-style turban,accompaniedby his personal security force of foiirTaliban soldiers, explaining that this wasastory that bad been conjured up by themen w^hofalsely imprisonedbimin thefirst place. Finally, someone believed his story, and, after 40 months in detention, he was released in April 2005 ' Mohammed Sagbirfacedasimilar ordeal.The w^oodcutter was also amissionarywitbJamaat-al-Tablighi,avast worldwide proselytizing organization whoscannual gatherings in Pakistan and Bangladesh attract millions of followers.Over the years he had been involved in numerous preaching missions to Afghanistan, but on this occasicm be and nine other missionaries were seized by Northern Alliance troops. Saghir w^as also held foranightatYergbanek,w^bere he "witnessed wounded and injured men buried alive with the dead,"and was then taken to Qala Zeini and herded intoacontainer."The journey took five hours,"be said."It was dark, bot and suffocating as there was not enough air in the container. Fift^^ out of the 250 prisoners died on [thej way."Unlike Abdul Rahman, however, it took Saghir less tbanayear to convince the Americans of bis innocence. He was one of the first three prisoners to be freed, in November 2002, and was tbe first ex Guantanamo prisoner to speak in detail not only about the horrors of detenticm in Afghanistan and Guba, but also about the death convoys.^ Fhetbreemenfroin Tipton waitedforanc^tberday until tbeir transportation was arranged, and in their case tbe container lorries came at night, and the whole sordid spectacle was illuminated by spotlights operated by US Special Forces soldiers Once the doors were shut,tbeir ordeal followedanow familiar pattern. "They'd herded maybe 300 of us into each container ...packed in so tightly our knees w^ere against our cbcsts,"Asif Iqbal said,"and almost immediately wc started to suffocate."As with some of tbe previous journeys, ventilation was provided byNorthern Alliancesoldiers, who made sure th^ttbeir humanitarian gesture was accompanied by more killing."We lived because someone made holes withamachine

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THE GUANTANAMO FILES

THE CONVOY OF DEATH

Ig been transported from Sheberghan tanamo, Abdul Rahman's nightmare his tribunal, repeating bis story as he vas obliged to refute allegations that iliban while wearing a Taliban-style -sonal security force of four Tahban IS a story that had been conjured up oned him in tbe first place. Finally, after 40 months in detention, be was lilar ordeal. The woodcutter was also ilighi, a vast worldwide proselytizing -lerings in Pakistan and Bangladesh er the years he had been involved in Afghanistan, but on this occasion he : seized by Northern Alliance troops, at Yerghanek, where he "witnessed J alive with the dead," and was then into a container. "The journey took k, hot and suffocating as there was Fifty out of the 250 prisoners died hman, however, it took Saghir less ricans of bis innocence. He was one freed, in November 2002, and was •r to speak in detail not only about nistan and Cuba, but also about the waited for another day until their d in their case the container lorries ordid spectacle was illuminated by al Forces soldiers. Once the doors i a now familiar pattern. "They'd ;h container ... packed in so tightly sts," Asif Iqbal said, "and almost ate." As with some of the previous led by Northern Alliance soldiers, itarian gesture was accompanied by omeone made holes with a machine

gun," Iqbal said, "though tbey were shooting low and still more died from the bullets. The last thing 1 remember is that it got really hot, and everyone started screaming and banging. It was like someone had lit a fire beneath the containers. You could feel the moisture running off your body, and people were ripping off their clothes." When he finally awoke, he realized that he had not drunk anything for more than two days, and was seriously dehydrated. Using a cloth, he wiped the moisture off the wall and began sucking on it, until be realized be was drinking the blood of those who had died. "We were like zombies," he said. "We stank; we were covered in blood and the smell of death. "^ Sheberghan As tbe survivors spilled out of tbe container trucks at Sheberghan, they discovered that, although the mass executions were over, the conditions at Dostum's prison were almost unspeakably grim. Thirtyfive hundred prisoners were crammed into a space that could only reasonably hold five hundred, and in order to sleep tbey took turns on the floor, squeezed together in four-hour shifts. Food was also a problem. Shafiq Rasul recalled that each prisoner received a quarter of a naan every day, and a small cup of water, and that sometimes prisoners fought over the food. Twenty-foiir-year-old Sulaiman Shah, an Afghan used car dealer, was another of the many irmocents swept up by the Northern Alliance. On his release in March 2003, he mentioned his time at Shcberghan, where, he said, "life was inhuman, all the prisoners had diarrhea, some had tuberculosis, there was no food for days at a time and we were subjected to beatings and torture."' Despite Shah's appraisal of the ill-health of the prisoners, medical attention was non-existent. Rasul recalled, " Fhcre were people with horrific injuries—limbs that had been shot off and nothing was done. I'll never forget one Arab who was missing half his jaw. For ten days until his death be was screaming and crying continuously, begging to be killed." To make matters worse, reporters were swarming around Sheberghan, but for the most part they were blind to the suffering of the prisoners. "All they seemed to be interested in," Rasul said, "was if any of us knew the American Taliban John Walker Lindb." No one realized that Lindh was not even in Shcberghan. Instead, he

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THE GUANTANAMO FILES

received injuries to their eyes in this manner, that "three brothers were blinded," and that many ofthe prisoners—himself included—bad their noses broken by the soldiers. He was also one of the first prisoners to describe how the prisoners' copies of the Koran were regularly abused. He explained that some of the soldiers "treated the Koran terribly," dropping copies in the toilet bucket, scrawling obscenities on its pages, and tearing out pages which tbey used to shine their shoes or to wipe out the toilet bucket, and added that they also cursed Allah and the Prophet Mohammed on a regular basis. Tbe abuse of the Koran was also noted by the Britons Tarek Dergoul, Shafiq Rasul, Asiflqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, and by Fhsanullah, a 28-year-old Afghan (released in March 2003), who said that soldiers in Kandahar hit him and taunted him by throwing the Koran in a toilet." Some of the other Bahrainis also had vivid tales to tell of their treatment at Kandahar. Isa al-Murbati (whose capture is related in Chapter 12) said that he was "shackled to a pole outside in very cold weather," and that, "every hour, US military personnel threw cold water on [him] while he was shackled to the pole." He explained that this took place every night for a week, and added that on one occasion he was taken to an area away from the other prisoners, because Red Cross representatives were visiting the camp, and the authorities did not want them to sec him. It was also clear that alMurbati was not the only prisoner to be exposed to the extreme cold. The Pakistani interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that "he and other prisoners were occasionally taken outside and forced to lie on the frozen ground unril they were numb with cold."" Abdullah al-Noaimi "witnessed other detainees being bitten by military dogs," and said that "a female soldier, upon learning that [his] brother lived in the USA, threatened to kill him." He also developed a urinary tract infection and came down with a fever, which made him vomit and left him unable to eat, but explained that, when he was taken to the clinic, "a military doctor allowed a military policeman to inject him with an unknown substance. When be began to bleed as a result, the doctor and the policeman laughed." He was then placed in isolarion for seven weeks, and was ignored by the medical staff, even though his eyes were yellow and there was blood in his urine, and added that a doctor told him, "you're about to die and there's nothing we can do for vou.' '

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Flamed Abmed explained, "The questions were always the same: if IknewOsama bin Li^iden or someone of his inner circle,whatlwas doing in that rcgion,who my contacts wcre,wberelhad fought, etc. This went on for two or three hours. They asked the s^me questions in different w^ays.Tbey finally told me that iflwasn't more cooperative, Iwould never see my family again."'' Initially, tbe conditions of detention were the most severe obstacle facirigtheprisoners,prompting Asif Iqbaltodeclarethat "the restrictions that were placed on us when we were in our cages were probably the worst things we had to endure."Importing tried and tested tactics from Afghanistan, the authorities prevented the prisoners ftom talkingtoone another and their cages were permanently floodlit. "Ispent the first month in utter silence,"Mohammed Saghir said after his release, and HamedAhmedadded,"In the morning theywoke us up at8o'clockwithasongbyBruceSpringsteen,'BornintheUSA,'whicb they played at full volume through the loudspeakers."The prisoners were allowedabandful of meager "comfort items"—two towels,a blanket,asheet,asmall toothbrush, shampoo, soap, flip-flops and an insulation mat to sleep on, as well as two buckets, one for water and one for use asatirinal-^but if tbey wanted to defecate they had to be escorted toaportaloo by the guards,who unshackled one of their hands, but kept an eye on them the whole time. This was not onlyasource of humiliation for devout Muslims,but also, as Shafiq Rasul explained, "very often the guards would refuse to take us to the portaloo outside and therefore people started to use tbe buckets in the cells.Many of the people who were detained in CampX-Raywc^re ill, often suffering from dysentery or other diseases and simply couldn't waituntil tbe guards decided they would take them to the toilet ...The smell in the cell block was terriblc."Asif Iqbal also described how, in the first few weeks, they were "not allowed any exercise at all,"were only"allowedoutfortwominutesawcektohaveasbowerandthen returned to the cage,"and were often only givenaminutc to eat their food before it was taken away. Although many prisoners said that tbe everyday violence that was common in Afghanistan was not replicated in Guantanamo, they explained that the psychological pressure was more intense, and that they were absolutely terrified during the first fewwecks in Cuba. Shafiq Rasul cxplained,"Durin^thewholetimethatwe were in Guantanamo,

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134

THE, GUANTANAMO Fll.KS

David I licks. I he men from Tipton described al-Dossari as having mental health problems. "He used to shout all the time," they said. "The guards and the medical team knew he was ill. Whenever soldiers would walk past his cell he would shout out and say things to them. Not swearing but silly things. He would impersonate the soldiers. One day he was impersonating a female soldier. She called the officer in charge, [who] came to the block and was speaking to Juma." Rasul ccmrinued: There were usuallyfivepeople on an ERF team. On this occasion there were eight of them ... Thefirstman is meant to go in with a shield. On this occasion the man with the shield threw the shield away, cook his helmet off, and when the door was unlocked ran in and did a knee drop onto Junia's back just between his shoulder blades with his full weight. He must have been about 240 pounds in weight ... |hej grabbed his head with one hand and with the other hand punched him repeatedly in the face. His nose was broken. He pushed his face and he smashed it into the concrete floor ... There was blood everywhere. When they took him our they hosed the cell down and the water ran red with blood. W e all saw it.'' In late April, Camp X-Ray was closed down and the prisoners were moved to a new, purpose-built prison. Camp Delta. Made out of shipping containers, the camp consisted of blocks of 48 cells, arranged in two rows of mesh cages separated by a narrow corridor. Although the new cells were a small improvement—they were slightly larger than Camp X-Ray's cages, and each had a wall-mounted steel bed, a toilet and a tap—there was no improvement in the prisoners' general living conditions. The cells were cold at night, the piped water (from a desalination plant) was yellow, the lights still stayed on all night, and giant "banana" rats turned up to replace the snakes and scorpions that had plagued them in Camp X-Ray. The cells were similar to those in the US's notorious Supcrmax prisons, on which they were modeled, but there were still fundamental differences: not only had the inmates of America's harshest prisons been tried and convicted of crimes, they also, for the most part, were allowed regular visits by family members, and had unlimited access to books, TV, music, pens and paper. In contrast, tbe Guantanamo prisoners were still held in a legal limbo, with no access to lawyers, no access to tbeir families, no books apart from the Koran, no other forms of recreation, and no notion of when, if ever, their detention would come to an end. What none of them knew at the time was that rhc worst was yet to come.

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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THE GUANTANAMO FILES

TORTURE, ABUSE AND FALSE CC

and had no experience in intelligence gathering. Backed up by the Pentagon, who admired his "can-do" approach and his reputation as a strict disciplinarian, he decided that the intelligence was so poor because the activities of the two elements that made up Guantanamo's personnel—the Joint Detention Group (the guards) and the Joint Intelligence Group (the interrogators and intelligence analysts)—were not coordinated. His flash of morbid inspiration came when he decided that their functions should be merged, and that the guards should be responsible for "setting the conditions" for the interrogations; in other words, that every aspect of the prisoners' physical existence—their condirions of detention, their food, their medical support, and every single "comfort item," which now included their solitary S tyro foam cup—would be geared to the interrogators' requirements. Miller insisted that this system was primarily directed towards rewards for cooperative prisoners, but it concealed a darker truth: not only was Guantanamo now the most oppressive of prison environments, but those who refused to cooperate—or were unable to cooperate, because they had no information —were subjected to horrendous abuse. Under Miller's watch, incidents of abuse during interrogations became widespread, as did acts of violence from the guards. Although much of this violence was tied in to the total control of the prisoners, other incidents were purely gratuitous. Asif Iqbal, for example, heard an MP boasting that he had "beaten someone in isolarion with a large metal rod used to turn on the water to the blocks," because "there was no one to tell," and the Bahraini Isa al-Murbati said that on one occasion, after an interrogation, the guards dragged him back to his cell by his shackles, causing his ankles to bleed, and then forced his head into the toilet and flushed it, and described another occasion when the lights in his block were suddenly turned off at night, and a group of guards, accompanied by a dog, entered his cell and sprayed mace in his eyes. David Hicks reported that he was repeatedly beaten, once for eight hours, and frequently while he was restrained and blindfolded. 'T have been beaten before, after and during investigations," he said, adding that he had also been "menaced and threatened, directly and indirectly, with hrearms and other weapons before and during investigations."^ As a result of the increased violence, several prisoners were hospitalized. The Kuwaiti Saad al-Azmi said that, during an interrogation, the guards beat him so hard that they broke his leg, and Sami al-Ha jj, the al-Jazeera

cameraman, reported that anothe by stamping on his leg." When I in October 2004, he was wearin series of incidents of escalating bi be asked one of his guards—a you for being difficult"—for a spoon, i to his cell after an interrogation s hands through the slot in the door the sergeant grabbed the belt att violently, even putting his foot a leverage," which caused him "si; one prisoner suffered irreparable interrogators stomped on the b dropped him on thefloorand repe resulted in two broken vertebrae He was then "denied the necessar; have saved him from permanent; As well as these attacks, the continued unabated. Sami al-Haj in ten days, and Omar Degbayes eye during another ERF attack, J as the Muslim chaplain at Guan September 2003, when, astonishir of spying, and held for 76 days i cleared of all charges; he was p; the ERF teams. He noted that "tl kept to the bare minimum and ca were weeks when it occurred evt "excitement" that followed each ... Tbey high-fived each other an, professional basketball players. I ... I wasn't accustomed to seeini of strength versus weakness." In brutal the ERF's tactics were, in J policeman, took part in an ERF e a prisoner. Beaten mercilessly unt that revealed that he was actually

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THK GUANTANAMO HLES

and was treated for a traumatic brain injury and discharged from the military in April 2004.' "Setting the Conditions" Although the abuse described above was directed at prisoners who were presumed to be significant suspects, it's clear that many other prisoners who have not spoken about their experiences also suffered brutal treatment. Not everyone was abused by their interrogators or picked on by the guards, but the new regime took as its starting point the presumption that the majority of the prisoners had something to hide, and came up with new forms of abuse, in an attempt to "break" them, which, according to a former interrogator, were applied to one-sixth of the prisoners in Guantanamo; in other words, to at least a hundred prisoners. Fie explained that "when new interrogators arrived they were told they had great flexibility in extracting information from detainees because the Geneva Conventions did not apply at the base."^ Describing this period, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, who were rarely subjected to physical brutality, said that they became aware of the changes when the frequency and the length of their interrogations increased, and explained that they were each interrogated on about five occasions in 2002, but that from January 200.3 until their release in March 2004 they were subjected to over two hundred interrogations. These kinds of figures have been confirmed by other prisoners, including, to cite just a few examples, the Moroccan You nis Chekhouri, who was interrogated over 150 times, the Frenchman Khaled bin Mustafa, who was interrogated over a hundred times, and—to demonstrate that the changes were not only directed at prisoners who were regarded with great suspicion—-a 29-year-old Afghan, Abdel Rahman Noorani {released in July 2003), who said that he was "badly punished 107 times," and added that "during his 20 months at Guantanamo, his captors had chained his hands and feci and had beaten him with a metal rod on his legs and back,"' What made the prisoners' experiences even more disturbing, however, was the new framework in which the interrogations were couched. Before the interrogations, prisoners were frequently moved into isolation blocks, where they remained for days, weeks, or even months, and where the air conditioning was usually turned up full.

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

THEC^U.^NTANA^lOl-lll^^

TORTUR^^,Al^US^AN^I.^I^EC^ONlTS^^ON^^NC^U.^NTA^A^tO

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brain injury and discharged from the

ibove was directed at prisoners who tsuspccts, it's clear that many other about tbeir experiences also suffered was abused by their interrogators or iew regime took as its starting point the ftheprisoners had something to hide, 3buse,inanattemptto"break"them, terrogator,were applied to one-sixth lin other words, to at leastahundred en newinterrogators arrived theywere xtractinginformation from detainees ^did not apply at the base."^ Rasul, Asiflqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, Bsical brutality, said that they became eqtiency and the length of their inter led that they were each interrogated ^,but that fromjanuary 2003 until were subjected to over two hundred gures have been confirmed by other few examples, the Moroccan Younis ^edovcrl,^0 times, the Frenchman interrogated overahundred times, changes werenotonlydirectedat ^ith great suspicion—a2^-year-old ii(releasedinjuly 2003),who said ^times,"and added that"during his iptors had chained his hands and feet rod on his legs and back."^ xpericnces even more disturbing, k i n which the interrogations were IS, prisoners were frequently moved remained for days,weeks, or even irioning was usually turned up full.

^othattheceflwasfreezingAryat'^akhitcw recalled,"During the interrogations they left you inacold room forafew weeks ...W^e weren't given anything to lie on—no carpet. All of us have problems with our kidneys because w ^ e slept on the iron [flc^or^witbjthe^ air conditioning on. It was freezing cold. The ceilings began to be covered with condensation from the cold. We were held like that for months. I was in the isolaticm ward for five months."Mehdi Ghezali, the Swede, who was interrogated daily for the first six months, but gave up talking when his interrogators kept asking the same questions, was subjected to Miller's regime in tbe three months before his release in July2004: "They put me in the interrogationrc^om and used it asarefrigerator. They set the temperature to minus degrees so it was terribly cold and one had to freeze there for many hours. 12^14 hours one had to sit there, chained."Similar experiences were reported by many other prisoners, and, demonstrating yet again that these techniques w^ere not only applied to those who were regarded as being of particular significance,Parkhudin,the Afghan farmer,who had already been traumatized when his friend Dilawarw^as murdered in Bagram, said on his release,"They made me stand in front of an air-conditioner. The wind was very cold,"and added that he was interrogated for up to twenty hours atatime.On other occasions, the authorities used heat instead of cold, and several prisoners reported this technique,including Isa al-Murbati, who was not only repeatedly heldinacell in which the air conditioning had been turned off, but said that on several occasions thefloorwas"treated withamixture of water andapowerful cleaning agent,"w^hich was then thrown on his face and body,"causing great irritation" and making it difficuh to breathe.' Prisoners were also subjected to loud music, sustained noise and strobe lighting,whicb were clearly designed to"break"them.Isa al Murbati was played songs"that had Arabic language lyrics praising Jesus Christ,"and on other occasions "very loud music and whitenoise was played through six speakers arranged close to [his[head"fortwelve hours,and "multipleflashingstrobe lights were used as well,"which were so strong that he"bad to keep his eyes closcd."These reports have been corroborated by other prisoners, including Asiflqbal, who was forced to listen to Eminem, Bruce Springsteen and techno music, accompanied by strobe lighting, and Mcbdi Ghezali,who was"exposcd to pow^erfulflashesof light inadark room, and to very loud music

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ers who spoke out in 2004—cither nods" or because they "objected to nd badly-run system"—added that m and Rage Against the Machine, )f babies crying and the television hich the jingle consists of repetition k place while the prisoners were . Several described how, when they nterrogation, they were actually left often forced to soil themselves as a :hat the authorities came up with a You have a reservation"—and added y for a month in 2003, and that he urs. "Eventually," he said, "I'd need d try to rilt my chair and go on the h a one-way mirror. As soon as I wet ; in yelling, 'Look what you've done! aken back to his cell for three hours, egan again. The prisoners were also ce, ned with an especially short chain 1 the floor. "After a while," Dergoul lid hear the guards behind the mirror, ig, knocking on the walls. It was not t was just about trying to break you." uantanamo in October 2002, a few vas almost immediately subjected to led and left in a room for six hours, officer would enter the room to laugh lim until he urinated on himself, and ining fluid over him and used him as mess." As if further humiliarion was "not provided with clean clothes for on."^ ored techniques was sleep deprivation, aking the prisoners whenever they fell oving them repeatedly from cell to cell ;. Abdul Malik al-Rahabi was subjected

to prolonged periods of sleep deprivation, David Hicks was subjected to sleep deprivation "as a matter of policy," and Mourad Benchellali explained, "We were treated differently depending on whether or not we responded to questions. Those who did not 'cooperate' were awakened every hour with tbe aim of preventing them from sleeping at all costs." The prisoners who were moved from cell to cell—the "frequent fliers," as the men from Tipton described them—included the Kuwaiti Fouad al-Rabia, who, they said, was picked on like all the prisoners who had spent time in the US, and was moved every two hours, leaving him "suffering from serious depression, losing weight in a substantial way, and very stressed because of the constant moves, deprived of sleep and seriously worried about the consequences for his children." Mehdi Ghezali was "deprived of sleep for about two weeks by the constant switching of cells and interrogation," and Isa al-Murbati was "moved from cell to cell in the Tango and Oscar [isolation] blocks, typically on an hourly basis." As a result, he said, he was "never able to sleep for more than short periods." Mohammed Khan Achakzai, a 24-year-old Afghan businessman (who was sold to the Americans by the Northern Alliance after the fall of Kunduz) said on his release in March 2004 that some prisoners had been deprived of sleep for up to 45 days at a time, and one particularly unfortunate Yemeni, Mohammed Cihanim (who was in the first group of prisoners captured crossing from Afghanistan to Pakistan in December 2001, but does not seem otherwise significant) was apparently moved between cells and blocks every two hours for a total of eight months, as a result of which he lost a lot of weight—and, presumably, found it increasingly difficult to keep a grip on his sanity.'" The authorities also made use of prisoners' phobias, either through the use of dogs, as in the case of Saad al-Azmi, who was bitten by dogs while being hooded, or, as was more common, through sexual humiliation. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed explained that it happened "to the people who'd been brought up most strictly as Muslims," and that they were frequently so ashamed that it took them some time to tell their neighbors about tbeir experiences. Although the men from Tipton were referring primarily ro the Gulf prisoners, very few of them have spoken about their experiences, although the Yemeni Yasin Ismail reported that when he refused to talk during an interrogation, a female soldier entered wearing a tight T-shirt. "Why

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to hood them, to beat them mercilessly, to hang them from the walls of their cells for days, to set dogs on them, to lead them around the cell block on leashes, to pile them up in grotesque naked pyramids and, on one notorious occasion, to place a hooded, dark-robed figure on a box, with his arras outstretched, and with wires trailing from his fingers. Schlesinger's report was critical, but, as in other reports commissioned in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, be pointedly refused to gaze up the chain of command to investigate where, ultimately, the responsibility lay for authorizing these techniques. Echoing Bush and Rumsfeld, who blamed the abuse on a "few bad apples," Schlesingcr concluded that it was the result of "Animal House on the night shift," although he conceded that "techniques effective under carefully controlled conditions at Guantanamo became far more problematic when they migrated [to Iraq] and were not adequately safeguarded."'-^ Noticeably, however, the changes authorized by Rumsfeld did not meet with universal approval in Guantanamo. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed noted that many of their guards, who kept them briefed about developments in the camp, "felt ashamed of the Army that these things were going on." More crucially, several major players in the US administration were also dismayed. Colin Powell's State Department remained implacably opposed to all the developments that sprang from the jettisoning of the Geneva Conventions, and Colonel Lawrence Wiikerson, one of Powell's Chiefs of Staff, was parricularly incensed by Rumsfeld's note about standing for eight to ten hours, telling Jane Mayer, "It said, 'Carte blanche, guys.' That's what started them down the slope. You'll have My Lais then. Once you pull this thread, the whole fabric unravels." The most trenchant criticism, however, came from two of the biggest law enforcement agencies, the FBI and the Naval Criminal Intelligence Service. The NCIS's battle was led by Alberto J Mora, the Navy's general counsel, who was informed about the abusive environment at Guantanamo in December 2002 by his colleague David Brant, who was overseeing a team of NCIS agents working with the FBI. In contrast to the military interrogators and the CIA—who were seeking to "break" al-Qaeda, and whose road to torture was paved by the highest powers in the land—the NCIS's mission was to seek out evidence that could eventually be used in military tribunals and civilian courts. Brant told Mora that the military interrogators, most of whom

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

TlltiGUANT.^^^^^^^^^^^,^

TORTOISE,Al^USEANt^EAISE^-ONITS^IONSI^GUANT.^N.i^^O

21^

cedtc^ludicroiisallegatiouswhose vhich weic^ clearly implausible. 33 year old Pakistani, ^^^ho^as smallsioremPakistanOaught ling to Afghanistan to look for ^rgban and am^tber three years iiistbatbewasnotamilitary idrassas,"tlii^mghwhichbewas i:da,andthatbehadledthisvast Arab al Qaeda operatives"—i^ mtilhcwascapttiied in Kunduz. id, "The person who made these dc^csn'tevcnliaveabrain,"and rd Member told him, " I don't ragreat general, or this person ^comc with you onamoment's l i n October 200^.^^' iwascapturcdinPakistan while ^t foot in Afghanistan, also had gations,whicb included claims ^^^,andtbathcwas"asenior , " m c o n t a c t with Osama bin ew board, the source of these ^r explained.ABoardMember dcntihcd you as belonging to him fcir details be was unable cr bizarre allegations involved reportedly caught smuggling ^e managed to keep the mcmey basement of the Qala i janghi ^uwari,whorespcmdcdtoan , where he was "in charge of tbe asked tme of the prisoners t, and wastoldthat"the camp live wereobtairied through oiigb General Miller's much kinder on the informers than

coercion^allowiiig them to move to Ci^mp 4, where tbey shared dormitories with nine others, ate communally and were allc^wed to play sports together—was just as damaging in terms of tbe value ofthe intelligence producedB'Numerous prisoners were, of course:, aware thai other prisoners were telling lies in the hope of being released, hut Miller was oblivious to it, proudly telling l^avid Rose that his ^aduatedsystemof2^extra"comfortitems"forcoopeiativeprisoners had contributed 10 tbe ^00 percent increase in inielligence under his watch, all of which, he maintained, was "enormously valuable intelligence,"whichwas"distributed around the worldBThis was clearly nonsense—Anthony Christino said that be saw no dramatic improvement in thequality of the intelligence, butiiotedanincrease in quantity and an attempt to "improve the way it was packaged"—bill although It was more palatable to sell bribery as tbe key tactic that had apparently transformed Guantanamo, tbe blunt truth was that coercion—combined withacredulousapproach to "evidence"on the part of the authorities—had playedamore preeminent part.-' It's uncertain quite how manyprisoners were presented with patently false information that they either refuted, leading to horrendous punishment, or accepted under duress, producing self incriminating false confessions, but the examples of several of the British prisoners suggestthatbothtbescenarioanditsresponsesweiewidesprcad.lt was in Guantanamo, under Miller's command, that Omar Degbayes was unexpectedly confronted withagrainyvideoofChcchenmilitants, in which,it was alleged,he wasapiomincnt player, even though It has been established thatthe man in thevideowasactuallyamilitant who died in Chechnya in 2004,^^ and it was under Miller that Shafiq Rasul,AsiflqbalandRbuhelAhmedsuddenly found themselvesunder intense suspicion when ant^ther grainy video surfaced purporting to show them in tbe crowd atamectmg between Osama bin Laden and Mohammed AttamAfghanistan In the case of the three men from Tipton,Britishintelligenceagents, having been useless uptothatpoint, finally intervened to confirm that Rasul's alibi—that he was working inanelectricalstoremtheWestMidlandsatthetime—wastbetruth, and not,as alleged,adevic^us cover story concc^ctedbyabardened terrorist. This, in turn, led to their release, but not until afl thtce men cracked under the pressure and"confessed" that the allegation was truelnasimilar scenario, Ahmed Errachidi,theMoroccan chef, was

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THEGt^ANTAN^^^^^^^^^

^^^^OST^I^^ISONEI^SANI^SIGI^EII^I^ISON^

21^

atioii'saccounts to public scrutiny or al Matrafi has also come from tbAyinanBatarfi pointing outthat, king relationship w^ith the Taliban, tianitarian work, and both Batarfi tbe organization was regarded with its Saudilinks.W^hat has largely iMay 200^, anaudiotape from bin called into doubt by US intelligence, sin Guantanamo—alMatrafi and .whatsoever wiihal Qaeda.^Noneof what has probably counted against ihe discovery, iu August 2002, ofa yalWafa in Kabul,which included , fuses and terrorist guide books," ig to do with him is unknown. His atthec^rganizationhadnolinksto repeatedly said we have no terrorist fficial or non governmental, is free Iqiiarters. We are only helping the

idnapping, 47-year-old Mamdouh imQuettatoKarachiwhenitwas ickedfrc^m his scat asasuspected lo^ail for three weeks, interrogated ^ured" by the Pakistani authorities, i f l ^ , d r i f t e d to Europe and settled cameacitizen,marriedaLebanese ranacleaningbusiness.He later of Sydney, but became"chronically isability benefit. In summer 2001, "he set off for Pakistan to look for iniily over to join bim, but when he ntheAmericansthattbey had caught ibib admitted that one of bis reasons

for IcavingAustralia was because be was"caught between pculice who suspected him of terror links and an often hostile Muslim community ^at was sometimes suspiciou.s of his activities,"aiid these suspicions were triggered afteravisit to the US,when he met follc^wers of the ^^yptianbornclericSbeikhOmar Abdul Rahman. Also known as the"BlindSheikh,"Abdul Rahman wasamajor source of inspiration for Gsama bin Laden,and was seivingalifc sentence for his role in thel^^3World Trade Center bombing andaplottoblc^w up several NewYork landmarks, llabib'stroiiblesbegan when he stayedin touch with Abdul Rahman's associates in NewYork on his return to Sydney, and spoke out in his defense, but although there was nothing in his activities to suggest that be was actually involved inanykir^d of terrorist activity,as soon as tbe Americans found oiitaboiit his history they rendered him to Egypt. For SIX months, he was "suspended from books on the walls while his feet rested onarotating metal drum that delivered electric sbocks,""kicked,punched, beaten witbastick and rammed with what can only be described as an electric cattle prod," and handcuffed and left inaroom that gradually filled w^ith water until it was just beneath his chin. "Brc^ken"by the Egyptians, he madea number of false confessions—in particular, that he "trained several of the Scptemberllhijackers in martial arts and had planned to hijack aplane himself"—which w^eretbcnused against him after hewas transferred to Guantanamo,yia Afghanistan, injune 2002.^ In Guantanamo, he continued to be treated brutally, and several prisoners reported his suffering, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed said that he was"in catastrophic shape,mental and physical," and that,asaresult of his torture,"he used to bleed from his nose, mouth and ears when he was asleep."Habib also made allegations about his treatment in Guantanamo—in particular that he was "smeared with the menstrual blood ofaprostitute"during an interrogation—and complained vociferously about being kept in solitary ccmfinement in Camp Echo:"Fhcy use every possible [way] to make mccrazy.They put me in isolation all the time.Inever see the sun.Inever have shower likeahumanbeing.lnevcr have soap.Inever have cup to drink.I never treated likeahuman being."Given thiscatalog of abuse, and the allegations against him,it came asasurprise to everyone—including the Australian authorities—when he was released from Guantanamo injanuary2005, and returned to Australia asafree man.^

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THEGUANT^NA^OEILES

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ironeofthem"tomeetOsamabin then swore allegiance to Osama bin It and influential al-Qaeda member." Ito implicate Slabi in afl manner of Ressam'splottoblowupLosAngeles efalsely confessed to being part of the dan, and explained that, although he gto find work as an electrical engineer, :mists, and returned to Mauritania in :pt under ccmstant surveillance by the Iwentlhad people right behind me .Isaidwhattbeheck^Thisisnotthe the Americans in November 2001 has It as if he was anunktiown quantity. Canada, be had been investigated in in Senegal on bis w-ay to Mauritania ibeenquestionedontwo occasions ytbree FBI agents and"another guy ^"inMauritaniainFebruary 2000, man American agent took part in an Slahi,threatened to bring in"black

Americans were enormotis. There wasahysteria in their behaviour." Unwilling to defy the Americans, the Bosnians then arrested the men, butafterathree-monthinvestigation,inw^hich they conducted extensive searches of their apartments, their computersand their documents, they found "literallynoevidence"to justify the arrests. The Supreme Court ordered tbeir release, and, with rumors circulating that the Americans weregoing to seize them anyway, tbe Bosnian Human Rights Chamber ruled that they had the right to remain in the country and were not to be deported.On the night of January I7,2002,ahugc crowd of supporters gathered outside the prison in Sarajevo to protect them on their release, but riot police dispersed tbe crc^wd with tear gas, and at dawn, as the men emerged, they were seized byAmerican agents, hooded, handcuffed and rendered to Guantanamo. Since arriving inGuantanamo, the embassy plot has never been mentioned.Instead,the six men havebeen subjected to relentless allegations that they were associated with al-Qaeda. Although they afl traveled to Bosnia to support Muslims during the 1^92-95 civil war and were then granted citizenship, tbey married Bosnian w^omen and spent the next six years w^orking with orphans forvariousMuslim charities, including the Red Crescent, and, in the case of Eahmar, an Islamic scholar, tbe Saudi High Committee for Relief, and there was no evidence that any of them maintainedasidelinc dealing with international terrorists. According to their law^yers, tbe source of the false allegations w^asLahmar's embittered ex-brother-in-law, who ran a"smearcampaign"against him.Another allegation made by the Americans—that Belkaccm made seventy phone calls to Afghanistan after ^^lland was "the top al-Qaeda facilitator" in Bosnia—has never been substantiated, and there seems no doubt that afl six men are innocent. Manfred Nc^vak, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, explained,"lt's implausible to say that tbey are enemy combatants. Tbey w^erefightersduring the Bosnian war, but that ended in 1^^.^. They may be radical Islamists, but they have definitely not committed anycrime."'^ Despite this, they have been treated brutally in Guantanamo. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed reported that during Geoffrey Miller's tenure,"Thcy were treated particularly badly.Thcy were moved everyti^vo hours. Theywere keptnaked in thcircells. They were taken to interrogation for hours on end.Tbeywereshortshackled for

aordinaryandunprecedentedstory^ nthe US embassy in Sarajevo asked inian citizens of.^lgerian origin—40 ^yearoldSabirLahmar,34year-old Mustafa AitIdr,3^ year oldLakhdar udellaalHajj—becau.se ofasuspicion :ilottobombtheUScmbassy.The ofadiplomaticnote, which contained gation, and the Bosnians refused to ^eatened to close tbeir embassy and inless the men were arrested. Human ic noted that"tbe threats from the

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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27^

LltEGUANT.^NAMOEILES

hospital,were watching,"the guards took tubes from one detainee, and with no sanitization whatsoever, reinsertcdhinto tbe nose ofa different detainee.When these tubes w^erc reinserted, the detainees could see the blood and stomach bile frc^m cither detainees remainiug on tbe tubes.""' Medical Malpractice W^ith these methods—and the use of fivc"restraint chairs,"which were ordered in December—the authorities succeeded in convincing the majority of the ^4 hunger strikers who were holding out in early January 200^ to give up their protest by the end ofthe month, and by March onlyafew yc^ung Gulf prisoners,including Gba,ssanal-Sharbi, were stifl on strike."lt was noticeable, however, that both the methods used and the complicity of the medical staff raised uncomfortable questions about the role ofthe doctors in Guantanamo which had,up to that point, largely been concealed, even though numerous prisoners had spoken about the various ways in which, instead of maintaining aprofessional distance,the doctors and medical staff were intimately involved in every aspect of tbe prison's operations. This had been apparent inageneral sense from the beginning, when the prisoners were required to take unknown drugs onaregular basis. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed described an incident in August 2002 when medical staff touted the cellblocks asking the prisoners if they wanted an injection, "although they wouldn't say what it was for."Thcy said that most of the prisoners refused,but the medical staff then returned w^ith an ERF team who forced them to have the injecticmsany^vay. Ahmed said that the drug made him feel "very drowsy,"andaddcd,"I have no idea why they w^ere giving us these injections.It happened perhapsadozen times altogether andl believe it stifl goes on at the camp. You are not allowed to refuse it and youdc^n'tknoww-batitisfor."AbdullahalNoaimitoldbislaw-yers that within his first few days at Guantanamo he"was injected with an unknown substance w^hich made him depressed and despondent. He w^as unable to control his thoughts and his mind raced. He was also unable to control his body and fefl to the floor."He was then placedin isolation for three day,s,w^bere medical staff administered an unknown medicine "thatmadehimfeeldrunk,"until he refused to take

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TIUGUANT.^NA^OEUES

Dostum and tbe Americans to ed were tied upatthe time they were briefed that"only"cigbt ;sbot after the uprising started, iscdbyLuke Harding, is more usea photographer "saw the lose bands had been bound by icrn part of the fort,"and that the scarves from the bands of 'erry noted, "some of the dead '^Idlers used scissors to snip off nificantly, because so many of suppresseduntilihcPentagon 00^—also talked about being

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

Yerghanek and Qala ^eini OnSunday,November25,2001,astbeuprisingbeganinQalaiJanghi, afar larger group of Taliban soldiers—at least 4,.^00, but possibly as many as 7,000—made their way from Kunduz toYcrgbanek,five miles west of the city,wbere they surrendered to General Dostum. What no cme either knew or cared about, how^ever, was that among the surrendering soldiers were hundreds of civilians who bad been caught up in the chaos or who w^ere fleeing the hard core al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters makiiigalast stand in Kunduz itself. One of the most vivid accounts of the surrender was provided by three young Britons w^ho fell into this latter category Twemy-fou: ^^^^^^^ShafiqRasul,20yeat^oldAsiflqbaiand20-year-o^ ^hmed—cbildhocid friends from Tipton in the West Midlands^ l:iadtraveled toPakistaninSeptember20(^l. Iqbal wasmaking atrangementsforhisforthcomingmarriagetoayoung woman in Pakistan, Ahmed w^as his best man, and Rasul was planning to do acomputer course once the wedding was cwcr, but soon after their arrival,when tbe invasion of Afghanistan began, theymade tbe fateful decision that anexcitingadventureaw^aitedtbemovcr the borders justashortbusride away. Using the money they had brought with them, they planned to provide humanitarian aid to.^fghanvillagers,a mission that also involved the adrenaline rush of being uiawar zone, and, they hoped, the opportunity to sample the Afghans'enormous naan breads. Up close, however, the war zone was more frightening than they had anticipated. At risk from both US bombing raids and theTaliban, w^howercdeeply suspicious of young men wandering
1^

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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I H E GUAN'l ANA.MO FILES

THE C;ONVi

I ,
" i

around without beards, they tried to return to Pakistan in a taxi, but were instead taken to Kunduz. As the first groups of Taliban soldiers bean to surrender, they clambered onto a truck that was leaving the city, but the vehicle was immediately shelled, and almost everyone on board was kflled. With nowhere else to turn, they surrendered to Alliance soldiers who took their money, their shoes and their warm clothes, and marched them to Yerghanek.' Very few of those who made their way to Yerghanek—70 at most—were eventually transferred to Guantanamo. Of these, only a handful have spoken about their experiences, and none were in the first convoys that set off for Sheberghan on the Sunday. Overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of people flooding out of the city, Dostum was obliged to keep thousands of them marooned in the desert while he arranged addirional transportation over the next few days. As a result, neither tbe men from Tipton nor the others who ended up in Guantanamo—including Abdul Rahman, a 25-ycar-old shopkeeper from Kunduz, and Mohammed Saghir, a 49-ycar-old woodcutter from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province—bad any inkling of the grisly fate that awaited them. 'While the vast crowds of fighters and civilians were disarmed, rJSstum's men recruited drivers to go to Qala Zeini, an old fort on the road between Mazar-e-Shanf and Sheberghan, where those transported from Yerghanek were transferred into containers for the last stage of. the journey to Sheberghah. One of the drivers, who was in the fon when a convoy of prisoners arrived that evening, said that, as soon as the Northern Alliance soldiers began stripping them of their turbans and vests, tying their hands behind their backs and transferring them to the containers, some of the prisoners—those who were familiar with recent Afghan history—realized that Dostum was planning to kifl them. Since 1997, when a brutal Uzbek general had first seen the viability of containers as cheap and convenient killing machines, murdering 1,250 Taliban soldiers by leaving them in containers in the summer sun, they had become a familiar weapon of Afghan warfare. When the Taliban took Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998, they disposed of their conquered enemies in the same fashion. According to one of the drivers, a few hours after the convoy had set off from Qala Zeini, the prisoners started pounding on the sides of the containers, shouting, "We're dying. Give us water! We are human,

Itii

not animals walls and p were caugh were not e suffocating trucks puUc opened, mc "They open Back at Abdul Rah) from Zabul he estabhsl his family's reassured tl radio they v was only ag on the day the Northet Pashtuns an them up." \ seek US anc their way ll when wc se up," he saic Afghanistan Abducted shock as se free, while b night. He b the night. "1 he said. "Th dirt on then and his com were wairin were throw "We did no air, a lot of arrived at Sl

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w

THE GUAN IANAMO MLES

KANDAHAR In additioi that his fathi and wrote a left hand, as of psycholc Kuwaiti pris specifically s made allegat subsequently All indicate, and I'akista they told w and beaten, naked in fri guards/intei confirmed t they just co Confirniat revealed in Union rcleas Information abuse of pris by mterrogai and bruises" of pain and f [He] stated C O four gua but he was approached stated that i and left. I at which ti appaient th had happen Abandoning Although C assumptiont

received injuries to their eyes in this manner, that "three brothers were blinded," and that many ofthe prisoners—himself included—had their noses broken by the soldiers. He was also one of the first prisoners to descri be how the prisoners' copies of the Koran were regularly abused. He explained that some of the soldiers "treated the Koran terribly," dropping copies in the toilet bucket, scrawling obscenities on its pages, and tearing out pages which they used to shine their shoes or ro wipe out the toilet bucket, and added that tbey also cursed Allah and the Prophet Mohammed on a regular basis. The abuse of the Koran was also noted by the Britons Tarek Dergoul, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, and by Fhsanullah, a 28-year-old Afghan (released in March 2003), who said that soldiers in Kandahar hit him and taunted him by throwing the Koran in a toilet." Some of the other Bahrainis also had vivid tales ro tell of their treatment at Kandahar. Isa al-Murbati (whose capture is related in Chapter 12) said that he was "shackled to a pole outside in very cold weather," and that, "every hour, US military personnel threw cold water on [him] while he was shackled to the pole." He explained that this took place every night for a week, and added that on one occasion he was taken to an area away from the other prisoners, because Red Cross representatives were visiting tbe camp, and the authorities did not want them to see bim. It was also clear that alMurbati was not the only prisoner to be exposed to the extreme cold. The Pakistani interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that "he and other prisoners were occasionally taken outside and forced to lie on the frozen ground unril they were numb with cold."'Abdullah al-Noaimi "witnessed other detainees being bitten by military dogs," and said that "a female soldier, upon learning that [his] brother lived in the USA, threatened to kill him." He also developed a urinary tract infection and came down with a fever, which made him vomit and left him unable to cat, but explained that, when he was taken to the clinic, "a military doctor allowed a military policeman to inject bim with an unknown substance. When he began to bleed as a result, the doctor and the policeman laughed." He was then placed in isolation for seven weeks, and was ignored by the medical staff, even though his eyes were yellow and there was blood in his urine, and added that a doctor told him, "you're about to die and there's nothing we can do for you."'^

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028373 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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THE GUANTANAMO FILES

and was treated for a traumatic brain injury and discharged from tbe military in April 2004.^ "Setting the Conditions" Although tbe abuse described above was directed at prisoners who were presumed to be significant suspects, it's clear that many other prisoners who have not spoken about their experiences also suffered brutal treatment. Not everyone was abused by their interrogators or picked on by the guards, but the new regime took as its starting point the presumption that the majority of the prisoners had something to hide, and came up with new forms of abuse, in an attempt to "break" them, which, according to a former interrogator, were applied to one-sixth ofthe prisoners in Guantanamo; in other words, to at least a hundred prisoners. He explained that "when new interrogators arrived they were told they had great flexibility in extracting information from detainees because the Geneva Conventions did not apply at the base."' Describing this period, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, who were rarely subjected to physical brutality, said that they became aware of the changes when tbe frequency and tbe length of their interrogations increased, and explained that tbey were each interrogated on about five occasions in 2002, but that from January 2003 until their release in March 2004 they were subjected to over two hundred interrogations. These kinds offigureshave been confirmed by other prisoners, including, to cite just a few examples, the Moroccan Younis Chekhouri, who was interrogated over 150 times, the Frenchman Khaled bin Mustafa, who was interrogated over a hundred times, and—to demonstrate that the changes were not only directed at prisoners who were regarded with great suspicion—a 29-year old Afghan, Abdel Rahman Noorani (released in July 2003), who said that he was "badly punished 107 times," and added that "during his 20 months at Guantanamo, his captors had chained his hands and feci and had beaten him with a metal rod on his legs and back."'' What made the prisoners' experiences even more disturbing, however, was the new framework in which the interrogations were couched. Before the interrogations, prisoners were frequently moved mto isolation blocks, where they remained for days, weeks, or even months, and where the air conditioning was usually turned up full,

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TORTURE, ABUSE AND FALSE CONFESSIONS IN GUANTANAMO

197

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to prolonged periods of sleep deprivation, David Hicks was subjected to sleep deprivation "as a matter of policy," and Mourad Benchellali explained, "We were treated differently depending on whether or not wc responded to questions. Those who did not 'cooperate' were awakened every hour with the aim of preventing them from sleeping at all costs." The prisoners who were moved from cell to cell—the "frequent fliers," as the men from Tipton described them—included the Kuwaiti Fouad al-Rabia, who, they said, was picked on like all the prisoners who had spent time in the US, and was moved every two hours, leaving him "suffering from serious depression, losing weight in a substantial way, and very stressed because of the constant moves, deprived of sleep and seriously worried about the consequences for his children." Mehdi Ghezali was "deprived of sleep for about two weeks by the constant switching of cells and interrogation," and Isa al-.Murbari was "moved from cell to cell in the Tango and Oscar [isolation] blocks, typically on an hourly basis." As a result, be said, he was "never able to sleep for more than short periods." Mohammed Khan Achakzai, a 24-ycar-old Afghan businessman (who was sold to the .Americans by the Northern Alliance after the fall of Kunduz) said on his release in March 2004 that some prisoners had been deprived of sleep for up to 45 days at a time, and one particularly unfortunate Yemeni, Mohammed Ghanim (who was in the first group of prisoners captured crossing from Afghanistan to Pakistan in December 2001, but does not seem otherwise significant) was apparently moved between cells and blocks every two hours for a total of eight months, as a result of which he lost a lot of weight—and, presumably, found it increasingly difficult to keep a grip on his sanity."^ The authorities also made use of prisoners' phobias, either through the use of dogs, as in the case of Saad al-Axmi, who was bitten by dogs while being hooded, or, as was more common, through sexual humiliation. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed explained that it happened "to the people who'd been brought up most strictly as Muslims," and that they were frequently so ashamed that it took them some time to tell their neighbors about their experiences. Although the men from lipton were referring primarily to tbe Gulf prisoners, very few of them have spoken about their experiences, although the Yemeni Yasin Ismail reported that when he refused to talk during an interrogation, a female soldier entered wearing a tight T-shirt. "Why

028375

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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THE GUANTANAMO FILES

toboodtbem,tobeatthemmercilessly,tohangtbemfromthewallsof tbeir cells for days, to set dogs on them, to lead them around the cefl block on leashes, to pile them up in grotesque naked pyramidsand, on onenc^toriousoccasion,toplaceahooded,darkrobedfigureonabox, with his arms outstretched, and with wires trailing from his fingers. Schlesinger'sreportwascritical,but,asinotherreportscommissioned inthew^akcoftheAbuGhraibscandal,hepointedlyrefusedtogazeup the chain of command to investigate where,ultimately, the respcmsibility lay for authorizing these techniques. Echciing Bush and Rumsfeld, who blamed the abuse ona"few bad apples,"Schlesinger concluded that it was the resuh of"AnimalFIouse on the night shift,"although he conceded that "techniques effective under carefully controlled conditions at Guantanamo became far more problematic when they migrated [to Iraq] and were not adequately safeguarded."'^ Noticeably, however, the changes authorized by Rumsfeld did not meet with universal approval in Guantanamo. Shafiq Rasul, Asiflqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed noted that many of their guards, who kept them briefed about developments in the camp,"feh ashamed of tbe Army that these things weregoing on."Morc crucially, several major players in tbe US administration were also dismayed. Colin Powell's State Departmentremainedimplacably opposed toaflthedevelopmentsthat sprang from the jettisoning of the Geneva Conventions, and Colonel Law^rence Wiikerson, one of Powell's Chiefs of Staff, was particularly incensed by Rumsfeld's note about standing for eight to ten hours, tellingjane Mayer, "It said,'Carte blanche, guys.'That's what started them down the slopc.Yc^u'fl have My Lais then Once you pufl this thread, the whole fabric unravels." Tbe mosttrenchant criticism, however, came from two c^fthe biggest law enforcement agencies, the FBI and the Naval Criminal Intelligence Service.The NCIS's battle was led byAlbertoJMora,the Navy's general counsel,who was informed about the abusive environment at Guantanamo in Deccmber 2002 by his colleague David Brant, who was overseeingateamofNCIS agents working with the FBL In contrast to the military interrogators and the CIA—who were seeking to"break"alQaeda,and w^hosc road to torture w^as paved by tbe highest powers in the land—theNCIS'smi.ssionwastoseckout evidence that could eventually be used in military tribunals and civilian courts. Branttold Mora thatthe military interrogators, most of whom

were poorly trained, were "engaging int psychological abuse,"and he later told would beagood word to desctibcthe ordered his men to "stand dearand ref they saw, and explained that he didn t w orparricipateinanyievelofpbysicalo No slapping, deprivation ofwate^ h, i t was pretty basic, black and white what the rules were that had been se, at that point. We were going to do v le.,allY permissible." He also cxplair th^ reliability of forced confessions"; methods would "taint the cases his a; detainees, undermining any attempts law " Morcovei^ he added, "it |ust ai Mora was equally appalled, espe the abuse wasn't "rogue activity," I authorized atahigh level in Wash interrogation techniques were ch were ever taught about American \^ justify the new regime were fatally hi could one day bee criminal charge ?0, he confronted his immediate S' Pentagon's general counsel (and a pr him that, 'whatever its intent, wha torture." Haynes disagreed, but M' itsramificationsrWhatdid'depnv mean? Could a prisoner be lockec could he be kept there for a moo What, precisely, did the authonty t detainee be held in a coffin? What could an interrogator push this? L Mora's appeal was uhimately seen whether his fears about the a its actions will one day come true. the direction that his country was his revulsion at the tactics that w« the FBL As early as November 2(

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N.AMO FILES ations whose implausible. ni,vvbowas Stan.Caught i t o look for rthree years ^ta military which he was died this vast eratives"—in id in Kunduz. 10 made these abrain,"and ^im,"I don't ^r this person namoment's
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Pakistan while ^tan, also had eluded claims was"asenior hOsamabin lurcc of these oard Member belonging to le was unable ^ions involved ^ht smuggling -cp the money Qalaijanghi ponded to an "in charge of ftheprisoners hat "the camp incdtbroiigb ^liller'smucli nformerstban

coercion—allowing themtomove to Camp 4,where they shared dormitories with nine others, ate cc^mmuiially and were allowed to play sports together—^was just as damaging in terms of the value ofthe intelligence produced.^-Numerous prisoners were, of cour,se,aw^are that other prisoners were telling lies in the hope of being released, but Miller was oblivious to it, proudly telling David Rose that his graduated system of29extra "comfort items" for cooperative prisoners bad contributed to the ^00 percent increase in intelligence under his watch, afl of which, he maintained,was"enormously valuable intelligence,"which was "distributed around the world."This was clearly nonsense—Anthony Christino said that he saw no dramatic improvement in the quality of the intelligence, but noted an increase in quantity and an attempt to "imprc^ve the wayitw^as packaged"—but although it w^as more palatable to sefl bribery as the key tactic that had apparently transformed Guantanamo, the blunt truth was that coercion—combined withacredulousapproach to"evidence"on tbe part of the authorities—had playedamore prominent part. It's uncertain quite how manyprisoners were presented with patently false information that they either refuted, leading to horrendous punishment, oraccepted under duress, producing self incriminating false confessions, but the examples of several of the British prisoners suggestthatboththescenarioanditsresponseswerewidespread.lt w^as in Guantanamo, under Miller's command, that Omar Degbayes was unexpectedly confronted withagrainy video of Chechen militants, in which,it was alleged,he wasapromincnt player, even though it has been established that the man in thevideowasactuallyamilitant who died in Chechnya in 2004,'^ and it w^as under Miller that Shafiq Rasul,Asiflqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed suddenly found themselves under intense suspicion when another grainy video surfaced purporting to show them in tbe crowd atameeting between Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Attain Afghanistan.In the case of tbe three men from Tipton, British intelligence agents, having been useless up to that point, finally intervened to confirm that Rasul's alibi—that he was working in an electrical store in the West Midlands at the time—w^as the truth, and not, as alleged,adevious cover story concocted byahardened terrorist.Tbis, in turn, led to their release, but nc^t until afl three men cracked under the pressure and"confessed"that the allegation was true.Inasimilar scenario, Ahmed Errachidi, the Moroccan chef,was

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

vNTANAMO FILES

'GHOST* PRISONERS AND SECRET PRISONS

219

to public scrutiny, s also come from poindng out that, with the Taliban, , and both Batarfi .vas regarded with What has largely udiotape from bin oy LIS intelligence, I—al-Matrafi and -Qaeda." None of y counted against Vugust 2002, of a ll, which included ist guide books," is unknown. His in had no links to ; have no terrorist crnmental, is free only helping the

for leaving Australia was because he w^as"caught between police who suspected bim of terror links and an often hostile Muslim community that was sometimes suspicious of his actiyities,"and these suspicions were triggered afteravisit to the US,when he met followers of the Egyptian-born cleric. Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. Also known as the"Blind Sheikh,"Abdul Rahman wasamajor source of inspiration for Osama bin Laden, and was servingalife sentence for bis rc^le in the 1993 W^orld Trade Center bombing andaplot to blow up several NewYorklandmarks. Habib's troubles began when he stayed in touch with Abdul Rahman's associates in NewYork on his return to Sydney, and spoke out in his defense, but although there was nothing in his activities to suggest that he was actually involved in any kind of terrorist activity, as soon as the Americans found out about his hi.story they rendered him to Egypt. For six months, he was "suspended from hooks cm the walls while his feet rested onarotating metal drum that delivered electric shocks,""kicked, punched, beaten witbastick and rammed with w^hat can only be described as an electric cattle prod," and handcuffed and left inaroom that graduallyfilled with water untfl it was just beneath his chin."Broken" by the Egyptians, he madea number of false confessions—in particular, that he "trained several of the Scptemberllhijackers in martial arts and had planned to hijack aplane himself"—which were thenused against him after he w^as transferred to Guantanamo, via.^fghanistan,in June 2002.^ In Guantanamo, be continued to be treated brutally, and several prisoners reported his suffering. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahrncdsaid that he was "in catastrophic shape, mental and physical," and that, asaresuh of bis tc^rture,"he used to bleed from his nose, mouth and ears when he was asleep."Habib also made allegations abouthis treatment in Guantanamo—in particularthat he was "smeared with the menstrual blood ofaprostitute"duringan interrogation—and cc^mplained vociferously abcmt being kept in solitary confinement in Camp Echo:"They use every possible [w^ay] to make mccrazy.They put me in isolation afl the time.Inever see the sun.Inever have shower likeahuman being.Inever have soap.Inever have cup to drink.1 never treated likeahuman being."Given this catalog ofabuse, and the allegations against bim,it came asasurprise to everyone—including tbe Australian authorities—when he was released from Guantanamo injanuary200.5,and returned to Australia asafree man.^

ir-old Mamdouh ichi when it was -It as a suspected eks, interrogated stani authorities, irope and settled itried a Lebanese isincss. He later ime "chronicafly n summer 2001, • istan to look for um, but when be t they had caught >ne of his reasons

028378

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THF GUANTANAMO FILES

GHOSI " PRISONERS AND SECRET PRISONS

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of t h c i n " i o meet Osama bin wore allegiance to Osama bin influential al Qaeda member." plicateSlahi i n a l l m a n n e r o f ^'splot to blow up Lens Angeles yconfesscdtobcirigpariofthe id explained thai, although he I w o r k asan electrical engineer, ind returned to Mauritania in ^r constant surveillance by the l h a d people right behind me .vhat the beck? This IS not tbe ^ricans in November 2001 has le was anunknown quantity. ,be hadbcen investigated in ^alonhiswaytoMauritania uestioiiedontwo occasions FBI agents and"another guy auritaniain February 2000, nerican agent took part in an hrcatenedto bring in"black

Americans were enormous. There was a hysteria in their behaviour." Unwilling to defy the Americans, tbe Bosnians then arrested tbe men, but afier a three month investigation, in which they conducted extensive searches of their aparrments, their computers and their documents, they found "literally no evidence" to justify the arrests. Fhe Supreme Court ordered their release, and, with rumors circulating thai the .A.mericans were going to seize them anyway, the Bosnian Human Rights Chamber ruled that they bad the right ro remain in the country and were not ro be deponed. On the night of January 17, 2002, a huge crowd ol supporters gathered outside the prison in Sarajevo to protect them on their release, but riot police dispersed the crowd with tear gas, and at dawn, as the men emerged, they were seized by American agents, hooded, handcuffed and rendered to Guantanamo. Since arriving in Guantanamo, the embassy plot has never been mentioned. Instead, the six men have been subjected to relentless allegations that they were associated with al-Qaeda. Although they all traveled to Bosnia to support Muslims during the 1992-95 civil war and were then granted citizenship, they married Bosnian women and spent the next six years working with orphans for various Muslim charities, including the Red Crescent, and, in the case of Lahmar, an Islamic scholar, the Saudi High Committee for Relief, and there was no evidence that any of them maintained a sideline dealing with international terrorists. According to their lawyers, the source of the false allegations was Lahmar's embittered ex-brothcr-in-law, who ran a "smear campaign" against him. Another allegation made by tbe Americans—that Bclkacem made seventy phone calls to Afghanistan after 9/11 and was "tbe top al-Qaeda facilitator" in Bosnia—has never been substantiated, and there seems no doubt that all six men arc innocent. Manfred Novak, the U N Special Rapporteur on Torture, explained, "It's implausible to say that they arc enemy combatants. They were fighters during the Bosnian war, but that ended in 1995. They may be radical Islamists, but they have definitely not committed any crime."" Despite this, they have been treated brutally in Guantanamo. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed reported that during Geoffrey Miller's tenure, "They were treated particularly badly. They were moved every two hours. They were kept naked in their cells. They were taken to interrogation for hours on end. They were short-shackled for

ryandunprecedentcd story ^embassy in Sarajevo asked zens of Algerian origin—40ilSabirLahmar,.ii4year-old AitIdr,3^year-oldLakhdar Hajj—because olasuspicion omb theUSembassy. The imaiic note, which contained ndthe Bosnians refused to to close theirembassy and men were arrested. Human that "thctbreatsfrom the

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THE GUANT.ANAMO FILES

SUICIDES AND HUNGER STRI

hospital,were watching,"the guards took tubes from cmc detainee, and with no sanitization whatsoever, reinserted it into tbe nose ofa different detainee. When these tubes were reinserted, the detainees could sec the blood and stomach bile from other detainees remaining on the tubes."'^ Medical Malpractice W^ith these methods—and the use of five"testraint chairs,"which were ordered in December—the authorities succeeded incc^nvincing the majority of the ^4 hunger .strikers who were holding out in early January 200^ to give up their protest by the end of the month, and by March onlyafew young Gulf prisoners, including Ghassanal-Sharbi, were stifl on strike."It w^as noticeable, however, that both the methods used and the complicity of the medical staff raised uncomfortable questions about the role of tbe doctors in Guantanamo which had, up to that point, largely been concealed, even though numerous prisoners had spoken about the various ways in which, instead of maintaining aprofessional distance, the doctors and medical staff were intimately involved in every aspect c^f the prison's operations. This had been apparent inageneral sense from tbe beginning, when tbe prisoners were required to take unknown drugs onaregular basis. Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rliuhel Ahmed described an incident in August 2002 wben medical staff toured the cellblocks asking the prisoners if tbey wanted an injection, "although ihcywcmldn't say what it was for."They said that most of the prisoners refused,but the medical staff then returned with an ERFtcam who forced them to have the injections anyway. Ahmed said that the drug made him feel "vc^rydrowsy,"and added,"I have no idea why they were giving us rheseinjectioiis.lt happened perhapsadozen times altogether audi believe it stifl goes on at the camp.You ate not allow^ed to refuse it and ycm don't know what it is for." Abdullah al-INoaimi told his la^v^^ers that within bis first fewdays at Guantanamo he"was injected with an unkiic^wnsiihstance which made him depressed and despondent. He was unable ten ccmtrolbis thoughts andbismmdraced.He was also unable to couirol bis bodyaiid fell to tbe floor."Hc was then placed in isolation for three days,wlieremedicalstiiff administered an unknown medicine "that made bim feci drunk,"iintil he refused to take

it any more, and on another him to bear voices."Whenh he was losing his mind,"the Although tbe authorities ha nothing sinister about the inje al-FIajj believes that they are experiments on tbe whole o^ "the inoculations that havcl that contain diseases."'^ Whetherornottbcreisa the medical staff have pcrsis the quest to"break"thept pronounced after Geoffreyl personnel—including the doi for the interrogations.Thisv first and most common mcthc untfl the prisoners cooperate reported by numerousprisc countless false confessions^ Sami al llajj, who has rcfusi to falsely confess that al-Ja complained that the authori denied bim access to the dri hislifetopreventa rccurr^ 199^. and Abdel Hamid ah Afghanistan withhis.^fghan cancer,presumably because terrorist and notashopkcep Othersinclude David I I hernia ata time when the "gonedownhfll"aiidappea confessions to alleviate hisp serious stomach pains but wa unless be cooperated,"and moved ficmi cell tc^cell fora treatment for hcmc^irboids submitting to this blackmail, was not carried out correctly.

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

Detention in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay

statement of Sliafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed

028495

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Defense Reciprocal Discx)very

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Composite statement: Detention in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed

1. All three men come from Tipton in West Midlands, a poor area with a small community of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. The school all three attended is considered one of the worst in England. Rhuhel Ahmed and Asif Iqbal who are now both aged 22 were friends from school, although one year apart. Neither was brought up religiously but each was drawn towards Islam. Shafiq Rasul is now aged 27 and had a job working at the electronics store, Currys. He was also enrolled at the University of Central England. 2. This statement jointly made by them constitutes an attempt to set out details of their treatment at the hands of UK and US military personnel and civilian authorities during the time of their detention in Kandahar in Afghanistan in late December 2001 and throughout their time in American custody in Guantanamo Bay Cuba. This statement is a composite of the experiences of all 3. They are referred to throughout by their first names for brevity. There is far more that could be said by each, but that task is an open-ended one. They have tried to include the main features.

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Index Topic Detention in Afghanistan Arrival in Kandahar Interrogation at Kandahar Interrogation by British Army Removal from Kandahar Guantanamo Bay Interrogations (Camp X-Ray) Interrogations (generally at Camp X-Ray) Interrogations by M15 Camp Delta - Conditions Explanation for Detention Camp Echo Assaults at Guantanamo Interrogations at Camp Delta Isolation and Interrogations (pre May 2003) - Shafiq Isolation and Interrogations (May/August 2003) - Shafiq Isolation and Interrogations - Asif Isolation Isolation and Treatment - Rhuhel Returning to England (Asif) Contact with the Outside World Legal Advice Red Cross M15 Re British Interrogators Suicides Medical Care Re Psychiatrists Shafiq - Medical Problems/Injuries Rhuhel - Medical Problems/Injuries Military Personnel The State of Some Other Prisoners 1) Jamil el-Banna and Bisher al-Rawi 2) Bisher al-Rawi 3) Moazzam Begg 4) Mamdouh Habib 5) Omar Khadr Paragraph 3-21 22-30 31 - 3 6 37-44 45-55 56-77 78-87 88-107 108-123 124-153 154-163 164 165-169 170-173 174-179 180-215 216-232 233 - 239 240 - 244 245 - 249 250 - 251 252 - 255 256 - 260 261 - 2 6 3 264 265 - 266 267 - 272 273 - 275 276 - 278 279 280 281 - 309 282 - 287 288 - 292 293 - 295 296 - 297 298

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6) Mohamed Rajab 7) Algerian detainees kidnapped in Bosnia 8) David Hicks 9) The Kuwaitis 10)Other detainees (including detainees sold to the Americans) 11)CampEour

299 300-304 305 306 307 308-309

Illustrations Index
Illustration Kandahar Reception Kandahar Interrogation Interrogation at Kandahar Reception at Guantanamo In for the Long Shackle - Camp X-Ray Reservation' Escort to a 'Reservation' - Camp X-Ray Softening the Detainees for Interrogation - Camp X-Ray Long Shackled - Camp X-Ray Delta Cell Pacification - Guantanamo Short Shackled - Camp Delta Guantanamo Haircut Paragraph 22 31 31 56 78 88 92 95 124 165 180 288

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^e^er^^^o^^^i^^^a^^8^a^ 3 AllthreemenweredetainedinNorthernAfghanistanon28November2001 by forces loyal to General Dostum They were loaded onto containers and transported toSherbeganprisonThehorrorsofthattransportationarewelldocumented elsewhere and are not described in detail here. 4 Accordingtoinformationallthreeweregivenlater,therewereUSforcespresentat thepointtheywerepackedintothecontainerstogetherwithalmost200othersAsif became unconscious and awoke to find that in an attempt to allow air into the containersDostum'sforceshadfiredmachinegunsintothesidesofthecontainers Asifwas struck in the arm byabulletasaresulLThe journey to Sherbegantool^ nearly 18hours and the containers were not opened until they reached the prison. All three men remained in the containers amongst the dead and dying throughout thistimeAsifreportsthattogetwaterhehadtolicl^thesideofthecontaineror wipeacloth on the top of the container where the condensation had collected and squeeze the drips ofwater into his mouth On arrival at Sherbegan ofthe 200 originally in the container only 20 were alive,some ofthem seriously injured

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Sherbegan Prison 5. This prison is an old fortress, a court yard surrounded by buildings open to the air. The 3 men were held in a room approximately 10m by 10m in which 70 men were held. After several days they were moved to another much smaller room with about 30 others. 6. Conditions in Sherbegan were appalling, Asif says; in the first week the only food we got was a tiny portion of bread per day and a very small amount of water. This was to last us the whole day. When the Red Cross arrived, after about a week, some more food was provided and also blankets. Shafiq was given plastic sandals at this point but Rhuhel and Asif were barefoot (their boots having been stolen by Dostum's forces). Asif had a 'Kameez' or traditional Pakistani top and jogging bottoms. Shafiq and Rhuhel each had a thin Kameez and Pakistani trousers known as 'shalwar'. These were thin summer clothes and provided no protection against the freezing weather, it being now December. 7. After one Red Cross visit a lorry load of grain was left to feed them which was however stolen by Dostum's forces. The prisoners had, in consequence less food than they had previously. It was at this point that conditions sharply deteriorated. Shafiq says that, 'we all had body and hair lice. They were big and would bite. I still have the scars from their bites on my body. We all got dysentery and the toilets were disgusting. It was just a hole in the ground with shit everywhere. The whole prison stank of shit and unwashed bodies'. After the food rations were reduced the prisoners started fighting over food. Rhuhel says'/ wa8 asleep and got up to pray. There was also food being distributed. I got my piece and there was a piece missing and someone accused me of having a piece extra and he attacked me'. 8. Whilst in Sherbegan Asif s arm which had been injured in the container became infected but he was given no medical treatment other than some iodine and gauze.

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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9. They were held in Sherbegan for approximately 30 days during which the Red Cross saw them. They gave their names and asked for families in England to be contacted. Asif says 'the Red Cross told us that they had contacted the British Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan and that the Embassy officials would be coming to see us on Friday. In fact on that day ('28"' December 2001) it was US Special Forces who arrived at the prison'. 10. After their identities were revealed to the US forces, they were woken up one morning by the guards in Sherbegan and together with other "foreigners" they were herded towards the main gates. The weather was freezing. Shafiq says / had a pair of flimsy shoes supplied by the Red Cross but no socks. At this time I was extremely weak. I was suffering from dysentery and my clothes were extremely thin and provided very little protection from the weather. We were all covered in hair and body lice and I had not washed for at least 6 weeks and I was filthy'.

11 .As they stood at the main gate, US Special Forces personnel surrounded them pointing their guns. One by one they were stripped of all their clothes despite the freezing temperature. They stood there naked, being held by two ofthe Special Forces soldiers whilst their pictures were taken. They were searched and after about five minutes, they were allowed to put their clothes back on but were already suffering from the effects ofthe cold. 12. Shafiq says'/ wa8 very weak. I had not eaten for at least two days and only a little water in the morning' All three believed that '"the British officials" would arrange for us to be taken out of the prison and possibly sent back to the UK even if that meant being interrogated by British officials'.

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First interrogation by U.S Army 13. After the search the men were taken into a room within the grounds of the prison. This location is best described as a shed and it offered very little protection from the cold. Shafiq describes the interrogations as follows, 'My hands and feet were tied with plastic cuffs. The room was about 5 foot by 5 foot and as I was dragged in, soldiers forced me onto my knees in front ofan American soldier in uniform. There were no tables or chairs in the room. The soldier did not identify himself to me but straight away started asking questions. Whilst I was in this position, one of the soldiers who had come in with me stood in the corner of the room with a machine gun pointed at me. He said ifyou move that guy over there (with the gun) will shoot you. The American interrogator asked my name, where I was from and what I was doing in the prison. I was so weak that I was barely able to walk and had difficulty concentrating on the questions, but I answered as well as I could in the circumstances. The interview lasted about 10 minutes and was conducted in English. I think there were interpreters for some of the other foreign detainees. At the end of the interview I was asked how I was feeling, and I told the interrogator that I was scared. He said that this was nothing compared with what they could do to me'.

14. Asif says of this first interrogation the soldier did not identify himself to me but straight away started asking questions. Whilst I was in this position there was a soldier in the room standing right next to me holding a black 9mm automatic pistol to my temple. The barrel of the pistol was actually touching my temple 15. After the interrogation they were all placed outside the shed side by side. As soon as they walked out of the shed, an American soldier put a sandbag on their head and then wrapped thick masking tape around their head, to further cover their eyes. Asif says that despite this, it was just about possible to see underneath the masking tape and through the sand bag that was being used as a hood ifyou angled your head correctly. It was obviously impossible to properly

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distinguish between people and identify features, but I could roughly distinguish figures'. After the hood was placed on their head they were sat outside in the main yard against the wall. They were all sitting side by side in the freezing cold. They estimate that there were approximately 30 to 50 prisoners, all of whom were non Afghani.

16. The Special Forces were standing in a semi circle in front of them. They had to wait until all of the detainees were interrogated and for the Americans to bring transport to the prison. This meant that they were sitting with no shoes or socks, in flimsy clothes and legs and arms tied with tight plastic cuffs for at least three to four hours. 17. Rhuhel says'/ think we were all suffering from the cold, dehydration, hunger, the uncertainty as well as the pain caused by the plastic ties. Added to this, periodically Special Forces soldiers would walk along a line of sitting detainees and kick us or beat us at wilf. Asif adds that they would abuse us in English, constantly swearing and threatening us. I recall that one of them said "you killed my family in the towers and now it's time to get you back". They kept calling us mother fuckers and I think over the three or four hours that I was sitting there, I must have been punched, kicked, slapped or struck with a rifle butt at least 30 or 40 times. It came to a point that I was simply too numb from the cold and from exhaustion to respond to the pain'. 18. Eventually large trucks were brought up to the prison. Still hooded they could not see the trucks but could distinguish the distinctive sound they make. They were picked up one by one and thrown in. It was impossible to walk because of the plastic ties around their legs so they were dragged everywhere. As they did not have any shoes or socks, this meant that the ground would scrape the skin off their feet. When they were thrown into the lorry, there was somebody else in there that grabbed them who dragged them in. They were not allowed to talk or communicate in any way. 19. They were driven for about 45 minutes until they arrived at what they now know was an airport. Whilst in the truck, they could distinguish flashes of light which they

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recognized to be from a camera/flash. Shafiq says 7 believe they were constantly taking photographs of us. I can't imagine these photographs were for identification purposes because of the hoods we were wearing, or to provide evidence that they were not maltreating us, because the abuse we were suffering was serious. I think, in light of what I now know that these photographs were trophies'. 20. When they got to their destination, they could hear the soldiers talking about "birdsarriving at 18.00 hours. They had to wait in the truck at the airport for some time. Shafiq says Asif and I were taken on the first plane. We did not know where we were being taken. I was not allowed to use the toilet, or given any food, extra clothes or water. Throughout this time we still had the hoods on which made the experience even more terrifying. The plane itself was I believe a large cargo plane. It had hooks on the floor and they sat us down attaching each of us to some form of metal belt. The belt was then attached to a chain on either side and also padlocked to the floor. Because our hands were tied behind us and our legs were still tied in plastic cuffs, we had to keep our legs straight out in front of us. In normal circumstances this position would have been difficult to maintain for any length of time. Given that I was extremely weak and that I was suffering from dysentery, dehydration, hunger and exhaustion it was impossible to maintain this position for more than a few minutes at a time. If however I leant back or tried to move, I would be struck with a rifle butt. These blows were not designed to prevent us from falling back or to adjust our position, they were meant to hurt and punish us'.

21. All three men explain the aircraft was freezing. Whilst the three men were not suffering from any major injuries (other than Asif s infected arm), there were others on the plane, including amputees and the victims of bombing raids, who were extremely unwell and yet had to maintain this position with the constant threat of being struck by rifle butts or kicked and beaten by the soldiers. Rhuhel says'/ took the last plane. The conditions in my plane were same as those described by Shafiq'.

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Arrival in Kandahar 22. The plane eventually landed in Kandahar and as they were being taken off, each detainee was taken to the side of the plane and in front of the engines. Shafiq says The cargo plane had no heating and given the flimsy clothes we were wearing I believe I was close to hypothermia. My feet were still tied with the plastic cuffs, and therefore once again we were dragged out of the plane and in front of the engines. I believe the reason we were placed in front of the engines was to try and heat us up'. 23. After this a rope was tied around their right arm and even though they were wearing a hood they understood that this rope was then connected to the man behind and the man in front. The rope was extremely thin and bit deep into their arm. 24. After the ropes were placed on their arms, they had to walk for nearly an hour. They believe they were actually walking around in circles rather than heading straight for their destination. Their feet were bound with plastic ties and so they could only shuffle. If the man in front or behind went too fast or too slow the rope would become taut and dig into their arm. This together with the pain of shuffling, in bare feet (and in the freezing cold) on the gravel, made this walk unbearable. 25. The hood and blindfold were still in place when they arrived at their destination, and all of them had deep cuts on their feet and rope burns on their right arm. 26. Asif says We were eventually herded into a tent and the rope was removed. I knew it was a tent because I couldn't feel the wind. We were made to kneel with our legs underneath us and our foreheads resting on the ground. Our hands were tied behind us as were our feet'. Shafiq adds that in normal circumstances, it might have been possible to keep my head one or two centimeters above the ground so that the sand and stones on the ground

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didn't dig into my head. By this time however I was so weak that I simply sunk forward and my head landed on the ground quite heavily. As I was in this position the sand and stone was cutting into my forehead and so occasionally I tried to lift my head to get some relief. Each time I would do this I was hit or assaulted in some way. My head was forced down on one occasion with a rifle butt. The soldier didn't stop when my head hit the ground but continued pushing down. On another occasion someone came up and pulled the plastic ties around my ankle which caused my legs which were folded under me to straighten, this meant my face and chest hit the ground heavily'.

27. They found out later that at this time the Americans were processing them and they were eventually given plastic wrist bands with numbers on them. Shafiq says / was number 78. As I was lying on the ground, two soldiers came up and carried me outside. They then laid me on the floor and started searching me. I still had my clothes on at this point. One of them kicked me a few times, as a result of which I suffered a lot of bruising. Whilst I was being searched, one of the soldiers would kneel on my back and the other carried out the search. After my search, I was taken to another tent. I still had the hood on and as I was taken to this tent, they were asking me "where are you from" and also they kept asking me what I was "doing in Afghanistan". In the tent, they cut off my clothes and they then carried out a "forced cavity search", but this took place with the hood still on my head and I was terrified and humiliated'.

28. After this tent, Shafiq was taken by the soldiers who were carrying a blanket and clothes (though he had to walk naked) through a maze made out of barbed wire. Even the doors in the maze were made of barbed wire. If he tripped or slipped, which was likely given how exhausted he was, the wire would cut him. This barbed wire maze was in the open air. 29. Asif and Rhuhel describe the same treatment and all three eventually found themselves in a large hanger where they stayed over-night. In relation to the processing carried out by the American personnel Asif adds that he saw a doctor in

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the tent,'/ showed him my arm and he said that it was infected. He put some sort ofa plastic bandage on it. I also told him about my feet which were badly cut up. He looked at them and then said "you'll live"'. 30. They had still not been given food or water. Shafiq says '/ was totally dehydrated, exhausted and suffering from the effects of malnutrition, dysentery and the beatings. Despite this I was called for interrogation by somebody shouting out my number. I had a sack placed on my head and for the first time, I was placed in shackles. These were not the "three piece suits" (see below) used in Guantanamo, but leg irons and handcuffs. I was taken into the interview room bent double with the sack on my head. I had received a change of clothes at this stage and was wearing a thin shalwar kameez which is a type of clothing commonly worn in Pakistan . Asif and Rhuhel describe the same treatment.

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Interrogation at Kandahar 31 .When they got into the interrogation tent, the hood was taken off and they were told to sit on the floor. There was a table in the middle of the tent with two men behind it. There was also a soldier with a gun standing behind them. All three were told forcefully that if they moved they would be shot. Shafiq says 7 was questioned for about half an hour. I could see four water bottles sitting on the table and I said I needed water. One of the interrogators told me that he did not have any despite the fact that I could see the bottles sitting in front of him. He told me that ifl cooperated I would get some water later' 32. They all answered the questions put to them truthfully. The bulk of each interview was about their backgrounds including address, telephone number etc. After this they were photographed and had their fingerprints and DNA taken. The DNA included a swab from their mouth as well as hairs plucked from their beard. 33. After the first interrogation by the Americans, they were taken to an open tent (with the sides open to the elements) and given a blue jump suit. They were also given a couple of crackers each and some peanut butter and at this point the Americans started to insist that they drink a lot of water.

34. The first interrogations were done in English by the Americans. None of the interrogators identified themselves to the detainees. 35. Asif explains that his second interview was also with an American but on this occasion he was badly beaten by his interrogator and the guard, He states that, My second interview took place a couple of days later. I was taken away from the others, with my hood on and walked (bent double) by some soldiers to a tent. An American came into the tent and shouted at me telling me I was Al-Qaeda. I said I was not involved in Al-Qaeda and did not support them. At this, he started to punch me violently and then when he knocked me to the floor started to kick me around my back and in my stomach. My face was swollen

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and cut as a result of this attack. The kicks to my back aggravated the injuries I had received from the soldier striking me with a rifle butt. After a few moments the guards dragged me back to the tent. Whilst he was attacking me, the interrogator didn't ask me any other questions but just kept swearing at me and hitting me'. 36. After about one week when they had been interrogated several times by American military personnel they were each separately brought in to be questioned by a British soldier.

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37 Theirfirst contact with British military personnel was whilst held in the US prison camp in Kandahar.Theinterrogatorwaswearingamaroon beret. He told them that hewasfromtheSAS hood was removed 38Shafiq describes being broughtintoatentbytwoUSsoldiersfirstthing inthe morning He had very thin clothes on and was freezing He hadasandbag placed over his head which was removed once inside the tent. He was handcuffed from behindandhadlegironsonOneoftheUSsoldiershadhisarmroundhisneckand was saying'wait until you get back to the tent you will see what we are going to do to you'.The British officer produced two letters He said one was from Scotland Yard and the otherfrom Interpol. 39There wereanumber of names onalist Shafiq was able to see the letters,only briefly before they were pulled away.He says that the letter claimed that16hours after he had left home for Pakistan his house was raided Shafiq knew this wasn't true as he had phoned home from Pakistan shortly after his arrival and no mention hadbeenmadeofsucharaid TheSASmanwentontosaythathehadareport that Shafiq wasamember ofthe AIMuhajeroon (this is not true) He went on to suggestthatShafiqhadattendedamarchinLondononSeptember19^^(justafter the Septemberll^^ attacks) and that he had been recruited to join them Throughoutthisinterrogationaswellastheearlierones,the

40Rhuhel says that he was taken before the British officer and interrogated for about3 hours. He said that one oftheUS.soldiers hadagun to his head and he was told that if he moved they would shoot him The SAS officer said,'You are funded by the AIMuhajeroon to fight." He was told to admit that he came to Afghanistan for holy "jihad" 41. He was questioned as to how he paid for his ticket. The SAS man also mentioned threemaximumsecurityprisonsin Britain,including Belmarsh,andsaidthathe

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would be sent there. When he was taken back from there the soldiers forced his head right down and threw him on the floor, forced to his knees with his head forced onto the ground and hands pulled up backwards, forcing his head right down into the broken glass and stones on the ground. When he screamed, the force was increased. The floor consisted of sand, broken glass and stones and Rhuhel's hands were cuffed at the back and his feet were shackled. 42. Asif also was told that he would be going to one of the three maximum security prisons back in England. He says that prior to being questioned by the British soldier he had been interrogated by US soldiers on two occasions in Kandahar and one in Sherbegan. The SAS officer asked him to set out his story and he was asked for a description of the area where he lived in England.

43. He was taken back to see the British SAS officer a second time the following day. He was told that "your friends have confessed to being members of the Al Muhajeroon". He asked him to admit that he was also a member. He showed him a list of names and suggested that a particular doctor from the Central Mosque in Birmingham paid for him to go out to fight in Afghanistan. The SAS man then left the tent and the U.S. soldiers roughed him up again (as Rhuhel has also described). Asifwas taken on a third day again to see the British SAS officer and was told that he hadn't told the truth. He was then threatened that because he wasn't telling the truth he would go straight back to England and be placed in Belmarsh or one ofthe other high security prisons. Asif thinks that the first time that he was questioned was for about 6 or 7 hours, the second time for about 2 hours and the third time for about 40 minutes. On the first occasion he was told by the SAS man that he was not going to be beaten because you are with me'.

44. Asif says 7 was told of maximum security prisons in the United Kingdom, including Belmarsh. The British officer told me that within a few weeks I would probably be taken there to be tried'.

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Removal from Kandahar 45. Shafiq says 7 was at the Kandahar camp for just less than two weeks. During that period I was interrogated about four times. We slept in a tent. I was in a tent with Rhuhel but Asif was in a different tent. There were about 20 of us in each tent. The tents were surrounded by barbed wire. We had to sleep straight on the ground, on the gravel. We were not allowed to talk and as Rhuhel explains (see below) they were deliberately stopping us from sleeping. Around midnight, probably on the 12"" or 13^ January 2002, US Army men came in and everyone in the tent was told to move to the back. They then shouted out three numbers. They called out my number (78) and I was taken out after the other two. It was raining and absolutely freezing cold. By this stage I was wearing the blue cotton boilersuit that we'd all been given and sandals. I was made to lie on the ground face down. A sergeant put his knee on my back and a soldier put shackles on my wrists and on my ankles. Then a rice sack was placed over my head. The sack was made from very coarse material and there were no holes to see through. I was then led about 300 to 400 yards with one guard abusing me and swearing at me. When we stopped the other guard, for no reason, hit me on the back of my head with a hand gun. I had been taken to another tent where I remained to sleep that night (the shackles and sacks were removed). There were about 20 people in that tent. The tent had a wooden floor although it had got wet from the rain. There was no bed or mattress or anything'.

46. In the morning all the prisoners in this tent were made to sit at the back of the tent and one by one their numbers were called out. They did not have any idea what was going on. Again, the same procedure was adopted, they were brought out and made to lie on the ground and shackled with a rice sack placed over their heads. This time Shafiq says 7 had to run as fast as I could with my legs shackled and I was bent over with a sack over my head. We were taken to another tent. There they cut off all my clothes and forcefully shaved our beards and heads. I was taken outside. I was completely naked with a sack on my head and I could

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hear dogs barking nearby and soldiers shouting "get 'em boy". Although I couldn't see I had a sense that there were a lot of soldiers around. I was taken, still naked with a sack on my head, to another tent for a so called cavity search. I was told to bend over and then I felt something shoved up my anus. I don't know what it was but it was very painful. I was then taken over to another part of the tent where the head sack was removed and photographs were taken of me. I think they were head and shoulder, full face and profile. After the photos I was given an orange uniform, of polyester trousers and tshirt. Then new chains were put on. These were handcuffs connected to a box that was held in between our wrists and from this box another chain went around the waist and then a different chain came down to other cuffs which were placed around our ankles. They were on extremely tight and cut into my wrists and ankles. I asked if they could be loosened but they refused. Then black thermal mittens were placed on my hands and taped on around the wrist. Goggles were placed on my eyes. These were rather like ski goggles but with the eye pieces painted out. Then ear muffs were put on like builders' ear muffs. A face mask, which was rather like a surgical mask, was put round my nose and mouth and I was given orange socks and plimsoles to wear. I was then taken outside. I could barely hear or see a thing and was made to sit down on the gravel ground. I was left there for hours and hours, perhaps nine or ten altogether. It was freezing and I was not allowed to move, I sat cross legged. I was aware that others sat beside me. Throughout that time I was given no food or water, the last meal I'd had was the night before. Whilst on the runway, they pulled down our face masks and gave us an MRE (meals ready to eat) packet. However, it was impossible to eat it because the packet was placed in our hands but as we were shackled and still had all the other stuff such as mittens on, you couldn't open the packet or reach your mouth with the food. They gave us no water and then they just took the food away. I was not able to eat any of it. We were then all made to stand up and I was given a sort of denim jacket which was placed over my shoulders with the top button tied but our arms were not in the sleeves. A thin strong rope was tied around my arm and connected, I believe, from my arm to the arms of other detainees. We were made to walk for a long time. I think we were simply

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walking round and round in circles. Because of the rope round our arms if it got pulled it became extremely tight. As we were walking I could sense that cameras were flashing and I suspect that they were also videoing us'. It was at this point that it became clear they were going to be transported by airplane out of Kandahar but they were not told their destination. 47. Asif who was on the same plane as Shafiq describes very similar experiences. He says I'd been in a different tent from Shafiq and Rhuhel. I remember three numbers being called out. I was number 79 and I was taken in the same way as Shafiq described to the wooden floored tent. In the morning we were all made to sit on our knees and I waited about three hours until my number was called out. I was also called into the tent and the same process happened of being shaved and stripped naked. I do also remember having a brief examination with a doctor who looked into my eyes and asked if there were any problems. I explained that I had stomach problems as I was still suffering from dysentery. He simply gave me some tablets'. 48. Rhuhel was not taken out of Kandahar at this time. He remained there for another month. His number was 102. It was never explained to him why he was left behind. 49. Shafiq and Asif describe being led onto large cargo planes. They were taken one by one up onto the plane. They estimate that the whole process would have taken about two or three hours. They were made to sit on benches that had no back. They still had on gloves, face masks, head muffs and they were shackled although the rope around their arms was removed. A further chain was then put around their waist and legs and this was then connected to the floor. Shafiq says my legs were in a painful position but if I tried to move to get comfortable they would kick you'. 50. The plane took off and they were in the air for many hours. They had to remain sitting in this very painful position with the shackles cutting into their wrists throughout this time. Asif says 7 was very tired, not having slept at all. During the flight at some stage the face masks were removed and we were fed peanut

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butter and jelly sandwiches and orange segments. Then the mask was replaced. It was absolutely freezing during the plane journey. When we eventually landed, it was obviously somewhere very hot. We could tell as we came off the airplane that it was in the middle of the day, it was very light and very hot. I had no idea where we were. I was then led from this plane onto another plane. On the way to the other plane we were moved, bent double quite quickly. A soldier at some point, stamped on the chain between my ankles which brought the cuffs around my ankles down very hard. It was extremely painful. I was not offered the opportunity to use the toilet at any Stage. I was again made to sit in the same position, shackled to the ground on this other plane and we waited for a couple of hours before take off. The second journey was shorter than the first. Eventually we arrived in Cuba; although at that stage we didn't know it was Cuba'. Asif and Shafiq have no idea where they changed planes but Rhuhel who describes a similar experience on his flight was told by soldiers that they had landed in Turkey. All three describe the plane journey as a nightmare with Asif saying that he was by this stage done for', he thought he would not survive the second flight but was too weak and too frightened to do or say anything.

51. Shafiq says during the plane journey the shackles had been on so tight that they really cut into me. I still have scarring on my left arm from them and I lost the feeling in my right hand for a long time because they were on so tight. 52. Whilst Asif and Shafiq were on their way to Guantanamo Bay Rhuhel remained in Kandahar. He describes the routine continuing as before. He states he was further interrogated, once by MI5 and separately by the Foreign Office. He asked after Asif and Shafiq but was told by the MI5 official in the first interrogation that they had gone home because they had cooperated. He was also interrogated on four further occasions by the Americans. He reports that after Shafiq and Asif left conditions in Kandahar started to deteriorate. He states they kept moving us around from tent to tent. This went on all day and night so it was impossible to settle down for the night. They also shone powerful lights into the tents which made things worse. There were no cages in the tents but you were separated from the

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person next to you by barbed wire. You were not allowed to communicate with anyone in the tent. I started to feel crazy from the isolation. About a week before I left I knew I was going to Guantanamo. I was told this by one of the soldiers. My conversations with the soldiers were the only real relief I had because it was human contact'. 53. Rhuhel says that just before he was flown to Cuba in February 2002 he was visited by somebody from the Foreign Office. It was a few days before he flew out. There was also somebody present from MI5 who said that he had seen his friends in Cuba and they had confessed to everything. He said ifyou admit to everything you will go Ihome. At that point Rhuhel was starving, frightened and living in appalling conditions at the prison camp. He had been surviving on only two biscuits a day and was sleep deprived. He had not been allowed to talk to anyone and at night was woken up every hour on the hour. He decided to agree with everything put to |.him so that he could be returned to England. He admitted that he was paid forty the Al Muhajeroon and that he had flown to Afghanistan to fight holy "jihad". He said, that he couldn't hack it. Rhuhel says that 7 was in a terrible state. I just said •OK' to everything they said to me. I agreed with everything whether it was frue or not. I just wanted to get out of there'. He says that the British officials could see the state he was in but did not seem to care or even ask him about the conditions. Five days later (on the day he left) the Foreign Office representative came to see him. He was pleasant and dressed in a suit. He told Rhuhel that he was going to Cuba. He was not concerned by Rhuhel's health and was not prepared to give him any information about what was happening. 54. The Foreign Office did not inform Shafiq and Asif s families that their whereabouts were known until they were in Cuba. Rhuhel's family was told when he was in Kandahar. Shafiq and Asif saw no one from the Foreign Office whilst they were in Kandahar. 55. All three talk of the use of particular interrogation techniques in Kandahar. Shafiq explains that 'when the soldiers would come into the tents in Kandahar they came with dogs. Ifyou made any sudden movements the dogs would be

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Guantanamo Bay 56. When they arrived in Cuba Shafiq states we were taken offthe plane and made to sit on the ground outside somewhere. I was still goggled and masked. At that stage they took my shoes off. We were then led onto a bus. I think there were maybe about 40 of us altogether. I later learned that we were the second group ofdetainees from Afghanistan taken to Guantanamo Bay. On the bus we sat cross legged on the floor (the seats had been removed) and were thrown about because of the movement of the bus, but soldiers would still punch or kick us ifwe moved. The bus then went onto a ferry which went over to the camp. On our arrival at the camp somebody lifted the earmuffs I was wearing and shouted into my ear "you are now the property of the US Marine Corps". We were told this was our final destination. There would be one soldier speaking in English and another in Arabic. We had arrived at Camp XRay. Asif describes very similar experiences.

57. Rhuhel, who arrived a month later, was also taken to Camp X-Ray. His journey on the plane was very similar to Asif and Shafiq but on the ferry to the actual camp he was kicked and punched by a US soldier. He states he was assaulted because we had been told to keep our hands by our sides. This was uncomfortable as we were shackled and after some time I moved my hands into my lap. A soldier came up to me and said put your hand on your left knee which I did. The soldier said "this motherfucker speaks English", and then kicked me about 20 times to my left thigh and punched me as well. I had a large bruise on my leg and couldn't walk for nearly one month. There was never anyone to complain to about these sorts of attacks and I think they are still going on'.

58. At Camp X-Ray, after they were taken off the bus, they had to sit outside for hours still shackled with the gloves, ear muffs and masks on. They were given no water

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even though it was extremely hot. Occasionally somebody would come round and wet their lips with water but it wasn't enough. 59. Asif states that 'after a couple of hours of squatting in that position I fell over and started shaking. I went into a sort of fit. I was taken on a stretcher into a processing room where I was given an IV tube into my arm. I was still shackled and goggled at that stage. I was in the room for about an hour and was then given a shower. Everything was taken off, all my clothing except for the goggles and the shackles. The shower was very brief, it didn't give me an opportunity to wash properly. After the shower I was taken over to a table and told to bend over (I was naked). Again somebody prodded up my anus. I don't know what they possibly could have thought I had hidden since I had been completely shackled since the last cavity search. I was then dressed and more or less carried across to another part of the tent where I was questioned by a woman who asked for my details, including my name, date of birth etc. My fingerprints were done, also a DNA mouth swab and photographs taken. I was given a new wristband which had my name and number printed on it'.

60. Shafiq who describes a similar experience when he was processed (as does Rhuhel) also states that when we arrived at Camp X-Ray I was made to squat in the boiling heat outside for about six or seven hours altogether. I became desperate and eventually asked for some water. The soldiers realized I was English and a man from the ERF team (Extreme Reaction Force - see below) came and started kicking me in the back and calling me a traitor. There were dogs present barking nearby. They were very close to me but I couldn't see them. I wasn't allowed to move, if I did I would be kicked. Eventually I was taken in to be processed, I was taken to a tent and my clothes were removed. Each hand was uncuffed in turn to allow them to take my top off and then recuffed. The same happened with my trousers. I was then led to a shower. While I was in the shower, a soldier pressed me f;rm/y against the wall using a riot shield or ERF shield. This meant that I was pressed against the wall with a dribble of water dropping on my head and couldn't wash properly. I also had my goggles on in the shower. After this I was walked naked to another table

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where a cavity search was conducted. This was both painful and humiliating. Having been subjected to the same search before we left Kandahar and having been kept shackled throughout the time we were transported, there can have been no purpose to this search other than to further humiliate or punish us. I was taken, naked, to a woman who processed me as Asif describes. I think this was meant to further humiliate me. When I was questioned by the woman about my details I told her I was British but she wouldn't believe me'. 61 .After processing, their clothes were put back on by the guards. Each was walked around the tent at least twice and then photographs were taken. Shafiq states 7 was given a wrist band. This wrist band had a photograph, name, date of birth, height and weight. When I arrived at Guantanamo I was UOIbs, but I was 195lbs when I had left the UK'. 62. After the photographs and processing had been completed they were told they had to write a letter to their families. They found it almost impossible to write anything because their hands were still cuffed together and they had lost all feeling in them. Shafiq states that 7 think all I managed to write was "I am in American custody". After I had done this the goggles were put back on and I was taken to a cage. At that stage the goggles and shackles were removed'.

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Camp X-Ray 63. After processing they were taken to the cages in Camp X-Ray. They describe the cage as being about 2 meters by 2 meters. There was a gap between the top of the cage (itself made of mesh) and the roof of the structure (made from corrugated iron). Asif states that 'in my cage there were 2 towels, 1 blanket, 1 sheet, 1 small toothbrush, shampoo, soap, flip flops and an insulation mat to sleep on as well as two buckets, one for wafer and one to use as a toilet (urinal)'. There were 60 people in each block each of which consisted of 6 groups of 10 cages. Throughout the time that they had been in custody, both in Kandahar and now in Camp X-Ray, they were not allowed to pray. If they tried to pray, the soldiers would deliberately disrupt them. 64. Asif states that on fbe first night after I arrived from Afghanistan at Camp XRay I weighed 120 pounds, I am normally 165 pounds. When I was placed in the cage I had the goggles as well as the shackles removed and I thought I was hallucinating. I could just see a series of cages with people wearing orange. Then I also noticed people outside who were veiled. I thought they were women at first. In fact they turned out to be men wbo were employed to do building work on the camp. It seemed that the people building the camp were mainly Indian and South East Asian. We found out later that they were paid only about one dollar or less per hour and had to work 12 hours per day. They were under the control of the company that had been contracted to build the camp. We weren't supposed to talk to them and in fact they were escorted and guarded by the US Army. Occasionally, however, we managed to exchange some conversation with them in Urdu'.

65. Asif also sets out the aspects of Camp X-Ray he found most difficult to deal with. He states that, 7 think Shafiq will agree that the restrictions that were placed on us when we were in our cages were probably the worst things we had to endure. By the time Rhuhel arrived things had improved a bit but in the first few weeks, we were not allowed any exercise at all; this meant that all day

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every day we were stuck in a cage of 2 meters by 2 meters. We were allowed out for 2 minutes a week to have a shower and then returned to the cage. Given the extreme heat, we sweated a lot and the area obviously began to smell. During the day we were forced to sit in the cell (we couldn't lie down) in total silence. We couldn't lean on the wire fence or stand up and walk around the cage. We were fed three times a day, but given very little time to eat the food. The quantity of food we were given was also very little. It is not an exaggeration to say that sometimes we were only allowed about one minute in which to eat our food. This was not too much of a problem if the food was on a plate, but occasionally it would be in packets and we would not be able to open the packet before the food was taken back. At this point, the US marines ran the camp and they were very brutaf. Conditions in Camp X-Ray were very difficult, especially in the first month. The cells were often under direct sunlight for hours on end. Shafiq says fbe way my cell was located I got more sunlight than the others and had to put up with direct sunlight for most of the day.

66. It was extremely hot but they were not allowed to take their tops off. They still had no idea why they were there. In fact for the first 7 days Asif and Shafiq did not know they were in Cuba. They did not know when their ordeal would end. All three say that they simply could not understand what the interrogators wanted from them. 67. Rhuhel says that when he arrived he gradually developed a technique of staring at the wire mesh or at the ground and letting my mind go blank. The area around Camp X-Ray was lit with very powerful (like football stadium) flood lights. At night, the area was lit up as though it were the middle of the day. The floodlights were used throughout their time at Camp X-Ray. There were also snakes, scorpions and a variety of unusual insects. Rhuhel says that 7 remember fbaf a number of detainees were bitten by scorpions in my block (I was still separate from Asif and Shafiq) and we always had to be on the look out. (If bitten by a scorpion, flesh had to be dug out from the bitten limb to remove the infection.) Asif says in Camp X-Ray his comfort items had been removed for some reason. They would place removed items outside the cage. When they came to return the items they

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lifted my blanket and underneath there wasasnake It was impossible to sleep or getanyresL When they were sleeping, they had to keep their hands outside their blankets In addition,the noise ofthe construction work going on (they were extendingCampXRay)wassuchthatitwouldhavebeenimpossibletosleep anyway. 68Another aspect of detention in CampXRay which caused considerable distress wasthetoiletfacilities Inthecagesthereweretwobuckets Onewasforurinating in and the other was for water The bucket which was used foratoilet was emptied onceaday and the bucket that was for water was filled on average twiceaday with ahosepipebroughtintothecellblockbytheguards,butthisdependedontheir discretion The detainees had to use the water in the bucket to drink, wash and for ablutions If they wanted to "doanumber 2,they had to ask permission froma guardwhowouldshacklethemandthenescortthemtoaportaloooutsidethe blocks Theguardswould stand staring atthemwiththedooroftheportalooopen and with their hands in shackles as they sat on the toilet. Because ofthe shackles they were also unable to clean themselves.

69Shafiqsaysveryoffenfbe^uard8woufdrefusefofa^eusfofb9porfa^oo oufs^deandfbereforepeopfesfarfedfousefbebuc^efsmfbeceffs. Hi^anyof fbep9opfewboweredefamedmCamp.^^^aywere^^^,offensufferm^from dysenfer^orofberd^seasesands^mp^ycou^dnfwa^funf^^fbe^uardsdec^ded fbeywou^dfa^efbemfo fbe fof^ef.ffbfn^ fbe guards a^so^new bow ^mporfancec^eanfmessfsfo^usf^msandfoo^as^c^pleasure from seefn^ us degraded ^^^efb^s.7besme^fmfbeceffbfoc^wasferr^b^eandmfbeearfy days fb^s was made worso by fb9facf fbaf W9 bad fos^fmfbem^dd^e of fbe room,descr^bedabove,w^fbouffe9nm^onfbeca^e,f9^^m^,praym^or movm^aroundfbeca^e 70Aftersometimetheconditionsimprovedbythattheymeanthattheygotslightly more food and could talk to each o t h e r - i e the restrictions on conversations were slightlyrelaxedThey could puttheirhandsunderneaththeblanketswhentheywent

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to sleep The conditions improved slightly afterthey confessed'to allegations put to them during interrogation They were also given shorts for decency 71 Acomplaint all three make is that the orange jump suits they were given asa uniform hadalongslitdownthesideThismeantthatwhenthey prayed (ifthey were allowed) the jump suit would open to reveal their groin area when they bent down In Islamaman must be covered from his midriff to just above his knees when he prays and so the prisoners took to wearing their towels around theirwaists when they prayed.This becameasourceofalot of conflictwith the guards The detainees were also prevented from calling out the Azzan or call to prayers Asif says that when people called out the Azzan '^beBlmer^canswoufd respond by e^fbers^^encm^fbep9rsonwbowasdom^^f,or,morefre^uenffy,pf9yfoud roc^ mus^cfo drown fbemouf 7beywoufdafso^omfo fbe person s ca^e and sb9c^f9fb9m,f9avm^fb9mfberefor4or^bours^

72Theywerenevergivenprayermatsandinitiallytheydidn'tgetaKoranWhenthe Korans were provided, they were kicked and thrown about by the guards and on occasion thrown in the buckets used forthe toilets This kept happening When it happened it was always said to be an accident but itwasarecurrent theme. 73Eventually the prisoners went on hunger strike because ofthe way that they were treated and in particular the way their religion was treated (see below) 74.Asif says that ifwas^mposs^bfe fopray b9caus9fmffaf^y we d^dnof^nowfbo dfr9Cffonfopray,bufafso^^venfbafwecou^dnfmov9andfbebar9ssmenf fromfb9^uards,^fwass^mpfynoffea8fbfe.7bebebavfouroffbe^u9rds fow9rdsourr9^^^^ouspracf^c9sasweff9sfbe^oranwasafso,mmyv^ew, des^^nedfocausousasmucbd^sfressasposs^bfe. 7beywoufd^fc^fbe ^oran,fbrow^fmfofbefo^fefand^enera^^yd^sr9specf^f^f^scfearfomefbaf fbecond^f^onsmourceffsandour^eneraffreafmenfweredesf^nedbyfbe of^cersmcbar^eoffbemferro^af^onprocessfo soffenusup^^^

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75After Asif and Shafiq had spent aboutaweek in CampXRay,the Americans broughtalongsomeonetheyreferredtoas'theChaplain" Theybelievethathe was in fact an American Muslim Asif states be sfarfedfo readfbe prayers and^ fbm^fbefd9awasfbafb9woufdbefeadm^usmpr9yer.^nfacf,nobody^new wbafwas^ofn^onandwewereaffuncer^amasfowbefberwewereaf^owed foparf^c^pafe. nobody ^neworfrusfedfb^smd^v^duaf andasaresuff be was fefffoprayonb^sown 7b^sd^dnofsfopfbe^mer^cansfromfifmm^b^mand su^^esfm^ fbaf be was ^eadm^re^ufar prayer groups 76Assetoutabove,afterthefirstmonthorso,ataboutthetimeRhuhelarrived,things were relaxed to the extent that they managed to speak to some ofthe Military Police ('MPs') These MPs told the detainees that their superiors had briefed them before theyhad arrived lnthesebriefings,thedetaineesweredescribedaswild animals As Asif says, fbey were fofd fbaf we woufd^^fffbemw^fbourfoofbbrusbesaf fbe fiirsfoppor^umfy,fbaf we were aff members of ^f^^aeda and fbaf we bad ^^^fed women and cb^fdrenmd^scr^mmafe^y'. This obviously affected the way they treated the prisoners. 77.Rhuhel was inadifferent block from the othertwo in CampXRay.After processing hewasputinhiscagebuttakenout20minuteslater Hehadafull medical, was stripped naked in front ofawoman and blood was taken from him.He was then put back in his celL He says that you coufd move around bufcoufdn^fspea^.^fter abouf^daysfwasaffowedfofaf^fomyne^^bboursbuffbeywerea^f^rabs andfd^dnofundersfandwbaffbeyweresaym^

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
028529 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2

^H^HH^C^I^^^

^1^,^^-^

^^^^""^^^^^^^^^^IHI^ ^l^^^^l.!^ ^^^^1^

^^^^^D^^I^^^^^^Di^^H^I^^^I^^^^^ ^^-^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^

028530

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fnferrogaf/ons
78. The first interrogation at Camp X-Ray didn't taken place until the second or third day after they arrived. 79. The first interrogations for Asif and Shafiq took place in a tent. By the time Rhuhel arrived they had built some booths (see below). Shafiq says In the tent, there was somebody who introduced himself as being from the British Embassy in Washington and a civilian from MIS. There was also an American soldier behind the table. There were at least 7 or 8 others standing in the tent behind me, but I was not allowed to look back. I was put in a chair with an armed soldier nearby. I was asked my name, address and family details. I was also asked for my phone number and other information about my family. The MIS officers told me, in no uncertain terms, that if Idid not cooperate they could make life very difficult for me. They kept insisting that I tell them I had gone tb Afghanistan for "jihad". They told me that if I agreed to this, then I could go ( back to England. f

80. During the first several weeks the American interrogations with all three consisted of pressing them to 'yusf say you're a fighter'. Asif was told if you just say you're a fighter, because ofthe Geneva Convention when the war is over you'll get sent back to England'. Rhuhel was told yusf say you're a fighter and you'll go home'. He was told 'you've come to kill American and British soldiers, coalition forces'. They talked about 'allied forces'. They referred to the Northern Alliance as being the same as allied forces'. 81 Asif comments "we W9r9 awar9 fbaf fbe first thing that appeared in our American files was something like 'I went to Afghanistan to kill American and British and allied soldiers'. We never signed anything but the interrogators had us one way or another after some weeks of interrogation agreeing to this. We did not all of us say we did." In Asif s case he eventually just nodded. 82. Asif describes the way that the interrogation would go. He was accused of meeting Mullah Omar, and money laundering for Bin Laden in England. He was given what

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*they called the big fish chart with Osama Bin Laden at the top, money launderers who seemed to be in the middle, and at the bottom was fighters', so"/ was led fo* think that the best thing to admit to was to being a fighter. The trouble is once you admitted you were a fighter they then wanted to get you up to the next 0Stage up the chart. So even ifyou said that you were a fighter to get them off' your back, that wouldn't stop them. They would still continue. They just want iyou to say something and once they've got you to say something they then keep pressing for something else. So you think that you're in the end saying ^something that will stop them but itjust encourages them ifyou do. 83. fbe series of questions asked in the early stages of captivity would be asking your whole life story and would last at least four hours each, hours and hours and hours. We were very tired. We were dehydrated. We had very little food and we were already completely exhausted from the whole experience in Afghanistan. One day in the heat of Cuba knocks you out anyway. We were completely unused to the heat. You came out from the slight shelter of your cell into the full scale Cuban heat which was even worse. There was a bit of a roof over your cell providing some shelter but it was pointless as the sun would hit directly at different times of day and if there was rain the rain would hit you too. When you came out ofthat to interrogation then the full heat of the sun would hit you. The interrogation tent in those early stages didn't have air conditioning."

84. The first interview Asif and Shafiq had was with English officials (Rhuhel's first interview was with an American). In all their interviews the interrogator kept saying 'just say you are a fighter'. Eventually all three said 'yes, I was a fighter' one way or another to the US interrogators. They couldn't take any more. 85. Shafiq says '/ was interviewed by MIS at least twice when I was in Camp X-Ray. After about 2 or 3 weeks in Camp X-Ray, I was also interviewed by US forces interrogators. This time, I was interviewed in a booth. I continued to be interviewed in these booths until I left. The Americans kept insisting that I say il knew Mullah Omar. I began to realize that in each interview they wanted me

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foadmfffosomefbmgmoreserfousunffffbeyforcedmefosayfwasm^f ^aeda.7b^8 was noffrueandfsfarfedfo refuse fo agree w^fb fbe mferrogafor, ^uffwasdesperafefogefoufandevenfuaffyf^usfaccepfedfbmgsfbeypuffo me 86RhuhelwasinterrogatedbyAmericansontheseconddayhearrivedHis interrogation was similarto Asif and Shafiq On the third day he was seen by MI5 HetoldthemthesamethinghehadsaidinKandaharTheycameonthenextday and insisted he say he wasafighter.He refused to say he wasafighterorthat he had gone for' jihad" to M15. 87Afterthisinterrogationhewasnotspokentofor4or5monthslnCampXRaythe only people around him were Arabs He did not speak Arabic and couldn't communicateOndescribingtheconditionsRhuhelsays7coufdn'ffaf^fofbe guysmmyceffbfoc^sofwoufd^usfsfffberesfarmgaffbew^resaf^day7bfs wenf on for^monfbs.fusedfo fry and spea^fo fbe guards buffbeywoufdn'f spea^fomeffefffofaffyfsofafod'

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028534

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l i l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ V ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

,^&^4km*2aA

028535

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fnferrogaf^onsafCamp^^ay^generaffy) 881ntheinterrogation booths, used afterthetent,therewasatableinthe middle, often screwed to the floor. There was alsoachair on which the detainees were ordered tositandinfrontofthischairtherewasametalhoopscrewedintotheground Whentheywerewalkedintotheinterrogation room,they hadtositdownandthen theirlegshackleswereinturnattachedtothishoopusingahugepadlock described as being long shackled'. Thisis

89Asifsays7sboufde^pfamfbafmfbeearfy days, we bad fo go from fbe cages fofbemferrogaffonboofbsonfoofwbfcbwase^fremefyd^fffcuffaswebadfo sbufffeafong,consfanffybemgpusbedandbarassedbyfbeguard8,wearmg fbefeg^rons Tb^smadeffver^d^ffiicu^ffowaf^andfbe^eg^ronswoufdcuf fnfoouran^fe8.^fferawb^fe,fbeybeganfomfroducefroffeyswbfcb^fbm^ bavebeenseenmpbofograpbs. ^anymonfbs^afer,fbeymfroducedgoff carfsandwewou^dbefoad9donfofb9carfanddrfv9nfofb9mf9rrogaf^on boofb 90 As described earlier in the interviews, they would be told that the interrogators had information that each ofthe detainees had met people like Mullah Omar. Shafiq ^ays,that7n my case fbeyfo^d me fbeyfound my personnel ff^emacavem ^fgbamsfan and fbaf ff was cf9arfwasfm^9dfo^f^^a9da. Tbfs^srfd^cufous, ^buffb9yms^sf9dfbaffacc9pffbfs.7b9mf9rrogaforswou^d^eep89yfng"feff ^u8you'reaf^gbf9r,fe^^u8you'reafiigbfer'' 7b^swoufdgoonforbourson ^ e n d . Asif and Rhuhel describe similar interrogations 91.In CampXRay wheneverthey were interrogated,they were never given any notice The process was that an escort team of usually2or3military police officers would arrive at the cages. They would be carrying chains and it would be obvious at this pointthatsomebodywasgoingforinterrogation Whentheywouldreachthecage ofthe particular detainee they wanted to speak to,he was told he was going to "reservation-whichwasthetermtheyusedforinterrogation

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C r - r f gA,,^

028537

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92. Shafiq says fbe guard came fo fbe cage, told me fo go fo fbe back of the cage, put my hands behind my head with my fingers interlocking, face away from the

entrance and kneel down. I was then shackled in a three piece shackle which basically meant my hands were tied, in front of me, and then attached to a belt which went round my waist. The chain of the leg irons I had around my ankles was about a foot in length which meant that I could not walk properly but rather I had to shuffle. If I was forced to move quickly as sometimes the guards would push or shove us, the metal restraints of the leg irons around my ankle would dig in and cut the skin around my ankles. This was how I was taken to my first interrogation, but things changed slightly (see below) when they built the booths'

93. All three report that the leg shackles would cut their ankles. Before they set off to the interrogation block they would be frisked, usually done very aggressively. As they were led off to the interrogation block, they had to have their heads down (almost bent double) and shuffle to the interrogation room with an MP on each side and one behind. They would insist on putting the shackles on their skin and not over their trousers which would have given them some protection from the sharp edges ofthe shackles and the scraping. Asif says one thing that always stuck with me was that the handcuffs had "made in England" written on them'. Eventually, in Camp Delta, after almost one year, the authorities agreed to put the shackles over the detainees' trousers which restricted them in the way they wanted, but did not cut into their ankles.

94. Shafiq says that in the early days before they introduced the trolleys (and later the golf carts) 'fbe MPs would compete to see who could get their detainee to the interrogation booths the fastest. They would push, pull and try to force us to go as fast as possible. I f y o u tripped, (which was very likely given that the leg irons were tight and it was impossible to move your feet properly) they would assume you were trying to escape and force you to the ground jumping on top of you. Often detainees were kicked and punched when this happened. The suggestion that somebody could try and escape in these circumstances is ridiculous and I believe it was an additional part o f t h e process of "softening us u p " for /nferrogaf/on'.

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'^'/ATV

028539

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95 As set out above, in Camp X-Ray, the tents that they used for interrogation in the first few days were replaced by booths These werealong way from the cages (at least 300 meters). They had to cover the whole distance in the manner described above 96WhentheygottotheboothstheMPwouldannouncethatthey had arrived overthe radio Theywouldrefertothedetaineesas'packages" ratherthan bytheirnames ornumbersShafiqsays'wewerefbenfa^enfnfofbefnferrogaffonbfoc^wffb an armed escorf. Ii^e were fed fnfo fbe room wbffsf fbe armed offfcer(^usuaffy armedwffbarfffeorasbofgun^sfoodoufs^defbedoor.fnfbeboofbswe were searcbedagafn and fbensaf down onacbafr. Tbel^^swoufdfben padfoc^ us foaboo^wbfcb was affacbedfo fbe fioor (see above^. 97Theywereusuallyleftintheroomwaitingforaninterrogatortoturnup Sometimes

theinterrogatorwasalreadytherebutothertimestheywouldbemadetowaitforup to3hours. Shafiq says7woufdff^efofbfn^fbere was some purpose fofbese 8fffygames,boweverfffseguaffyff^efyfbafffwassfmpfymcompefence l^bffsfwewaffedmfbeboofbs,fberewasaguardwbosfayedfbere fbrougbouf.^ew9snofarmedbufbewasfofdnoffofaf^fous.7beguard woufd^usfsfandfberesfarfngafus room,fbeguardwoufdremafn 98TheinterrogatorsveryrarelyintroducedthemselvesOccasionallythey lied about theorganizationtheyworkedforandallthreemenbelievethenamestheygave were almost always false This misinformation was quite common. As an example, ononeoccasionRhuheltoldaninvestigatorthatoneofhercolleaguesfromtheFBl had kepthimintheinterrogationroomfor18hours(thiswasinCamp Delta) He describedtheinterrogator Thepersontowhomhewascomplainingtoldhimthat heknewthewomanandthatshewasnotfromthe FBI butfrom Military Intelligence l^benfbefnferrogaforcamefnfofbe

99ln relationtotheinterrogators,theygenerally changed fnferrogaforonfbreeoccasfonsaffbemosf

Itwasveryraretohavethe

sameinterrogatoronaregularbasisShafiqsays7onfyeversawfbesame

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100

TheorganizationsthatwereinvolvedintheinterrogationsincludedtheClA,FBl,

DOD,M15,NCl(NavyCrimelnvestigators),NSA,ArmyCID 101 Whentheinterrogatorscameintotheroom,theydidnotalwayshavefileswith

them. It varied however and occasionally they would have notebooks or other statements with them In Camp X-Ray they usually came in without files Rhuhel saysthat7amfafrfycerfafnfbaffbemformaffonaboufuswasnofsbaredby fbedffferenforganf^affonsandoffenfbeywoufdaffendandas^fbesame guesffonsffmeandagafn Btsane^ampfe,fdon'ffbfn^fbeybadrecefvedany fnformabonaboufusfromourmferrogaffonsfn^andabaB 102 Each interrogation started right from the beginning The first question was

always "do you speak English" which was an absurdity since knowledge of the detaineesandwhotheywerewasthepresumed starting pointforinterrogation On occasion the interrogators even brought inatranslator because they simply had no ideawhethertheyspokeEnglishornoLTheywouldthenproceedtoaskthemtheir name, date of birth and detailed questions about their background. 103 Rhuhel saysthat'afffbefnferrogaforsseemedfo^nowwasfbaffbadbeen

defafnedfnBtf^^banfsfanandfransferredfo^uanfanamofrom^andabar.B^ffer fbeybadobfamedmybac^grounddefaffs,fbeywoufdsfarffoas^mewbaff wasdofngm^fgbanfsfan l^ye^perfenceswffbfbesecondfnferrogaffonfn Camp^^^aywereverysfmffarfo^sff'8.7bey^epf98^fngmewbefberfwasa ffgbferornoffevenfuaffyfofdfbemfwasbecausefbey^epfpromfsfngfo sendmebac^fo^ngfandorpufmefnfronfofafrfbunaf

104.

The interrogation system was based on written statements Itwas made clearto

the detainees thatwhateverwas set down on the statementwas the official version ofeventsinthe interrogation room Allthreereportknowingofmany examples whereprisonersbecameinvolvedinargumentswiththeinterrogatororrefusedto cooperate and in turn the interrogatorwould write lies in the statements and the

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detaineewouldspendmonthsbeingquestionedbasedonhisalleged'admissions" whichwere nothing otherthan maliciousaccountsinserted bythe interrogator There was no system of redress and no way of challenging this behaviour The samewouldapplyifthedetaineehadanargumentwithaninterpreterAsifsays 'fberewasonedefafneewbospo^e^ngffsbandB^rab^c7bemferprefer wrongfyfransfafedsomefbfngbesafdandbefnferrupfedfosay'nofnever 8afdfbaf'.7befnferrogaffonconfmuedm^ngffsbbuffbosedefameeswbo coufdn'fcorrecf fbe fnferprefer often found fbey were supposed fobavesafd fbfngsfbey never bad. Ilifany of fbe defafneesdecfdedfo fry fo fearn ^ngffsb because fbe fnfe^referscoufdnof be reffed upon 105 Toillustratethepoweroftheguards,Asifgivesanexampleofanincidentthat

took place when Rhuhel, Shafiq and he were in isolation because of the' Bin Laden video" (see below) Asif states'on one occasion fberewasacbange over fn fbe unffswbowereguardfngus fsofaffon^seebefow) Tbecapfafnwbobadbeenfncbargeoffbebfoc^ came fofnfroducebfsrepfacemenffo fbe bfoc^ and fo fbe defafneesfn fwasfaf^fngfofbemwbenfurfberdownfbefsofaffon Obvfousfyfdfdnofdoffandfbad 7bec9pfafn^newfbfswas bfoc^anfnmafespafononeoffbeguards

fwocapf9fnsfowffnessfbf8,buffbesergeanfwbobadbeenspafonbafedme somucbfbaffnbfssfafemenfbesafdfbaffdfdff. fafse because every move fbaf we made was monffored,ffmed and our conversaffonsffsfenedfo,bufafso be ^newff was fafse because be was wffb meaffbeffmeoffbefncfdenf. Oneoffbesenforoffiicersdecfdedfbaffwasfo bepunfsbedforfbfssofrememberverycfearfyfbaffbecapfafnwenffospea^ foama^orfofeffbfmfbaffbesergeanf'ssfafemenfwasnoffrue Tbema^or ^s apparenffysafdfbaffbeaffegaffonbadbeenwrfffenupandfbereforebecause ffwasfnaswornsfafemenfffmusfsfandandfbadfodomypunfsbmenf. aresuffoffbfsfwassenffoanofberparfoffbecampforawee^andfosfaff my comfort ffems'

106

Allthreeweretold intheirinterrogationsthatiftheyacceptedtheywereafighter Asifsaysthat'fnC9mp^^^9y,f

theywouldbesentbacktoEnglandverysoon

wasfnferrogafed^ffmesby^f^and^ffmesbyfbe^merfcansover^monfbs

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^fffbefnferrogaffonsseemedfocoverfbesameground, ffbougbffbfsmusf n^eanfbaffbeybadrunoufofguesffonsorwerenofreadfngfberesuffsofmy previous mferrogaffons. ^8wffbofbers,f8f9rfedfo confess foeveryfbfng and agreedfoanyfbfngfbeypuffome. frememberfbafafonepofnfa^erfbfs ^eneraf^enbar^cameupfousfnfbecagesandsafdfbafwewoufdbegofng borne soon
107 Itwas very clearto all three thattheir conditions were being carefully monitored

and controlled by the interrogation^intelligence officers.

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fnferrogaffonsbyHi^f^ 108 AsifsaysthathehadanumberofinterrogationsbyM15officialsin Camp X-Ray (see above) He states that7n my firsf fnfervfewwffb fbe ^f^offfcfaf,fwasaf80 fofdfbaffsboufdsayfbaffbadgonefo^fgbanfsfanfor'^fbad'^esafdfbaff dfdnofneedfosayf'dbeenafigbferbecausefberearefofsofwaysfbafone cando^fbad. Tbfsfnferrogaffonfs fbe firsf one fbaf foo^pfacefnafenf. ff fasfedabouf^fo^bours'. 109 TheM15interrogatorschangedoverthetimethatthemenwereinGuantanamo

The first one who interviewed Asif however came back at leastacouple of times They nicknamed him "rat face" but believe his name was Chris Shafiq was also interrogated by this man At the first interview with him he insisted that Shafiq admit hehadgonefor"jihad"andwhenherefusedtoadmitthis,onleavingtheroom,he saidthatitwasnotlookinggoodforShafiqandthathewouldstayinGuantanamo for the rest of his life He was supported in this by an official from the UK Embassy in Washington (seeabove) 110 ItwasonlyinhisthirdinterviewthatAsifwasinterrogatedbyanAmerican

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028544 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7

^rofesfafCamp^^^ay 111. After some months, there wasaslight alteration of conditions at CampXRay so that it was possible forthe first time to sleep at nighL Atthe discretion ofthe soldiers (based on the standard operating procedures) they were allowed,oncea week,to walk inasmall recreation yard for about5minutes Because of the acute lackofspaceintheircagesandthefactthattheywerenotallowedtomoveorwalk around in their cages their legs would often suffer cramps and pains 112 Aftertheirinitialprocessing,onarrivalatCampXRay,therewerenofurther

cavity searches (though they would be frisked before each interview) All three men howeverwitnessed other prisoners being stripped oftheir clothes and being humiliated This was done in full view of all those on the block and not only humiliated the prisoner involved but caused deep resentment in the others in sight. 113 Rhuhel says that one protest in CampXRay started in his block He says7saw

aguardwaf^fnfoadefafnee'sceff,searcbfbrougbfbe^orananddropffon fbe fioor. 7bedef9fneefofdbfmfopfc^ff up and puffffnfoffsbofder.f rememberfbe guard footed affbef^oran on fbe fioor and safd'fbfs'andfben ^fc^edff.^very one sfarfedsbouffng and bangfng fbe doors. Tbe guard ran oufoffbeceffandfbeenffrecampwasonfoc^downforbaffaday.Onfbaf day fberewasabungersfrf^eforfbreedays.fdfdnof^ofnfn.fwas very fsofafed and dfdnofreaffy^nowwbaf fbe ofberdefafnees were faf^fngabouf

114

About one week laterwhilst Asifwas in interrogation there was an incident in the

block he shared with Shafiq. Asif says,7cannofrememberfbedafe,bowever, aboufawee^ before fbe fncfdenffdescrfbe,aguardfn^bubef'sbfoc^^fc^ed fbef^oran. Tbfsbappened often fn fbe eariy days, and we were evenfuaffy promfsedffwoufdnofbappenagafn.l^benfbfsguard^fc^edfbef^oran, peopfeweree^fremefyupsefandwenfonasborfbungersfrf^e. fnourbfoc^, one of fbe defafnees wbo bad wrappedafowef around bfswafsffopray (^our ^umpsuffswoufd open af fbe sfdewben we prayed wbfcbfsconfraryfofsfam,

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028545 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

0000009^^

fn fbaf we are regufredfo be covered wben we pray) and an ^ ^ f o f d fbe defafnee,wbo's name was ^uresbf from ^audf^rabfa^bfspbofofs on fbe cageprfsoner'swebsffe^,fo remove fbe fowef. ^uresbfwasfnfbemfddfeof bfsprayer and fgnoredfbem. TbeH^^fben opened bfs cage, wbfcbwasa breacb of fbe rufes, and wben^uresbfsffffwoufdn'fsfopbfs prayers, fbe puncbedbfmvfofenffyfofbeface,^noc^fngbfmfofbegroundandfben ^fc^edbfm. 7be1^^'scoffeaguesfben removed ^uresbf'scomforfffems as weffasfbefowef fdfdnofseefbefncfdenfffseffbuffoundoufaboufwbenf gof bac^ from fnferrogaffon Shafiq says7saw fbe fncfdenfbappenabouf^^fo ^^mefers away from me. fcfearfysawfbe^f^puncbbfm^^noc^bfmfofbe groundandbeafbfmvfofenffy^

115

This incident led to another hunger strike The detainees had not been allowed

togivetheprayercall or Azzan,toprayproperly,tohaveprayermatsorto practice their religion. Asaresult ofwhat happened to Mr Oureshi someone shouted out thattheyshouldstopcooperating (Thewholecampwentonhungerstrikealthough Asif, Shafiq and Rhuhel did not participate.) The second day of the protest was filmed as people threw their comfort items out oftheir cells asaresult of yet another incidenL 116 Asif says that fo be cfear,fbe food was very ffmffedand fnsufffcfenf. l ^ e n

fbeybrougbffbefooddurfngfbebungersfrffre,fwoufdeaffbefoodfbafbad been assigned fo fbe ofberprfsoners as weff as my own. Tbebungersfrf^e fasfed for up foamonfb and fn some cases defafneesconffnuedfor^fo8 wee^s. ffbfn^fbere were ofbers wbo wenffonger. fremembercfearfyfbaf peopfesfarfedfosufferwffbsfomacbandbowefprobfems.Onfbeofberband fpuf on 2^ pounds. Tbfs was fbe onfyffmefpufbac^ any wefgbf and fbaf was becausefwassodesperafefwaseaffngmanypeopfe'sraffons.fdfdnof parffcfpafebecausefdonofbeffevefnabungersfrffre' 117 Thedetaineeshadalsoagreednottospeakattheirnextinterrogation InAsifs

case this was to be his fourth interrogation. He explains that despite this he was put under considerable pressure so took the opportunity to set out some of their

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grievancesHesayswebadaffagreednoffospea^afourne^ffnferrogaffonas parfoffbeprofesf^yne^ffnferrogaffonwasadayorfwofaferandwbenf wasfa^enfnfofbefnferrogaffonroomfrefusedfofaf^fofbem. Tbfs fnferrogaffonwaswffbanH^f^manwbowasguesffonfngmefogefberwffban ^merfcan. f c o n f f n u e d f o r e f u s e f o f a f ^ f o f b e m u n f f f f b e m a n s a f d f b a f f b f s wasnofbfngfodowffbfbe^rfffsbandfbafffwasanB^merfcanmaffer 118 ^ f f b f s fbe man feff fbe room and fbe ^f^offiicfafconffnuedfo^uesffon

me buffsffffwoufdn'f answer, ^borffyafferfbfs an embassy offfcfaf came fn. 7bfswasadffferenf one fo fbe person wbo bad guesffonedme fn fbe fenfa fewwee^searffer. f^esafd fbaf be was nof from fbe fnfefffgence services buf be was from fbe embassy, f^esafdfbaffsboufdfaf^fobfmandbecoufddo somefbfngaboufourgrfevances fconffnuedfosfaysffenfandfbenbe sbowedmefeffersfbafbesafdwerefrommyfamffyandfbaffwoufdonfygef fbemfffcooperafed.fwasdesperafefogefsomefeffersfrommyfamffysof 8farfedfospea^.Ourfngfbecourseofmydfscussfonswffbbfm,beaf80foo^ mypfcfurewffboufmypermfssfonbufbesafdfbafffwasformyfamffy. Tbey never recefved any pfcfures.fgavefbfsofficfafafongffsf of grievances wbfcb ffrnowbenofeddown^suaffywbenwewoufdgfveaffsfofgrfevancesfo embassy offfcfafsfbeywoufd never bofberfowrffeff down buffremember fbfscfearfyfbafbewrofedowneveryfbfngfsafd.fmenffonedfbaffwasupsef abouffbefoffowfng 1 ^edfcaf fsafdfbafffogefberwffbofbersweresufferfngwffbfnfecffonson Tbeofffcfafswoufd

ouran^fesasaresuffoffbescrapfngbyfbesbacfrfes

feff us fbaf we sfmpfy neededfowasb our anfrfeswffb soap and wafer,buf fbfswasfmpossfbfeasweonfybadaonemfnufesbowerperwee^. Offen, wbenwewerefnfbesbower,webadbarefypuffbesoaponwbenfbey woufdfurn fbe wafer off and famous away. 2 fnrefaffonfo fbe sbowersfafsocompfafnedfbaf fbeywoufdusuaffyfead usfoandfromfbesbowersna^edandwoufdn'fevenfefuswearafowef around us. 3 fafsocompfafned about fbe guafffy and guanfffy of fbe food, fbe fac^ of anyreffgfousrfgbfsandfas^edforfbemforespecfourreffgfon f

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complained about the flood lights and the constant lack of sleep. My complaints ran to some two pages but despite this nothing changed. 119. After two weeks of the hunger strike. General Lenhart came into the

blocks, took his cap off and pleaded with the detainees to eat. They also started to improve the conditions. Gradually, as more and more people stopped the hunger strike, we got more food, we were allowed to wear shorts and we could keep our towels on as we went for a shower. The guards were also told not to disturb us when we were praying (though they continued to do this anyway) and we were also allowed, for the first time, to talk more freely to the person in the cage next to us 120. Shafiq says of the others in his block (which he shared with Asif), In my block, which was Bravo block at Camp X-Ray, there were other English speaking detainees including David Hicks, four French detainees, and Feroz Abbasi. I remember Feroz was getting a very hard time and he was interrogated more regularly than the rest of us. They also treated David Hicks in a very aggressive way. From my recollection, Feroz was a very quiet individual and as with most people he wouldn't describe what was happening to him. David Hicks and us three (when we were together) would always talk about our interrogations and I remember that David Hicks told me the interrogators had promised to get him prostitutes ifhe agreed to work with them'. 121. Asif also says of the general conditions, we were afso aware, in Camp X-Ray and later in Delta, that we were being listened to and our conversations were being recorded. On the question of observation I wish to add that being under constant observation was an additional stress. We would all joke about it and sometimes make things up in order to irritate those listening. I know that the intelligence officers disregarded most of this material but it was all brought up again and put to us when the video incident took place (see below). The observations conducted were not just in relation to what we were saying, but everything we did. They would look to see if we stared at women MPs or looked down when they walked passed. Tbey looked to see if we used

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028548 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery O O O O O l O l

par^fcufarcomforfffemsmoreregufarfyfbanofbersorbadanybabffsfbaf fbeycoufdcfearfyfdenfffy. Bis an e^ampfe,ff we were sufferfng because of fbe smaffporffons,fbeywoufdfdenfff^fbfsasawe9frnessoraffernaffvefyffwe regufredmedfcafbefp,fbfswoufd depend on our cooperaffonfnfnfervfew. fn myvfewffwascfearfbaffbeywerefdenfff^fngweafrnessesuponwbfcbfbey coufdpfayforfbepu^osesoffnferrogaffon' 122 AllthreemenspokefreelytothewomenguardsandMP'swithoutanyproblems

but many others would not do this. These individuals would then be interrogated by provocativelydressedwomen interrogators Shafiq saysthat'fnmycasefbey frnewfbafedfsofaffon and fbfs was fbe reason fbey used ff as fbe mafn means ofpunfsbfngme'Asifand Rhuhel bothsaytheyfoundsleepdeprivationwasthe mainstrategyusedagainstthem 123 Rhuhel says7baveprobfemswffb my eyes and need specfaffensesfo

correcf my vfsfon.ffunfreafedfbfscondfffon can causepermanenfdamage,f woufdgefseverebeadacbesbecauseffwoufdsfrafnmyeyesforeadfbe f^oran.^fferoneandabaffyearsfgoffbefensesbufffwasconsfdereda comforfffemwbfcbfbeywoufdfbreafenfofafreunfessfcooperafed.fnany casefbeynevergavemefbesofuffonfneededforfbefensessoffwas pofnffess'(RhuheTseyesightisnowpermanentlyseverely damaged asaresult)

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028550

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Camp^effa-Condfffons 124. After CampXRay all three were transferred to Camp Delta about May 2002 The conditions in Camp Delta were more permanent than those in CampXRay Thecellsweremadeoutoflargeshipping containers Thesidesateitherend had been removed as had the fronL Inside each container they had constructed6mesh cages Thebackwall,thefloorandtheroofwerefromthemetalcontainerbutthe side walls and the front were made of mesh In the backwall there was cut outa square to act asawindow, but this also had thick mesh across iL 125 Shafiqsaysthatoneoffbeeffecfsoffbesemesbcagesfbaffwassurprfsed ffbecamedffffcufffofocusonfbfngs

fodfscoverwasfbaffoofrfngfbrougbfbem24boursadayforwee^sonend wascausfngdamagefomyeyesfgbf andwbenfwasfafrenoufoffbecageeffberforasbowerorfnferrogaffon,ff woufdfafremesomeffmefoac^usfmyvfsfon 126 127. Acontinuing problem was lack of privacy. The conditions were inappropriate.When it rained,rain would come into the

cage Itwasalsoveryhumid and hotin Camp Deltawhichwasmadeworsebythe fact that they were inametal container The heat could become unbearable during thedaysandatnightitwasextremelycold extra blankets despite the cold. Thedetaineeswerenevergivenany

128

The detainees were transferred to Delta onabus in the same way they were Comfortitemsincluded Ordinaryitems

taken to CampXRay.When they arrived in Delta,the interrogators and guards started usingtheideaof "comfortitems"("CTs")moreoften almostanythingthatwasnotscrewedorweldeddowninthecages singleStyrofoamcupswereconsidered'comfortitems"

such as blankets, towels, face cloths, toothbrushes, toothpaste and even regulation Theywere removed atthe discretion ofthe interrogators orthe guards depending on the standard of behaviour and the extent of co-operation Comfortitemswerealso used as part ofa'carrot and stick" approachtotheirinterrogation Ifthey cooperated,theyweregiven or

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028551 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

allowed to retain certain items If they were perceived not to be cooperating, items were taken away. 129 Delta was placed very close to the sea and as such,the salt airwould cause the Thismadeit

containers to rusL This meant that there was constant reconstruction work and thereforelargeelectricgeneratorswererunning24hoursaday difficultto sleep There was also constant noise from the 48 or so other men all detained in the same "block". An unusual, but foreseeable problem that emerged in Deltawasthatthecagesandtheentireareaaroundthecontainerswereinfested with rats Thesewerehuge "banana" ratswhichwouldclimboverthecontainersor around the cages. Every morning, the men would wake up to find rat droppings on their blankets or on the floor.There were also snakes in Delta but less than Camp XRay 130 fnnormafcfrcumsfancessucbcondfffonswoufdbedffffcufffo endure, fn

^uanfanamo8ayboweverwe were deffberafefyfrepfbungry fbe wbofeffme. Ii^ewereconsfanffyfnasfafeofan^fefyaboufourfufureandfofaffyaffbe mercyoffbeguards 131 All three men say that they believe the conditions were designed specifically to

assist the interrogators. They were able, with great precision, to control the behaviour ofthe detainees depending on the type of answers orthe level of cooperation they believed they were getting The interrogators had already made up their mind as to what they wanted and it often becameaquestion of trying to gauge what they wanted to hear and give the right answer 132. Those detainees who did not cooperate with them, despite the loss of comfort items and recreation (recreation was consideredacomfort item and even the five minutes exerciseaweek could be removed ifthey thought you weren't cooperating) were taken to another camp altogether and detained in total isolation (see below).

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133

Shafiq comments "wbffe we were fn^uanfanamoeacb of us was

fnferrogafedforbundredsandbundredsofboursbyfbeB^merfcans.Tbesame guesffons were repeafed over and over and over agafn. 134 Ourfng fbe wbofeffme fbaf we were fn^uanfanamo, we were afabfgbfevef

offearl^benweffrsfgoffberefbefevefwassf^y^bfgb^ffbebegfnnfngwe were ferrffiedfbafwemfgbf be frfffedaf any mfnufe. Tbe guards woufdsayfo us'we coufdfrfff you af any ffme'.Tbeywoufd say fbe worfddoesn't frnow you're bere, nobody frnows you're bere,afffbeyfrnowfs fbaf you're mfssfng 9ndwecoufdfrfffyou9ndnoonewoufdfrnow'. 135 ^fferffme passed, fbaf fevefoffear came down somewbafbuf never

vanfsbed.ffwasafwaysfbere.l^ewerefnasffuaffonwberefberewasnoone wecoufdcompfafnfoandnofonfycoufdfbeydoanyfbfngfoanyofusbufwe coufdseefbemdofngfffoofberdefafnees.^fffbeffmewefbougbffbafwe woufdnevergefouf^osfespecfaffyffwewerefnfsofaffonfberewoufdbea consfanffearofwbafwasbappenfngandwbafwasgofngfobappenffff badn'fbeenforfbe^rabsfrnowfngbyfbeposfffonoffbesunwbenfopray,we woufdn'fbavefrnown even fbaf. l^edfdn'ffrnow fbe fime. I^efrnow fbe dafes we do frnow because we counted for oursefves and some sofdferswoufdfeff usenougbfofefussffgbffy^eepfracfr,ofber^fsefberewasnowayandfbere was never meanffo be any way.^omeffmes fbe prayer caff woufd be pfayed ffveffmesaday,buffbenffwoufdbesfoppedagafn.

136

li^e were deffberafefyfrepffnasfafe of enforcedboredom wbfcbfncreases

fbedespafr.^fferayearonedayfbeycamewffbbo^esofboofrsafffn^ngffsb. Tbeyweregfvenouffopeopfefncfudfngfbosewbocoufdn'fspeafr^ngffsb. I^eeacbgofsomefbfngforeadffseemedfobecompfefefyaccfdenfafwbaf we gofgfven.li^e read andrereadourfirsfboofr, as many as fen ffmeseacb." ^Shafiq was givenabook called KillingTime'about Americans going to Afghanistan to wipe out theTaliban regime. Rhuhel got Planet ofthe Apes'j"Tberewerea ffmffed number of boofrs.^ou soon bad read aff.fn2^^3, fbe boofrs fbaf we weregfvensfar^edfobaveafargeamounfoffbeconfenfsfornouf for

59
028553 Defense Reciprocal Discovery r^r^r^r^r^ ^

^^^^^1^^

fnsfancenovefswoufdbavefargecbunfrsrfppedoufbufwewoufdsffffread fbembecauseweweresodesperafeforsomefbfngfodfsfracfoursefvesTbe f^edCrossfofdusfbaffbeybadbrougbf2^^t^boofrsbuffbeybad mysferfousfydfsappearedandnevergoffofbedefafnees" 137 "l^ewereafsofofdfbaffbef^edCrossbadbrougbfafargenumberof

fanguageboofrsf^orfnsfance,peopfewerefnferesfedfofearn^rabfcor ^ngffsb,efcl^ebrfeffybadaccessfofbemandfbenfbeywerefafrenaway agafnandweneversawfbemagafn"Shafiqrecollectsthemsaying"you'renof berefo fearn anyfbfng,you'reaprfsoner,you'reberefo bepunfsbed". 138 Although in Deltathecageshadasink, with runningwaterandatoilet (squat

toilet)withaflush, (Shafiq saysthat'fogofofbefoffefwewoufdpufupa bfanfref,fbougb some f^f^swoufd,fn fbe earfy days, fnsfsf on faf^fngfbese down'),the cells were smaller than those at CampXRay mainly because there was abunk^bed welded to the floor ofthe containerfrom which the cell block had been created. This restricted the space Shafiq still suffers from pain in his back, legs and knees asaresult ofthe cramped space and lack of exercise(15minutestwicea week). 139 (In the first few months, they were allowedaone minute shower perweek Later

this increased to5minutesperweek and after7or8months in Delta,they were allowed2showersaweek This was still not enough because asaresult ofthe heatandthehumiditytheywouldbeconstantlysweatingandfeel dirty Most ofthe peopleinthecellblocksgrewtheirbeards,butiftheyshavedtheywerealloweda razor for2or3minutesonceaweek and then had to hand it back) 140 When Rhuhel arrived at Delta he went to isolation straight away He was never

toldwhyHehadnotdoneanythingwrongandbelievesthemovewasatthe directionofintelligenceofficersHestayedinisolationforaboutonemonth 141 After he was taken out of isolation Rhuhel was taken to one ofthe blocks.He

wasputinacagenextto Martin Mubanga,anotherBritishdetaineeAsifand Shafiq

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028554 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery ^ r ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ B^i^

^^^^^107

were in the same block as David Hicks, Feroz Abbasi and damalHareeth The only person, close enough for Rhuhel to speak to though was Martin. Rhuhel says 71^arffnandfwoufdfaffrabouffbfngsfnfbefBf^,foofbaff,bo^fngandour fnferrogaffons.ffewasver^gufef^ 142 DuringthistimetheywereinterrogatingRhuheleverySundayTheyaskedthe

samequestionsoverandoveragain Thiscontinuedfor6months The interrogators weremostlyAmericanthoughM15officerscameononeoccasionHealways maintained the same account to his interrogators. They also started to show photographs of people from the UK (people he did not know). 143 (It was very clear to all three that M15 was content to benefit from the effect of

the isolation, sleep deprivation and other forms of acutely painful and degrading treatmentincluding'shortshackling'(seebelow)Therewasneveranysuggestion on the part ofthe British interrogators that this treatment was wrong orthat they would modifytheirinterrogationtechniquestotakethisintoaccountorthelong-term consequences of isolation, humiliation and despair All three men express considerableangeratthefactthattheMI5agentswerecontentandinfactquite happythattheywerelong shackled and attachedtoahookthroughouttheir interrogations) 144 ThequalityofthequestioningwasextraordinarilylowEachwasasked

repeatedly for names and details of all of his relatives in England, in Pakistan or Bangladesh orothercountrieswheretheirfamilieshadaconnection(inthecaseof Asifhisfatherwasborn in Kenyawhichledtoquestioningaboutbombingsin Kenya in 1998) He was also asked about the Cole . He did not know what the Cole'was (a ship in the Yemen that had been attacked) It was they who told him about these events 145 After6months Rhuhel was moved to the cell opposite Shafiq Asif had been

taken to isolation overthe incidentwith the food (see below) (He stayed there for about one month). This was the first time Rhuhel had seen Shafiq since Kandahar.

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146

Afteraboutamonth, Shafiq and RhuhelweremovedtoCamp2together

Rhuhel was then not interviewed for the next6or7months They were there for about one month and then Shafiq was moved back next to Asif Rhuhel stayed in the new block in Camp2for about another month Again there was no one to speak to They were all French speakers, but there were also many prisoners from Uzbekistan After this Rhuhel was moved back to the same block as the othertwo Withinaweek he was moved to isolation Rhuhel says7compfafned about fbe food. Tbe porffons were fessfbannormaf and fbfs was seen asadfscfpffnary offence.fwasnof^f^f^'dbufwasfafrenfnsbacfrfesfofsofaffonwberefsfayed foroneweefr^

147.

After this he was moved back opposite Shafiq and Asif He was then moved to

anotherblockforanightandthenathirdblockwherehestayedforabout3months There were mainly Arabs and Afghanis in the third block but by then he had learnt Arabic so he could communicate After some3months he went back to the same block as Shafiq and Asif but withinaweek he was moved to isolation.Rhuhel says7 wasfnmycagesfngfngasongbuffbfswasagafnseenasadfscfpffnary offenceTbesongfwassfngfngwasanB^merfcanrapsongwffbsomeabusfve wordsfnffOneoffbefemafeguardsfoofroffenceandfwassenffofsofaffon. Tbfsfsane^ampfeofbowdffifcufffffsfogefbywffbouffberebefnganycfear rufes because sfngfng by ffseff was nofnecessarffy an offence.fsfayedfn fsofaffon for one weefr and fben moved b a c f r n e ^ f f o ^ s f f ^ e s f a y e d f b e r e for afewmonfbs^ffbfspofnffwasonfferfwcbuffwassffffnofgefffng fnferrogafed,unfffrefbeofberfwo^ 148 (Rhuhel'snextmovewasfollowingthe discovery'ofthevideoandhis8hour

interrogation (see below) He had started to be interrogated forafew times by Steve but was handed over to "Sarah " ) 149 Asif was also moved on occasion to isolation He says that 'affer about one

monfbaf Camp f^effa,fwas moved fofsofaffonasapunfsbmenf. Tbe reason forfbfspunfsbmenfwasfbaff'dbeenmafrfngfunofamffffar^poffceman^s aresuffofmy^ofres,fwasfofdfbaff'dbegfvenfessfood li^benfbene^fmeaf

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028558 Defense Reciprocal Discovery O O O O O l O l

ffmecamearoundfwasgfvensucbfffffefoodfbafffwasrfdfcufous

fagreed

wffb one or fwo ofbers fbaf we woufdnof condone fbfsfreafmenf by eaffng fbe food, and fbereforewbenfbey came focoffecf fbe paper pfafe,frfppedmfne upandfbrewffoufoffbeceff.Tbeguardsfbensafdfbaffbeywanfedfo searcbmeandfbereforefbadfopufmybandsfbrougbfbecagefnfbe regufaffonfasbfonsofbaffbeycoufdbecbafned. frefusedfodofbfsasweff.f wasfucfryfbaffbeguardsdfdnofrefyonfbe^f^f^feambuffwasfofdfofeave fbe ceff and accompany fbe guards, fwassbacfrfedasusuafbufbecausef wascooperaffngfbeydfdnofrefyonfbe^f^^feam. fwasfafren from my cage fofsofaffon.Onanofberoccasfonfscrafcbed'baveanfceday'onmy ^fyrofoam cup andfbfs was seen asadfscfpffnary offence forwbfcbfspenf anofberweefrfnfsofaffon 150 After this second period of isolation Asif was moved toablock which housed

only Chinese speaking detainees Given that every move was observed, recorded and monitored he takes the view that wasadeliberate move to break him.He also believes that the British were complicit in this decision because he explains that shortly before, he had been taken to be interrogated by two officials from M15 (including'ratface'-seeabove).TherewasalsoanEmbassyofficial presenL He saysthattheguardswhocametotakehimtothisinterrogationwereextremely aggressiveandastheysecuredhimtoplacetheshacklesonhishandsoneofthem put such pressure on Asifs neck that he was in terrible pain. When he got to the interview he refused to speak to the interrogators The Embassy official on this occasion suddenlystartedactingasathirdinterrogatorwhichupsetAsifeven more He told them that he had been promised for months that if he co operated with them hecouldgohomebuttheyhaddonenothingforhimHehad sworn atthemand refused to identify people in photographs they put in front of him which they said were of people fromTipton

151.

The move to the block with the Chinese (possibly Uighurs) was very difficultfor

AsifThere was no-one to talk to.Asaresult he explains,7sfarfedfo suffer wbaff beffevewasabreafrdown.fcoufdn'ffafreffanymore.fasfredfospeafrfoa psycbofogfsfbufafffbeysafdwasfbaffsboufdbegfven^rozacwbfcbfdfdn'f

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028557 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 ^ 0

want fobave. Tbe ofberprfsoners wbo bad fbfswere^usffffrezombfes and puf onfoadsofwefgbf.fwasb9vfngffasbbacfrsandnfgbfmaresabouffbe confafnersandcoufdn'fsfeepafnfgbf.fwasfnfbfsbfocfrfor^monfbsl^bffef wasfberefwasfnferrogafedfbreeffmesffrepffefffngfbefnferrogaforfbaff was about focracfr up and f m sure ff was obvfousfbaffwasfnabadway.^ff bewoufdsayfomewasfbaffsboufd'bebaveonfbebfocfrs'wbfcbmadeff cfearfomefbaffbeybadfbougbfcarefuffyabouffbebesfwayfopunfsbme andbreafrmeanddecfdedfbafasfamguffesocfabfeandfffrefaffrfngfsboufd befrepfwffbpeopfefcoufdn'fcommunfcafewffb.fbeganfobebavefnfbeway fbeywanfed.fwoufdnofmafre^ofresfn fbe fnferrogaffonand^usf answered fbefrguesffons.^ffbeendofmyfbfrdfnfervfewfbefnferrogaforfofdmefo bangfnfbere'becausebecoufdseebowdfsfressedfwasfwasmovedfrom fbeCbfnesebfocfrfbreeweefrsfafeB 152. Recreation in Delta was compulsory Initially this was quite restricted, but Ifa

eventuallytheregimewas15minutesofexercise^recreationtwiceaweek

detaineedidnotgotorecreationathisallottedslot,theERFwouldcomeandtake him Shafiq says you bad foaffend even ffyou were fff. I^edfdfoofr forward, occasfonaffy,forecreaffon, because ff was an opporfunffyfosfrefcb our fegs^ boweverfbee^ercfse bad fo be done afonefnasmaff yard wafcbed over by fbeguards fnfffaffywebadfowearsbacfrfesbuffbeyevenfuaffyfefuswaffr freefy. Tbeprobfem wffb recreaffon was fbaf wbeneverff wasyourffmefo come fo fbe yard you badfofeavefmmedfafefy. ^ven ffyou were fn fbe mfddfeofyourprayersfbeywoufdgfveyouaffbemosfonemfnufefoffnfsb and fben drag you ouf. Tbfs was fbe same wffb fbe sbowers 153 Asif says, refurnfngfo fbe guesffon of fbe monfforfng and observaffon,f

sboufd say fbaf wben we moved foOeffa,asborfffmefafer,we found ouf fbaf afffbecagesbad been bugged. Oneoffbedefafneesaccfdenfaffybrofreafap byfbesfnfrandamfcropboneffferaffyfeffouf.fnOeffa,youcoufdfaffrfofbe peopfene^ffoyouwffboufmucbdffffcuffy,oropposffeyoubufyoucoufdn'f sbouforyefffur^berdownfbebfocfr Tbfsmadefbfngsafffffeeasferbecause wecoufdsbaree^perfencesandfaffrfafrfyopenfy^nofwffbsfandfngfbebugs^

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028558 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1

^^pfanaffonforf^efenffon 154 Shafiq says as far asffrnow, none of us were everfofdwby we were fn Ofcoursewewere CubaofberfbanwebadbeendefafnedfnB^fgbanfsfan

fofdfbaffbeyconsfderedus "unfawfufcombafanfs 'bufwbeneveranyofus 9sfredwbaffbfsmeanffbeyrefusedfogfveusadeffnfffon'Asifsaysthat7was fofdfffseasyfogeffoCubabufbardfogefouf 155 As set out above, there was never any redress when they were mistreated or Throughouttheirtimenoneofthemeneverheardofany TheAmericans

ruleswerebroken

procedureorrules, guidebookorstructuralprocessforcomplaining

operated according to their standard operating procedures'(which also governs theiroperationsonbasesintheUKbutissosecretprosecutorsin English Courts and the police are not allowed to see it) but no one was allowed to see these or become aware of the details other than from experience They were never told how they could progressthroughthesystem(orindeedwhatthesystemwas) They found out, throughdiscussionswithothersandtheirownexperiences, thatthe interrogatorswereapplyingafourtiersystemthatwasbasedonadegreeof cooperation fromaparticular detainee

156

In this system level ortierfourwas considered the worsL Such detainees were

often removed (as set out above)and placed inaseparate camp This was called Camp Echo(see below) Level or tier one denoted the highest degree of cooperation. As far as the men understood it, many of the detainees were admitting toalmostanyoftheallegationsputtothemsimplytoalleviatetheharshconditions Asifsaysthatfnmycasefadmfffedfomanyfbfngsfnanaffempffogefbome andfobaveaneasferffmewbffsffwasfnCuba 157 Shafiq says,7was moved from Camp ^^f^ayfo Camp Oeffaaf around fbe

begfnnfngof^ay2^^2Tbrougboufmyffmeaf^uanfanamofbadneverbeen pfacedfnfsofaffon.Towards fbe end of December 2^^2anew system was fnfroduced,affbougbweweren'fawareofffasasysfemassucbwbereby

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028559 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2

defafneeswoufdbepfacedondffferenffevefsorffersdependfngonfbefrfevef ofcooperaffonandfbefrbebavfourfnfbecamp.^ffbebegfnnfngfwaspfaced onf^evef2,fbesecondbfgbesffevef.Tbfsmeanffbaffbadafffbesocaffed comforfffems,fncfudfngfoofbpasfe,soap,cupsefcTbeonfybefferposfffon fobewoufdbavebeenf^eveffwbereyouwereafsogfvenabofffeofwafer ^parffromfbeffmewbenfwasguesffonedaboufavfdeofremafnedonffer fwounfffafferfbevfdeofncfdenfwbenfwenffofferone'. 158 Despite this, different people were still placed on different tiers for no apparent

reason Many people took the view that some ofthose being given tier one status weresimplygettingitaspartofanattempttosuggestthattheywereinformersorto try and encourage people to believe that they were cooperating where as in fact theyweren'L

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Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

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^f^e fbe fevef fbaf you were pfacedon^ 159 "ff wasn't afwayspossfbfefofrnowwby you were on fbe fevef you were on. ^o far as fbere seemed fobearaffonafe^pfanaffon, fnrefaffonfo fbe fnfef bfocfrs',feabfocfrwberefbefnferrogaforspufyou,fbesearebfocfrswberefbe peopfepfacedfnfbemarepeopfefbefnferrogaforsfbfnfrbavespecfaf frnowfedgeTbeymfgbfbepeopfewboarecooperaffngorwboarenof cooperaffngbuffbey've been puffbere because fbey'reoffnferesffo fbe fnferrogafors.l^ewereon'fnfef'bfocfrsafffbeffme.Tbemffffarypoffcefofdus fbaf ff you foofredfn fbe computer afourfifesffwoufd say bfgbprforffy'on fbem and fbaf no one efsefn fbe camp bad fbaf, buf we've no fdeawby fbaf was. ffapparenffy was onfyfbereforfbe fast year and we wonder now ffff coufdbave been because of our Court case fn America affbougb we dfdnof frnowanyfbfngabouffbafaffbeffmeorwefrnewnofbfngabouffbafe^cepffor wbafoneguardoncefefsffpfous."

160

The authorities in Guantanamo have absolute power overthe detainees They

are not accountable to anybody and there is, as far as the men can see, no control on their behaviour. Shafiq says that wben you are defafnedfnfbosecondfffons, you are enffrefypowerfess and bave no way of bavfng your vofce beard. Tbfs bas fed me and many ofbers fo "cooperate " and say or do anyfbfngfogef away^ 161 "fffscfearfo us fbaf fbe mffffarypoffce were nof free fomafrefndfvfduaf

decfsfonsafaff and fbaf . . . ^ e bad fbe fmpressfon fbaf af fbe begfnnfngfbfngs were nofcarefuffypfannedbufapofnf came afwbfcb you coufdnoffcefbfngs cbangfngTbafappearedfobeafter^eneraffl^ffferaroundfbeendof2^t^2 Tbaffswbensborf^sbacfrffngsfarfed,foudmu8fcpfayfngfnfnferrogaffon, sbavfngbeardsandbafr,pufffngpeopfefnceffsnafred,fafrfngawaypeopfe's comforf 'ffems, fbe fnfroducffon of fevefs,movfng some peopfe every fwo boursdeprfvfngfbemofsfeep,fbeuseof^Cafr.f8of9ffonwasafwaysfbere fnfef'bfocfrs came fn wffb ^eneraff^fffer.^efore wben peopfe were puffnfo

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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fsofaffonfbeywoufd seem fo stay for not more fbanamonfb.^ffer be came, peopfewoufdbefrepffbereformonfbsandmonfbsandmonfbs.l^dfdn'f bearanybodyfaffrfngaboufbefngse^uaffybumfffafedorsub^ecfedfose^uaf provocaffon before ^eneraffl^fffercame.^fterfbaf we dfd.^ffbougbse^uaf provocaffon,mofesfaffondfdnofbappenfous,wearesurefbafffbappenedfo ofbers. ffdfdnof come about affirsf fbaf peopfe came bacfr and fofd about ff. Tbey dfdn ' f . l ^ a f b a p p e n e d was fbaf one defafnee came bacfr from fnferrogaffoncryfngandconfidedfnanofberwbafbadbappenedTbaf defafneefn turn fbougbf fbaf ff was so sbocfrfng be fofd ofbers and fben ofber defafneesreveafedfbaf ff bad bappenedfo fbem buffbey bad been foo asbamedfoadmfffoff.fffberefore came fo fbe frnowfedge of everyone fn fbe camp fbaffbfs was bappenfngfosomepeopfe.ff was cfearfo us fbaf fbfs was bappenfngfofbepeopfewbo'dbeenbrougbfupmosfsfrfcffyasl^usffms.ff seemedfobappenmostfopeopfefnCamps2and3, fbe'fnfef'peopfe,fefbe peopfeofmosffnferesffofbefnferrogafors " 162 "fnaddfffon,mffffarypoffce afso fofd us about some of fbe fbfngs fbaf were

gofngon.Tbeywoufdfeffus^usfrafberfffrenewsorsomefbfngfofaffrabouf. Tbfswassomefbfngfbafwasbappenfngfnfbecampffseemedfousfbafafof offbefli^^scoufdn'ffbemsefvesbeffeveffwasbappenfng.Tbeysafdfousfbey wantedfogef ouf wben fbefrffme was done and fbey woufdnof go bacfrfn. Tbey safdfbaffbeyfeffasbamedof fbe ^rmyfbaffbese fbfngs weregofng on. fl^osf of fbesepeopfe were reser^fsfs.H^any of fboseaf fbe camp were peopfe wbo as reserv^fsfs bad been recenffy drafted, ^ n d many of fbem fbougbf fbaf ff wasabfgpersonafmfsfafrefbey'd made, l^egof fbe fmpressfon fbaf most of fbem baddone ff because fbey wanted fbe pensfon fbaf befngareservfsf carrfedorfopuffbemfbrougbcoffegeandfbensuddenfyfoundfbemsefvesfn Cuba asaresuff and fbey badno cbofce. Tbey fofdus fbaf fbey coufdn'f say noandfbafofberwfsefbeywoufdbesenffoamffffaryprfson.^omeoffbe f^^s bad ^usffmfrfendsfn^merfca and fbey were ones wbo were nfcesffo us."

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163

"Tbeyfofd us abouffbefacffbaf fbey weregofngfo be senffo frag and

bow fbey d f d n f w a n f f o g o . Tbey'd come and feff us about bowfbey read of sofdfersbefngfrfffedeacb day fn frag, ^ffbougb fbey dfdn'f want fo be fn Cuba, forfbemff was affeasfbefferfban gofngfo frag."

028563

iprocal Discovery Oefense Reciprocal

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Camp^cbo
164. The three men neversaw Camp Echo but reportthat Moazzam Begg (see below) and Feroz Abbasi are detained there. In this Camp the detainees are held in total isolation indefinitely.They are apparently allowedaKoran with them but all the other conditions of isolation described below also apply They are kept under 24 hourwatchbyaguard sitting outside the cell,though the guard is not allowed to speak to them This means that the only people they are ever allowed to speak to are the interrogators.

028564

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^^B^^^^

B^^^^^^

^ ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

028565

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000118

^ssauffsaf guantanamo 165 All three report that when they were at Camp Delta around August 2002 the medical corps came round to see them and asked if they wanted an injection althoughtheywouldn'tsaywhatitwasforMostofthedetaineesthereforerefused to have one Afew hours laterthe medical corps returned,this time bringing the Extreme Reaction Force (ERF team). The ERF team was dressed in padded gear so they had pads on from their boots, padded vest, helmets like motorcycle helmets withvisors, thick glovesuptotheirelbowsandsomeofthem had riotshieldsThey were always accompanied by someone who filmed them.

166

Rhuhel says fbe ^f^^ team woufd come fnfo fbe ceff, pface us face down on

fbe ground fben pufffng our arms bebfnd our bacfrs and our fegsbendfng bacfrwards fbey woufdsbacfrfe us and bofd us down resfrafnedfn fbaf posfffonwbffsf somebody from fbe medfcaf corps puffed up my sfeeve and fn^ecfedmefnfbearm.Tbeyfefffbecbafnsonmeandfbenfeff.Tbefn^ecffon seemed fo bave fbe effect of mafrfng me feef very drowsy.fwasfefffffre fbaf forafew bours wffb my fegs andarms sbacfrfedbebfndme. f f f f r f e d f o move myfegsfogeffnamorecomforfabfeposfffonffwoufdburf^venfuaffyfbe ^f^^ team came bacfr and sfmpfy removed fbe sbacfrfes.fbave no fdeawby fbeyweregfvfngusfbesefn^ecffons.ffbappenedperbapsadozenffmes affogefberandfbeffeveffsffffgoesonaffbecamp^ouarenofaffowedfo refuse ff and you don"ffrnowwbaffffsfoB Asif and Shafiq describe similar experiences but they were not left shackled. 167 One example of such an assault happened in the same block as Asif and Shafiq

as well as David Hicks and Feroz Abassi.dumahalDousari from Bahrain, who had lived in America for some time, was already mentally ilL He used to shout all the timeTheguardsandthemedicalteamknewhewasillWheneversoldierswould walkpasthiscellhewouldshoutoutandsaythingstothemNotswearingbutsilly thingsHewouldimpersonatethesoldiersOnedayhewasimpersonatingafemale soldierShecalledtheofficerin charge, thecommanderthatday,whosenamewas Blanche(thesamepersonwhowasinchargethedaythatthedogwasbroughtinto Asifscell;seebelow)-astaffsergeantE6,E6beinghisrankstructureHecameto

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theblockandwasspeakingtodumahShafiqsays"fdon"ffrnowwbafwassafd buffbene^ffbfngbecaffedfbe^f^^feam.li^ffefbe^f^f^feamwascomfngbe foofr fbe femafeofffcerfo one sfde.fbeardbfm say wben you go fn fbaf ceff you"regofngfoffngfrfcfrbfm"^beseemedapprebensfve.f^efrepfsbouffngaf berfo mafreber say bacfrfobfmwbaf be badsafd.ff was very odd. Tbere were usuaffyfivepeopfeonan^f^f^feam.Onfbfsoccasfonfberewereefgbfof fbeml^ben^umabsawfbemcomfngbereaffsedsomefbfngwaswrongand wasfyfngonfbeffoorwffbbfsbeadfnbfsbandsffyou'reonfbefioorwffb your bands on your bead, fben you woufdbope fbaf aff fbey woufd do woufd be fo come fn and puf fbe cbafns on you. Tbaffswbaffbey're supposed fo do. Tbe firsf man fs meant fo go fnwffbasbfefd. On fbfs occasfon fbe man wffb fbe sbfefdfbrew fbe sbfefdaway,foofrbf8befmef off, wben fbe door was unfocfredran fn anddfdafrneedrop onto^umab'sbacfr^usf between bfs sboufderbfades wffb bfsfuffwefgbf.f^e must bave been about 2^t^ pounds fn wefgbf.fffsnamewas^mffb.ffewasasergeanf^^Oncebebaddonefbaffbe ofberscamefnandwerepuncbfngandfrfcfrfng^umabli^bffefbeyweredofng fbaf fbe femafeofffcerfben came fn and was frfcfrfngbfssfomacb.^umab bad badanoperaffonandbadmefafrodsfnbfssfomacbcfampedfogefberfnfbe operaffon. Tbe ofifcer^mffb was fbe fli^^ sergeant wbo was puncbfngbfm.ffe grabbed bfs bead wffb one band and wffb fbe ofber band puncbedbfm repeafedfyfn fbe face, fffs nose was brofren.ffepusbedbfs face and be smasbedfffnfo fbe concrete fioor.^ff of fbfs sboufd be on vfdeo.Tbere was bfoodeverywbere.l^en fbey foofrbfm ouf fbey bosed fbe ceff down and fbe wafer ran red wffb bfood.l^e aff saw ff. "

168

Asifdescribesbeing in isolationTheytookhisKoranawayfrom him having

alreadytakenhisotherpossessions His hands were shackled in front of him He waslookingback Theguardtaking him held hisnecktopushitbacksohecouldn't lookback He was pushed intoacorner and was punched in the face numerous times and kneed in his thigh They opened his chains, put him on the floor of his cell and then left and locked the door before he could get up.The doctor came shortly after,notforthatreasonbuttogivehimEnsurebecausehewasseriously undei^eighLShesawtheheavybruisingalloverhisthighAsifaskedtocallthe

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028567 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 ^ 0

senior officerto complain about what was done to him'Tbe guards saw me faffrfngfo fbe docfor,caffedber over and fofd berfo do nofbfng.'That was the lastAsif saw or heard of anyone. He told the next shift and they told him that he should have told the previous shift 169. On another occasion Asifwitnessedaman on the toileLThe guards came to

takehimforinterrogationHewasstillonthetoileL(Theguardsarenotsupposedto open the door unless you stick your hands ouLThat'stheprocedure)So they pulled him offthe toilet, shackled him and took him to interrogation He complained, thatistootherguardsintheblockandweretoldthoseweretheordersfrom interrogationThereweremanymanyfurtherassaultsAnMPevenboastedthathe had beaten someone in isolation withalarge metal rod used to turn on the waterto the blocks. He said there was no one to tell.

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028568 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^

00000121

fnferrogaffonsafCamp^effa 170 In relation to the interrogation blocks at Delta, they fell into the following Alltheboothseitherhadaminiaturecamerahidden categories^ yellow building, brown building, gold building, blue building, grey buildingandorangebuilding in them (it was possible to see the cameras in the air vents) or they had one way glass behind which sometimes it was possible to make out other individuals using videocameras Asifstatesthat durfngonepartfcufarfnferv^fewwffb1l^f^,f rememberseefngpeopfebebfndfbeH^f^manfifmfngme.fl^osfoffbe fnferrogaffonsfnCamp^werefn fbe brown orfbeyeffowbuffdfng. ^fterfbey bufffCamp2,mosfoffberouffnefnferrogaffonsfoofrpfacefnfbegofd buffdfngandfbebrownbuffdfngwasfbenusedforfbeforfure 171 Afterawhile it became apparent that the interrogators were no longer interested

inany"information"theymightobtainfromthemen,orindeedingetting "confessions" Asif states that in early 2003 he was told by one ofthe interrogators that this source has no further value' Shafiq says7cerf9fnfy began fofbfnfr fbaf ^unforfnferrogaforswerebefngbrougbffnfo'pracffce'onusbecausefbey woufdrepeafedfygooverfbesamegroundfbafbadbeencoveredbyanofber fnferrogaforsayaweefrorfendaysearffer. Tbey were often^unfor and confusedaboufourbacfrgroundorfbecfrcumsfancesfbafbadfedfous arrfvfngfn guantanamo' The interrogations continued however in the same way They would often continue for2to3hours(sometimes5or6hours) The men would be chained to the hoop in the middle ofthe floor having to put up with question after question which they had answeredahundred times before.

172

^ofarasfbe^merfcanfnferrogaforswereconcernedfbeydfdnofseem

frnowfedgeabfeaf aff abouffbesuf^ecfs fbey were guesffonfng us about. Tbe B^merfcansw9nfedfofrnowaboufB^f^banfsfan,wbowefrnewfbere,wbowe mef,wb9fwe8aw.Tbeyasfredus,forfnsfance,ffwesawfapfops,e^pfosfves, cbemfcaf weapons, barrefs,mefafconfafner8 wffb sfruff and crossbones on andadangersfgn and mfssffes andammunfffon dumps and anyone wffb

:

00000122

safeffffepbones.l^ebadn'fseenanyfbfng.l^ebadn'fevenseenefecfrfcffy Onefnferrogafor,^ames,safdfous,foofrfngafbfspfeceofpaper,'someof fbeseguesffonsaresorfdfcufousf'mnofgofngfoasfryou'HoweverShafiq was asked questions like'fffwanfedfo get surface foafr mfssffes from someonefnTfpfonwbowoufdfgofo^'l^ewereasfredffwebadseenfapfops andcompufersfn^fgbanfsfanwffbpfcfuresofffgufdsandfaboraforfesand cbemfcaf weapons. 173 ^fsomefnferrogaffonsweweresbownpbofograpbsoff^onafdOucfr,

f1^fcfrey11^ouse,Tom^^erry,f^ugf^afs,^brabamf^fncofn,fl^fcbaef^acfrson, ^fdef Castro, Cbe Guevara, Osama 8fnf^aden and famous peopfe from dffferenfcounfrfes. actresses for fnsfance,^baron^fone, etc. One American fnferrogaforcaffed1^ffre^acfrson,fromf^^f^8f,safdfbafbebadbeensenfby fbe Oueen'accordfngfobfm.f^esafdfbaf ll^f^badsentbfmpbofograpbs because fbey coufdn'f come and bad asfredbfmfoasfr us about fbem. Tbese werepbofograpbsof8rfffsbcfff^ensTberewasone^ngffsb woman wffb bfondebaframongsffbepbofograpbs.Tbesewereaffsur^efffance pbofograpbsfafrenofpeopfeasfbeywenfsboppfngfnTesco8,efc.orwffb fbefrfirfends.^erydffferenfpeopfe came fn fact wffb fbe same set of pbofos (^aff^merfcans^ and none of fbem frnew fbaf we bad afready been asfred about fbepbofograpbsonofberoccasfonsTbfsfnfacfbappenednumerousffmes durfng fbe fnferrogaffons.^e'd be asfred fbe same fbfng agafn and agafn by dffferenf sets of fnferrogafors wbo dfdn'ffrnow fbe answers.Tbere seemedfo benocoordfnaffonoffbefnformaffonfbaffbeyweregefffngorfr^fngfogef Tbe ^rmy woufd come and sbow fbe pfcfuresfo us, fben fbe f^8f and fben fbe CfB^Tbeydfdn'fseemfopassfnformaffonamongsffbemsefves^ndfromfbe ^8fdffferenfpeopfe woufd come from dffferenf departments.

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028570 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3

fsofaffon9ndfnferrog9ffon8fpre1l^9y2t^t^3^^baffg 174 ShafiqsaysbefweenOcfober2^t^2andf1^ay2t^t^3fwasfnferrogafedmaybe ^or^ffmes.f^osfoffbefnferrogaforssfmpfyrepeafedfbeguesffonsfbad beenasfredbeforeaffbougbfbeydfdafsofnfroducesomemapsof^afrfsfan and^fgbanfsfanandasfredmefopofnfoufwbafroufesf'dfafrenwbenfbad entered fbe country and wberef'd stayed. Tbey afso sbowedpbofograpbs of fli^usffmswbofassumedwere^rfffsbaffbougbfdfdn'frecognfseanybody ^roundabouffbeendof1l^arcb,begfnnfngof^prff2t^t^^,fwasfafrenfofbe ^ofdbuffdfngforanfnferrogaffonfwasfafrenfnfoaroomwberefmef somebodyfbad not met before wbo was not formaffy an fnferrogafor.f^e was fberefoconducfapofygrapbfesf^eforefenferedfberoomfmeffwo fnferrogaforswbobadfnferrogafedmerfgbfaffbesfartwbenfffrsfarrfvedaf Camp .^^f^ay. One of fbem safdfo me fbaf bopefuffyfffpassed fbepofygrapb fesffwoufdbeaffowedforefurnbomeffeffverybopefuffbaffbfsmfgbfbe fbe begfnnfng of fbe end afOuanfanamo^ay.^orfbe firsf ffmesfncebefng defafned by fbe tB.^,fwasasfred guesffons wffboufbefngsbacfrfed.

175

fwasmadefosffonacbafrfacfngfbewaffandfbemanpfacedsomepads

onmyfingerswbfcbwereconnecfedfoafapfopmacbfnebebadonadesfr bebfnd me. ^ddfffonaffyfbadabfoodpressurepad ffed around fbe caff of my feftfeg,afsoconnecfedfofbefapfopandsomefbfngefsewasffedaroundmy cbesf.fwasfbenasfredaserfesofguesffonsTbrougbouffbeperfodofabouf an bourwbenfwasguesffonedfwas fofd fbaffmusf not move af aff. f^e first asfredacoupfeofconfrofguesffonsfffre'arefbeffgbfsonfnfberoom'and "doyoudrfnfrwafer'.f^efbenwenfonfoasfrmefffwasamemberof^f^ Oaeda.ffebadaffsfoffrafnfngcampsandbeasfredmefff'dfrafnedafanyof fbosecamps.f^easfredfffbadspecfafweaponsfrafnfngandfffbadany e^perfenceorfrafnfngfncbemfcafwar^arefansweredfrufbfuffyand negaffvefyfo aff fbe guesffons puffo me. f^easfred fbe same guesffons about sf^ffmeseacbandfgavefbesameanswersoneacboccasfons

028571

Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4

176

^fter about fwo bours of guesffonfng be dfdn'f say anyfbfng tome buf^usf

feff fbe room, ^fterfbaffwasfafren away bacfrfo my ceff andfnever saw fbaf man agafn.fbad no fdeawbaf fbe resuffs of fbe tests were af fbaf stage. 177 ^bouffwoweefrsfaferfwasfafrenfofbe^rownbuffdfngwberefmefa

femafefnferrogaforwbofbadmefprevfousfyfnfbebfocfrbufsbebadnof asfred me guesffons before, ^be was B^rmypersonnef,fbeffeve, buf fncfvfffan cfofbfng^besafdfome."congrafufaffons,youbavepassedyourpofygrapb fesf'fwasobvfousfy very pfeased and asfredfffwoufd be affowedfo return bacf^fo^ngfand.^besafdsbe coufdn'f gfve me any fnformaffon about fbaf. 178 ffben wafted for aboufamonfb anddfdn'f bear anyfbfng.fdfdnot bave fo

affendanyfnferrogaffonsdurfngfbafperfod. 179 fwas aware fbaf ^sff bad afso been asfredfodoapofygrapb test fn fact we

were bofbfafrenaf fbe same ffme.f^bubef was not fafren for pofygrapbfesffng affbafffme(^8eebefow).fam not aware 98 fowbefber any ofber defafnees were asfredfo do pofygrapb tests.

78
028572 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5

028573

79
Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

00000126

f8ofaffonandfnferrog9ffons(^^ayB^ugusf2t^^3)^baffg 180 ^fferawbffefbeguardssuddenfycamefocoffecfmeandmovedmefo Tangobfocfr^f'dprevfousfybeenonf^fmabfocfr^Tangobfocfrwasforf^evef4 defafnees and aff my comfort ffems were fbereforeremoved.fasfredwbyfwas befngmovedbufnobodywoufde^pfafnfbereason 181 ^fferaboufaweefrfwasfnmyceffwbenfbeardaguardfaffrfngfoa

defafnee fn fbe ceff ne^f tome and sayfng'foofraf fbaf 8rfffsb guy nextto you, we bave found ouf fbaf be and bfs fwo frfends from 8rffafn are ferrorfsts and ffnfredfo^f Oaeda as weff.li^e bave found vfdeoswbfcb prove fbaf fbey are ffnfredfofbemenwbocarrfedoutfbe^epfemberf^^^affacfrs'.l^enfbeard fbfsfcaffed fbe sofdfer over andsafd'wbaffs aff fbfs abouf^'ffe fofd me fbaf " my superfors bave fofd me fbaf fbey bave found vfdeoevfdence on you and yourfwofrfends'.fwase^fremefysbocfredand dfdnot baveacfue about wbaf be was faffrfngabouf.fdfdn'f see fbaf sofdfer agafn. 182 ^boufaweefrfaferfwassuddenfycoffecfedandfafrenfooneoffbefbree

fsofaffonbfocfrs,"f^ovember'fasfredfbe^ergeanfwbyfwa8befngmovedand besfmpfysafd""wedon'ffrnowTbeorderfsfromfbefnferrogafor8"fwas pfacedfnamefafceffpafnfedgreenfnsfdeffwasfiffbyandver^rusfyTbere wasatap,sfnfr,foffef9nd9mef9fbunfr.ffw9se^fremefybof,bofferfbanfbe ofberceffsf'dbeenfnprevfousfy.B^ffbougbfberewasanafrcondfffonfngunff ff was turned off so fbe ceffs were mucbbofferfban fbe onesfwasprevfousfy befdfn because fbey were compfefefycfosed off and no afrcoufd come fnfo fbe ceff. Tberewasagfasspanefaf fbe batcbaf fbe front of fbe ceff so fbey coufdfreepaneyeonusl^bffsfffwase^fremefyboffnfbedayffme,afnfgbf wbenffgofcofd,anyway,fbeywoufdfurntbeafrcondfffonfngupsofbatff becamefree^fng.fdfdn'fbaveabfanfreforamaffressandbadonfymy cfofbesfofreepmewarmsofgofabsofufefyfreezfngafnfgbff^orfbeffrsf weefrfb9dnofdeawbafwasgofngon.fwasnoffafrenfofnferrogaffon,f^usf badfosfffberewafffng.ffefffffrefwasgofngoufofmymfnd.fdfdn'ffrnow wbere fbe ofbers were,fdfdn'ffrnowwbyfwasbefngbefdfbere. nobody woufd faffrfome.fwastafren ouf maybe^ustfwfce for sbowers buf fbaf was ff.

80
028574 Defense Reciprocal Discovery r^r^^^^..^

^^^11^^127

fwase^fremefyan^fous.Tbenaboufaweefrfaferfwasfafrenbyfwosofdfers fofnferrogaffonaffbeOofdbuffdfng 183 fwasfafrenfnfoaroom and sborfsbacfrfed. Tbfs was fbe first ffme fbfs bad

bappenedfome.ffwase^fremefyuncomfor^abfe.^borfsbacfrffngmeansfbaf fbebandsandfeefaresbacfrfedfogefberforcfngyoufosfayfnan uncomforfabfeposfffonforfongbours. Tben fbey turned fbe afrcondfffonfng on foe^fremefybfgbsofsfarfedgefffng very cofd.fwasfefffn fbfs posfffon on my own fn fbe room for abouf^or7bours, nobody came fo see me.f wanfedfousefbefoffefandcaffedforfbeguardsbufnobodycameforme. 8efngbefdfnfbesborfsb9cfrfedposfffonwase^fremefypafnfufbufffyou frfedfo move fbe sbacfrfes woufd cut fnfo your anfrfes or wrfsfs.8y fbe ffme fbaffwasevenfuaffyrefeasedfobefafrenbacfrfomycefffcoufdbardfywaffr asmyfegsbadgonecompfefefynumb.fafsobadseverebacfrpafns. 184 fwas returnedtomy ceff wffb no e^pfanaffon as fowbyfbad been brougbf

fofnferrogaffonandfwasfbenfefffnfbefsofaffonceffforafurfberweefr ^gafn, nobody woufd e^pfafnfo me wbat wasgofng on andffefffwasgofng crazyfnsfdemybead^omeffmedurfngfbafweefrfsaw^sffandf^bubef befngbrougbffnfofbef^ovemberbfocfrandpfacedfnceffsfurfberdownfbe corrfdor. 185 Tbene^fdayaffer^sffandf^bubefbadarrfvedfwasfafrenfofnferrogaffon

fnfbe^ofdbuffdfng.fwasfongsbacfrfedandcbafnedfofbefioor.Tberewas anfnferrogaforfnfberoomfbfsffmeffesbowedmesomepfcfureswbfcbf faferdfscovered were sffffsfafrenfromavfdeo.Tbepfcturessbowed about peopfesffffng on fbe fioor fnafiefd.ffeasfred me fffrecognfsedanybody fn fbepfcfureTbepfcfurewasnofverycfearandfdfdn'frecognfseanybody 186 ffe fben sbowed me anofberpfcfurewberefbreepeopfe were sffffng fogefberandfberewerearrowspofnffngwffbmynameasweffas^sffand f^bubef'sname.8ebfndfbefbreemenwboweresupposedfyfbefbreeofus fberewasanofberpersonwffbanarrowfndfcaffngfbatbewasfl^obammed

028575

Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

0 0 0 0 0 1 2 8

^ffaoneoffbe^epfember^^^^bffacfrers.fdon'ffrnowwbefberfbepfcfurewas ^obammed^ffaornof,fbemanfnfbepbofograpbbad9beardwbere9sfbe onfypfcfuresf'veseenoffl^obammed^ffaareofbfmbefngcfeansbaven.f beffevefbefnferrogaforwasfromB^rmyfnfefffgence.f^ewasan^merfcan B^rabfcguywboffrnewbyfbename^asbfraffbougbofberfnferrogaforscaffed bfmOannyffesfarfedbasfcaffyaccusfngmeofbefngpresenfaffbemeeffng, ofbefngfbepersonfnfbepfcfureandofbefngfnvofvedwffb^f^Oaedaand wffb^epfember^^^^bf^acfrfngs.fwasdenyfngffbufbewoufdn'fbeffeveme. 187 l^benfsawfbepbofograpbsfcoufdseefbaffbeywerepurportedfyfrom

2t^^t^andffrnewfbaffwasfn^ngfanddurfngfbafffme,wbfcbffofdbfm. 188 ^fferfbeffrsffnferrogaffonfwasbrougbfbacfrfomyceffandfbenafew

daysfaferbrougbfoufagafnTbfsffmefwassborfsbacfrfedfwasfeft sguafffng for about an bour and fben fbfs 8asbfr came bacfr agafn and be started guesffonfng me agafn abouffbepbofograpbs andfryfngfo get me fo admfffbaffwasfnfbepbofograpbs.fwasfefffngbfmfbafffyoucbecfryouwfff ffndouffbaffwasfn^ngfanddurfngfbfsffmeB^fferawbffebefefffberoom andfwasfeftagafnfnfbesborfsbacfrfeposfffonforseverafbours^ffbfnfrfor abouf4bours^beforefwasevenfuaffyfafrenbacfrfo fbe ceffs. ^ e n we were fefffnfbefnferrogaffonroomswewerenofprovfdedwffbfoodandwemfssed meafs.li^e afso mfssed our prayers. 189 ^fterfbfsfwasfafrenbacfr tomy ceff andfben affnfervafs of a b o u f ^ o r ^

daysafaffmefwasbrougbfbacfrfofbesamefnferrogaffonbfocfrwberefwas sborfsbacfrfed and feft for boursafaffme and not fnferrogafedaf aff. Tbfs bappenedabouf^or^ffmes. 190 Onacoupfeofoccasfonswbenfwasfef^fnfbesborfsbacfrfeposfffonfbey

woufd pfaye^fremefyfoudrocfr or beavymefafmusfcwbfcb was deafenfng. ^robabfyfbefongesfperfodofffmefwasfefffnfbesbor^sbacfrfeposfffonwas 7or8bours, wbfcb was on fbe first occasfon. On ofber occasfonsfwoufdbe feftfnfberoomforupfof2fo^3boursbuffnfbefongsbacfrfeposfffon

028576

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

0 0 0 0 0 1 2 9

nobody woufd come fn.Occasfonaffy someone woufd come and say fbaf an fnterrogaforwasonfbefrwaybuffbeywoufdn'ffurnup.f^oraperfodofabouf ^weefrsfwasfafrenbacfrwardsandforwardsfofnferrogaffonbufnofacfuaffy asfred any guesffons. 191 ^fsodurfngfbafperfodamarfnecapfafn,fogefberwffbanumberof

sofdfersandsomefnferrogaforsfurnedupatmycefffnfsofaffonfwasfofdto get on my frneesfwassbacfrfed and fben moved from November bfocfrfo Tango bfocfr. 192 B^bouf^t^fo^^mfnufesearfferfbadseenB^sffbefngmovedfntbesame

mannerfbavenofdeawbyfwasmovedffwassffgbffybefferfbanbefngfn fsofaffon because at feast ff was open. ffowever,afteronfyfbreedaysfwas fbenmovedbacfragafnfof^ovemberbfocfr.8yfbfsffmef^bubefb9dbeen moved and f 'd no fdeawbere be and ^sff were befngbefd. 193 fremafnedfnfsofaffona^er fbfs forafurfber fwo monfbswffbouf any

comfort ffemsaf aff, aparffromabfanfref andm9f. 194 On one occasfon wbenfbad been guesffoned by 8asbfrfsafdfobfm bow

can you asfr me fbese guesffons wben you frnowf've passed my pofygrapb fesf.6asbfrfofdmefbaff'dacfuaffyfaffedmypofygrapb 195 Onanearfferoccasfonwbenfwasbrougbffofnferrogaffonfromfsofaffonf

mefwffbadffferenfsefoffnferrogaforswbowerefromCrfmfnaffnfefffgence (^CfO^. Tbey fofd me fbaffbey were fbe ones fbaf were gofngfo start tbe frfbunafs.OneoffbeguyswascaffedOrewandanofberTerr^Tbeywere asfrfngmeguesffonsabouffbevfdeoagafnandfwasasfrfngwbatdafefbe vfdeowastafrenbecausefcoufdsbowfbaffwasfn8rffafn.ffefofdme, "fm nofgofngfofeffyou'.fsafd'areyoufr^fngtoscrewmeover^'f^esafd "maybe"

028577

83
Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6

196

fwasfnferrogafedrepeafedfy about my presence af fbfs meeffng buf fbe

^merfcans bad made up fbefrmfnd andrefused fo accept my account, ffofd fbem fndefaff fbaf af fbe ffme fbe vfdeo was supposed fo bave been fafrenf wasworftfngfnCurrysfn^ngfandandgofngfocoffege l^benfsafdfbfs,fbey woufd turn ff around and say fbatffrnewfwasgofng to ^fgbanfstan at fbe refevanfffmeandfbereforefbadfafdafafseaffbffraffbeforeffe^. l ^ a f e v e r f safdfbeywoufdfgnoreandrefusedfoffsfenfome

197

^boufamonfbafferfdffrsfbeenbrougbffnfofsofaffonforfbesecondffme

fwasfafrenfofnferrogaffonandmef^asbfragafn.fwasfnfongsbacfrfe posfffon and on fbfs occasfon be afso brougbfafongafemafefncfvfffan cfofbfng.8asbfr fofd me fbaf sbe bad come aff fbe way from l^sbfngfonfo sbowmeavfdeo.fwas fben sbownavfdeoona^4""fv on fbe fabfefn front of me. before fbey puf fbe vfdeo on tbeyfofd me fbaf ft was an Osama 8fnf^aden raffyfn^fgbanfsfan.^pparenffyfberaffyfoofrpfaceafsomewberecaffed Turnofrf^armssomewberefnB^fgbanfsfan. 198 Tberewasnosoundonfbevfdeobufyoucoufdseeanumberofmen

sffffng down andOsama 8fnf^adenappearfng and gfvfngaspeecb.fwasnf sure wbefberff may bave been fifmedbyabfdden camera. Tbe guafffyoffbe pfcfurewasnofgood^besuggesfedfomefbaffbetbreemensffffngdown fbaf bad prevfousfy been pofnted ouf fn fbe pbofograpb were me, ^sff and f^bubef. 199 fs9fdffw9sn"fmebuf8befrepfpre8sfngfbaffsboufd9dmffff.^bewas

very adamant. ^be89fdfo me "fve puf defafneesberefnfsof9ffonfor^2 monfbs9ndevenfuaffyfbey"vebrofren.^oumfgbf98weff9dmffffnowsofb9f you don't b9vef0 8f9yfnf8of9ffon".^veryffmeffrfedfo9nswer9gue8ffon sbefnsfsfedfwasfyfng.^befrepfgofngonandon9fme,pressurfngme, fefffngmefbaffw9Sfyfng,fefffngmefbaffsboufdadmffff^venfuaffyf^usf ^gavefn and s9fd""ofr9y,ff'sme".Tbere9sonfdfdfbfs was because of fbe prevfousfiveorsf^weefrsofbefngbefdfnfsofaffonandbefngfafrenfo fnferrogaffon for bours on end, sborfsbacfrfedand befng treated fn fbaf way.f

028578

procal Discovery Oefense Reciprocal

0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1

wasgofngoufofmymfndanddfdnffrnowwbafwasgofngon.fwas desperafeforftfoendandfbereforeevenfuaffyf^usfgavefnandadmfffedfo befngfnfbevfdeo. 200 f w a s f b e o n f y o n e o u f o f f b e f b r e e o f u s f o s e e f b e v f d e o . fcoufdnot bear

anofber day of fsofaffonfefafone fbe prospect of anofber year and can onfy fmagfnebowferrf^fngffmusfbeforf^erozB^bbasforf1^oazzam8eggbefngfn defenffonandfsofaffonforsofong. 201 ^ s soon asfbrofre down andadmfffed fbaf ff was me sbe^usf got up and

feft tbe room and fbenfwasfafrenbacf^ tomy ceff. 202 ^fterfbaffremafnedfnfsofatfonforanofberfiveorsf^weefrs.fwasnof

fafrenforfnferrogaffon,9par^fromfo8rownbuffdfngwberefbef^8fsbowed mepbofograpbsofvarfouspeopfeasfrfngffffrnewanyoffbembuffdfdnf ^partfromtboseperfodsfw98feftonmyownfnfsofaffon,noffrnowfngwbaf was gofngfo bappenfomeorwbafwasgofngonffbougbffbatperbapsnow fwoufdbefrfedforacrfmeaffbougbfdfdn'ffrnowwbafwasgofngonwffbB^sff andf^bubef. 203 ^fter about five or sf^weefrsfwas movedfo Oscar bfocfr (^anofber fsofaffon

bfocfr)wberefbecameaware^sffandf^bubefwerebefngbefdfwasn"tabfefo speafrfo fbem a s f w a s a f fbe ofber endof fbe bfocfr.fmusf bave been fbere forafurfberfewweefrs,agafnfwasdenfed"comforfffems',denfedeveryfbfng apartfromsbowersfwoorfbreeffmesaweefr.Ourfngfbfsperfodfbey sfopped9ffowfngusoutfore^ercfseafaff,unffffbefnfernaffonaff^edCross fofd fbem fbaffbey bad tofef us e^ercfse.li^ffsffwasbefd on Oscar bfocfrf wasnoffafrenforanyfnterrogaffon 204 Tben, around fbe mfddfe of August 2t^t^3,fwas moved to anofber camp

wffbfnCampOeffaandpfacedon^cbobfocfr.Tbfsffmefwaspfacedonf^evef ^andwasgfvenbacfraffmycomforfffemsandaddfffonaffygfvenabofffeof wafer.^obodye^pfafnedwbyfbadbeen movedbacfrto fbfs bfocfr.^bouf fwo

85
028579 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2

weefrs after befng on ^cbobfocfrfwascaffed fnfo fbe 8rownbuffdfngwberef met forfbe first ffme an fnferrogaforcaffed^ames,^om^rmyfnfefffgence.ffe fofdmefbaffwoufdbemovfngfnfofbesamebfocfrfnceffsne^ffo^sffand f^bubef.f^e dfdn'f asfr me any guesffons.fasfredbfmwbaf was gofng on wffb fbevfdeoandeveryfbfngandbesafdfwfffbeseefngyoufaferfnfbeweefrand f'ffe^pfafnwbaf'sgofngon. 205 B^fferfbafmeeffngfwasfbenfafrenfof^ffobfocfrwbere^sffafreadywas

f^ffobfocfrfsrunbyfnfef^febyfbefnferrogaforswbodecfdewbafyou're enffffedfo and wbaf you're not enffffedfo^.fbadprevfousfy been on an fnfef bfocfrwbenfwasbefdfnf^fma before befng moved fofsofaffon. 206 f^bubefwasbrougbftof^ffobfocfrfbene^fdayandfbefbreeofuswere

abfefofaffrfoeacbofber.ffbfnfr fbaf fbe reason we were tafren away from fsofaffonfo fbfs bfocfr was because fbe same fnferrogafors were now deaffng wffbusandfbeymaybavefbougbffbeywoufdgefmorefnformaffonoutofus ff fbey affowed us fofaffrfoeacb ofber as fbe bfocfrs were bugged so fbey coufd overbear our conversaffons. 207 Overfbene^f fwo weefrs every dayfwasbrougbffo fbe 8rownbuffdfngfo

beguesffonedbyfbenewfnferrogafor^ames,from^rmyfnfefffgence. 208 t^urfng fbe firsffwoweefrsfwas on f^ffofwasbrougbf every day tobe

gue8ffonedby^amesl^ewoufdbebrougbffnsuccessfon,usuaffy^sffffrsf, fben f^bubef and fben mysefff^e started asfrfng me fofs of guesffons about my movements durfng fbe perfod of fbe vfdeofn 2^^^. f^e was asfrfng for affbf evfdence.ffofdbfmwberefwasworfrfng and wbenfwasafunfversffy and fbaf be coufdget my records fo prove fbaffwasfn^ngfand.f^e was gafberfng various defaffs. 209 On one occasfon be asfred me fodoavofce stress anafy^erfesf.f^e fofd

mefbafffwasbefferfbanapofygrapb.fsafdfobfmfbaffdfdn'fwanffodoff asfbadafreadypassedmypofygrapbfesf,evenfbougb8asbfrb9ds9fdfbad

86
028580 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3

faffed, ffe fofdmefwoufd bave fo do ffbuffrefused.Tbereasonfrefused was becauseffefffbeywerepfayfngagameTbeybadprevfousfyfofdmefbaff bad passed mypofygrapbandfwoufdbegofngbomeandfbenfbeyfofdmef badfaffedmypofygrapbffefffbeyfreptmovfngtbegoafpostsandfdfdn'f want fo cooperate wffb fbefrfests any more.

210

^urfngfbeffmefwasguesffonedby^amesbewoufdbrfngcafresfnfoeaf.

Tbe fast fnferrogatfonsfbad wffb Barnes be started sbowfng mepbotograpbs ofofberdefafneesafOuanfanamo8ayandasfrfngmeffffrnewfbemfsafd weff,yes,fdo,becausefveseenfbembereffefffbafbewascfufcbfngaf strawsto fry andfindawayoffmpffcaffngmefnsomewayorofber seemedfobeparfofapaffernofencouragfngpeopfenof^usffogfve fnformaffonfnfnfervfews buf afso fofnform on ofbers fn tbe camp. Tbey woufd announce upon foudspeafrers^^artfcufarfy wben peopfe were refeased^ fbaf ff we co operated wffb fbem fbey woufdrefease us. Ii^efrnewfbfsfncfuded 9cffng9S9nfnform9nf. 211 B^fterfbefasffnterrogaffonwffb^amesfwasfofdfwasnowgofngfobe Tbfs

bandedoverfof^avyfnfefffgencef^owever,beforefbfsbappened,wbffsffwas sffffbefngguesffonedby^amesfn^epfember2t^^3fwasbrougbffnfo fnterrogatfonandfwasfefttosffonmyownfor^bourswafffngfortbe fnferrogafors to arrfve.fbad been fasffng fbaf day and wben ff was fbe endof fbe dayfasfredforagfass of wafer buf was fofdfcoufdnot bave any.fafso asfredforfood and fopray buf fbey refused foaffow me. nobody came to see mefbafdayandfwasfafrenbacfrfbafevenfng.Tbenfbene^fdayfwas brougbffofnferrogaffonandfbfsffmefbe^rfffsbofficfafsarrfvedTbese fncfudeda^rftfsb embassy offfcfafwboffrnew by fbe name of fl^artfn and fwo fl^f^agenfsnamedf^ucyand^fe^. 212 Ourfngfbefirsfconsuffatfonwffb1^arffn,beasfredmefffwasofray,orfff

bad any probfems.ffofdbfm fbaf fdbeen frepffnfsofaffon for fbreemonfbs for no reason.fafso fofd bfm my frnees were fnafof of pafn because of fbe facfrofe^ercfsefwasgefffng.ffefofdmefbafbebadfwofeffers,onefrommy

87
028581 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ,^

00000134

mofberandonefrommybrofberwbfcbbetoofroufandfactuaffysawfbem bufbesafdbewasn'faffowedtogfvefbemfomeunffffbeybadbeencfeared wffb fbe aufborfffes.fneveracfuaffy saw fbosefeffers.fbadn't beardany news from borne sfnce about February 2t^^3.fasfredbfmwbaf was bappenfng, wbefberfwasgofngfobefrfed, wbefberfwoufd bave fawyers, and varfous ofber guesffons. f^esafdf^f^offfcers woufd be comfng tbe ne^f day and fbey woufd answer my guesffons.fsboufdsay af fbfs pofnt fbaf fn our e^perfenceff fl^f^ were fovfsff fbe camp we were never feftfnfsofaffon.l^efbfnfr tbfs fs because fbey woufd asfreacbffmewbaffevef we were on (rafter fbe fevef system sfarfed).l^e don't frnow ffff was forfbefr records. I^efrnowbowever, fbaf fbey woufd frnow we'd been fnfsofaffonff onfy because we fofd fbem.

213

fwasrefurnedfomycefffbafnfgbfandtbene^fevenfngafffbreeofus

were fafrenfo fbe fnferrogaffonbfocfr(^fbfsffmeff was fbe Cf^buffdfng^.fwas fafrenfo Orange buffdfngwberefmet tbe fwo fli^f^offfcers,^fe^ and f^ucy.f bad prevfousfy met f^ucy on fwo occasfons, once fnOecember2t^t^2 and once fn^prff2t^t^3.fbadprevfousfy met ^fe^fn^une2^t^2. Tbey asfred me some guesffons about wbaffwasdofngdurfng fbe year 2t^t^t^.fbecameguffe angry and safdfoofr, you'vegot aff my fifes, and you frnowwbaffwasdofngfn2t^t^^ andfe^pfafnedfbaffwas not fn fbe vfdeos.ffofdfbem fbaffwasworfrfng and bad been afunfversffydurfng fbfs perfodfn^ngfand. Tbey fben safd we don't need foasfr you any more guesffons.fasfredwbaf was gofngfobappen tome, wbefberfwasgofngfogeffoseeafawyer and tbe ofber guesffonsfbadasfred fbe^mbassyguys.Tbeyfofdmefbaffbeycoufdn'fanswerfboseguesffons fbaf fbe embassy man sboufd bave answered fbose guesffons for me. Tbat wasfbefasffsawofany8rfffsbofffcfafse^cepffl^artfnwbofsawfbeday beforefwasrefeased.fcarrfed on seefng^amesafewtfmes before befng banded overfof^avyfnfefffgence

214

^fferfbfsweweresffffbefdonf^ffobuffdfngandwoufdoccasfonaffybe

brougbfforguesffonfngbyf^avyfnfefffgenceandaguycaffedf^omofwas asfredsfmffar guesffons fo before and was fofd fbaf basfcaffy fbey beffeved us bufwewereapoffffcafpawnnow.

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028582 Intense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5

215 us"

Tbfs was because some 8rfffsbdefafnees were, fbey safd,fyfng,fberefore

we coufdn'f go bacfrfo^ngfand and fbey seemed fo be pfayfng games wffb

028583

Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

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fsofaffonandfnferrogaffons-^sff 216 Asif says in relation to the isolation and treatment experienced following the recovery ofthe Bin Laden video,thatfn about ^arcbBi^prff2t^t^3fwas at Camp Oefta.fwasfafrenonedayfofnterrogaffonandasfredfoperformapofygrapb test. Ourfng fbat fesffwasasfred guesffons sucb as badffrafnedfn ^f^banfsfan^ffadfbandfedcbemfcafs, bombs, e^pfosfves^^mfamemberof ^fOaeda^Tbeyasfred fbe same guesffons onanumber of occasfonsandf answered eacb guesffon trufbfuffy,mosf of fbe answers were "yes'or no', fmmedfafefyafferfbefesffbemanwboconducfedfbepofygrapbsafdfbad faffed but be woufd send ft away for tests

217

f d been affbe doctors one day and wbenfrefurnedffoundfbaffbadbeen

movedfoadf^erenfbfocfrandrefegafedfot^evef4.t^evef4wasfbefowesf ffer.ff meant fbaf you bad aff your comfort ffems removed, fe you bad no soap, foofbpasfe, cup, fowefs or bfanfref.^ou onfy bad your cfofbes andbad fo sfeep on fbe bare mefaf.^ou bad to drfnfrwaferwffb your bands.fbad been onf^evef4onacoupfeofoccasfonsbefore.fwasfe^tbereforfwoweefrs wffboufanye^pfanaffonandfbenfwasfafrenfofbefsofaffonbfocfr.fbad prevfousfybeenfnfsofaffonaspunfsbmenf. 218 l ^ e n f b a d b e e n fnfsofaffon before, you woufdbe feftfor maybe tbree or

four days and fbe guards woufd bave fowrffeasworn statement, affbougb fberewasnoac^udfcaffonoranytbfng,bufyouwerefbenpuffnfsofaffon. Tbere seemed fo be fwo reasons wby you woufd be pfacedfnfsofaffon^ 1) for punfsbmenf and you woufd be fnformed of fbe reason and fofd fbaf you woufdbespendfng,egfbreedaysfnfsofaffonforfbafreason, 2) fbeofberwoufdbeforfnferrogaffonwberefberewasnospecfficffmeffmff. 219 ^ ^ e r f b a d been on f^evef4for about fwo weefrsfwas fben tafrenfo

fsofaffononfbefnsfrucffonsoffnfefffgenceofffcers^bafigbasafready

028584

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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descrfbedfbecondfffonsfnfsofaffon.fwasfafrenfofbef^ovemberbfocfrand found myseffpfacedfnaceffopposffef^bubef.ffe badbeen brougbffo fbe bfocfr about fbe same ffme as me.fcoufd see bfmtbrougb fbe gfasspanef and fried faffrfngfobfm buf sofdfers became aware of fbfs and afteracoupfe of daysfwasmovedfoacefffurfberafongfbecorrfdorTbfsceffbadbeen occupfedbyaguy wbo bad devefoped severe menfafbeaffbprobfems and bad smeared excrement everywbere.ff was absofufefydfsgusffng.fbadno soap or anyfbfngandfwasfe^fn fbfs ceff.fcoufd not sffanywbere.ffsfanfr.ff was e^fremefy bot. ^fnaffydffferenfsofdfers came on fbe nfgbfsbfff and fbey gave me some cfeanfngmaferfafandfscrubbed fbe wbofepface down. 220 ^fferaboufaweefrfwasfafrenfofnferrogaffonfwasfafrenfbereby

guards from ^B^.Tbese were fbe f^bodefsfand,fl^assacbuseffs^ofdfers. Tbey badarepufaffonforfbe worst vfofence.fremember once Oeneraffl^fffer bad fo fnvesffgafetbemforusfnge^cessfveforceasfbeybadbeafenuponeman wboendedupasacabbage. 221 fwas fafren to "f^es'fef^eservaffon, and brougbffnfoacarpefedroom wffb

swfvefcbafrs.fwaspfacedonaseaf and fongsbacfrfed andmet somebody c9ffed^r^mffb.ffebadmagazfne8onfbefabfe,drfnfrs,nufs,cfgareffes, crfsps.fasfredbfmwbyfwasfnfsofaffonandbefofdmebecausefwasbefng fnfiuenced by ofber defafnees.^esafd be bad some pbofograpbs be wanted mefofoofraf.ffofdbfmfbaffwoufdn'ffoofraffbem.fwasfbenfedaway.f wasn'fgfvenanyoffbefreafsfbafwereonfbefabfe. 222 ^ffer aboufaweefrfwascaffedbacfrfo anofber room. On fbfs occasfonf

bad been bavfng my sbower,mybafrw98 8ffff wet, andfwasfafrenfo fbfs ofber room and pfacedfn fbe sbor^sbacfrfe posfffon. Tbfs bad not bappened tome before andff was e^fremefyuncomfortabfe.fwas fben fefffn fbfs room and fbey turned fbe afrcondfffoner down fo4t^f^abrenbeff(^fberewasasfgn onfbecondfffonfngunffwbfcbsafdftsboufdnofbepufbefow7t^^^.fwasfben feftfn tbfs room fn fbe sborfsbacfrfe posfffon for about fbreebours.fwas 9bsofufefyfreezfng,partfcuf9rfy9fsobecausemybafrbadsffffbeenweffrom

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028585 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 8

fbe sbower. Tben fl^r^mffb came fnfo fbe room and safd ""ff'snfce and cofdfn bere".ffeasfredmefffwasgofngfofoofraffbepbofograpbsf^esafd"7can gefyouanyfbfngyouwanf'f^ewassffffngafadesfrwbffefwasfnfbesbor^ sbacfrfe posfffon. f^e fben puffed ouf some pornograpbfcmagazfnes.f^e sbowedmeapbofograpbandsafd""foofr,you'regofngfoseepussyagafn".^f fbaffsfar^edfaugbfngasfbewbofefbfngseemedsorfdfcufous.Tbenfswore afbfmandbewaffredouf.ffofdbfmfwoufdn'ff9ffr.f^efeftmefnfbafroomfor anofberfbreeorfourbour.fwasabsofufefysbafrfng andsbfverfng wffb fbe cofd and wbenfwasfinaffy returnedto my cefffcame down wffb fbe fiu. Tbat dayfbadbeensbor^sbacfrfedforsevenorefgbfboursOneoffbemffffary poffce fofd me fbaf fnfefffgence bad safdfwasn'faffowed any medfcaffon. 223 Tbene^fdayfwasescorfedbyal^arfneCapfafnandabouf^^sofdfersfo

Oscar bfocfr. Tbfs was afso fsofaffon.fwasfeftfnacefffbereforacoupfe of daysandfbenfafrenfofnferrogaffon.fwassufferfngfromafemperafureand feffve^fff. 224 Tbfsffmefwassbor^sbacfrfedagafn.^dffferenffnferrogaforwbofcamefo

frnow by fbe name of ^ames, came fnfo guesffon me.fbadbeen fefffn tbe sborfsbacfrfeposfffonforabouffbreeorfourbours.ffwasagonybecausef badbacfrprobfems,fwascafffngouffnagony.^amescamefnandsafd""wbo basaufborfsedfbfs^'f^eapofogfsedfomeandfwasunsbacfrfed. 225 f^esafdfome""famfbenewfnferrogaforandfwfffseeyoufnacoupfeof

day's f f m e ' ^ e fben^ustcbaffedbeforefwas returned fo fbe ceff. 226 ^fterfbreedaysfwasfafrenfo""fbe8rownbuffdfng".fwasfongsbacfrfed

and sat f n a c b a f r . f w a s f e f t f n a r o o m andstrobe ffgbffng was puf on and very foudmusfcffwasadanceversfonof^mfnempfayedrepeafedfyagafnand agafnfwasfefffnfberoomwffbtbesfrobeffgbtfngandfoudmusfcforabouf anbourbeforefwasfafrenbacfrfomyceff.f^obodyguesffonedme.

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028586 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 9

227

Tbene^fdayfwasfafrenbacfrtofbefnferrogatfonandfbfsffmefwassborf

sbacfrfed andfeff for maybe five or sf^bours before refurnfngfo fbe ceff. ^gafn, nobody came fo guesffon me. Tbat nfgbtfasfredfo see ^amesfn f^eservaffon.f^edenfed be frnewanyfbfng about fbe sbortsbacfrffng.ffofdbfm fwoufdco^operafe.fwasasfredaserfes of guesffons abouftbepbofograpbs. f^efofdmefbaffbepbofograpbswerewffb^fnf^adenf^usfansweredaffbfs guesffons as bonesffyasfcoufd.ffesafd tome you are not befngconsfsfenf.f wasne^ttafrenfofnferrogaffonwffbamanfcamefofrnowasf^rewf^ewasfn fbeCrfmfnaffnfefffgenceOepar^menf.Tbereweresomeofbermenpresent9S wefff^esbowedmepbofograpbsbuffrefusedfofoofraffbem.Tbeyfbenfeff fbe room andfwassborfsbacfrfed for maybe about four orfivebours. Tbey came bacfr.8yfbafffmefcoufdn'f bear ff any fongerandf^usfsafd""ff's me fn fbe pbofograpb'.fdfdn'f even foofraffbepbofograpbs.fwas returned t o m y ceff.

228

^bouffourdaysfaferfwasfafrenfobefnfervfewedbyf^^f.Tbeyasfredme

guesffons about wbaffbad been dofng during 2t^t^t^.fgave fbem fuff defaffs. Tbey safdfbaffbey were gofngfocbecfr ouf my story forfberefevantperfod. 229 fwas fben bacfrfn fbe fsofaffonceff.fwasbrougbf to "f^es'af some stage

and cbaffed wffb somebody from fbe ^^f.ffe was fryfngfo be frfendfy.ffe brougbfmemaga^fnesandfasfredfffberewasanynewsffebrougbfsome arffcfes be bad fafren from fbe fnfernef and read some extracts of news about mysefff^es9fd""fre9ffyfffrefaffrfngfoyoubuffneedsomefnformaffon"f^e safd'f needsome befp from you, fbere are some evffpeopfebere,fneed some fnformaffon"f^ewasobvfou8fyf^fngfogefmefospyforbfmf89fdfcan"f speafr^rabfcandfmnofberefospyonpeopfe.f^efeffmefnfberoomfor maybe^2boursfongsbacfrfed.fwasnofgfvenanyfbfngfoeafandevenfuaffy fwas^usffafrenbacfrfomyceff. 230 Ourfng fbeperfodfbaffwasfnfsofaffon and befngfnferrogafed bynames, "baveyoueverbeenfof^ew^orfr^""fasfredbfmwbaf sort of guesffon was

ononeoccasfonfsawall^ffffaryfnfefffgenceofffcercaffedO^wboasfredme

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028587 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0

fbat. f^efbreafenedfo beat me up. ffesafd ' f am not fffre fbe ofber fnferrogafors,fffw9nff"ffbeafyouup""f^ewasaveryfargeguy,guffe fnffmfdaffng.f^esafdfo me "^usf answer fbe guesffons"".ffaterfoundouf fbaf fbfsmanwasfncbargeoff^erozB^bbasfscaseffbfnfrbfsffrsfnamefs Oscar

231

fremafnedfnfsofaffonforafurfberfwoorfbreemonfbsbuffwasnofreaffy

fnferrogafed agafn, or 9f feast not serfousfy,afterfbadadmfffedfobefng presenffnfbepbofograpbsf^erbapsafteraboutamonfbf^bubefwasmoved fnfo fbe ceff fn front of me and we were affowedfofaffr and caff fo eacb ofber.f fbfnfr after f d made fbe admfssfons fbey wanted fbey weren't reaffyfnferesfed fnme. 232 Tbe condfffonsfnfsofaffon were v e ^ bard. Tbe ceffs were made of mefaf.

Tbeyweree^fremefybof.Tbe9frcondfffonfngwasbrofrenandbofafrwoufd come out. ^omeffmes fbe sofdfers woufdpuf ff on reaffybof.^ou bad fosfeep onamefafbunfrfnfbeffrsffewweefrsfwasgfvennofbfng,nofamaffressora bfanfretandfwasdenfedaff comfort ffems.fcoufdn'ffaffrfoanyone.Tbe onfy fbfngfwasgfvenwasmyf^oran.fsortoffearnedawayofdeaffngwffbffand frfednoffofeffbefsofaffonbofberme.ffwasfmpossfbfefofrnowwbafffmeff wasfnfacffbrougbouffbfsffme^fnfacffbrougbouffbeffmefbatfwasfn ^uanfanamo^fbadno concept of fbe ffme or date, wewere not affowedfo frnowwbaf day ff was and nobody was affowedfo wear wafcbes. Tbe guards weretofdnotfofefusseefbefrwafcbes(^tbougbsometfmesfbeyforgot^. Tbey cerfafnfyneverfofdus wbafffmeff was. Tbey stopped dofng fbe caff for prayers after aboufayear.^fn fbe firsf year ff was on someffmes and not ofbers.^ ff stopped after Oeneraffl^fffer came.

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fsofaffon(^^sffconffnued) 233 ""^mongsffbeeffectsoffsofaffonwasfbafoveraperfodofffmeffwas cerfafnfydrafnfng.^ouwoufdgefwornouffromffffyouwereafready depressed ffmafres you more depressed because you freepfbfnfrfng repeffffvefy about fbe same fbfng and fbere's no one fbereto comfort you or dfsfracfyou.^omeffmesyouwefcomefnferrogaffonwbenyou'vebeenfn fsofaffon becausefberefssomeone fofaffrfo andff'sarefeaseandno doubt fbat'swbaffnterrogatorsarecounffngonwbenfbeyfreepyoufbereTbe fsofaffonbfocfrs were ff seemed fo us, deffberafefyfreptfn as depressfnga state as possfbfe. Tbe ofber bfocfrs, fbey bad fo redo from ffmefoffme becausefbesaftfromfbeseaafrcorrodedeveryfbfngl^ffbfbefsofaffon bfocfrsff was aff peeffngpafnf and everyfbfngrusffng.^ventbougb fbfngs were modffiedorrenovafed,ffwasn'fpafnfed.(^^ffe we were fn guantanamo fnfactfberewerefbreerenovaffons,sbowfngfberafeatwbfcbsfrucfures woufddeferforafefbere.^ 234 ^fferabouffbreemonfbsfnfsofaffonwewereaffbrougbfoufandmovedfo

f^ffobfocfr. Tbfs wasanormafbfocfr fbaf was afso run by fntef as opposed fo fbe^rmy.Tbefbreeofuswerepfacedfnfbfsbfocfrandwewerenofongerfn fsofaffon, we were affowedfofaffrto eacb ofber. 235 fwasfafrenfofnferrogaffonandasfredfodoavofcesfressanafy^er.Tbfsfs

apparenffyanofberwayoffesffngwbefberyouarefefffngffes.^mfcropbone wasaffacbedfomyfbroafandfwasasfredaserfesofguesffonsfncfudfng "are you fn fbe pbofos".fsafd""^o"."f^9ve you ever met Osama 8fnf^aden".^f safd""f^o".fwas fofd fbaffbad faffedon fbese fwo guesffons. ffeasfred me fbe same guesffons 9g9fnandf9n8wered""^es"" and be safdfwasfefffng fbe frufb 236 Ourfngoneoffbesessfonsafferfbfswbenfwasbefngguesffonedby

Barnes andbe was asfrfng about my movements fn fbe tBf^,fsafd""f can't waff

028589

Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

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0 0 0 0 0 1 4 ^

unffffgofofbefrfbunafbecausefwantfomafreyouguysfoofr8fupfd""f^e said "wbat do you mean^""ffofdbfm fbaf durfng fbe refevanfperfodfbaffwas supposedtobefntbepbofograpb wffb Osama 8fnf^aden,fbadbeenfn froubfewffbfbepoffcefn^ngfand.fsafdfcoufdgeffenpoffcemenwbocoufd be wffnesses,ffnecessary.ffofdbfmfbaffbadcourt records.fbadasoffd affbfwbfcb fbey woufdn f bave been abfefo deny. 237 ^bouffourdaysfaferfwasbrougbfbacfrandsomebodyreadfomeafeffer

wbfcb came from 8rffafn. Tbe fetter basfcaffy proved fbaffwasfn^ngfandaf fberefevanfffme,9ffbougbff8afd9ffbeendfbafyousboufdf9frefnfoaccounf fbaf be may b9vefr9vefedonaforgedpassport. 238 f^urfngtbefasfsf^weefrsorsoofmyffmeonOuanfanamo^ayfremafned

fnf^ffobfocfr and fbey started fo treat meafofbeffer.^ysef^^bafig and f^bubefwoufdbefafrenfoapfacefrnownas""fbefovesbacfr""fnfbe8rown buffdfng.Tbfswoufdbeever^^undaywberewewoufdgeffowafcbO^Os,eaf f^cf^onafds, eat f^f^^af^uf and basfcaffycbfff ouf. I^e were not sbacfrfedfn fbfs area. Tbe firsffbreeffmes or so f^omo waspresent and fben we were banded overfo^8f,awom9ncaffedf^esfey and sbe was fbe one fbaf reaffy treatedus weff and gave us treats and food. I i ^ bad no fdeawby fbey were befngfffre fbaf fo us. Tbe rest of fbe weefr we were bacfrfn fbe cages as usuaf, but ff was nfceto bave fbat perfod.ffbfnfr we were fbe onfy fbree fbaf were treated fn fbfs wayOnoneoccasfonf^esfeybrougbt^rfngfes,fcecreamandcbocofafes,fbfs wasfbeffnaf^undaybeforewecamebacfrfo^ngfandf^esfeyfofdusfbafwe woufdbefeavfngne^fweefrfogobacfrfo^ngfand 239 ^ b o u t ^ d a y s before we were due to return fbe five of us, me, ^bafig and

f^bubef and fwo ofber 8rffs,^amafandTarefr were aff fafrenfofsofatfon tobe frepfaparffrom fbe ofber defafnees.l^ewerenfdenfed our comforts apart fromTarefrwbowasonf^evef^.

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fsofaffonandTreafmenf-f^bubef 240 In relation to the treatment and isolation experienced following the discovery'of theBinLadenvideo,Rhuhelsaysthat7w9sfnmycagefnaseparafebfocfrfo fbeofbersandanfnferrogaforcaffed^arabfoofrmefofnterrogaffon.fwasfn fnterrogaffonforabouf^bours^bewentfbougbmywbofesfor^agafnTben sbesaysfwfff assess your paperwork as fbfs was part ofafferfbree fnfervfew,meanfngfffp988edfwoufd move fo fbe ne^f stage, ^be afso recordedmy vofce af fbaf ffme.^f tbe end offbefnter^fewsbeasfred wbaff wore fn^f^banfsfan.fsafdftoofr an ^dfdasfracfrsuff.^be fben puffedouta pbofowbfcbfoofredfffreasfffffromavfdeo and fbere was someone cfrcfedfn ft. ^be safdwbosfbfs^ff was someone fn an ^dfdas fop buf ff was not me. ^besafd"youarefyfngfbepersonfnfbepfcfurefsyou."^bepofnfedfo anofber man nextto fbe guy fn fbe ^dfdas fop and safd fbfs fsyourfrfend^sff Tbfs went on for anofber2bours.8ynowfbad been fnfnferrogaffonfor^^ bours.fwasfbenfafrenbacfrtomycageTbene^fdayfwasfransferredto fsofatfon.fremafnedfbereforfbreemonfbs.

241

fwasfnfervfewedevery^or^days. Tberouffnewoufdbefwasfafren,

sborfsbacfrfedandfbe afrcondfffonerwoufdbe turnedup to mafre fbe room freezfng.Tbefongesfffmefwassborfsbacfrfedwasforabouf^or7bours ^ffer about one monfbfwas seen by someone we caffed"^teve^mffb'.f^e usedtobemyprevfousfnferrogaforbefore^arab.f^epuffedoufpbotosfrom fbevfdeoandsafdfbadbeenfyfngfobfmffesafdwefrnowft'syou admff fff'fsafdff'snofmeandfrepffnsfstfngonfbfs.f^efrepfmefberefor7bours. Tbenfwasnoffnferrogafedforagesunffffsaw^amesf^ebadarepufaffonas atorfurer.f^fsofffcew9sfbe8rownbuffdfngffefoofrmefnandsbowedme fbepbofosagafnandfnsfsfedfbaffwasfnfbemfwasfafrenbacfrfomyceff, buf tbenafew days faferwe were aff fbree moved fo an fnfefbfocfr.^weefr afterfbemovefdfdasfressanafy^erfesf. f^e fofd mefbadfaffedand fbaff wasfyfng.f^efbensbowedmefbedafeoffbepbofoswbfcbwas"^.8.2^t^^'.f dfdnoffrnowwbefberfbfswasfbe^merfcandaffngsysfemwbfcbwoufdmafre

028591

Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

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ff 8"" January 2000 or the English system which would make it 1 August 2000. On both dates I was England and I told him to get my police, community service and probation records. He said he would check with MIS who would look into it. Despite this on other occasions, after I had left isolation I would be taken to interrogation, short shackled and left in a room with very loud heavy metal music and sometimes Eminem. This would usually last for 4 or 5 bours. Tbe interrogator would never come. After about three weeks I saw James and asked him about this but he denied it saying it was nothing to do with him. He then told us he would transfer us to Romo and the Navy Intel guy. Before I saw Romo, I saw Lucy and Alex from MIS who asked about where I was at the time of the photos. I believe they had the photos with them and were just confirming things. The next day I saw Martin from the Foreign Office who just asked how I was. He showed me two letters but I never received them. After this we were dealt with by Romo and I was not short shackled after that point. He was trying to be nice and took all three of us to watch a movie. At my next interrogation with him be pulled out the photos and said 'admit it is you, be a man about it'. I got pissed off and said "yeah it's me. What are you going to do about it?" He said "it doesn't matter if it is you, just admit it." About a week after this I had my polygraph test.

242. f went fnfo fbe room and fbere were fwo women from the FBI. I took about 4 tests and the woman says you failed all four and then said admit it is you. f safd ffyou think it is me then it's me. She took me to another room and left me in the cold without food for hours. She then took me back into the original room but this time I wouldn't talk to her. She got her colleague, a male, to come and talk to me but we ended up arguing and swearing at each other. He then calmed down but said he would send me fo isolation. I told him, I did not care. I told him Romo had already said the whole thing had been a big mistake and the Army had 'fucked up'. I think he contacted Romo whilst I was still in the room. That's why instead of sending me to isolation he sent me back to the block with Asif and Shafiq. A few weeks later I got a new interrogator called Leslie. She was an FBI agent.

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iprocal Discovery Defense Reciprocal

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243

^bebardfy ever fnfervfewed me and sbeevenfuaffy safd fbaf we woufd

probabfybegofngbome^bearrangedforusfoseemovfeson^undayTbfs was because fbey frnewtbey bad messed us about and tortured us forfwo and baffyears and fbey boped we woufd forget ff. 244 before wefeftfiveofus8rfffsbdefafnees were fafrenfofsofaffon

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f^efurnfngfo^ngfand^B^sff^ 245. In relation to their return to the UK Asif says,"on Sunday 7^^ fl^arcbfwastafren foseefbef^edCrossfn^uffefbuffdfngTbfswas^usfaformafffyforfbemfo cbecfrbowfwas before refurnfngbacfrfo^ngfand.^ftertbaffwastafrenfo seesomemffffar^offfcfafswboasfredmefosfgnapfeceofpaper.fdon'f remembere^acffywbaffbepfeceofpapersafdbufffwasafongfbeffnesfbatf wasamember of tbeTaffban and ^f^Oaeda,boweverfbavesfncecbangedfn ofber wordsfbadcbanged my mfndsfncefwasdefafnedaf guantanamo 8ay. ff went onto say fbaf f f f w a s suspected of anyfbfng at any ffme by fbe tBnffed ^fafes,fcoufd be pfcfred up and returnedfo guantanamo 8 a y . l ^ f f s f f w a s sbownfbfspfeceofpaperfwasafsobefngpbofograpbedandfffmedonvfdeo camera.fsafdfbaffwoufd not sfgn ft. ^nofffcer safd tome ffyou don't sfgn ft you're not gofngbome.fdfdn'freaffybeffevebfm'

246.

The men had known from at least four weeks earlier,having heard from the

military police and others that it was all over and that they would be returning to EnglandfairlysoonAllthreesaythiswasthemainreasontheywerenot intimidated bythedemandstosignthedocumentdescribed by Asif Asifgoesonto saythat7wasbrougbfbacfrfrommyceffafewboursfaferandfbfsffmefsaf downandagafnmorepbofograpbswerefafrenandfffmwastafrenandagafn fbfs same document was read fo me andfwasasfredfosfgn.frefused agafn. Tbewomanwbowasdeaffngwffbmeatfbafpofnfasfredfffagreedwffbfbe statement andfsafd no'

247

OnemorningallfiveBritishdetaineesscheduledforreturnweretakenfromtheir

cells Asif explains that they were to be taken for interrogation They initially refused to go or be shackled.As Asif explains7was fofd fbaffbadfo bave my beard sbaved off and fffrefused fbey woufd use force, fnofberwords fbey woufd geffbe^f^f^feam.l^benfrefusedfbesergeanffncbargesafdfbaffwoufd definffefy "get ^f^^ed".fs9fd""we'ffsee".ffoweverfbecapfafnfncbarge came fnandsafdfbeyaregofngbomeanywaysowbaf'sfbepofnfofsbavfngfbefr

100
028594 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

00000147

beardsoffOespffefbfssomeoffbe^rmypersonnefworfrfngfnfbebfocfr weretefffngusfbatwewerenfgofngbomefbafweweregofngfospendfbe resfofourffvesfnprfson
248 Thateveningallfivedetaineeswere (separately) broughtbeforetheBritish

Embassy representative,Martin,andapoliceofficerfrom the UK who read through adocumentsayingthathehadarighttohandcuffthemandtousereasonableforce to move them They were then each told that they would be returning to the UKthe next day. 249 The next day they were collected and transported toaplane that was waiting for

them Despite protests from the Americans they were not hand cuffed and they were flown back to the UK where they were arrested

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Contact wffb tbe outsfdeworfd 250 Shafiq says, ^ben we were fn^fgbanfsfan and captured, firsf by fbe ^orfbern^fffance and fben fbe B^merfcans, we dfd not bave any contact wffb ourfamfffes or anyone fn^ngfand.l^e were not affowedfowrffe and we dfd not recefve any correspondence. I ^ e n we first arrfvedfn guantanamo 8ay on fbe firsf day afterfbesbacfrfes were removed afferfbeborrendousjourney, we werefofdfowrffeafeffer.^fffrememberwrfffngwastbatfwasfnB^merfcan cusfody.fcoufdbardfywrffe because my bands were so numb from bavfng been resfrafnedfntfgbfsbacfrfes for sucbafongperfod of ffme and wbenf wasasfredfowrffemybandsweresffffcuffedfogefberfdonffrnowwbefber fbose fetters were ever sent. 251 ^bouf fwo weefrsafterwe bad first arrived and were fn Camp ^^f^ay fbe

^rmy came round wffbapfece of paperfor eacb of us so fbaf we coufd wrffe bomefoourfamffy.fwrofebomeaf fbaf tfme.fdfdnfbearanyfbfng from bomeunfff aroundabout fbe endof February 20t^2 wben ^ f ^ came tosee us. Tbfs was tbe second occasfon wben tbey came and fbey produced fetters frombome.fwasgfvenafefferfrommybrofberffbfnfrbebadrecefvedmy feffer^fferfbafwemfgbfgefafefferperbapsonceeveryfwofofbreemontbs l^econffnuedfowrffefeffersunfffaroundabouf^ugusf2^^3wbensuddenfy fbeysfoppedgfvfngusanyfeffersfbeymaybaverecefvedfrombomef^or abouf8or7monfbsfbadnocommunfcaffonafafffrommyfamffy" Norall three men discovered later,had their families received any communications from themforasimilartime.

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028596 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 9

f^egafadvfce 252 Shafiq statesthatthequestionoftheirlegalrightswasverymuchonallthe detainees'minds He goes on to say, we were never gfven access tofegaf advfce.fasfredat varfous pofnfs buf fbey^usf safd fbaf fbfs fs not ^merfca fbfs fsCubaandyoubavenorfgbfsbere.B^roundabouf^ugust2^^3fspofrefoa guard wbo fofd me fbat bedseen my name on fbe fnfernef and fbaffwas represenfedbyafawyer,^arefb^efrcefn^ngfandfneverbeardanyfbfngaf afffromfbefnferrogafors,tbe^mbassyortbef^edCrossabouffbefacffbafa casewasbefngbrougbfonmybebafffbrougbtbetB^cour^sandwasonffs wayfofbe^^^upremeCourtfonfyfoundoufabouftbafwbenfgofbacf^fo ^ngfand l^benweasfredtbefnferrogaforsandfbe^mbassyandll^f^more aboufwbattbeguardbadsafdaboufafegafcasefbeysafdtbeyfrnew nofbfng" 253 They were intended to be keptwithout hope and starved of information Asif

says that in about January or February 2004 he hadaconversationwithamilitary guard who told him that he was going to go home He goes on to say that "fbe guardwbowasmovfngme^fwassbacfrfedandbefngbrougbffof^eservaffon^ safd " ff s frue, you've probabfy beard fffoads of ffmes before, buf fbfs ffme ff s true" ffefofdmefbaffbet^^can'fffgbfmycase,fbeywffffose,andffwfffcost fbemfoomucbmoneysofbeyaregofngfosendmebomeanyway. 254 Tbeguardsneverspofrefouswbenwewereonfbebfocfrbuffndfvfduaf guards on rare occasfons passed on fnformaffon wben fbey were escorffng us. 255 ^bouffbreeorfourweefrs before we feft,perb9ps around fbe end of

f^ebruar^2t^t^4,wesawfbef^edCrossandfbeysafdfousfbaf""somefbfng"s bappenfng,buffbeyarenof8uree^acffywbaf""andfbeycan"ffeffusunfffff's confirmed. Tbenaweefrfafer tbey fofdus fbaf ^acfr^fraw bad madeaspeecb fnwbfcb be'dmenffoned fbe five of our names and fbaf we woufd be refeased

103
028597 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^ r ^ r ^ , n i ^ . . ^ i^

^^^^^150

f^edCross
256 The International Red Cross used to visit the detainees from time to time to inspect the camps and the conditions they were being held in The men would see themwanderingaroundtheblocksandoccasionallytheywouldcalltosee detaineesShafiqsaysthatfbeguardswoufdbrfngusonebyonefoseefbem ^ecompfafned about fbe condfffons and fbe f^ed Cross safd fbaf tbe ^rmy werenoffoffowfngafffbegufdeffnes.Tbeywereconcernedaboufwbefberor not compfafntssboufd be made orfbematferfafrenfo court because ft woufd mean fbaf fndfvfduafs woufd be compfefefy cut off from contact wffb fbe famffy as fbe f^ed Cross was fbe onfy means for contacts "

028598

Oefense Rec^l^al Discovery

0 0 0 0 0 1 5 1

embassy vfsffs
257 TheofficialsfromtheBritishEmbassywouldalwayscometogetherwith officers from MI5. All three believe they saw somebody from the Embassy on about six separate occasions They would ask ifthey had any problems but all three men got the impression that the officials didn't seem interested at all Only Asif reports that on one occasion an official wrote down his list of complaints but the only changes cameaboutasaresultofthehungerstrikebytheprisonersthemselvesShafiq saysthat on oneoccasionthe Foreign Officewasduetocomebuthewastoldtheir planehadn'tgottotheislandWhentheycamethenextdayitseemsthey'dcome withthe M15officerwho had arrivedtointerrogatethemWhen Shafiq askedthe Foreign Officeofficialwhatwasgoing on hesaidaskM15WhenheaskedM15 they saidaskthe Foreign Office TheForeignOfficeofficial asked himquestionsabout hiswelfare Nobody explained why he was there Asif also reports that on more than oneoccasiontheBritishEmbassyofficialsactedasathirdinterrogatorasking questions that had nothing to do with theirwelfare but were of interest to the interrogators. None of the men felt they could trust or rely upon the Embassy officials. 258 Shafiq believeshewasinterrogated by British personnel on about6or7

occasions Despite asking on many occasions he was never allowed access to lawyers They were allowed to write home but they believe most of the letters were never sent out and they received few from theirfamilies When they flew back to London, theForeignOfficemanwhomtheyknewas'Martin'waspresentonthe flighL He told them to "mafre sure you say you were treated properfy' 259 Allthreemenbelievethatthe Foreign OfficeandM15werealwaysintotal C O

operationwiththeAmericansWhenthey asked aboutgoing home, theAmericans would say wbenfbe8rfffsbwanfyoubomeyoucangobomeButtheBritish would saywecan'fdoanyfbfng because youarefntB^ custody' When any of them complained about the treatment in Guantanamo Bay, about the food and

028599

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

105

0 0 0 0 0 1 5 2

general conditions, the ForeignOfficewouldalwayssaythereisnothingwecando They seemed to try and makeajoke of if

^^0 Shafiq also adds,7woufdmentfon ofber probfems.^besefncfudedtbe facfr of any proper medfcaf treatment, for e^ampfe wffb my frnees and my bacfr pafn.li^e suffered sfeepdeprfvaffon and dfdnot get enougbfood.Tbe wafer was undrfnfrabfe and fbey dfsrespecfedour reffgfon andfbe f^oran.frafsed aff fbese wffb fbe embassy officfafs,someffmes fbey made brfefnofes, buf dfdn'f reaffycommenfonfbemandnofbfngcbanged^easfredabouffegaf represenfaffon buf on eacb occasfon fbey woufd^ust say "we don't frnow about fbat.f^yfmpressfon was fbaffbey were fofd by fbe ^merfcan autborfffes fbaf fbey coufd not feff us anyfbfng.fafsotbougbfff was fafrfy cerfafn fbaf fbey bad been brfefed on everyfbfng fbaf was gofng on, our treatment, condfffons of defenffon,wbaf came up fn fbe varfous fnferrogaffons as weff as our bebavfoursfnce fbey fast vfsffed.fam sure fbaf fbey were aware offbeabusesfore^ampfefbesborfsbacfrffng.Tbeycer^afnfyfrnewfbafwe werefnfsofaffonforfbreemonfbs

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028600 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3

MIS 261 "From approximately July 2002 MIS officers interrogated us without American interrogators or guards present in the room. We were in exactly the same physical circumstances of interrogation as when the Americans interrogated us, sitting on a plastic chair shackled to the floor. We complained to MIS as well as the Foreign Office about all the things that were being done to us in Guantanamo Bay. You couldn't tell the difference between the MIS and the Foreign Office. Neither was interested in us other than to get information we didn't have. The last three interrogations Asif did not talk to them at all. When we saw the Foreign Office we were chained in exactly the same way as when we were befng interrogated."

262.

"Bofb MIS and the Foreign Office wrote down on different occasions long

lists of all of our complaints. We all made complaints. We understand that claims are now being made that we did not make complaints of at least some of the things that happened to us. We complained about everything that was being done to us and notes were made. We cannot believe how it can now be being said that we did not complain. After the guards had told us that they had seen on the news that we had a case happening on the outside we asked the Foreign Office and MIS and our American interrogators about it and they all said they knew nothing. They didn't bring us news." 263. "Primarily MIS were interested in getting from us information about people

in England and the British detainees who were in Cuba but we didn't have any to give them. They also wanted us to get information out of other British detainees."

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028601 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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Re British interrogators 264. "We know that the British asked questions not just of British detainees but certainly of French, Belgian, Danish, Swedish, Bosnian, Algerian and some Arabs, Libyans, anyone they thought had either been in Britain or had information about people in Britain."

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028602 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 5

^ufcfdes 265 While they were in Guantanamo Bayalarge number of people tried to commit suicide In addition,of thoseanumber tried to commit suicide repeatedly The attemptsundoubtedlygointoseveralhundredaltogether,atleasL(Asifrecollects the first instance ofwhich he was aware was in CampXRay The first time Asif saw itwasduringthedaytime""^omeonefrom^audfB^rabfa^ustsuddenfymade9 noose and banged bfmsefffn front of me.fand everyone efsesboufed and fn fact fbe guards came and be dfd not dfe. " 266 "l^e were fofd by sofdferswbaf bappenedfo one defafneewbere we were

not present, someone caffedl^fcbaf from ^audf^rabfa wbo we understand bungbfmsefffffso^ygenwascutoffandbepassedoufTbeguardsfoofrbfm down buf fben beat bfm up andnow be fsbasfcaffyacabbage.ffefs apparenffysfowfyrecoverfng.Forawbffe someone badfo feed bfm buf we understood now be can eat by bfmseff.l^e understand fbat be was fn fnfensfve care for overayear.f^eneverwenfbacfrfo fbe bfocfr agafn. ^ s weff asbefngfnfnfensfvecarebefsapparenffysbacfrfedfofbebedbybandand foot. Tbe guards fofd us and f^bubef saw bfm wben be was fnbospftafseefng adenffsf.(^Tbfsbappenedsbortfyprforfocomfngbome fourdaysbefore because we were comfngbome and fbey wanted fosbow we were befng treated decenffy.f^bubef bad been fnpafn for overayear and bad been asfrfng foseeadenffsfforoverayear.^"

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028603 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 6

f^edfcafcare 267 Theydescribeaveryhighpercentageofdetaineestherearenowon antidepressants^Prozac and would say at leastahundred detainees have become observably mentally ill as opposed to just depressed ""f^oraf feast of fbose so far as we are aware fbefrbebavfourfs so dfsturbed as fosbow fbaf fbey are no fongercapabfeofraffonaffbougbforbebavfour.li^edonofdescrfbefndefaff berefbebebavfourbuffffssomefbfngfbafonfyasmaffcbffdorananfmaf mfgbfbebavefffreB^ffoffbosewbobavebecomeserfousfymenfaffyaffecfed seem fo be frepffnOeffabfocfr."Asif describes how the first time he walked past Oeltablockonthewaytointerrogationhecouldhearstrangeinhumannoises""Tbe mffffarypoffcetofdusfbaffbeyfffredworfrfngfnOeffabfocfrbecauseffwas "easyworfr'OnOeffabfocfrfbeywoufdbave^^peopfeworfrfngasopposedfo four.Four of fbem woufd be medfcs, so you bave very fffffeworfrfo do. ^acb guardwaswafcbfngaboufffvepeopfe.Tbeyseemedfofafreamaffcfous pfeasurefndescrfbfng fbe dfsturbedbebavfourfbat fbey were wafcbfng.Tbey safdfbaffbeywerepfayfngmusfcforfbemfffredrumsandfbatpornograpbfc pfcfures were puf oufsfde. " 268 " Tbesepeopfe were obvfousfyserfousfy fff and yet we understand fbey sffff

geffnferrogafedandfffbeysaysomeonefsfromB^fOaedafbenfbaf fnformaffon fsused^ffffarypoffcefofdusfbfsl^edfdnofgettbefmpressfon fbafwbatfbeywerefefffngusfbeyweremafrfngupforanypurposeTbe guardswbowerefefffngusfbfswerefefffngusffwffbamusemenfand suggesffng fbaf fbey were gefffng fnformaffon fi^ompeopfe and fbaf fbey were dofng basfcaffyfbe^obfbeyweremeanffobedofng,f.e.fbemfssfonwas successfuf." 269 ""Tbefasfyearwewerefbere,onCbrfsfmas09yfbeguardscamefbrougb ourcageswffbbafonsbangfngonfbecageswffbdogs.Tbeyearbeforeon Cbrfsfmas Oay fbey bad fafren everyone's sbeefs away apparentfyarumour bavfngbeenspreadwbfcbwascompfetefyuntruefbateveryonefnfbecamp

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028604 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery

00000157

wasgofngfobangfbemsefves.f^ogswoufdbepafrofffngfnfbecamp,around fbe camp aff fbe ffme buf woufdbe brougbffn about fbreeffmesadayfo cages,fnfofbebfocfr8.Tbeywere^fsaffansandfbeguardsorderedfbemfo barfr.f^ogs were not used 98 dfrecffy as fbey were fnf^andabarfofnffmfdafe buf we frnew of fnsfanceswberepeopfe bad been bfffenfn guantanamo by dogsandfberewasafwaysfbaffearfbaftbedogwoufdbefeffnfoyourceff" 270. On one occasion this happened to Asifwhere as the dog wentthrough the block

someone said Meow'and Asif got the blame and was intimidated by the guard who came into his cell and brought the dog in. 271 There were aware of one man,Abdul Rahman Madini,aSaudi Arabian,wherea

dogwasbroughtintobarkathimthroughouthisinterrogationAnotherman, MoussaMadini got bitten in his cell in isolation byadog very badly,taking,they understoodabigchunkofhislegout,themusclepartofhiscalfTheyunderstood he was in hospital afterthat and then taken to Camp Echo He was very mentally affected and for instance, he would hardly eaL (Rhuhel used to be next to him Shafiq also saw him. He was extremely skinny and could eat very little He would be pacing around his cell really fast for hours It would consist of stepping back and steppingforwardbecausetherewasnospaceatallThisisarecurrentthemeinthe camp,that there are so many people seriously depressed and asaresult they don't eat)(Thenamesreferredtoarefamilial names, as is customary)

272.

They noticed that detainees who had either visited America or lived in America

foranylengthoftimeweregivenaparticularlyroughtimeTheywereall being accused of being Al-Oaeda cells. These were men from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain. These were people who had been, most of them, students One man, darullah, whose sister in law is in America and is American, was told that his sisterin-lawwould be treated very badly in America and that she would be imprisoned They understood that he was told that she was already in prison in America and that badthingswerebeingdonetoherTheywereinterrogatedmorethananyoneArab nationals also hadaparticularly hard time There were on the other hand Afghanis

028605

iorcical Discovery Defense Reciprocal

0 0 0 0 0 1 ^ 8

and Pakistanis, mostly Afghanis, who were simply not interrogated foravery, very longtime They werejustthere without any reason for keeping them there.

028606

Oefense RecVr^al Discovery

0 0 0 0 0 1 5 9

f^epsycbfafrfsfs 273 "li^eareawarefbaffberewereafargenumberofpsycbfafrfsfsaf OuantanamoBayaffbougbwefbfnfrfbeywerenofaffguaffffedbutmany frafneesfbere.Tbewbofe camp was aware fbat one detafnee badfaffenfnfove wffbapsycbfafrfsf and cut ber name fn bfs arm. ffer name was f^feur.^be was specfaffsf ^4. I^e beard fbaf perbapssbe was dfsturbed as weff and was safd fo bave bebaved most fnapproprfatefy wffb fbaf detafnee and fbaf sbe was removed fo oufsfde fbe wfres. " 274 ""Onepsycbf9frfsffberew9sgoodf^ewasacapfafn,acfuaffyadocforf^e

used fo worry about peopfe.^ou coufdfeff from bfs face. "When Rhuhel and AsifcomplainedaboutlosingweightdrasticallyheprescribedEnsureandMREs (prepacked meals) for them Shafiq says ""we used fo feff bfm about ofber defafnees wbo bad probfems and be woufd fry f o b e f p . l ^ e n be came on fbe bfocfr be woufd come fo us fbree first and asfr us about ofber peopfe.f^e was unusuaf.Tbeofberswoufdfargefycomefofbebfocfrandasfrusguesffons fffre "do you want fofrfffyourseffB^Oo you bave any desfrefofrfff^merfcan sofdfers^OrceffmafesBfnmafes^" ffyou answered "nofo fbose guesffons fben fbeydsay "youreofray.Tbepsycbfafrfsf fbaf we fbougbf was good woufd come onto fbe bfocfr wffb fr9nsf9for8fnt^rdu,^rabfc,f^asbfu,Farsf and woufd fry to understandpeopfe'sprobfems.Tbe ofbers woufd come wffbouf fransfafors and fben dfsappearforfive or sf^ days beforeafransfafor woufd comebacfrwffbfbemffewasunusuaffnfbafbewasnofprescrfbfngf^rozac across fbe board fffre fbe ofbers were. ffe'dfoofrafyourprobfem,fffre "you've gofnoonefofaffrfo'andfryfopufyouwftbsomeoneTberewasofcourse onfyaffmffed amount fbat be coufd do."

275

"l^edfdnffrnow fbe name of fbe good psycbfafrfst.Tbey bad to cover fbefr

names wffb bfacfrfape.Tbe names fbaf we frnow were because af fbe begfnnfng fbey dfdnfbavefo cover up fbefr names, wewere fofdby sofdfers fbat fbe sofdfers were fofd fbaf fbey bad fo cover up fbefr names because

028607

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0

wben fbe detainees were released they would go home and then come back to America and kill them. There were some who thought that they shouldn't cover their names and their attitude was 'why should we?' but they were ordered to."

028608

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000161

Shafiq - medical problems/injuries 276. In relation to the medical facilities at the camp Shafiq adds that whilst I was in Kandahar I started experiencing some problems with my knees. These became a lot worse when I arrived at Camp X-Ray. I think the problem was aggravated a lot by the position I was made to sit in for so long on the plane journey. Throughout the time I was at Guantanamo and still today I have quite a lot of pain in my knees. I experience pain when I'm walking or when I kneel to pray. When I was at Guantanamo I asked for medical treatment. Often when you asked a corps man for a doctor no-one would come. Occasionally when a doctor was doing a round I would see him and explain my problems. Sometimes the doctor would give me some painkillers. I was always given them when I hadn't had anything to eat so fbe fabfefs caused severe stomach ache as the pain killers were obviously really strong. 277. f afso bad similar problems with my back. That seemed to start from when I was in Camp Delta sleeping on metal bunks and when I was made to squat, or sit, in really awkward positions. It was made much worse by the short shackling. I still have back pain in my lower back. I have been to my GP who can see there is a problem and has given me some medication. 278. Tbe ofber injuries I have were from when I was handcuffed in Kandahar

and when I was on the plane. I got very bad cuts on my ankles and wrists from the tightness of the cuffs. When we were taken off the plane they were pushing us about and fcfcfrfng us so f sustained bruising'.

115
028609 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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f^bubef-medfcafprobfemsBfn^urfes
279 Rhuhel in particular has suffered irreversible damage to his eyes He suffers fromacondition where the cornea of his eye is misshaping (intoashapelikea rugbyball)Theconditioniscontrollablebyagaspermeablecontactlenswhichis whathehadbeforehewasdetained ThroughoutthetimehewasatGuantanamo Hisfamilywrote hewasurgentlyaskingforlensesandthesolutiontogowiththem

to him that they had sent lenses for him No one evertold him they had come There was some contact between the American authorities and Rhuhel's specialist in England butstill no lenseswereeverprovidedEverytimeheasked his interrogatorstheywould say ""ff'snofaboffday camp" Aboutaweekbeforehe left some more lenses were produced but again with no correct solution. Since he has seen his specialist and he has had it confirmed what he was of course aware of himself that his eyesight has drastically deteriorated asaresult ofthe lack of any medical attention at afl. Rhuhel and Asif are also suffering from pain in their knees and lower back pain forthe same reasons as explained by Shafiq.

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028610 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 3

I^ffffarypersonnef 280 OneunitofguardscamefromPuertoRicanlnfantryTheytreatedthedetainees likehumanbeingsTheywerenoticeablypleasanterthanotherunitsthatwere based there "Tbey dfd fbefr^obprofessfonaffy,fefreaffng us fffrebuman befngs. Tbey were fafren off duty. Tbey fofd us fbaf fbey were fnfroubfe becausefbeyweretreaffngusweff.Tbeyfofdusfbaffbeyfrnewwbafwas rfgbfandwbafwaswrongbuffbaffbeygoffnfofroubfefordofngwbafwas rfgbf. Tbey were bfamed, we understood, for aff fbe probfemsfn fbe camp.To our frnowfedgeff was not fbey wbo made probfems.Tbere were fwo unffs of Puerto f^fcans.l^e are aware fbaf fbe first unff got senffo frag andfbe second unff we beffeve afso after ff returned to ^merfca got senffo frag. Tbe second group of f^uertof^fcan sofdfers was fn fact spfff up fnfo dffferenfunffs so fbaf fbey dfdn'f worfr as one unffTbere was afsoaunfffrom fbe ^rgfnfsfands wbo were treated fnasfmffarway.ff was very cfearfo us fbaf fbere was dfscrfmfnaffon and racfsm. Tbe sofdfers fbemsefves used fo feff us about fbe racfsm and fbe dfscrfmfnaffon fbey suffered."

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028611 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 6 0 0 0 0 1 6 4

Tbe state of some other prisoners 281. A few prisoners only are mentioned here. 1. Jamil el-Banna and Bisher al-Rawi 282. Asif says he was in Mike block in Camp Delta next to Suwad Al Madini (a Saudi national whose wife is British and whose children are British, also known as Shakir . . .). He recollects, A large number of the men were brought into the block from isolation. I believe they came in February 2003 having spent a month in isolation in Guantanamo Bay after they arrived. Abu Ennis, Jamil el-Banna, was put in the cell next to me. Given that he had been in isolation for a month and before that in Bagram Airbase (and before that I understood in Gambia), he was still coping but quite soon after he began to deteriorate. I didn't talk to him much about the Gambia but knew he'd gone there to set up a business. He said that Bagram was very rough. When he arrived at Guantanamo he had very little facial or head hair which he said had all been shaved off in Bagram Airbase. He said that he had been forced to walk around naked, coming and going from the showers, having to parade past American soldiers or guards including women who would laugh at everyone who was put in the same position. When he arrived at Guantanamo his English was not good and still is not good. Bisher al-Rawi was placed on the same row of cells and he used to translate for him. El-Banna was in constant pain from his joints because he suffered from rheumatism and he was diabetic. He told them repeatedly that he was diabetic and they would not believe him " 283. " Tbey used fo come and take his blood and say that there was nothing

wrong with him. Bisher al-Rawi also told them that el-Banna was not well. When you come new they come and take your blood " (Shafiq recollects that they were told by the guards and by the medical officers who were military, that costs were being cut in respect of food and medicine. They said that the cost of the military personnel was going up and that meant that they had to cut costs in other ways which included food for the prisoners and medical care for the prisoners.

00000165

284

ft was very noffceabfe by fbe ffme we feft fbaf fbe guafffy offood andfbe

amountoffoodbadgonedown. Tbefood bad been parffcufarfybadaffbe begfnnfngffbadfmprovedsffgbffydurfngfbeffmeweweretbere,butusedfo noffceabfyfmprove^usf before fbere wasavfsfffrom fbe ForefgnOfffce" 285 (DuringthefirstRamadanAsifrecollectstheywerefasting,obviouslyHowever

they would only be provided with two mealsaday and those were drastically reduced amounts like fourteaspoonfuls of rice "l^e were undertbe firm fmpressfondurfngfbefirsff^amadanfbafffwaspartofapoffcyfostopus fasffng and fo cause us fo abandon our reffgfouspracffces.l^benf^amadan finfsbed fbe food went bacfr up fonormaffevefs and fberefore ft was very obvfousfbatffwasdesfgnedfopufpressureonusfosfopfasffng,wbfcbafso fbe doctors and fbe guards were fefffng us fo stop. Tbe guards served us fbe food wbo bad been fofd(^tbeyfofdus fbfs^ fbaf fbey were under orders fogfve us fbaf mucb food from fbefr superfor officers. Ii^en we asfred after f^amadan wby we were bacfrfonormafsf^edraffons we were fofd fb9f fbe ^eneraf bad ordered fbaf now."") 286 "ft was very cfearfbafef^8anna was devotedfo bfs famffy.f^e bad

pbofograpbsofbfscbffdrenfncfudfngbfsnewdaugbfer.Tbesebadcomefn fbrougb fbe f^edCross.fcanrecoffecf one day wben fbe fnferrogafor came fo vfsffbfmfnfbebfocfr.^ensbevfsffedbfmfnfbebfocfrbesbowedberfbe pfcfures ofbfscbffdren and started cryfng and sbe safd fo bfm we're fryfngfo gefyououfofbere(^fbfswasanB^merfcanfnterrogafor^,wefrnowyou'rean fnnocenf man.fcoufdsee as fbe monfbs went by,"says Asif "fbaf be was worryfngmoreandmoreandfbaffbfswasbavfnganeffecfonbfsmenfaf beaffb.f^econsfanffyfaffred about bfs cbffdren and wbo woufd foofr after fbem."(Asif and Shafiq both comment that the repeated questions for Jamil el Banna whom they questioned less than they questioned BisheralRawi,concerned Abu Oatada and where he was.In the light ofthe fact that Abu Oatada is known to have been arrested in England in late 2002,it seems extraordinary that this wasa questionthattheAmericanswereasking)

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287.

Shafiq says that to his knowledge during the time that el-Banna was in

Guantanamo helostabout 40 kilos inweighLHestartedoffassomeonequitebulky and became someone very, very thin. Asif is aware that el Banna found it almost impossible to eat the food that was provided.What was provided wasameal packeL "Tbe meafpacfrefs were wbaf we coufd eat. Ii^e were fofd fbey cost ^7 eacb andconsfsfedofamafnmeaf, pasta and ^ffredo sauce, pasta and vegefabfesfn tomato sauce, bfacfr bean burrffo,cbeeseforfefffnf. Tbe sofdfers safd fbaf fbey were fnedfbfe, fbaf tbey woufdnf eat fbem, buffo us fbey were mucbmucbbefferfbanwbaf we bad before.Tbere were more caforfesfn fbem andtbey were more fifffng. Tbey weren't nfce buf we feff fuffer.^ome of tbese pacfragesweremarfredfosbowfbeywereover^2yearsofd8uffbenfbey sfoppedfbemaround^ufy2t^^3andwewerefofdbyfbeguardsfbatfbeycosf foomucb(^f^owever,abrandnewc9feferfawasbufffforfbeguardsB^ffbat pofnf we were fofd fbaf fbey bad fee cream added fo fbefr menu.^ef ^anna coufdmanagefoeaffbepacfragedmeafs(^caffed^f^^,bufbecoufdn'feaf anyfbfngefsel^benfbeysfoppedgfvfngfboseef^annacoufdn'fmanagefo eafanyfbfngefsef^efofdfbedocforsbuffbe^enerafsafdnoonecoufdbave fbeseprepacfragedmeafsanymoreandbecoufdnteafwbafwasonoffer li^ere compfefefy sure fbafforfbefbreeweefrs before we feft be wasnfabfefo eat af aff. ^venfuaffy we are aware fbaf fbey puf 8fsberaf^f^awfne^ffo bfm (^fbeybadbeenseparafed^fofr^fofreepbfmgofngmenfaffyandpbysfcaffy. l^ewoufdsayfbafmenfaffybasfcaffybesffnfsbedTbefasffbfngwebeard aboufbfmfbfsyearbeforewecamebacfrfo^ngfandwasfbafwbenbewenffo fnferrogaffon fbey fofd bfm fbat be was gofngfo be sent bacfrfo Jordan and be wase^fremefyscaredoffbafprospecfl^efrnewfbafbedbeenffvfngfn ^ngfandfor about fen years and wasarefugee and fbaf bfs wbofefffe was fn ^ngfand and bfs wffe and cbffdren. Tbey were cfearfy fbe cenfre of bfs wbofe e^fsfenceand9ffbeeverre9ffyfbougbf9bouf.Tbeprospecfofbefngsenffo Jordan meant to bfm fbe end ofbfsfffe.f^efrnew fbaf be woufd be tortured or frfffedfbere."

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288

2.f^e8fsberafR9wf Asif and Shafiq both rememberthat he was taken foraliedetectortest about

two weeks after he arrived from isolation in Guantanamo Bay (about six weeks after hegottoCuba),andwastoldthathe'dpassediLHewasputuptoLevel1,the highestlevel(whenShafiqwasthere)butthen"forreasonswedon"ffrnowand after bedpassedbfs ffedefecforfest we suddenfy beard fbaf be was fn fsofaffonandfbeprfvffegesfbafbedbeengfvenfffremagazfneswerefafren awayaswasever^bfngefsel^easfred bfm faferon wben wesawbfmwby be'dbeenpuffnfsofaffonandbebadnofdea.Tbeyfrepfsayfngfobfmfbafbe frnewmorefbanbewassayfng. 289 8fsberaf^f^awfbadanarmbandonsayfng"frag'and^amffef^8annabadan

armband on sayfng"^ordan',evenfbougb bofb of fbem ffvedfn^ngfand. 290 ^ e n 8 f s b e r was puf fnfsofaffon fbey sbaved bfs bead and beard, ^ e

frnow fbaf 8fsber was fnferrogafed probabfy more fban^t^ ffmes (^unfffreef^ 8annawbowasprobabfynoffnferrogafedmoretbanaboufffveffmes^1^e don't frnow fbe e^acf reasons wby8fsberaf^f^awfsbafr and beard were sbaved off buf we f^now fbaf wbaf used fobappenfo ofbers woufd be fbaf ff yousafdyoudfdn'fwanffogofofnferrogaffonyouwoufdbeforcfbfyfafren ouf of fbe ceff by fbe ^f^Ffeam.^ou woufd be pepper^sprayedfn fbe face wbfcb woufd frnocfr you fo fbe fioor as you coufdn'f breafbe or see and your eyeswoufdbesuf^ecffoburnfngpafnf^fveoftbemwoufdcomefnwffba sbfefd and smacfr you and frnocfr you down and^ump on you, bofd you down and puf fbe cbafns on you. ^ n d fben you woufd be fafren oufsfde wbere fbere woufdafreadybeaperson wffb cffppers wbo woufdforcfbfysbaveyourbafr andbeardfnferrog9forsgavefbeorderforfbaffobedone,tbeonfywayfn wbfcbfbfswoufdbefrfggeredwoufdbeffyouwerefnsomewayresfsffng fnferrogaffon,fnsomewaysbowfngfbafyoudfdn"fwanffobefnferrog9fedOr ffdurfngfnferrogatfonyouwerenoncooperaffvefbenffcoufdbappenasweff.

291

(^it was our vfew fbaf fbey were foofrfngforvufnerabfffffes aff fbe ffme and

fbaffbepeopfewboseemedmosfcomforfabfebavfngabeardormosfusedfo

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Oefense Reci^ocal Discovery

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ff, fbose were fbe ones fbaf fbey would shave it off. We think with the three of us that they thought we would not be so affected ifit happened to us. They would watch how you wash, how you eat, how you pray and the guards would talk to you and perhaps because we sounded more like the guards themselves and western that they did not think that we had those same vulnerabilities. They undoubtedly thought we had vulnerabilities, but different ones such as liking to talk to people, not liking to be alone, etc., and those were fbe ones fbey focused on with us.) 292. According to Bisher they seemed obsessed with what he was doing in

Gambia and wbo sent bfm fbere and where he got the money from to go and to finance their business project. They were still asking him about a battery charger that he had in his possession in his baggage on the plane. The Americans were asfrfng bfm about fbaf.

3. Moazzam Begg 293 Moazzam Begg we never saw. We only heard about him, particularly from Saad Al Madini, who was a Pakistani brought up in Saudi Arabia. He had been in Bagram Airbase with Moazzam Begg and he had himself been taken from Bagram Airbase. He had been we think handed over by Indonesia to the Americans, kept in Bagram Airbase, taken from Bagram Airbase to Egypt where he had been tortured and then taken back to Bagram and then to Guantanamo. 294 IVbffe we never saw Moazzam Begg, we did talk to guards who had had

contact with him and they told us fbaf be bad been fn isolation all the time he was there and had only seen fbem and no one efse. Four guards fofd us fbaf be was fn a very bad way. fn addition, he was in Bagram for a year and no one that we know of had ever been there for a year and must be in a worse state coming out ofit. People coming from there used to tell us that there was a British guy imprisoned there and that must have been Moazzam Begg.

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028616 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery (l A A H A i A Q

295

l^edon ffrnow buf bave fbe fmpressfon fbaf be may bave bad "admfssfons"

forced ouf of bfm af Bagram wbfcb be dfd nofwanffoconffnue wben be got fo guantanamo Bay and fbe autborfffes frepf bfm fnfsofaffonfo stop bfm befng abfefo go bacfr on wbaf be may bave safd orto bave fbe cbance of gefffng any supporffromanyoneefsefbafmfgbfcausebfmforesfstwbatfbeywanfed li^e beffeve fbaf be was fnfsofaffonfn Camp Oeffa and fben fnfsofaffonfn Camp^cbo.Tbefmpressfonwebavefsfbaffbepofnfoffreepfngpeopfefn compfefefsofaffonfn Camp ^cbo was so fbaf fbey woufd fn every way be underfbeconfrof of fbepeopfe wbo befd fbem fbere. Tbey woufd bave no ofber fnformaffon tbanwbaffbey were gfven by fbeguards orfbe fnferrogaforsandwoufdbeobffgedfopufafffbefrfrusffnwbaffbeysafdand woufd frnow nofbfng wbafsoever about wbaf was bappenfngfn fbe oufsfde worfd or even fn guantanamo Bay. Tbe guards were especfaffypfcfredfo goto ^cbo.l^efaffredfo peopfe wbo bad come bacfr from Camp ^cbo.

296

4.1^amdoubffabfb One was ^amdoubffabfb, wbo was fbe ^usfraffan.f^e safd fbaffbere was

no nafurafffgbfaf aff fbere. ^ven wben you went fo fbe sbower, wbfcb was "oufsfde",ff was sffff seafed off so you coufdnf see any nafurafffgbfafaff.^ou coufdnffeffwbafffmeofdayornfgbfffwas.^ouwerefnaroomandaguard wassffffngoufsfdew9fcbfngyou24boursadayTbafwasbfs^ob,^usffosff oufsfde fbe ceff and wafcb you. 297 ffabfbbfmseffwasfn cafasfropbfcsbape, menfaf andpbysfcaf. asaresuff

ofbfsbavfngbeenfor^uredfn^gypfwberebewasfafrenfromBagramand fbenbrougbfbacfr,beusedfobfeedfrombfsnose,moufbandearswbenbe was asfeep.l^e woufd say be was about years of age. ffe got no medfcaf affenffonforfbfs.li^e used fo bear bfm asfr buf bfs fnferrogafor safdfbaf be sboufdn f bave any. Tbe medfcs woufd come and see bfm and fben a^er be d asfred for medfcafbefp fbey woufdcome bacfr and say ffyou cooperate wffb your fnferrogafors fben we can do somefbfng. (Shafiq says " f^abfb fofd me fbfs andfbave afso beard fbem say fffo ofber defafnees as weff"".)Asif recollects

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028617 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0

that "anofber man wbo dbeenfafrenfo^gypf and tortured fbere, ^aadB^f fli^adfnf, was afso refusedmedfcafassfsfanceforfbe same reason, l^efrnow from ^ f ^ a d f n f fbaf be bad bad efecfrodes puf on bfs f^nees and fbaf somefbfng bad bappenedfo bfs frnees and somefbfng badbappenedfo bfs bfadderandbebadprobfemsgofngfofbefoffeff^efofdusfbafwbenbewas fnfnferrogaffon be was fofd by fbe fnterrogafors fbaf ff be cooperated be woufd be first fnffne for medfcaf treatment.

^.Omarf^badr 298 Rhuhel recollects ""fbe same fbfng afso, we are aware, bappenedfoayoung Canadfan man, Omar f^b9dr,wbo was aged ^7 wben we feft.ffe badbeen sbot fbree ffmes afpofnfbfanfr range and bfs fung punctured and bad sbrapneffn one eye andacafaracffn fbe ofber. Tbey woufdnot operate on bfm. ffe was fofd fbaf was because be woufd not cooperate. I^e were fofd one ffme wben be was fnfsofaffon be was on fbe fioorverybadfy fff. Tbe guards caffedfbe medfcs and fbey safd fbey coufdn f see bfm because fbe fnterrogafors bad refused fofef fbem. Ii^edonffrnowwbaf bappenedfo bfm (^be bad badsome sort of operaffon wben be was sffff fn^fgbanfsfan buf be was fn constant pafn fnOuanfanamo and sffff undoubfedfyfs and fbey woufd not gfve bfm pafn frfffers."(He was one doorfrom Rhuhel in the same block and all three used to talk to him.)

8.1l^obamedf^afab 299 One man,a^emenf,1l^obamedf^a^ab, was fnaparffcufarfy badstate, ^very fwo bours be woufdget moved from ceff fo ceff, 24 boursaday,sevendaysa weefr,someffmes ceff fo ceff, someffmesbfocfrfobfocfr,overaperfodof efgbf monfbs. ffe was deprived ofsfeep because of fbfs and be was afso deprfved of medfcaf affenffon.f^edfosfafof of wefgbf.l^e were aware fbaf be bada pafnfuf medfcaf probfem, baemorrbofds, and fbaf treatment was refused unfess be cooperated, f^e safd be woufd cooperate and bad an operaffon. f^owever,fbeoperaffon was notperformed correcffy andbe sffff bad probfems.ffe woufd not cooperate. Ii^e were aware fbaf sborffy before we

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Oefense Rec^^^al Discovery

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camebacfrfo^ngfandbewaspuffnfof^omeobfocfrwbereyouweresfrfpped nafred.l^e woufd see peopfe go and come from f^omeo.l^en fbey went fbey woufd go fuffycfofbed.li^en fbey came bacfr fbey woufd onfy bave sborts on. Tbey fofd us fbaffbey woufd bave aff fbefr cfofbesfafren off fn fbe ceff. Tbe f^ed Cross fs aware offbfs.fffbe fnterrogafors afterfbaffbougbf you sboufd be affowedcfofbes, fben you were affowed fbem. Tbfs appeared tobe an open^ ended process dependfng on fbe fnferrogaffon and fbe fnterrogafors. Tbe peopfe wefrnowwbo wentfofbafbfocf^ werenotpeopfe wbo caused probfemsorweredfsrupffve.Tbewbofeappffcaffon of fbese measures was enffrefyfo do wffb fnterrogafors and wbefberfbeyfbougbffbey were gefffng out of fbem wbaffbey coufd and sboufdget ouf offbem.^ff fbe Bosnfans were fbere for fnsfance.

7.^fgerfan defafnees frfdnappedfnBosnfa 300 " By Bosnfans we mean sf^^fgerfans wbo were unfawfuffyfafren from Bosnfafo guantanamo Bay. Tbey fofd us bowfbey bad won fbefr Court case fnBosnfa.^s fbey waffred ouf of Courf,^merfcans were fbere and grabbed fbem and foofr fbem fo Camp ^^f^ay,^anu9ry 2^, 2t^t^2. Tbey arrived five days after us. Tbey were treated parffcufarfybadfy. Tbey were moved everytwo bours. Tbey were frepfnafredfn fbefr ceffs. Tbey were fafrenfo fnferrogaffon for bours on end. Tbey were sborfsbacfrfed for someffmes days on end. Tbey were deprfved of fbefr sfeep. Tbey never got fetters, nor boofrs, nor readfng maferfafs. Tbe Bosnfans bad tbe same fnterrogafors forawbffe as we dfd and so we frnew fbe names wbfcb were fbe same as ours and fbey were gfvena very bard ffme by fbose. Tbey fofd us fbaffbe fnterrogafors safd ff tbey dfdnf cooperate fbaf fbey coufd ensure fbaf somefbfng woufd bappenfo fbefr famfffesfn^fgerfaandfnBosnfa.TbeybadduafnaffonafffyTbeybadfamfffes fnBosnfaasweffasfn^fgerfa. 301 (^Fromwbaf we coufd see fnterrogafors used fo prey on parffcufar groups of naffonafffy so fbaf Europeans woufd bave fbe same fnterrogafors, f^orfb ^frfcans woufdbave fbe same, efc.^. One offbemefbods of fnferrogaffon was

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028619 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 2

fo say fbaf someone fn Cuba bad fofd fbem fbaf we were fnaparffcufarpface, for fnsfance, fbe vfdeo wo ve descrfbed and frafnfng camps fnf^andabar. Ii^en we asfred wbo ff was, fbey woufd not feff us." 302. (On one occasion Asifwas told who had implicated him because he was shown

the photograph ofaparticular detainee in Guantanamo and told that that man had implicated him and said that you were inamosqueinatraining camp in Afghanistan.However,thiswasadetainee whom Asif knew was mentally ill.Before Asifwas told this the man was placed inacell opposite him for about five days and then taken away and itwas afterthat that Asifwas accused "l^e coufd see fbe process by wbfcb fbe fnterrogafors seemed fo get e^cffed, because fbey finaffy got some pfece of "reafevfdence and sfmpfydfdn fcare fbaf ff bad come from someone wbo was menfaffyunbafanced. One of fbe fnterrogafors dfd afso fefsffp fbaf anofber detafnee bad fdenfffied us as fbe fbree wbo were fn fbe vfdeo and safd be"d seen us fn guantanamo Bay"(Shafiq recollects examples of interrogators inventing "information" about us, about the three, and then informing other detainees of if For example, one detainee came back after interrogation and said he'dbeen told that Shafiq said that he and another detainee should not be puttogether because they were in dispute with each otherwhich was completely untrue Shafiq had never said anything like thaL

303

" 1 ^ were fofd by one ^fgerfan^nof one offbeBosnfan^fgerfans^ fbaf be

bad been fafrenfo fnferrogaffon and been forced fo stand nafred.f^e afso fofd us be bad been forced fowafcbavfdeosupposedfysbowfng fwo defafnees dressed fn orange, one sodomfsfng fbe ofber and was fofd fbaf ff woufd bappenfo bfm ffbe dfdn'f cooperate." 304 An issue that all three men have concerns about is the treatment ofthose

detainees from countries withaworse human rights record than the UK Whilst in the Chinese block Asif managed to understand from one ofthe other detainees that theyhadoriginallyalldeniedtheywerefromChinaTheyhadapparentlysaidthey wereAfghani He says that they were very rarely interviewed Eventually the Americans told them that ifthey admitted where they were from they would not tell

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028620 Oefense Reciprocal Discovery ^

00000173

their governments (it seems they did not know ifthey were Chinese orfrom one of the Southern republics due to their dialect). The detainees admitted to being Chinese and within one month Chinese officials arrived to interrogate them. The Chinese officials told them that the US had provided full co-operation Ifthey are returned to China they will afl be executed. All three men report similar concerns in relation to the Russian detainees It seems thatanumber ofthese (possibly 20) have been returned to Russia and theirfate is unknown

8.f^avfdfffcfrs 305 Asif says7firsf saw f^avfdfffcfrsfn Camp ^^f^ay.ffewasaverysu^rfsfng sfgbf.^ffnywbffeguynofmorefban^'3"wffbafofoffaffoosonbfm.f^efofd us be bad endured an e^fremefy bad e^perfence bavfng been befdonasbfp wbere be bad been fnferrogafed by ^merfcans and booded and beaten, f^espffe fbaf e^perfence, be was fn better sbape fben fbaf be was wben we fast sawbfmfnll^ffrebfocfr. I^efbougbf fbaf be bad gone downbfff. Bydownbfff we mean fbaf be seemed fo be fosfng aff bope and more wffffngfo co operate asaresuff. I^e were fnferrogafedafof buf be used fo get fnferrogafed every fwo fo fbree days, someffmes every day.f^e was fofdfbaf ffbe dfdn'f cooperafebewoufdnevergobomeffsfarfedwbenbewasmovedfoOeffa, fbaf be began fo be moved aff fbe ffme. Tbey woufdn'ffef bfm sefffe wffb anyone. I^e met bfm agafn fnfl^ffrebfocfra^erOeffa and bad fbe fmpressfon fbaf be was befng forced fomafreadmfssfons, fbe " force" consfsffng of offers of benefits ffbe cooperated and removaf of anyfbfng fbaf coufdmafrefffe sffgbffyeasferffbedfdnof. I^e were aware for fnsfance fbaf be needed essenffaf medfcaf freafmenfforabernfa and fbaf be was fofd be woufd onfy get f f f f be cooperated, l^e do not frnow fbe reason for bfs appearance wben be arrfvedaf^ffrebfocfr,be bad afways been proud of bfs bafr,buf wben be arrfved fbere bfs bead bafrwas sbaved of^ affbougb be sffff badabeard.l^e werefofdbysomeguardsfbafbewasfafrenfo^cboafferbesfarfedco^ operaffngandfbaffn^cbobebadaccessfomorebasfccomfor^sasareward, affbougbfffsourundersfandfngfbafbewasfnCamp^cbofefncompfefe fsofaffon from fbe summer of 2t^t^3 onwards and we presume sffff fbere, wbere

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028621 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 4

fbeonfypeopfebecoufdcommunfcafewffbwoufdbefnferrogaforsTbesame guards afso fofd us fbaf be bad been fafren ouf of ^cbo for anofber operaffon, buf we don't frnowff fbaf fs correct

^.Tbef^uwafffs 306 "Fouadfl^abmoud^ff^abfabwasabusfnessman, we understand, wbo bad sfudfedfnB^merfcaandgraduafedfroml^famffnaeronauffcafengfneerfngTo usbesounded^cofffsbffebadffvedfn^ngfandB^coffandforappro^fmafefy fenyearsffewasgfvenaparffcuf9rfybardffme,befngconsfanffymoved around, every fwo bours, after ^eneraf^fffer came fo fbe Camp, ffefoofr bfs pofygrapb test andpassedafong ffme ago and was fnfffaffy sent to fbe best secffonoffbeCampbuffbenbrougbtbacfr agafn afferawbffe.f^egof e^fremefybarsbfreafmenffncfudfngsborfsbacfrffng.Becausebewas educated, we understand, weaffby,and fbey were defermfned fbaf be bad fo be part o f a c e f f . ^ e understood fbaf be was sefzedfnFafrfsfan,basfcaffysofd byfbeFafrfsfanfsandfbenfbe^merfcansfnvenfedaccusaffonsfofryandfif. fn2t^^fbef^uwafffgovernmenfcameandfofdafftbef^uwaftfstbaffbeywoufd begofngbomefn^une.li^benfbeywanfedtofrnowwbafwoufdbappenfo fbemwbenfbeygofbome,fbeywerefofd""youwfffffndoufwbenyougef bome."l^ecoufdseefbafbewassufferfngfromserfousdepressfon, fosfng wefgbffnasubsfanffafwayandverysfressedbecauseoffbeconstanfmoves, deprfved of sfeep and serfousfyworrfed about fbe conseguences for bfs cbffdren^veryfafberfnfbecampbadabugeworryaboufbfsfamffywbfcb added fo fbe sfress.'Shafiq recollects when he was next to him in isolation that he was suffering from serious stomach pains and that medication was denied He was told that he couldn't receive medication unless he cooperated.

^^Ofberdefafnees(^fncfudfngdef9fneessofdfofbe^merfcans^ 307 Asif describesadisturbing number of detainees who have clearly been sold All three are convinced that there must beapaper trail which will show huge sums of money paid out by the USA for many of those now in Guantanamo. Theseare some examples(some of the names are familial names,as is customary)

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a^ "TwobrofbersfromFafrfsfan, onefsascbofarfbeofberareporfer, reason fbey are fbere because fbey were bavfngafeud wffb anofber famffy,fbeofberfamffy fofd somepeopfe fbey are afOaedanowtbey are fn Cuba. Bofb were sure fbat tbe ^merfcans were payfng money for capffves. b^ numerous ofberpeopfefn Cuba wbo are from ^fgbanfsfan and Fafrfsfan were sure fbey bad been sofd by corrupt fndfvfduafs.^fof of peopfe wbo were bavfng fanddfspufes were sofd by fbe dfspufersfo fbe ^merfcans. Tbesepeopfe were brougbffo Cuba. Tbe ^merfcansfrnow fbey are fnnocenf buf sffff fbey are not fefffng fbem go. c^ ^bu^bmed^9frfrf,a^audf^rabf9ncfff^enmarrfedfoaFafrfsfanfwffe ffvedfnFafrfsfan wffb bfs wffe and was arrested fnFafrfsfan by fbe Fafrfsfan autborfffes. I^osfofbfspossessfons were fafrenfncfudfng bfs moforbffre and casb.t^pon bfs refeasefnFafrfsfan by fbe autborfffes be asfred for bfs vafuabfesbacfr buf be was re^arresfed and banded overto fbe^merfcans wbo foof^bfm fo Cuba andbe bas been fbere foroverfwo years, ffe was fofd be sboufd not be fbere buf fbey wanted bfm fo spy fn fbe camp forfbem. f^e was fofd once be bad cooperatedand befpedfbe ^merfcans fbey woufd refease bfm. d)^bu^bmad^ud9nf,afeacberfnFafrfsfanwbobasawffeandacbffdfn Fafrfsfanbeffeves be afso was sofdfo fbe ^merfcan forces, ffe was fofd fbaf be woufd be refeased overayear ago buf be fs sffff fn Cuba, ^e doesn't frnow wben fbey wfffrefease bfm to. ffe wants fo go foFafrfsfan because bfs wffe and cbffd are fnFafrfsfan.f^fswffe and cbffd are Fafrfsfanfnaffonafffyandbefsa^udanf.' e^OneBlfgbanfm9n,afarmerabouf^^yearsofd,fsafarmerfromBamyam f^e was nextto ^bafig.f^espeafrsFarsf and affbougb fn Cuba for overa year was onfy fnferrogafed on fwo occasfons^ on one occasfon fbere was noFarsffransfaforandbewasbrougbfbacfrfobfscage.f^edoesnof frnowwbaf be bas done fo be fn Cuba, f^e doesn't even frnowwbere Cuba fsfffefs depressed, scaredand badfy affected.

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Camp Four 308 Asif says numerous ofber defafnees bave been fofd fbaffbefr fnferrogaffon basfinfsbed,fbeybavepassednumerous tests e.g. ffedefecfor,sfress anafyserfesf. Tbey bave been fafrenfoCamp4buf fbey sffff bave not been refeased. 309 fffscaffedamedfumsecurffysecffon. Ii^en we were fnt^uanfanamo fbere were four bfocfrs. One bfocfrbas four bays fn ft. ^acb bay bas fen orfwefve peopfefnfnsteadofwearfngorangetbeyaffwoufdbewearfngwbffeTbese are fbe defafnees wbo are afwayssbownonT^pfayfngfoofbaff.Tbey don't wear cbafns or sbacfrfes. Tbey are safdtobepeopfe wbo are about fo go bome buf fbey yet bave been fbere about one year. Tbese are e^ampfesoffbe bundredsofpeopfe wbo sboufd never bave been fn Cuba fn fbe first pface. Tbe autborfffes seem parafyzed. Tbey can't send fbem bome, fbey don't bofberfofnferrogafe fbem so fbey are^usfsfucfr.'

Shafiq Rasul Asiflqbal Rhuhel Ahmed

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For Opinion See 124 S.Ct 2686 , 124 S.Ct 1494 , 124 S.Ct. 534 U.S.,2004.
Supreme Court of the United States. Shafiq RASUL, et al., Petitioners, v. George W. BUSH, et al.. Respondents. No. 03-334. January 22, 2004. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Petitioners' Brief on the Merits Joseph Margulies Counsel of Record Margulies & Richman, PLC 2520 Park Avenue, South Minneapolis, MN 55404 (612) 872-4900 MaeArthur Justice Center University of Chicago Law School 1111 East 6 0 * Street Chicago, IL 60637 (773) 702-9560 Barbara J. Olshanky Steven .Macpherson Watt Michael Ratner Center for Constitutional Rights 666 Broadway New York, NY 10012 (212)614-6430 John J. Gibbons Gitanjali S. Gutierrez Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, P C. One Riverfront Plaza

Newark, NJ 07102 (973) 596-4700 Attorneys for Petitioners * i QUESTION PRESENTED Whether United States courts lack Jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. * i i LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW The following persons imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base appeared below as petitioners: Mamdouh Habib; Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal; and David Hicks. The following individuals, who are family members of the detainees listed above, also appeared below as next friend petitioners: Maha Habib, the wife of Mamdouh Habib; Skina Bibi, the mother of Shafiq Rasul; Mohammed Iqbal, the father of Asiflqbal; and Terry Hicks, the father of David Hicks. The following persons appeared below as respondents: George W. Bush, President of the United States; Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; Brigadier General Michael Lehnert, Commander of Joint Task Force-160; Brigadier General Rick Baccus, Commander of Joint Task Force-160; Colonel Terry Carrico, Commander of Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and Lieutenant Colonel William Cline, Commander of Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. *iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ... i LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW ... ii

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C. Guantanamo Is Not Like Wartime China or Germany ... 41 D. The Current Hostilities Do Not Justify A Departure From Settled Practice ... 46 CONCLUSION ... 50 *v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES OPINION BELOW JURISDICTION I 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVl SIGNS INVOLVED I STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 7

FEDERAL CASES .Addingtrm v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418(1979) ... 17 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)... 12 Atkins V. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) ... 29 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ... 19

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ARGUMENT 9

LTHEHABEASSTATUTEGIVESTHEDIS TRICT COURT JURISDICTION 9 A.HabeasTurnsOnExecutiveDetention,NotTbe Accident ofNationalityorSitus... 11 B TbeHabeasStatute ShouldNot B e R e a d T o Condone CreatingAPrisonOutsideThe Law... 16 1. Tbe Executive's Interpretation Of Tbe Habeas Statute Would Raise Serious Doubts Under The Due Process Clause... 17 2. Tbe Executive's Interpretation Of The Habeas Statute Would Also Raise Serious Doubts Under The Suspension Clause , .21 ^IvC.UnreviewableExecutiveDetentionlsReJec ted Not Only By Anglo American Tradition, But Also By "Every Modern Government".,23 IL THE GOVERNMENT OFFERS NO PERSUAS IVE REASON TO IGNORE THE UNAMBIGU OUS COMMAND OF THE HABEAS STATUTE 29 A. Introduction ...30 B. TheCourtIn,.^c^^^,^^,i^RestrainedTheExercise Of HabeasWbereALawful And Independent Sys tern of Justice Had Allowed Tbe PrisonersToCbal lengeTbeirDetention,,,32

Bird V, United States, 923 F. Supp. 338 (D.Conn. 1996) .„ 45 Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) ... 9 Bi aden v. 3o'^ .Judicial Circuit Court. 410 U.S. 484 (1973) ... 12, 38 Brr)wn v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) ... 13, 15, 39, 46 Burns v, Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) ...passim Burn V. Schick, 23 M.J, 140 (U.S.C.M.A. 1986) ... 44 *vi Callas v. United States. 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958) ,.. 46 CarLson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) ... 18 Chew Hermg v. United States,, 112 U.S. 536 (1884) ... 15 Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) ... 31, 37 DeMore v. Kim,. 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708 (2003) ... 13

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Downes v. Bidwell. 182 U.S. 244 (1901) ... 20, 46 Duncan v. Kahanamoku. 327 U.S. 304 (1946) ... 30 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) ... 9

Vo/,mf,M V. ZerW. 304 U.S. 458 (1938)... 9, 37 Joint Anti-fascist Refugee Committee v, McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)... 18 Kansas v, Hendricks. 521 U.S. 346(1977) ... 17

Ex parte Hawk. n W . S . 114 (1944) ... 37 Ex Parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327 (1973) ... 12 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874) ... 9 Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868) ... 12,40 *vii Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) ... passim Ex parte Royall, I 17 U.S. 241 (1886) ... 37 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869) ... 13, 14 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) ... 13, 14 Frank v, Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) ... 37 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) ... 17 Gherehi v. Bush, _ F . 3 d _ , 2003 WL 22971053 (9th Cir, Dec. 18, 2003)... 41 Gwfit V. 340 U.S. 128 (1950)... 36 McElroy v. United States ex rel, Guagliardo, 361 U.S, 281 (1960) ... 15 *ix Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy. 6 U.S. (2 Crunch) 64 (1804)... 11,29 NgFung Ho V. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) ... 41 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)... 15 Padilla v, Rumsfeld _ F . 3 d _ , 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25616 (2d Cir. Dec. 18 2003),.. 44 Ralpho V. Bell, 569 F,2d 607, reh'g denied, 569 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir, 1977)... 46 Rasul V , Bush, _ U . S . _ , 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003) ... 1,4 Reidv, Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957) ... 19, 20 Steel Co, v. Citizens f o r a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) ... 40 Aer/mg v. Com/oMfm, 287 U.S. 378 (1932)... 30 V. ^f. 533 U.S. 289 (2001) &oMe V. f o W / . 428 U.S. 465 (1976)... 30, 37 .Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) ... 13, 15, 17 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) ... passim Swain V, Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) ... 13, 23 Toth V, Quarks, 350 U.S. 1 I (1955) ... 12 *x United States v, Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946) Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993)... 44 ATMactVaM f a f v. 253 U.S. 454 (1920)... 37

AawrcMCC v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003)... 29 Ludecke v, Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) ... 18, 41

Harris v, Ncl.wn, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) ... 15 Hiatt V. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950) ... 34, 39 Hirola v, McArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949) ... 38 In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890) ... 34 *viii In re Yamashiiu. 327 U.S. I (1948) ...passim

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...43 United States v, Castro, 124 S CL 786 (2003) ... 10, 23 United States v. Lee, 906 F.2d 117 (4^^ Cir. 1990) ,.. 43 United States v, Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) ... 17 United States v, Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949) ... 46 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)... 19 Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) ... 44 Walling V, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944) ... 11 Withrow V. Williams, 507 U.S, 680 (1993) ... 37 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579(1952) ... 15 Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S. 678 (200!) *xi FEDERAL STATUTES 10 U.S.C. § 844(a) ...44 10 U.S.C, §§ 1471-1593 ... 32 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ... I 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ... 13 28U.S.C. § 2241...paff,m 28 U.S.C. § 451 ... 35 28 U.S.C. § 452 ... 35 5 U.S.C, § 702 ... 13 Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 ... 12 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 ... 13 ...passim

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, I Stat, 73 ... 12 Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat, 224 (2001) ... 23 U.S, Const, amend. V ... 2 U.S. Const, art. I , § 9, cl. 2 ... 2 USA PATRIOT Act, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115 Stat, 272 (2001)... 14 *xii OTHER AUTHORITIES Anita Snow Cuba Rants About Use of U.S. Navy Base, Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Dec. 27, 2003, at 14 ... 45 Brief for Respondent, Calcano-Martinez v. INS. 533 U.S. 248 (2001) (No. 00-1011)... 21 Charles Savage Growth at Base Shows Firm Stand on Military Detention, Miami Herald, Aug. 24, 2003, at A l ... 5 Charles Savage Inside Guantanamo, Miami Herald, Aug. 24, 2003 a l L l ... 5 Cherif Bassiouni Human Rights in The Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections .ind Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 235 (1993)... 24 Commentary on Geneva Convention IV of Aug. 12, 1949 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)... 27 European Parliament Resolution on the European Union's Rights, Priorities and Recommendations for the 59 Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva (Mar. 17-Apr. 25, 2003), available at *\n\ http:// europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200301/p 102001. htm ... 28

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Exec. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in tbe War Against Terrorism., 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831 (2001)... 4 Gerald L. Neuman, Surveying Law and Borders: Anomalous Zones, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1197 (1996) ... 7 Guantanamo Detainee Attempts Suicide, Raising Number to 30 (Associated Press Aug. 15, 2003) ... 6 Guantanamo Inmate Tries to Kill Himself, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 7, 2004, at A8 ... 6 Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War 57 (Naval War College Press 1978) ...47 Human Rights Committee, Gen. Cmt. 29, States of Emergency (art. 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/ C/21/Rev.1/Add.l1 (2001)... 26 Human Rights Committee, Gen. Cmt, 8, art. 9 (Sixteenth Session, 1982), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRl/ GEN/1/Rev. 1 (1994),.. 26 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), States Party to the Geneva *xiv Conventions and their Additional Protocols, at http:// www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/partygc#a7 (May 20, 2003)... 27 International Committee of the Red Cross, Overview of the ICRC's Work for Internees, at http:// www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/iwpList454/95 IC74F20D2 A2148C1256D8D002C A8DC (November 6, 2003)... 27, 29 John Mintz Guantanamo Bay Detainee Is First to Be Given a Lawyer, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 2003, at A8 ... 4 Johnson v, Eisentrager. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (Case No. 306), Index to Pleadings filed in Supreme Court... 33, 45

Katharine Seelye A Nation Challenged: Captives: An Uneasy Routine at Cuba Prison Camp, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2002 at A8 ... 5 Lillich, Richard B. & Hannum, Hurst International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy, and Practice 136 (3d ed. 1995)... 25 Lord Johan Steyn Address to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law f o r the TwentySeventh F.A. Mann Lecture, at www.nimj.org (Nov. 25, 2003)... 24 *xv Mike Allen & Glenn Frankel Bush Halts Military Proceedings Against 3, Wash. Post, Jul, 19, 2003, at A l 5 ... 4 Nancy Gibbs Inside "The Wire," Time Mag., Dec. 8, 2003) at 40 ... 6 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly Rotterdam Declaration and Resolutions Adopted during the 12 Annual Session (Rotterdam, July 5-9, 2003), available at http:// www.osce.org/documents/pa/2003/07/495_en.pdf ... 29 Report on the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 59 Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8 (Dec. 16, 2002)... 28 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 114 (2000)... 29 Rights of Persons Held in the Custody of the United States in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No. 1340 (2003) (Adopted June 26, 2003), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/Adopted Texts ... 28 Roland Watson Bush Law Chief Tried to Drop Habeas Corpus, The Times (London), Dec. 3, 2001, at 14 ... 14 *xvi Senate Resolution of Ratification Of Interna-

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fioMa/ GovewaMf O M C/v;/ aM(/ fo/;f;ca/ ^(/g/ib, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781, S4784, 102 Cong. (1992) (ratified Apr. 2, 1992)... 25 Statement of High Commissioner for Human Rights on Detention of Taliban and Al Qaida Prisoners at U.S. Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Jan. 16, 2002)... 28 Statement of Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, at http:// www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/0C5F3E73 2DBFC069C1256CE8002D76C0? opendocument (Mar. 12, 2003) ,.. 28 Statute of the International Court of Justice, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasi ctext/ibasicstatute.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) ... 26 United Nations Treaty Collection, at tp://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4_ asp.htm.) (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) ... 25 ht-

Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.T.S. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S, 287 ... 2, 27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N, GAOR. Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) ... 2, 25,26 Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934 U.S. - Cuba, art. I l l , 48 Stat. 1682, 1683, T.S. No. 866 ... 45 DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS Aksoy V. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. 553 (1996)... 26 *xviii Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. 413 (1997)... 26 Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), InterAm.C.H.R. (Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M, 532 (2002)... 28 Legality rjf the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I C J . 226 (Advisory Opinion of July 8) reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 ... 26 Ocalan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. App. No. 46221/99 (Mar. 2003)... 26 R. V. Cook, 2 S C R. 587 (1998)... 24 R. V. Sec'y of State f o r Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 2002 EWCA Civ 1598 ... 24 EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) ... 24 TREATIES Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and *xvii Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. I l l , T S. No. 418, 6 Bevans 1113 ... 6, 43 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XXV, O.A.S.T.S. XXX, adopted by tbe Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/ Ser.L/V/lI82 Doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992)... 25 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ... 2, 27

25 OP. ATT'Y GEN. 157 (1904)... 43 6 Op. O f f Legal Counsel 236 (1982)... 43 Basic Principles for Merger of the Three Western German Zones of Occupation and Creation of an Allied High Commission, reprinted in Documents on Germany, 1944-70, Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92"^ Cong., (Comm, Print 1971)... 46

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*xix Directive Number 20-5, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (March 15, 1968), reprinted in 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 765 (1968) ... 48 Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, United States Army Regulation 190-8 (applicable to the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps) (October 1, 1997)... 2, 47 Frederic L. Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat (Office ofthe Judge Advocate General 2001)... 47 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 1, 1945, reprinted in Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, Comm. on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 87th Cog., 1st Sess. 8 (Comm. Print 1961)... 46 United States Department of State, "Fact Sheet: Cuba," Feb. 22, 1993, available at 1993 WL 2977391 ... 45 United States Department of State, Treaties in Force (\995) ...45 War Briefing, Army Col. John Delia Jacono, Enemy Prisoner of War Briefing from Umm Qar, Iraq (May 8, 2003), available at 2003 WL 1864306 ... 49 *1 OPINION BELOW The opinion of the D. C. Circuit is reported at 321 F,3d 1134 (D.C. Cir, 2003). P A. la.^ ^ ' ^ The orders denying petitions for reconsideration by the panel and rehearing en banc are unreported, but are reprinted at P A. 31a. The opinion of the district court is reported at 215 F. Supp.2d 55 (D.D.C, 2002). P.A. 32a. FN1. References to the Appendix to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari are denoted P.A. ; references to the Joint Appendix are denoted J.A. . JURISDICTION

The D.C. Circuit denied timely petitions for reconsideration and rehearing en banc on June 2, 2003. Petitioners filed a timely Petition for Writ of Certiorari on September 2, 2003, and this Court granted certiorari on November 10, 2003. Rasul v. Bush, __U.S._, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003). J.A. 64-68. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U S C. § 1254(1). CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED This case involves 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which provides in relevant part: (a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.... **** (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless *2 1. He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States ...; or **** 3. He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.... This case also involves the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendmem, U.S. Const, amend. V (P.A. 67a); the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, cl, 2 (J.A. 128); Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (P.A. 69a-70a); Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.T.S. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (P.A. 69a-70a); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR. Supp. No, 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (P.A. 69a); and Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, U.S. Army Regulation 190-8 (applicable to the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps) (October 1, 1997) (P.A. 71a). STATEMENT OF THE CASE

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Seized in ostensible connection with bostflities abroad,tbe petitioners are inUnited States custody at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba. They have been confined for two years without charges, access to counsel or courts, or recourse to any legal process. The Executivebaspresentedno evidence tojustify tbedetentions,andc1aimsitisunderno obligationtodoso. Itclaimsitmay holdthepeti tioners under these conditions indefinitely. ^3 Sbafiq Rasul and Asiflqbal are British citizens; Mamdouh Habib and David Hicks are Australian citizens^^^^^ JA 75108 AfterSeptember 11, 2001, Petitioner Rasul traveled from bis borne in Britain to visit relatives in Pakistan, explore bis cul ture, and continue bis computer studies. He was seized in Pakistan after leavingavisit with his aunL J.A. 83. Petitionerlqbal also traveled toPakistan from bis home in Britain after September 11, in tending tomarry a womanfromhisfather's small village. Shortly before tbemarriage, his father al lowed bim to leave tbe village briefly; while away, hetoo wasseizedin Pakistan 7^ Bothmen were ultimately detainedby Northern Alliance orotber forces and turned over to the United States in December 200I. In January 2002,they were trans ported to Guantanamo, wheretbeyhavebeenheld ever since. J A. 86. FN2. The allegations recounted above were accepted as true by tbelower courts, for purposes of Respondents' Motion to Dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. Petitioner Habib traveled to Pakistan from his home in Australia in August 2001,to look for work anda school for bis teenage children. On October 5, 2001, he was arrested by Pakistani authorities, wbo turned him over to Egyptian authorities. Early in 2002, Egypt transferred Mr. Habib to United States custody,and on May 4,2002,be was transported to Guantanamo. J.A 112, 119. Petitioner Hicks was livingin Afgbanistanatthetimeofbisseizureby tbe Northern Alliance, which transferred bim to United States custody inDecember 200l. J.A. 84. Hicks' fatherbelievesbissonmay bavejoinedtbe

army of the then-incumbent Government of Afghanistan, the Taliban. P.A. 40. Like Petitioners Rasul and Iqbal, he has been held at Guantanamo since January 2002. J.A. 86. *4 The four Petitioners have never been enemy aliens or unlawful combatants. Prior to their detention, the Taliban had caused no American casualties, and tbe Petitioners neither caused nor attempted to cause harm to American personnel. The four Petitioners bad no involvement, direct or indirect, in any terrorist act, including the attacks of September 11, 2001. They maintain today, as they have throughout this litigation, that they are innocent of wrongdoing, and the United States has never presented evidence to the contrary. J.A. 86, 112, 113. All four Petitioners promptly identified themselves to the United States by correct name and nationality. Government agents at the prison bave repeatedly interrogated all four Petitioners but no Petitioner has been charged with any wrongdoing or brought before any a military or civilian tribunal, J.A. 86, 113. With the recent exception of David Hicks,'no Petitioner has been informed ofhis rights under domestic or international law, and the Executive claims the petitioners should not be so informed. They do not even *5 know they are the subject of this litigation. The Executive also claims the petitioners are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention. J.A. 92, 119. Only Petitioner Hicks has received counsel. No charges are pending against him, and he, like the other petitioners, has no means by which he can establish his innocence or secure his release. Military officials have acknowledged that at least some detainees at Guantanamo are victims of circumstance and probably innocent. J.A. 121. See Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives: An Uneasy Routine at Cuba Prison Camp, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2002, at A8 (quoting Deputy Commander at Guantanamo). FN3, In the lower courts, the Executive took the position tbe prisoners were held

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pursuant to the President's power as Commander in Chief "and under tbe laws and usages of war." E.g. Rasul v. Bush. Government's Motion to Dismiss at 4. On July 3, 2003, the President designated David Hicks and five other detainees as being held pursuant to the President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, concerning the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism." 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831. Mike A l len & Glenn Frankel, Bush Halts Military Proceedings Against 3, Wash. Post, Jul. 19, 2003, at A15. According to the Government, this means Hicks may, but need not, be brought before a military commission. On December 3, 2003, the Executive assigned military counsel for Petitioner Hicks, and counsel has since visited with Hicks. John Mintz, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Is First to Be Given a Lawyer, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 2003, at AS. At present, however. Hicks has not been charged, has no recourse to any procedure for demonstrating his innocence or seeking his release, and remains subject to indefinite detention without legal process. The Executive has disclosed little information regarding the detainees. It has not indicated what they are believed to have done to justify their seizure or their continued detention. It does not report on their current welfare. It has, however, "allowed tightly controlled media visits." Charles Savage, Inside Guantanamo, Miami Herald, Aug. 24, 2003, at L l . According to published reports, the Guantanamo installation consists of four units, with construction underway o n a f , f l h . [ ^ ^ ] The majority of the inmates are held in three camps described by the Government as maximum-security facilities. These inmates are in solitary confinemenL restricted to their 6' 8" x 8' cells twenty-four hours per day, except for thirty minutes of exercise three times per week, followed by a five-minute shower. Id, The inmates are shackled while outside their cells. They

exercise on a "caged 25-foot by 30-foot concrete slab." Id. "Lights are kept on 24 hours a day, and guards pace the rows *6 constantly. Inside each cell, detainees have a hole-in-the-ground toilet, a sink with running water low enough to make washing feet for prayers easy, and an elevated shelfId, bunk with a mattress," FN4. According to the prison commander, the new construction signals the Government's intention to rely on the prison "as long as the global war on terrorism is ongoing." Charles Savage, Growth at Base Shows Firm Stand on Military Detention, Miami Herald, Aug. 24, 2003, at Al, Current plans call for a capacity of 1,100 inmates. Id. FN5. There have been thirty-four attempted suicides since the prison opened. Guantanamo Inmate Tries to Kill Himself, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 7, 2004, at A8. Prison officials attribute the attempts "to the effects of the indefinite detentions on prisoner morale." Guantanamo Detainee Attempts Suicide. Raising Number to 30 (Associated Press Aug. 15, 2003). The prison currently holds approximately 660 inmates from 44 countries. Nancy Gibbs, Inside "The Wire," Time Mag., Dec. 8, 2003, at 40, 40. Though some inmates have been released in the past two years, others have replaced them and the prison has maintained approximately the same number of inmates for the past year. Id, However, days after this Court's grant of certiorari in the present cases, the Executive announced its intention to release approximately 140 inmates, more than double the number that had been released since the prison opened. Id, at 41, As of this writing, these releases have not taken place. The Government has occupied Guantanamo since 1903, pursuant to a lease that grants the United States "complete jurisdiction and control," while Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty." Agreement

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BetweenlheUnitedStatesandCubafortbeLease ofLandsforCoalingandNaval Stations,Feb. 23, 1903,US Cuba, arL l I L T S N o ^ 1 8 , 6 B e v a n s 1113, These terms are not defined in tbe lease. The lease term is indefinite, Guantanamo is a self sufficient American enclave, larger than Manhattan, with thousands of military and civilian residents. Thebaseoperates itsown schools, power system, water supply, and internal transportation system. Congress has repeatedly extended federal statutes to thebascand United States courts have long ^7 taken jurisdiction over disputes there. Gerald L. Neuman, ,^i^^v^yi^^ ^a^ a^^^a^^^^.^.' BIi^^,ii^a/^^ii,s ^^^^i^^.^,48Staii L Rev 1197,1228 (1996) Further facts about Guantanamo are set forth i ^ a , .^G^^B^^FGF^TT^^B^^GG^^A^T The district court had jurisdiction over the petitions for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U S.C. ^ 2241, which codifies the Great WriL The statute grants tbe federal courts power to review Executive deten tions 'in violation of tbe Constitution or laws or treaties of tbe United States."The prisoners in this case have been confinedby the Executivefor two yearswithoutlegalprocess,inallegedviolationof the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States Tbe Executive contends that the federal judiciary is powerless to review tbe prisoners' detention be cause they are foreign nationals imprisoned beyond the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States. This claim should be rejected. FirsL nothing in the statute purports to limit jurisdiction based on na tionality or territory, andCongress hasdone nothing to suggest tbat federal courts should be stripped of their jurisdiction in these circumstances. The Court has longtakenjurisdictionoverbabeaspeti tions filed by persons detained beyond this coun try's "ultimate sovereignty." Second, the construction of tbe statute urged by tbe Executive, i f accepted, would raise serious due pro cess questions by permitting "an indefinite, perhaps permanenL deprivation of human liberty without

any [judicial] protection." Zadvydas v, Davis. 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001). It would also raise serious questions under the Suspension Clause by denying an entire class of persons access to the writ *8 through Executive fiat. Under settled doctrines forbidding a reading of statutes that raises grave constitutional doubts or extinguishes habeas jurisdiction without the clearly expressed intention of Congress to do so, the Court should avoid such a construction of § 2241. The Executive's proposed construction would also violate the principle that statutes must, when possible, be construed in conformity with international law, which prohibits prolonged detention without judicial recourse, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U,S. 763 (1950), is no bar to this proceeding. There, the Court considered whether enemy aliens convicted of war crimes by a lawful military commission during a declared war were entitled to post-conviction review in federal habeas. The prisoners were convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned in post-war China and Germany, which the military temporarily controlled as a result of wartime operations. At trial, the prisoners enjoyed a number of due process rights, and raised the same constitutional issues they would later urge before the Court. The Court held that these prisoners had 'no right to the writ of habeas corpus." Id, at 781. The habeas statute gave the Court the power to consider the prisoners' contentions in Johnson, and the Court exercised that power by examining their claims at length. First, the Court gave the prisoners "the same preliminary hearing" it had previously given to other war criminals imprisoned here and abroad. Id. at 780-81. Second, the Court scrutinized the prisoners' application to determine whether the military commissions had jurisdiction over the alleged crimes. Id, at 790. And third, the Court analyzed and rejected tbe merits of the prisoners' claims under both the Constitution and the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 785-90. *9 Johnson, therefore, is best understood as a restraint on the exercise of habeas, rather than a limit-

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ation on the power of the federal courts. The Court has often limited the exercise of habeas to avoid undue interference with a lawful coordinate system of justice that provided petitioners with a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims. In Johnson, the Court limited habeas to a determination that the prisoners were convicted enemy aliens detained outside our territory lawfully tried by a properly constituted military commission. By contrast, the prisoners here have been detained for two years without charges, trial, access to counsel or the courts or process of any kind. They are not citizens of enemy nations, but citizens of our closest allies who maintain that they are innocent of any wrongdoing. They are held at Guantanamo, far from the theatre of military operations and subject to the complete and exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States Government. Far from seeking post-conviction relief after a trial, they complain that they have had no trial or other lawful process. The very factors that called for restraint in Johnson now call for review, and the district court has jurisdiction. ARGUMENT I. THE HABEAS STATUTE GIVES THE DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION The Great Writ stands as "the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired." Bowen v, Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939). Since the founding, it has been the indispensable means for the judiciary to test the legality of executive detention. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S, (4 Cranch) 75, 99 (1807); Ex parte Lange. 85 U.S. (18 Wall,) 163 (1874); .lohn.son v, Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-67 (1938); -^lOZadvydas v, Davis, 533 U.S. 678. 699 (2001); /A^S v, ^f. Gyr. 533 U.S. 289, 301-04 (2001). Yet the Executive argues that the federal courts are powerless to review these prisoners' indefinite detentions because they are foreign nationals brought by the military to a prison beyond the "ultimate

sovereignty" of the United States. The Government is mistaken. FirsL nothing in the habeas statute supports such a limitation, nor has Congress manifested an intention to strip the federal courts of their jurisdiction under these circumstances. The Court has routinely taken jurisdiction of habeas petitions filed by persons in custody under the authority of the United States in places beyond its "ultimate sovereignty," even during times of armed conflict. And the Court has never suggested that the Executive can incarcerate people indefinitely, beyond the reach of judicial recourse, simply by confining them in a facility that the United States Government controls through some arrangement other than „• * sovereignty. • f "[FN6] ultimate FN6. The Executive leans heavily on JohnfOM I'. EweMfrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950). But Johnson cannot bear the weight, as we demonstrate at pages 30-46 infra. Second, the Executive's argument - i f accepted would raise "serious constitutional problem[s]." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. It would permit "an indefinite, perhaps permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any [judicial] protection," id., and would suspend the writ for an entire class of detainees on no firmer basis than Executive fiat. Tbe Executive would have the Court "close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress' intent." United Slates v. Castro. 124 S.Ct, 786, 791 (2003). This country has rejected imprisonment without legal process, even during times of war, and the Court should not interpret the babeas statute in a manner that permits the creation of an offshore prison for *11 foreign nationals that operates entirely outside the l a w ^ ^ ^ ^ Id,: St, Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314. FN7. Even the prospect of judicial review is salutary. Only after this Court granted certiorari did the Executive announce its apparent intention to release 140 detainees. Cf, Walling v. Helmerich < & . Payne, Inc.. 323 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1944) ("Respondent

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has consistently urged tbe validity of [its] planand wouldpresumably befree tore sume theuse of thisillegal plan wercnot some effective restraint made"). Third,construing the statute to exclude habeasjur isdiction would violate the well establisbed canon that "an act of Congress ought never to be con strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." ^i^^^ay v, ,^c^^,ia^^iG/iaiiiiiii^^^^^^,6US (2Cranch) 64,118 (1804) In recent decades 151 nations, including this one, bave ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whichguaranteesjudicial re view of executive detentions, even in wartime. And 191 nations, including the United States, have joined the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which require tbat prisoners captured in combat zones have tbe rightto be brought before a "competent tribunal" whenever there is "any doubt" as to tbeir status. TbeExecutive's strained constructionofthe habeas statute, permitting indefinite incarceration with no legalprocess,would violate these fundamental pre cepts of international law. The statute should not be so construed. A.HabcasTurns On Executive Detention,Not The Accident ofNationalityorSitus Title 2 8 U S G ^ 2241(c)(1)and(c)(3) confer jut isdiction on the district court to bear applications for habeas corpus filedby any person imprisoned "underor by color of the authority o f t h e United States,"or "in violation of the Constitutionorlaws or treaties of the United States."^12Notbing in the textpurportstoexcludehabeasjurisdictionon the basis of nationality or territory. On tbe contrary, "[t]his legislation is of the most comprehensive character. Itbrings withintbe ^a^^a,s^'a^^^,sjuris diction of every court and of every judge every pos sible case ofprivationofliberty contrary to the Na tional Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is im possible to widenthisjurisdiction."^^^^^E^^a^^^ ^^B^'Ga^^i'/^^.73US(6Wa11)3l8, 325 26 (1868) FN8. Section 2241(a) empowers federal

judges to grant the writ "within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). At one time, the Court interpreted this language to require the petitioner's presence within the jurisdiction. See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 189-93 (1948). This is no longer the law, however, see Braden v. 30 Judicial Cir, Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973), and petitions challenging military detention overseas are properly filed in the District of Columbia because the courts bave jurisdiction over the custodian. E.g., McElrrty v. United States ex rel, Guagliardo, 361 U.S, 281, 282-83 (1960) (habeas filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia against Secretary ofDefense by petitioner detained in Morocco at time of filing); Toth v, Quarles. 350 U.S. I I , 13 n.3 (1955) (habeas filed in the District Court of tbe District of Columbia against Secretary of the Air Force by sister of petitioner detained in Korea); Ex parte Hayes. 414 U.S. 1327, 1328-29 (1973) (Douglas, J., in chambers) (habeas filed in District Court of the District of Columbia against Secretary of the Army by petitioner detained in Germany). The history of the statute is well known. In 1789, Congress granted habeas jurisdiction over prisoners "in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. In 1842, Congress made explicit that federal habeas included foreign nationals. Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat, 539, 539. In 1867, Congress expanded habeas review to include "all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or of any treaty or law of the United States." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. *13 385, 385. The 1867 Act is the "direct ancestor" of 28 U.S.C, § 2241(c).1^™^] Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996).

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FN9. The historical foundations of the writ are canvassed in greater detail by several amici. See Brief of the Commonwealth Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae; Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae. Though habeas today often involves collateral review of criminal convictions (as in Johnson v. Eisentrager), "[a]t its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest." St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301; Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977); Brown v, Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) ("The historic purpose of the writ has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial"). Indeed, at common law, "[w]bile habeas review of a court judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdictional competency, an attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of the detention." St, Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 n,14 (internal cita[FN 10] tions omitted) FN 10. In addition to the habeas statute, Petitioners relied on 28 U.S.C, § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 702 in the lower courts to establish jurisdiction. J.A.76, 107. Jurisdiction under these provisions is discussed by the Petitioners in A l Odah v. United States, No. 03-343, and we adopt their arguments. The Court has always jealously guarded its power to review Executive detention. It has consistently required a clear and unequivocal statement of legislative intent before concluding that Congress stripped the federal courts of their habeas jurisdiction. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall ) 85, 102 (1869); DeMore v, Kim,, 538 U.S, 510 (2003); see also St, Cyr. 533 U.S. at 308-09. In Kim, the Court held that Congress had not removed habeas jurisdiction despite statutory language which provided that "[n]o court may set *14 aside any action or decision by the Attorney General" to detain criminal aliens while removal proceedings are ongoing. Kim,

123 S.Ct. at 1714. And in St. Cyr, the Court preserved habeas jurisdiction in the face of four statutory provisions that could have been read as excluding it, including one entitled "Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus." 533 U.S. at [FN 11 308-11, 314 FN11, Other statutory language considered in St. Cyr provided that "judicial review" was available "only" by means other than habeas, and that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review" any final agency order. 533 U.S. at 308-11. Yet the Court found a "lack of clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important question of law." Id. at 314; see also, e.g.. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U,S. at 102 ("We are not at liberty to except from [habeas corpus jurisdiction] any cases not plainly excepted by law...."); Felker, 518 U.S. at 660-61 (statutory provisions purporting to strip federal courts of jurisdiction did not foreclose habeas review). Unlike Kim and St. Cyr, where the Court was faced with explicit - although insufficiently categorical statutory provisions appearing to restrict the courts' habeas jurisdiction, the present case involves no remotely perceptible attempt by Congress to abridge . . / *: [FN 12] . / ; • , ,u n jurisdiction. And certainly, the Executive cannot amend the statute by fiat. Cf *15F««ngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb...."); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S, at 533 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[l]f Congress intended a reversal of this traditional concept of habeas corpus it would have said so,"). FN 12. On the contrary, available evidence suggests that Congress refused to suspend the writ as part of the "war on terrorism." Published accounts indicate the earliest

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drafts of the USA PATRIOT Act, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115 StaL 272 (2001), included a provision entitled 'Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.' Representative James Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, later told reporters "[t]hat stuck out like a sore thumb. It was the first thing 1 crossed out." Roland Watson, Bush Law Chief Tried to Drop Habeas Corpus, The Times (London), Dec. 3, 2001, at 14; see also Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the Sept. 12 Era, Newsweek, Mar. 10, 2003, at 66 (same). The USA PATRIOT Act passed by Congress does not alter § 2241. See USA PATRIOT Act § 412(b)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § I226a(b)(l)). Over time. Executive detention has taken countless forms, limited only by the perceived demands of the day. But the genius of habeas is "its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention - its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969).^™"^^ To that end, the Court has long recognized that federal courts have the power to review every species of Executive imprisonment, wherever it occurs and whatever form it takes. The Court has entertained habeas petitions by aliens detained on ships at sea, e.g.. Chew Heong v. United Slates., 1 12 U.S, 536 [FN 14] (1884);"^ ' by United States citizens detained at American military installations overseas, e.g., McElror v. United Slates ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 IFNISI U S. 281 (1960);'^ and even by enemy aliens conyicted of war crimes during a declared war, whether in the *16United States, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S, 1 (1942), or in territories overseas. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1948). Even the Executive has conceded that the federal courts would have habeas jurisdiction over an American citizen imprisoned at Guantanamo. *

FN 13. As discussed in Part I I , the Court on occasion limits the extent of habeas review, but distinguishes these limitations from a restriction on its power to review executive detention. See, e.g.. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953) (plurality) (question is "not whether the District Court has any power at all to consider petitioners' applications; rather our concern is with the manner in which the Court should proceed to exercise its power"). FN 14. See also, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States. 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) ("An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful" (emphasis added)). FN 15. See supra note 8 (collecting additional cases). FN 16. Tr. of Nov. 17, 2003 Oral Argument at 16:25-19:8, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, __F.3d_, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25616 (Nos. 03-2235, 03-2438), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/ padrumsl 11703trans.pdf Yet the Executive insists the prior decisions count for naught because no single case embraces all the circumstances presented here. This, of course, testifies to the unprecedented character of the Executive's position. Detention without legal process is the very antithesis of this country's wartime experiu u I [FN 17] , [ . ence, as shown b e l o w . ' It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has had no occasion to consider whether the Executive may unilaterally strip the federal courts of their statutory power to review the indefinite detention of foreign nationals without legal process, simply by deciding to detain them in an offshore prison.

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FN 17. See also Brief of Former American Prisoners of War as Amicus Curiae: Brief of the National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus Curiae. B. The Habeas Statute Should Not Be Read To Condone Creating A Prison Outside The Law The lower court did not discuss the scope of the habeas statute. Instead, it resolved the jurisdictional question by concluding the prisoners have no rights that may be vindicated in federal court, "under the due process clause or otherwise." P.A. 12a. In its view, foreign nationals may be subjected to an "indefinite, perhaps permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any [judicial] protection," Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692, so long as the Executive elects to detain *17 them outside the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States. This holding creates a "serious constitutional problem," id., both by approving prolonged detention without legal process, and by suspending the writ in the absence of any indication of congressional intent. To avoid these results, the Court should interpret the babeas statute to allow the prisoners to bring this challenge in federal court. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314. 1. The Executive's Interpretation OfTbe Habeas Statute Would Raise Serious Doubts Under The Due Process Clause At its core, the Due Process Clause protects against unlawful bodily restraint. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 ("Freedom from imprisonment - from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint - lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects."). The Executive may not imprison people for more than brief periods unless it acts pursuant to narrowly circumscribed criteria and strict procedural restraints. Id. at 690-91 ("[W]e have upheld preventive detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections."); cf. Kim, 123 S.Ct. at 1720 (contrasting the "indefinite" and "potentially permanent" detention condemned in Zadvydas with the "brief detention

upheld in Kim)

[FN 18]

FN 18. See also United States v, .Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747, 750-52 (1987) (stressing stringent time limitations and presence of judicial safeguards); Addington V, Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979); Kansas v, Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-58 (1977) (emphasizing strict procedural protections); Gerstein v, Pugh, 420 U S. 103, 117-18 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana. 406 U.S. 715, 737-39 (1972). *18 Statutory schemes that subject a particular class of aliens to potential restraint have consistently been interpreted so as to respect these principles. Aliens detained pursuant to these schemes enjoy at least the right to a fair hearing to determine whether they fall within the defined class. See, e.g., Ludecke v, Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 n. 17 (1948) (administrative hearing followed by judicial review to determine whether person detained was in fact an "enemy alien"); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S, 524, 540-41 (1952) (administrative hearing followed by judicial review to determine whether detained alien was an active member of the communist party); Kim. 123 S.Ct. at 1722 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (detainee entitled to hearing "to demonstrate that he was not improperly included in a mandatory detention category."); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting on other grounds) ("[Ijnadmissible aliens are entitled to be free from detention that is arbitrary or capricious."). During the Second World War, the Court repeatedly agreed that even convicted saboteurs and war criminals, seized here and abroad, were entitled at least to a hearing to determine their status. See Quirin, 317 U.S, at 24-25; Yamashita. 327 U.S. at 8; Johnson, 339 U.S. at 780-81 (prisoners received "the same preliminary hearing as to sufficiency of application that was extended in Quirin.... [and] Yamashita"). In this respect, the Executive "is certainly not immune from the historic requirements of fairness merely because he acts, however conscientiously, in the name of security." .Joint Anti-Fascist

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Refugee Comm, v, McGrath. 341 U.S, 123, 173 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Yet the Executive takes the position now that foreign nationals imprisoned by the military beyond the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States have no rights that can be *19 protected by a federal court and may be detained indefinitely without legal process. This has never been the law: The proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution "does not apply" overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place. *** [T]he question of which specific safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context overseas can be reduced to the issue of what process is "due" a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case. Reid V, Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harian, [FN 191 J,, concurring). The Court later quoted this language with approval in a case involving a nonresident alien. United States v, Verdugrj-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990)- fee also id at 277-78 ' (Kennedy, J., concurring).*^ FN 19. See also Reid. 354 U.S. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Governmental action abroad is performed under both the authority and the restrictions of the Constitution — for example, proceedings before American military tribunals, whether in Great Britain or in the United States, are subject to the applicable restrictions of the Constitution."). FN20. In Verdugo, the Court held that the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search of a foreign national in Mexico by Mexican agents. Dicta cited Johnson v, Eisentrager for the "emphatic" rejection of the "extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment." Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 269. But this language

cannot be read in isolation. Verdugo cited the Insular Cases, id, at 268-69, in which the Court repeatedly recognized that the Due Process Clause embodies a fundamental right that constrains the Executive, even when it acts with respect to an alien outside the United States. As the Court stated in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922): [T]he real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico when we went there, but which of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative power.... The guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution, as f o r instance that no person could be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, had from the beginning full application in the Philippines and Porto Rico. .. Id. at 312-13 (emphasis added). Verdugo tben approvingly quoted Justice Harlan's Reid concurrence insisting that the extra-territorial reach of the Constitution depended on what process was due in a particular case. Although Reid had involved a U.S. citizen overseas, Verdugo did not hesitate to endorse Justice Harlan's guiding principle in a case involving a foreign national, just as it had in the Insular Cases, E.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 283 (1901) (rejecting theory that aliens in unincorporated territories "have no rights which [Congress] is bound to respect."). It is thus incorrect to read Verdugo as establishing a categorical rule that the Due Process Clause cannot apply to aliens overseas. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Verdugo made explicit that the Court had not yet resolved the Constitution's extra-territorial reach "when

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the Government acts, in reference to an alien, within its sphere of foreign operations." 494 U.S. at 277. *20 The suggestion, therefore, that the Constitution tolerates the creation of a prison beyond the reach of the judiciary, reserved for foreign nationals who may be held on mere Executive fiaL is mistaken. Rather, the courts must undertake a more discriminating analysis of the interests at stake. Here, that analysis can wait for another day. For while "there is no table of weights and measures for ascertaining what constitutes due process," Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 149 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the Executive's claim that courts lack jurisdiction even to undertake the weighing misreads the habeas statute and would raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause. *21 2. The Executive's Interpretation Of The Habeas Statute Would Also Raise Serious Doubts Under The Suspension Clause The Court should also avoid an interpretation of the habeas statute that suspends the writ for an entire class of claimants based solely on Executive proclamation. In St. Cyr, the Govemment argued that certain provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, should be construed as denying the alien petitioners the right to habeas review of their deportation proceedings. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308-11. The Court rejected this position, noting that such a construction would raise grave constitutional doubts under the Suspension Clause. Id, at 305. It was common ground among the parties in St. Cyr that Executive detention struck at the "historical core" of the writ, "and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest." Id, at 301. Furthermore, as the Court observed, "[i]n England prior to 1789, in the Colonies, and in this Nation during the formative years of our GovernmenL the writ of habeas corpus was available to nonenemy aliens as well as to citizens," Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). While the Government ac-

knowledgedtbishistoricalunderstanding, it argued there was nounlawfulsuspensionaslong as" 'an official bad statutory authorization to detain the in diyiduaL'"B^.at 303 (quoting Brief for Respond entat33,Ga/ca^a-^7a^^ai^^^v FV.^,533 US 348 (2001)(No 001011)) It acknowledged "that the writ protected anindividual who wasbeldwithout legal authority,!!^,,but because tbe deportation statutesat issue in.^^. Gy^gave theGovernment au thority to detain, the Government argued that the alien could complain of nothing more thanafailure by the official detaining him to exercise his "discretionary power to determine wbetber the per sonsbould ^22 bere1eased," afai1ing which, in the Government's view, raised no concern protected by the Suspension Clause. B^. Tbe Court rejected this argumenL While acknow ledging that the Government's "historical arguments are not insubstantial,"tbeCourt found tbat "the am biguitiesin the scope of the exercise of tbe writ at common law identified by SLCyr, and the sugges tions in this Court's prior decisions as to tbe extent to which habeas review could be limited consistent with the Constitution," convinced the Court "that the Suspension Clause questions that would be presented by the INS' reading o f t h e immigration statutesbeforeus are difficult and significant."^^, at304 Tbe constitutional questions are even more "difficult and significant" here. Because the prison ers in this case "are nonenemy aliens" they are cit izensofallied nations thewritwouldhavebeen availabletothemevenatthcFounding^^^^^^^^ Gy^,533 US at301;,s'^^a/,^ai^ ("[A]ttheabso luteminimum, the SuspensionClauseprotects the writashexistedin 1789."(quotation marks omit ted)). In addition, thedetentions here are the very sort that tbe Government conceded in Gy^musL underthe Suspension Clause, besubject to testing by habeas corpus because they are supported by no statutory authorization. There is no evidence that Congress meant to suspend tbe writ during the cur rent hostilities, let alone the plain and unambiguous

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statement required by the Court. See supra 14 and note H . [ F N A ] FN21. The historic right of aliens to test their status as alleged "enemies" in habeas proceedings, even when detained beyond the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States, is canvassed by the Brief of Legal Historians Amici Curiae. FN22. The Use of Force Resolution that authorized the present military action hardly qualifies as explicit "statutory authorization" for a suspension of the writ. Congress' Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L, No, 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). During the Second Worid War, the Court held that the Articles of War did not strip the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction even though they explicitly purported to do so. Yamashita, 327 U.S, at 9 ("[Congress] has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of the Government could not, unless there was suspension of the writ, withdraw from the courts the duty and power to make such inquiry into the authority of the commission as may be made by habeas corpus."); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25 (despite Articles of War, federal courts retained habeas jurisdiction). Johnson is not to the contrary, since the prisoners in Johnson had the opportunity to litigate their claims in the military commission. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. at 381-83 (no suspension of the writ if petitioner had an adequate chance to mount a collateral attack in coordinate court system); St, Cyr, 533 U,S. at 305 (suspension clause problem arises if writ is suspended with "no adequate substitute for its exercise."). See Part ll infra, *23 These grave constitutional questions would confront the Court i f the habeas statute were read as the Executive suggests - to close the courthouse doors to an entire class of habeas petitioners

"without any clear indication that such was Congress' intent." United States v, Castro, 124 S.Ct. at 791. It should not be read that way. C. Unreviewable Executive Detention Is Rejected Not Only By Anglo-American Tradition, But Also By "Every Modern Government" Few canons of international law are now more universally accepted that the prohibition against prolonged, arbitrary detention. For centuries, the law in Anglo-American countries has not only prohibited indefinite detention without legal process, but allowed petitioners to challenge that detention by h a b e a s . ' The Executive's position that the prisoners at Guantanamo occupy a law-free zone recently *24 prompted the English Court of Appeal to note its "deep concern that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, [the prisoners] may be subject to indefinite detention in territory over which the United States has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of [their] detention before any court or tribunal." R, v. Sec'y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2002 EWCA Civ 1598, at 166. A senior judge in the United Kingdom recently described the detentions on Guantanamo as "a monstrous failure of justice"[''^2^] This common tradition is further reflected in the holding of the Supreme Court of Canada. In R. v. Cook, 2 S C R. 587 (1998), fl 25, 44, 46, 48, that Court held tbat the Canadian Constitution protects foreign nationals outside Canadian territory, so long as the conduct in question is that of Canadian Government officials, and application of the constitution will not interfere with the sovereign authority of a foreign state.[''N:^] FN23. See Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae and Brief of Legal Historians as Amici Curiae. FN24. Lord Johan Steyn, Address to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law for the Twenty-Seventh F.A, Mann Lecture, at www.nimj.org (Nov. 25,

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2003). FN25, See the discussion of R, v. Crmk in the Brief of Omar Ahmed Khadr as Amicus Curiae. Judicial review of executive detentions is not limited to common law jurisdictions. This principle is enshrined in the Constitutions of nearly every country in the civilized world,^^^^^^ as well as every major human rights instrument in force today, including the Universal Declaration of Human 1FN27I Rights, ^ the International Covenant on Civil and Political *25 Rights (ICCPR),^™^^^ and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of IFN291 Man. In 1950, when the Court decided Johnson - upon which the Executive places dispositive reliance - the Court took pains to note that "[t]he practice of every modern Government" is to refuse the protection of the "organic law" to enemy aliens convicted by a military trial. 339 U.S, at 784-85, In the present circumstances, the reverse is true: "the practice of every modern Government" *26 condemns prolonged Executive detention without legal process. FN26. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in The Context of Criminal .lustice: Identifying International Procedural Prolections And Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 235, 261 n.l77 (1993) (lisfing 119 national constitutions that protect the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention). FN27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 9, G.A, Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71, 73 (Dec. 10, 1948). Though the Universal Declaration is not a treaty, the United States recognizes that Article 9 embodies a rule of customary international law. Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy, and Practice 136 (3d ed, 1995).

FN28. International Covenant on Civil and Polifical Rights, G.A. Res, 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N, GAOR Supp, No. 16, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR]. The relevant provisions of the ICCPR, which the United States ratified in 1992, are unambiguous: Article 9(1): Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in according with such procedure as are established by law.

Article 9(4): Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in other that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release i f the detention is not lawful. ICCPR, art. 9(1), 9(4); Senate Resolution of Ratification of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S4781, S4784, 102"^ Cong. (1992) (ratified Apr. 2, 1992). Of the one hundred fifty-one states, including the United States, that have ratified the ICCPR, none has made a relevant reservation to these provisions. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://www.unbchr.ch/btml/menu3/b/treaty4 _ asp.htm.) (last visited Jan. 5, 2004), FN29. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XXV, O.A.S.T.S. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/ll82 Doc. 6 rev. 1 at 17 (1992).

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War works no exception to this settled principle of international law. The International Court of Justice has observed that "the protection of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war.''^^^"^^^ See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I C J . 226. 240 (Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996) reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809, 820. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the ICCPR, has held that Articles 9(1) (prohibiting arbitrary detentions) and 9(4) (guaranteeing judicial review of detentions) apply to all deprivations of liberty, and that Article 9(4) is non-deroeable, even in times of armed conflict.

fourteen days without judicial intervention); Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. 413, 1 131 (1997) (concern for national security, though legitimate, "does not mean...that the national authorities can be free from effective control by the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved"). *27 International humanitarian law - part of the law of war - similarly provides that even during hostilities, prisoners may not be held without legal process. Over 190 countries, including the United States, are parties to the Geneva Conventions. fFN331 ^ ' Under the Conventions, the rights due to an individual vary with the person's legal status. The Official Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention,^^^'^^^ makes clear that "every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law...[N]obody in enemy hands can be outside the law." Commentary on Geneva Convention IV of Aug. 12, 1949, at 51 (Jean S. Pictet ed,, 1958). To implement this command. Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, governing prisoners of war, requires that any doubt regarding the status of a person captured by the detaining power must be resolved by a "competent tribunal," and that all detainees enjoy prisoner of war status unless and until an Article 5 tribunal determines otherwise. [FN35] FN33. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, at http:// www, icrc, org/Web/Eng/siteengO. nsf/htmlal l/party_gc#a7 (May 20, 2003). The requirements of the Geneva Conventions are discussed in detail by several amici. See Brief of Former American Prisoners of War as Amicus Curiae: Brief of Retired Military Officials as Amicus Curiae. FN34. Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War,

rFN3n

^ ' In any event, the United States has not declared any derogation from the Covenant. See also Ocalan v, Turkey. Eur. Ct. H. R. App. No. 46221/99 (Mar. 2003) fl 45, 66-76 (prompt judicial review required of detention of alleged terrorist accused of responsibility for more than 4,000 deaths). [FN32] FN30. Unlike this CourL the International Court of Justice is expressly charged to render advisory opinions at the request of an authorized body. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, arts. 65-68, at htavailable tp://www, icj-cij, org/icjwww/ibasicdocume nts/ibasictext/ ibasicstatute.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). FN31. See Human Rights Committee, Gen. Cmt. 8, art. 9 (Sixteenth Session, 1982), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRl/GEN/l/Rev.l at 8 (1994) at para. 1; Human Rights Committee, Gen. Cmt. 29, States of Emergency (art. 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) at para. 16. FN32. See also Aksoy v, Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. 553 (1996) (though Turkey had lawfully declared a national emergency, it could not hold a suspected terrorist for

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Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. FN35. Geneva Convention I I I Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, U.N.T.S. 135. This provision was not part of the 1929 Convention, which the Court considered in Jr>hnson v, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In light of these settled principles, it is not surprising that the detentions at Guantanamo have come under sharp criticism from the international community, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United *28 Nations, and the European ParliamenL In 2002, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member, decided that the Guantanamo prisoners may not be held "entirely at the unfettered discretion of the United States Government" and that the Government must convene competent tribunals to determine the legal status of the prisoners under its control. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), Inter-Am.C.H.R. (Mar. 12 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 532, 533 (2002).^ ^ FN36, The United States has also rejected the view of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC), all of which disagree with the Government's position on Guantanamo. See Statement of High Commissioner for Human Rights on Detention of Taliban and Al Qaida Prisoners at U.S. Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

(Jan. 16, 2002) P.A. 75a-76a; Report on the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 59*^ Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/8 at 19-21 (Dec. 16, 2002). P.A. 77a-82a; Statement of Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, at http:// www, unhchr. ch/huricane/huricane. nsf/0/0 C5F3E732DBFC069CI256CE8002D76C0 ? opendocument (Mar. 12, 2003); European Parliament Resolution on the European Union's Rights, Priorities and Recommendations for the 59 Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva (Mar. 17-Apr. 25, 2003), available at http:// europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/20030I/p I0200I.htm: Rights of Persons Held in the Custody of the United States in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution No. 1340 (2003) (Adopted June 26, 2003), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/Adopted Texts; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly Rotterdam Declaration and Resolutions Adopted during the 12 Annual Session (Rotterdam, July 5-9, 2003), available at http:// www,osce.org/documents/pa/2003/07/495_ en.pdf; International Committee of the Red Cross, Overview of the ICRC's Work for Internees, at http:// www,icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO,nsf/iwpLis f'/j^/PjyG74E20D2/f2/^gG/2J6D&D002G A8DC (November 6, 2003). *29 The Executive's proposed reading of the habeas statute would thus put the United States in flagrant disregard of globally recognized norms. Just as the Court should avoid an interpretation of the statute that runs afoul of the Constitution, it should avoid an interpretation in conflict with international law. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S, (2 Cranch) at 18;

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Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 114 (2000) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States."). [FN37] FN37. As the Court has recently observed, these international norms may also provide persuasive authority for the interpretation of constitutional values. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas. 123 S.Ct, 2472, 2481, 2483 (2003); Atkins V, Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Human Rights Institute of the International Bar Association (discussing obligations imposed by international law). 11. THE GOVERNMENT OFFERS NO PERSUASIVE REASON TO IGNORE THE UNAMBIGUOUS COMMAND OF THE HABEAS STATUTE The Executive argues that the current hostilities demand indefinite detention without legal process. Indeed, tbe argument is broader still; the contention is made that Executive action has become "proof of its own necessity," and that no court may inquire into the lawfulness of the detentions on Guantanamo. *30Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 336 (1946) (Stone, J., concurring); see also Aer/aig y. Co/w/aafm, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) ( "What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions."). The Executive makes this argument despite the text of the habeas statute, the absence of any Congressional indication that federal courts should be stripped of their habeas jurisdiction, the settled practice of this Court to take jurisdiction of habeas petitions filed by people imprisoned beyond the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States, and the considerable weight of constitutional doubt. To support its argument, the Executive relies heavily on .Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S, 763 (1950).

But as demonstrated below, this reliance is misplaced. A. Introduction In Johnson, the Court was asked to grant postconviction habeas review to enemy aliens who were convicted of war crimes by a military commission. The commission bad been created pursuant to explicit Congressional authorization during a declared war. The prisoners were convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned in occupied enemy territory temporarily controlled by the U.S. military as an incident of our wartime operations. At trial, the prisoners had the right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. They also enjoyed due process protections tbat insured against the conviction of an innocent person. In fact, six of the original twenty-seven defendants were acquitted and released. *31 The Court held that these convicted war criminals did not enjoy the "privilege of litigation" in the federal courts. Id, at 777. It couched some portions of its opinion in jurisdictional terms. See, e.g., id. at 791 (prisoners present "no basis for invoking federal judicial power in any district."). Seizing on this language, the Executive assigns the broadest possible reading to the case: federal courts are always powerless to review executive detention of aliens outside the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States, regardless of the circumstances. See Government's Brief In Opposition to Certiorari at 16, 18-19. But Johnson is more ambiguous than that. It is useful to examine what the Court did, not merely what it occasionally said. FN38. See also, e.g.. Chin Yow v. United States. 208 U.S. 8, 11-13 (1908) (if alien had a fair exclusion hearing, district court would not have jurisdiction to consider habeas application; but if petitioner did not have a fair hearing, district court had jurisdiction and could grant habeas relief); see also infra 40-41 and note 40. Johnson is best understood not as a limitation on

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the^a^e^ of the federal judiciary,butasarestraint on tbe e,x^^ci,^e of babeas based on tbe factors present in that case. The Court limited the exercise ofhabeas toadetermination that tbe prisoners were enemy aliensimprisoned in occupied territory who had receivedalawful trial beforeaproperly constituted military commission,Because these threshold questions wercnot indispule,tbe Court ref^usedto countenance any further interference with the opera t i o n o f a l a w f u l a n d independent systemof military justice, Tbe presentcase stands onentirely different foot ing.Congressbasnotauthorizedtrialsby military commission, and,evenif it bad,the prisoners here have been detained for two years with no legal pro cess.They are not enemy aliens, but citizens ofour closest allies who allegetheyhaye'^32committed no wrong against theUnitedStates,and whose al legations at this stage must be accepted as true. Be causetherehavebeennoproceedings, tbey donot seek post conviction relief from an overseas trial by a lawfully constituted tribunaL Instead, they chai lengethefacttbattbeyhavebeencastintoalegal limbo, held by the Executive without charges, without recourse to any legalprocess,andwith no opportunity to establish their innocence. B.TbeCourt In .Ba^a,s'a^ Restrained The Exercise OfHabeasWbereALawful And Independent Sys tem of Justice Had Allowed Tbe PrisonersToCbal lengeTheir Detention By December 11, 1941, Congress had declared war on Germany and Japan. Within weeks, Congress p a s s e d t h e A r t i c l e s o f W a r l O U S C ^ ^ 1471 1593 .These Articles authorized the President to convene military commissionsto try suspected war criminals, ^ i ^ i ^ i ^ , 317 U.S. at 28 ("Congress has expli citly provided,sofarasit may constitutionallydo so,that military tribunals shall havejurisdictionto tryoffenders or offenses against t h e l a w o f war in appropriate cases."). ThroughouttheSecond World War, tbeExecutive repeatedly invoked tbe power given it by Congress,

creating military commissions to try suspected war criminals captured here and abroad. ,^ee, eg., la^, ("[T]he PresidenLasCommanderinChiefby his Proc1amationintimeofwarhasinyoked[the Art ides of War]"); Fai^a.^Fa7a, 327 U S at 712 (Articles of War authorized creation of military commissioninthePhilippines);.7a^^,^a^,339 US at 766, 786 (military commission had authority lo preside over tria1sinNanking,Cbina).On January 21,1946, tbe Executive invoked this ^33 power and convenedamilitarycommissionto try alleged war criminals in tbe China Theater..,^a/i^,^'a^ Ei.s^^i^ ^iage^,339 US 763 (1950) (Case No 306), Index to Pleadings filed in Supreme CourL Ex. F 'Regulations Governing theTrialofWar Criminals in the ChinaTbeater," at 34 [hereinafter,Ba^^.s'a^, Index lo Pleadings]. J.A, 155 56, Each commission consisted of at least three service members who had to be free from "personal interest or prejudice" and who could not preside over "a case which he personally investigated, nor i f h e [was] required asawitnessinthat case."J.A. 158 Whenever feasible, every commission was to include "one or more members" with legal training. JA. 159.No sentencecouldbeexecuteduntfl ap proved byacommandingofficer,who also had the power toreduce the sentenceororderanew trial. JA 165 The prisonersin„^a^^,^a^ were tried by these com missions. After Japan surrendered, tbe military ar restedtwentysevenGermannationalsinCbina. A Bill of Particulars accused them of violating the laws of war. .7a^^,^a^, Index to Pleadings, Ex. C "Charge and Bill ofParticulars Against LotharEis entrager,e^a/,at 25 34 J A 142 55 Prior to triaL the commission conducted a two day hearing, wheretheprisonersunsuccessfully urged the same constitutional issues tbey would later raise before tbe Supreme CourL .7a^^,s-a^, Index to Pleadings, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 4 5. J.A, 127 40. After four weeks of triaL the commission grantedmotionsforjudgmentofacquittal withre spect to six prisoners. J.A. 134. The defense case

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for the remaining prisoners lasted an additional eight weeks. J.A. 135. The commissionfoundeach prisoner guilty of war crimes "by engaging in, permitting or ordering continued ^34 military activity against the United Statesafter surrenderof Germany andbefore sur renderof Japan.".Ba/i^,^aB^, 339 U.S, al 766. After thecommission sentencedtheprisonersto various terms, the reviewing authority reduced the sentences for three prisoners and approved the re mainder. J.A. 136. Throughout these proceedings, the prisoners enjoyed the right to notice of the charges against them, to prompt appointment of counsel of choice,to prepareadefense,to call and confront witnesses, to compulsory process, to dis cover and introduce evidence, and to make an open ing statement and closing argumenL J A 160 65 After they were repatriated to Germany, the prison ers sought post-conviction relief in the District of Columbia, claiming unspecified violations of the Fifth Amendment and other provisions of the Con stitution and the 1929 Geneva Convention. 339 U.S. at 767, In addition, tbe prisoners admitted tbey were enemy aliens, 7^, at 784. Tbus,the prisoners in ,Ba^^,^a^ were tried byalaw fully constituted and independent military court tbat provided them an opportunity to challenge the law fulness of their detention.The Court haslong held that lawfullycreated military courts, sanctioned by Congress in the valid exercise of tbeir Article I power, represent an independent judicial system whoselawfuljudgments are not subject to plenary review by the civilian courts ,^ee,eg,, 7ai^ G^i^i ^ey,137US 147. 150 (1890) ('^[The] civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court martial."); F^ia^^ v ^^aiiB^,339 US 103,111(1950)(same)(col1ecting cases). The Court reaffirmed this principle throughout the Second World War, and repeatedly applied it to military commissions. As the Court explained inFa^a,s^i7a: [0]n application for habeas corpus we are not concerned with tbeguiltorinnocenceofthe^35peti

tioners. Weconsider here only tbelawfulpower of the commission to try tbe petitioner for tbe offense charged. .. The military tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by tbe Articles ofWar are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made subjectto review by this Court...Congress conferred on the courts no power to review their determinations save only as it has granted judicial power "to grant writs of habeas corpus for tbe purpose of an inquiry into tbe causeof the restraintof liberty."28U.S.C 451,452. Thecourtsmay inquire whether thede tention complained of is within the authority of those detaining the petitioner. I f the military tribunalshavelawful authority tohear,decide and condemn,tbeiractionisnot subject tojudicialre view merely becausethey bave madeawrongde cision on disputed facts. Fa^a^'/n7a,327 U,S,at8:,^e^a^,s'a^i^i^i^,317U.S. at24 The Court has often restrained the exercise of habeas toavoid interference with lawful andinde pendent military judicial systems. For example, three years after.,^a^^,s'a^, the Court considered a babeas application from American servicemen court martialed in Guam, ^ i ^ ^ ^ , ^ , 346 U S at 138. The Court readily concluded that the habeas statute providedjurisdiction,^^ at 139, Tbe question was "not wbetber the District Court has any power at afl to consider petitioners'applications; rather our con cern is with themanner in which the Court should proceed to exercise its power."7^, Inanswering this question, thepluralitynotedtbat "[t]he military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as do the federal courts to pro tectapersonfromaviolationofbis constitutional rights."y^. at 142.Consistent with this responsibil ity, the military bad provided ^36 the petitioners in ^1^^^,^ with repeated opportunities to litigate their claims. B^. at 140 42. The Court concluded "it would be in disregard ofthe statutory scheme ifthe federal civfl courts failed to take account ofthe pri or proceedings of tbe fair determinations of the military tribunals after afl military remedies have

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been exhausted." Id. at 142. This military process does not displace the civil courts' jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus from the military prisoner. But ... when a military decision has dealt .fully and fairly with an allegation ... it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Gusik V. Schilder, 340 U.S, 128, 131-32 (1950) (babeas petitioner must first exhaust available remedies in military system: "The procedure established to police the errors of the tribunal whose judgment is challenged may be adequate for the occasion. I f it is, any friction between the federal court and the military or state tribunal is saved,"). As Burns intimates, the Court has sometimes limited the substantive claims for relief that the federal courts should entertain in habeas, in order to recognize an appropriate division of responsibility between those courts and another competent adjudicatory system. But these limitations have been imposed only when the habeas petitioners were challenging their confinement under orders issued by a lawfully created and convened coordinate system of tribunals in which they enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to present their claims; and the Court has always made clear that the limitations are upon the extent of habeas review, not upon the existence of habeas Jurisdiction. See, e.g.. Ex parte *31 Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886) (to avoid interference with the "courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, administered under a single system," and in the absence of any indication that the state court had abused its authority, Court declines to exercise its undisputed power under the habeas statute); Aoae y. Pawe//, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (federal court has jurisdiction under habeas statute, but will restrain exercise of judicial power for Fourth Amendment claims fully and fairly adjudicated in state court); Frank v, Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 329, 334-36 (1915).'^™-'^^ Indeed, ifthe petitioner has been denied that opportunity, it is well settled that "a federal court should entertain his pe-

tition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless." Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 118 (1944) (per curiam) (citations omitted). FN39. See also Withrow v. Williams. 507 U.S. 680, 716 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting on other grounds) ("[T]he most powerful equitable consideration [in deciding whether to restrain the exercise of habeas is whether petitioner] has already had full and fair opportunity to litigate [his] claim."). FN40. The Court has long recognized tbat federal habeas is available to fill the void created by an inadequate remedy in the coordinate system of justice. See, e.g.. Chin Yow, 208 U.S. at 11-13; Kwack Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1920) (immigration findings by Executive are conclusive unless petitioner establishes in habeas that "the proceedings were manifestly unfair, were such as to prevent a fair investigation, or show manifest abuse of the discretion committed to the executive officers by the statute, or that tbeir authority was not fairly exercised, that is, consistently with the fundamental principles of justice embraced within the conception of due process of law.") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86,91 (1923) (if state fails to provide an adequate "corrective process" to a trial dominated by mob sentimenL petitioner may seek review and secure relief by federal habeas); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467 (habeas must be available to provide remedy for constitutional violations that, through no fault of the petitioner, cannot be remedied elsewhere): Burns, 346 U.S. at 142 (plurality) ("Had the military courts manifestly refused to consider [petitioners' claims], the District Court was empowered to review them de novo."). *38 As on these other occasions, the Court in John-

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son restrained the exercise of habeas to avoid interfering with the military commissions. Thus, the Court refused to provide tbe prisoners with the right to appear before the District Court, "[a] basic consideration in habeas corpus practice" as it existed at 1FN4n that time.^ J 339 U.S, at 778. The Court, however, did not consider itself powerless to inquire into the lawfulness of the prisoners' detention. On the contrary, the Court stated that "the doors of our courts have not been summarily closed upon these prisoners," id. at 780. FN41. The habeas statute has been amended since Johnson and this is no longer an essential feature of habeas practice. 30'^ .ludicial Cir, Ct,, 410 U.S, at 497-98. First, the Court reviewed at great length the legal disabilities imposed upon enemy aliens, and took pains to emphasize that these disabilities are "imposed temporarily as an incident of war and not as an incident of alienage." Id, at 772. Beginning with this historical understanding, the Court then undertook " the same preliminary hearing as to sufficiency of application" that was extended in Quirin , Yamashita, and Hirota v. McArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949). This review established, without the need for further inquiry, that the prisoners '"are really enemy aliens," id. at 784, who bay been "'active in the hostile service of an enemy power," id. at 778, and who were convicted by a lawful military commission, id, at 777. Having heard "all contentions [the prisoners] have seen fit to advance and considering every contention we can base on their application and tbe holding below," the Court arrived "at the same conclusion" as in Quirin, Yamashita, and Hirota: " that no right to the writ of habeas corpus appears." Id. at 781. Second, the Court reviewed the prisoners' challenge to the "jurisdiction" of the military commissions, and ultimately *39 concluded that it failed. Id. at 785-788; see also i d at 790 ("We are unable to find that the petition alleges any fact showing lack of jurisdiction in the military authorities ...."). Two

months before Johnson, the Court used this 'jurisdictional' formulation to describe its merits review of a habeas petition challenging military detention. Hiatt V , Brt)wn. 339 U.S. at 110 ("[l]t is well settled that by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial .... The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction" (internal quotations omitted)). The Court also used this articulation to describe its merits review of the habeas petitions brought in Quirin and Yamashita, Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-29; Yamashita, 327 U S, at 8-9. Yet in all of these cases, federal habeas jurisdiction was not in dispute. See also Burns, 346 U.S. at 142 ("We have held before that this [military process] does not displace the civil courts' jurisdiction over an application for habeas corpus from the military prisoner."). And third, the Court in Johnson adjudicated the merits of the prisoners' claims under both the Constitution and the 1929 Geneva Convention. The Court rejected the prisoners' contention that the Fifth Amendment conferred "a right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an enemy alien engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States," Johnson. 339 U.S. at 785, as well as their other arguments under the Constitution and the Convention. I d at 788-790, This extensive and multi-faceted review of the prisoners' claims cannot be squared with the Government's contention tbat the Court did not have jurisdiction. "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and wben it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of *40 announcing the fact and dismissing tbe cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506. 514 (1869). To be sure, Johnson occasionally uses the term "jurisdiction" in its modern sense - i,e., "the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case," Steel Co, v. Citizens f o r a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) - and the decision is ambiguous 1FN421 for this r e a s o n . B u t the better reading - the

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reading tbat is faithful to the language ofthe babeas statute, that considers what tbeCourt iFi^,andthat O avoids needless conflict withalawfully created C ordinate system of mflitary justice is to view .Ba^a,saaasarestraint on the exercise ofhabeas,not asalimitation on the courts'power to acL FN42..Fa^afaa thus confirms that jurisdic t i o n " i s a w o r d of many,too many,meanings."Gi7i^e^,s'^a^a,^e^^e^E^v'^,523U.S. at 90 (internal quotations omitted). Else.Ba^a,sa^ uses the term where, "jurisdiction"to refer to "the territorial jurisdiction"of the United States.E.g., ii^. at 768 ("Wearecitedtonoinstance wherea court... basissued[tbewrit]onbebalfof an alien enemy who, at no relevant time andatno stageofhiscaptivity, hasbeen within its territorial jurisdiction"). The formal denial of post conviction review in .Ba^^,sa^ is,inanyevenLnobar to habeasjurisdiction where,asbere,thepetitionershayebeenhdd completely without legal process for two years. They have bad no opportunity to challenge the law fulness of their detention and there has been no pro ceedinginalawfullycreatedcoordinate systemof justice to whicbtbis Court candefer.They are not enemya1iens,but citizens ofour closest allies. Just as thehabeas statutegave tbeCourt thepower to act in ,7a^a,s-aa, the statute provides the power to act in this case;but the very factors that called for re straint in .Fa^a,^aa are notable here for their ab sence, and now cafl for the opposite resulL^F^^^^ FN43,Evenif,7a^^,sa^wereajurisdiction al holding that federal courts do not have babeas jurisdiction over enemy aliens law fully tried, convicted, and imprisoned in areas equivalent to post war China and Germany federalcourtshaveatleast tbe power toinquire whether thesefactors are presenL Indeed, tbeCourt in .7a^^,^aaun dertook precisely this inquiry. Tbe Court has long recognized tbe power ofahabeas court to inquire into the "jurisdictional

facts" tbat mark tbe outer bounds of its power.^ee, e.g,,F^^i^ec^e,335 U.S.at 163 n.5 (whether petitioner is alien enemy isa jurisdictional fact that may be tested in babeas); .Ba^a,s'a^,333 U,S.at 775 (same); A^Eaag7^av lF^!7e 259 U S 276,284 (1922) (claim of citizenship is ajurisdic tional fact tbat may be tested in habeas pri or to alleged alien's deportation: "Tbe situation bears some resemblance to that which arises where one against whom pro ceedings are being taken under tbe military law denies that he is in the military ser vice.It is wefl settled tbat in sucbacasea writ ofhabeas corpus willissue to determ ine tbe status."); .see a/,^a Brief Bfaiiei G^^iae of Legal Historians (at common law, babeas courts hadjurisdiction to resolve whether the prisoner was infact an enemy alien). As demonstrated below,Guantanamoisin no relevant respect akin to post war China and Germany,But even i f i t were,tbe pris oners in this case, unlike tbe prisoners in .^a^^,saa, are not enemy aliens, have not been provided the benefit of the Geneva Conventions,andhave not beentriedbya military commission. The factors that led to tbe resuh in.Ba^a,saa bave neverbeen established in this case, and the Petitioners' allegations are afl to the contrary. ^41C. Guantanamo Is Not Like Wartime China or Germany Here,unlike in .Fa^a,^aa,the petitioners arehdd at Guantanamo. Tbe Executive concedes tbat i f the petitioners were being held in tbe United States, the federal courts wouldbe open to them. G/ie^e^i y 7^^^^, 352F 3d1278, 2003 WL 22971053, at'^4 (9th Cir. Dec. 18,2003).It offersnopersuasive reason why an area subject to the complete, exclusive, and indefinite jurisdiction and control of tbe United States, where this country alone has wielded power for more tbanacentury,should be treated the same

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asoccupiedenemy^42territory,temporarily con trolled as an incident of wartime operations. The Executive also concedes that i f the prisoners at Guantanamo were U.S. citizens, federal babeas would lie.^FN^^^ It offers no persuasive reason why tbe courthouse doors should be open to cit izens detained at Guantanamo but not to citizens of our closest aflieswboallegetheyhavecommitted no wrong against this country. FN44.,5^ee,^!i^^a 16^note l6(citingoral arguments inFa^i7/a). Once again, the Executive relies heavily on stray language in ,7a^a,saa. And again the reliance is misplaced.Tbe Court in .Ba^a,sa^ repeatedly notedtbe prisoners' lack of connection to this country's "territory," or "territorial jurisdiction." ^ee, e.g., .7a^ia.siai,339 U.S. at 768 ( " W e a r e c i t e d t o n o i n stance whereacourt...basissued[tbe w r i t j o n b e balf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and at no stage ofhis captivity,hasbeenwitbinitster ritorial jurisdiction"); i ^ . at 771 ("[l]n extending constitutionalprotectionsbeyondthe citizenry,tbe Court has been at pains to point out tbat it was tbe alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction tbat gave the Judiciary power to act."); i ^ at 781 (criticizing lower court for dispensing with"all re quirement of territorial jurisdiction."); i^^. at 777 (writ should not extend to enemy alien detained "outsideofour territory andtberebddinmilitary custody asaprisoner of war.")The Court also ob served that the prisoners bad not come within United States sovereignty, 7^, at 778. At no time did the Court indicate that this observationwases [FN45] sential to tbe result.^ ^ Stifl, the Executive seizes on this language and ^43 argues that this Na tion's relationship to Guantanamo brings the case within .Ba^a,^aa because the lease governing the base grants Cuba ""ultimate sovereignty" over the territory. FN45. The ,Ba^a,sa^ dissenters certainly did not believe the holding depended on whether tbe petitioners had set foot within

the "ultimate sovereignty" of the United States. The dissent never uses the word 'sovereignty' and criticizes tbe majority formakingtheresultturnon whether the prisoners had come within tbe "territorial jurisdiction" 339 U S a t 796 ( B l a c k , ) , dissenting) ("a majority may hereafter find citizenshipasufficient substitute for territorial jurisdiction"). To suggest thatbecauseof theseundefined terms, Guantanamo is no more amenable to federal habeas jurisdiction than occupied enemy territory defies reality.[F^^^^ Tbe Government has long considered Guantanamo to be ""practically...apart of the Government of the United States."25 Op.Att'y Gen. 157 (1904). Solicitor General Olson once de scribed tbe base as part ofour "'territorialjurisdic tion"and"underexclusiveUnitedStatesjurisdic t i o n " 6 0 p O f f Legal Counsd 236, 242 (1982) (opinion of AssL Attorney General Olson). The same treaty article tbat reserves an undefined quantumof "ultimate soyereignty"for Cuba grants the United States "complete jurisdiction and con troF'over the base. Agreement Between theUnited States And Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling andNayalStations,Feb 16 23, 1903, arL I I L T S No.418,6Bevans1113,The Executive determines whomayenterandleave the base, and enjoys the power "to acquire....any land or other property tbereinby purcbaseorby exerciseofeminentdomain."B^;.seeG^i7e^^,^^a^e.s V Ga^^^ac^, 329 U,S, 230,236 (1946) ("The power of eminent domain is essential to a sovereign government."). United States law governs the conduct of all who are present on the base, citizen and alien alike; and vi olations of criminal statutes are prosecuted in tbe Government's name, ^ee, e.g., G^i7e^,^'^a^e^ v. Fee. 9 0 6 F 2 d 1 1 7 ( 4 * C i r 1990) FN46. A number of a^iei discuss the nature and history of Guantanamo in de taiL,5^ee Brief ofFormer Guantanamo Offi cials asB^^iea,s' Ga^iae; Brief ofNational Institute of Military Justice as .4aae^,s'

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Curiae, *44 Consistent with the Treaty language, the United States has long exercised prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction over Guantanamo. In Vermilya-Brown V. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948), the Court made clear that Guantanamo is presumptively covered by federal statutes regulating conduct in "territories and possessions" and that the rule against "extraterritorial application" of federal law has no provenance in a case arising from Guantanamo. Id. at 390 ("[W]here [the statute's] purpose is to regulate labor relations in an area vital to our national life, it seems reasonable to interpret its provisions to have force where the nation has sole power."). Unlike the conditions that prevailed in Johnson, Congress governs Guantanamo pursuant to its Article I and IV powers. Courts routinely take jurisdiction of cases that arise from the base, and have long exercised their power to test Government action on the base against the requirements of the Constitution, See, e.g., Kirchdorfer. Inc. v. United States, 6 F,3d 1573. 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding violation of Takings Clause by Navy); Burtt v. Schick, 23 M.J, 140, 142-43 (U.S.C.M.A. 1986) (granting writ of habeas corpus and holding that impending court martial proceeding on Guantanamo would constitute double jeopardy, in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 844(a)). Cf Johnson, 339 U.S, at 780 ("[T]he scenes of [petitioners'] offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States."). And while Guantanamo is a military installation, it is eight thousand miles from the theater of operations, and manifestly not under martial law. Compare Padilla v, Rumsfeld. _ F . 3 d _ , 2003 U,S. App, LEXIS 25616 at *57-58 (2d Cir. Dec. 18 2003) (Chicago not in theater of operations), with Johnson, 339 U.S, at 780 (events in Johnson took place within "a zone of active military operations or under martial law"). *45 Equally importanL Cuba's laws are wholly ineffectual in Guantanamo. United States governance,

now entering its second century, is potentially permanent and in no way dependent on the wishes or consent of the Cuban Govemment. Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934 U.S. - Cuba, art. I l l , 48 Stat. 1682, 1683, T.S. No. 866. Indeed, the Cuban Govemment has long characterized the United States presence as "illegal" and refuses to cash the annual rent payment of $4,085 the United States has tendered pursuant to the lease. 5'ee Bird V, United States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 341 n.6 (D Conn. 1996). Recently, the Cuban Government added its voice to the chorus of governments criticizing the detentions on Guantanamo. Anita Snow, Cuba Rants About Use of U.S. Navy Base, Ft. Worth Star-Telegram, Dec. 27, 2003, at 14. However, "ultimate sovereignty" does not imply actual authority, as the United States has ignored Cuba's complaints and "continues to recognize the validity of these treaties." Bird, 923 F.Supp. at 341 (citing U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties in Force (1995); U.S. Dep't of State, "Fact Sheet: Cuba," Feb. 22, 1993, available at 1993 WL 2977391. The extent of our jurisdiction and control in Guantanamo, and its amenability to judicial process, stands in stark contrast to the situation in Johnson. The Executive could not convene a military commission to try the Johnson petitioners unless it first secured permission from the Chinese Government. Johnson, Index to Pleadings, Ex. 4 Message of 6 July 1946 to Wedemeyer from Joint Chiefs of Staff J.A. 167. The same is true of Landsberg prison, where the Johnson petitioners were detained. The United States shared jurisdiction and control over detentions in occupied Germany with the United Kingdom and France. See Basic Principles for Merger of the Three Western German Zones of Occupation and Creation of an Allied High Commission, *46 reprinted in Documents on Germany, 1944-1970, Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92"*^ Cong., (Comm. Print 1971), at 150-51, and the occupation in Germany was avowedly temporary. 5'ee Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 1, 1945, reprinted in Documents on Germany,

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1944-1961, Comm. on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 87th Cog., 1st Sess. 8 (Comm. Print 1961); fee also .Johnson, 339 U.S. at 797 (Black, J., dissenting)(China and Germany were "temporarily , / , . „. [FN47] ' occupied countries. ).^ FN47. The Govemment also relies on United States v, Spelar. 338 U.S. 217, 200 (1949), which held that plaintiffs injured on a United States base in Canada could not sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act (""FTCA") because tbe base was in a foreign country. That case involved the interpretation of a particular statute; Congress's authority to legislate was not in question, and the possibility that territory is "foreign" for some purposes and not for others is uncontroversiaL 5'ee Downes v, Bidwell. 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901) ("Porto Rico ... was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense"); fee also VermilyaBrown, 335 U.S. at 386-390 (presumption against extraterritorial application does not govern in United States "'possessions"). For that reason, courts have held that Government action in a territory is constrained by the Constitution, even though the territory may be in a foreign country, which precludes litigation under the FTCA. Compare Ralpho V, Bell, 569 F.2d 607, reh'g denied, 569 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (fundamental constitutional rights apply in Pacific Trust Territories), with Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838, 839-40 (2d Cir ), cert, denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958) (FTCA does not extend to Pacific Trust Territory). D. The Current Hostilities Do Not Justify A Departure From Settled Practice Lastly, the Executive makes vague reference to the ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan, as though this were sufficient reason to permit the creation of a prison beyond the law, eight thousand miles away. But until this litigation began, the United States had

never proposed that military necessity demanded indefinite detention without legal process ^47 for prisoners capturedduring hostilities, nor does tbe military take tbat position during thcpresent con flictinlraq. On the contrary,the military has adoptedacompre hensive set of regulations to insure tbat noperson be detained without legal process. E^eaiyF^i,saae^,s a^ ^a^, F^e^aiae^ Fe^,saaaeF Givi7iaa 7a^e^^ee,s', aa^G^^e^F^e^aiaee.s, U,S, ArmyRegulation 1908 (applicable to tbe Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and tbe Marine Corps (October 1,1997)),PA71a74aThese regulations trace tbeir origin to theVietnamconflicLwhen the United States often captured people whose status under the Convention wasindoubL "[Rjarely did tbe Viet Cong wear a recognizable uniform, and only occasionally did the guerrfllas carry their arms openly. Additionally, some combat captives were compelled to act forthe Viet Congout of fearof harm to tbemselvesor their families,"Frederic L. Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat 21 (Office of the Judge Advocate General 2001); Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War 57 (Naval War College Press 1978). The nature of tbe conflicL in other words,createdadistinctriskofcapturing innocent civilians. Rather than allow innocent detainees tolanguishin custody,the military created"Article5tribunals" to resolve all doubtful cases.^^^^^^ Levie, Prisoners ofWar at 57.These tribunals,whichoperated during hostilities within the theater ofoperations,con sistedofat least threeofficers, indudingone who was "a judge advocate or other military lawyer ^48 familiar with the Geneva Convention." Directive Number 20 5, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (March 15, 1968),^e^^ia^e^ia 62 A m F l n t ' l L 765 (1968).Detainees enjoyed the "fundamentalrights considered to be essential toa fair hearing,"including the right to counsel and an interpreter. 7^. at 771. Counsel had "free access" to hisdienL wasgivenat leastoneweektoprepare, and, at the hearing had the right to call and cross

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examine witnesses, to present evidence, and to make an opening and closing statemenL The tribunaldeterminedwhetheradetaineewasapris oner of war, a "civil defendant" subject to Viet nameselaw,or aninnocent civilian who shouldbe released 7^ at 767; Borch, Judge Advocates in CombaL at 21. No one was held without a legal status. Directive Number 20 5, ^e^^ia^e^ia 62 Am. JlntLLat768 FN48. So named because they implement A r l i d e 5 o f t h e T h i r d Geneva Convention. As noted above. Article 5 requires that "any doubt"regarding the status o f a p e r son captured by tbe detaining power be re solved bya"competenttribuna1,"and that alldetaineesenjoyPOWstatus unless and untfl an Article5 tribunaldeterminesotb erwise.Geneva1I1,arL5,6U.ST.at 3324, 75UNTS.at142 Today, Article5tribunals consist of three commis sionedofficers. Prisonersmay attendall open ses sions and they enjoy the services ofaqualifiedin terpreter. They may testify on their own behalf, cafl witnesses, present documentary evidence, and ques tion witnesses called by the tribunaL Prisoners may also remain silent and cannot be compelled to testi fy. At the dose of the hearing, the tribunal determ ines, in a written reporL whether the person is a prisoner of war, who enjoys tbefullprotections of theGenevaConvention,ardigiouspersonwhois likewise "entitled to"POWprotections,an innocent civilian "who should immediately be retumed to his homeorreleased,"ora civilian internee"who for reasons of operational security, or probable cause incident to criminal investigation, should be de tained"US Army Regulation 190 8, at16e The tribunal may reach no other possible outcome, and noone is held without somedefined s t a t u s . a t 1 6e(10). Persons in the civilian internee category may not bepunished "without further proceedings to determine what acts tbey may have^49 commit ted and what penalty should be imposed." 7^, at 1 6g, Finally, any decision denying POW status

"shall be reviewed for legal sufficiency" by the of fice ofthe Judge Advocate General, Since Vietnam, Article 5 tribunals have been a settled part of military practice. During the first Persian Gulf War, the United States conducted nearly 1,200 Article 5 tribunals, finding tbat 310 detainees were entitled toPOWstatus,with the re mainder entitled to refugee status.5ee Dep't o f D e fense,Conduct of ibePersianGulfWar: FinalRe port to Congress Pursuant toTitleVoftbePersian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Per sound Benefits Act of1991(Public Law 102 25) App. L. at 577 (Apr. 1992). Even during the present conflict in Iraq.within the field ofbattle,tbe milit ary continues to conduct these tribunals. War Brief ing. Army Col. John Delia Jacono, Enemy Prisoner of War Briefing from Umm Qar, Iraq (May 8, 2003), a^ai7ai^^/ea^ 2003 WL 1864306 Why the same process should be denied to citizens o f o u r closest allies wbo have done no harm to the United States and who remain imprisoned half a world away,isamystery.

In sum, whatever may have been thejustification for restricting the exercise ofhabeas in .7a^^faa a matter on which the prisoners here take no position the prisonersin.Ba^afa^ were enemy alienswbo were given the opportunity to litigate their claims in acoordinatesystemofjusticecreatedby the valid exercise of Congressional authority during a de dared war. Tbey were charged, tried, convicted, and held in occupied territory temporarily con trolled by the military. The considerations that counseled in favor of restraint in that case now cafl for the opposite resufl-judicial exercise ofjurisdic tion to review indefinite detentions. ^^0GG/^GFG5yG/^ TbeCourt should reversetbejudgmentbdowand remand to IheD.C.Circuit to allow tbe prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in the district court.

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Shafiq RASUL, et al.. Petitioners, v. George W. BUSH, etal. Respondents. 2004WL 162758 (US ) (Appellate Brief) ENDOFDOCUMENT

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ForOpinionSee 433 FSupp2d58,414FSupp2d26 United States District CourL District of Columbia. Shafiq RASUL Asiflqbal Rhuhel AhmedJamalAlharith, Plaintiffs, v. Donald RUMSFELD Department ofDefense Air Force General Richard Myers Army Major General Geoffrey Miller Former Commander, JointTask Force Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Army General JamesT.Hifl Commander, United States Southern Command Army Major General Michael E.Dunlavey Former Commander, JointTask Force Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,Cuba, Army Brigadier General Jay Hood Commander, Joint Task Force, GTMO Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Marine Brigadier General Michael Lehnert Army CoL ond NelsonJ.Cannon Commander, Camp Delta Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,Cuba, Army ColonelTerry Car rico Commander CampXRay,Camp Delta Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,Cuba,Army Lieutenant Colonel Wil liam Cline Commander, Camp Delta Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, ARMY Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver Legal Adviser to General Dunlavey Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba c/o United States Army, andJobnDOESI 100,Individuals involved in the illegalTortureofPlaintiffs at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Afl in their personal capacities. Defendants. No 104CV01864 October 27,2004 (Violations of the AlienTorl Statute, the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the U.s.Constitution,tbe Geneva Conventions, and tbe Religious Freedom Restoration Act) Complaint B a a c h R o b i n s o n ^ L e w i s , E r i c L L e w i s D C B a r N o 394643,JeffreyDRobiiisonDCBarNo 376037,Lois J S c h i f f e r D C B a r N o 56630,1201FStreetNW,Suite 500, Washington,DC 20040, 202/833 8900 Barbara Olshansky (NY 0057), Jeffrey FogeL Michael Ratner, Center for Constitutional Rights, 666 Broadway, 7th Floor, NewYork, NY,20012,212/614 6439,Attorneys for Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Shafiq RasuLAsiflqbaL Rhuhel Ahmed and JamalAlHaritb,by and through their undersigned attor neys,BaachRobinson^LewisPLLCand Michael Ratner at the Center for Constitutional Rights, as and for their complaint against Defendants Donald Rumsfeld, Air Force General Richard Myers, Army Major General Geoffrey Miller, Army General JamesT.Hifl, Army Major General Michael E.Dunlayey,Army Brigadier Gen eral Jay Hood, Marine Brigadier General Michael LebnerL Army ColonelNelson J. Cannon, Army Colonel Terry Carrico, Army Lieutenant Colonel William Cline, Army Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver and John Does 1-100, hereby allege as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs are citizens and residents ofthe United Kingdom.They are not now and have never been members of any terrorist group. They have never taken up arms against tbe United States, 2. ^laintiffs Shafiq RasuL Asiflqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed were detained in Northem Afghanistan on November

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28,2001,by General Rashid Dostum, anUzbek warlord temporarily allied with the United States as part of the Northern Alliance.Thereafter,General Dostum placed Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed in tbe custody of the United States military. Because Plaintiffs Rasul, Iqbal and Ahmed were unarmed and not engaged in any hostile activities, neither General Dostum nor any ofhis troops ever could have or did observe them engaged in combat against the United States,the Northern Alliance or anyone else.On information and beliefGeneral Dostum de tained Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed and numerous other detainees who were not combatants; he handed de tainees including Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed to the custody ofthe United States in order to obtain bounty money from the United States; and tbe United States took custody of Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed without any independent goodfaithbasisfor concluding that they were or had been engaged in activities hostile to the United States. 3. Plaintiff JamalAlHaritb works as an internet web designer in Manchester, England.Intending to attendare ligiousretreaLPlaintiff AlHaritharrivedinPakistanonOctober 2,2001, wherebewasadvisedtoleave the countrybecause of animosity towardBritishcitizens.Heeding the warning,beplannedtoreturntoEuropeby traveling overland through Iran toTurkey by truck.While in Pakistan,the truck in which Plaintiff Al-Harith was riding was stolen at gunpoint byAfghans; he was tbenforcedintoajeepwhicbcrossedtheborder into Afgh anistan. Plaintiff AlHaritb was then bandedover tothe Taliban, Plaintiff AlHarith was beatenby Taliban guards andtakenfor interrogation. He was accusedofbeingaBritishspecialforces military spy and heldin isolation. After the USinvasion of Afghanistan,theTaliban released Plaintiff AlHaritb into the general prison population. WbentheTalibangovernment fell and the newgovernment came to power,P1aintiff AlHarith and otbersintbeprisonweretoldthatthey werefreetoleave and Plaintiff AlHaritb was offered transportationto Pakistan.Plaintiff AlHaritb thought it would be quicker and easier to travel to Kabul where there wasaBritish Embassy.Officials of thelnternational Committee of thcRed Cross ("ICRC") instructed AlHarith to remain at the prison and they offered to make contact with theBritish Embassy to fly him home.Plaintiff AlHaritb also spoke directly to British Embassy officials who indicated that they were making arrangements to fly him to Ka bul and out of the country. After Plaintiff Al Haritb had been in contact with the British Embassy in Kabul for approximatdyamontbdiscussing thelogisticsofevacuating bim, AmericanSpecialForces arrived and ques tioned Plaintiff The ICRC told Plaintiff Al Harith that the Americans would fly Plaintiff Al Haritb to KabuL two days before he was scheduled to fly toKabuL American soldiers told Plaintiff Al-Harith,"You're not going anywhere. We're taking you to Kandahar airbase." 4. All four Plaintiffs were first held inUnited States custody in Afghanistan and later transported to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba (" Guantanamo"), where Defendants imprisoned them without chargefor more than twoyearsDuringPlaintiffs'imprisonmenL Defendants systematically and repeatedly tortured them in violation of tbe United States Constitution and domestic and international law,and deprived themofaccessto friends,relatives, courtsandcounseL Defendants repeatedly attempted toextract confessions from Plaintiffs without regard to the truth or plausibility of these statements through the use of the illegal methods detailed below. 5 Plaintiffs were released without charge in March 2004 and have retumed to their homes in the United King don^ where they continue to suffer the physical and psychological effects of tbeir prolonged arbitrarydetention, torture and other mistreatment as hereinafter alleged, 6. In the course of their detention by the United States, Plaintiffs were repeatedly struck with rifle butts, punched, kicked and slapped.They were"short shackled" in painful "stress positions" for many hours atatime, causing deep flesh wounds and permanent scarring. Plaintiffs were also threatened with unmuzzled dogs, forced

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to strip naked,subjected to repeated forced body cavity searches,intentionally subjected to extremes ofbeat and cold for the purpose of causing suffering, kept in filthy cages for 24 hours per day with no exercise or sanitation, denied accesstonecessarymedicalcare,harassedinpracticing their religion,deprivedofadequate food,de privedofsleep,deprivedofcommunicationwithfamilyandfriends,anddepriyedofinformationabout their status. 7, Plaintiffs'detention and mistreatment were in plain violation of theUnited States Constitution,federal slat utory law and United States treaty obligations, and customary international law. Defendants' treatment of Plaintiffs and other Guantanamo detainees violated various provisions oflaw including the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbidding tbe deprivation ofliberty without due process; the Eighth Amendment forbidding cruel and unusual punishmenLUnited States statutes prohibiting torture,assauh, and other mistreat ment; the Geneva Conventions; and customary international law norms prohibiting torture and other crueLinbu man or degrading treatmenL 8. Plaintiffs^ torture and other mistreatment was not simply the product ofisolated or rogue actions by individual military personnel.Rather it wasthe result ofdeliberaleandforeseeableactiontakenbyDefendant Rumsfeld and senior officers toflout or evade theUnited States Constitution,federalstatutory law,United States treaty obligations and long established norms of customary international law.This action was taken inamisconceived and illegal attempt to utilize torture and other crueL inhuman, or degrading acts to coerce nonexistent informa tionregardingterrorism. It wasmisconceivedbecause, according to the conclusionoftheUS military as ex pressedinthe ArmyField ManuaLtorture does not yield reliableinformation,and becausePlaintiffs along with the vast majority of Guantanamo detainees bad no information to give. It was illegal because, as Defend ants wefl knew, torture and other crueL inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees is not permitted under the United States Constitution, federal statutorylaw,United States treaty obligations, and customary international law. 9.On or about December 2,2002,Defendant Rumsfeld signedamemorandum approving numerous illegal inter rogation methods, including putting detainees in "stress positions" for up to four hours; forcing detainees to strip naked,intimidating detainees with dogs, interrogating them for20 hours atatime, forcing them to wear hoods, shaving their beads and beards, keeping them in total darkness and silence, and using what was euphemistically ^ called "mild, non-injurious physical contact."AsDefendant Rumsfeld knew,these andotber methods werein violation of the United States Constitution, federal statutory law, tbe Geneva Conventions, and customary inter nationallaw as reflected in,la^e^a^ia, theUnited Nations Convention AgainslTorture and Other CrueLinbu man or DegradingTreatment or Punishment ("CAT).This memorandum of December 2,2002,authorizing tor ture and other mistreatmenLwas originally designated by Defendant Rumsfeld to be classified for ten years but was released at tbe direction ofPresident GeorgeW.Bush after the Abu Ghraib torture scandal became public. 10. After authorizing, encouraging, permitting, and requiring the acts oftorture and other mistreatment inflicted upon Plaintiffs, Defendant Rumsfeld,on information and belief, subsequently commissioneda"Working Group Repon"dated March 6,2003,to address "Detainee Interrogations in the Global War onTerrorism: Assessment of LegaLHistoricaL Policy and Operational Considerations."This report,also originally dassifiedforaperiod of ten years by Defendant Rumsfdd,was also released after the Abu Ghraib torture scandal became public.This report details tbe requirements of intemational and domestic law governing interrogations, including the Geneva Conventions; the CAT;customary international law; the torture statute, 18U,SC.^ 2340; assauh within maritime and territorial jurisdiction, 18U.S.C.^ 113; maiming, 18U.S,C.^ 114; murder, 18U.S.C,^ 1111; man slaugbter,18USC^1112; interstate stalking, 1 8 U S C ^ 2261a; and conspiracy18USC^2and^371 The

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report attempts to address "legal doctrines under the Federal Criminal Law that could render specific conducL otherwise criminal not unlawful."Working Group Report at p.3(emphasis in original).Tbe memorandum is on its face an ex post facto attempt to create arguments that the facially criminal acts perpetuated by the Defendants were somehow justified. It argues first tbat the President as Commander in Chief has plenary authority to order torture,apropositionthal ignores settled legal doctrinefromKing John at Runnymede to Fi^^iB^^.s1^.iua5/iee^^ 7a^^e, 343 U,S.579 (1952L It next tries to apply common law doctrines of self defense and necessity,arguing the erroneous proposition that the United States has the right to torture detained individuals because it needs to defend itself or because it is necessary that it do so. Finally, it suggests that persons inflicting torture and other mistreatment wifl be able to defend against criminal charges by claiming that they were following orders. Tbe report asserts that the detainees bave no Constitutional rights because the Constitution does nol apply to persons held at Guantanamo.However,the report acknowledges that U.S.criminal laws do apply to Guantanamo, and further acknowledges that the United States is bound by tbe CATto tbe extent that conduct barred by that Con vention would also be prohibited by tbe Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. On June 22,2004,the conclusions of this report and other memoranda attempting to justify torture were repudiated and rescinded by President Bush. 11.In April 2003,following receipt of tbeWorking Group ReporL Defendant Rumsfeld issuedanew set of re commended interrogation techniques, requiringapprovalfor four techniques. Theserecommendations recog nized specifically that certain ofthe approved techniques violated the Geneva Conventions and customary inter national law,including the use ofintimidation,removal ofrdigious items,threats and isolation.The April 2003 reporL however, officially withdrew approval for unlawful actions tbat had been ongoing for months, including hooding,forced nakedness,shaving,stresspositions,use ofdogsand"mild,noninjuriousphysicalcontact." Nevertheless, on information and belief these illegal practices continued to be employed against Plaintiffs and other detainees at Guantanamo. 12. Defendants w d l knew that their activities resulting in tbe detention, torture and other mistreatment of Plaintiffs were illegal and violated dearly established law i.e., tbe Constitution, federal statutory law and treaty obligations of the United States and customary international law. Defendants'after tbe fact attempt to create an Orwellian legal facade makes clear their conscious awareness that tbey were acting illegally Therefore tbey cannot claim immunity from civil liability. .JURISDICTION AND VENUE 13. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs'claims under 28U.S,C,^1331(federa1 question jurisdiction); and 2 8 U S C ^ 1 3 5 0 (AlienTort Statute) 14 Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 2 8 U S C ^ 1 3 9 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) a n d 2 8 U S C ^ 1 3 9 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) T h e alleged acts described below are "inextricably bound up with the District ofColumbia in its role as tbe nation's capital." ^^^^i^yi,II^ei^^e^ge^,554 F,Supp,811,8I8(D.D.C, 1982).Decisions and acts by Defendants ordering, facilit ating, aiding and abetting, acquiescing, confirming and/or conspiring in the commission o f t h e alleged acts reached the highest levels of the United States GovernmenLOn information and belief, approval for all alleged acts emanated under color of law from orders,approvals, and omissions occurring in thePentagon, numerous government agencies headquartered in the District of Columbia, and the offices of Defendant Rumsfeld, several of which are in the District of Columbia. Venue for claims arising from acts of Cabinet officials, tbe Secretary ofDefense and United States agencies lies in the District of Columbia. 5'ee i^,,5'i^^7^iyi^a/^a!i,927 F,Supp, 1 ( D D G 1996)

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PARTIES 15. PlaintiffShafiq Rasul was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant heretoadtizen and resident of tbe United Kingdom,He is not now and has never beenaterrorist oramember ofaterrorisl group. He has never taken up arms against tbe United States. At tbe time of his initial arrest and detention, be was 24 years old. 16. Plaintiff Asif Iqbal was born in the United Kingdom and has been at afl times relevant heretoadtizen and resident of tbe United Kingdom.He is not now and has never beenaterrorist oramember ofaterrorisl group. He has never taken up arms against tbe United States.Atthe time of his initial arrest and detention,be was 20 years old. 17. Plaintiff Rhuhel Ahmed was born in the United Kingdom and has been at afl limes relevant heretoadtizen and residentof theUnited Kingdom. Heisnotnowandhasnever beenaterrorist oramember ofaterrorisl group.He has never taken up arms against tbe United States. At the time ofhis initial arrest and detention,he was19yearso1d. 18. Plaintiff JamalAlHaritb was born in the United Kingdom and has been at all times relevant heretoadtizen andresident of theUnited Kingdom. He isnolnowandhasneverbeenaterroristoramember ofaterrorisl group.He has never taken up arms against tbe United States.At the time ofhis initial arrest and detention,he was 35 years old. 19. Defendant Donald Rumsfeld is the United States Secretary ofDefense.On information and belief, he isacitizen of Illinois andaresident of the District of Columbia.Defendant Rumsfeld is charged wilh maintaining the custody and control ofthe Guantanamo detainees,including Plaintiffs, and with assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law. Defendant Rumsfeld ordered, authorized, condoned and has legal responsibilily for the arbitrary detention,torture and other mistreatment ofPlaintiffs as alleged herein.Defendant Rumsfeld is sued in bis individual capacity, 20. Defendant Myers isaGeneralin tbe United States Air Force and was at times relevant hereto Chairman of iheJointChiefsofStaff On information and belief he isacitizen and resident ofVirginia. As the senior uni formed mflitary officer in the chain of command. Defendant Myers is charged with maintaining the custody and control of the Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and with assuring tbat tbeir treatment was in accord ance withlaw.On information and belief Defendant Myers was informed of torture and other mistreatment of detainees at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and condoned such activities. Defendant Myers was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. Defendant Myers is sued in his individual capacity. 21. Defendant Miller isaMajor General in the United States Army and was at limes relevant hereloCommander of JointTask ForceGTMO.On information and belief, be isacitizen and resident ofTexas.Al limes relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and was responsible for assuring that their treatment wasin accordance withlaw.OninformationandbeliefDefendant Miller wasin regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in IheDis trict of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia. On informa tion and belief. Defendant Miller implemented and condoned numerous methods oftorture and other mistreat mentashereinafterdescribed On information and belief Defendant Miller was subsequently transferred to Abu Ghraib where be implemented and facilitated torture and other mistreatment ofdetainees there.These acts were

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filmed andphotographedandhavejustly inspired widespread revulsionandcondemnationaround the world. Defendant Miller is sued in his individual capacity. 22. Defendant Hill isaGeneralin the United States Army and was al limes relevant hereto Commander of the United States Southern Command.On information and belief, be isacitizen and resident ofTexas.On information and belief. Defendant Hifl was in regular contact wilh Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain ofcommand based in the District ofColumbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District of Columbia.On information and beliefGeneral Hill requested and recommended approval for several abusive interrogation techniques which were used on Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs. Defendant Hifl is sued in his individuals capacity. 23. Defendant Dunlavey isaMajor General in the United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Com mander of JointTask Forces160/170,the successors to JointTask Force GTMO.On information and belief be is a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania. At times relevant hereto, be had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law On information andbeliefDefendant Dunlavey wasin regular contact withDefendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials inlhechainofcommandbasedin the Dislriclof Columbia andparticipaled inand implemenledde cisions taken in the District ofColumbia.On information and belief Major General Dunlavey implemented and condoned the torture and other crueL inhuman or degrading acts and conditions alleged herein. Defendant Dun lavey is sued in his individual capacity. 24 DefendanlHood isaBrigadier General in theUnitedStates Army andislbe Commander of JointTask Force-GTMO,which at afl relevant times operated the delentionfacilities at Guantanamo.Oninformation and belief he isacitizen and resident ofSouth Carolina.At times relevant hereto,be bad supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance wilh law. On information andbdief Defendant Hoodbasbeenandcontinueslobe in regularcontact wilh Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in tbe chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District ofColumbia.Defendant Hood is sued in bis individual capacity. 25. Defendant Lehnert isaBrigadier General in the United States Marine Corps and was al limes relevant hereto Commander of the JointTask Force responsiblefor tbe construction and operationofCampXRayandCamp Delta at Guantanamo.On information and belief he isacitizen and resident ofFlorida.Al limes relevant hereto, he had supervisory responsibility for Guantanamo detainees, including Plaintiffs, and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance with law On information and belief. Defendant Lehnert was in regular contact wilh Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in tbe chain ofcommand based in theDistrict ofColumbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in the District ofColumbia.Defendant Lehnert is sued in bis in dividual capacity. 26. Defendant Cannon is a Colonel in tbe United States Army and the Commander of Camp Delta at Guantanamo.Oninformationandbelief he isacitizen and resident ofMichigan. At times relevant hereto,he has and continues to have supervisory responsibilily for Guantanamo detaineesincluding Plaintiffs and for as suring that their treatment was in accordance wilh law.On information andbeliefDefendant Cannon has been in regular contact wilh Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in IheDis IrictofColumbia and participated in and implemented decisions takenintheDistrict of Columbia.Defendant Cannon is sued in his individual capacity.

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27. Defendant CarricoisaColonelin theUnited Slates Army and was al times relevant hereto Commander of CampXRay and Camp Delta at Guantanamo.On information and belief, be isacitizen and resident ofTexas. At limes relevant hereto, he bad supervisory responsibilily for Guantanamo detainees including Plaintiffs and for assuring that their treatment was in accordance withlaw.On information and belief, Defendant Carrico was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the Dis trict of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions taken in theDistrict of Columbia.Defendant Carrico is sued in his individual capacity. 28. Defendant Beaver isaLieutenant Colonel in tbe United States Army and was at times relevant hereto Chief Legal Adviser to Defendant Dunlavey.On information and belief sbe isacitizen and resident ofKansas.On in formation and belief knowing that torture and other mistreatment were contrary to military law and regulations, sbe nevertheless provided an opinion purporting to justify the ongoing torture and other mistreatment of detain ees at Guantanamo, including Plaintiffs. On information and belief Defendant Beaver was in regular contact with Defendant Rumsfeld and other senior officials in the chain of command based in the District of Columbia and participated in and implemented decisions takenintheDistrict of Columbia.Defendant Beaver is sued in her individual capacity. 29. Plaintiffs do not know tbe true names and capacities ofother Defendants sued herein and therefore sue these defendants by fictitious names, John Does 1 100. Plaintiffs wifl amend this complaint lo allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. John Does 1 100 are the military and civilian personnel who participated in the torture and other mistreatment ofPlaintiffs as hereinafter alleged. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 30. Plaintiffs are citizens and residents ofthe United Kingdom. 31. P1aintiffsRasul,Iqbaland Ahmed areboyboodfriendsandgrew up streets away fromeacholber inthe workingclass town ofTiplon in theWest Midlands ofEngland, 32. PlaintiffShafiq Rasul atlendedaCalbolic elementary school before sludyingatthe samehigh school as Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed.An avid soccer fan, PlaintiffRasul played foralocal team before going on to study computer science at the University ofCentral England. He also worked part time at an electronics store. 33. PlaintiffAsiflqbal attended the same elementary school as PlaintiffRasul and the same high school as both PlainliffsRasuland Ahmed. Aflerleaving highschooLPl^inliff Iqbal worked alaloealfactory making road signs and building bus shelters.He was also an active soccer player and volunteered atthe local community center. 34. PlaintiffRhubd Ahmed attended tbe same high school as Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed.Like Plaintifflqbaf he worked atalocal factory and worked with children and disabled people at the local governmentfunded Tipton Muslim Community Center. 35. In September 2001,Plaintiff Iqbal traveled to Pakistan tojoin his father who had arrangedamarriage for bim wilhayoung woman from his family's ancestral village.His longtime friend,Plaintiff Ahmed traveled from England in October in order to join bim al his wedding as his best man. Plaintiff Rasul was at the same lime in Pakistan visilinghisfamily with theexpectationofconlinuinghisdegreecoursein computer science degree within the month.Prior tothe wedding in Pakistan,in October 2001,Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed crossed

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the border into Afghanistan in orderto offer help in the ongoing humanitarian crisis.After the bombing in Afgh anistan began. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed tried to return to Pakistan but were unable lo do so because the border hadbeenclosed. Plaintiffsnever engaged inany terrorist activity or lookuparmsagainst theUnited Stales 36.PlaintiffsRasuflqbal and Ahmed never engaged in combat against theforces of theUnited States or any other entity. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed never conducted any terrorist activity or conspired, intended, or planned to conduct any such activity.Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed never belonged to AlQaeda or any olh er terrorist organization. Detention in Afglianlstan 37.OnNovember 28,2001,Plaintiffs Rasuflqbal and Ahmed were captured and detained by forces loyal to General Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord who was aligned with the United States. 38. NoU.S. forceswerepresentwhenPlaintiffsRasul,IqbalandAhmedwere detained.Therefore, noU.S. forces could have had any information regarding Plaintiffs otherthan that suppliedby the forces of General Dostum,who were known to be unreliable and who were receivingaper head bounty of, on information and be liefupto$ 35,000. 39. WithU.S. military forces presenL PlaintiffsRasuL Iqbal and Ahmed,along with 200 to 300 others,were crammed into metalconlainers and transported by truck to Sherbegan prison in Northern Afghanistan.General Dostum's forces fired holes into the sides ofthe containers with machine guns, striking the persons inside. Plaintifflqbal was struck in his arm, which would later become infected. Following the nearly 18hour journey to Sherbegan prison. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were among what they estimate to have been approxim atdy20 survivors in the container. 40. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were held in Sherbegan by General Dostum's forces for about one month, where they were exposed lo extremely cold conditions without adequate clothing, confined lo tight spaces, and forced to ration food. Prison conditions were filthy. Plaintiffs Rasuf Iqbal and Ahmed and other prisoners suffered from amoebic dysentery and were infested with lice. 41.In late December 2001,the ICRCvisited with Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed and informed them that the British Embassy inlslamabad,Pakistanhadbeenadyisedoftbeirsituationandthalembassy officials would soon be in contact with Plaintiffs. 42. OnDecember 28,2001,U.S.SpecialForces arrived at Sherbegan and wereinformed of tbeidentities of Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed. 43. General Dostum'stroopschainedPlainliffsRasuL Iqbaland Ahmed andmarchedthemthroughthemain gale of the prison,whereU.S.Special Forces surrounded them at gunpoinL 44. From December 28,2001 until their release in March 2004,Plaintiffs Rasuflqbal and Ahmed were in tbe exclusive physical custody and control of theUnited Stales military.In freezing temperatures,Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were stripped of their clothes, searched, and photographed naked while being held by Defendant JohnDoes,twoU.S.Special Forces soldiers. American military personnel look Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed toaroom for individual interrogations.Plaintiff Rasul was bound band and foot with plastic cuffs and

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forcedonlohiskneesbeforean American soldier inuniform.Both PlainliffsRasul and Iqbal were interrogated immediately and without knowledge of their inlerrogators'identilies.Both were questioned at gunpoinLWhile Plaintiff Iqbal wasinterrogated,Defendant JohnDoehdda9mm pistol physically touching bis temple. At no time were Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed afforded counsel or given the opportunity to contact tbeir families. 45. Following their interrogations. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were led outside whereaDefendant John Doe immediately covered their eyes by pulling sandbags over their heads and applying thick masking tape. They wereplacedside byside,barefoot infreezing temperatures,wilh only light dothing,for at least three lofour bours. While hooded and taped. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were repeatedly threatened with beatings and death and were bealenbyanumber of Defendant John Does,U.S.military personnel.Plaintiff Iqbalestimates that be waspunched, kicked, slapped, andstruckby US military personnel with riflebuttsat least 30or40 times. 46. Thereafter, Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were placed in trucks with other detainees and transported to an airport about 45 minutes away. 47. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were led onto one plane and Plaintiff Ahmed was led onto a second plane. PlaintiffsRasuLIqbaland Ahmed, stillhoodedwiththeirbandstiedbehindlheir backs andtbeirlegstiedin plastic cuffs,were fastened toametal belt attached to the floor of each aircraft.The soldiers instructed Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed to keep tbeir legs straight out in front of them as they saL The position was extremely painful. When any ofPlaintiffs or other detainees tried lo move to relieve the pain, anunknown number ofDe fendant John Does struck Plaintiffs and others with rifle butts. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were flown by theU.S.military lo Kandahar. 48. Upon arrival in Kandahar, Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed, stifl covered wilh hoods, were led out of the planes.Arope was tightly tied around each oftheir right arms,connecting tbe detainees together. 49. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed,who were stifl without shoes,were forced to walk for nearly an hour in the freezing cold, causing them to sustain deep cuts on their feel and rope burns on tbeir right arms. 50. P1ainliffsRasuLIqba1and Ahmed were herdedintoalenL where soldiersforcedthemlo kneel wilhlheir legs bent double and their foreheads touching the ground. With tbeir bands and feet stifl tied, the position was difficultto maintain.Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were repeatedly and violently beaten by Defendant John Does,US soldiers.Each was asked whether he wasamember of AlQaeda and wben each responded negatively, each was punched violently and repeatedly by soldiers. When Plaintiffs Rasul Iqbal and Ahmed identified them selves as British nationals. Defendants John Doe soldiers insisted they were "not white" but "b1ack"and accord ingly could nol be British, The soldiers continued lo beat them, 51. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were "processed" byAmerican soldiers,and bad plastic numbered wristbands placed on their wrists.Soldiers kicked Plaintiff RasuL assigned the number78,several times during this process.American soldiers cut off his clothes and conductedabody cavity search.He was then led through an openair maze constructed of barbedwire.Plaintiffslqbaf assigned number79,and Ahmed, assigned number 102, experienced tbe same inhumane treatmenL 52. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed,dehydrated, exhausted, disoriented, and fearfuLwere summoned by num her for interrogation. Whenca11ed,each wasshackledandledloaninlerrogalion lenL Tbeirhoods werere moved and tbey were told lo sit on the floor.An armed soldier stood behind them out of their line of sighLThey

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were told that if they moved they would be sboL 53. Afleranswering questions aslo their backgrounds. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were eacb photo graphed by soldiers.Tbey were fingerprinted andaswabfrom their mouth and hairs plucked from their beards were taken for DNA identification. 54. An American soldier questioned Plaintifflqbalasecond time.Plaintifflqbal was falsely accused by the in terrogatorofbeingamemberof AlQaeda. Defendant JohnDoes, US soldiers,punchedandkickedPlaintiff Iqbal in the back and stomach before he was dragged to another lenL 55. Personnel believed by Plaintiffs to be British military personnel later interrogated Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed,withUS soldiers presenL Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were falsely accused ofbeing members of the AIMuhajeroon.During theinlerrogation,P1aintiffsRasuLIqbaland^hmed were ihrealenedby Defendant John Does,armed American so1diers,wilb further beatings if tbey did nol admit to various false statements. 56. Plaintiffs Rasul and Ahmed slept inatent with about 20 other detainees.Plaintifflqbal was in another lenL Tbe tents were surrounded by barbed wire. Detainees were not allowed to talk and were forced lo sleep on the ground.American soldiers woke the detainees hourly as part ofasyslematic effort to deprive them of sleep. 57. Defendant JohnDoes,interrogators andguards,frequently usedphysical violence andunmuzzleddogsto threaten and intimidate Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed and other detainees during the interrogations. 58. A l o r around midnight of January 12 or13,2002,US army personnel entered the tent ofPlaintiffs Rasul and Ahmed.Both were made to lie on the ground,were shackled,and rice sacks were placed over tbeir heads.They wereled to another lenLwhereDefendant John Does,USso1diers,removed tbeir clothes andforcibly shaved tbeir beards and heads.Theforced shaving was not inlendedfor hygiene purposes,but rather was,on informa tion and belief designed to distress and humiliate Plainfiffs given their Muslim faith, which requires adult males to maintain beards, 59. Plaintiff Rasul was eventually taken outside where he could hear dogs barking nearby and soldiers shouting, "Get'em boy."He was then givenacavity search and photographed extensively while naked before being given an orange uniform. Soldiers handcuffed PlaintiffRasul's wrists and ankles before dressing him in black thermal gloves, dark goggles,earmuffs, andafacemask.Plaintiff Rasul was then lefl outside for hours in freezing tem peratures. 60. PlaintifflqbaLwho was in another lenL experienced similar treatment ofbeing led from bis tent to be sbaved and stripped naked. 61. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were escorted onto large cargo planes. Still shackled and wearing facemasks, both werechainedtothefioorwilhnobackrests.They were forced by Defendant John Does lo sit in an uncomfortable positionfor the entire flight to Guanlanamofof approximately eighteen lo twenty bours) and were not al lowed lo move or given access to toilet facilities. 62. Plaintiff Ahmedremained inKandabarforanother month Americansoldiers inlerrogatedhimfourmore times. Sleepdeprivedandmalnourished,Plaintiff Abmedwasalsointerrogatedby Britishagents w h o , o n i n formation and bdiefwere from the British intelligence agency, M15, and he was falsely told lhal Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal had confessedin Cuba lo allegations of membership in the AIMuhajeroon.He was told that he could

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returnlotheUnitedKingdom inexchangefor admitting to various accusations. DistraughLfearful of further beatings and abuse, and without benefit ofcontact with family or counseL Plaintiff Ahmed made variousfalse confessions. PlaintiffAhmed was thereafter transported to Guantanamo. 63. As noted above. Plaintiff AlHarith was being held in custody by theTaliban in Southern Afghanistan asa suspectedBritishspy. He wasinterrogated andbeatenbyTalibanlroops. When theTaliban governmenlfelL Plaintiff AlHarith was inaTaliban prison.He contacted the British Embassy through the ICRC and by satellite phone and was assured he would be repatriated to Britain. Two days before his scheduled repatriation, US forces informed him that be was being detained and taken loKandahar,wbere he was held inaprison controlled by US forces and interrogated and beaten by USlroops.Plaintiff AlHarith was flown to Guantanamofrom Kandahar on or aboul February 11,2002. 64. Prior to lake o f f Plaintiff Al Harith, like Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed, was hooded and shackled; mil tens were placed on his hands and earphones over his ears. Chains were then placed around bis legs, waist and the earphones,The chains cul intohis ears,Goggles were placedon his eyes andamedicalpatchthaLonin formation and belief contained muscle relaxant was applied. Captivity and Conditions a t C a m p X R a y . Guantanamo 65. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were transported to Guantanamo in midJanuary 2002 Plaintiffs Ahmed and AlHarith weretransporledtbereapproximatelyonemonlh later. During the trip,Defendant JohnDoes,US sol diers, kicked and punched PlaintiffAhmed more than twenty times.PlaintiffAl-Harith was punched, kicked and elbowed repeatedly and was threatened with more violence. 66. Upon arrivalat Guantanamo,Plaintiffs were placedonabargetoget to themaincamp. Defendant John Oocs, US Marines on the barge, repeatedly beat all the detainees, including Plaintiffs, kicking, slapping, dbow ing and punching detainees in the body and head,The Marines announced repeated1y,"You are arriving at your final destination,"and,"You are now properly of the United States MarineCorps." 67. Plaintiffs were taken to CampXRay,the prison camp for detainees.Soldiers forced all four Plaintiffs on ar rival to squat outside in stress positions in the extreme heaL Plaintiffs and the other detainees bad tbeir goggles and hoods removed, but tbey had to remain with their eyes closed and were not allowed to speak. 68. PlaintifflqbaL still shackled and goggled,fefl over and started shaking.Plaintifflqbal was then givenacav ity search and transported to another area for processing, including fingerprinting, DNA sampling, photographs, and another wristband. 69. Plaintiff Rasul was forced to squat outside for six to seven hours and went through similar processing. Un muzzled barking dogs were used to intimidalePlaintiff Rasul and others. Alone poinLDefendant John Doe,a soldier fromaunit known as IheExtremeReaction Force (ERF), repeatedly kicked Plaintiff Rasul in the back and usedariot shield to slam bim againstawall. 70. After processing. Plaintiffs were placed in wire cages ofabout2melersby2melers,Conditions were crueL inhuman and degrading. 71. Plaintiffs were forced to sit in tbeir cells in total silence for extended periods.Onceaweek,for two minutes. Plaintiffs wereremovedfrom tbeir cdlsandshowered. They werethenretumedtotheir cells. Onceaweek,

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Plaintiffs were permitted five minules recreation while their hands remained chained. 72. Plaintiffs were exposed lo extreme heat during tbe day,as their cells were situated in the direct sunlighL 73. Plaintiffs were deliberately fed inadequate quantities of food, keeping them inaperpetual stale of hunger. Much of the food consisted of"MRE's"(meals ready to eat),wbich were ten to twelve years beyond their usable date. Plaintiffs were servedoulofdatepowderedeggs and milk, stalebread from which themoldbadbeen picked out and fruit that was black and rotten, 74. Plaintiffs and other detainees were forced lo kneel eacb timeaguard came into their cells. 75. Plaintiffs alnightwereexposedlopowerful floodlights,apurposeful tactic topromotesleep deprivation among tbe detainees. Plaintiffs and the other detainees were prohibited from putting covers over tbeir heads to block out tbe light and were prohibited from keeping their arms beneath the covers. 76. Plaintiffs were constantly threatened at CampXRay,with guards stating on multiple occasions,"Wecould kill you at any time; the world doesn't know you're here; we could kifl you and no one would know." 77. Plaintiff Al Haritb was taken to the medical clinic and was told that his blood pressure was too high. He was given,on information and belief muscle relaxantpills and an injection ofan unspecified substance. 78. On various occasions, Plaintiffs'efforts to pray were banned or interrupted. Plaintiffs were never given pray er mats and did not initially receive copies of ibeKoran.Korans were provided tothem after approximately a month. Onone occasion,aguard in Plaintiff Ahmed's cdlblocknoticedacopyoftheKoranonlhefloor and kicked iL On anotberoccasion, a guard threw a copy of the Koran in a toilet buckeL Detainees, including Plaintiffs,were also at times prevented from cafling out tbe cafl to prayer,wilh American soldiers either silen cing the person who was issuing the prayer cafl or playing loud music to drown out the cafl to prayer.This was part ofacontinuing pattern of disrespect and contempt for Plaintiffs'religious beliefs and practices. Interrogation at Camp X-Ray 79. Plaintiffs were extensively interrogated at CampXRay. 80. Duringinterrogations,P1ainliffs were typically "longshackled,"whereby Ibdrlegs were chainedusinga large padlock.Tbe sbackleshad sharp edgesthatscrapedtbe skin,and allPlainliffs experienced deep cuts on and around their ankles,resulting in scarring and continuing chronic pain.During the interrogations,Plaintiffs were shackled and chained to the floor Plaintiffs were repeatedly urged byAmerican interrogators lo admit that they were fighters who went to Afghanistan for "jihad."In return,Plaintiffs were promised that if they confessed tolhesefalse assertions, they couldreturnlolheUnited Kingdom. PlaintifflqbaL who was interrogaledfive times byAmerican forces over three months at CampXRay,was repeatedly encouraged and coerced to admit to having beena"fighter." 81. PlaintiffAlHarith wasinterrogated approximately tentimes at CampXRay.He wasinterrogated by both Britishand Americanautborities. Ononeoccasion,aninterrogatoraskedPlaintiff AlHarith toadmitthathe went to Pakistan to buy drugs,wbich was not true.On another occasion,Plaintiff AlHarith was told that there wasanew terrorism law that would permit the authorities to put his family out in the street ifPlainliff AlHarith did not admit l o b d n g a d r u g d e a l e r o r a f i g b l e r . O n another occasion, interrogalorspromised money,acar,a bouse andajob ifhe admitted those things.As tbey were not true,he declined to admit them.

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82. Following Plaintiff Ahmed's first several interrogations at CampXRay.he was isolated inacellblock where there were onlyArabic speakers.Plaintiff Ahmed,who does not speak Arabic,was unable to communicate with anyone other than interrogators and guards for approximately five months. Conditions at Camp Delta 83. Around May2002,Plaintiffs were transferred to Camp Delta. 84. At no time werePlainliffs advised as lowhy they werebeing transferred,for what purpose they were de lained,wby they were considered "unlawful combatanls,"and what medical and legal resources might be avail able. 85. At Camp Delta, Plaintiffs were housed in mesh cages tbat were subdivided fromalarger metal container. There wasliltlelonoprivacy and the cages provided little shelter fromthe beat during tbe dayor the cold at nighLThe cages quickly rusted because of the sea air.Tbe cells contained metal slabs at waist hdghL detainees could not sh on the slabs because their legs would dangle offand become numb. There was not enough room in the cells lo pray. 86. Constant reconstruction work and large electric generators,whichran24 hoursaday,were used as part o f a strategic effort to deprive Plaintiffs and others of sleep.Lights were often left on24hoursaday. 87. Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were in the same cdlblock. Plaintiff Ahmed was placed in isolation for aboul one month,There was no explanation given as to wbyPlainliffAhmed had been placed in isolation.Following this period, he wasplaced i n a d i f f e r e n t c e f l and inlerrogatedby mostly American interrogators whorepealedly asked him tbe same questions for six months, 88. After six months at CampDdla, Plaintiff Ahmed wasmovedloacefldirectlyoppositePlaintiff RasuL Plaintifflqbal was placedinisolationfor about one month. Again,no explanationwasgivenfor the arbitrary placement in isolation. 89. PlaintiffAhmed was repeatedly disciplined wilh periods ofisolation for such behavior as complaining about tbe food and singing. 90. PlaintifflqbaL after about one month at Camp Delta,was moved lo isolation and given smaller food portions because it was believed be was bdittlingamilitary policeman He was disciplined with another week of isola lion when he wrote "haveanice day"onaSlyrofoam cup. 91. After his last period of isolation,Plaintiff Iqbal was moved toablock which housed only Chinese speaking detainees. Duringhislime there,he wasexposed to aggressive interrogation. Afterbeing there for months, Plaintifflqbal's mental condition deteriorated further. 92. Plaintiff AlHaritb wasputintoisolation f o r r e f u s i n g l o w e a r a wristband. Plaintiff AlHarith wasalso placedinisolationfor writing thelelter""D"onaSlyrofoam cup,The isolation block was freezing cold as cold air was blown through the block twenty-four hours a day. Tbe isolation cell was pilch black as the guards claimed the lights were not working.Plaintiff AlHarith was placed in isolalionasecond time around Christmas 2002 for refusing to lake an unspecified injection.When he refused, the ERFwas brought in and Plaintiff Al Harith was "ERFed": he was beaten,forcibly injected and chained inahogtied position,wilh his stomach on the floor and bis arms and legs chained together above bim. The ERF team jumped on his legs and back and kicked

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and punched Plaintiff AlHarith.Plaintiff AlHaritb was tben placed in isolation for approximalelyamonth,de prived at various intervals of soap, toothpaste oratootbbrusb, blankets or toilet paper. He was also deprived o f a Koran during this second period ofisolation. 93.On information and belief,"ERFings,"i.e.,the savage beatings administered by the ERF teams,were video taped onaregular basis and should be available as evidence of the truth of tbe allegations contained herein. 94. The Camp Delta routine included compulsory ""recreation"twiceaweek for fifteen minutes.Attendance was enforced by the ERF. As soon as fifteen minutes had passed, detainees were immediately returned to their cells. PlaintiffRasul noted that one would be forced to return to his cefl even i f i n the middle of prayers. 95. Around August 2002,medicalcorpspersonndofferedPlaintiffsRasuflqbalandAbmedinjections o f a n unidentified substance.PlaintiffsRasuLIqbaland Ahmed,like most delainees,refused.Soon after,Defendant JohnDoes, themedica1corps,relurnedwiththeERFteam. TheERFleammembers weredressedinpadded gear, thick gloves, and helmets. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were shackled and restrained with tbeir arms andlegsbentbackwardswhilemedicalcorpspulleduptbeirsleevestoinjecl their arms with anunidentified drug that had sedative effects. 96. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed received these injections against their wifl on approximatelyadozen occasions.Plaintiff AlHarith receiyed9or10compulsory injections on six separate occasions. 97. Plaintiff Iqbal was deprived of bisKoran and other possessions.His hands were sbackledinfrontofbim. When Plaintiff Iqbal looked back,aguard pushed him in the corner.ThereDefendant John Does punched bim repeatedly in the face and kneed bim in his thigh. Isolation and Interrogations at Camp Delta 98.Interrogation booths either hadaminiature camera hidden in them oraone way glass window.Thus,on in formation andbdief, someorafl ofthe interrogationsofPlaintiffsandotherdelaineesare recordedandare available as evidence ofthe truth ofPlaintiffs'allegations herein. 99.In December 2002,aliered reward system was introduced atCampDelta,whereby detainees were placed on different levels or tiers depending on their level of co operation and their behavior at the camp. 100. Interrogators and guardsfrequenlly promised to provide or threalenedlowitbdrawofessential items such asblanketsortootbpaste referred to as "comfort items" in orderto coerce detainees into providing informa tion.The truthful assertion that Plaintiffs bad no information lo give did nol result in the provision of'comfort items."Tothe contrary,the interrogators demanded lhal IhePlainliffs confess tofalse allegations and promised "comfort items"in exchange. 101.Isolation ofdetainees was frequently used asatechniqueto"'weardown"detainees prior toinlerrogalion. There were two primary ways in which prisoners would be placed in isolation: (1)for punishment, foraset peri od oftime foraspecific reason; or (2) for interrogation,wilh no specific lime limiL 102.Between October 2002 and May 2003,Plaintiff Rasul was interrogated about five or six times.Most of the interrogations involved the same questions that had been asked before. In April 2003, Plaintiffs Rasul and Iqbal were given polygraph tests and were led lo believe that they might be allowed lo return home ifthey passed.

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103 After two hours of questioning aslo whether he wasamember of AlQaeda, PlaintiffRasul was returned to his cefl,Two weeks later,he was interrogated byawoman who may have been army personnel in civilian cloth ing.She informed him tbat he had passed the polygraph tesL PlaintiffRasul was transferred toadifferenlcdlb lockandinformedby interrogators tbat they had videos whichproved that he andPlaintiffsIqbal and Ahmed were members of AlQaeda and linked to the Septemberllattacks. 104. A week later, PlaintiffRasul was transferredloan isolationblock, called "'November." PlaintiffRasul asked tbe army sergeant why be was being moved and was informed lhal the order was from the interrogators. Plaintiff Rasul was placed inametal cefl.Tomake the conditions of confinement continuously debilitating,the air conditioning was turned off during the day and turned on high at nigbLTemperatures were near 100 degrees during the day and 40 degrees at nighLThe extremes ofbeat and cold were deliberately utilized lointimidate, discomfort and break down prisoners. For one week, Plaintiff Rasul was held in isolation without interrogation. Later,he was taken toaroom and'"short shack1ed"and placed in an extremely cold room for six to seven hours Short shackling consists of chaining the ankles and wrists closely together to force the detainee intoacontorted and painful position. He was unable to move in the shackles and was not afforded an opportunity to go to the bathroom. He was hardly able to walk and suffered severe back pains. He was taken back lo his cell without ex planalion. 105. The next day PlainfiffRasul was "short shackled" and chained to the floor again for interrogation by an US Army intelligence officer named Bashir, also known asDanny.He was sbownpholographs of three men who were supposedly Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed withaman purported to be Mohammed Alia.Plaintiff Rasul repeatedly and truthfully denied being the person in tbe photograph. Further, he repeatedly and truthfully denied any involvement with AlQaeda or the Septemberll attacks.On five or six more occasions,PlaintiffRasul was interrogated in similar fashion. During these interrogations. Plaintiff Rasul was not provided with food and was not permitted to pray. 106. Following the first interrogation,on five or sixoccasions,Plaintiff Rasul was removed from bis cefl and broughlbacklotheinlerrogalionblockforinlervalsofaboutfourorfivedaysatatime. He wasrepeatedly "short shack1ed,"exposedlo extremely loud rock or heavy metal music,and left alone in the interrogation room for up to13 hours in the "long shackle" position. 107. During this period,aMarine captain and other soldiers arrived at PlaintiffRasul's cell to transfer bim to an other block, where be would remain in isolation for another two months without "comfort items." 108.On one occasion, PlaintiffRasul was brought to the interrogation room from isolation to be questioned by interrogatorsfrom theCriminal Investigations Diyision(CID). These interrogators, identified as"Drew"and "Terry,"informed PlaintiffRasul that theyweregoingto begin military tribunals. 109. After continued interrogations as to his alleged presence inaphotographwith Osama BinLaden,Plaintiff Rasul explainedlhalhe was working inEnglandandgoing lo college atthe time thephotographwaslaken. PlaintiffRasul toldinterrogatorshisplace ofemployment at anEnglishdectronics shop and his attendance at University ofCentral England and implored interrogators to corroborate what he was telling them.The interrog ators insisted he was lying.ToPlaintiffs knowledge,no effort was made lo find corroborating information which wouldhaveconfirmedthatPlaintiffRasulwaslivinginEngland at thetime of the alleged meeting witbBin Laden in the photograph. 110. Aboutamonth after bis second isolation period,PlaintiffRasul was "long shack1ed"and placed inaroom.

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where he was met by Bashir andawoman dressed in civilian clothing.Bashir informed Plaintiff Rasul that the woman had come fromWashington to show himavideo of an Osama Bin Laden rally in Afghanistan.After the woman showedP1ainfiffRasulaporlionoftheyideo,sheassertedlhatitshowedPlaintiffsRasuL Iqbaland Ahmed sitting down with Bin Laden. The woman interrogator urged Plaintiff Rasul lo admit that the allegation wastrue,butthepersonsin the video wercnot IhePlainliffs. PlaintiffRasulcontinuedtruthfully todeny in volvemenL He was threatened that ifhe did nol confess, he would be returned to isolation.Having been in isola tion for five to six weeks, with the resuh tbat he was suffering from extreme mental anguish and disorientation, Plainlifffalsdy confessed that be was in the video. 111. PlaintiffRasul was then returnedtoisolationfor another five to sixweeks.During that period he had no contact wilh any human being except with guards and interrogators who questioned him regarding the identity of certain individuals in photographs. 112. PlaintiffRasul was then transferred to another cdlblock,where both Plaintiffs Iqbal and Ahmed were being held.Here,PlaintiffRasul was denied'"comfort ilems"and exercise privileges. 113. Around mid Augustof 2003, PlaintiffRasul was moved within CampDeltaandplaced in anothercefl block without explanation.After about two weeks, PlaintiffRasul was taken toabuilding known as the'"Brown Building"and was informed by an army intelligence interrogator named"James" that be would soon be moving loacdl next to Plaintiffs Iqbal and ^hmed. 114. Following the meeting with the army intelligence interrogator, PlaintiffRasul was brought lo"Kilo Block" the next day,where Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were reunited and ableto speak with one another. 115. For the next two weeks, Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were brought in succession to be questioned by an army intelligence officer, known only as "'James,"as to their purported involvement in the 2000 video ofBin Laden. 116.On one occasion,PlaintiffRasul was administeredavoice stress analyzer test by"James." 117, After bis last interrogation by"James,"Plaintiff Rasul was informed tbat be would soon be turned over lo Navy Intelligence,Before ibaLhowever, in September 2003,Plaintiff Rasul wasfurther interrogated. He was brought into aninterrogationroomfor eight hours,He was denied requests to pray and lo have food or water. The following day,British officials questioned PlaintiffRasul PlaintiffRasul informed an officiafwho gave the name "Martin,"that he had been kept in isolation for three months without cause and had severe knee pain from the lack ofexercise,Later that evening, PlaintiffsRasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were taken to what was,on informa tionandbeliefaCIA interrogation block. 118, Plaintiffs continued tobeheld in thcKiloBlockandwereoccasionallybroughl infor interrogationbya navy intelligence officer wbo gave the name "Romeo." 119, Plaintifflqbal was treated inamanner similar to the other Plaintiffs, 120, Plaintifflqbal was interrogated on several occasions, sometimes for as long as eight hours. 121, The typical routine was to be "short shack1ed"and placed in an extremely cold room, 122, Plaintifflqbal was relegated to Level 4,the harshest levef for aboul two weeks,with virtually no"comfort

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items."Soon after, he was placed in isolation on the instruction ofintelligence officers. 123. Plaintiff Iqbal'sisolalion cell was covered in human excremenLPlaintifflqbal had no soap or towels and could not dean the cell. He was unable lo sit anywhere. 124. Plaintiff Iqbal wasinterrogated periodically lo review photographs,On one occasion,be wasplaced i n a "short shackled" position and left inaroom with tbe air conditioning turned down lo 40^.Plaintifflqbal was left in the "short shack1e"position for about three hours.Then, Defendant John Doe, an interrogator calling himself "Mr. Smitb,"entered tbe room and teased Plaintifflqbal aboul the temperature."Mr.Smitb"told Plaintifflqbal that he was able to gel anything Plaintifflqbal wanted."Mr. Smitb"then pulled out pornographic magazines and taunted him. Plaintiff Iqbalrefused to talk t o " M r . S m i t h . " " M r . Smith" left Plaintiff Iqbal alone for another three or four hoursintbefrigid room. lnthatoneday,Plaintiff Iqbal badbeen"shortshackled"forsevento eight hours.Upon returning to his cefl, he became ifl with flu and requested medication.One ofthe military po liceofficers. Defendant JohnDoe, denied bimmedicalion, andinformedbim that he wasactingunder orders from intelligence. 125. The next day,aMarine Captain and about 15soldiers escorted Plaintifflqbal lo another isolation block.He wasleft therefor severaldays. Prior lohisinterrogalion,Plaintiff Iqbal was"short sback1ed"andthenintroduced to an interrogator who gave the name""James".Because the pain from the shackling became excruciating, Plaintifflqbal began lo scream.After about three or four hours,""James" unshackled him, 126. After three days, Plaintifflqbal was taken to the "Brown Building,"where he was "long sback1ed"and left inaroom with strobe lighting and very loud music played repeatedly,making it impossible for him lo think or sleep,After about an hour, Plaintifflqbal was taken back to his cefl. 127. Thenext day,Plaintiff Iqbal was"'shortshack1ed"intheinterrogationroomfor five or six hoursbefore later being interrogated by "'Drew,"who identified himself as an agent from CID.Plaintifflqbal was shown pho tographs,bul refused lo look al them.He was "short shackled" for about four or five bours more.Afterawhile, he was unable to bear tbe conditions and falsely confessed that he was pictured in the photographs. 128. Four days later,agents from the FBI interrogated Plaintifflqbal about his activities in 2000. 129. Plaintifflqbal remained in isolation and was questioned at one point byamilitary intelligence officer giv ing the name of'OJ."Soldiers threatened him wilh further beatings ifhe did nol answer the questions. 130. PlaintiffAhmed was interrogated on numerous occasions,particularly wilh respect to his knowledge ofthe BinLaden video He wasinterrogated every three or four days, and the typical procedure was that he wasfirsl "short shackled"and placed inafreezing room with loud music for several hours. 13LBefore arriving at Guantanamo,PlaintiffAhmed was seriously sleep-deprived and malnourished.He was the first ofthe Plaintiffs to admit to various false accusations by interrogators. 132, Upon Plaintiff Ahmed's arrival at CampDdla, be was placed in isolation for about one month.Following this period,he was placed inadifferent cefl and interrogated by mostlyAmerican interrogators who asked him tbe same questions for six months. 133. Plaintiff Al Harith also was givenalie detector test approximately one year into his detention which he was told he passed.

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134, Plaintiff Al Harith on three or four occasions witnessed Defendant John Does, military police, using an in dustrialstrength hose to shoot strong jets of water at detainees,He was hosed down on one occasion. Aguard walked along thegangway alternating thehoseoneach cell.Plaintiff AlHarithwashoseddowncontinuously for approximately one minute.Tbe pressure ofthe water forced him to tbe back ofhis cell.The contents ofhis cdL including his bedding and Koran, were soaked. 135. PlaintiffRasuL in the next cdL^lso had all the contents ofhis cell soaked. 136.In or around February2004,Plaintiffs heard from military police that they would be released and sent home soon.Before leaving Camp Delta,Plaintiffs afl were interrogatedafinal time.Plaintiffs were asked to sign slate ments admitting to membership in AlQaeda and participation in terrorist activity.Plaintiffs declined. 137. In March 2004, Plaintiffs were released from Camp Delta and flown to the United Kingdom. Injuries 138. Plaintiffssuffered andcontinueto suffer from tbecrucLinhuman,anddegrading treatment they experi encedduring theirdetenlion. The""short shackling" which Plaintiffs wereexposedloresulled indeepcutsat their ankles, permanent scarring, and chronic pain. PlaintiffRasul has chronic pain in his knees and back. PlaintiffAhmed also suffers from permanent deterioration ofhis eyesight because ofthe withholding of required special lenses as ""comfort items." 139. Plainfiff Al Harith suffers from severe and chronic pain in his knees from repeatedly being forced onto his knees and pressed downwards by guards whenever he left his cell. He also has experienced pain in his right el bow. 140. Plaintiffs further suffer from acute psychological symptoms. Development and Implementation o f a P l a n o f T o r t u r e and Otl^er Physical and Psychological Mistreat ment or Detainees 141. The torture, threats, physical and psychological abuse inflicted upon Plaintiffs were devised, approved, and implemented by Defendant Rumsfeld and other Defendants in the military chain ofcommand.These techniques were intended as interrogation techniques to be used on detainees. 142. It is well-established that the use of force in interrogation is prohibited by domestic and international law. The United States Army strictly prohibits the use of such techniques and advises its interrogators that their use may lead to criminal prosecution.Army Field Manual 34 52,Ch, 1,""Intelligence Interrogation,"provides: Prohibition Against Use ofForce The use of force,mental torture,tbreats,insulls,or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind ^f^B-a^^^^^e^^^^a^andisneilher authorized nor condonedbytheUS GovernmenL...The psychologicallech niques and principles outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous wilh, unaulhor izedtechniquessuch asbrainwashing, mental torture,or anyotberformofmentalcoerciontoinclude drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation ofasource. The absence ofthreals in interrogation is inlenlionaL^s their enforcement and use normally constitute v^a7a^^aaf a^^a^e^aa^^aaaB^aiyaa^a^ay^efay^^a^^afeea^^aa. (Emphasis supplied).

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143. Further, according t o F i d d Manual 34 52,ch. 1:"Experienceindicales that the use of forceis not necessary to gainthecooperationofsourcesfor interrogation.Therefore,theuse of forceisapoor technique, asit yiddsunreliable results,maydamage subsequent collection efforts,andcaninducethe source lo say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear." 144. ArmyField Manual 27 10,"The Law ofLand Warfare,"summarizes the domestic and international legal rules applicable to the conduct ofwar.Field Manual 27 lOrecognizes the following sources of the law of war: The law ofwar is derived from two principal sources: a. Faiyaia^iagF^ea^ief(a!-Gaavea^iaaf^, such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions. b. Gi^f^aB^, Although some ofthe law ofwar has nol been incorporated in any treaty or convention lo which the United Slates isaparly,lhis body of unwritten or customary law is firmly established by tbe custom of nations and well defined by recognized authorities on international law. B^atCh 1,^L 145.In spite ofthe prohibitions on the use offorce, threats, and abuse in the Army Field ManuaL and its clear acknowledgement tbat tbeir use violates international anddomestic law, DefendantRumsfeldapproved tech niques that were in violation ofthose prohibitions and thus knowingly violated the rights ofPlaintiffs, 146,Inapress release dated June 22,2004,Defendant Rumsfeld admitted that beginning December 2,2002,he personally authorized the use of interrogation techniques tbat are not permitted under FM 34 52. Further, in the press release, Defendant Rumsfeld admits that he personally was consulted when certain of the techniques were to be utilized. 147.The techniques practiced on Plaintiffs including beatings,"short shackling,"sleep deprivation,injections of unknown substances, subjection lo cold or heaL hooding,stress positions,isolation,forced shaving,disrup tion ofrdigious practices, forced nakedness,intimidation with vicious dogs and threats were known to and ap proved by Defendant Rumsfeld and others in the military chain ofcommand. 148 Artide3commontoal1 fourGeneyaConventionsrequirestbatallpersonsintbehandsofanopposing force,regardless of theirlegal status,beaffordedcertainminimumstandards of treatmenL Personstakingno active part in the bostflities, including members ofarmed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed horsdecombatby sickness, wounds,detention,oranyothercause, shall inallcircumstancesbetreated hu manely,without any adverse distinctionfounded on race,colour, religion or faith,sex,birth or wealth,or any other similar criteria. Tothis end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever wilh re spect to tbe above-mentioned persons: (a)Violencelo life and person,in particular murder of afl kinds, mutilation,cruel treatment and torture; (c)Outrages upon personal dignity,in parlicu1ar,humi1ialing and degrading treatmenL 149 TheThird Geneva Convention of 1949,ArL 130, bars lhe"wi11ful killing, torture or inhuman treatment... willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or hea1th"of any prisoner of war. 150.In February 2002,theWhite House issuedapress release,which advised: The United States is treating and will continue to treat all ofthe individuals detained at Guantanamo humanely and,to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity,inamanner consistent with the principles

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of thcThird Geneva Convention of1949. Tbe President has determined that tbe Geneva Convention applies lo the Taliban detainees, but not lo the alQaedadetainees. AlQaeda is notastate party to the GenevaConvention;itisaforeignterrorist group. As such,its members are nol entitled toPOWstatus. 151. On information andbdief DefendantRumsfdd and allDefendants were aware of this statementof the PresidenL Moreover, Defendant Rumsfeld knew that this statement of policy wasadeparture from the previous policy of the United Stales that the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions,were always lobe honored. Defendant Rumsfeld knew that IheDepartmentofStaleandtbeuniformedservicestookthe generally recog nized position that the Geneva Conventions could not be abrogated or ignored, 152. However, Defendant Rumsfeld and others deliberated failed to implement the Presidential Directive in any evenL Defendant Rumsfeld and other Defendants in the chain ofcommand had no good faith basis for believing that Plaintiffs were members ofor affiliated with AlQaeda in any way,Indeed,the policy as announced was incoherent in that Defendant Rumsfeld and the other defendants had no way ofknowing who was and wbo was nol amemberofAIQaeda or theTaliban and Defendants look no steps to implement any reliable factfinding pro cess which might ascertain who was and who was nolamember of AlQaeda or theTaliban,including in parlic ulara"competenttribunal"as mandated by IbeThird Geneva Convention,ArL 5,U.S.military regulations and long standing practice of theU.S.armed forces. 153. Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants were aware tbat torture and other mistreatment perpetrated under color oflaw violates domestic and international law aL 154. Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendants were aware that Plaintiffs were tortured and otherwise mistreated or knew they would be tortured and otherwise mistreated while in military custody in Afghanistan and al Guantanamo. 155. Defendant Rumsfeld and afl Defendants took no steps to prevent the infliction oftorture and other mistreatment to which Plaintiffs were subjected. 156. Defendant Rumsfeld and afl Defendants authorized and encouraged the infliction oftorture and other mistreatment against Plaintiffs. 157. Defendant Rumsfeld and afl Defendants were aware tbat prolonged arbitrary detention violates customary international law. 158. Defendant Rumsfeld and all Defendantsauthorized andcondoned the prolonged arbitrary detention of Plaintiffs. Countl ALIEN TORT STATUTE Prolonged Arbitrary Detention

159. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1lhrougb158 of this Complaint as i f fully set forth herein.

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160. As staled by the Supreme Court ofthe United States,the allegations contained herein "unquestionably de scribe'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of tbe United States.'"Rastflv.Bush, I24S. CL 2686,2698,n15 (2004)(citation omitted) (Plaintiffs Rhuhel Ahmed and Asiflqbal were also Plaintiffs in that case). 161. Plaintiffs RasuL Iqbal and Ahmed were unarmed and were detained inaprison camp operated by nonU.S. forcesandPlaintiff AlHarith had beendelained and mistreated by theTaliban asasuspected British spy and was trapped inawar zone when Defendants took physical custody of their persons.Plaintiffs never engaged in combaL carried arms, or participated in terrorist activity or conspired with any terrorist person or organization. Defendants could have had no good faith reason to believe that tbey bad done so. 162. The Plaintiffs weredelainedunder the exclusive custody andcontrol of Defendantsforave^^i^a^ea^f without due process, access to counsd or fami1y,orasing1echargeofwrongdoing being levied against them. 163. The acts described herein constitute prolonged arbilrarydetenlion in yiolation of the law of nations under the AlienTorl Statute,28USC.^ 1350, in that the acts violated customary international law prohibiting pro longed arbitrary detention as reflected, expressed, and defined in multilateral treaties and other international in slruments, international and domestic judicial decisions, and other authorities. 164. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered,acquiesced,confirmed,ralified, aidedandabelledand/orconspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention ofPlaintiffs. 165. Defendant's unlawfulconducldeprivedPlaintiffs of their freedom,ofcontact wilhlheir families,friends and communities.Asaresuh, Plaintiffs suffered severe psychological abuse and injuries. 166. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other rdieflo be determined at triaL Count 11 ALIEN TORT STATUTE Torture

167. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs1throughI58 of this Complaint as i f fully set forth herein. 168. The acts described herein were inflicted deliberately and intentionally for purposes which included, among others, punishing the Plaintiffs or intimidating them.Tbe alleged acts did nol serve anylegitimate intelligence gathering orothergovernment purpose. Instead, they wereperpetraledlo coerce, punish, and intimidate the Plaintiffs.In any evenL torture is not permitted asalegilimale government function under any circumstances. 169. Tbe acts described herein constitute torture in yiolation of the law of nations under the AlienTorl Statute, 28 U.S.C, ^ 1350, i n l b a t l h e actsviolatedcustomary international lawprohibiling tortureas reflected, ex pressed, and defined in multilateral treaties and other international instruments, international and domestic judi cial decisions and other authorities.

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170. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered acquiesced, confirmed, ratified and or/conspired together in bringing about the tor ture and other physical and psychological abuse ofPlaintiffs as described above. 171. Plaintiffs suffered severe,immediate and continuing physical and psychological abuse asaresult of tbe acts alleged herein.Plaintiffs continue to suffer profound physical and psychological trauma fromthe acts alleged herein. 172. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other rdieflo be determined at triaL Count I H ALIEN TORT STATUTE CrueL Inhuman or DegradingTreatment

173. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege tbe allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 158 ofthis Complaint as i f fully set forth herein, 174. The acts described herein had tbe intent and the effect of grossly humiliating and debasing IhePlainliffs, forcing them to act against tbeir will and conscience, inciting fear and anguish, and breaking their physical and moral resistance, 175. These acts included inter alia repeated severe beatings; the withholding of food,water, and necessary med ical care; sleep deprivation; lack ofbasic hygiene; intentional exposure to extremes ofbeat and cold and thede ments; continuous isolation foraperiod ofmonths; forced injections; sexual humiliation; intimidation wilh un muzzled dogs; deprivation ofthe rights to practice their religion and death threats. 176. The acts described herein constitute cruefinhuman or degrading treatment inviolalionof t h e l a w o f na tions under the AlienTorl Statute,28USC ^ 1350,in that the acts violated customary internationallaw pro hibitingcruef inhumanor degrading treatment asreflecled,expressed,anddefinedinmultilalerallreaties and other international instruments, international and domesticjudicial decisions and other authorities. 177. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facflitated, ordered acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided and abetted and/orconspired together in bringing about the crueL inhuman or degrading treatment ofPlaintiffs as described above. 178. Plaintiffs suffered severe immediate physical and psychological abuse asaresult of the acts alleged herein. Plaintiffs continue lo suffer profound physical and psychological trauma from the acts alleged herein. 179. Plainfiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other rdieflo be determined al triaL Count IV VIOLATION O F T H E GENEVAC0NVENT10NS

180. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragrapbs1throughl58 of thisComplaint as i f

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fully set forth herein. 181. As detailed herein. Plaintiffs were held arbitrarily, tortured and otherwise mistreated during theirdetenlion in violation of specific protections of IbeThird and Fourth Geneva Conventions including bul not limited to Art icle3common to afl four Geneva Conventions. 182. Violations ofthe Geneva Conventions are direct treaty violations as well as violations ofcustomary inter national law. 183. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated,ordered,acquiesced,confirmed,ratified,aided and abetted and/or conspiredlogelber in bringing about the prolonged arbitrary detention, torture, abuse and mistreatment ofPlaintiffs as described above. 184. Asaresuh of Defendants'violations of the Geneva Conventions,Plaintiffs are entitled lo monetary damages and other relief to be determined at trial. Cc^ttntV. CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION O F T H E UNITED STATES Violation of tlie Eightli Amendment

185. Plaintiffs repeal and reallege tbe allegations contained in paragraphs 1 thorugh 158 ofthis Complaint as i f fully set forth herein 186. Defendants' actionsalleged herein against imprisoned Plaintiffsviolated the Eighth Amendment to tbe United Stales Constitution. Over the course of an arbitrary and baseless incarceration for more than two years, Defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on Plaintiffs. Despite never having been tried by any tribunaL Plaintiffs and other detainees were repeatedly denounced as guilty ofterrorisl acts by Defendant Rums feld. President Bush, Vice President Cheney and others. Tbe acts of crueL inhuman or degrading unusual pun isbment were imposed based on this arbitrary and impermissible declaration of guilL 187. Defendants were acting under color oflaw ofthe United Slates at all times pertinent to the allegations set forth above. 188. Tbe Plaintiffs suffered severe physical and mental injuries as a result of Defendants' violations o f t h e Eighth AmendmenLThey have also suffered present and future economic damage. 189. The actions ofDefendants are actionable under^^ie^^.sy 5ixGa^^rBua^^a^ie^Ee^^eia/Bfgea^,^, 403 U.S, 388 (1971) 190. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered,acquiesced,confirmed, ratified,aidedandabelledand/orconspired together in bringing about the prolonged arbilrarydetenlion,physical and psychologicaltorture and abuse,and other mis treatment ofPlaintiffs as described above. 191. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other rdieflo be determined at triaL

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Count V l CLAIMS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION O F T H E UNITED STATES Violation oftime Fifth Amendment

192. Plaintiffs repeat and re allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1through158 of this Complaint as i f fully set forth herein. 193. Defendants'actionsallegedhereinagainstPlaintiffsviolatedlheFifth Amendment tothe United Slates Constitution. 194. The arbitrary and baseless detention ofPlaintiffs for more than two years conslitutedadear deprivation of their liberty without due process,in direct violation oftheir Fifth Amendment rights. 195. The cruefinbuman or degrading, and unusualconditions of Plainliffs'incarceralion clearly violated tbeir substantive rights to due process.See City ofReverev.Mass.Gen,Hosp,463 U.S.239,244 (1983). 196. Defendants'refusal to permit Plaintiffs to consufl with counsel or to have access lo neutral tribunals to chai lengethefact and conditions of tbeir confinement consliluledviolalions ofPlaintiffs'proceduralrights to due process. 197. The abusive conditions ofPlaintiffs'incarceration served no legitimate govemment purpose. 198. Defendants were acting under the color ofthe law ofthe United States at all limes pertinent to the allega tions set forth above. 199. The Plaintiffs suffered severe physical and mental injuries asaresult ofDefendants'violations of the Fifth AmendmenLThey have also suffered present and future economic damage. 200. The actions of Defendants are actionableunder^ive^,s V 5i.r G!7^aai^Bi^Vai^e^Ee^ei^a/B^gei7^,s,403 U.S, 388(1^71) 201. Defendants are liable for said conduct in that Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered,acquiesced,confirmed,ratified, aidedandabelledand/orconspired together in bringing aboul the prolonged arbilrarydetenlion,physicalandpsychological torture and abuse andolher mis treatment ofPlaintiffs as described above. 202. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other rdieflo be determined at triaL Count V H C L A I M UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT

203. Plaintiffs repeat and re allege the allegations contained in paragrapbs1tbrough158 of this Complaint as i f fully set forth herein. 204. Defendants' actions alleged herein inhibited and constrained religiously motivated conduct central to

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Plaintiffs'religious beliefs. 205. Defendants'actionsimposedasubstantial burden on Plaintiffs'abilities to exercise and express tbeir reli gious beliefs. 206. Defendants regularly and systematically engaged in practices specifically aimed at disrupting Plaintiffs'religious practices.These acts included tbrowingacopy of tbe Koran inaloilel buckeL prohibiting prayer, ddib eratdy interrupting prayers, playing loud rock music to interrupt prayers,wilhho1ding the Koran without reason oraspunishmenLforcingprisonerstopraywithexposedgenital areas, withholding prayer mats and confining Plaintiffs under conditions where it was impossible or infeasible for them to exercise their religious rights. 207. Defendants were acting under the color of the law of the United States at afl times pertinent to the allega tions set forth above. 208. The Plaintiffs suffered damages asadirect and proximate resuh ofDefendants'violations of tbe Religious Freedom I^estoralionB^cl,42USCB^^^20l^l^bb etseq 209. Defendants are liable for said conduct in tbat Defendants participated in, set the conditions, directly and/or indirectly facilitated, ordered, acquiesced, confirmed, ratified, aided andabetted and/orconspired together in bringing about the deniaL disruption and interference with Plaintiffs'religious practices and beliefs as described above, 210. Plaintiffs are entitled to monetary damages and other rdieflo be determined at triaL WHEREFORE Plaintiffs each demand judgment against Defendants jointly and severally, including compensatory damages in the amount of$10,000,000 each (Ten Million Dollars),punitive damages, tbe costs ofthis ac tion, including reasonable attorneys'fees, and such other and further reliefas this Court may deemjust and prop er. Dated: October 27,2004 ENDOFDOCUMENT

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2007 WL 106499 (C.A.D.C.) Page

For Opinion See 563 F.3d 527 , 2009 WL 395238 , 512 F.3d 644 United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Shafiq RASUL, el al.. Appellants, v. Donald H. RUMSFELD, el al.. Appellees. No. 06-5209, January 8, 2007. Appeal from the United States District Court For the District ofColumbia, C A . No. 1:04CV01864 (RMU) The Honorable Ricardo M. Urbina, District Judge Brief of Appellants Michael Ratner, Jennifer M. Green, Shayana Kadidal, Center For Constitutional Rights, 666 Broadway, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10012, Telephone: 212-614-6439, Facsimile: 212-614-6499.Eric L. Lewis (#39627), A. rFN*i Katherine Toomey (#46678), Sarah L. Knapp (#49711), Elizabeth A. Wilson^ ', Baach Robinson & Lewis PLLC, 1201 F Street N.W., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20004, Telephone: 202-833-8900, Facsimile: 202-466-5738, Attorneys for Appellants. FN'*Admission Pending TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES ... i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ... vi GLOSSARY ... ix JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ... 1 STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ... 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ... 3 STATEMENT OF FACTS ,., 4 INTRODUCTION ... 4 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ... 6 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ... 10

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ARGUMENT

13 13

LSTANDARDOF REVIEW

IFTHE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING THE UNITED STATES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS UNDER THE WESTFALLACT 13 A. Application ofthe Westfafl Act... 15 B. The DistrictCourt Improperly Denied Discovery... 16 1. The District Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard in Denying Plaintiffs Discovery... 17 2. Plaintiffs Mel their Burden ofSeltingForlhaMaterial Issue Meriting Discovery...17 C. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Ibis Action asaMatterofLaw,.. 19 l A l N o T i m e W a s Defendants'Conduct Authorized ...21 2.Defendants'Conduct in OrderingTorlure Was Not Incidental to Authorized Conduct ...24 D. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiffs'International Law Claims, Because the Entire Civfl Action Against Defendants Falls within the Exception to the Westfall Act ...28 IIF THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS'CLAIM UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 32 A. The Geneva Conventions Guarantee Rights lo Individuals ...33 B. The Relevant Provisions of the Geneva Conventions Are Self-Executing ...34 IV THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED A S A M A T T E R OF LAWTHATDEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 35 A. Tbe District Court IncorrectlyAnalyzed Defendants Claim of Qualified Immunity..36 B. AReasonablc Person in the Defendants'PositionWould Have Been Fairly on Notice thalTorturing Plaintiffs Was Illegal and Unconstitutional ...38 1. Torture Indisputably Implicates Established Constitutional Norms ...38 2. Fundamental Constitutional Rights Are Clearly Recognized as Applying Beyond our Borders ...39 3. Defendants'Own Actions Demonstrate that They WereAware that Tbeir Conduct WasWrongful and Uncon stitutional ...42 CONCLUSION 44 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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FEDERAL CASES In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn Indiana, 96 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996) ... 30 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987),., 37 Austin V. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (M.D. Ala, 1998) ... 39 Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) ... 39 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S, 278 (1932) ,.. 41-42 Butz V, Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) ... 44 Clem V. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543 (4th Cir. 2002) ... 44 Columbia Marine Services, Inc, v, Rejfet Ltd, 861 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988) ... 33 Commissirmer v. Jean. 496 U.S. 154 (1990) ... 30 Conley v, Gibsrm. 355 U,S. 41 (1957) ... 13 Connecticut National Bank v. Germain. 503 U.S. 249 (1992) .., 30 Crockett v. Abraham, 284 F.3d 131 (D.C. Cir. 2002)... 19 Diggs V. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ... 33 District Certified TVServ, v. Neary, 350 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ... 19 Dorrv, U.S.. 195 U.S. 138 (1904) ... 39 Dowries v. Bidwell. 182 U.S. 244 (1901)... 39 Drummond v. City of Anaheim. 343 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003)... 44 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation. 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) ... 13, 23 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995) ,.. 23, 39 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) ... 23 Evicci V. Baker. 190 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Mass. 2002)... 39 Exxon Mobil Corp. v, Allapattah Services. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005)... 29 FSLIC V. Mackie., 962 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1992)... 30 ^^^*^Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) ... 13, 22-23 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 546 (1989) ,., 12, 29

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Foster v. Neilsrm, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled in part on other grounds. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833)... 34 Gates V, Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974)... 39 In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.C. 2005) ... 40 Gutierrez de Martinez v, Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995) ... 16, 19 Haddon V. United States, 68 F.3d 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ... 20 ^^^*^Hamdan v, Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) ... 32-33 Hamdan v, Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C, Cir. 2005) ... 3, 11-12, 32 Hamdi v, Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ... 37 Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002)... 40 Harlow V. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800 (1982) ... 36, 42 Harper v. Wall, 85 F, Supp. 783 (D.N.J. 1949) ... 39 ^^^*^Hope V. Pelzer. 536 U.S. 736 (2002) ... 37-39, 43 INS V, St, Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001)... 33 Johnson v, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) ... 41 Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. District, 239 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2001) ... 44 Kimbro v. Velten, 30 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ... 15 A:«ge/V. United States, 947 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991)... 13 Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) ... 33 Lidas. Inc. v. United States. 238 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)... 35 Lyon V. Carey. 533 F.2d 649 (D C. Cir. 1976)... 25-26 f ™ * W a / a a o v. United States, 469 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2006)... 16, 20, 27 Malley v. Briggs. 475 U.S. 335 (1986) ... 37, 42 McDonald V, Haskins. 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992) ... 37, 44 Mclntyre v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D. Mass. 2004)... 42 Medellin v, Dretke. 544 U.S. 660 (2005) ... 34

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Merritt v. Hawk. 153 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Colo. 2001) ... 39 Montecatini Edison SPA v, Ziegler. 486 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ,.. 32 Nelson v, Heyne. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974) ... 39 Nolan V. Boeing Co.. 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990) ... 30 Nuru V, Gonzalez, 404 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2005)... 23 Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chemical Acquis. L L C , 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (S D. 111. 2005) .., 30 Polk V, District ofColumbia, 121 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2000) ... 42 Ralpho V. Bell. 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ... 40 ^^^*hasul V. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)... 11-12, 36, 40-41 Rasul V. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ... 37 Rubin V, United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981) ...31 Srjsa V. Alvarez-Machain. 542 U.S. 692 (2004) ... 23, 31, 38 [™*^5toitef V. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003)... 15, 17-18, 20 In re Surinam Airways Holdings Co.. 974 F.2d 1255 (1 lib Cir. 1992)... 30 Telegraph-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ... 25 The Nuremberg Decision. 6 F.R.D. 69 (1947).., 22 United Mine Workers v, Gibbs. 383 U.S. 715 (1966) ... 32 United States v. America Trucking Co,. 310 U.S. 534 (1940) ... 3 1 United States v. Dickey. 20 C.M.R. 486 (Army Bd. Rev. 1956)... 43 United States v. Finch, 22 C.M.R. 698 (Navy Bd. Rev. 1956)... 43 ^^^*^UnitedStates v. Lanier. 520 U.S. 259(1997)... 37, 44 United States v. Lee. 25 M.J. 703 (Ct. Mil. Rev. 1987) ,.. 43 United States v, Lee. 906 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1990) ... 40 United States v. Noriega. 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ,.. 34-35 United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va, 1975) ... 40 United States v. Verdugr)-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259(1990) ... 41-42

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Xuncax v, Gramajo, 886 F, Supp. 162 (D, Mass. 1995).., 13-14, 23 Yr)ungstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ... 9 STATE CASES Br>ykin v. District OfColumbia, 484 A.2d 560 (D.C. 1984) ,..21, 27 Brown v. Argenbright Sec, 782 A,2d 752 (D.C. 2001) ... 16 Mayer v. Buchanan, 50 A.2d 595 (D C. 1946) ... 22 Moseley v. Second New St. Paul Baptist Church, 534 A.2d 346 (D.C. 1987) ... 27 Murphy v. Army Distaff Foundation, 458 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1983) ... 19 Penn Central Transport v, Reddick, 398 A.2d 27 (D C. 1979) ... 27 Weinberg v, Johnson, 518 A.2d 985 (D.C. 1986) ... 25-26 STATUTES & RULES 10 U.S.C. § 893 (Article 93, UCMJ)... 13, 43 18 U.S.C, § 7 .,. 40 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ... 1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ... I 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (Alien Tort Claims Act)... 1 28 U.S.C. § 1441 ,., 30 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (Federal Tort Claims Act) .., 15, 19, 28 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (Westfall Act)... 2, 10, 15, 19, 28 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b) (RFRA)... 1 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (The Military Commission Act of 2006)... 33 Fed, R. Civ. P. 54(b)... 1 TREATIES Convenfion Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 ... 3, 34 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ... 3, 34

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United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), U.S. Ratification 1994 ... 8, 13 MISCELLANEOUS Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1127-28 (1992)... 35 Oscar M . Uhler et. al., Crnnmentary IV: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 20 ... 33 Installation of Slot Machines on U.S, Naval Base, Guantdnamo Bay, 6 Op. O f f Legal Counsel 236 (1982) ... 40 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 ... 22 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 ... 20-21 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 ... 20, 24 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 231 ... 21 H. R. Rep. No. 100-700, al 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949 ... 31 Cases on which Appellants chiefly rely JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT [FNI] Plaintiffs'^ ' complaint asserted claims under international law, the Geneva Conventions, the Constitution, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (""RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b). Federal jurisdiction was proper below pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. FNI. For ease of reference, and in light of the cross appeal in this case, appellants use the terms "plaintiffs" and '"defendants" lo refer to the parlies below, regardless of their posture as appellant or appellee in this Court. The district court issued three decisions relevant to this Court's jurisdiction. On February 6, 2006, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I-VI of the complaint (claims under intemadonal law, the Geneva Conventions and the Constitution), while reserving its decision on Count VII of the complaint (violation of RFRA). On May 8, 2006, the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the RFRA count. On July 3, 2006, defendants filed a timely notice of interlocutory appeal on the RFRA claim. Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion pursuant lo Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) to certify the district court's decision of February 6, 2006, for immediate appeal. The district court granted this motion on July 10, 2006, and entered final judgment as to Counts I-VI of the complaint on July 20, 2006. On July 25, 2006, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. This Court's jurisdiction is accordingly proper pursuant lo 28 U.S.C, § 1291. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW I . In determining whether defendants, the former Secretary ofDefense and high-ranking U.S. military officers in

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the chain of command,are entitled lo immunity under IheWeslfall AcL 28 U.S.C.^ 2679(b)(1),did the district court err when il ruled,asamatter oflaw and without allowing discovery,thaL a. Defendants acted within the scope of their employment when they devisedaprogram of torture,prolonged ar bitrary detention, cruel and abusive treatment, and religious persecution of plaintiffs, innocent alien non combatants detained at Guantanamo; b. Torture (and other abusive conduct) was "a foreseeable consequence ofthe military's detention of suspected enemy combatants" and ""incidental to[defendants']ro1es[as]mi1ilary officials" and thus within the scope of de fendants'employment; c. Torture(and other abusive conduct) was within the scope of defendants'employment notwithstanding that it is contrary tothe announced policy ofthe President and tbe official position ofthe State Depariment that torture by the U.S. military is prohibited, expressly outside the scope of any military personnel's authority, and forbidden by military regulations governing defendanls'dulies7 2. Did the district court err in ruling that the provision of theWestfall Act precluding immunity where "a eiv!7 ae^iaaagainst[tbe] employee ...is brought foraviolation of the Constitution of the United Stales,"28U.S.C.^ 2679(b)(2)(A)(emphasis added),applies only to tbe specific constitutional claim and not to the entire "civfl action" as the statute expressly provides7 3. Did the district court err when, on authority of 7Fa^^aay.^iiai,s^^^,4l5F.3d 33 (D.C.Cir.2005),flrejected plainliffs'daim lhal defendants'acts of torture violated rights secured tothem under the Geneva Conventions,in light ofthe Supreme Court's subsequent reversal ofthat decisions 4. Did tbe district court err in ruling that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on grounds that no reasonably competent public official should be expected to know thataprogram of torture,prolonged arbitrary de tention, cruel and abusive treatmenL and religious persecution against alien non combalants detained at Guantanamo violated the Constitutions STATEMENT OFTHE CASE Thisaclionisbroughlby fourBritish citizens who allege they were detained andlorluredal theUnitedStates Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba ("Guantanamo") from early 2002 untfl early 2004 They were subsequently released and have never been charged wilh any crime. They have never been determined to be "enemy combatants." Defendants areformer Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld and bighranking military officersincharge of plaintiffs'incarceration and treatment at Guantanamo. The complaint asserts seven causes of action premised on violationof^'afcageaf norms of international law,The ConventionRelativetotheProleclionof Prisoners of War,Aug 12, 1949,6 U S T 3316,75 U N T S 135 ("Geneva POW Convention") and The Convention Relat ive to the Protection of Civilian PersonsinTimeofWar, Aug 12, 1949,6 U S T . 3 5 1 6 , 7 5 U N T S 287 ("Geneva Convention on Civilian Detainees"),the Constitution,and the Religious Freedom Restoration AcL42 U S C ^ 2000(b)(b) Defendants moved lo dismiss the complaint onanumber of grounds,including lhal they are entitled lo absolute immunity underThe Federal EmployeesLiability Reform and Tort Compensation A c t o f 1988, Pub. L. No, 100 694, 102 StaL 4563 (codified in relevant part at 2 8 U S C ^ 2679)(the "Westfall Act"), with respect tothe international lawandGenevaConventionclaims.andtoqualifiedimmunitywilhrespect tothe constitutional claims. The district court dismissed these claims as barred by the doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity. This appeal challenges the dismissaf and in particular the district court's determinations thaL a.defendants were acting within the scope oftheir employment in torturing plaintiffs, because such conduct was

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a"foreseeableconsequence"of plaintiffs'detention,and defendants were therefore entitled to absolute immunity under theWeslfall AcL and b,defendants were entitled to qualifiedimmunity for their conduct in designing andimplementingadeliberate plan lo detain and torture plaintiffs because this conduct did nol violate dearly established law. Appellants respectfully submit that these decisions are in error and should be reversed. STATEMENT OFFACTS INTRODUCTION This is a case about torture Whatever euphemisms are applied, whaleverabslractions are invoked, plaintiffs were tortured at the behest and direction of these defendants. For more than two years during their detention at Guantanamo, plaintiffs were stripped, shortsbackled for hours in painful slressposilions, deprived of sleep, isolated for days in total darkness, deliberately subjected lo extremes ofbeat and cold, threatened with un muzzleddogs, injected withforeign substances, deprivedofcontact with their families, deprivedof medical care, kept in filthy cages with no access to exercise or sanitation, subjected to repealed body cavity searches, and harassedandhumiliatedaslheyatlempledtopracticelheir religion.Eg., App. at 13 14,32 34,35 38, 39 45 ( C o m p L f l 4 6,67 78, 83 97,104 07,111,117,124, 127,130, 134)These practices are familiarlo despots and dictators afl over the world. This torture was not the act ofarogue guard or interrogator.Defendants designed and approvcdaplanlo detain and torture plaintiffs and hundreds ofolhers like them apian,memorialized through written instructions,that was systematically implemented lo degrade and debase plaintiffs onadaily basis for more than two years.Eg,, App.at 15 18,48,49 50 ( C o m p L f l 8 12, 146, 152).Defendants conceived and implemented their torture pro gram in violation oftheir oaths ofoffice, the express policy statements ofthe PresidenL applicable military reg ulalions, U.S. and international law, theConstitulion, and any pretenseofhonoror morality App, al 15 18, 46 50 (Comp1,fl8-12, 141-158),Initially,the Defense Department dismissed allegations oftorture as "terrorist misinformation,"After the sickening details were made public,defendants argued to the district court that ordering these acts was within the course of their duties as U,S, cabinet and mflitary officers and that they could not have known that the acts were wrongful. But defendants'knowing violation of the universal norm against torture was notaforeseeable part oftheir duties and it was nol undertaken with the kind ofgood faith ignorance protected by qualified immunity. The applicable principles here are simple.wefl-recognized, and timeless: i) I l is a/^ayf wrong lo authorize or administer torture; torture is aeve^alegilimale tool in the interest of nation al security or foreign policy; ii) lt is aeve^ withintbe scope ofagovernment employee's duliestotorlurepeop1e,aslhePresident's offidal statement lhal torture is against the policy ofthe United Slates confirms.The district court's dedsion that torture isincidental tothe officialdutiesofU.S.cabinet andmilitaryofficers and reasonably foreseeablefliesintbe face of our law,undermines its moral underpinnings,and directly contradicts the holdings ofU.S.courts,which have uniformly refused to allow foreign leaders toinvoke doctrines of immunity loinsulate themselves against liability for their own actsoftorture; and iii) There is no more fixed star in the firmament of the law of nations than the prohibition against torture,and, accordingly,the defendants could not have beenin any doubt that ordering torture violated dearlyestablished rights.Defendants'failed attempts to circumvent their obligations and crealealawless enclave where they could

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abusepeoplewithimpunily are indicaliveoflheirknowledgethallhey were violating plainliffs'fundamental rights. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiffs are Britli^tlt^lllzt^tis who were detained and tortured at Guant^ii^^^ they were released without charges and flown home to England in March 2004,App,at 13 1 4 ( C o m p L f l 4 5 ) , Plaintiffs never received any military training or look up arms against theUnited Slates.Plaintiffs have never been members of any terrorist group.App.at 12(CompL11). Shafiq RasuLAsiflqbaL and Rhuhel Ahmed are boyhood friends from the working class town ofTipton in th^ WestMidlands of England.App.at24(Compl,131),They were born and raised in the United Kingdom,At the time oftheir detention, they were 24,20, and 19years old respectively,App.at24(CompLfl32 34).Asif went toPakistan in September 2001 lo marryayoung woman from his family's village Rhuhdjoined him to be his beslman Shafiq was in Pakistan about to beginacomputer science course Afier the bombing began in Afgh anistan, these young men, who had traveled to Afghanistan to provide humanitarian assistance, tried to retum to Pakistan,but found the border closed.App.al25(Comp1.135).They were captured by General Rashid Dostum, an Afghan warlord temporarily allied with the United States. General Dostum was widely reported lo have de livered prisoners to the U.S.military onaper-head bounty basis App at 25 26 (CompL 11 37 38) TheU.S, military look custody of Asif RhuheL and Shafiq without any conceivable good faith basis for concluding that they had been engaged in activities hostile to the United States.App.at 25 26 (CompL138). Jamal A l Harith was alsoborn and raisedinEngland. H e i s a web designer inManchesterJamalarrived in Pakistan on October 2,2001,lo participate inalongplanned religious retreaLWhen he was advised to leave the country because ofanimosity toward Britisbnaliona1s,hebookedpassageonatruckheadedtoTurkey,from which he planned to fly home to England.The truck was hijacked at gunpoint byAfghans.When identifled asa foreigner, Jamal was forcibly brought to Afghanistan and handed over lo theTaliban.Jamal was accused ofbe ingaBritish spy,bdd in isolation,and beaten repeatedly byTaliban guards. When theTaliban fled underU.S. advances, Jamal wasfreed.TheBritish Embassy'splans toevacuatehim werepreempted when U.S. Special Forces arrived at the prison and took Jamal into custody. App. al 12 13, 31(Comp1,11 3, 63), All four men were first held in U S. custody in Afghanistan and later transported, under appalling conditions, to Guantanamo,where tbey were imprisoned and systematically tortured without charge or hearing for more than two years.App.at 13 14(Compl,14),The horrific treatment visited upon these young men and others has now been widely reported in the media and confirmed by internal U.S documents. During the Spring of 2004, plaintiffs wereflowntoEngland and released They were never charged with any crime and never found to be enemy combatants.App.al 13 14,46(Comp1.114 5,137). These innocent young men were tortured pursuant to directives from defendant Rumsfeld which were implemen ted throughlhemilitary chain ofcommand. On December 2, 2002, defendant Rumsfeld approvedamemor andum condoning numerous illegal interrogation methods, including putting detainees in stress positions for up to four hours; forcing detainees to strip naked; intimidating detainees with dogs; interrogating them for 20 hours atalime;forcinglhemlowearhoods;shaving their heads and beards;keepinglheminlolal darkness and si lence; and using what was euphemistically called "mild,noninjurious physical conlact."As defendant Rumsfeld knew,these and other methods were in violation of the Constitution,federal statutory 1aw,tbe Geneva Conven lions,and customary international1awasreflecledin,!a^e^a/ia, TbeUnitedNationsConvention AgainslTor

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ture andOtherCrueLlnhumanorDegradingTreatmenlorPunishmenL39U.N.GAOR UNDoc,A/39/51 (1984),G5,^a^i^ea^iaa1994,Ex.1("UNTorlureConvenlion")

Supp.No, 51 at 197,

After authorizing the acts of torture and other mistreatment inflictedupon plaintiffs, defendant Rumsfeld com missioneda"WorkingGroupReporl"daledMarch 6,2003,loaddress"DetaineeInlerrogalionsinlbe Global War onTerrorism: Assessment ofLegafHistoricaL Policy and Operational Considerations."This repori details the requirements ofinlernalional and domestic law governing interrogations,including the Geneva Conventions; tbe UNTorture Convention; customary international law; and numerous sections of tbeU.S.CriminalCode.The report attempts loidenlifypulative"1ega1doclrines under tbeFederalCriminalLaw that could render specific conducLotberwisecriminalaa^unlawfuL" Working GroupReportat3(emphasisinoriginal). App. at 16 17 (Compl.110). The report thus acknowledges that the techniques in use were ^^laia^eie unlawful. The report tben makesatransparenL^af^^ae, attempt lo create arguments under which the facially criminal acts already perpetrated by these defendants could somehow be justified.il asserts that the President as Commander inChiefhas plenary authority to order torture,aproposition that ignores settled legal doctrine from King John at RunnymedetoFai^agf^a^a5^ee^^F^^ev5a^ye^,343 U S 579 (1952) App at 1617(CompL110) It next tries lo apply common law doctrines of sdfdefense and necessity,asserting the legally nonsensical proposition that the United States has the right to torture in order to defend itselfor because it is necessary to do so. Ignoring the Nuremberg cases, the report wrongly suggests that persons who torture may be able to defend against crim inal charges bydaiming tbat they were followingorders.Finally,the report asserts tbat the detainees have no constitutional rights because the Constitution does nol apply lo persons held at Guantanamo.However,the re port acknowledgesthatUScriminallaws^a apply lo Guantanamo andthat theUnited Statesis bound by the UNTorture Convention to the extent that conduct barred by that Convention would also be prohibitedby the IFN2] Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.^ ^ App.at 16 17(CompLl 10).These docu ments can only be seen asasbameful nadir forAmerican law,acynical attempt to manipulate legal language to justify the inherently unjusfifiable. F N 2 0 n June 22, 2004, the conclusionsofthisreporlandotbermemorandaattemptingto justify torture were explicitly repudiated by President Bush App.al16 17(Comp1.110). In April 2003,following receipt of tbeWorking GroupReporL defendant Rumsfeld issuedanew set of recom mendedinterrogationtechniques.Theserecommendationsrecognizedlhatcertainoflheapprovedtechniques, including the use ofintimidation,removal ofrdigious items, threats, and isolation,violated the Geneva Conven tionsandcustomary internationallaw.The recommendations officially withdrew approvalforcertainunlawful actions, including hooding,forcednakedness,shaving,slressposilions,use ofdogs,and"mild, noninjurious physical contact."Nevertheless,these illegal practices continued to be employed against plaintiffs and other detainees at Guantanamo.App.al17(CompL111). In sum, the complaint alleges that defendants'conduct reflectsaconscious and calculated awareness that the torture, violence, and degradation that they ordered and implemented al Guantanamo were illegal. Defendants' after the fact legal contortions to create an Orwellian legal facade manifests their knowledge that they were acting illegally and in violation of dearly established legal and human rights.App,at18(Compl.112), SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Plaintiffs'complaint asserts that the conduct of former Secretary ofDefense Rumsfeld and senior officers in tbe chain ofcommand inimplementing and approving tbeir detention and torture violated customary international

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law, the Geneva Conventions and the Constitution. The district court dismissed the international law claims on the ground thaL asamatter of law,defendants were acting within the scope of their employment and are there fore immune from suit pursuant totbeWestfafl AcL 28U.S.C. ^ 2679(b)(1).The district court dismissed the GenevaConventiondaimsbased onlhis Court's since overruled dedsioninT^a^^a^v^a^f^/^, 415F,3d33 (D.C.Cir 2005).Wilh respect tothe constitutional claims, the district court found that defendants had qualified immunity because they could nol bave been on notice ofplaintiffs'havingaclearly established legal right nol to be tortured until the Supreme Court decided T^afa/y^^f^, 542 U.S.466 (2004),which was after plaintiffs're lease fromGuantanamo. In sum,the district court has found that defendants are immunefrom being held ac counlablefor manifestly heinous criminalconduct that has dishonoredour nalion andunderminedtherule of law.Each ofthe district court's rulings is dearly erroneous and should be reversed. With respect to the international law claims, the district court ignored binding precedent holding that the issue of whether an employee's activity is within the scope ofhis employment isaquintessenlial question of fact for the trier of facLThe district court erred bothinrefusingtopermfldiscoveryonlhisissue and bydecidingil asa matter of law. Under settled law, plaintiffs were entitled to discovery based on the allegations of the complaint andtheirsubmissionofunequivocal statements by theUnited Stales that torlureisfllegalunder military, slat utory,inlernationa1 and constitutional law and can never be withinapublic official's scope of employmenLin any evenL the district court's determination asamatter oflaw that torture was within the scope of employment is contrary tothe Restatement approach followed in the District ofColumbia,requiring consideration of, la^e^a^ia, whether conduct purportedly incident tothe scope of employment is "seriously criminal,"as tbe conduct alleged in this case undoubtedly is. Even i f the conduct al issue were arguably within the scope of employmenL this does nol support dismissal asa matter oflaw.TheWeslfall Act contains an exception lo immunity fora"eivi7ae^iaa against an employee of the GovernmenL.which is brought foraviolation of theConstitulion of the United Slates."(emphasis added).The district court wrongly applied the Supreme Court's legislatively overruled holding in Eia/e^y Gai7e^5^ai^ef,490 U S 546 (1989) to find tbatthis exception was not meanttoapplyto the entire civil action but onlyto plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The district court's holding was erroneous because Eia^e^ is inapposite, and its reasoning isinapplicablelotheWeslfall AcLThe term""civilaclion"inlheWestfafl Act embodies Congress'purpose of excluding from general immunity egregious conduct lhal rises lo thelevel ofaconslitutional violation.The district court should have looked lo numerous analogous cases in which courts have construed "civil action"inac cordance with its plain meaning. I.e., the entire case. The district court based its dismissal of plaintiffs'Geneva Convention claim on this Court's holding in TFaa^^aa y^aa!f^e/^,415F.3d 33 ( D . C C i r 2005),that the Conventions did not provideaprivale right of action.But the Supreme Court overruled T^aai^aa and permitted the petitioner to invoke rights secured lo him by the Conven tions.This conclusion is consistent wilh accepted rules of treaty interpretation and this Court should recognizea private right of action under tbe Geneva Convention. Finally,the district court's grant of qualified immunity asamatter of law is similarly erroneous.While tbe dis trictcourt accepts that theconduct alleged is manifestly unlawfuf it found tbatdefendanls lackednolicelhat they were violating plaintiffs'rights because their right nol to be tortured was not "clearly established" until tbe Supreme Court decided ^ a f ^ / y , ^ i ^ f ^ , 542 U,S, 466 (2004), The district court's analysisisinconsistent with qualified immunity jurisprudence, which makes dear lhal qualified immunity is not available for egregious and consciously illegal conducL even when there is no case law directly on point holding that the conduct is uncon stitutionaLTorturing detainees violates fundamental rights and stains the integrity of the governmenLDefend

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ants cannot reasonably claim that they believed that tbey were acting within the constraints ofthe Constitution. ARGUMENT LSTANDARDOF REVIEW This Court reviewsadistrict court's decisionlodismissacomplaint^eaaya. 5ee^i^ge^v Gai7e^5^a^ef, 947 F.2d 1504, 1505 (D.C.Cir. 1991).The Court must construe the complaint in tbelighl most favorable tothe plaintiff Ga^/e^v,G!7^faa,355 U,S,41,45-46 (1957),Dismissal should be affirmed only if plaintiffs can prove no set of facts under which they are entitled to relief B^, IL THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING THE UNITED STATES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS UNDER THE WESTFALLACT Plaintiffs'complaint alleges that the highest officials of the U S. military deliberately formulated, approved and implemenledapolicy of torture consisting of acts that so shock the conscience they are universally condemned, includingby theConstitution, U.S. criminal statutes, Arlic1e93 oftheUCMJ,ea^i^e^a^ 10U.S.C. ^ 893 ("Article 93"), Army Regu1alionI90 8,the Army Field ManuaL the Geneva Conventions, and tbe UNTorture Convention.Defendants'conduct was not only illegal bul was wholly unauthorized by U.S.law,by any directive fromthePresidentasCommanderlnCbieforbyanyotherUS authority, App,at 46 50 (Compl.11 140 42, 148-58); App.at 73,78 (Compl.11 3 4 , 1 58).Tbat torture is never authorized and, indeed,cannot be authorized byasovereign,isasettled proposition ofinternational law,which has long been recognized in tbe United States. Ei7a^^igayEeaaB^a^a,630 F2d 876 (2dCir.1980);7a^eEf^a^ea^/1Fa^eafF^^a!aa^ig^^f 1472 (9lhCir 1994); ^a^eaxvG^aaia^a,886 F Supp 162, 175 76 (D Mass 1995) It necessarily applies lo the conduct ofU.S.officials as wefl as the conduct offoreign despots. Nevertheless, the district court expressly rejected what it termed ""vague analogies" to the standards against which our courts have consistently measured the conduct of foreign tyrants when they have sought immunity from actions charging similar acts of torture.App,at 96 n.7.Instead, the district court determined tbatU.S.offi cials could claim immunity i f their conduct occurred within the scope of their employmenlunderslale law standards of ^ef^aa^ea^f^^e^ia^7^,0n that basis,the district court concluded that defendants are immune pur suant totbeWestfafl AcL In making this determination,the district court expressly held asamatter oflaw lhal torture ofdetainees wasbolh"aforeseeab1e consequence of the military's detentionof suspected enemycom balanls"and"incidenla1to[defendants']ro1es [as] mililaryofficials."This holding is nol only abhorrenLit is clearly erroneous. As an initial matler,while state law principles governing scope of employment are germane to the analysis, there are important caveats that the district court simply ignored.Theliberal construction of the doctrine of ^ef^aa^ea^fi^^e^ia^ adopted in modern law is designed lo broaden tbe resources available to compensate tort victims by making employers liable for their employees'misconduct in circumstances where the employees themselves may have few assets.In theWestfaflcontexLadifferenl set of policies apply.While the statute in most circum stances also broadens the available resources for compensation by making tbe United States liable, i l does something that common law ^ef^aa^ea^fi^^e^ia^ does noLimmunize the wrongdoing employee.State ^ef^aa^ea^ f^^e^ia^ law is thus an imperfect paralldlhat can,particularly under suchextreme circumstances, lead lo perverse results. Moreover,evenasastraightforward application of ^e,s^^a^ea^f^^e^ia^,the district court's analysis fails.FirsL

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the district court failed to apply tbe proper standard under IbeRestatement in determining whether defendants' conduct was within the scope oftheir employmenL Second,the scope ofemployment question is one for the tri er of fact onafuflevidentiaryrecord.lt was therefore error to refuse to allow plaintiffs to take discovery on this poinL A.Application ofthe Westfall Act TheWeslfall Act permits the United Slates to substitute itself asadefendant in actions brought against federal officersfor negligent and wrongful aclsandomissionsunderlaken withinlhescopeoftheiremploymenL 28 U.S.C.^ 2679(b)(d). Asaresuh, tbe individual defendants are absolutely immune from personal liability,and the exclusive remedy becomes an action against the United States under the FederalTort Claims AcL 28U.S.C. ^^ 2671 80 ("FTCA").TheWeslfafl AcL however, does nol provide immunity for civfl actions alleging consti tutional torts or violations of federal statutes. 28 U.SC.^ 2679(b)(2).Thus, for Westfafl immunity lo apply: i) defendants must bave been acting within the scope of their employment; aa^ii) the actions complained of must be ordinary acts or omissions, not rising to the level ofconstitulional or express statutory violations. Whenafederal officer is sued, the Attorney General may certify that the officer was acting within the scope of employmenL 28 U.S.C.^ 2679(d),The Attorney General's certification is nol entitled to any "particular eviden tiary weight" 5^ai^efvG^aff,327 F3d 1210, 1 2 1 4 ( D C C i r 2003)(^i^a^iag^iai^^ayFe^^ea,30F,3d 1501, 1509 (D,C,Cir. 1994)).The Supreme Court has recognized that the Attorney General may "fedaslrong lug" to supplyacertification, in cases like this one,where the conduct falls within one of the exceptions to the FTCA, leaving both the United States and tbe individual officers immune from suiLGi^^ie^^e:^iFe^a^^iae^yFaa^agaa, 515U.S.417,427 28 (1995).The submission ofacerlification simply shifts to the plaintiff the obligation lo comeforward with specificfacts rebutting the certification and ordinarily "the plaintiffcannot discharge this burden without some opportunity for discovery,"F^, Although this Court initially indicated tbat disputed issues offact concerning scope ofemployment could be resolved by the court after an evidentiary hearing,!^,,more re cently it has mandated that disputed issues of fact concerning scope of employmenL like all other disputed faclu al issues, be decided by the trier of fact allriaL,^a^'aaayG^i7e^5^a^ef,469F,3d138, 142 (D.CCir.2006). B. The District Court Improperly Denied Discovery. The district court's decision that defendants'conduct in ordering and supervising torture and other cmel and de grading treatment was within the scope of their employment was error on two grounds.FirsLwhelheradefend ant is acting within the scope of his or her employment is an issue of facL Eg.,^^c^iyayBI^gea^^ig^^5ee,,782 A.2d 752,757 (D.C.2001).Even in theWeslfaflcontexLadisputed factual issue such as scope of employment cannol be determined onamotion to dismiss.,^a^aaa,469 F.3d at 140 41.Second, even assuming lhal this is one of tbe rare cases in which there are nofactual disputes and the court could decide the issue asamatter of law, the court below misapplied the law in reaching its resulL Plaintiffs'complaint asserted that defendants'conduct was unauthorized and beyond the scope of their employ menLPlaintiffs proffered earlier official statements of the United States which expressly contradicted the cerli fication in this case that torture could be within tbe scope ofaU.S.official's duties.Plaintiffs proffered later of ficial statements lhal torture of detainees al Guantanamo was unauthorized and contrary to U.S. policy. Despite these submissions,which clearly raiseamaterial dispute of fact concerning whether defendants'acts were within the scope of their employmenL the court below denied plaintiffs discovery,ho1ding that plaintiffs had failed ""to meet their burden of proving that the individual defendants acted outside the scope of tbeir employment."App.

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at103.Bul it is nol plaintiffs'burden to "prove" that defendants acted outside the scope of employment onamo tion to dismiss. I . The District Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard in Denying Plaintiffs Discovery. ThisCourt'sdedsionin5^a^ef makes clear that plaintiffs havearighl to discovery. Acomplaint cannol be dismissed without discovery i f its allegations taken as true and read liberally raisea"malerialdispule"concerning whether the defendants were acting inthe scope of their employmenL 5^a^ef. 327 F.3dal 1215.In 5^a^ef,this Courlexpressly rejecledthe argumenLwbichlhedistrict court erroneously accepledbelow, App.al 103,that plaintiffs were required to prove at the motion lo dismiss stage that the individual defendants acted outside the scope of their employmenL 5^a^ef,327 F,3d al1215.Indeed, pursuant lo5^a^ef,plaintiffs are not required even "to allegethe existence ofevidence[lhey] mightoblainlhroughdiscovery."7^. at 1216.Plaintiffs'complaint need only allege facts thaL taken as true,would rebut the certification submitted by defendants.B^Because the court below erred by requiring the plaintiffs to submit ""proof'concerning the scope of defendants'employment at an impermissibly early stage ofthe proceeding,the decision must be reversed and remanded. 2.Plaintiffs Met their Burden ofSettingForlbaMaterial Issue Meriting Discovery. Plaintiffs have easily met the modest burden imposed by5^^^^ef. For instance,plaintiffs'complaint alleges that thedefendantsconceivedandimplemenledaprogram tolorluredelainees. Plainliffsalleged thattbeprogram was illegal under the UCMJ and applicable military regulations, the Constitution, federal criminal law and customary international law.The complaint also asserted lhal the conduct was wholly unauthorized.In their Oppos ition to Defendants'Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs identified specific relevant facts requiring discovery,induding whether the use oftorture,extreme force, cruel and degrading treatmenL and prolonged arbitrary detention are commonly permitted by U.S. officials'^ ^ and whether itwas foreseeable that seniorgovernment officials would order torture at Guantanamo despite presidentialprobibilions.0pp.at 16 18.This Court has previously held thaL even where it is questionable whether the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to raiseaquestion of facL plaintiffs are entitled to discovery i f they can identify specific information tbat would be available through discovery that they would submit in support oftheir complainL^^. at 1215.Plaintiffs'Opposition brief did just thaL FN3. This mighL for example, be evidenced by training manuals, policies or protocols governing use of force in interrogations and detentions, and complaints by detained persons or prisoners concerning use oftorture. In addition lo the allegationsof the complaim, plaintiffs submitted supplemental material tothe courlbelow wbicbevidencedamalerialdispule of facLPIainliffsfiledaprevious statement by theUnited Slatesthat ex pressly contradicted the Attorney General's certification.In 1999,lhe U.S.State Department made its first report to the United Nations Committee AgainstTorture.U.S.Department of State,Initial Report of tbe United States of AmericatotheU.N.Committee AgainstTorture ("SlateDeparlmenlReport''), IntheStateDepartmenlRe port, the United States condemned torture in any and afl circumstances, and acknowledged thaL ^the prohibition on torture applies to theU.S.military; ^torture "cannot be justified by exceptional circumstances,nor can it be excused on the basis of an order froma superior officer;"and ^"a commanding officer wbo orders such punishment would be acting ai^^fi^e^^efea^ea^^ifa^^e^^afi7iaa aa^^aa/^^e laiFiv^'^i^a^/^^ia^/e^^^^eia^ea^i'aaa/ia^ie^iaaa^^a^ii^ at 67,69

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(emphasis added). Such a prior inconsistent statement, standing alone, is sufficient lo raise a material issue of fact precluding judgment as a matter oflaw. 5ee, e.g., Crockett v, Abraham, 284 F.3d 131, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The district court relegated the State Department Report to a footnote, concluding that "state law, not State Department representations to the United Nations, governs the scope of employment determination." App. at 93 n.5. While plaintiffs do not dispute the relevance of state law to the scope of employment issue, they respectfully submit that the district court's statement is a non sequitur. An employer's direct admissions concerning the scope of employment are dearly relevant under state law. See Murphy v. Army Distaff Found,, 458 A.2d 61, 63 (D.C. 1983) (holding that conflicting statements regarding employee's duties precluded decision concerning scope of employment as matter of law); Dist. Certified TV Serv, v, Neary, 350 F.2d 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (admitting testimony from employer that employee was disobeying instructions at lime of accident). And the Westfall Act focuses particular attention on an employer's representation by expressly requiring certification. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). This requirement appears nowhere in state law. Given the relevance of the United States' representations concerning scope of employment, under both stale law and the provisions of the Westfall Act, and in light of the Supreme Court's warning that courts should be cautious about accepting certifications at face value, Lamagno, 515 U.S, al 427-30, the district court's refusal to consider evidence contradicting the United States' certification was reversible error. C. The District Court Erred in Dismissing this Action as a Matter of Law. In deciding, as a matter of law, that defendants' conduct was within the scope of their employment, the district court improperly limited the factors it considered, and so reached an erroneous conclusion. Stale law governs whether a defendant is acting within the scope of his or her employment. Majano, 469 F.3d at 141. The district court considered the scope of employment under the law of the District of Columbia, which follows the Restatement (Second) of Agency. App. al 92; Stokes, 327 F.3d at 1215. Under the Restatement, conduct is within the scope of employment i f il is authorized or "incidental to" authorized conduct. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228; Haddon v. United States, 68 F.3d 1420, 1424 ( D C Cir. 1995) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229). The Restatement sets forth four general factors relevant lo the scope of a defendant's employment: a) whether the conduct at issue is "'of the kind" the defendant is generally employed to perform; b) whether the conduct occurred within the authorized time and space of defendant's employment; c) whether the defendant's intent was, at least in part, lo serve the purposes ofhis employer; and d) in case of force, whether the use of force was "not unexpectable" by tbe employer. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228; Haddon, 68 F.3d at 1423-24. The general factors are supplemented by additional guidelines in other sections of the Restatement. Where, as here, the defendants' conduct was not authorized, fee App. at 46-50, (Compl. fl 140-42, 148-58), the Restatement lists additional factors to be considered to determine whether the conduct was, nonetheless, incidental lo authorized conduct. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229. Consciously criminal or intentionally tortious acts may be potentially within the scope of employment, but [t]he fact that the servant intends a crime, especially if the crime is of some magnitude, is considered in determining whether or not the act is within the employment since the master is not responsible for acts which are clearly inappropriate to or unforeseeable in the accomplishment of the authorized result. The master can reasonably anticipate that servants may commit minor crimes in the prosecution of the business, but serious crimes are not only unexpectable but in general are in nature different from what servants in a lawful occupation are expected to do.

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Restatement (Second) of Agency ^ 231,cmL a(emphasis added).5eea^fa^a^^iay. DifL G^Ga/i^^^ia, 484 A.2d 560, 563 (DC 1984)(ciling^ 245 oflheReslalement(Second) of Agency) The district court limited its consideration to tbe four factors listed in the Restatement (Second) of Agency^228 and failed lo consider the factors listed i n ^ 229 or the guidance of^231.Applying solely the^ 228 factors,the districtcounbeldthatdefendantswereacting within thescopeoftheiremploymentbecause: a)defendants' design and implementation ofaprogram of torture and other violations of international law were somehow au thorized or incidental to authorized conduct; b) defendants'conduct occurred within the time and place of their employmenL c) defendants'conduct was motivaledbyadesire,however misguided, to advance thecauseof their employer, the United States; and d) defendants'conduct was foreseeable. The district court erred in holding that defendants'conduct was at any time authorized, because this determination is flatly contradicted by the ex press allegations of the complaint and by undisputed facts. Tbe district court further erred in determining lhal defendants'conduct was incidental to authorized conduct purportedly because torture, asaspecific instrument of government policy,was "foreseeable."Finally,tbe district court failed to consider other factors made relevant by IheRestatemenL and further failed lo recognize that those factors required discovery. L A l N o T i m e W a s Defendants'Conduct Authorized. The district court held that defendants'conduct was initially authorized because they "acted pursuant lo direct ives contained inaDecember 2,2002 memorandumfrom defendant Rumsfeld."App.at 93.Because tbe com plaint allegedlbatlhismemorandumwaswithdrawnbydefendantRumsfeldin April 2003,the district court concluded that "the crux of the dispute here is whether the defendants'actions afterApril2003 were incidental to the conduct authorized."App.at 94 (internal citation omitted).In effecL the court determined that defendant Rumsfeld authorized his own conduct ordering torture,and tbat the authorization somehow further appliedtoall other defendants.The district court misreads the complaint and is wrong asamatter oflaw. An agent cannot authorize his own conducL Restatement (Second) of Agency^7;,i^aye^v.^ae^aaaa,50 A.2d 595, 598 (D.C. 1946). Moreover, the complaint expressly alleges that the defendants'conduct was never author ized.5eeApp.at 46 47 (CompLl 142) (quoting ArmyField Manuallhal"[l]he use of force,menlaltorture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by theU.S,GovernmenL"),In addition,tbe complaint expressly alleges that the Presid enL the Commander in Chief of all defendants, did not authorize the torture and degradation lhal defendants in flicted on plaintiffs. App. at 48 (CompL1146). Indeed, the President has expressly rejected any suggestion that he ever authorized or condoned torture.App.at 16 17(CompLl 10); i ^ at 78,(CompL158).Finally,tbe district court ignored that, asamatter of 1aw,defendants could never be authorized or properly ordered to commit war crimes such as torture.F^eA^i^^eai^e^gFleeif!i^a.6F.R.D.69, 110 (1947) ("he wbo violates the laws ofwar cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance ofthe authority ofthe state ifthe state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under International Law."); i^.al 154, U.S.courts have recognized for more than 25years that no sovereign has the power to authorize torture.In EiF a^^igayFeaay^a/a,630 F.2d 876 (2dCir. 1980),the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's attempts toinvoke sovereign and act of state immunity for acts of torture and murder, stating "there are f e w , i f any,issues in inter national law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations onastate's power to torture persons held in its custody."7^, at 881.Tbe EiFa^^iga Court held thaL asamatter of law,acts of torture and murder ex ceeded that foreign leader's authority. 7^. at 889. Ei7a^^iga has recently been cited with approval by the Supreme Coun5afavB^/va^e^^ae^aia,542US 692, 732, 738 n 29 (2004)

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TheNintb Circuit followed the Second Circuit's reasoning in cases against Ferdinand Marcos and senior mem bers of hisgovernment for arbitrary and pro1ongeddetention,torture,andcrue1and degrading treatment very similar to the allegations of this comp1ainL5ee, e.g.,,^a^eEf^a^ea^^a^eaf^^aiaa7^ig^^fFi7ig,,978 F.2d 493, 497 9 8 i ^ n . 1 0 ( 9 t b C i r 1992); ^a^eEf^a^ea^^a^eaf 7^i^aiaa^ig^^fFi7ig,910FSupp 1460, 1463 ( D H a w . 1995).In considering Marcos's claims ofimmunily,the Ninth Circuit concluded that ""acts oftorture,execution, and disappearance were dearly acts outside of his authority as PresidenL...Marcos's acts were nol taken within any official mandate and were therefore not the acts of an agency or instrumentality ofaforeign state."7a ^e Ef^a^e a^^a^eaf7^^a!a^^ig^^fFi7ig,,25F.3d 1467, 1472 (9lh Cir 1994) 5eea^fa/^a^ayGaa^a/e^,^ 1207, 1222 23 (9th Cir. 2005) (torture violates^'^fcageaf norms and can never be authorized byagovernment); .^^aeaxv G^aaia^a.886 F.Supp. 162, 175 76 (D.Mass. 1995)(Guatema1a's Minister ofDefense was not acting withinscope of his officialdutieswbenhe ordered anddirecledcampaignofkidnapping,torture,andexecu tion). While the district court denigrates plaintiffs'reliance on these cases as "vague analogies" to the acts o f f o r e i g n tyrants,"App.at 96 n.7,there is nothing vague about the proposition for which these cases stand or their relevance here.Torture can ^eve^ be authorized asalegilimale act of any government including the United States. Contrary to the district court's determination, defendant Rumsfeld's December 2002 memorandum is evidence of his complicity in torture bul it is certainly not official authorization for iL Atthe very 1easl,whelber this conduct was authorized isaquestion of facLBy failing topermit discovery and deferring decisionoflhisissue to triaf the district court committed reversible error. 2 Defendants'Conduct in OrderingTorlureWas Nol Incidental loAulhorizedConduct The district court further erred in determining thaL i f not authorized, defendants' conduct was at least "incidental" to authorized conducLWhile the court examined gardenvariety agency cases,it reached its determ inationwithout ever considering the factors most germane tothe matter as outlined in Restatement (Second) of Agency^ 229 and other relevant provisions that specifically consider whether intentional torts and consciously criminal conductcanbewilhinthescopeofemploymenLNot surprisingly, therearenoDistrictof Columbia cases that consider whether establisbingaprogramto inflict torture could fall within an employee's authorized employment or be "incidental" loiL And there are no cases that consider such conduct in circumstances wherea ruling that the conduct falls within the scope of employment would confer immunity on the employee and insu late him from civfl liability. Especially in these extraordinary circumstances, where run of tbe mill scope of em ployment cases decided under local law provide so little guidance, the district court had an obligation lo broaden its consideration ofthe issue and to examine all available authority and the policies underlying that authority.Its failure to do so was error. Reslatement^ 229 supplies guidance o n t h i s p o i n L i t requires tbe court to consider tenfactorsin determining wbetheradefendanl's conducL ^llhoughunaulhorized,is neverthdessincidenlallo authorized conducLFaclors pertinent here include: 1) Whether the unauthorized conduct is of the sort commonly done by persons in defendant's circumstances; 2) Tbe extent ofdeparture from the normal method ofaccomplishing an authorized resuh; and 3) Whether or not tbe unauthorized act is seriously criminaL Restatement (Second) of Agency^ 229. As alleged in the complainL defendants designed and implementedaprogram to torture,to detain persons indef

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initdy without charges or triaf^nd louse cruel and degrading tactics in an attempt lo obtain information.These allegations,taken as true,support plainliffs'asserlionlhal the conduct alissueis""seriouslycrimina1."5eeFe/ G^e^v,Fi7iyaaB^^a^^e^a^/ie,726 F.2d 774,781(D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards,),concurring) (identifying the tor turer,lhepiraleandtheslavetraderas'^af^if^^aiaaigeae^if' the enemy of afl mankind,"quolingE!7a^^iga, 630 F.2d at 890).Indeed,defendanls'own working group report concedes as much.App.at16 17(Compl,110), Under both^ 229 and^ 231 of theRestatement,tbeintentionally criminal nature ofdefendants'acts strongly militates against such acts being within the scope of employmenLUse of torture,prolonged arbitrary detention, and cruel and degrading treatmenl,which the United States has long condemned, are alsoasubslanlial departure from the government's "normal method" of detaining and interrogating persons of interesL Moreover, as plaintiffs argued below,many of IheRestatemenl factors such as whether the conduct is commonly performed by persons in defendanls'circumslances and whether their employer had reason lo expect that defendants would order and implementaplan of torture-could not be fully considered without first allowing discovery.Each of these factors, had the court considered lhem,would have precluded its holding, asamatter of law,that defend ants'conduct was within the scope oftheir employmenL Instead of examining such factors,the district court relied on its reading oftwo cases F^aayGaB^ey,533 F.2d 649 ( D C C i r 1976), and IFeia^e^gy.7^^^!!,^^a,518A2d 985 (DC 1986) forthe proposition that "practically anyconduct[fa11s] withintbe scope o f o r incidental lo,that authorized by their employer solong as tbe action has some nexus to the action authorized."App.al 94. IFeia^e^gandF^aa stand fornosuchproposition The two cases simply recognize two selsof circumstances bothradically differenlfrom theonepresentedhere in which isolatedactsofviolenceby anemployee were deemedtobequestionsforthejury, not issues of law. Neither case supports the district court's ruling here. Evenacursory examination of these two cases demonstrates how far afield they are from the instant action.In ^ei^^eig, the plaintiff acustomerinalaundromaLwas shot by an employee inadispute that arose over whelh er tbe employee bad removed plainliffs'shirtsfromthe washer. At thefirsltriaLlhe court directedaverdicl in favor of the employer,bolding asamatter o f a l a w that the employee's acts in shooting the plaintiff were outside tbe scope of his employmenL518A.2d al 986 87.TheD.C.Court of Appeals reversed, holding thatareason ablejurycoulddeterminethat the shooting was withintbe scope ofemployment andthat the plaintiff was en lilledtobaveajuryconsider the question.7^, AflerasecondlriaLlhedefendantemployer asserted againlhal the issue should be decided asamatter of law. Again the D.C.of Appeals held that the issue was properly one for the jury. 7^ ThisCourl came toasimilar conclusion inF^aayCa^e^InF^aa, the defendant wasadeliveryman who got in lo an altercation withacuslomer whom he assaulted and then raped. As in ^eia^e^g, the trial court determined tbat the rape/assauh could noL asamatter of1aw,be within defendant's scope of employmenLF^aa,533 F.2d at 650 51.On appeaftbisCourt disagreed,holding that the question was one of fact andthatareasonable jury could find that tbe conduct was within the defendant's employmenL y^ Despitelheobviouslimilalionsof IFeia^e^g and Fyi^a,andtheir transparent attempt nol to deprive victims of compensation, the court below suggested tbat they compel the result it reached. Tbe district court slated: If tbe doctrine of ^ef^aa^ea^fa^e^ia^ is panoptic enoughtolink sexual assault wilhafurnilureddiveryman's employmentbecauseoflhelikdy friction that may arisebelweenddiverymenandcustomer, ilmuslalso in elude torture and inhumane treatment wrought upon captives by their captors. Stated differently, if ""a1tercalions" and "violence"are foreseeable consequences ofafurnituredebveryman's employment, then torture isaforesee able consequence ofthe military's detention ofsuspecled enemy combatants.

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App.at 95.Tbe court's analysis is without logical basis.Tbe fact that an intentional tort aiay be found byareas onable jury lobe within the scope of employment does not compel sucharesull in every intentional tort case,To the contrary,in other cases applying D.C.law,specific intentional torts have been determined asamatter oflaw ^a^to havebeencommitted withintbe scopeofemploymenL E.g., /I^c^fe^ey y 5eeaa^/^ei^5^. Ea^/^a^^^f^ G^^^e^,534 A 2 d 346 (DC1987);i^a^i^ia,484 A 2 d a t 562 63;EeaaGea^^a/F^aaf^y^e^^iei^,398 A 2 d 2 7 (D.C. 1979). Ifanytbing, tbe cases relied on by the district court suggest that courts should be chary of deciding scope ofemployment asamatter of law,an approachlhal this Court has recently stronglyendorsed.5ee,i^a^a^a,469 F3dal 140 41 Tbe district court'srdiance on ^eia^e^gandFya^ wasmisp1acedforanolher,evenmorefundamenla1reason. Both involved altercations between employees and customers. Both turn on the degree to which the defendant's conduct was connected to his work responsibilities.If the case at bar arose fromarogue soldier beating an individual detainee,these cases might be on poinLBut the case at bar bears nofactual resemblance to this garden variety lypeoflawsuiL^nd therefore the precedential value of such cases is quite limited. The issue presented with respect to defendants here, which wasin no way presented in F^aa and IFeia^e^g,is whetheradeliberaledecisionbylheSecretary of Defense and senior mililaryofficerstousetorlureandcrud and degrading treatment as aninstrument of policy,in radical departure from authorized techniquesfor deten tion and interrogation,and contrary tofederal law,military 1aw,and internationallaw,should be deemed to be within the scope of employment for federal officers.The fact IhataD.C.jury might be permitted toview it as "foreseeable" tbataguard might get intoadisputewithaprisoner resulting in violence and injury or even thata rogue interrogator might decide on his own lo inflict torture onaparlicular detainee,in no way suggests that the court is entitled lo prejudge the questionofwhetherajury would find it foreseeable that IheSecretaryofDe fense and senior military officers would deliberately commit crimes under tbe UCMJ, federal law, and internationallaw. Yet thisis the resuh the district court reached here by its simplistic application of Fyaa and ^eia ^e^g. The district court'sfinding,asamatter of law,that torture was withintbe scope ofemployment was reversible error. D.The District Court Erred In Dismissing Plaintiffs'International Law Claims,BecauseThe Entire Civfl Action Against Defendants Falls WilhinTheExceplionToTheWeslfall AcL The Westfall Aclstatesexpressly thattheexclusive remedy provision of theFTCA(substituting theUnited States and immunizing individual defendants) "does not extend or apply toaeiyi7ae^iaa against an employee of the Government ...whichis brought foraviolation of the Constitution."28U.S.C. ^ 2679(b)(2)(emphasisad ded). Plaintiffs argued below that their constitutional claims,andaccordinglylbeirentire "civil action," fafl within this exception. The district court rejected plaintiffs'argumenL holding that only the specific constitutional claims fall within the exception. Tbe district court therefore substituted the United Stales as defendant for the in ternational law and the Geneva Convention claims, immunizing defendants. Because tbe district court's decision is belied by the plain language ofthe statute,as wefl as Congressional intent in enacting iL this Court should reverse. In rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the exclusive remedy provisions of the Westfall Act do not apply lo plaintiffs'enlire "civil action"whenaconstitutional or statutory tort is asserted, the district court relied on Ei^/eyy Gai7e^5^a^ef,490 U.S.546 (1989).Eia^ey, however, has been overturned by statute, and, in any evenL is not applicable here.

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In Finley, the Supreme Court decided that the language "civil action on claims against the United States" as used in the FTCA did not grant federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims against parlies other than the United States where such claims do not raise federal questions. The district court quoted Finley for the proposition that a 1948 change in the language of the FTCA from "claims against the United States" to "civil actions on claims against the United States" does not permit "the assertion ofjurisdiction over any 'civil action,' so long as lhal action includes a claim against the United States." App. at 100-01; Finley, 490 U.S. at 554. Finley is nol controlling here. First, the Supreme Court's holding in Finley has been legislatively overturned. Exxon MobU Corp, v, Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2619-20 (2005). In abrogating Finley, Congress indicated that the term "civil action," as used in the FTCA, should be read to refer to the entire civil action and not just to particular claims. This determination is consistent with long-standing policies against claim-splitting. Second, Finley's reasoning is inapplicable here. The Court's reasoning in Finley was significantly influenced by the fact that the change in language was the result of a 1948 recodification of the Judicial Code. The Court was, accordingly, bound by precedent to read such language narrowly, presuming lhal no change in policy was intended, in the absence of evidence of Congressional intent. Finley, 490 U.S. al 554. In contrast to tbe FTCA language interpreted in Finley, the Westfafl Act is not a mere recodification of an existing statute. This Court should therefore give "civil action" its plain meaning, consistent with the use of the term ""civil action" in the Federal Rules themselves and in numerous other statutes. 5ee, e.g., Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1990) ("'civil action" in Equal Access to Justice Act required that attorneys' fees be assessed on case as an ""inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items"); Nolan v, Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990) (28 U.S.C. § 1441 permitting removal of any "'civil action" involving foreign sovereign permits removal of entire proceeding); In re Surinam Airways Holdings Co., 974 P.2d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn Indiana, 96 F.3d 932, 942-43 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); FSLIC v, Mackie., 962 F.2d 1144, 1147-50 (5th Cir. 1992) (interpreting "civil acfion, suit or proceeding" in FIRREA to mean entire action); Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquis. L L C , 382 F.Supp. 2d 1079, 1087 (S.D. 111. 2005) (interpreting "civil action" in CERCLA to mean "entire civil proceeding, including all component claims and cases within that proceeding"). The structure of the FTCA and the Westfall Act make clear that, with respect to these particular statutes. Congress was cognizant of the differences between an individual "claim" and a "civil action," which is more naturally read as comprising a group of claims. Section 2680 of the FTCA, which lists the exceptions lo the FTCA generally, is instructive in this respect. Section 2680 exclusively uses the term "claim" in defining the scope of the exceptions to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. In contrast, Congress' decision to use the broader term "civil action" in connection with exceptions to the Westfall Act reflects its intent that the exceptions to the Westfall Act encompass the entire civil action and not merely a particular claim as would be the case under the exceptions listed in § 2680. In interpreting a statute, ""courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). "When the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 n. 9 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:06 at 194 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). Where the words of the statute are unambiguous, no further judicial inquiry is necessary or permitted. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981). Although the district court characterized its interpretation as "consistent with Congress' intent to provide immunity for common-law torts," the district court ignored a key limitation on lhal immunity. Congress did not intend to provide immunity for "egregious misconducL"^^^'*^ Indeed, Congress expressly staled, " [ i ] f an employ-

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ee isaccused ofegregiousmisconducl,ralherlhan merenegligenceorpoorjudgmeuL then theUnited Slates may nol be substituted as the defendanL and the individual employee remains liable,"H.R.Rep.No. 100 700,at 5 (1988), ^e^^ia^eiFia1988 U S C C A N 5945,5949 5ee a/fa 5afa,542 U S a t 707 n4(FTCA intended loap ply to "garden variety torts"). FN4.In interpreting federal statutes, courts must always strive to realize tbe intent ofCongress.G^i^e^ S^a/efy.^^^,F^i^e^i^gG^,,310U,S.534,542 (1940).If the "plain meaning"of words,especially taken inisolation and out ofcontexLwould lead to'absurd or futile results,"oreven"anunreasonab1e one 'plainly at variance with the policy of Ihelegislation asawhole,'"courts should look beyond the words to tbe purpose ofthe acL^^. at 543. Thisdistinction,belweenegregiousmisconduct which Congress did not intend to immunize and mere negli genceorpoorjudgmenl which i l did is embodied in the statutory and constitutional exceptions to the absolute immunity granted by tbeWestfafl AcL In shorL in enacting theWeslfall AcLCongress focused on the serious ness of the defendant's misconduct rather than on specific claims or causes of action lhalaplainliff might bring. Ifadefendant'sconduclrisestothelevelofaconstitulionalorstatutory violation,then immunity is not available.The cause of action arises from the core conduct and the parsing ofasingle nucleus of operative facts into specific claims does not affect the analysis ofwhether or not Congress intended the conduct to be immunized. The district court's reading of theWeslfall Act exceptions would leadto anomalous and illogical results.Officials would be immune from some claims arising oulaparlicular nucleus of operative facts,and nol for others, dependingon thenatureoftbeparticularclaimsasserted witbinasinglecauseofaclion. Thedislrictcourt's readingoftheexceptionsalso violatesgeneral publicpolicyinfavor of judicialeconomyandagainst claim splitting.It has long been recognized that the adjudication inasingle proceeding of afldaims arising out o f a single"common nucleus ofoperalive fact" is favored. Gai7e^^iae IFai^^e^f v, GiTi^f, 383 U.S. 715, 724 25 (1966);^aa^eea^iaiEi^ifaa5E^yZieg/e^,486 F2d1279,1287 (DC Cir 1973) In these circumstances, the Westfall Act should not be interpreted to foster piecemeal and inefficient adjudication. IIL THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS'CLAIM UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS Inafootnote and without analysis, the district court dismissed plaintiffs'claim that torture and mistreatment vi olated tbeir rights under the Geneva Conventions on the basis tbat ""IheD.C.Circuit has ruled that the Geneva Convenlionsdo not incorporateaprivaterigbttoenforce [their] provisionsincourt." App. al90 n.4(ciling F^aai^aa y ^i^^f^e^^, 415F.3d 33,40 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).7^aai^aa, whichwas decided after thebriefing was completed below,has since been reversed by the Supreme CourL F^aai^a^y^i^aif^/^, 126 S.CL 2749 (2006). While not specificallydecidingtowhat extent the Geneva Conventions confer private rights of action,the Supreme Court characterized the reasoning of the Circuit's F^aai^aa decision,which rejected the petition on,iT^^e^ a^ia, the ground thataprivate right of action is not available under the Geneva Conventions, as not "persuasive." 7^, at 2793, The SupremeCourl then consideredlhepetilion andallowedHamdanloassert rightsunderthe GenevaConvenlionsy^al2793 94 [F^^^ FN5,TheMilitaryCommissionAclof2006,PubL No 109 366, 120 StaL 2600 (codified in relevant part as 10U.S.C. ^ 949) (""MCA") doesnotpredudeplaintiffs'privateactiontoenforcethe Geneva Conventions. Although Section 5(a) of the MCA prohibits use of the Conventions as "a source of rights" by private parlies, this provision,in stark contrast to several other provisions ofthe MCA,does

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nol contain an effective dale or retroactivity provision. Consequently, the MCA does not affect this action, which was pending al the lime of its passage. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (noting deeply rooted "presumption against retroactive legislation"); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 316 (2001) (statute does nol affect pending claims "absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a result"). An individual has enforceable rights under a treaty if a private right of action is provided expressly or by implication. Columbia Marine Services, Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1988). A private right of action exists where the treaty: ( I ) prescribes a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined, and (2) is self-executing. Diggf v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The Geneva Conventions meet these requirements. In Hamdan, the Supreme Court concluded that the Geneva Conventions are judicially enforceable and considered the Conventions as a source of rights enforceable by individuals. The Court strongly suggested that the Conventions provide a private cause of action. Hamdan, 126 S. Cl. at 2793-94 & nn. 57-58 (citing authorities for proposition that Conventions are enforceable by individuals). Against this backdrop, the district court's summary dismissal of the plaintiffs' Geneva Conventions claim was error. A, The Geneva Conventions Guarantee Rights to Individuals. The Geneva Conventions were written "first and foremost to protect individuals, and not to serve state interest." Oscar M . Uhler et. a i . Commentary IV: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 20 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). By interpreting and enforcing rights secured to the petitioner by the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan, the Supreme Court has rejected this Court's earlier view that the Conventions give rights only lo other signatories and nol individuals. Both the Geneva POW Convention and the Geneva Convention on Civilian Detainees expressly provide that detained persons "may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention." Geneva POW Convention, Article 7; Geneva Convention on Civilian Detainees, Article 8 (emphasis added). This formulation confirms that rights under the Conventions are secured to individuals. If the intention were otherwise, that rights are secured only to the nation-stale signatories, this non-waiver provision would be meaningless, because individuals would have no rights lo "renounce." In addition, the Conventions contain provisions requiring that prisoners be given notice of their protections, which strongly suggests that the Conventions guarantee rights to individuals. Geneva POW Convention Act 41. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 687 (2005) (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (notice provision in Vienna Convention on Consular Relations indicative that treaty secures rights to individuals). As one district court has stated in reference to the Geneva POW Convention: [I]t is inconsistent with both the language and spirit of the treaty and with our professed support of its purpose to find that the rights established therein cannol be enforced by the individual POW in a court of law. After all, the ultimate goal of [the Geneva POW Convention] is lo ensure humane treatment of POWs-not to create some amorphous, unenforceable code ofhonor among the signatory nations. United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992). B. The Relevant Provisions of the Geneva Conventions Are Self-Executing. A treaty is considered self-executing when i l is effective upon ratification and no additional legislation is necessary to accomplish the purposes of the treaty. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (self-executing treaty "operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision"), overruled in part on other grounds. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). A treaty may "contain both self-executing and non-

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se1fexeculingprovisions"Ei^af,Bae vGai7e^S^a^ef, 238 F3d 1076, 1080 (9lh Cir 2001); ^a^iega,808 F Supp at 797 98 There can belittle doubt that the relevant provisions of the GenevaPOWConventionandlhe Geneva Conven tion on Civilian Detainees are self-executing.TheseConventions prohibit any signatory from torturing detained persons; fromcommiltingoutragesupon their persons or trealinglhemwilhbrutality; from exposing them to cruel and degrading treatmenL from using physical or mental coercion or torture in order to secure information fromlbem;andfrominterfering with their religious practices.In ratifying these treaties,theUnited Slates as sumed tbe specific obligation to comply with these prohibitions audio do so for the express benefit ofindividual detainees.Nofurlher legislation was required Thisis the verydefinitionof "sdfexeculing."SeeRestatement (Third) of tbe Foreign Relations Law of the United Slales^11I,Rpl'sNole 5 (1987) ("obligations nol loacL or to act only subject to limitations,are generally self execuling");Car1os Manuel Vazquez,F^ea^yEafe^^ig^^f aa^ ^e^^ea^iefa^Fa^iyi^^a^f, 92 C o l u m L R e v 1082,1127 28 (1992) Given that the relevant provisions ofthe Geneva Conventions are both sdfexeculing and guarantee rights l o i n dividuals, the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs'Convention based claims. IV THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN ITRULED ASAMATTER OF LAWTHATDEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY Thedislrictcourldismissedplaintiffs'constitutional claims ( C o u n l s V V l o f the complaint) based onafinding that defendants enjoyed qualified immunity when tbey designed and implemenledapolicy of torture.The court found that plaintiffs'right not to be tortured was nol dearly established. AsaresulLlhe district court held that defendants are entitled to immunity. Defendants'conduct was grossly illegak they knew iL and they were seekingalegal loophole to avoid respons ibility. Their contention that they should be immune from suit because they thought lhal detainees al Guantanamo had no constitutional rights and could be tortured without accountability is an anathema and should be rejected.The doctrine of qualified immunity was never intended to providealicense for knowing and deliberate misconduct which defendants tried, but failed,to shield from accountability. Under the doctrine ofqualifiedimmunity,"government officialsperformingdiscretionaryfunctionsgenerally areshieldedfromliability for civildamagesinsofar as their conduct doesnot violate dearlyestablished Stat utory or constitutional rights of whicbareasonable person would have known.",^a^/ai^y.Ei7:^gei-a/^,457 U.S, 800,818 (1982).Here,it is beyond cavil that defendants'conduct violated plaintiffs'constilutional rights tor ture,prolonged arbitrary detention,andcrudanddegrading treatment violatethebedrocklegalnorms ofany civilized society.7^af^F 542 U.S.al 484 n. 15.There is also no question that any reasonable and competent pub lie official would havebeenon notice that sucbconductwasnot only illegalbul that it violatedfundamental constitutional constraints on govemmental power. Indeed, the complaint specifically refers to defendants' memoranda acknowledging the fact that the conduct was illegal.App.al15-18(CompL119 12). A,Tbe District Court IncorrectlyAnalyzed Defendants'Claim ofQualified Immunity, It is axiomatic that qualified immunity is not absolute it only immunizes persons who act without knowledge lhattheirconduct violatesprotectedrigbts. Allhoughthe qualified immunity standard"givesamp1eroom for mistakenjudgments," fldoes notprotect"lbeplain1y incompelentor those who knowingly violate the law." /I7a//eyy ^^iggf,475 U.S.335,341 (1986).Similarly,il does not shield officers from liability for conduct "so

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egregious"lhatanyreasonableperson would knowitwasfllegalwilhoulguidancefromcourts. ^cDa^a/^v, ^afi^iaf, 966F2d 292, 295 (7tb Cir 1992) The district court rested its decision that plaintiffs'constilutional rights were nol wefl established on its conclu sion that the Supreme Court's decisions in E a f ^ / y ^ i ^ ^ f ^ / ^ , 5 4 2 U.S.507 (2004) and F^aai^iy.^^a^f^/^, 542 U.S.507 (2004) were the first to deal "precisely with the facts and basic concerns presented here"and consti luted "the first indication that detainees may be affordedadegree of constitutional protection."App.al 112 13. This is not accurate, buL in any evenL qualified immunity does not turn on locating a prior case deciding identical facts and concerns; rather it involves an assessment of""objeclive reasonableness."Tbe Supreme Court has stated empathically that qualified immunity can be denied although ""the very action in question has not pre viouslybeenbeldunlawful."BI^^e^faay G^eig/i^aa, 483 U.S. 635,640 (1987). Aplaintiffdoesnolneedto identify legal precedent arising from""materially similar" facts to the case at bar. T^a^eyEe/^^e^, 536 U,S.736, 739 (2002).As the Supreme Court observed in G^i7e^S^a^efyFa^ie^,"the easiest cases don't even arise.There has never beena...section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that i f suchacase arose, the officials would be immune from damages [or criminal] liability."520 U S 259,271 (1997) (internal citations omitted) F o r a r i g h t l o be c1earlyestab1ished,it is enoughthal "the contours of Iherighl"are"sufficient1yc1ear thata reasonable official would understandthat what he is doing violates lhal righL"BIa^ei^faa, 483 U.S. al 640. ""[T]he salient question ...is whether the stale of the law[ai the relevant lime]gaye [the officia1s]^i^i^a^aiag that their alleged treatment of[the plaintiff! was unconstitutional."7ya^e,536 U.S.at 741(empbasis added).As is clear from ,^a^e and Faaie^, lhe""fairwarning"slandardisinherenl1yacommonsense,goodfaith standard, notalegalisticinquiryinlowhelherfundamentallegalrequirements canbe evaded.Thus,IheSupreme Court held in FFa^e that "the obvious cruelty inherent" in the use of the bitching posL and treatment "antithetical to human dignity" under circumstances that were both"degrading and dangerous,"were sufficient lo trigger notice. yiF.al 745 46.The fact that the specific practice had never been addressed by the courts did nol afford thede fendants in T^a^e an escape into qualified immunity. No less so here B.AReasonablc Person in the Defendants'Position Would Have Been Fairly on Notice thalTorturing Plaintiffs was Illegal and UnconslilutionaL Even without the benefit of Eafa^aa^TFaai^i.defendants had ample warning lhal their conduct was illegal and UnconslilutionaL At the time that plaintiffs were under defendants'complete controL torture undeniably violated U.S.law.Indeed,torlure violates the core norms of every civilized country.It was also dearly established that fundamental rights,such as tbe right to be freefromtorture,are guaranteed to aliens resident nol only inthe United States proper but in afl territories underU.S,control.Finally,defendants'own regulations,their solicita tionof legalopinionsseekingameanstoevadethose regulations,andlheiractionsinknowingderdictionof their own regulations make clear lhal they were fully aware of the wrongful character of their conducLin these circumstances, the district court should have found that defendants were duly on notice of plaintiffs'rights. 1. Torture Indisputably Implicates Established Constitutional Norms. The prohibition on torture is universally accepted.See Si^fa, 542 U.S.at 762 (Breyer,J.concurring) (torture is included among the subset of conduct "universally condemned"under international law); Ei7a^^iga,630 F.2d al 883 84.Virtually all of the specific acts alleged in the complaint have been held lobe illegal and violative of the Fifth and/or Eighth Amendmenlby a wide variety of judicial decisions. See, eg,, ^a^e, 536 U.S. at 737 38

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(shackling in painful positions, exposure to sun, deprivation of water and access lo toilet facilities); Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (shackling in painful positions, severe chafing of handcuffs); Gafef y Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974) (forced nakedness, isolation in darkness, deliberate exposure to cold, withholding hygienic items, withholding food, shackling in painful positions); Merritt v. Hawk, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1223 (D. Colo. 2001) (beating while shackled); Evicci v. Baker, 190 F, Supp. 2d 233, 238-39 (D. Mass. 2002) (same); Marcos Human Rights Litig,, 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (D. Haw. 1995) (beating while shackled and blindfolded, exposure to extreme cold, forced nakedness, solitary confinement); Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir. 1974) (forced use of tranquilizing drugs); Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783, 785-86 (D.N.J. 1949) (attacks with dogs). Consequently, there can be no question that defendants were on notice that their conduct violated established constitutional norms. 2. Fundamental Constitutional Rights Are Clearly Recognized as Applying Beyond our Borders. The Supreme Court and this Circuit have long held that fundamental rights such as the ones at issue here are applicable beyond U.S. borders. For example, in the "Insular Cases," the Supreme Court consistently found that fundamental constitutional rights apply to people in territories under U.S. control regardless of their citizenship, Drjwnes v, Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901) (disclaiming "any intention to hold that the inhabitants of these territories are subject lo an unrestrained power ... upon the theory that they have no rights"); Dorr v. G.S,, 195 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1904) (trial by jury is not one of the fundamental rights which applies outside the U.S.); Balzac v. Perjple of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (in U.S. territories "it is locality lhal is determinative of the application of the Constitution ... and not the status of the people who live in it"). See also In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp. 2d 443, 454-56 (D.C. 2005) (summarizing and discussing the Insular line of cases). This Court has also found that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the clause at issue here, restricts U.S. governmental conduct in Micronesia, even though the United Slates is not the "technical" sovereign. Ralpho V, Bell, 569 F,2d 607, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977). More recently, it has noted that "inhabitants of nonstate territories controlled by the United Stales - such as unincorporated territories or occupation zones after war - are entitled to certain 'fundamental rights.' " Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 603 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, Christopher v, Harbury, 536 U,S, 403 (2002). l l cannol be realistically argued that Guantanamo is nol controlled by the United Slates. The U.S. government occupies this territory under an indefinite lease that grants it "complete jurisdiction and control." Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480. Thus, the United States lacks only titular sovereignly over this area. U.S. law is the only law that applies al Guantanamo. Guantanamo falls within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United Stales; therefore, U.S. criminal law applies there, including the panoply of constitutional rights that go along with criminal prosecufion. 18 U.S.C. § 7; United States v. Lee. 906 F,2d 117 (4th Cir, 1990), United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298, 301-02 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Fourth Amendment applies to criminal cases arising out of conduct of civilians at Guantanamo). More than 25 years ago, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the base comes within the ambit of federal legislation. Installation of Slot Machs. on U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 236 (1982). Consequently, defendants were fairly on notice that U.S. law, including the fundamental protections secured under the Constitution, governed their conduct al Guantanamo. In ruling otherwise, the district court relied primarily on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) ("Verdugo"), but these cases are not dispositive here. Eisentrager involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by convicted enemy prisoners of war imprisoned in Germany. As the Supreme Court held, the prisoners in Eisentrager had been convicted of war

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crimes,which put them inasubstantially different posture than plaintiffs,who are innocent civilians.7^a,sa/, 542 U.S. al 476. Regardless of the plaintiffs'status, however, there is nothing in Eifea^^age^ tbat suggests that it is constitutionally permissible for tbe U.S.military to torture prisoners in their custody,wherever those prisoners may beheld.The prohibiliononlorture.asafundamentalrighLwaswelleslablishedby tbe timcEi.seai^age^ was decided.See E ^ a ^ a v , ^ i f f i f f i ^ ^ i , 2 9 7 U,S,278,285 87 (1932)(torture "inconsistent wilh the fundamental principles ofliberty andjustice which lie at the base o f a f l ofour civfl and political institutions").In addition, Eifea^^age^ arose in another sovereign country with its own laws, not an area within the territorial and maritime jurisdiction of theUnited States. Defendants could nolhave reasonably rdiedonEifea^^age^as giving them cover for their mistrealmenlof plaintiffs and the other Guantanamo detainees. The district court's reliance onFe^^aga-G^^i^iiFe^ is equally inapLFe^^i^ga involved the trial of an alleged Mex ican drug lord.The question presented was whether the United States could use evidence gathered fromasearch of the defendant's apartment in Mexico,where no warrant for the search was obtained in advance,The Supreme Courthdd thatthe evidencecouldbeusedbecauselheFourth Amendment didnot restrict IheUniledStales from participating inasearch of property in Mexico,It is difficuh to see how the defendants could have relied on the holding inFe^^aga,which was expressly limited to the question of the Fourth Amendment's applicability to a search in a foreign sovereign nation, tojustify their arbitrary detention and torture of the plaintiffs at Guantanamo.The plaintiffs'detention at Guantanamo involved neither tbe Fourth AmendmenL nor the pretrial procedures and sovereignty ofanother country. And,contrary tothe dislriclcourl'sholding, FeB-^aga supports plaintiffs'argumenl that defendants'conduct at GuantanamowasunconstitutionaLThe SupremeCourl in Fe^ ^agaunderlakesalengthy discussion,on an amendmentbyamendment basis, of what rights bave been held to apply to aliens and citizens outside theUnited Stales This discussion culminates with the conclusion that "'only fundamental righls"areguaranleed to inhabitanlsofterritoriesunderU.S, controf suchas Guantanamo, Fe^ ^aga G^^ai^e,:^, 494 U,S. al 268 69 (citing cases). Since at least 1932, fl has been established that torture ""offendssome principle of justice sorooted in the traditions and conscience ofour people as tobe ranked as fundamental" E^a^a,297 U S a l 285 86. 3.Defendants'Own Actions Demonstrate that TheyWereAware that Their Conduct Was Wrongful and Unconstitutional. Good faitbis atthe heart of qualified immunity.Tbe SupremeCourl often uses the terms "qualified immunity" and "good faith immunity" interchangeably.See, eg,F^a^/aiy,457 U.S.at815.lt is intended to protect from in dividualliability the defendant who"makesamistake in judgment"or "fails lo anticipate subsequent legal developments" Ea/^vDif^a^Ga/iBaii^ia, 121F Supp 2d 56,71 ( D D C 2000) It is not intended to protect de fendants who engage in deliberately unlawful conducL ^a//e^,475 U.S.at 341;^e7ai^^ev, G^i7e^S^aie,s, 336 F Supp 2d 87, 123 26 (D. Mass 2004), or ""active deception" Ea^i^,121F Supp 2d at 71 Although the Su premeCourl applies an objective test for good faith in this contexLflhas noted that ""[b]y defining the limits of qualified immunityessentially in objective terms,we provide nolicenselo1awlessconducL"^a^/a^,457 U.S. al819.Yetalicense for lawless conduct is precisely what defendants sought and were granted by the court be low. Like the state court judge wbo committed sexual assault in Gai^e^SfafefyEaaie^.defendants here assert thatfl is unfair to subject them to liability because the unconstitutionality of their conduct was not clear.Judge Lanier argued that he was not on notice that theConstitulion was implicated in his criminal conduct sexual assault of five women-even though he was presumably aware that slate criminal statutes prohibited sucb conducL SimiF arly,defendants here assert thaL although tbey were clearly aware that torture violated every known legal stand

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ard, they were nol on notice lhal the Constitution would be implicated because ofthe location oftheir egregious criminal conducL Like the Court in Eaaie^,lhis Court should reject defendants'attempt to lake refuge inalegal loophole to avoid the consequences oftheir manifestly illegal conducL Defendants could have been in no doubt aboul the unlawfulness oftheir acts. As in F^a^e, defendants were knowingly violating their own regulations. Such knowing violations preclude reli ance on qualified immunity. F^a^e,536 U.S. at 743 44. And like the prison guards in TFa^e, defendants here had much more lhana"single warning."7Fa^e,536 U.S.al 740 41.Defendants'conduct violated virtually every law of whichlheycouldhavebeen aware federalcriminal 1aw,lbeUCMJ,military regulations,the Army Field ManuaL and international law.Cruelly,oppression and maltreatment of prisoners isaviolation of Article 93 and ofArmy Reg. 190 8 and military courts have long held lhal these protections extend to nonmilitary persons subject to the control of military personneL Gai7e^SfafefyDie^e^,20CMR486,48889(ArmyBd Rev 1956). Abuse and torture of prisoners bave repeatedly been found unlawfuLF^ie^e^,20C.M.R.at 488 89;Gai7eiFS^a^ef yFee, 25 M.F 703,704 05 (CL MIL Rev 1987); G^i7e^S^aiefvEiae^,22CMR 698, 700 01 (Navy BdRev 1956). Plaintiffs submfl thaL whether there was a constitutional case directly on point or noL defendants' "warning" was more lhan"fair."As the Supreme Court has h d d , " i l is not unfair lo hold liable the official who knows or should know that he is acting outside the law."Ea^:^yEeaaaaia^,438 U.S.478,506 (1978) Defendants plainly selected Guantanamo as plainliffs'delentionfadlilyinacalculated effort toavoid account ability for conduct that bad long been held unconstitutional when il occurred in U S, prisons. But Guantanamo is notaHobbesian enclave where defendants could violate dear prohibitions on their conduct imposed by statute and regulations, and then point toapurported constitutional void asabasis for immunity,Faaie^aa^T^a^e pre elude suchacynical use of qualified immunity.As many courts have held, granting qualified immunity inacircumstance in which the unlawfulness of defendants'conduct was clear but in which there was no constitutional casedirectly onpoint wouldpervert the very purpose ofqualifiedimmunity,immunizing themost egregious conduct because itwas so far beyond the pale lhal no court had been required lo address iL See, eg,Faaie^,520 U.S. at271 72;D^i^aiaiaa^yGi7ya^^aa^eiai,343 F3d 1052,1061 (9lhCir.2003);G/e^yGa^^eaa,284 F3d 543,553 (4thCir 2002);,Ba^afaav/^e^^^^g/iEa/a^ge^Se^Dif^,239 F3d 246,253 (2dCir 2001);/^eDaa a/^y7^afi^iaf,966 F.2d 292,295 (7lhCir 1992) The district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs'constitutional claims on qualified immunity grounds must be reversed. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, plainliffs appellants request lhal the order of the district court be reversed and this matter be remanded for further proceedings, Shafiq RASUL, eta1,Appd1ants,vDonaldH,RUMSFELD, etal,Appellees 2007 WL106499 ( C A D C ) ( A p p e l l a t e Brief) ENDOFDOCUMENT

028710

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Detainee: The habeas proceeding going on, onmy behalf andlbelieve the actual determinationfi:om this...(inaudible),.on the basis to go toward those habeas proceedings. Iwonderwhetherthe documents are goingto go tow^ard the habeas proceedings^ TribunalPresident: Tomy knowledge none ofthe evidence submitted todaywill go to the habeas.The decision it selfmighL You havealawyerrepresentingyoumtlie habeas and ifhe chooses to submitthataspartofthehabeasthat is up to him. Detainee: IbelievethatJudge Greene in the United States she requested the basis as to whywe are being heldhere forthe habeas petitioners. And the record is actually...(inaudible)..^racom^on sense review Tribunal. Ibelieve specific basis are presented to her and those documentationswill actually go into.Maybeyouhaven't been infi:irmed on this matter. TribunalPresident: lhave noL Wewillcheckintoitandifthatisthe issue and again we win decide ifit is relevantthen we willrequestitandhave it submitted assart ofthe package. TribimalPresident: Please understand this is the firsttimewe have seen the evidence asa panel, so itis dif^cult sometimes fbr me to answertherelevancyuntilafterwe have seen the evidence. Ifafterwe have gone through the Tribunal and we feel that we need this evidence and it is relevantthenwewillrecess and call forthe evidence andreconvene at alatertime. TribunalPresident: DoyouwishtomakeastatementtothisTribunal7 Detainee: Maylbe presented with my defense response to the accusations fbrmy designation as an enemy combatant. l^The Detainee was swom.j Detainee: This is to be submitted asadocument into evidence, solw^ote it asa documentratherto be spoke on, butlam going to speakfi:om it anyway,so bear withme. ^eading^:...^inaudible)..A.K..A Malcolms, lam notanti-Americanandldid not come hereto condemnAmerica. Iwantto make thatvery clear. Icame here to tell the tmth and ifthe tmth condenms America, thenshe stands condemned. ...(inaudible)..thesun rising is splendor. A. Notice. Itis my duty asaMusIim to wam all who are involved in this matter thatthey are personallyresponsible fortheir actions at all times before Allah. Allah says in this uncreated world thatis the K^oran. Isthenthemanwhobehevesno betterthen the man who is rebellious and wicked7Not equal are they. Forthosewho believe and dorighteousdeeds are gardeners as hospitable homes fbrtheh-good deeds. As to those who are rebellious and wicked their abode will be the fire. Everytimethey w^sh to get awaytherefi-omthey will be forced there into and it will be said to them.
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Filed 11/02/2004

Page18of30

UNCLASSIFIED^FOUO
Take ye the penalty ofthe fire, the which ye w^ll want to rejectas false. Andmdeedwe will make them taste ofthe penalty ofthis life priorto the supreme penalty in orderthat theymay repent and retum. And who does more wrongthen one to whom are recited the signs ofhis lord and who turns awaytherefi:om. Varyfi:omthose who transgress we will exactdueretribution.Chapter32,AlSa)dah, versus 18-22. Itis also my duty and pleasure asaMuslim to happily^roclahnthatAllah will forgive anywrongs we do and/or have done upon sincere repentance. And those who have done somethingto be ashamed of or wronged their own souls, earnestly bring Allah to mind and ask for forgiveness oftheir sins and who can forgive sins exce^tAllah. And are never obstinate irt persisting knowingly in the v^ongs they have done. Fro such the reward is forgiveness fi^om their lordand gardeners-withriversfio-wingunderneath an eternal dwelling how^ excellentarecompense forthosewho work and strive. Chapter 3, Allmran, versus 135138 TribunalPresident: Excuse me. Whilelappreciateyourconcemfbroursoulslwould really like you to getto the relevantinfbrmationconcemingthisTribunal.Directed specificaHyto the facts relevantto this Tribunal. Detainee: Okay,Ijust wanted to letyouknow. IwantedtomakethatpointasaMuslim itwasmyduty TribunalPresident: lappreciateyourreligiousduties.Iwould appreciate more nowthat you getto the facts ofthe Tribunal. Detahiee^readingj:B.Deputy Secretary ofDefense Order ofJuly7,2004. The Secretary ofDefense has establishedaCombatant Status Review Tribunal process to determinema fact-based proceeding, whetherthe mdividuals detained bythe Department ofDefense at the U.S.Naval Base Guantanamo Bay,Cuba are properly classified as enemy combatants and are to permit each detainee the opportunityto contestsuch designation. The arguments in this written presentation are confined and directed to the above. C. Islamic Law. Itwas we who renewed the laws to Moses, therein was guidance and light. By its standards have beenjudged the Jews, bythe Prophets who bowed as hi Islam to Allah's wiII,bytheRabbisanddoctorsoflaw,fbrtothemwasenti:ustedtheprojectionofAllah's book, and theywere witnesses thereto.Therefbrefearnotmen, but fearme and sell not my signs fbramiserable price. If any do fail to judge by the light ofwhat Allahhath revealed they are no betterthan unbelievers. TribunalPresident: Once again... Detainee: This concems my designationas an enemy combatant. Ifyou will aHowme to go through the process you w^lunderstandmy... TribimalPresident: Iv^llallowyou to go through the process ifyou ever getto the part aboutwhatwe are here to talkabouttoday, which is your classification as an enemy combatanL
tSF^i Enclosure (3) Page4of9

UNCLASSIFIED^FOUO
028142 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

^^^^

0000002^

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-3

Filed 11/02/2004

Page 19 of 30

UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
Detainee: This does concem my classification as an enemy combatant because I am speaking to you on the point of view of Islamic law. Tribunal President: This is not Islamic law; it has no authority here and has no bearing on these proceedings. This is a Military Tribunal. You have been designated as an enemy combatant against the United States by the U.S. Govemment. That is what is important here. We do not comply with or consider Islamic law. [The Personal Representative attempted to hand the Detainee a copy ofthe unclassified summary.] Personal Representative: Would you like to look at this, this is the specifics, you wrote some notes about this. Detainee: I understand, I imderstand. I know what I am doing. Detamee [reading]: In July 2003, respondent Bush announced that he had designated Mr. Abbasi an enemy combatant subject to the Executive Military Order of November 13, 2001. D. The Joint Resolution. In the wake of the September 11,2001 attacks, the United States at the direction of Respondent Bush, began a massive military campaign against the Taliban government, then in power in Afghanistan. On September 18,2001, a Joint Resolution of Congress authorized the President to use force against the nations, organizations, or persons that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on September 11*, 2001 or that harbored such organizations or persons. Defense Response: Unlike the greatest terrorist acts known to history, committed by the United States of America. The atom bombings of the civilian population of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There has not been shown any adequate, sufficient, and substantial evidence to establish the guilt of Al-Qaida as the very perpetrators ofthe terrorist attacks of September 11*, 2001. Buttiierehas been much unfounded and biased...(inaudible). Therefore based upon the wholesome legal principal of, itmocent until proven guilty without a shadow ofa doubt, Al-Qaida can be said to be mnocent ofthe terrorist attacks of September 11**", 2001. Unless adequate evidence is presented before a fair and just court oflaw, which then establishes Al-Qaida as the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks of September 11* without a shadow of a doubt Al-Qaida bemg innocent of perpetrating the terrorist attacks of September 11*, Taliban cannot be guilty of harboring terrorist If Taliban is not guilty of harboring terrorist and Al-Qaida is innocent of the September 11* terrorist attacks then the fundamental basis of Congress' Joint Resolution authorizing the use of necessary and appropriate force agamst nations, organizations, or persons that planned, authorized, committed, or aided in the September 11*, 2001 attack, Al-Qaida terrorist attacks; not only does not have a leg to stand on, it does not even have buttocks to sit on, nor a back or sides to lie on. In fact the unfounded use of military force commencing I believe on October 9*, 2001...

ISN### Enclosure (3) Page 5 of 9

UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
028143 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

5204

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Case1:04cv01137RMC

Document 44 3

Filed 11/02/2004

Page20of30

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
TribunalPresident: Excuse me. This is your last waming and this is the lasttimelam goingto tell you this. This is notamatterofAl-Qaidathis is notamatter of govemment against govemment This isamatter of what you did in Afghanistan. Detainee: Ibelieve this isamatter ofmy classification as an enemy combatant TribunalPresident: It is not lamheretotellyouitisnot These matters are beyond the control and beyond the range ofthis Tribunal.Iamtellingyoufi^rthefinaltime to cot^ifine your discussion to the matters before this Tribtmal. Iwill help you specifically address the matters on the Combatant Status summary of evidence on the combatant status review Tribunals, which speci^cally address your actions in Afghanistan. Detainee: Wouldyou, Personal Representative, didyou not tell me that I'mhere and that Tribunal is gomgto deal witl^ one ^ling, my designationas enemy combatant Younever toldmespeciallylhad to address those matters. Iflwantto address my designation as an enemy combatant by IntemationalLaw and the Geneva Conventions... TribunalPresident Once again, Intemational Law does apply, Geneva Conventions do notapply.YouhavebeendesignatedasanenemycombatantThisTribunalwillfah:ly listen to yourexplanationofyour actions. Wewillconsiderwhatyouhave written but forthe purposes ofthis Tribunal, forthis session,Iwill once again direct you to address the matters specific to your actions inAfghanistan. Detamee: Well sir, you toldmethati'm here to address my designation as an enemy combatant ...(inaudible)..! don't see whylshould be confined to those matters, lhave righthere my status. Andmy status shouldn't be mcompetent IshouldhaveP.O.W. status. So, you are telhngmelam an enemy combatant lam telling you by special Geneva Conventions,Iamanon-combatant TribunalPresident lam telling you... Detainee: ...(inaudible)..by U.S.lawyou should hold me asacombatant Butyouare sayingthatlcannotdothat Those accusationsfi-anklyifthe Recorderwouldhave read my autobiography those accusations would nothavebeenmade. Inthe original...(inaudible)..tmcIassified...(maudible)..basisorresponse there are mistakes that dif^rfi:omautobiography,you wouldnot have made them. TribunalPresident Once again, IntemationalLaw does notmatter here. Geneva Convention does notmatter here. Whatmatters here and whatlam concemed aboutand whatlreallywantto get to, isyour status as enemy combatant based upon theevidence thathas been provided and your actions while you weremAfghanistan. Ifyou deviate fi:om that one more time you will be removed^om this Tribunal and we will continue to hear evidence v^thoutyou being present

^ S ^ i ^

Enclosure (3) Page^of9

UNCLASSIFIED^FOUO
028144 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

^^^^

00000020

Case1-04cv01137RMC

Document 44 3

Filed 11/02/2004

Page21of30

UNCLASSIFIEDi^FOUO
PersonalRepresentative: (to the Detainee, while attempting to hand him the unclassified summary) Do you want to readfi-omthis and whatever you said that was specific to this, fi-om ourmeetingtoday7 Do you realize whathe is talking about7 These. TribunalPresident Would you like to haveamomenttoconferwith your Personal Representative, to gatheryourthoughts7 Detainee: lam justthinking ofwhat everworks. This specific documentwill do itmuch better. Okay,Defensecallto essential witnesses and documentation. TribunalPresident: Justfbr clarification and once again. You are not being hmited exceptfbrthefactthat we will consider everything that youhave written. Detainee: Iknow butlhave therightto speak... TribunalPresident No you don't Detainee: And the PersonalRepresentative told melcansaywhateverllike. TribunalPresident Hewasmistakenifhetoldyouthat Detainee: Okay. TribunalPresident But we will consider all ofwhatyouhave written. Detainee: This concems my being said to beamember of Al-QaidaandanAl-Qaida fighter, [reading]: Itis unclearwhether Mr. Abbasi is or is notaprisonerofwar,butthis is clearlyaquestion appropriate fbr inquiry byacompetent Tribunal.The answerwould depend upon the precise facts ofthe case and in particularupon the exactrelationship between the Taliban, whichinourviewwas asamatter oflntemational Lawthe govemment ofAfghanistan,eventhoughitwasnotrecognized bythe United States as such,andanyorganizationinwhichhewasanactiveparticipantinAfghanistan. We understand that itis saidMr. Abbasi wasamember ofAl-Qaida, but we are notaware of anyproofthatthisisthe case, or of anyproofofthenatureofdie relationship between Al-Qaida. This point is important because the definition ofacombatantinlntemational Lawmay be v^de enough... TribunalPresident Once again...International Law... [The Detainee continued to readfi:omhis document speaking overthe Tribunal President as the TribunalPresidentattempted to stophim.] TribimalPresident Mr. Abbasi your conductis unacceptable and this is your absolute final waming. Idon't care about Intemational Law. Idon'twanttohearthe words Intemational Law again. Weare not concemed v^th Intemational Law. Iam goingto
ISNi Enclosure (3) Page 7 of9

UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO
028145 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

5206

00000027

C^^^I^^^^^OII^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

give you one last opportunity,fbrwhichIambeingmuchmore generous and perhapsi shouldn't, butlwill give you one lastopportunityto address the specifics on the summary ofevidence. Ifyouv^shtodosoyoumay,ifyoudonotwishtodosowevrill haveyouremoved. PersonalRepresentative: (to theDetainee, while attemptmgtohandhim the unclassified summary) Why don'tyouusethisindefense answerstothe allegations. Detainee: Let me see this. Ibelieve the Recorder is suppose to present evidence on the circumstances ofmy capture. [The DetauieekepttryingtoitttermpttheTribunalPresidentas he stated the following:] TribunalPresident The unclassi^ed evidence the Recorder had to submithas been submitted, and provided fbryourreview. Any otherevidence he has,has been classified. Detainee: So, the govemment evidence has been classified. TribunalPresident Any other e-vidence he... Detainee: Iwantto make it aware to this Tribunal thatlhaveacopy ofthe Combatant Status Review Tribunal process andlam aware ofhowthis Tribunal is to be conducted. TribunalPresident So are we. Detainee: That'sgood, and the Recorder is suppose to present the govemmentevidence based on govemment information and part ofthat evidence is the circumstances ofmy being captured. [The Detainee tumed to the recorder and asked:] Is that classified ornot Recorder7 TribunalPresident The Recorder is notrequired to answer your questions. All the unclassifiedevidencehehas,hasbeensubmitted. Detainee: Iwouldlike to bringitto the Tribunals attention. The CombatantStattts Review Tribunal process, [reading]: E.CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Authority. 3. Request the production of suchreasonable available mformation in the possession ofthe U.S.Govemment bearing on the issue ofwhetherthe detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant including information generated in connection with the mitial determination to hold the detainee as an enemy combatant andin any subsequentreviews ofthat determmation as well as anyrecords, determinations, or reports generated in connection with such proceedings...(inaudible)..called hereinafter the Govemment Information. Tribunal PresidentThe Tribunal Recorder has requestedaclosed session to present fiirther evidence.
lS)^i

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UNCLASSIFIEDi^FOUO
028148 Defence Reciprocal Discovery

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Case1-04cv01137-RM^^o^^i^^^^^Fil^11/02/2004

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Detainee: lunderstand that TribunalPresident That further evidence will be subtnitted. Do you wish to address the specifics on your unclassified summary ornot7 Yes or No. Detainee: Ithinkno. TribunalPresident Weare going to ask fbr you to be removedfi:omthe Tribunal hearing.Thankyoufbryourtime... Detainee: Iwould like to make itknown to the Tribunal thatall your actions will come before Allahandhe will be just when allowing considerationfbrthis. AndAllahmay forgive youandAllahmaypunish you. [The Tribunal was recessed to remove die Detaineefi:omthe room.]

AUTHENTICATION
Icertilythe material containedin this transcript isatme and accurate stirnmary of the testimony given duringthe proceedmgs.

^ , Col, USAF Tribunal President

ISN Enclosure (3) Page 9 of9

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
028147 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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00000029

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC Document 44-3 Filed 11/02/2004 DETAINEE ELECTION FORM Date: 26-Sep-04 Start Time: 0845 End Time: 1000 ISN#:' Personal Representative: (Name/Rank) Translator Required? NO Language?. ENGLISH

Page 24 of 30

CSRT Procedure Read to Detainee or Written Copy Read by Detainee? YES Detainee Election: [x| |~1 Wants to Participate in Tribunal Affirmatively Declines to Participate in Tribunal Uncooperative or Unresponsive Personal Representative Comments: Detainee has requested 3 witnesses. #1 Flis Lawyer, Gitanjali S. Gutierrezz located at Gibbons, Dell Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, Attomeys at Law, One Riverfiront Piazza, Newark, NJ, 07102"5549. Phone: 97j'596» 4500. His lawyer will testify regarding wrongly being held as an enemy combatant should be held as a POW by Intemational Law and the Geneva Convention. •#2. His Mcsi&5st7^/ttlt/KKKKBtk^QGate6-^^ His mother has his Last WUl and Testimony as well as supplemental Notes that can attest to his fi:ame of mind before leaving the United Kingdom. It covers the reasons why he left home. #3.He gave a ^ ^ P ^ P M B P B U j P a 130-page document/biography that explains his history in Britain through his capture by Afghanistan diat explains his actions, intents, and basis for his -actions. His Interrogator here in GITM also liave seen it. Detainee would-Iike that document presented to the Tribunal.

Personal Representative: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
028148 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

5209

0-/)

008

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-3 Filed 11/02/2004 UNCLASSIFIED

Page 25 of 30

Combatant Status Review Board TO: Tribunal Members FROM: OIC, CSRT (23 September 2004) Subject: Summary ofEvidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - Feroz Ali Abassi 1. Under the provisions of the Secretary ofthe Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to review the detainee's designation as an enemy combatant, 2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directiy supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." 3. The United States Govemment has previously determined that the detaktee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that he is a member of al Qaida. He engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. a. Detainee is a member of al Qaida. 1. Detainee traveledfi-omGreat Brittan to Afghanistan, using his own funds, to receive military training and to fulfill his jihad obligation. 2. Detainee was escortedfiromQuetta, Pakistan to a guesthouse in Afghanistan, where recruiting took place. At the guesthouse, detainee relinquished his passport and money for security piuposes, completed an application form, and chose a nickname. Detainee was then taken to Camp Farouq for training. 3. At Camp Farouq, detainee received military training, including but not limited to, city tactics, mountain tactics, weapons, maneirver, topography, surveillance, and ambushing. During weapons training, detainee trained on the following weapons: AKM, AK-47, RPG, and PK machine gun. 4. After basic training, detainee volunteered for advanced courses in Mountain Tactics and City Tactics. Detainee attended these courses because this training was a perquisite for bemg sent to thefirontof the firont lines.

f
UNCLASSIFIED
028149 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

5^^0
Exhibit /

00000031 I

J

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-3

Filed 11/02/2004

Page 26 of 30

UNCLASSIFIED 5. After completing his basic traming, detainee met with high-level al Qaida leaders. During this meeting, detainee stated that he left his home, in the United Kingdom, to take action against Americans and Jews. Additionally at this meeting, the detainee volunteered for a martyrdom mission. 6. Detainee was present when Usama Bin Laden gave a speech at al Farouq. Additionally, detainee was present when Usama Bin Laden visited the mountain warfare camp. 7. Detainee was identified as the guard posted to watch a suspected spy. This took place at the home of a Taliban official. b. Detainee engaged ui hostilities against the United States. 1. After 11 September 2001, detainee was forced to leave the guesthouse where he was staying. Detainee volunteered to be sent to defend the Kandahar airport, because it was the most dangerous mission. While there, detainee served in a small unit of al Qaidafighters,intent on defending the airport agamst the Americans. 4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desh-es to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability of evidence or witnesses.

UNCLASSIFIED
028150 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

g211

00000032

,Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMCiXifi/(^cif4StSi^6 ( ^^d Memorandum

11/02/2004 Page 27 of ^ A

To

Department of Defense Date 09/08/2004 O f f i c e o f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review f o r Detained Enemy Coinbatants Col. David Taylor, OIC, CSRT FBI GTMO Coimterterror REQUEST FOR REDACTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (ISN # # )

From

Subject

Pursuant t o t h e Secretary o f the Na-vy Order o f 29 J u l y 2004, Ittiplementation o f Combatant Review Tribunal Procedures f o r Enemy Cumbdtnnty be t a l l i e d ac uuancanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Section D, paragraph 2, the FBI requests r e d a c t i o n of the i n f o r m a t i o n h e r e i n marked^. The FBI makes t h i s request on the ha.Q-iw ^J2fjl__^id informatjroa-gelates "to--the nat--inn,-il .Qcr-ii-pjty r'f • the United States^. I n a p p r o p r i a t e dissemination o f said i n f o r m a t i o n could damage the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f the United States and compromise ongoing FBI i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . CERTIFICATION THAT REDACTED INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE IS NOT AN ENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s the aforementioned r e d a c t i o n contains no i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would support a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t the -not an enemy • eofffea4rai-rt' The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN redacted by the FBI and provided t o the OARDEC:
FD-302 dated ^^aOfi?..dated FD-302 dated FD-302 dated FD-302 dated FD-302 dated FD-302 dated 03/22/2002 08/03/2002 12/09/2002 04/14/2003 04/22/2003 04/23/2003 04/30/2003 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 dated dated dated dated dated dated dated 05/03/2003 05/06/2003 05/17/2003 05/24/2003 05/31/2003 06/07/2003 06/09/2003 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 dated dated dated dated dated

have been

06/10/2003 06/11/2003 06/19/2003 06/20/2003 06/21/2003

^Redactions are blackened o u t on the OARDEC provided FBI document. ^See Executive Order 12958

i

-^limiM-msms^it.t!:

028151

u/'i^Cl/^^^/f/^^
Defense Reciprocal Discovery

%Kit R'2

00000033

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-3

Filed 11/02/2004

Page 28 of 30

^(^CkaSSf^fE-D
Memorandum from ^ B H H H B W H P - t o C o l . David Taylor
Re: REQUEST FOR REDACTION, 09/08/2004

I f yoli need a d d i t i o n a l assistance, please contact On Scene Commander M i H ^ H i j l ^ H H l B I H ^ ^ M I ^ H B l ( f H H ^ H I I ^ H B i ) , or I n t e l l i g e n c e Analyst

•AilS«^ai!*lWWSttH5»»*OT

M/ucz:4^r/"Fr6/:^
028152 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

5213

00000034

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMp. Memorandum

%cuxriei)t,4^-^ ^ /failed 11/02/2004 •'"&4'BMf^£/5"

Page 29 of 30

To

:

Department o f Defense Date 09/22/2004 O f f i c e o f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review f o r D e t a i n e d Enemy Combatants Col-. D a v i d - T a y l o r /' OIGi-'"GSRT-.., — •.. FBI GTMO Counterterrorism Division A s s t . Gen. Counsel REQUEST FOR REDACTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

From :

subject

Pursuant t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Navy Order o f 29 J u l y 2004,- I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Combatant Review T r i b u n a l Procedures f o r Enemy Combatants D e t a i n e d a t Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, S e c t i o n D, p a r a g r a p h 2, t h e FBI r e q u e s t s r e d a c t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h e r e i n marked^. The FBI makes t h i s r e q u e s t on t h e basis that said information relates t o the national security of t h e U n i t e d States^. I n a p p r o p r i a t e d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d damage t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and cott^romise ongoing FBI i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . CERTIFICATION THAT REDACTED INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE I S NOT AN ENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d r e d a c t i o n c o n t a i n s no i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t w o u l d support a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e d e t a i n e e i s n o t an enemy combatant. • — The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN € H have been r e d a c t e d by t h e FBI and p r o v i d e d t o t h e OARDEC: FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 FD-302 dated dated dated dated dated 06/09/2003 06/10/2003 06/11/2003 06/20/2003 06/21/2003

^Redactions a r e blackened document. 'See E x e c u t i v e Order 12958

o u t on t h e OARDEC p r o v i d e d FBI

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Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-3

Filed 11/02/2004

Page 30 of 30

Memorandum f r o m ^ g g g g g g t o C o l . D a v i d T a y l o r Re: REQUES51,..JF0R REDACTION, 09/22/2004

I f you need a d d i t i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e , p l e a s e c o n t a c t A s s i s t a n t General Counsel ( I H H M H B I M ) , " rst

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GIBBONS. D E L D E O . D O L A K , GRIFFINGER &
A PROFESSIONAL OOFIPOBATION GIBBONS FELLOWSHIP IN PUBLIC INTEREST & CONSTHimONAL LAW JOHNJ. GIBBONS SENIOR PARTMER ATTORNEYS AT LAW O N E RIVERFRONT PLAZA NEWARK, N.J. 07102-5496 &73-S96-4500
WEB SITS btlp://wwrw.gibbonKtaw.cam

VECCHIONE
LAWRENCE S. LUSTBERG DIRECTOR PHILIP G. GALLAGHER JENNIFER CHING JONATHAN L HAFETZ* GrrANlALI S. GUTIERREZ
"NOT ADMITTED IN NJ.

July 9,2004 V U CERTIFIED MAIL. RETURN RECEIPT REQUIRED George Walker Bush President of the United States The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, D.C. 20500 Re: Kumaz v. Bush, et al., Doc No. 1:04CV0113S (D.C. DistCt) Begg V. Bush, et al., Doc. No. L-04CV01I37 (D.C. DistCt) 0 . b « W g V. Bush, et al., Doc. No 1;04CV01136 (D.C. Dist Ct) Dear President Bush: Enclosed pleasefindtwo copies of each of the habeas petitions in the above-captioned matters which have beenfiledin the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any furthers questions. Sincere] Vjjeurs/ Gitanjali S. Gutierrez Enclosures cc: Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller Army Col. Nelson J. Cannon John D. Ashcroft Esq., Attomey General of the United States Roscoe C. Howard, Esq., United States Attomey

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028155 NEW YORK OFFICE • ONE PENNSYLVANIA PUZe*rfl56't«ifllOac6ia9teM»WlVNY I011M70I • 212-6494700

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Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-4

Filed 11/02/2004

Page 2 of 35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Detainee, Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba;

FEROZ ALI ABBASI, Detainee, Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba; and

Petitioners,
V.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS No. l:(t4CV01137

GEORGEW.BUSH, President of the United States The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C 20500; DONALD RUMSFELD, Secretary, United States Department of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301-1000; ARMY BRIG. GEN. JAY HOOD, Commander, Joint Task Force - GTMO Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba; and ARMY COL. NELSON J. CANNON,

028156

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-4

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Page 3 of 35

Commander, Camp Delta, Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba Respondents. All sued in their ofHcial capacities. CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on July 9, 2004, I caused two copies of petitiqjua:S^flHHHHili flHBB ^ Next Friend o f # m m g : Feroz Ali Abbasi;

a n d t | | | m B [ m H B l as Next Friend of Feroz Ali Abbasi's, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, tb be served on the following respondents and counsel by certified mail, retum receipt requested addressed as Hsted below: George Walker Bush President of the United States The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington. D.C. 20500 Donald Rumsfeld Secretary, United States Department of Defense 1*00 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301-1000 Maj. Gen. Geoffery Miller Commander, Joint Task Force GTMO Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba John D. Ashcroft, Esq.. Attomey General of the United States 5111 Main Justice Building 10th Street & Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20530 Roscoe C. Howard, Esq. United States Attomey 555 4* Avenue Washington, D.C. 20530 Army Col. Nelson J. Cannon, Commander, Camp Delta, Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba

Gitanjali S. Gutierrez Attomey for Petitioners Date± July 9, 2004

028157

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

52mf7Z

000C0G39

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-4

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Page 4 of 35

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBU

Detainee, Camp Delta, Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba;

FEROZ A L I ABBASC Detainee, Camp Delta, Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba; and

CASE NUMBER

1:04CV01137

JUDGE: John D. Bates DECK TYPE, Habeas Corpus/2255 DATE STAMP: 07/02/2004 Petitioners,

PETITION FOR WRIT OFHABEAS CORPUS No.

V.

GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500; DONALD RUMSFELD, Secretary, United States Department ofDefense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washmgton, D.C. 20301-1000; ARMY BRIG. GEN. JAY HOOD, Commander, Joint Task Force - GTMO Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and ARMY COL. NELSON J. CANNON,

52'
028158 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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00000040

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

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Page 5 of 35

Commander, Camp Delta, Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Respondents. All sued in their official capacities. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 1. Petitioner i H B I H l l f e ^ i ^ Feroz Ali Abbasi seek a Writ of Habeas Corpus. They act on their own behalf and through their Next Friends, flHHmH the wife of J

a n d ^ N H ^ U m ^ m ^ the mother of Feroz Ali Abbasi. 2. Petitioner ^ H m m m ^ ("detained Petitionei'') is a citizen of the United Kingdom. PetitionerimPmUlis a citizen of the United Kingdom. Petitioner4||||BBVBfe'^ being held virtually z«commwn/caifo in Respondents' unlawful custody. 3. Petitioner Feroz Ali Abbasi ("detained Petitioner") is also a citizen of the United Kingdom. resides i n l | | | | | | | H B H P Petitioner Feroz Ali Abbasi is being held virtually incommunicado in Respondents* unlawftil custody. 4. Pursuant to either the President's authority as Commander in Chief and under the laws and usages of war or the November 13, 2001 Military Order, see % 38-40 infra. Respondents George W. Bush, President of the United States, Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Army Brigadier General Jay Hood, Commander of Joint Task Force-GTMO, and Army Colonel Nelson J. Cannon, Commander, Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba are either ultimately responsible for or have been charged with the responsibility of maintaining the custody and control of the detained Petitioner at Guantanamo. JURISDICTION 5. Petitioners bring this action under 28 U.S.C. §§2241 and 2242, and invoke this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1651, 2201, and 2202; 5 U.S.C. §702; the Fifth, Sixdi. and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution; die International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; and

5220
028159 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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Page 6 of 35

customary intemational law. Because tiiey seek declaratory relief Petitioners also rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57. 6. This Court is empowered under 28 U.S.C. §2241 to grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and to entertam the Petition filed b y ^ | g g g @ a n d ^ m m ] | ^ ] ^ a s Next Friends under 28 U.S.C. §2242. This Court is further empowered to declare the rights and other legal relations of die parties herein by 28 U.S.C. §2201, and to effectuate and enforce declaratory relief by all necessary and proper means by 28 U.S.C. §2202, as this case involves an actual controversy within the Cotirt's jurisdiction.

n
PARTIES 7. Petitioner m m i l ^ l i s a citizen o ^ l H H m i P B i ^ b ° is presently incarcerated and held in Respondents' unlawfiil custody in Camp Delta, Guantanamo. See Exhibit A (Affidavit o#@*#). 8. P e t i t i o n e i ^ m m ^ is flHMVs wife. She is adm^citizen. Because her husband cannot secure access either to legal cotmsel or to the courts ofthe United States, ( H H j ^ ^ acts as his Next Friend. See Exhibit A. 9. On her own and through cotmsel, Gareth Peirce, ( m U B has repeatedly tried to contact her husband, to leam more about his condition and status, and to gain access to him. The British Authorities have either rebuffed or ignored the requests of Mrs.^d^ and her counsel. See id.

10. Petitioner Feroz Ali Abbasi is a citizen of the United Kingdom who is presently incarcerated and held in Respondents' unlawful custody in Camp Delta, Guantanamo. See Exhibit C (Affidavit of Louise Christian). 11. P e t i t i o n e r ^ H m m m ^ i s m o t h e r . She resides in

Because her son cannot secure access either to legal counsel or to the court ofthe United States, ^ | [ H m i m | | | | | m | a c t s as us Next Friend. See Exhibit C. 12. On her own and through counsel, Louise C h r i s t i a n , h a s repeatedly tied to contact her son, to leam more about his condition and status, and to gain access to him. The United States authorities have either rebuffed or ignored the requests of Mrs. H f f ^ and her counsel. See id.

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028160 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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Page7of35

13. Respondent GeorgeW.Bush is d^e President ofthe United States and CommanderinChief of d^eUnited^tatesMilitary. . I t ispursuant to dteNovember 13, 2001 Military Order promulgated by him oraltematively.under his authority as CommanderinChief and under dte laws and usages ofwar, that M r . ^ ^ ^ i s being detained. Accordingly, Respondent Bush is ultimatelyrespot^ible fbr Petitioner's tmlawful detention. 14. Respondent Rttmsfi^ld is the Secretary ofthe United States Department ofDefi^nse. Pursuant to either the Novemberl3, 2001 Military Order or the President's authority as Conm^ander in Chief and tmder the laws and usages of war, Respondent Rtimsfeld has been charged with maintaining thecustody and control ofdtedetamedPetitioner. 15. Respondent Hood is the Commander of Joint Task Force-GTMO, the task force running the detention operation at Guantanamo. Petitioner. 16. Respondent Cannon is the Cortunander of Camp Delta, the U.S.facility where the detained Petitioner is presendy held. He is the inm^ediate custodian responsible fbr Petitioner's detention. ^TH^^^^^i STATEl^NTOFF^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e detained Petitioners are not nor have they ever been, enemy aliens, lawftjl or ttnlawful belligerents, or combatants ofany kind, ^ ^ ^ e detained Petitioners are not nor has they ever been,^^enemy combatants" who are ^^art of - or supporting forces hostile to the Uttited States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who were engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there." See^i^^^v..^t^^^^^, 542U.S.^slipop.at8-9(June28,2004). ^^i^Petitioners seek to enforce their right toajudicial determination 0^ basis fbr Respondent'sdetermination that they are ^^enemy combatants." 20.InAugustof2001,Petitioner^^^^^^^^^^^^hiswifi2^^^^^^^^andtheirchil^^^ live in Kabul, Afghat^stan with their lifi^ savings in order to establishaschool. Once they arrived, they purchaseahome and Mr.^^^^began setting u^ the school. See Exhibit A. After 4^ 5222
028161 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^^^B^^

He has supervisory responsibility fbr the detained

00000043

Case 1 ;04-cv-01137-RMC

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Page 8 of 35

the events of September 11, 2 0 0 1 , a n d

his family remained in Kabul because

they lacked the means to leave.immediately and hoped that the threats ofmilitary repercussions would not materialize. After the bombing of Kabul,f^mH|and assistancefiromfamily and friends to flee to Pakistan. See id. 21. By November 2001,
^ H H V H H

his family sought financial

and his family bad re-established themselves in

Islamabad, Pakistan and leased a new home. See Exhibit B. 22. During the night ofJanuary 31,2002, Pakistani officials seized^|HI||imP firom his home

in Islamabad, Pakistan. See Exhibit B. He was able to make one call to his father stating that he was seized by Pakistan officials and that United States officials were also present See id. Both^Hmmik family and hisUB^ counsel have repeatedly attempted since that time

to intervene on his behalf and to acquire information about his detention. See id. 23. Shordy after his seizure, Pakistani lawyers filed a habeas petition on behalf o f M H i m p in Pakistani court On March 1, 2002, the court ordered the Pakistan Interior Minister to p r o d u c e ^ g g m ^ b e f b r e Ae court on March 7, 2002, but the Interior Minister refused to do so. On March 8, 2 0 0 2 , ^ | | ^ H m i ^ s lawyer, Mr. Abdur Rahman Saddiqui, submitted that die Pakistani Security Services ("ISF') and die United States Central hitelUgence Agency ("CIA") had seized and that die ISI had interrogated him. Upon threat of

sanctions, the court again ordered tbe Interior Minister to produce ^ @ N m | | | ^ o n March 14,2002. Again, the Interior Minister did not do so. See Exhibit B. 24. On March 4, 2 O Q 2 , 0 f / / l / / / / / / f s father leamed from an Intemational Red Cross worker that Pakistani authorities had transfened custody of ( g g m | | ^ g | | | ^ t o United States audiorities. According to die Red Cross worker, United States forces had taken Mr. I ^ j ^ t o Kandahar approximately 10 to 14 days earher. See Exhibit B. 25. For some time, the United States h e l d ^ g m @ m ^ in detention at a United States military airbase in Baghram, Afghanistan. See Exhibit ^ g g y s family received a few messages from him flirough the Intemational Red Cross. See Exhibit A. In one letter to his wife dated November 20, 2 0 0 2 , ^ H g g m i # stated diat he wished his family to consult the lawyer, Gareth Peirce, on his behalf In a letter to his father written December 15,2002, he also stated

028162

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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000C0G44

Case1:04cv01137RMC

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Page9of35

that " I have not seen die sun, sky, moon etc. fbr nearlyayear" and diat ^^I am in diis state of depression^andlam beginning to lose die fight against depression and hopelessness.^' Sei^ ExhibitB. 26. Thereafrer, at somepoint in 2003,^^^^^^^^^^'sfamily was informed that United States of^^^ had transferred him to Guantanamo Bay on February 6, 2003. See Exhibit B.^^^^^^^has beenheldinU.S. custody at Guantanamo since diat time. 27.1n July 2003, RespondentBushannouncedthathehaddesigtiated Mr.^^^^^an^'enemy

combatant" subject to die Executive Military Order ofNovember 13, 200L Mr.^^^^hasyet to be charged, provided access to counsel, or granted any other legal process. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ counselhasbeeninfbrmedthat Mr. ^^^^^ hasbeen heldin solitaryconfinementsincehis designationinJuly 2003. See ExhibitB. 28. Both^^^^^^^^^^^^^'sfrimily and attomeys are concemed about his deteriorating physical and mental health.SeeExhibitsA-B. 29. Atthetimeofhisdetention,Mr.^^^^^^asnotamember of either theTaliban government's armed forces or die Al^aedaarmed fbrces. He did not cause or attempt to cause any harm to American personnel or property prior to his capture. Mr. ^^^^ was not in Afghanistan at the time ofhis detention, but was taken into custody in Pakistan, tumed over to the custody ofthe U.S. Military there, then transferred to Afghanistan, and ultimately tr8nsported to Guantanamo. ^ O i ^ e British ForeignOffice has confirmed that Feroz Abbasi is being held inGuantdnamo, subject to interrogation, and denied Consular access. See Exhibit C. The United States has not disclosed the circumstances of his seizure but Petitioner^^^ believes that he was taken by United States Military Forces in Kandahar, Afgh^i^tan sometime on or before Januaryll, 2002. ^ 3 L ^ July 2003,Respondent Bush announced that hehaddesignated Mr. Abbasian^^enemy combatant" subjectto die Executive Military Order ofNovember 13,2001. Mr. Abbasi has yet to be charged, provided access to counsel, or grantedany other legal process. ^ ^ . A t dietimeofhis detention, Mr. Abbasi was notamember of eidier the Talibangovernment's armed forces or the AlO^^da armed forces. He did not cause or attempt to cause any harm to

5224
028163 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^ ^ 7 ^ ^ ^

0000004^

Case1-04cv01137RMC

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American personnel orproperty priorto his capture. TheJoint Resolution
B^^^

3 3 ^ t h e wake of die September 11,2001 attacks, tiieUnited States, atdiedirectionof Respondent Bush, beganamassive military campaign against theTaliban govemment then in power inA^anistan. On September 18,2001,aJoint Resolution ofCongress authorized the President to use force againstthe "nations, organizations, orpersons" that ^^lanned, authorized, committed,oraidedthe terrorist attacks onSeptember l l , 2001, or ^that^harbored such organizations orpersons." Joint Resolution 23,Audiorization fbr Use ofMilitary Force, Public Law 107-40,115Stat224(Jan. 18,2001). ^^^^-^ ^34. The detained Petitioners are not andhave never beeti,amember of Al^aedao ^ terrorist group. Prior totheirdetention,theydid not commit any violent act against any American person or espouse any violent act against anyAmerican person or property. Nor were they involved in the ensuing armed conflict They had no involvement direct or indirect ineithertheterroristattacksontheUnited StatesonSeptember 11, 2001,or ^ y actof intemational terrorism attributed by the Utiited States to AlOaeda or any other terrorist group. They are not properly subject to die detention order issued by the President As they did not participate in the armed conflict at any point intime,they also are not properly subject to the Executive'sauthority as Commanderin Chief orunderthe laws and usages of war. ^^^^^^^ f3 ^ ^ ^ ^ They at notimevoluntarily

The detained Petitioners^ was not initially t^ken into custody byAmerican forces. Itis joinedany terrorist ^rce. unclear how Petition Abbasi was seized. Both, however,were taken into custody against their will and handed over to the Americans. They did not engage in combat against American forces. 37. The detained Petitioners promptly identified themselves by their correct name and nationality to die United States. They requested diat the United States provide diem with access to thenfamilies and to legal counsel. The detained Petitioners were kept blindfolded against theirwill fbr lengdiyperiods while being taken involuntarilyto Guantanamo.

5225
028164 Defense Reciprocal Discovery /^^^B^^

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The Detention Order 38. On November 13, 2001, Respondent Bush issued a Military Order audiorizing indefinite detention without due process of law. The Order aufliorizes Respondent Rumsfeld to detain anyone Respondent Bush has "reason to believe": i. ii. is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit acts of intemational terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the Uiuted States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy, or has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in subparagraphs (i) and (ii).

iii.

See Military Order of November 13, 2001. President Bush must make this determination in writing. The Order was neither authorized nor directed by Congress, and is beyond the scope of the Joint Resolution of September 18,2001. 39. The Military Order vests the President with complete discretion to identify the individuals that fell within its scope. It estabhshes no standards governing the use of his discretion. Once a person has been detained, the Order contains no provision for the person to be notified of the charges he may face. Instead, the Order authorizes detainees to be held widiout charges. It contains no provision for detainees to be notified of their rights under domestic and intemational law, and provides neither dierightto counsel nor the right to consular access. It provides no right to appear before a neutral tribunal to review the legahty of a detainee's continued detention and no provision for appeal to an Article III or any other court. In fact the Order expressly bars any form of judicial review. The Order authorizes indefinite and unreviewable detention, based on nothing more than the President's written determination that an individual is subject to its terms. 40. The MiUtary Order audiorizes die use of military commissions to try noncitizens accused of terrorism and other war crimes. It establishes no guarantee that charges will be promptly

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brought diat these charges will be made know to die accused and his counsel, or diataspeedy trial providmg adequate legal.process will be afforded to determine guilt on such charges or their legal validity under domestic or intemational law. It permits prolonged pre-commission detention in sohtary confinementriskingsuch long-term psychological injuty as that suffered
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

41. ThedetamedPetitioners are not properly subjectto the Military Order. 42. However, the Mihtary Orderwas promulgated in the United States and in diis judicial district the decision to detain and designate Petitioners were made by Respondents in the United States and in this judicial district the decision to detain Petitioners at Guantanamo was made in the United States and in this judicial district and the decision to continue detaining the Petitioners was, and is, beingmadeby Respondents in the United States and in this judicial district 43. In therelatedcaseof^8st^^v.^t^s^,2l5F.Supp.2d55 (D.D.C. 2002), Respondentscontended that the pedtionersmthat case were bemg detained not pursuant to the President's Military Order butratherunderthePresident'sauthority as CommanderinChief and underthe laws and usages ofwar. However, Petitionersmthismatterwerenot arrested or detained by the United States in the courseofthe armed confiict 44. Moreover,Petitioner^^^^ was detained by Pakistani notUnited States audiorities and was arrested by them notmAfghanist^but while in hishome in Pakistan, nowhere neara battlefield. Accordingly, Petitioneris not properly detained under die President's authority as CommanderinChieforunderthe laws andusagesofwar. Guantanamo Bay Naval Station 45. On or aboutJanuary II,2002, the United States military began transportingprisoners captured inAfghanistan to Camp ^-Ray, at the United States Naval Base, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In April 2002, all prisoners were transferred toamore permanent prison facility in Guantanamo, Camp Delta. Offenses committed by bodi civilians and fbreign nationals living on

Guantanamo are brought before federal courts on the mainland,where respondents etijoy die ftill panoply of Constitutional rights. Detainees incarcerated at Guantanamo are entitled to test the legality of dieir detention in die federal courts, ^^^t^^ v. ^^^,542 U.S. , (June 28,

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2004) 46.1n or about Pebruary 6, 2003, die United States military transferred die detained Petitioner ^^^^to Guantanamo, wherehe has beenheldeversince, in the custody ofRespondents Bush, Rumsfeld, Hood, and Cannon. In or aboutJanuary 2002, the United States military transferred the detained Petitioner Abbasito Guantanamo, where he hasbeen held ever sinccindie custody ofRespondents Bush, Rumsfeld, Hood, and Cannon. The Conditions ofDetentionatGuantdnamo 47.Since gaining control ofthe detained Petitioners, die United States military has held them virtually t^^i^^^t^^^^^^o. On infrirmation and beliefs, they have been, or will be, interrogated repeatedly by agents of the United States Departments ofDefense and Justice,dioughdiey have not been charged with an ofirense, nor notified of any pending or contemplated charges. They havemade no appearance before eitheramilitary or civilian tribtmal of any sort and have not been provided counsel or the means to contact counsel. They have not been informed of theirrightstmder the United States Constitution, the regulations of the United States Military, the Geneva Convention, the Intemational Covenant on Ci-^1 and Political Rights, the American Declaration on die Rights andDuties of Man, or customary intemational law. Indeed, Respondents have taken the position that Petitioners should not behold of these rights. Asa resultthe detained Petitioners are completely unable either toprotect or tovindicate their rights tmder domestic and intemational law. 48. On information and belief die detained Petitioners have been forced to provide involuntary statements toRespondents'agents at Guantanamo. The detained Petitioners have been held under conditions thatviolate their intemational and constitutionalrightsto dignity and freedom from cruel, unusual and degrading treatment orptmishment They have been housed throughout their detention in accommodations that fail to satisfy either domestic or internationally accepted standards fbr any person subject to detention. For example, upon information and belief, they were initially forced to useabucket foratoilet and were not provided with basic hygienic facilities. They have been refused meaningfiil access to their families. They have not been providedwiththeopportunity fully to exercisetheirreligiousbeliefsanddiey havebeen 10

522^
028167 Defense Reciprocal Discovery / ^ ^ ^

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humiliated in die exercise of dieir religion. They have been exposed to the indignity ^nd humiliationofthecamerasofthenationalandintemational press, broughtto Guantanamo with theexpress consent and control ofRespondents. 49.1n published statements, Respondents Bush, Rumsfeld, and officers I^ehnert and Carrico who preceded Hood and Cannon in their respective positions, hav^ indicated that the United States may hold thedetamed Petitionersunder these conditions indefinitely. See. e.^.. Roland Watson,T^To^5(LO^O^),Jan. 18, 2002 ("DonaldRumsfeld,dieU.S. Defence Secretary, suggested lastnight that al-Oaeda prisoners could be held indefinitely at die base. He said diat the detention of some would be open-ended as the United States tried to buildacase against diem.").^ 50. Indeed, accordmg to the Depariment ofDefense, detainees who are adjudged innocent ofall chargesby amilitary comtnission may nevertheless bekeptindetention at Guantdnamo indefinitely. See Department ofDefense Press Background Briefing ofJuly 3,2003, available at http://www.defenselmk.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030703-0323.html (last visited on Julyl, 2004). lY CAUSESOF ACTION FIRSTCLAIMFORRELIEF ^UNLAWFULDETENTION^ 51. Petitioners incorporateparagraphsl-50byreference. 52. The detained Petitioners are not nor have they ever been,enemy aliens, lawful or utdawful belligerents, or combatants of any kmd. Petitioners are not nor have they ever been,"enemy combatants" who were "part of or supportingfrirceshostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who were engaged in an armed confiict against the Uruted States diere."See^^^ii^..^t^^.^/^,542U.S.^,slipop.at8-9(June28,2004). The Petitioners

^See^/^^T^MAO.,^/co^e^^C8^^^.^^,Feb.3,2002: More curious still is die matter of die prisoners^ ultimate fate. Rumsfeld has laid out four options:amilitarytrial,atrialinU.S. criminalcouris.retumtotheir home countries fbr prosecution, or continued detention awhile additional intelligence is gathered.' The last seems adistinctpossibility; the Pentagon plans to build 2,000 cells at Camp^-Ray. 11

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have committed no violation of domestic, fbreign, or intemational law. There is no basis whatsoeverinlawfbrPetitioners'detention. SECONDCLAIMFORRELIEF (DUEPROCESS-FIFTHAMENDMENTTOTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION^ 53. Petitioners incorporate paragraphsl-52byreference. 54. By the actions described above. Respondents, acting under color of law^h^ve violated and continue to violate the Fifth Amendment to die United States Constitution. Respondent Bush hasordereddieprolonged,indefinite,andarbitrary detentionof indi-Yiduals, widiout Due

Process ofLaw. Respondents Rumsfeld, Hood, and Cannon are likewise acting in violation of the Fifth Amendment since they act at the President's direction. On its face, the Executive OrderviolatestheFifihAmendment THIRDCLAIMFORRELIEF (DUEPROCESS^FIFTHAMENDME^T TOTHEUN^ITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION) 55. Petitioners incorporateparagraphsl-54byreference.

56. By die actions described above. Respondents, acting under color of law, have violated and continue to violate therightofthe detained Petitioners to be free from arbitrary,prolonged, and indefinitedetention,inviolationoftheDueProcessC1auseoftheFtfth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Executive Order, as applied to Petitioners,violates the Fifth Amendment FOURTH CLAIMFORRELIEF fDUEPROCESS^INTERNATIONALLAWl 57. Petitioners incorporate paragraphsl-56byreference. 58. By die actions described above, Respondents, acting under color of law, have violated and continue to violate customary mtemationallaw,Arts.9andl4ofthe Intemational Covenant on Civil and Polifical Rights, and Arts. ^^O^III,^V,and^^O^Iofdie American Declaration on the Rights and Duties ofMan. Respondent Bush has ordered the prolonged, indefinite, and arbitrary detention ofPetitioners,without legal process, in violation ofbinding obligations of

12

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die United States under internationallaw. Respondents Rumsfeld,Hood,andCannon are likewise acting inviolation oflntemational law.since they act at the President's dii^ection. On its face, the Executive Orderviolates intemational law. FIFTHCLAIMFORRELIEF tr^UEPROCESS^lNTERNATIONAtLAWl 59. Petitioners incorporate paragraphsl-58byreference. 60. By the actions described above. Respondents, acting under color of law, have violated and continue to violate therightofthe detained Petitioners to befreefromarbitrary.prolonged. and indefinite detention, in -eolation of customary intemational law. Arts. 9 and 14 of the h^temationalCovenantonCivilandPohfical Rights, andArts.^^O^II,^0^,and^^O^ American Declaration on die Rights and Duties ofMan. TbeExecutive Order, as applied to the detained Petitioners,violates these and other binding obligations of theUnited States under IntemationalLaw. SI^HCLAIMFORRELIEF ^DUEPROCESS^FAILURETOCOMPLY WITHUSMII^ITARYREGULATIONSAND INTERNATIONALHUMANITARIANLAW^ 61. Petitioners incorporate paragraphsl-60 by reference. 62. By the actions described above,Respondents, acting under color of law,have violated and contmue to violate therightsaccorded to persons seized by die United States Military in tunes of armed confiict as established by, t^re^^/i^^, the regulations of die United States Military, Articles4and5ofGeneva Convention III, Geneva Convention P/.and customary intemational law. SEVENTH CLAIMFORRELIEF ^WARPOWERSCLAUSE^ 63. Petitioners incorporate paragraphsl-62byreference. 64. By die actionsdescribed above, Respondents, acting under coloroflaw,have exceeded theconstitutional authority ofthe Executive and have violated and continue to violate die War Powers Clause by ordering the prolonged and ini^efinite detention of die detained Petitioners

13

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widiout Congressional authorization.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT> 65. Petitioners incorporate paragraphs I - 64 by reference. 66. To die extent die Executive Order of November 13, 2001, disallows any challenge to the legality of the Petitioners' detention by way of habeas corpus, the Order and its enforcement constitute an unlawftd Suspension of die Writ, in violation of Article I of the United States Constitution. The actions of the Respondents in claiming the legal right to detain petitioners without judicial authorization or review constitute a suspension of die writ ofhabeas corpus in violation of Article I of the United States Constitution. NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (ARBITRARY AND UNLAWFUL DETENTION - VIOLATION OF THE A?A) 67. Petitioners incorporate paragraphs 1 - 66 by reference. 68. By detaining Petitioners for the duration and in the manner described herein. Respondents have arbitrarily, unlawfidly, and unconstitutionally detained the Petitioners, in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act 5 U.S.C. §706(2). TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (UNLAWFUL TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION - VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION) 69. Petitioners incorporate paragraphs 1 - 68 by reference. 70. Pursuant to die Executive Order ofNovember 13, 2001, Petitioners have been designated by Respondent Bush as "enemy combatants" subject to a possible trial by military commission. 71. By the actions described above, Respondents, acting under color of law, have violated and continue to violate the Fifdi Amendment to the United States Constitution. Respondent Bush has ordered that individuals designated as "enemy combatants" may be tried by military conunission, without Due Process of Law. Respondents Rumsfeld is likewise acting in violation of the Fifth Amendment, since he acts at die President's direction. On its face and as

14

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applied to Petitioners, bial by military commission pursuant to the Executive Order violates the Fifth Amendment. TENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (UNLAWFUL TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION - VIOLATION OF INTERN.ATIONAL LAW) 72. Petitioners incorporate paragraphs 1- 71 by reference. 73. The trial by military commission for which Respondents have, by designating Petitioners, indicated that he may be eligible, 'violates therightsaccorded to persons seized by the United States Military in times of armed conflict as established by, mrer alia, the United States Constitution, the regulations of the United States Military, Articles 4 and 5 of Geneva Convention UI, Geneva Convention IV, and customary international law. 74. As Lord Goldsmith, the British Attomey General, said a week ago, There wdl always be measures which are hot open to govemments. Certainrights- for example the right to life, the prohibition on torture, on slavery - are simply non-negotiable. There are others such as the presumption of innocence or the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal established by /au-, where we cannot compromise on long-standing principles ofjustice and liberty, even if we may recognise diat there may sometimes be a need to guarantee these principles in new or different ways. See Lord Goldsmith, Terrorism and Justice: The British Perspective from the Attomey General, Speech at the Cour de Cassation (June 25, 2004), available at

http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/uk_news/ politics/3839153.stm. The manner in which Petitioner has been treated in Guantanamo Bay, and die 'tribunal" diat has been organized to try him described by anodier respected British jurist Lord Steyn^ as a court that is a "mockery of justice" and that "derives from die jumps of the kangaroo" - cannot pass muster under the most basic and fundamental description of due process.

V PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, petitioners pray for reliefas follows: 15

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1. GrantPetitioner^^^^^^^^^^NextFriend status, as NextFriendof^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^; 2. GrantPetitioner^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^NextFriendstatus, as Next Friend ofFerozAli 3. OrderthedetainedPetitionersreleased fromRespondents'unlawful custody; 4. Order Respondents immediately to allow counsel to meet and confer v^^th the detained Petitioner, inprivateandunmonitored attorney-client conversations; 5. OrderRespondents to cease allinterrogations of die detained Petitioners,direct or indirect while this litigation is pending; 6. Order and declare the Executive Order ofNovember 13, 2001,tmlawfulasaviolation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 7. Order and declare die Executive Order ofNovember 13, 2001,unlawful asaviolation of die Administrative Procedures Act5U.S.C.§702; 8. Order and declare the Executive Order of November 13,2001,unlawful asaviolationof customary intemational law,the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Declaration on die Rights and Duties ofMan; 9. Order and declare diat die Executive Order ofNovember 13, 200L violates die War Powers Clause; 10. Order and declare that the provision of die Executive Order that bars the detained Petitioners from seekingreliefmdiis Court is an unlawfid Suspension ofthe Writ in violation ofArticlel ofthe United States Constitution; 11. Order and declare that the prolonged, indefitute, and restrictive detention of Petitioners is arbitrary and unlawful,adeprivation ofliberty widiout due process in violation of die Fifth Amendmentto die UnitedStates Constitution, and in violation ofthe law ofnationsandti^eaties ofdieUnitedStates; 12. Order anddeclarediatdiedetained Petitioners arebeing heldin violationoftheFifth

Amendmentto the United States Constitution; 13. Order and declare that die detained Petitioners 2ire being held inviolation of customary intemational law, die hitemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties ofMan; 16

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14. Order and declare that the detained Petitioners are being held in violation of the regulations of the United.StatesMilitary,theGeneva Conventions, and intemational humanitarian law^: 15. Order and declare that the provisions of the Executive Order that authorize trial by military commission violate die FifthAmendment ofthe United States Constitution. 16. Order and declare diat the provisions of die Executive Order that audiorize trial by military commission violate the various provisions of the regulations of die United States M i l i t ^ , the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice, theGeneva Conventions, and intemational law; 17. To die extent Respondents contest any material factual allegations in diis Petition, require respondents to show the facts upon which Petitioners'detentions are based, grant Petitioners an opportunity fbr meaningful discovery mto the case against diem, and schedule an evidentiary hearing, atwhichPetitionersmayadduceproofinsupportofdieirallegations; and 18. Grant such odier legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to protect Petitioners'rights tmderthe United States Constitution, federal statutory law,andintemationallaw.

17

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VERIFICATION I declare under penalty of perjury that die foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledae. information, and belief.

is .z^ZZday ^ ^ ^ day of iJuly Executed on this

2004

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Respectfully submitted, Counsel for Petitioners:

2^.
/TpnaCMb. Susanin (y.S. DiWct Court for the Jistrict of Columbia Bar No. 455429 Lawerence S. Lustberg Gitanjali S. Gutierrez Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, P.C. One RiYerfront Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07102 (973) 596-4500 (973) 639-6243 (fax)

Counsel for Petitioners

* Mr. Susanin appears as local coimsel for all attomeys. Dated: Newark, New Jersey July 2, 2004

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EXHIBIT A

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Petitioners,
V.

No.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, President of tbe United States DONALD RUMSFELD, Secretary, United States Department of Defense MAJ. GEN. GEOFFERY MILLER, Commander, JointTask Force-GTMO Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ARMY COL. NELSON J. CANNON, Commander, Camp Delta Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT OF SOLICITOR GARETH PEIRCE I, GARETH PEIRCE, of 14 Invemess Street, London, United Kingdom, NWl 7HJ, being duly swom, depose and state as follows:

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1.

I am a solicitor in England and I am a partner in tbe firni of Bimberg Peirce at the above

address. 1 have been retained by tbe Second Pedtioner,^^mg^ to act on her behalf and also on behalf of her h u s b a n d ^ f l H B H B i the Fiist Petitioner, who is presendy detained by the United States military at Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba (Guantanamo). 2. On 2"" Febmary 2002, I was retained by the fadier o f | B H H B i > fll^HBt and

thereafter by bis ' ^ f £ > t H H I ^ to act on their behalf and on behalf of

himself.

Annexed hereto marked "GPl" is a copy of my designation as a solicitor f o r f H H ^ p and her h u s b a n d ^ j U m H ^ ^ in diese proceedings. 3. My understanding of the events that preceded Mr^H^'s detention in Guantanamo Bay is as

follows and is derived fiom interviews with his wife and also information from the British Foreign Office. 4. In August of 2 0 0 1 , ^ g m m ^ ^ bis wife and their children moved to live in Kabul, in

Afghanistan. This had been a long term plan of the family; I ^ B H U ^ b e l i e v e d that be and his family could live safely in that country, and that be could be involved in work of social value, namely by setting up a school. He and his family had travelled to Kabul with their life savings. Once they arrived they acquired a house in Kabul and was involved in the process of

setting up die school. M r H ^ spoke tofemilyand friendsfromtimeto time after their arrival and was believed by them to have become safely settled there. 5. The events of September 11,2001 and their repercussions, however, had an immediate and

disturbing effect u p o n f H I H m [ | a n d his &mily as they did upon the entire civilian population of Afghanistan in the light of statements about military repercussions planned by the United States. I and his family remained in Kabul during the bombing of that city; it had been 2

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almost impossiblefordiem to leave and, like many others, their iiutialreactionhad been to wait and hope that conditions did not worsen. However, they were eventually compelled to flee. 6. It is my understanding that, by the end ofNovember 2
0 0 I , 4 H B H B I

his family

had reached Islamabad and his father i n ^ H m H H a n d a &mily friend were involved in arranging for tbe sending of monies in order for tbe family to re-establish itself in Islamabad. The family entered into a lease on accommodation there and were intending to stay and attempt to re-settle themselves. 7. On the 31 st January 2002, ^ B B H H i telephoned his father directly, stating that he had

been seizedfayPakistani officials, with Americans also present, and that he was making the call from a mobile phone which had not yet been takenfromhim whilst he was in transitfromhis house. He had been arrested from the premises he had rented, with his wife and children present 8. From the date of the receipt ofthat call continuous attempts were made by and on behalf of

his family to obtain answers to what happened t o ^ K H H I i m ^ a n d to obtain intervention on his behalf. Lawyers were instructed in Pakistan to initiate babeas corpus proceedings there to obtain his release from detention. All of the papers in diose proceedings can be produced should tiiey be considered of assistance to the CourL The affadavit evidence of all relevant departments in Pakistan with authority to make arrests, denied all knowledge o f ^ M H m p ^ s existence, despite die production in those proceedings by M r s ^ H ^ f the lease taken out by her husband for the property in vAach the family were living at thetimeofhis arrest 9. In parallel, on behalf of the family, 1 asked for intervention by die Foreign Office. The

response of die Foreign OfiBce was diat upon inquiry (indicating that they had been shown a copy

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of M r J U f s Pakistani passport) they could make no formal intervention to Pakistan in view ofthe fact that M r f l ^ had dual Bndsh and Pakistani nationality. 10. The Court in Pakistan on 1st March 2002 ordered die Interior Minister to bring Mr g * ^ to

Court on 7th March; the Interior Ministry failed to comply with that order. On 8th March 2002, Mr ^m^'s lawyer, Mr Abdur Rahman Saddiqui, submitted that M r | | P | had been taken from his home by the CIA and die Paldstani Security Services ('ISI'), and interrogated by the ISI. The Court ordered M r l H ^ ' s production on 14th March 2002, on pain of sanctions being imposed upon the Interior Ministry. Still Mr^jP^was not produced. 11. However, in the interim, on 4th March 2002, a Mr@m@k&om the Red Cross telephoned

M r | H ^ s father i t ^ B H B K ^° say t h a t ^ ^ m g m ^ h a d been handed to the US authorities by Pakistani authorities, and had been taken to Kandahar, some 10 to 14 days previously by US forces. It is our understanding that Mr was thereafter held at a US military airbase in

Baghram in Afghanistan. In the light of the swom responses to the habeas corpus application in Pakistan it is clear t h a t | H ^ m | w a s removed to Afghanistan unlawfiilly. 12. Thereafter his family received few communicationsfromhrni of which two are exhibited

here, one to his wife |||^ dated the 20* ofNovember 2002, and one to his father, dated the 15* of December 2002. In a letter to his wife he makes specific reference to his wish that the family consult a lawyer, naming myself as the lawyer who had represented^^|m|||||||| in the year

2000. In his letter to his father, he states "/ have not seen tbe sun, sky, moon etc for nearly a year," He states, "lam in this state of desperation and Iam beginning to lose the fight against depression and hopelessness."

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13.

I on behalf o f ^ g g g a n d ^ g g ^

the father of the first petitioner pressed tbe

Foreign Office by letter and in interview in England to ensure the most basic provision of information concerning M r | | P ^ The Foreign Office indicated it was impossible to obtain any infonnation whatsoever from the US authorities. As one example, in a letter dated the 24* of October 2002 the Foreign Office confirmed that ' W have made regular requestsfor information on and access for welfare purposes, preferably Consular access, to M r f / ^ and any other British nationals who may be in a similar position. The US position is that they will not allo-w us Consular access, or access for any welfare purposes, to any British national detained in Afghanistan or provide us with arty information about Mr i/jf^'s detention." I exhibit a copy of that letter at "GP2". 14. Mr^jjjjj^'s family was informed that he had been transferred to Guantanamo Bay on

Febmary 6*, 2003. On the 10* of February 2003 on behalf o f ^ g g g g g T s father and his wife I instructed the Centre for Constitutional Rights in the United States to initiate all such legal action on his behalf as they considered possible. (I had already in 2002 instructed the Centre for Constitutional Rights in similar terms to initiate habeas corpus proceedings on behalf o f f H ^ ^ H P and whose petition is now shortly due to be heard by the Supreme Court in the

United States.) The Centre for Constitutional Rights petitioned the inter-American Commission on Human Rights for die Organisation of American States on March 4"*, 2003 on behalf of H m U l ^ • • H a n d others. 15. 1 have continued to press the Foreign Office in England to achieve the release of M r f l ^ ^

and compliance with international law. 1 enclose one example of letters written to the Foreign Secretary Mr Straw, and to the Attomey General. 1 am aware that the Attomey General has

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continued to press for due process to be applied to ^ H i l H j j j ^ who is now, I understand, designated as a person who may be placed before a military tribunal as an "enemy combatant" although no charges have yet been proffered against him. 1 have been infomied by die Foreign Office that he has been held in solitary confinement since thetimeof his designation. 16. After two years in custody,^@]Hgm^ has been detained wholly incommunicado from

any legal advice. He has clearly and specifically asked that his family obtain tbe assistance of his lawyer, namely myself but as has been throughout the case w i t h ^ U m p a n d @ @ ] | ^ no possibility of access by any who might provide him with advice has been achieved. At repeated approaches by myself and hisfemilyto, and meetings with, the Foreign Office, nofiirtheror better information c o n c e m i n g ^ m m ^ has been aclueved. No letters have been received by his femily since July 2003. In the past 24 hours I have been told that reliable information suggests that there are serious questions as t o ^ j m H H H V ^ mental health. Sucb a condition is wholly unsurprising given that the Foreign OfSce has stated that be has been held in solitary confinement for some six months. As a lawyer with lengthy experience of the effects of isolation upon the ability ofany detmnee to stand trial, and to make appropriate decisions conceming his defence, 1 ara certain t h a t ^ H m U m must now be in urgent need of wholly independent advice, both legal and medical. 17. I know tbe facts deposed to herein to be tme of my own knowledge, except where otherwise

appears. Swom by the Deponent at on this ^ day of March, 2004

OSBORNES SOLICITORS 68 PARKWAY LONDON i.^l^l^t^N

^^^^^^^^^^

^

^ ^ ^ ^ ^

^

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Before me:

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INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Petitioners
V.

No.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, President ofthe United States DONALD RUMSFELD, Secretary, United States Department ofDefense MAJ. GEN. GEOFFERY MILLER, Commander, Joint Task Force -160 Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba ARMY COL. NELSON J. CANNON, Commander, Camp Delta Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Defendants.

EXHIBITS TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS EXHIBITS TO AFFIDAVIT OF SOLICITOR GARETH PEIRCE land her husbandi A. GPl: Copy of designation as solicitor for| 4 l ^ V i n these proceedings. B. GP2: Copy of letter sent by the FOREIGN OFFICE to Bimberg Peirce & Partners. (October 24,2003)

OSBORNES SOUCITORS 68 PARKWAY LONDON N W l 7AH 020 7485 H P t i g246 028185 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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EXHIBIT GPl

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iSx'loaiO^tf i -r ^ u ^ ^ i , ,^^5,^;

GREATBRITAIN AUTHORISATION COMES NOW,, follows: being didy swom, and deposes and stales as

He is my husband. I love him and wam only what is in bi& 1. Iam related 1 best interests. 2. It is my understanding that he is not allowed access to a bwj'er or to the couns ofthe United States. 3. I wish to act as his "next Ericnd" and I hereby retain request and authorise Garcdi Peirce, solicitor, and Daniel Guedalla, solicitor, at Bimberg Peirce and Partners solicitors, M Invemess Street London NWl 7HJ, United Kingdom, and m the United Stares 1 retain and authorise Clive A. Stafford Smith, and his associates, to act on behalf of Moazzam Begg and take whatever legal steps tbat diey consider to be in his best interests. Swom to dais ^ - i ^ day of March 2004 Witnessed;

UcMA-^o^ (^"^^"^^
TYNDALLWOODS
WINDSOR HOUSE TEMPLE ROW BIRMINGHAM B2 STS

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EXHIBIT GP2

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EXHIBIT GPS

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._

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FROM OJNbLLHi* j i v

24 October 2002 Bimberg, Peirce andPartncTS 14 Invemess Street
London NW17HJ -

Foreign & Commonwealtii Office "^CmSm"" Old Admiralty Buflding
London SW1A2PA

ByFaxto:020 79110170

JS^ICS^:
E-nuU: J«lin.CullqflKfco.(oY.uk

S i e . o r
Thank you for your letter to die Foreign and Commonwealth Office of 8 October about Mr ^ m ^ j U m i ^ who js believed to be detained in Afghanistan by die United States. I am the officer dealing w i t h ^ H ^ ^ s case and have been asked to reply. Please use the above address and &% number fbr conespondeoce. I would like to assure you that we are conscious ofthe importance of safeguarding M i f ^ | ^ welfiare. You have asked fbr a meeting to discuss this matter witiiFC^fScials. It will be possible to have a meeting at 14.00 on Wednesday 30 October;^H|m^ Head of Consular Division and myself, will attend die meeting. Please cotdd you adviseus in advance of who is attending from Bmibcrg Peirce & Partners andfromMr(||p's femily. We will have to limit the total number of visitors to four. If this time is inconvenient, please contact me by telephone to arrange a different time. In answer to the four specific points raised in your lettena) & b) There has not been a consular visit. c) On hearing reports of M r d ^ ' s possible detention in Afghanistan by die US authorities, die FCO sought informationfromdie US Govemment about his identity and location. Smcc then we have made regular requests for information on and access for welfare purposes, preferably consular access, to M r f f l B and any o t h e i ^ | B B | H | | i who may be in a similar position. The US position is that tbey will not allow us consular access, or access for any welfare purposes, tomyUHfljli^ detained in Afghanistan or provide us with any infonnation'about )&#N#iS detention. We do however continue to press fbr access and infoimation. We understan^at the International Red Cross (ICR.Q has had access to Mr at Bagram.

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d) We have not been provided with infomiation on his stahis by the US authorities.

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EXHIBIT B

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Petitioners,
V.

No.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, President of the Uiilted States DONALD RUMSFELD, Secretary, United States Department ofDefense MAJ. GEN. GEOFFERY MILLER, Commander, Joint Task Force-GTMO Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guautinamo Bay, Cuba ARMY COL. NELSON J. CANNON, Commander, Camp Delta Guantdnamo Bay Naval Station GnanCinamo Bay, Cuba Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT O

I.MBHBP.O;
state as follows: 1. I am a die wife of{ tsmcel I and I am al

being duly sworn, depose and kdtizea I have beat married to

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2.

All of the relevant background is already set out in the witness statement of Gareth Peirce.

made on my behalf) and contact with t h s ^ m U m U p l with the Government of Pakistan, -with the courts in Pakistan and officials in Pakistan has been conducted on my behalf by my fatw in law and our solicitor, Gareth Peiice. She has provided an affidavit in these proceedings, and I do not icpaX what is contained in her affidavit 3. I have beenmaniedfor|Blyeus to my husband We have^^ children, one child having

been bom following my retum t o ^ H ^ irom Pakistan i n | [ ^ . 4. In August oflasi year my husband and I moved widi our children to Kabul m Afghamstaa

The reasons for our move were related to die wish ofourfemilyto live in a society that we regarded as safe and in which we wished to bring up our children. My husband's plan was to be involved in the running ofa school. We, in consequence, came to move to Kabul in August of2001 and bou^ a house in Kabul. My husband was engaged in setting a school when the events of September

11, 2001 occurred, and bad an effect upon all civilians living in Afj^anistan. We believed that ths sensible diing was to wait and see what happened, hoping that the mmoun of war would not materialise. However, after the bombing of Kabul occurred, in which we were living, we were forced toflee,although we were not in a position to do so immediately. 5. We eventually succeeded in getting out of A^hanistan and, with the help of monies sent by

ourfemiliesandftiendsin England, rented a house tn Islamabad where we le-setdcd and were living widi our children in v^at we believed, then, to be safety. The premises were rented in our name, and diete was nodiing clandestine about our presence. 6. During the night of 3 Ist January 2002, when I was asleep, people who were not known to

me arrived at our bouse and took^m^away. I was extremely concerned about him fbr a range 2

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of reasons, but including thefeetdiat he is someone who has sufferedfromill health for a numba of years, in particular concerned with great difficuhy in breathing. When he courts himself in any way, even going up the staits, he has to have recourse to an inhaler. I am aware diat he cannot fimction at all widiout this and I asked those persons taking him to ensure that he had it with him at all times. 7. I have not seen my husband since Uiattime.As is set out in the statement of Garedi Peiice;

proceedings were initiated m Pakistan and all knowledge ofmy husband's detention was denied in die course of tiiose proceedings by all relevant Pakistani authorities with power to arrest It was my father in law who received a call during Ihc time in which those proceedings were ongoing, to say that my husband was in American hands in detention in Afghanistan. 8. I was eventually able to return to myself widi my children, and enquiries on my

behalf have been made by my fadier in law and our solicitor of the Foreign Office at frequent intervals. No inibrmadon has been provided that reassures us, nor allows us even to know what is his legal situation, and what is bis physical condition. I have received a number oflettersfrommy husband through the Red Cross in which the average delay has been several months m arrears of the date appearing on each letter. I do not fixl that my husband is able to say snydiing that reflects what is happening to him. His letters are very obviously censored. He has indicated that time is passing veiy slowly, and diat a wedc seems like a year. He says always diat he prays &r us and wishes us to pray for him. I have however had no letter since July of last year. 9. I have seen it reported diat my husband was capnired on a batdefield and have now leamed

that he has been designated an "enemy combatant" and yet I know that be was seizedfiomour

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house in blamabad. I know him to be a good and principled poson wiio was trying, with his family, to Uve a responsible and socially useftil Iif:. 10. I have asked diat allftirtherpossible steps be taken on his behalf bring this in view ofthe

now extreme alarm 16el at my husband's never ending detention at ths hands of the Americsn aotborities who have at alltimesindicated publicly that tbey do not intend to be bound by what 1 imdeistood to be intemational minimum norms. 11. ^HB^ftbas mentioned in coirespondence to me die name ofour family's solicitor, Gar^

Peirce, and it is my ceitain belief that he would want me to take ^propriate legal action on his behalf. Consequently. I wish to act as his "nextfriend".In diis capacity I have letamed and here record my continuuig request and audiorisation to Gareth Peiice solicitor or her associates and Michael Ratner attomey for die Centre of Constitutional Rights (CCR) in New York, and any lawyers associated with the CCR to act on my own and my husband^mH^s behalf and lake whatsoever legal steps tbey consider to be in our best interests. 12. I know thefectsdeposed vo herein to be true ofmy own knowledge, excqpt where otherwise

7V''5flCt.Uo^-J'»UC/n>«f Swom by die Deponent a t _ ^ ! f f ! f ^ n dus day of March, 2004

Before me:

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EXHIBIT C

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IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FEROZ ALI ABBASI ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ): ) ) ) ) ) ) }

^K^tSmmtm
as Next Friend of Feroz Ali Abbasi Petitioners V. GEORGE WALKER BUSH, President of the United States DONALD RUMSFELD, Secretary, United States Department of Defease BRIGADIER GEN. MQCE LEHNERT, Commander, JointTask Force-160 Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba COLONEL lERRYCARRILO, Commander, Camp X-Ray Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Defendants. No.

AFFID AVrr OF LOUISE CHRISTIAN I LOUISE CHRISTIAN of Christian Fisher of 42 Museum Street, Btoomsbury, London WCIA ILY in die Uinted Kingdom bemg duly swom, DEPOSES AND STATES as follows: 1, I am a sohcitor and I have been engaged by the Second Petitioacr#@mH# f l l ^ to act on her behalf and on behalf of her son Feroz Ali AhbasI, the First Petitioner.

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2.

On die 8di February 20021 wrote to William Farish, the US Ambassador to die UK and to die UK Forrign Secretary, Jack Straw in similar tarns. The letters arc attached hereto and marked "LCI".

3.

On the 18di day of Febmary 2002 members of my firm, my client and Stephen SoUey QC. Leading Counsel instmcted on behalf of Mr Abbasi had a meeting widi Baroness Amos ofthe UK Government.

4.

We have instmcted Leading Counsel Stephen Solley QC and two leading academics Professors Vaughan Lowe and Guy Goodwin-Gill to advise on the legal status of Mr Abbasi and hisrightto access to Jawyws. I attach marked "LC2" a copy of (heir Opinion. The Opinion was handed to Baroness Amos but she said she would not be reqionding to it.

5.

On 21st February I telephoned the US Ambassador's ofSce and asked for an immediate reply to our letter of 8di Fdjruary. I was told 1 would be telephoned later in the day. I subsequeatiy sent a faxed letter dated 21st February a copy ofwhich is attached marked "LC3". The letter notifies our requirement diat an indqiendent Court or Tribunal determine Mr Abbasi's status and diat his lawyers be given access tohhn.

6. 7.

I have not received a reply to my letters to die US Ambassador. I have not received any other communication eidtcrfromany autiiority of die United States ^artfromthose refeired to above. I has received messagesfromher son Feroz one of which is attached to her affidavit

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I have spoken to a Red Cross R^iresentadve m die UK who has confiimed to me that the Red Cross will pass lettersfromthe family to Feroz but these messages arc to be limited to matters offkmily news only.

10.

I know thefectsdeposed to herein to be true of my own knowledge, excqjt where odierwise appears.

SWORN by die Deponent at ) tins 2. ) day of ^^(X 2004 ) beforemc: ^ (^.^^^L. SVfc tj>itU,v^

....L

BuTtonWoods Solicitors Museum Houce 25 Museum Sieet London WCIA UT

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FEROZ ALI ABBASI As Next Friend of Feroz Ali Abbasi Petitioners No.
V.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, President ofthe United States DONALD RUMSFELD Secretary, United States Department ofDefense BRIGADIER GEN. MIKE LEHNERT. Commander, Joint Task Force-160 Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba COLENEL TERRY CABRILO, Commander, Camp X-Ray Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Defendants. EXHIBIT "LCI* This is die exhibit refeired to m die Affidavit of Louise Christian referred to as exhibit "LCI"

Signed: Dated:

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8 February 2002 LC;RG.J0121-G01

William Farish Esq US Ambassador US Embassy 24 Grosvenor Square London WIA lAE BY FAX; 0207 493 3425 Dear Mr Farish, RE; FEROZ ABBASI - DETAINED IN GUANTANAMO We have been insbnjcted by M s ^ B I M H P , to represent her son, Feroz Abbasi. Mr Abbasi who Is a British National has been reported as being detained by the US Government in Guantanamo, Cuba. This has been confirmed by the Foreign Office who states that Mr Abbasi has been interrogated by MIS officers from Britain who confirmed his identity. The Foreign Office have however stated that they have been denied Consular access to Mr Abbasi. We are writing on behalf of Mr Abbasi to express a number of extremely urgent pressing concems about the legal authority under which he fe being held, the status which the US Govemment accords to him, the conditions of his detention and In particular any sensory deprivation to which he Is being subjected, the lack of access by any independent person or medical expert, the question of whether we as lawyers will be allowed access to visit him in Cuba, the proposed future conduct of the US Government in relation to him and whether he will be afforded a fair trial and if so In what jurisdiction. We write to let you know that we have Instructed Stephen Solley QC the Chairman of the Bar Human Rights Committee and that we have received backing from the Law Society Human Rights Committee and the Bar Human Rights Committee in requesting Immediate access to visit Mr Abbasi in Guantanamo to check on his welfare. We would like access for a member of this firm, Mr

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Stephen Solley QC and an independent medical expert instructed by us. We would be grateful to hear from you urgently whether you are able to grant us access to Mr Abbas) at Guantanamo. Obviously M s ^ H l Mr Abbasi's mother would also like access to her son so we also make a separate request for a visitfayher. We would like to have an urgent meeting with you In person to discuss our requests, the basis on which Mr Abbasi is being held, what efforts have been made to confirm his identity, and the conditions of his detention. We would be grateful If you could telephone Louise Christian or Elaine Kassabian on the above number as soon as possible to arrange such a meeting. We have instructed Stephen Solley QC to advise on whether the US Govemment has lawful authority to detain Mr Abbas? at Guantanamo, on whether his status is that of a prisoner of war or a person detained on suspicion of a crime, on the conditions of his • detention and the treatment being afforded to .him and on his right to be bn^ught before a Court or other Tribunal which w/1/ satisfy the International law requirements for a fair trial. We Intend to let you have a copy of Mr Solley's opinion as soon as possible. We would be grateful to hear from you exb-emely urgently in response to our request for a meeting and for access to Mr Abbasi as his lawyers to confer with him in private. Mr Abbasi who Is a British Citizen was bom on the 29th October 1979 so he Is only just twenty two years old. He disappeared on the 12th December 2000 to the enormous disb-ess of his mother who Is extremely close to him. His mother Is extremely concemed that she has not received any personal message from him or had any information at all on his medical condition or well being. She has passed a personal message to the Red CnDss to give to him but has had no response or information from them. Similarty she Is very dlsturiDed that although it is said that MIS officers have Interrogated Mr Abbasi in Guantanamo no Consular access has been allowed. It appears to us that the lack of any Independent access whatsoever to Mr Abbasi constitutes a grave breach of intemational law and that the US Govemment is laying itself open to very serious accusations should any harm befall Mr Abbasi while he is detained In Guantanamo.

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We would be grateful to speak with you urgently concerning this matter and for your response to our request for access to Mr Abbasi In Guantanamo. We are sending a copy of this letter to the Foreign Secretary and ofncials in the Foreign Ofnc&, to Mr Abbasi's MP, Mr Geraint Davies and to the Bar and the Law Society Human Rights Committees. We await an urgent response. Yours faithfully,

CHRISTIAN FISHER

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8 February 2002 LC.RGJ0121-001

The Right Honourable Jack Straw MP Foreign Secretary Foreign St Commonwealth Office King Charies Street London SW1A 2AH BY FAX; 0207 839 2417 Dear Foreign Secretary, RE; FEROZ ABBASI - DETAINED I N GUANTANAMO We have been instructed to act for Mr Feroz Abbasi who has been detained In Guantanamo. We enclose a copy of a letter sent to the US Ambassador and also a copy of a letter to the British Red Cross. We are writing to askforan urgent meeting with you in person for ourselves and our client, Ms the mother of Feroz Abbasi. We are concemed to hear from the Foreign Office that Consular access to Mr Abbasi has been denied. We have asked for proof that there has been a request for Consular access and of the reply. Ms#@#ls extremely concemed that she has not received any personal message from her son even though they are very close. As you will see from our letter to the US Ambassador we are asking for access to Mr /Kbbasl in Guantanamo for ourselves as lawyers and an Independent doctor. We anticipate that a member of this firm will be accompanied by Stephen Solley QC, the Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee. The request for access has the backing of the Law Society and the Bar Council Human Rights Committees. We seek an urgent meeting with you as we understand you have called for the British detainees in Guantanamo to be retumed to the UK. Ms would urgently like to hear from you as to what communications have been between the British Government and the US Govemment in furtiierance of your request.

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We await hearing from you urgentiy. Yours faltiifully,

CHRISTIAN FISHER ENCS

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FEROZ AjU ABBASI As Next Friend of Feroz All Abbasi Petitioners No. v. GEORGE WALKER BUSH, President of the United States DONALD RUMSFELD Secretary, United States Department ofDefense BRIGADIER GEN. MIKE LEHNERT, Commander, Joint Task Force-160 Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba COLENEL TERRY CARRILO, Commander, Camp X-Ray Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Defendants. F.YBnrerr«r.C2» This is the exhibit refeired to in the Affidavit of Louise Christian referred to as exhibit "LC2".

Signed: Dated:

^^IB^^^,^^^:^^^^^^^^

.

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Ifl t h e Matter of the,detention of Mr Feroz A b b a s i a: US Guantanamo Base. Cuba. ,Opinion on Status. Detention; RiqhT of Legal Access. Consular Access, and Remedies.

1. We understand that Mr Abbasi is held under the Unixed States Presidential Order dated 13 November 2 0 0 1 - This advice is based upon the Text of the Presidential Order currently 114 February 2002) displayed on the US Government website, . at http://www.whhehou5e.qov/new5/releases/2001 /11 /2001111327.htmL 2. Tine Order does not automatically apply to anyone: it applies only to those individuals who have been determined by the President, in writing, to be a non-US citizen whom there is reason to believe was at the 'relevant times' (and the Order does not define the 'relevant times') a member of al Qaida or engaged In international terrorism airned_ at United States interests, or harboured any such person, and whom it is in the interests of the United States to make subject to the Presidential Order (Section 2). We do not know whether such a written determination has been made in respect of Mr Abbasi. Mr Abbasi's status 3. As far as Mr Abbasi's status is concerned, as a matter of international law there are only three possibilities: (i) he may be a combatant, now held as a prisoner of war; (ii) he may be a civilian detainee, now interned; or (iii) he may be an unlawful combatant, now detained, either pending trial or simply detained and not pending trial. 4. If Mr Abbasi is a prisoner of war, his detention is governed by the terms of Geneva Convention III. He could not be required to give any information to the US authorities other than his name, rank, serial number and date of birth. He could not be prosecuted for his involvement in the hostilities: he could be prosecuted only for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He would be entitied to be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. [GCIII, art. 118].

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5. The United States denies that Mr Abassi is a prisoner of war. As a matter of law that question is regulated, by GCIII Article 5 and Article 45 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions {'API'). 6. The United States has not ratified APL However, in the Operational Law Handbook (JA 422) issued by the Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1997, it is stated, 'that the US.views [among others. Article 45 API] as customary international law' (page 18-2), which would bind the United States along with all other States. The Handbook summarises Article 45 in the following terms: "prisoner of war presumption for Those who participate in the hostilities". 7. This statement is qualified in the 2002 edition of Operational Law Handbook, in which it is now said thst the US views Article 45 API as 'customary international law or acceptable practice though not legally binding' (Ch. 2, p. 11). It is practically inconceivable that the customary international laiAr has changed in this way since 1997, In any event it would arguable before an international tribunal that the United States is estopped from denying that API represents customary international law, particularly given the fact that 159 States have now ratified Additional Protocol 1 (such an argument would, however, be less likely to succeed before a United States court or tribunal). 8. API stipulates that if Mr Abbasi 'claims the status of prisoner of war, or if he appears to be entitled to such status, or if the party on which he depends claims such status on his behalf by notification' to the United States, he is presumed to be a prisoner of war, and retains that status until such time as his status has been determined by a competent tribunal. It is not known whether prisoner of war status has been claimed by or on behalf of Mr Abbasi. In our view, • however, such status could be claimed on his behalf, certainly by the British Government, and possibly by his legal representatives. (Some doubt as to the right of his legal representatives to make the claim flows from the fact that API does not expressly give such a right, although earlier US practice has confirmed the, role.of counsel ih proceedings to determine status; see further below). We understand

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that the United States has not submitted the question of Mr Abbasi^s status toacompetent tribunaL 9. In our v i e w . t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s obliged t o s u b m i t the questionof MrAbbasi^s status toacompetent tribunaL which is also consistent with the practice of the United States in other theatres of operations. 10. During the Vietnam War,the US MilitaryAssistance Command in Vietnam issued comprehensive criteria-for classification and dispositionof detainees. Annex A of Directive l^umber 3S1-4^ of December 27, 19^7defined'detainees'as'personswho have been detained but whose final status has not yet beendetermined.Such persons are entitled to humane treatment in accordance with the provisionsof the Geneva Conventions.' It further provided f o r t h e systematic classification of detainees into'prisoner of w a r ' a n d ' n o n prisoner of war'oategories. 11. Among the non-prisoner of warclass, thedirective included ^ civilian-defendants liable to trial by the Government of. Vietnam for , offences under local law, as well as certain categories of'irregulars', suchasguerrillas'detained ^hile not engaged in actual combat'and adetainee'suspected of beingaspy,saboteur or terrorist'. 12. Directive l^umher 20-S of March 15, 19^5 made extensive provision forthe determination of eligibility for prisoner of war status applicable, among others, to 'non-prisoners of war and doubtful cases whoarecaptured by c r a r e i n t h e custody o f U n i t e d States forces.'The Directive relied expressly o r i A r t i o l e 5 G C I I L I t provided t h a t ' A I I United States military and DOD civilian personnel who take orhave custodyof adetainee will... (2) Afford t o e a c h d e t a i n e e i n theircustody treatment consistent with t h a t o f a prisoner of war, unless or until it has been determined by competent authority in accordance with this directive that the detainee is notaprisoner of war.^ 1^. The Directive provided further inrelation to the rights of trie detainee that.'l^o person may be deprived of his status asaprisoner of war without having had an opportunity topresent his case with the assistance of aqualified advocate or counsel', and that, 'The

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Detaineeshall h a v e t h e r i g h t t o be present w i t h h i s counsel at all open sessions of the tribunal.' 14. The Directive made extensive provision for the 'l^ights of Counsel for the Detainee',including'^ period of at leastone week before the hearing in order to prepare his case', free access to visit the detainee and interview him in private',a'reasonable opportunity to confer privately with essential witnesses, includinc prisoners or war', and rights of cross-examination and presentation of witnesses and testimony. 12. It is unclear whether MrAbbasi is or is notaprisoner of war, but this is clearlyaquestion appropriate for inquiry b y a c o m p e t e n t tribunaL The answerwould depend upon the precise facts of his case, and in particular upon the exact relationship between the Taliban(which in our view was asamatter of international law the Government of Afghanistan, even though it was not recognised by the United States as such) and any organisation in which he was an active participant in Afghanistan. We understand that it is said that MrAbbasiwasamemberofAlG'aida.butwearenotawareo^any proof t h a t t h i s i s t h e case, or of any proof of t h e n a t u r e o f t h e relationship between AlO'aida. This point is important becausethe definition o f a ' c o m b a t a n t ' i n intemational law may be wide enough to embrace Al O^aida fighters if, as a matter of fact, they were integrated into theTaliban command structure. 1^. If I^r Abbasi wereaclvllian detainee,his internment would be governed by the terms of Geneva Convention IV. He would be entitled to visits, communications, andother privileges, anri to be released as soonas the reasons, which necessitated his internment nolonger^existl^GCIV.art.1^2].

17. Eveniftheexceptionalprovisionsof A r t i c l e S G C I V a p p l y a n d a person is detained in the territory of a Party to the conflict/occupied territory 'as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power'.such he or she shall be treated with humanity and.'in case of trial,shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention.'

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12. Internees in the territory of a Party to the conflict against whom penal proceedings are pending for offences not exclusively subject to disciplinary penalties, m a y b e d e t a i n e d u n t i l t h e close of suchproceedingsand,if circumstancesrequire, untilhecompletion of the penalty: A r t . l ^ S , G C I V . H o w e v e r , t h e provisions of Articles 71-7^ GCIV inclusive shall apply by analogy to proceedings against internees who are i n t h e national territory o f t h e Detaining Power: Art.l2^GCIV 19. ^ Among others. Article 72 provides for rights of defence, including assistance by a qualified advocate or counsel of their c h o i c e , ' w h o ^ h a l l b e a b l e t o visit t h e m f r e e l y a n d s h a l l enjoy tbe necessary facilities for preparing the defence.' 20. ^ e understand t h a t t h e United States does not regard Mr Abbasi as an internee within the terms of GC IV. 21. The third possibility is that Mr Abbasi is an unlawful combatant, entitied to treatment neither as a c o m b a t a n t p r i s o n e r o f ^ war nor as a civllian internee. This appears to be the status that the United States regards him as having. 22. Unlawful combatants are not without rights.They are entitled t o t h e minimum standardof treatment set out in API article 7 5 . A r t i o l e 7 ^ is among tboserecogni^^d by-the United Statesin 1997 as representing customary international law. Article 7S reads as follows:Art 75. Fundamental guarantees 1.In so far asthey are affected byasituation referred to in A r t i c l e l of this ProtocoLpersonswho are in the power o f a Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy,asaminimum,tha protection provided by this Article without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour,sex, language, religion or belief,political orotber opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions and religious practices of all sucti

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persons. 2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents: (a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons,' in particular: (i) murder; (ii) torture of all kirids, whether physical or mental; (iii) corporal punishment; and (iv) mutilation; (b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault; (c) the taking of hostages; (d) collective punishments; and (e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 3. Any person arrested, detained -or interned for actions relatedto the armed conflict shall be informed promptiy, in s language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist. 4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regulariy constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following: (a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence: (our emphasis) (b) no one shall be convicted of sn offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility; (c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence

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on account or any act or omission which did no: constitute a criminal offence under the national or intemational law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; If, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby; (d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; (e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence; (f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; (g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party • f o r a n offence In respect of which a final Judgement acquitting, or convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the same law and Judicial procedure; (ij anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement pronounced publicly; and (j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised. [5. Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be held in quarters separated from men's quarters. They shall be under the immediate supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained or interned, they shall, whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated as family units.] 6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict. 7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and

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"

trial of persons accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply: (a) persons who are accused or such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of international law; and (b) any such persons who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or this Protocol shall be accorded the treatment provided by this Article, whether or not the crimes of which they are accused constitute grave breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol. 8. No provision .of this Article may be construed as limiting or infringing any other mors favourable provision granting greater protection, under any applicable rules of international law, to persons covered by paragraph 1

» •1^}" (

23. • Article 75 represents the minimum standard of treatment to which Mr Abbasi is entitled. That is so regardless of whether he is a prisoner of war, civilian intemee, or unlawful combatant. Mr Abbasi's detention 24. In so far as Mr Abbasi's detention is concerned, the entitlement of the United States to detain him without proceeding to try him for any offence is limited. It was noted above that prisoners of war and civilian Intemees must be released as soon as possible after the end of hostilities or the cessation of the circumstances that warranted their detention. 25. The United States may claim that they are entitled by The right of self-defence to detain Mr Abbasi, in order to avert a real and imminent threat to the United States. The generally-accepted statement of the criteria of self-defence appears in the correspondence concerning the Caroline incident, where it was said that there must be shown "a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation", and further that the State invoking self-defence must do "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it." [British & Foreign State Papers, vol. 29, p. 1137). Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes-that the right of

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self-defence may be exercised by any single State, and also by States acting in exercise of the right of collective self-defence. That might besaid T O warrant l^rAbbasi^s d e t e n t i o n i n o r d e r t o a v e r t a threat to any of the United States'NATO allies. 2^. It isaquestion of fact whether the circumstances warrant the exerciseof aright of self-defence by the United States. Mr Abbasi might have presented a danger to the United Sta-^es immediately after S e p t e m b e r l l , 2001.He might have presented suchadanger when he was in Afghanistan, and wouldclearly have done so if he were engaged in hostilities against United States or other NATO . forces operating lawfully in Afghanistan (and forpresent purposes we assume that the United States action in Afghanistanwas, a s a matterof international law, lawful). But he plainly cannot be held indefinitely without trial on this basis. 27. If MrAbbasi is facing prosecution by the United States, his detention forareasohable period pending trial will be lawfuL If he is aprisonerof war he could beprosecutedonly for warcrimes and - crimes against humanity. lf he is an unlawful combatant he could be. prosectrtedforhisinvolvementin hostilities: for example, he could be prosecuted for the attempted murder of any United States soldiers against whom he fought. l^rAbb^^i'sriobt of access t o a l a w y e r 29. If M r A b b a s i is o r m a y be facing prosecution, API Article 75(4)(a), s e t o u t above, expressly entitles him to ^all necessary rights and means of defence'.That must includearight of access to a lawyer. That right is reinforced by similar provisions in other intemational agreements. Two instruments, to both of which the United S t a t e s i s a p a r t y , areparticularlysignificant.The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man sets out various entitlements to equality before -the law (Article 11). resort to the courts (Article X V I l D t o s u b m i t p e t i t i o n s t o competent authorities (Article ^ ^ I V ) , and to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (Article ^ ^ V l ) . 29. The International Covenanton Civil andPolitical Rights sets out the right of every person Tolife (Articled), the right t o l i b e r t y and freedom from arbitrary detention (Article 9), to treatment with

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respect for their humanity and inherent dignity (Article 10) and to equality before the law and to adequate facilities for the preparation of his defence (Article 14). 30. In our opinion, those instmments all establish a right of access to a lawyer, for any person facing possible prosecution. Moreover, in the particular circumstances of this case the right of access arises in two ways.-First, Section 2 (a) (1) of the United States Presidential Order indicates that the President has already determined in writing that he has reason to believe that Mr Abbasi has committed one or more of the offences set out thereafter at (i), (ii) and (iii). These are similar offences to those faced by l H H | 0 l i B B H B H B i in the criminal proceedings he faces in the US District Court of Virginia, having been detained, it will be remembered, in Afghanistan. Mr Abbasi plainly faces the real prospect of prosecution. There would otherwise be no reasonable basis to detain him. Whether in due course he- is actually prosecuted is a different question and one that does not affect the issue of legal access. Mr Abbasi is entitled to seek legal advice so as to present his position in such a light that he is not prosecuted. English jurisprudence is clear upon the point, as is European Strasbourg jurisprudence. Secondly, access might arise in the context of proceedings before the 'competent tribunal' that would determine Mr Abbasi's right to the status of a prisoner of war. The international instruments do not explicitly establish such a right for persons who are detained without facing prosecution, but in our view such a right is implicit in all of the instruments cited. 31. These rights may be the subject of derogations where, broadly speaking, h is necessary to do so in order to preserve public safety in time of public emergency: see American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Article XXVIII, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 4. Any such derogation must be limited to what is necessary to preserve public safety. Again, there is no evidence to suggest that the denial of access to a lawyer is strictly necessary in order to protect public safety. 32. No derogation from its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been declared by the United States, or communicated to any of the other 1 4 4 States Parties through the intermediary of the UN Secretary-General, as required by Article 4(3).

^ ^

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39. Article 14 ICCPR^^, it will be recalled, requires adequate - facilities forthe preparation of a defence, and declares that 'All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determinationof any criminal charge against him or of his rights and obligations at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and pi^blic hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.' 34. In the present case, it is difficult to see how it c a n b e a r g u e d That the denial ofaccess t o a l a w y e r is strictly necessary in order to defend theUnited S t a t e s . T h e q u e s t i o n i s whether the prisoner is any more of a t h r e a t t o the United States if he has access t o a lawyer than he is if he does not. It is very difficult to see that this c o u l d b e s o . Only if there were areasonable fear that Mr Abbasi's contact with a lawyer might enable items or communications prejudicial to public safety in or out of the prison could this be maintained. Moreover, that fear would have to be one arising in the specific case of MrAbbasi andhis lawyers. MrAbbasi's right may hbt be suspended because there is a reasonablefear that lawyersvisiting other prisoners might constitute suchadanger. In any event, no argument to this effect has been made out by the United States. 35. It might be argued b y t h e United States that access t o a lawyer would impede the process of interrogation. Even if, as a matter of fact, this were true, it would be relevant only in so far as tha interrogation was the only means available t o enable the United States to defend its vital interests, in accordance with the circumstances in which derogations from human rights instruments are permitted. There is no evidence to suggest that this is the case; and given the length of time for which the prisoner has already been available for questioning, it is difficult to believe that any such case oouldbe made out.Moreover,this argument would be relevant only in so far as the interrogation did not involve the application of internationally unlawful force or pressure to the prisoner: international law does not permit States to suspend their basic humanitarian duties, and self-defence would not operate so es to permit the use of torture or other internationally unlawful pressure to the prisoner. Even if a State had a right not to have lawful Interrogations impeded, that right could not extend to unlawful interrogations.

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36, There is a further and important reason why the United States may not suspend the right of access to a lawyer in this case. The Presidential Order of 13 November 2001 specifically excludes from its scope US nationals. Non-US prisoners are as a matter of law thus discriminated against in relation to their access to lawyers and to right to petition courts in the United States or other countries and international tribunals. This is objectionable on three grounds. 37. First, Guantanamo Bay is Cuban territory, currently leased by the United States: see Article 3 of the Agreement Between The United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval stations; February 23, 1903. The apparent claim in the 13 November 2001 Presidential Order that the United States may forbid foreign nationals outside United States territory to petition non-United States courts is entirely without foundation as a matter of international law. The United States has no competence to' give any such order: it lies beyond the reach of United States' jurisdiction. 3 8 . S e c o n d , by discriminating between the Cuban prisoners o n t h e basis of their nationality, the United States is violating its international legal duties to maintain the equality of all persons before the law, without discrimination. That duty is set out in the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (Article II), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2), and API (Article 75(1). The United States is not entitled to deny to Brhish nationals right that it gives to its own nationals. 39. Third, notwithstanding its characterisation under US law, Guantanamo is clearly a place for which the United States is responsible and in respect of which the international obligations of the United States apply. Consular access 40. We note also that the United Kingdom is entitled to insist upon consular access to Mr Abbasi. That right is set out in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which provides:"Communication and contact with nationals of the sending state. 1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions

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relating to nationals of the sending State: (a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular o-fficers of the sending State; (b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or dAention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall infonn the person concemed without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph; (c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action." Remedies 41. There are three main approaches through which Mr Abassi's rights might be enforced. First, there may be an appeal to the United States' courts. We understand that such an application has already been lodged. We are not experts In United States law; but it seems reasonable to suppose that, given the tenns of the Presidential Order, it is not probable that a United States' court will rule that the detention of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay is entirely unlavirful, although it may be more likely to uphold claims to humane treatment and to access to lawyers for those detained.

42.

Second, the British Government should make diplomatic representations to the United States Government, requiring that Mr

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Abbasi and other British nationals held at Guantanamo Bay be treated in accordance with the United States' obligations under international law, and in particular at the ven/ least have immediate access to legal assistance. 43. Third, a petition might be lodged on Mr Abbasi's behalf with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Article 1 of the Statute of that Commission gives it jurisdiction over matters arising under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Article 25 of that Statute empowers the Commission to adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons. This is a case in which it would be appropriate for the Commission to order precautionary measures, as a matter of urgency. Stephen Solley QC, Charter Chambers Prof. Vaughan Lowe, Essex Court Chambers Prof. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Blackstone Chambers

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FEROZ ALI ABBASI As Next Friend of Feroz Ali Abbasi Petitioners No.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, President of tbe United States DONALD RUMSFELD Secretary, United States Department of Defense BRIGADIER GEN. MIKE LEHNERT, Commander, Joint Task Force-160 Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba COLENEL TERRY CARRILO, Commander, Camp X-Ray Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Defendants. irymprr«T,C3'' This is die exhibit referred to in die Affidavit of Louise Christian referred to as exhibit "LC3".

Signed: Dated:

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• 21 February 2002 LC.RGJ0121-001

William Farish Esq US Ambassador . US Embassy 24 Grosvenor Square London WIA lAE BY FAX; 0207 493 3425 FOR THE ATTENTION OFl

URGENT FOR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION
Dear Ambassador, RE; FEROZ ABBASI - DETAINED I ( INTERNMENT SERIAL NUMBER;! We act for the above and write further to our letter of 8th February a .further copy of which we enclose. We are extremely surprised not to have received a response and confirm our telephone conversation when we advised Ms i H H B l that we require a response urgently. We understand that decisions are being taken In Washington and we would like to speak to the person making the decisions so would be grateful for a name and telephone number. We enclose a copy of a Counsel's opinion which is written by Senior Leading Counsel, Stephen Solley.QC, Chair of the Bar Human Rights Committee togetiier with two leading academics in the field of International human rights law. We respectfully draw your attention to its content. We are extremely disturbed that the status of our client has still not been clarified by the US and that he Is still being detained without any clarification of whether he will be charged with any offence or the procedure to which he is subject We wish to notify you formally that we consider our client to be a prisoner of war and subject to the terms of the Geneva Convention.

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Weunderstand that this (^disputed by the US Govemment and write to give formal notice that we requlreadetermination by an IndependentTribunalorCourtassoon as possible asto his status. We also require access to him as his lawyers as requested previously. We conslderthlsmatterto be extremely urgent and look forward to your urgent response today. ^ours^lthfully,

CHRISTIAN FISHER ENCS

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Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-12

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-12

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Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

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Dase 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

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028277
De'ffirise
iscovery

00000159

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-13

Filed 11/02/2004

Page 27 of 30

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5339
028278 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000160

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-13 Filed 11/02/2004 UNCLASSIFIED

Page 28 o

Combatant Status Review Board TO: Personal Representative FROM: Recorder Subject: Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - Feroz Ali Abassi 1. Under the provisions of the Secretary ofthe Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Proceduresfor Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanatno Bay Nerval Base Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to review the detainee's designation as an enemy combatant. 2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part ofor supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against die United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." 3. The United States Govemment has previously determined that the detainee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that he is a member of Al-Qaida. He engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. a. Detainee is a member of Al Qaida. • 1. Detainee traveledfromGreat Brittan to Afghanistan, using his own funds, to receive military training and to fulfill his jihad obligation. 2. Detainee was escortedfromQuetta, Pakistan to a guesthouse in Afghanistan, where recruiting took place. At the guesthouse, detainee relinquished his passport and money for security purposes, completed an application form, and chose a nickname. Detainee was then taken to Camp Farouq for training. 3. At Camp Farouq, detainee received military training, including but not limited to, maneuver, topography, surveillance, and ambushing. During weapons training, detainee trained on the following weapons: Klashnikov, PK Pistol, RPG, and PK machine gun. 4. After basic training, detainee volunteered for advanced courses in Mountain Tactics and City Tactics. Detainee attended these courses because this training was a perquisite for being sent to thefrontof the front lines.

UNCLASSIFIED
028279 Defense ReciprqcalBiscovery

5340

gr^^ve.

^

00000161

Casel:04-cv.OII37-RMC

D o c u ^ m 4 4 ^ ^ Filed 11/02/2004

Page 29 . , 3 0

5. After completing his basic training, detainee met with high-level Al-Qaida
leaders. During tliis meeting, detainee stated that he left his home, in the

United Kingdom, to take action against Americans and Jews. Additionally at this meeting, the detainee volunteered for a martyrdom mission. 6. Detainee knew that Usama Bin Laden operated Al Farouq. Detainee was present when Usama Bin Laden gave a speech at Al Farouq. Additionally, detainee was present when Usama Bin Laden visited the mountain warfare camp. 7. Detainee was identified as the guard posted to watch a suspected spy. This took place at the home ofa Taliban official. The suspected spy recognized the detainee because the detainee beat liim, because, as detainee explained, it was his personal jihad. b. Detainee engaged in hostilities against the United States. 1. After September 11,2001, detainee was forced to leave the guesthouse where he was staying. Detainee volunteered to be sent to defend the Kandahar airport, because it was the most dangerous mission. While there, detainee served in a small unit of Al-Qaidafighters,intent on defending the airport against the Americans. 4. The detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence ofany reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The Tribunal President -will determine the reasonable availability of evidence or witnesses.

UNCLASSIFIED
028280 Defense ReciproatOigyyety

534-]

0000016%

Case 1:04-cv-01137-RMC

Document 44-13 Filed 11/02/2004 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Page 30 of 30

Personal Representative Review of the Record of Proceedings

I acknowledge that on October 20041 was provided the opportunity to review the record of proceedings for die Combatant Status Review Tribunal mvolving ISN

I have no comments. My comments are attached.

0'\ oc^o*^ Date

ISN Enclosure ^

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
028281 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

5342

0000016?

cayr i i r GUANTANAMO FILLS OTHERS CAPTURKD IN AFGHANISTAN
11

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ICC."'

•stern Afghanistan. .Mahmud 1 March 2004), was married as a lottery agent in Turkey, country in search of work, an, where he was captured It for three months before -two-year-old Abdul Majid released in October 2006), and explained that he went 4e money out of drugs and he punished for desertion. watchman for the Taliban, vn to kill Iranians, and that a Catholic, and said that he rs, who thought he was an ns.were captured in Kabul ibdulrahim Kerimbakiev family members, including s and brothers, but denied he Taliban, saying that he 'here he spent most of his for his tribunal to accept, We're trying to understand ildn't detain someone for vegetables. Can you help lossible to be imprisoned ined that one of the other I, Yakub Abahanov, "was he third Kazakh, 18-yeart the house for five days, en he and the others were r, who held them in "some bam," before transferring ig, Kerimbakiev was still

in Guantanamo, while Abahanov and Magrupov were released in December 2006. ' Fcro? Abbasi, a 21-year-old Unton (released in Jaiiunry 2005), was captured in Kandahar, A student from Croydon, he traveled to Afghanistan in December 2000 with James Ujamaa, a black iXmcrican civil rights activist who converted to Islam in the early 1990s and traveled to the UK. where he became close to the radical cleric Abu Ham/a al Mash at London's Finsbury Park mosque. Abbasi also became close to al-.Vlasri. Inspired by his speeches, he became a volunteer for jihad, eventually living at the mosque, and "relying solely on Abu Ilamza and his followers for his education in Islam." Having pressured al-Masri to allow him to fight in Kashmir, he was eventually sent to Afghanistan, where he trained at al-Farouq, and was then introduced to Abu Hafs, al-Qacda's military commander (killed in an air strike in November 2001), who asked him, "Would you like to take any actions against the Americans and the Jews?" When he answered yes, he was sent to receive specialized training in a camp at Kandahar airport, where, he said, he was the only one of the recruits to argue that martyrdom operations should only be directed at military targets and not at civilians, a moral stance which was also at odds with the views of his mentors, but which resurfaced in his opinions about 9/11. "I've had enough of innocent people losing their lives," he wrote in a 1.56-page autobiography that he produced in Guantanamo. " I did not leave my home except to defend innocent people." Although he agreed to undertake a suicide mission after the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud, he was unable to find the office to which he had been sent to receive further instructions, and, as the aftermath of 9/11 brought a temporary halt to al-Qacda's suicide missions, he was dispatched instead to another location in Kandahar, and ordered to await instructions to fight with other "English-speaking brothers." He was eventually called upon to defend the caves near Kandahar airport against Gul Agha Sherzai's men, a terrifying experience in which he spent his time "running around like a madman in the middle of nowhere trying to dodge missiles," and then found himself alone, as the Yemeni fighters with whom he had spent the night ran away. A few days later, having decided to undertake a freelance suicide mission, his jihadi adventure came to an ignominious end when he was caught with a grenade stuffed down his

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s.

028329

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000164

OQH'^YD^aW^LL
114 THE GUANTANAMO FILES

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trousers bytwoI^orthernAlliancesoldiersinKandahar."Thisguy'sa nutter,"oneofthemsaid,beforehandinghimovertotlie Americans, who had, by now, established their prison at Kandahar airport.^ The^^5^ies^ The most unfortunate group of prisoners captured at this time were fivemen who i^ere held bythe Taliban asspies inaprison forpolitical crimes in Kandahar^ Jamal alHarith,a^5yearoldI^riton (released in March 2004),Abdul I^ahimalCinco,a2^yearold Syrian Kurd, Aryat^akhitov,a24-year-old Tatar (released in March 2004),and two Saudis, ^addiq Ahmed Turkistani, a I.lyghur who was born and raised in ^audi Arabia (released in june 2006), and 46-year-old Abdul Flakiml^ukhari. When the Taliban vacated Kandahar, 2,.500 prisoners—including 1,^00 in the political prison-^were released, but the five foreigners were made to stay behind. "We want to release these men,"the prison's new warden said,"but for their security we are requiring them to stay here as guests.Ifthey^alk into the bazaar, the people will think they are from al-Qaeda and w^ill kill them."^ The five men had found themselves on the wrong side ofthe Taliban in different ways..lamalalFIarith first revealed his story to the journalistTiml^eid,who met him at the prison and gained his trust by bringing him some antiseptic cream andashortwave radio, which he had requested. I^ornl^oriald Fiddler to parents of Jamaican heritage,hehadcoiiverted tolslamandhadchangedhisnamein 1992, after reading Malcolm ^'sautobiography.Awebsite designer, he went to Iran to learn more about his religion inl99.^,and traveled to Pakistan in ^eptember 2001 forathreeweek holiday to continue his studies. Flis problems arose when the I ^ ^ led invasion began, and he decided to return home.Having paidalorry driver to let him travel with him toTurkey via Iran,he had no idea that they were going to travel through Afghanistan,and afterafew days they were stopped by threeTaliban soldiers.According to alUarith,"It all turned to hell'^ when they saw his I^ritish passport, stripped of his belongings, he was accused of beingaspy, beaten for three daysand sent to the prison in Kandahar, where an American prisoner died afteraparticular brutal beating."! am surelwould have got the same treatment,''he said, "butlmade sure that every time my guards saw melwas praying. The

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028330

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000165

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ TIII^e^itlANTANA^OFIl.I^^ ehrst got there the level was -ified that we might be killed us,'we could kill you at any I't know you're here, nobody you're missing and we could is stage, no one—not even the lerstand the Americans—had 1 1 Red Cross representatives ey pointed out that in many ^sign that someone is about it led toafe^ improvements ^ed to get the no-talking ban ethatthe prisoners would be successful in their attempts to s'complaints about tiieir lack for more food (2,100 calories it is not), and their requests ed near other prisoners who ejurnpsuits was addressed in vamember of the Joint Task .otto tell them what is going RCsays they are very scared, hedarkvs.tellingthem-v^hat ebeingtakentobeshot."As theauthor concluded,"This round of interrogations." less random violence than in ^red that regular punishment A^hafiq Rasul said that their he most minor infringement ^alls of the cell, for example, ^ey were subjected to indis^rs of the military personnel. the most dangerous men on i—twothirdsofwhom'^ere uard—took the propaganda V, when therestrictionson the first few weeks, several e^i^ANTAN.^^i.^e^l^I^^^S
1^^

told him they had been briefed that they were"wildanimals,"who "would kill them with our toothbrushes at the first opporiunity, that we ^vere all members of al Qaeda and that we had killed women and children indiscriminately."^^^ The Fxrreme Reaction Force The most extren^e brutality came fromaspecial unit called the Fxtreme Reaction Force, which was—and is—a live-man dot squadrespoiisible for beating suppo.sedly recalcitrant prisoners into submission, and its use ^as so prevalent thatanewphrase^"to be FRFed"—was coined by the prisoners. Mohammed saghir explained that, in the early days of Camp^-Ray, even prisoners who attempted to pray were FRFed. "They wouldn't let us call for prayers,"hesaid."I tried to pray and four or i^ve commandoes came and they beat me up. If someone would try to makeacall for prayer they would beat him up and gag him."Tarek Dergoul,who spoke at length about the FRF after his release, confirmed that their attacks were largely prompted by minor disciplinary infractions,which he described as"an act of deliberate provocation."Fxplaining what happened to him on one of the five occasions that he was FRFed—for refusing to agree toathird cell search inaday—hesaid^ ^heypeppersprayedmeinthefaeeandlstartedveimiting^inalllniusthave brou^hr^pi^-^-^ei^pful^.Thi^v panned me ^i^^'n^n^^rt^^ke^r^e,pi^kir^^ their finders in my eyes, and forced my head into the toilet p^iia^d flushed They tied me up likeabeast and then they were kneeling ^nn^e, kicking and punching. Finally they dragged tne out of the cell in chai^^s.ii^to the rec yard, and shaved n^yhe^rd,n^y hair, rr^yeyehro^vs.^^ Dergoul was the first released prisoner to point out that each FRF attack was ^lmed,byasixth member ofthe team withavideo camera, and this wasconfirmedbyaspokesman for Cuantanamo in 2004,who said that they were used to monitorwhether or not excessive force had been used. Fie refused to discuss how many times the FRF had been used,but in July 2004 the pentagon said that"only ^2 hours" ofthe tapes showed the units using "excessive force."-^ ^^iie of themost violent ofa^l the l^RF assaults tookpl^ce in ^^^mp^ ^--Ray at the end ofApril2002.The victim wasJumiia^Doss^^ri,^nd the attack waswitnessed by ^hafiqRasul,AsifIqbal,,Fero^Abbasiand

028331

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000166

([PY R ^ ' z , / ^ ^ k / ^
THE CUANTANAMO FILES CHALLENGING THE LAW 259

lismissed the case, ruling that oskcause they were non-US CCR dicn appealed, arguing 'on to review the executive uld act in any way it chose 'MNadiewodd.''In March 'PPeal. setting the stage fora otedihardie Court "ignored dared 'enemies'of the United omestic tribunal" and were ivity without any legal basis,"

emion is a foundation of liberty irta. The U S is not only denying opardr/.ing any claim that it'is a of ail of us. The court's ruling, osc jailed in territory over which :rol," is utterly erroneous. Every i)' in court.ii')n of the administration's -y was challenged in June ' on behalf of Yaser Hamdi, )02, when the authorities at 1^ citizen rather than a Saudi giiiia in an attempt to prevent g "f Guantanamo. Hantdt v. —the government's assertion tary unit and received military IS an "unlawful combatant," ystem, and Hamdi's assertion and was mistakenly captured work. Although the administition, Judge Robert Doumar, r stamp" for the government, and the level of "affiliation" Tiy combatant status," and enabling the court to perform Ig Statements by the Northern

Alliance regarding Hamdi's capture, the dates and circumstances of his capture and interrogations, and a list of all the officials involved in the determination of his status as an "enemy combatant." Overturned by Appeal Court judges, Doumar's principled demands were never met, but the challenges meant that the case, like Htimdi v. Bush, also made its way to the Supreme Court. ' The third challenge came in July 2003, when the administration announced the names of the first six prisoners to be tried by Military Commission: David Hicks, Salim Hamdan, -Mi Hamza al-Bahlul, Ibrahim al-Qosi, and, initially, Moazzam Begg and Feroz .Abbasi. Although apparently authorized by the Military Order, the proposed Commissions attracted fierce criticism from the moment they were announced, for a number of obvious reasons, including the fact that the juries and presiding officers would be hand-picked by the administration, that evidence obtained through hearsay or torture would be allowed, and that both the accused and his lawyers could be prevented from seeing certain evidence. Despite hoping that the Commissions would proceed smoothly, the administration failed to realize that some of the military lawyers who were assigned to defend the prisoners might, like Charles Swift of the Judge Advocate General's Group (JAG), balk at what was required of them. Swift, who recognized immediately that the proposed system was monstrously flawed, ended up defending Salim Hamdan. "He had never been involved in any shootings or real violence," he told the journalist Marie Brenner in January 2007. "OK, so he was a driver to one of the worst men on earth. All that really links him is that he worked for a motor pool. He wasn't necessarily a henchman, I thought, I can work with this." What particularly disturbed Swift and the other JAG lawyers, as they learned more about Guantanamo and the proposed Commissions, was that they were primarily intended to sidestep the prohibition on torture and to secure prosecutions against men whose guilt had already been decided by the Executive. He told Brenner, "It took me about a month to understand: why a military commission? Because if you torture someone, it is the only way you can get their statements in and not have to admit it in public." "The whole purpose of setting up Guantanamo Bay," he continued, "is for torture. Why do this? Because you want to escape the rule of law. There is only one thing that you want ro escape the rule of law to do, and that is to question people coercively—what

028332

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000167

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^1^^

TFlFGUA^TANA^OFILli^5

e^FIALLFNe allbut3^e designatec toacknov innocent, the admin Combata who ende Where predeces^ available and place prisoner! Shocking nointeni other pr orrelati the case phoner anyint^ anyfal current veryea "They further prove Abdul whoh ofhis thegc Taiiba
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posttraumaticstressdisorder,complicatedbytheneuropsychiatric effects of prolonged isolation "^^ CombatantStatus Review Tribunals Forthelaw^erswhohadspentsolongfightingforthehabeasrights of^heGiiantanamoprisoners,theverdictmR^si^^^^^^^^appearedto vindicatetheirbeliefthatdueprocesswouldtriumphintheendoverthe abuseofexecutivepowerHowever,whilelawyersbeganfilinghabeas petitionsinthehopethattheywouldleadtotrials.theadministration refusedtobederailedfromitslawlessmissionAlthoughtheauthorities atGuantanamocouldnottefuseprisonerstherighttomeetlawyersand filehabeaspetitions^Gitinj^dlGutierrezwasthehrstlawyerto^^^^^ d^eprison,inOctober2004,wbenshemetMoazzamBeggandFeroz Abbasi aiidathirdoftheprisonershadlawyersbyMay200^^they didevervthingintheirpowertodisabletheprocess,fromintin^idating prisonerstoobstructingthelawyeistbemselves^^nelawyernoted thatseveralprisonerstoldhim-theyiiadbeeninterrogatedbypeople whoclaimedtobetheirlawyersbutwhoturnedoutnottobe,"Juma alDossarireportedthatseveralinterrogatorstoldhimhislawyers wereliars,andFouadalRabia^astoldthat"ifhecomplainedto hislawyersaboutconditionsatGuantanan^oBayhewouldbekept there for life-Numerous lawyers have also pointed out thattheir securityclearancesareoftenheldupformonthsandtheyareregularly preventedfrommeetingclients,andmOctober 2004,respondingto theircomplaintsaUSDistrictJudgeorderedtheFentagontostt^p eavesdropping on lawyer^lient conversations, whichshe described asa"bedrock" American principle.^^ Theadministrationalsointroduceditsownresponsetothedemand forgreatertransparencyandaccountability,announcingmjuly2004 thatdieprisoners'statuswouldbereviewedinCombatantStatusReview Tribunals (CSRTs)AsmentionedmChapter 8, these resembled the "competenttribunals"demandedbytheGenevaConventions, which hadtakenplaceonornearthebattlefielddnringeveryotherUSmilitary operation, butatCuantanamo theywere nothing more thanhollow simulacra: prisoners were not allowed legal representation, were not allowedtoseeorhearsecretevidenceagainstthem,and,givendie"low evidentiaryhurdle"mentionedinChapterl3,thetribunalsjudgedthat

of At Walsl three unab
Nati^

Aca

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

Defense Exhibit C 1 page classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason 2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated 20 August 2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record of Trial

DJAMEL AMEZIANE* ALGERIAN GUANTANAMO REFUGEE I N NEED OF REFUGEE PROTECTION DJAMEL AMEZIANE is an ethnic Berber from Algerfb who fled his home country 16 years ago in order to escape persecution and make a better life for himself. He traveled to Austrfa, where he worked as a top-paid chef in an Italian T&# restaurant, and later to Canada, where he appliedfor political asylum and lived for • ^ve yeari, though his application was ultimately denied. Displaced, fearful of being returned to Algeria, and faced with few options, he traveled to Afghamst^!^ But as a foreigner in a land soon torn apart by conflict, he became an ea.sy target for corrupt local forces, who sold him to the U.S. military for a bounty. The Americans transported him first to the Airbase at Kandahar, Afghanistan, and then' to Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, where, after more than six years, he remains imprisoned without charge and, lo date, without judicial review of his detention. If Djamel is ever to leave Guantdnamo in .safety, he needs the protection of a third country to offer him resettlement. ^fljjjjj^^ Personal History Djamel Ameziane was born in 1967 in Algiers to a close-knit family of four brothers and four sisters. He obtained a college diploma in Algeria and worked as a supervisor responsible for supplying drinking water and waste disposal. In 1992, Djamel left tbe country to escape escalating instability and oppression under tbe one-party govemment then in power. He transited through Italy to Vienna, Austria, where be lived legally for several years. Djamel began working as a dishwasher in Vienna, but his talent allowed hjj^i to rise quickly to become the highest-paid chef at Al Caminetto Trattoria, a well-known Italian restaurant. In 1995, following the election of a conservative anti-immigrant government, new immigration policies kept Djamel from extending or renewing his visa, and bis work permit was denied without explanation. He was forced to leave tbe country. Djamel traVelM dffedtty 16'C&fiada because of its large French-speaking population and his belief tbat Canada's immigration policy was more favorable to immigrants like him. Immediately upon his arrival, be told immigration officials tbat be wanted to apply for asylum because be was afraid of being deported to Algeria. As he awaited a decision, Djamel obtained a temporary work permit and worked diligently for an office supply company and for various restaurants in Montreal* His application was denied in 2000 and he was forced to uproot his life and leave the country he had made bis home for tbe past five years. Fearful ofbeing forcibly returned to Algeria, Djamel went to Afghanistaif, tbe only country where he felt he could live freely without discrimination as a Muslim man, and where he would not fear deportation to Algeria. Once in Afghanistan, he did not participate in any military training or fighting and, as soon as the war started, he fled to escape the fighting. He was captured by local police while trying to cross the border into Pakistan, and was turned over to U.S. forces for a bounty. Later, in Guantanamo, soldiers told Djamel tbat tbe Pakistanis sold people to them in Afghanistan for $2,000, and in Pakistan for $5,000. Djamel has never been alleged by the U.S. government to have engaged in any acts of terrorism or hostilities. He has never picked up a weapon or participated in any military training or fighting, nor is he accused of tbese acts. In short, be bas never bad any involvement with extremism, terrorism or any act of violence whatsoever. Tragically, Djamel was nonetheless sent to Guantdnamo Bay on or around February' 11, 2002; where he was held in the now-infamous metal cages of Camp X-Ray.
* Djamel Ameziane is represented by attorneys Wells Dixon and Pardiss Kebriaei at the Center for Constitutional Rights. For more information about Guantanamo's refugees, contact emaclean^«;cci-Ju.stice,org.
027969
Photo credit: Center f o r Constiimional Rights

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Defense Reciprocal Discovery
t\ f\ ' \ r\ r\ ^ j..

_
^

_
^

uuOOOCOlQ^ai

Imprisonment at guantanamo At Guantanamo, Djamel has been detained over tbe past year in solitary confinement in a small windowless cell in Camp 6,wbicb tbe ICRC bas described as more restrictive than supcrmax facilities in theU.S.^ Separate fromthe inhumane conditions ofhis detention, he has been subjected repeatedly to brutal acts of physical violence by military guards. He bas been subjected toaii^rm of waterboarding, where guards held his head down and placedarunning water hose between his nose and mouth, running it fi^rseveral minutes over bisfaceand suffocatingbim, repeatingtheoperation several times. Ofthat experience he wtites.'l bad tbe impression that my bead was sinking in water. Simply thinking ofit gives me tbe chills." He has spent as many as 25 and ^0 bours atatime in the interrogation room,sometimes with techno music blasting,^^enougb to burst your eardrums." He was once sprayed all over with cayenne pepper and tben hosed downwithwater to accentuate the effect of tbe pepper spray and make bis skin bum.Tbe guards tben bound himin cuffs and chains and took himtoaninterrogationroom.wbere be was left for several hours,writhing in pain, his clothes soaked while air conditioning blasted in the room, and his body burning from tbe pepper spray. Forthe injuries and ailments resulting from his imprisonment, he has neverbeen afforded adequate medical care. For example, because he spends nearly all his time staring at the inside ofhis small cell in Camp 6, his vision bas been steadily deteriorating. Ittookayearofrepeated requests ti^rhim to receive an eye examination, and be still does not bave a proper pair of eyeglasses. He also suffers from rheumatismin bis legs because of tbe extremely cold temperatures inside Camp 6,fi^r wbicb be cannot even getapair of socks. During his more than sixyears at Guantanamo, Djamel has been deprived ofcriticalmoments withhis family. His father passed away during this period, before Djamel could see or communicate with bim one last time. His brothers and sisters have had weddingceremonies be has beenunable to attend and had children wbo bave never known their uncle. Fear ofReturn to Algeria Djamel hasacrediblei^ar of persecution ifhe were to be returned to Algeria, InDjamel'sbometownin l^abylie, an unstable region in tbe north of Algeria known for frequent, violent clashes between the Algerianarmyand lslamicresistancegroups,practicingMuslimsareautomaticallysuspectedofbeing supporters of sucb groups and are frequently harassed and targeted for arrests and detention by tbe governmentsolelybecause of their religiouspractices. The stainof having spent timeinGuantanamo would alone be enough to put him at risk ofbeing imprisoned ifhe is returned, Algeria hasadocumented history oftorture and illtreatment of its prisoners, and Algerian government officials bave stated to lawyers f^r Guantanamo prisoners that all Algerian citizens in Guantanamo would be considered serious security threatsand would besubject to furtberdetention and investigation ifreturned. The first two Algerians transferred out of Guantanamo in luly 200^ were disappeared fi^r two weeks and likely subjected to interrogation bytbeDRS, Algeria's"militarysecurity"police, Amnesty International bas reported that themost serious violations of bumanrightsabuseshavebeencommittedbytheDRS in cases ofindividuals detained on suspicion ofterrorist activity, l^eed for Refugee Protection Djamel remainstrappedatGuantanamountilatbirdcountrycomesti^rwardto offer himresettlement protection. He is in tbe process ofapplying for resettlement in Canada, tbe country be lived in for five years and would not have left had he not previously been denied asylum.

^Thisis according to the most recent version ofhis attorney'sunelassilied notes.
027970 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

OOOOOOO^

IN THE UNTTED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUIVIBIA

ALDL AL NASR, Petitioner,
V.

Civil Action No. 05-345 (JOB)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, etal, Respondents.

DECLARATION OF TERESA A. McPALMER Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,1, Commander Teresa A. McPalmer, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, the following is true, accurate and correct: 1. I am the Legal Advisor to the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention

of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (OARDEC). In that capacity I am an advisor to the Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals. 2. I hereby certify that the documents attached hereto constitute a tme and accurate

copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal related to petitioner Aldl al Nasr that are suitable for public release. The portions of the record that are classified or considered law enforcement sensitive are not attached hereto or have been redacted by an OARDEC staff member. This staff member also redacted information that would personally identify U.S. Government personnel in order to protect the personal privacy and security of those individuals.

2015
027971 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000003

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is tme and correct. Dated: ^^^ui^ ^ l^or \ .jt^ 4/k/alu^ Teresa A. McPalmer CDR, JAGC, USN

2016
027972 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

I

00000004

Department ofDefense Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals
OARDEC/Ser: g Q ^
-Wkhll IAI IIXkilNlTV

f '^ FEB m

From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Subj: REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #308 Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary ofDefense Order of7 July 2004 (b) Secretary ofthe Navy Order of 29 July 2004

1. I concur in the decision of the Combatant Status Review Tribimal that Detainee ISN #308 meets the criteria for designation as an Enemy Combatant, in accordance with references (a) and (b). 2. This case is now consideredfinaland the detainee will be scheduled for an Administrative Review Board. . • —

^^hv\mA^iAJul—
J. M. McGARRAH RADM, CEC, USN Distribution: NSC (Mr. John Bellmger) DoS (Ambassador Prosper) DASD-DA JCS (J5) SOUTHCOM (CoS) COMJTFGTMO , OARDEC (Fwd) ' CrrF Ft Belvoir

027973 '

lUtt-Oiji^leLiL lUiiL lUijilLL.
Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2017

00000005

UNCLASSIFIED

25 Jan 05 MEMORANDUM From: Assistant Legal Advisor To: Director, Combatant Status ReviewTribunal Via: Legal Advisor ^ ^ ^ ^ Subj: LEGALSUFFICIENC^REVIEWCFCOMBATANTSTATUSREVIEWTRIBUI^AL FORDETAINEE1SN#308 Ref: (a)DeputySecretaryofDefenseOrderof7July2004 (b)Secretary ofthe Navy ImplementationDirectiveof29July2004 Encl: (l)AppoiritingOrderfor Tribunal #12 of29 Sep 2004 (2) Record ofTribunal Proceedings 1. Legal sufticiencyreview has been completed on the subject Combatant Status Review Tribimalinaccordancewithref^rences(a)and(b).Afterreviewingdierecord ofthe Tribunal,! finddiat: a. The detainee was properlynotified ofthe Tribunal process and elected to participate in the CSRT, by attendhig the CSRT and presentingaswomstatementwith the assistance ofhis personal representative. i^^^ Exhibits D-a. The statement consisted ofthe detainee'sresponses to the allegations contained inE^bitR-2.1^^^ Enclosure (3). b. The Tribunal was properly convened and constituted by enclosure(l). c. The Tribunal substantially comphed with all provisions ofreferences(a) and (b). d. Notethat some iiifbrmationinExhibitR-4 was redacted. The FBI properly certified inExhibitR-2thattheredacted information wouldnot supportadetermination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant. e. E^bitsR-3,R-4andR-9containhandwrittennotesinthemargins. These notes appearto be aids in directingthe Tribunal to the source ofinfi^rmation contained in die Unclassified Summaryprovidedto the detainee. These notes do not alterthe evidence, nor do they af^ct the legal sufficiency ofthe evidence. f Thedetaineedidnotrequestthatanywitiiessesordocumentaryevidencebe produced. g. The Tribunal'sdecision that detainee#308 is properly classified as an enemy combatant was unanimous.

2018
02797^ Def^

00000006

UNCLASSIFIED Subj: LEGALSUFFICIENC^REVIEWOFCOMBATANTSTATUSREVIEWTRIBUNAL FORDETAINEEISN#308 h,Thedetainee'sPersonalRepresentative wasgiven theopportunitytoreviewthe record ofproceedings, and declined to submit post-tribunal comments to the Tribunal. 2.Ttheproceedings and decision ofthe Tribunal as refiectedinEncl. (2) are legallysufficient, andno corrective action is required. 3. Irecommend that the decision ofthe Tribui^ be approved and the case be considered final.

3NM. GIBBS CDR,JAGC,USNR

^
027975 D e f ^ ^ ^ ^ l ^ e i y

201^

00000007

Department of Defense
Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals 29 Sep 04 From; Dkector, Combatant Status Review Tribunals Subj: APPOINTMENT OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIE'W TRIBUNAL #12

• • .
Ref: (a) Convemng Authority Appomtment Letter of 9 July 2004 By the authority given to me in reference (a), a Combatant Status Review Tribunal established by "Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures fbr Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba" dated 29 July 2004 is hereby cohvehed. It shall hear such cases as shall be brought before it without fiirther action of referral or otherwise. Colonel, U.S.2vlarine Corps Reserve; President The following commissioned officers shall serve as members of die Tribunal: Lieutenant Colonel, JAGC, U.S. Army; MEMBERS: Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force; Member

C^^#W^
J. M. McGARRAH Rear Admiral Civil Engineer Corps United States Navy

2020
027976 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000008

HEADQUARTERS, OARDEC FORWARD GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

21 January 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CSRT FROM: OARDEC FORWARD Commander ICO ISN 308 1. Pursuant to Enclosure (1), paragraph (I)(5) of the Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba dated 29 July 2004,1 am forwarding die Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report for the above mentioned ISN for review and action. 2. Ifthere are any questions regarding this package, point ofcontact on this matter is the tmdersigned at DSN]

CAPT, us:

2021
027977 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000009

(ID Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet (U) This Document is UNCLASSIFIED Upon Removal of Enclosures (2) and (4). (U) TRIBUNAL PANEL: rmiSN#: Ref 308 #12

(a) (U) Convening Order for Tribunal #12 of 29 September 2004 (U) (b) (U) CSRT Implementation Directive of 29 July 2004 (U) (c) (U) DEPSECDEF Memo of 7 July 2004 (U)

Encl: (1) (U) Unclassified Summary ofBasis For Tribunal Decision (U/FGW) (2) (U) Classified Summary ofBasis for Tribunal Decision (S/NF) (3) (U) Summary of Detainee/Witiiess Testimony (U/FOUO) (4) (U) Copies ofDocumentary Evidence Presented (S/NF) (5) (U) Personal Representative's Record Review (U) 1. (U) This Tribtmal was convened on 20 October 2004 by references (a) and (b) to make a determination as to whether the Detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant, as defined in reference (c). 2. (U) On 20 October 2004 the Tribunal determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Detainee #308 is properly designated as an enemy combatant, as defined in reference (c). 3. (U) In particular, the TribunalfindsthattillsDetamee is a member of, or affiliated with, al Qaida forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, as more fully discussed in the enclosures. 4. (U) Enclosure (1) provides an imclassified account of the basis for the Tribunal's decision. A detailed accoimt ofthe evidence considered by the Tribunal and its findings of fact are contained in enclosures (1) and (2).

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Tribunal President

DERV FM: Multiple Sources '-SECRET//N0FORI^/;%O27903ECLASS: X I Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2022

00000010

UNCLASSIFIED//^^^^ l^Cl^ASS^P^DSIl^^^^^R^D^^ASfSP^DRTRl^^I^^A^ D^C^S^D^ (Enclosure (I) to Combatant Status Review TribunalDecision Report) TRIBUNALPANEL: ISN#: 308 L Introduction As the Combatant Status Review Tribunal(CSRT)DecisionReport indicates, the Tribunal has determined that this Detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant because he isamember of, or affiliated with, alQaida forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States and its coalition parmers. Inreaching its conclusions, the Tribunal considered both classified and unclassifiedinfbrmation. The following is an account ofthe unclassified evidence considered by the Tribunal and otherpertinent information. Classified evidence considered by the Tribunal is discussed inEnclosure (2) tothe CSRTDecisionReport. 2. Synopsis ofproceedings The unclassified evidence presented to the Tribunal bythe Recorder alleged tbatthe Detainee was associated with the Talibanand traveled to Afghanistan tofightthejihad. The unclassified summary also indicated thatthe Detainee admitted travelingto Afghanistan to join the Taliban and stayed ataTalibanfarminKabul, TheDetainee chose to participate in the Tribunal process.Hecalledno witnesses, requested no documents be produced and madeaswom verbal statement with the assistance ofhis assigned Personal Representative. TheDetainee, inhisverbal statement, admitted thathe did travel to Kabul, but didnot go tofightthe jihad orto join the Taliban. TheDetainee stated that he was goingto Pakistan because he hadaproblem withhis eye andhe was goingto get ittreated. He also wanted to see the religion ofthe Taliban forlOdaysm Afghanistan and then afterthat, he was goingto go back to Pakistan and havethe operation. Whenhegotto Kabul, the Taliban put him in jail because he had stated that he wasaSaudiArabian police officer and they believed that he musthavebeenaspy. 3. EvidenceConsidered bythe Tribunal The Tribunal considered the following evidence in reaching its conclusions: a Exhibits: D-aandR-ldiroughR-17. b. Testimony ofthe followingpersons: Swom statement ofthe Detainee. #12

UNCLASSIFIED^^^^^^^
027979 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

ISl'^^^O^ enclosure (1)

Fagelo^202^

00000011

UNCLASSIFIED/^^^^^^ 4.RulingsbytheTribunalonDetaineeRe^uestsforEvidenceorWitnesses The Detamee requested no witnesses and requested no additional evidence be produced; therefore, no mlings on these matters were required. ^. Discussion ofunclassified Evidence The Tribunal considered the followingunclassified evidence inmakmgits determinations: a. The Recorder o^redExhibitsR-landR-2mto evidence durhigthe unclassified portion ofthe proceeding.ExhibitR-1 isthe Unclassified Summary of Evidence. While this summary is helpfiilin that itprovidesabroadoutihieofwhatthe Tribunal can expecttosee, it is notpersuasive in that itprovides conclusory statements without supporthigunclassifiedevidence.E^bitR-2providedno usable evidence. Accordingly, the Tribunalhad to looktoclassifiedexhibits for support ofthe Unclassified Summary ofEvidence. b. Essentiallythe onlyunclassified evidence the Tribunal hadtoconsiderwas the Detamee'sswom testimony. Asummarized transcript ofthe Detainee'sswom testimony is attachedas Enclosure (3) to the CSRTDecisionReport. In sum, the Detainee testified thathe did travel to Kabul, but did not go tofightthejihad orto join the Taliban. The Detainee stated that he was goingto Pakistan because he hadaproblem with his eye and he was goingto getittreated.He also wanted to see the religion ofthe TalibanforlO days inAfghanistan and then afterthat, he was goingto go backtoPakistanandhave the operation. Whenhegotto Kabul, the Taliban puthim in jail because he had stated that he wasaSaudiArabian police officer and they claimed thathe wasaspy. TheDetainee tolddieTalibandiathewantedtogohome,butdieywerestilltreatinghimasaspy,He was taken toabeanfarm underthe control oftheTaliban and then eventually led across the border and was tumed overwith others to the Pakistani authorities. c. The Tribunal also relied on certain classified evidence inreaching its decision. Adiscussion ofthe classified evidence is found inEnclosure (2) to the Combatant Status ReviewTribunalDecisionReport. 6. Consultations with the CSRTLegalAdvisor No issues arose during the course oftbis hearing thatrequired consultation with the CSRTlegal advisor.

UNCLASSIFIEDZ/geger027980 • Defense Reciprocal Discovery

ISN #308
nclosure (1 Enclosure (^Q24 Page 2 of

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UNCLASSIEIED//^^^^ 7. Conclusions of the Tribunal Upon carefiil review of all the evidence presented in this matter, the Tribunal makes the following determmations: a. The Detainee was mentally and physically capable ofparticipating in the proceeding. No medical ormentalhealthevaluationwas requested or deemednecessary. b. The Detainee understood the Tribunal proceedings. He asked no questions regarding hisrightsand actively participated in the hearing. c. The Detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant because he isa member of, or affiliated with, alQaidaforcesthatareengagedinhostilitiesagainstthe United States or its coalition partners. 8^Dissentin^TribunalMeniber^s report None. The Tribunal reachedaunanimous decision.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps TribunalPresident

UNCLASSIFIED/fflier
027981 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

ISN #308 Enclosure nclosure (D (1}

P a g e 3 of 2 02 5
r\ ^ n r\ r\ t

00000013

UNCLASSIFIED/^^r Summarized Swom Detainee Statement The Detainee requested that the Personal Representative make a statement on his behalf, and the Detainee would add information if he needed to. The Personal Representative, along with theDetainee, addressed each point of the Unclassified Summary. • 3(a)l The Detainee, a Saudi Arabian citizen, traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, in July 2001 to fight the jihad. Personal Representative: The Detainee admits he did travel to Kabul, but did not go tofightthe jihad. When he got to Kabul, the Taliban put him in jail because he was a Saudi police officer... Detainee: They asked me i f l was afighter,I said no, I just came to see your reHgion. Personal Representative: .. .and they claimed that the Detainee was a spy. • 3(a)2 The Detainee admitted traveUng to Afghanistan to join the Tahban. Personal Representative: This is much like point 1. Yes, the Detainee traveled to Afghanistan... Detainee: 1 was gomg to Pakistan because I had a problem with my eye and I wanted to get it treated. I wanted to see the rehgion of the Taliban for 10 days and then after that, I was going to go back and have the operation. That's when they captured me and put me in jail, as stated in the previous answer. Personal Representative: Yes, although he admitted to traveling to Afghanistan, the Detainee never admitted he went there to join the Taliban. He did not go to join the Taliban. • 3(a)3 The Detainee stayed in a Taliban bean farm in Kabul. Personal Representative: The Detainee admits he was on a farm. The Taliban had taken him out of jad, and he was given no choice. The Detainee told the Taliban that he wanted to go home, but they were still treating hun as a spy. He was brought to this farm bytiieTaliban. Detainee: They were telling me they were going to take me to my family. There were a whole bunch of people together. They said, start moving, ISN#308 Enclosure (3) Pagel of 14026 0 2 7 9 8 2 URtaMSSiF]PKtW¥9^-

00000014

UNCLASSlFIEDi^i^^^ and we'll tal^eyouto your country and we started walking atnight. We stayed atthe farm for 15 days and then we were to go to Pakistanand then back to my hometown. Iwas crying. PersonalRepresentative: The Detainee made the point, thathe didnot want, didnot like the idea, andhas no idea whathappened, but didnot go and didnotwantto fight America. The Detainee was traveling tbroughTora Bora withanumber of otherpeople. Detainee: Iwas toldlwould go throughToraBora to my hometown. PersonalRepresentative: Because the Detainee believedhe was bemgtreatedasaspy, die Taliban shared very little inf:^rmationaboutwheretiieywere going, e^cepttotellhim theywere bringing him backto his family. Instead, he was turned overwiththe others to tiiePakistaniautiioritiestoaPakistanijail. Tribunal Members Questions to Detainee Q: A: Youmentionedyouhadaproblemwithyoureye. Whatwastheproblem7 IwasinacaraccidentinSaudiArabia. Ihad27fi:actures inmy head and something was wrong withmy pupil. Iheard thatthe medicine inPakistan, especially forthe eyes, was the best in the world. Was your vision impaired? I have a loss of eyesight. Can you see us now? Yes, I can. Did you have someone help you get all the way to Pakistan if you could not see well? A: Q: A: Q A: No, I didn't have anybody. It must have been quite a challenge to travel to a strange country, where you had never been before, when your vision was not 100%. There were some people that spoke Arabic. They told you where to go and how to get there? Yes, they did.
ISN# 308 closure Ci) ( Enclosure
027983

Q A; Q A;

_

UT%32%§SmE

Page 2 of 1 •U027

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I^CLASSlFIEDi^i^^^^ Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A.: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: Did youhave the treatmentinPakistan? Ineverwentto the hospital, Iwentto theTaliban and whenlcamebacklwas goingto the hospital. Because you wentto Afghanistan first, you didn't have the opportunityto getthe treatment, right? Yes. Couldyourepeatthatquestion? Because you wentto Afghanistanfust... Ididnot go to Afghanistan,Iwentto Pakistan. FromPaldstan,Iwentto Afghanistan. When you wentto Pakistan the firsttime, were you able to getthe treatmentthen? Ineverwentto the hospital? Whywastiiat? Iwantedto see the Talibanreligionfirstand then come back again and take care ofmy eye. Even though your eye was botheringyouthatmuch, you chose nottoget itfi^ed first? Just out of cttriosity,Iwanted to find out about the Taliban first and then come backandtakecareofmyeye. Howlongdidtiieykeepyoumjailforbeingaspy? Idon'tknowe^actly,butappro^imately2-2^months. Then they released you and took you to the farm? They didnotrelease me, butdieytookme there. So, you wentto the farm.,were you allowed to move about fi^eely? No,Iwasnot. What did they ask you to do fbrthem while you were there?

ISN#308 Enclosure (3)

Page 3 of 12028
02798^

U^^A^^^^IF^O^

00000016

UNCLASSIFIED/^^^^ A: Q: A: Q: A: (^: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: They saidtostayhere, do nothing and don'tmove around. If you wanted to go outand use the bathroom, you wouldfindatree and go behindatree. Theydidn'taskyoutohelpwithanyofthefarmingduties? No, they did not. Weretiiereotherpeople there who were working? There wasn'tanybodyworkingthere, Isaw everybody just sittingthere. How could there beafarmwhenno one is working? Idonotknow;allIsawwasalotoftrees. Were there soldiers there guardingthe people? There were some people there who had Kalashnikovs. Theywere moving back and forth. They didnot speak with us. Theywere supposed to preventyoufi^om leaving? Yes, because you can't move without them seeing you. Wastiiereanymilitaryti:ainingtiiathappenedattiiefarm? 1^^. How longwere you atthe farm? Appro:^matelyl5days. Whathappened afterthat? Afterthe 15 days, theytook me to ToraBora and into Pakistan, Sometimes they had us walk and sometimes they carried us with vans ortmcks, Can you describe the circumstances ofhowyou were captured? Which one, the Pakistani orthe Afghani? Ididn'tknowthere was more than one. You were apprehended inPakistan, after goingthroughToraBora? Yes
ISN# 308 Enclosure (1) Page4of B 0 2 9

027985

uf%r%.§s#'

00000017

UNCLASSIFIED^^^^^^

Q: A:

Please describe your capture, There were groups ofpeople. You don't know who they are,whetherthey are Arabs or differentnationalities. Wearrived inPakistan and they gave us some bread to feed us, they killedacowfbrus,afterwe ate, they letus sleep. Inthe middle ofthe nighttheywoke us up and said we had to move now. Wewere taken toamosque and divided us up mto groups oflO. They said they'd take each group oflOanddeliverthem to theirfamilies. Theytookawhole bunch ofpeople and when ourtum came, we were putinacarwith Pakistani soldiers who were carrying all kinds ofweapons. From there, theytook us directlyto the prison.

Q:^ A: Q: A: Q: A:

You were in prisonfbratime and then given to the Americans? Istayedmprisonapproxmiately6days Did youhave yourpassportandmoneywith you when you were taken bythe Pakistanis? No. Whathappened to yourpassport? When theytold us to move hi the middle ofthe night,Tfbrgotthem.Ileftwithout them. Theytoldmetokeepmovingandthey'dbring all of my belongings. Itold themldidn'thavemypassport and money,and they told me to keep moving and they'dbringmymoneyandpassporttome. Did youhave anyweapons with you when you were making your journey? No. When youwereinjail inPakistan, did any embassy representatives visityou? Yes, They came to visitmewhenlwasmthe hospital. When did you go to the hospital? Iwentto Pakistan inabus.

Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:

027986

ISN# 308 Enclosure ( Page 5 of] 030 URR5K«l§SiFrKd?flM&:

00000018

UNCLASSIFlEDi^i^^ TribunalPresident Questions to the Detainee Q: A: This was afteryouhad been captured? The bus flipped over and they tookme to the hospital.

TribunalMembers Questions to theDetainee
^

Was this before you wentto jail? In prison. So,afteryoulefttiiejail? Whilelwasmprison. They were moving usfi^omone prison to anotherprison. I was on the bus sleeping. Iheard peoplefiringatthe bus andlgothitwithabullet inmy arm and broke my arm. The bus tumed over, and they just keptmovingus. From that point, theytookme to Pakistan and tookme to the hospital tiiere. You were shot in the arm? What other iri^uries did youhave? Thatwasit. InthePakistanhospital, theyfixedyour arm? Yes, they fixed it and put it inacast. Did they fix your eye atthe same time? No, they didnot. How longwere you in the hospital? Ido notrecall,butmy guess would be appro^^ately7days. That is where the embassy representative came to visit you? Yes Can you tell us how the conversation went between the two of you? Idon'trecall, but whatlremember is he asked my name, which part ofSaudi Arabialwasfi^om, wherelwas captured. That'salllrecall. When youfinishedyour stay in the hospital, they took you back to jail^
ISN# 308 Enclosure (3)

A
^

A

^

A
^

A
^

A
^

A
^

A^
^

A

Page 6 of 12031
027987

UN^A&§#,

00000019

UNCLASSIFIED^^^^^ A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Theytook me toaprison inPakistan. From the Pakistani prison,lwas tumed overtothe States. What did they accuse you of doing atthattime? They did not accuse me of anything. When you first came hito the custody ofthe Americans, didtheytell you why you were there? They didn't say anything to me and there were no accusations. How longwas it befi:^re somebody explamedwhyyou were there? Idon^t recall. Iwas taken by plane toaprison that belongs to the States and fi^om there they broughtme to Cuba, lexplamedmysituationandmystorytothem. The interrogator inAfghanistan toldme not to worry and notto fear anything becauselwas going back to my family andmy home. Iwas put onaplaneandlthoughtlwas going backto my family. Instead, they broughtme here. They startedinterrogatingmeagam,andIkepttellmgthem die same story. Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: The hiterrogations were, that you wentto help the Taliban? Notto help the Taliban. They askedmeiflknewthe Taliban, andlsaidldidn't knowthe Taliban. lexplained the situation the waylexplainedithere. Have you ever had anyweapons traimng at anytime in your life? Only whenlwas working for the police department in Saudi Arabia. How long did youhave that job? Idon'trecall, approximately 5-6years,I'mnotsure, Iforgot. Whatresponsibilities did youhave asaSaudi police officer? In the Red Cross. You were guarding people who worked there? Iwas sittmg in the office. All the people that came there with bodily mjuries,! asked them howthey sustained those itijuries. lasked about the location where
ISN# 308 Enclosure (3)

Page 7 of 12032
027988

U^^^^^^^EiD:^i^i^

000000 20

UNCLASSIFIED/i^l^OOi^ tiieinjurytookplace,I'dcontacttiieautiiorityinthatparticularregionandtiie interrogatorwould come over andinterrogate the person. Ifthis guy had done something wrong, they l^interrogatorsjwould take him to that location and interrogate him furtiier,and dealwithhim at that location. lex^plained this to the interrogators here, in Cuba. Q: A: Q: A: (^: A: Q: A: Did you do the same duties fbr5or6years, or did you do otherthings also? Iwasadriver. Forimportantpeople,orforwhat? lused to work one day,andhave two days off, so instead ofwastingmytimel usedtoworkforataxionmytimeoff. Thisishowlwaseamingmoney. Asapolice officer, youhadaresponsibilityto maintain proficiency on weapons? All they did was give us information on pistols and howto use them. Every six or sevenmonths they would let us fire off20 rounds or so. That'sallwewoulddo. Asapolice officer, you were required to carryapistol with youat all times? No,Iwasnotcarryhigapistol. Ifyou wanted to haveagun, you were required to cleanitandsubmitareport. Ididn'twantto deal with that, so that'swhyldidn^t haveapistol. Are there any otherweapons they trained youhowto use? Yes. Whatweapons were those? The Kalashnikov,l^andJaSaudi made rifie;Idon't knowthe name ofit. So, itwas pistol, Kalashnikov,and the Saudirifie? Yes. WhentiieTalibanarrestedyouforbemgaspy,didyoutelltiiemyouwere familiarwith these weapons? No,ldidn^t.
ISN#308 Enclosure (3)

Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:

Page 8 of
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^i^^

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UNCLASSIFIED^ Q: A: (^: A: (^: A: (^: A: Q: A: Did they knowyouhade^erience asapolice officer? They hadno idea. When you wereapolice officer, did you carry special identification thatshowed youhadthatjob? No. Youdidn'thavepolicelD? They didn't give me one. When die Talibanaskedwhatyou did, what did you tell them? Itold themlwas in the police force. Sotheydidknowyouwereapoliceman? They asked me iflwasafighter with themu^ahadin. IsaidTmnotafighter. They asked whatidid in SaudiArabiaandltoldthemlwas with the police force. That^swhen they told melwasaspy. Did they ask you to do anything fi^rthem, perhaps tramsomeofthehpeople on pohce skills? No. Have you ever had treatment on your eye, after all this tune? No. Not even while you've beenhere? Igaveup. Tm goingto waituntillgo backto Saudi Arabia and Fll treatmyself there, What city in Saudi Arabia were youapoliceman? Sakakaal-Jouf Isthatasmalltownorbigtown? Smalltown,
ISN# 308 Enclosure (3)

Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:

Page 9 of 1J034
0 2 7 9 9 0 uM0HAS§i;m)gm#k

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UNCLASSIFIED^^^^ Q: A:^ Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Does it costmuchmoney to getto Afghanistan? It doesn't costmuch,roughlylOOOSaudiRiyals, or less, Did anyone help you pay to go to Afghanistan? Nobody helped, Do youhave any other family members in the police force? No. Do youhave to know anyone to getajob with the police?Do youhave to be fi:iends with anyone, or can anyone becomeapolice officer? Anybody canregistertobecomeamember ofthe police department.

Tribunal President Questions to Detainee
^

Did you have to take vacationfi^'omthe police force to travel to Pakistan? No,Iwas let go from the police departmentalong time ago. How long ago, before you traveled to Pakistan? Fourmonths prior. What did you do afteryou were releasedfi^omthe police force? Iwasadriver andahorse trainer. You were goingto pay fbryour operation with the money you earned from working in Saudi Arabia?

A
^

A
^

A

A:

Yes. How long did you anticipate the travel and the operation would take before you would be able to retum to Saudi Arabia? Iwas thinking it wouldn'ttake any longerthan 40 days, includingthe time forthe operation. My wife had just hadababyandltookherto her family. In Saudi Arabia, when awomanis ready to haveababy,she is sentto her family fbr 40 days. Afterwards, she is taken backhome. Since she was ready to haveababy and it
1SN#308 Enclosure (3^

027991

UMaA§&IpiaD«^

Pagel0ofl2035

00000023

U^CLASSIF1ED^^^^^2^ was goingto take 40 days,Iwould leave my wife and family and go to Pakistan, have the operation and come back. WhenIcameback,lwould pick herup ftom her family. Itoldthistothe interrogator and it'sinmy file. Q: A: You thoughtyou'dhave enough tune to travel to Pakistan, getthe operation, but before geftmg the operation, you'dgo to Afghanistan? Iwentto Pakistan, butlwanted to see the rehgion ofthe Taliban. Iwantedto go to the TahbanfbrlOdays, go back to Pakistan andhave the operation and theni was captured and imprisoned. Did you think oftravelmgtoAfghanistanafteryouhad the operation? No. Tmwonderingwhyyou did not have the operation inPakistanfirstand then travelto Afghanistan to observe the Talibanreligion. Isaidbefbrelhave the operation, I'll go find out aboutthe religion and thenl'll comeback. Thank you fbryourtestimony. Iswear by God to tell the tmth.

(^: A: Q: A: Q: A:

Personal Representative's Questions to Detainee
^

During ourmeeting, you stated thatthe TahbaninKabul arrested you? Idon^tknowwhich one is Kabul and which one is not. InAfghanistan, the Taliban arrested you? Yes. That'swhen they found out you were with the Saudi police, and said you werea spy, Didtheymake any accusations againstyou?

A
^

A

A^
^

No, diey didnot. When you werefirstarrested, did the Taliban take your money and yourpassport? Yes, and they retumed it back to me,
ISN#308 Enclosure (3)

A

Pagellofl^^3^
027992

^

^

^

^

^

^

^

00000024

UNCLASSIFIED,

Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A: Q: A:

Theytumeditback to you atthe beanfarm, or later? WhUe we were movingtowards ToraBora. This is one ofthe reasons you believed theywere takingyou back to yourfamdy? Yes. Did you getthe eye iti^urythe sametimeyouhad all the head fi^actures? Yes, atthe same time. Did thathappenafteryouleftthe Saudi police? Beft^relleftthe police. Sixteen years prior. Sixteen years prior? Yes So, your eye...you were allowed to still do day-to-daythings with your bad eye? Yes. You decided, since your wife was going to haveababy,that would beagood time to get your eye fixed? Yes. When did you decide to see the Taliban religion? Whenlwas readyto go have my eye taken care of^Isaidbefbreldo that, letme go to Afghanistan and see theTaliban'sreligion and then come back. Didyounotgofi^om Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan, thenPakistan? Why didn't you do that? No. Went to Pakistan first... From Saudi Arabia, to Bahrain to Pakistan to Afghanistan. Itold the interrogator thattoo.
ISN#308 Enclosure (3)

Pagel2of^037
027993 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

00000025

UNCLASSIFIED^ Q: A: Q: A: That'sfine, I'mjusttryingto determine if, while youwere inPakistan, you decided to see the Taliban? Yes When you were inPakistan, did you haveadoctor'sappointmentto get your eye fixed in the hospital? No,

Tribunal Members Questions to the Detainee Q: A: Q: A: Why did you leave die police force? Idon'trecall. The salary was very little. Working onmy own,Imadealotmore money, Previously,you said you were let gofi^omthe police department, Isaidlleft.

AUTHENTICATION I certify the material contained m this transcript is a tme and accurate summary of the testimony given during the proceedings.

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps" Tribunal President

. .

ISN# 308 Enclosure (3)

Page 13 of 12038
027994 UM^ASS£f£Ea6fSS^

00000026

UNCLASSIFIED//]^^

DETAINEE ELECTION FORM
Date: 14 October 2004 Start Time: End Time; ISN#: 0308 I, MAJOR, USAF 1300 hrs 1400 hrs

Personal Representative: (Name/Rank) Translator Required? YES

Language? ARABIC

CSRT Procedure Read to Detainee or Written Copy Read by Detainee? YES

Detainee Election: [x] I I I I Wants to Participate in Tribunal Affirmatively Declines to Participate in Tribunal Uncooperative or Unresponsive

Personal Representative Comments: Detainee desires to participate in the Tribunal; however, he would like his Personal
Representative to answer Tribunal questions regarding the evidence. No witnesses or documentary evidence is required. Please cancel the follow-up interview—it is not required.

Personal Representative

Exhibit
027995

0^^039

00000027

UNCLASSIFIED Combatant Status Review Board TC: PersonalRepresentative FROM: CIC, CSRT (23 September2004) Subject: Summary ofEvidence forCombatant Status Review Tribunal^ALNUSAYRI,Adil UqlaHassan, 1. Underthe provisions ofthe Secretary ofthe Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004,
^i^/^^^^^i^^^^^Ct^^^^^^^^i^^^^^^^t^/^^7^/^^^^^

-D^^^f^^i^i^^^i^^^i^^i^^i^^i^ ^1^1^/^^.^^Ct^^i^,aTributial has been appom^ detainee'sdesignation as an enemy combatant. 2. An enemy combatant has been defined as ^^anindividual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al(^aidaforces, or associated forces thatareengagedinhostilitiesagainstthe United States or its coalition partners. This includes anyperson who commiftedabelligerentact or has directiy supportedhostihtiesinaid of enemy armed forces." 3. The United States Govemment has previously determined that the detainee is an enemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed bythe United States that indicates that detainee is associated with the Taliban. a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban: 1. The detainee,aSaudi Arabian citizen, traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan,mJuly 2001 to fightthe jihad. 2B The detainee admitted traveling to Afghanistan to join theTaliban, 3. The detainee stayed inaTaliban bean farm in Kabul. 4. The detainee has the opportunityto contesthis designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavorto arrange forthe presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence thatthedetamee desires to call orintroduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The TribunalPresident will determine the reasonable availabihty of evidence orwitnesses.

UNCLASSIFIED
027996 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^

2040 ^^^^^:^^ ^^b^^^^

0000^^028

Memorandum

To

:

Department o f Defense Date 09/21/2004 O f f i c e o f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review f o r D e t a i n e d Enemy Combatants, C o l . D a v i d Taylor,- OIC, CSRT FBI GTMO Counterterrorism Division, O f f i c e o f General Counsel. A s s t . Gen. Counsel REQUEST FOR REDACTION OF . NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

From :

Subject

Pursuant t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Navy O r d e r ' o f 2 9 J u l y 2004, I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Combatant R e v i e w " T r i b u n a l Procedures f o r Enemy Combatants D e t a i n e d a t Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, S e c t i o n D, p a r a g r a p h 2, t h e FBI r e q u e s t s r e d a c t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h e r e i n marked^. The FBI makes t h i s r e q u e s t on t h e b a s i s t h a t s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e s t o t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f the U n i t e d States^. I n a p p r o p r i a t e d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d damage t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and compromise ongoing FBI investigations. CERTIFICATION THAT REDACTED INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE I S NOT AN ENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d . r e d a c t i o n c o n t a i n s no i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would s u p p o r t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e d e t a i n e e i s n o t an enemy combatant. The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN 308 have been r e d a c t e d by t h e FBI and p r o v i d e d t o t h e OARDEC, GTMO: FD-302 dated'10/24/2002

'^Redactions document.

a r e blackened o u t on t h e OARDEC p r o v i d e d F B I

^See E x e c u t i v e Order 12958

2041
027997 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^

Exhibit

00000029

Memorandum from Re: REQUEST FOR^'KEH

t o Col. David Taylor ' -09/21/2004

If

you need a d d i ^ ^ n a

-2-

2042
027998 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

%

00000030

UNCLASSIFIED//Ee^Personal Representative Review ofthe Record of Proceedings

I acknowledge that on H January 2005 I was provided the opportunity to review the record of proceedings for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal involving ISN #308.

have no comments. My comments are attached. Lt Col, USAF Name 1?eP Tei9M LEAD 19 CG.kv OS" Date

ISN #308 Enclosure (5)
027999

u^^MmmpAKp

2043

00000031

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DJAMEL SAID Aid AMEZIANE, Petitioner v. GEORGE WALKER. BUSH, etal. Respondents. CivU Action No. 05-0392 (ESH)

DECLARATION OF TERESA A McPALIVlER Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,1, Commander Teresa A. McPahner, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best ofmy knowledge, information and belief, the following is true, accurate and correct: 1. I am the Legal Advisor to the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC) at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In diat capacity I am an advisor to the Director, Combatant Stams Review Tribunals. 2. I hereby certify that the documents attached hereto constitate a true and accurate copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the Combatant Stams Review Tribunal related to petitioner Djamel Said Ali Ameziane that are suitable for pubhc release. The portions of the record that are classified or considered law enforcement sensitive are not attached hereto, I redacted information that would personally identify other detainees and certain U.S, Govemment personnel in order to protect the personal privacy and security of those individuals. 3. I confirmed with a contact at the Federal Bureau of Investigation that thereferenceto

2044
028000 , Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000032

ISN 888 on page 3 of Recorder's Exhibit 2 is a typograpliical error. The ISN should have been properly identified as 310.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: ll^u^ Zoof V V

^t^'^^kTeresa A. McPalmer CDR, JAGC, USN

2045
028001 . . . . . Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000033

Department of Defense Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals
QARDEC/Ser: 0328

06D E C m c D
From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Subj: REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #310 Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order of 7 July 2004 (b) Secretary oftiieNavy Order of 29 July 2004

1. I concur in the decision of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal that Detainee ISN #310 meets the criteria for designation as an Enemy Combatant, in accordance with references (a) and (b). 2. This case is now considered final and the detainee will be scheduled for an Admiiustrative Review Board.

C^;A^4W__-.
J. M . McGARRAH RADM, CEC, USN
I I

Distiribution: NSC (iVIr. John Bellmger) DoS (Ambassador Prosper) DASD-DA JCS (J5) SOUTHCOM (CoS) COMJTFGTMO OARDEC (Fwd) CirFFtBelvok

2046
028002 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000034

UNCLASSIFIED

26Nov04 MEMORANDUM From: Legal Advisor To: Director, Combatant Stams Review Tribunal Subj: LEGALSUEFICIENCYREVIEW0FC0MBATANTSTATUSR8VIEWTR1BUNAL FORDETAINEEISN#310 Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary ofDefense Orderof7July 2004 (b)Secretary of the Navy Implementation Directive of 29 July 2004

Encl: (l)AppointmgOrderforTribunal#7ofl3September2004 (2) Record ofTribunal Proceedings 1. Legal sufficiency review has been completed on the subject Combatant Status ReviewTribunal in accordance with references(a) and (b). Afterreviewing the record of die Tribunal,Ifind that: a. The detainee was properlynotified of the Tribunal process and affirmatively declined to participate in the Tribunal. b. The Tribunal was properly convened and constimted by enclosure (1). c. The Tribunal comphed with all provisions of references(a) and (b). Note that some information in exhibitsR3,R16,andR17was redacted. The FBI properly certified in exhibitsR2andR-3tiiat the redactedinformation wouldnot supportadetermination that the detainee is not an enemy combatant d. The detainee did not requestthatwimesses or evidence be produced, e. Thi^Tribunal'sdecision that detainee#310is properly classified as an enemy combatant ^^^^nanimous. f The detainee'sPersonal Representative was given the opportunity to reviewthe record of proceedings and dechned to submit comments to the Tribunal. 2. The proceedings and decision of the Tribunal are legally sufficient and no corrective action is required. 3. Irecommend that the decision of the Tribunal be approved and the case be considered final

AFIELD JR CDR,JAGC,USN

UNCLASSIFIED

2047
028003 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000035

Department of Defense
Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals
13 Sep 04 From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals Subj: APPOINTMENT OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL #7 Ref: (a) Convening Authority Appointment Letter of 9 July 2004

By the authority given to me in reference (a), a Combatant Status Review Tribtmal established by "Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba" dated 29 July 2004 is hereby convened. It shall hear such cases as shall be broug^ before it without further action of referral or otherwise. The following commissioned ofBcers shall serve as members ofthe Tribunal: MEMBERS; Colonel, U.S. Army; President Commander, JAGC, U.S. Navy; Monbcr (JAG) , Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy; Member

^^.J^
^J. M. McGARRAH Rear Admiral Civil Engineer Corps United States Naval Reserve

2048
028004 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

/

I 00000036

HEADQUARTERS, OARDEC FORWARD
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

27 October 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CSRT FROM: OARDEC FORWARD Commander SUBJECT: CSRT Record of Proceedmgs ICO ISN# 310 1. Pursuant to Enclosure (1), paragraph (I)(5) of the Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba dated 29 July 2004,1 am forwarding the Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report for the above mentioned ISN for review and action. 2. If there are any questions regarding this package, pomt of contact on this tngA^lsme undersigned at DSN j

CHARLES E CAPT, USN

2049
028005 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000037

(U) Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet (U) This Document is UNCLASSIFIED Upon Removal of Enclosure (2) and (3). (U) TRIBUNAL PANEL: (U) ISN#: Ref: 310 #7

(a) (U) Convening Order for Tribunal #7 of 13 September 2004 (U) (b) (U) CSRT hnplementation Directive of 29 July 2004 (U) (c) (U) DEPSECDEF Memo of 7 July 2004 (U)

Encl: (1) (U) Unclassified Summary ofBasis for Tribunal Decision (U/FOUO) (2) (U) Classified Summary ofBasis for Tribunal Decision (S/NF) (3) (U) Copies ofDocumentary Evidence Presented (S/NF) (4) (U) Personal Representative's Record Review (U/PQUQ) 1. (U) This Tribunal was convened by references (a) and (b) to make a determination as to whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant as defined in reference (c). 2. (U) On 21 October 2004, the Tribunal determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Detainee #310 is properly designated as an enemy combatant as defined in reference (c). 3. (U) In particular, the Tribunalfindsthat this detainee is a member of, or affiliated with, Taliban or Al Qaida forces, as more fiilly discussed in the enclosures. 4. (U) Enclosure (1) provides an unclassified account ofthe basis for the Tribunal's decision. A detailed account of the evidence considered by the Tribunal and its findings of fact are contained m enclosure (2).

Colonel, U.S. Army Tribunal President

DERV FM: Multiple Sources DECLASS: X I
028006 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2050

00000038

UNCLASSIFIED//I^^^

U^Cl^ASSIPIEDSUMMAR^OP^ASISPORTR^UNAl^ DECISION
(Enclosure (I)to Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report) TRIBUNALPANEL: ISN#: 310 L Introduction As the Combatant Status Review Tribunal(CSRT)DecisionReport indicates, the Tribunal has determined thatthis detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and was pari of or supporting Taliban or Al Qaidaftirces.In reaching its conclusions, the Tribunal considered both classified and unclassified information. The following is an account ofthe unclassified evidence considered by the Tribunal and otherpertinent information. Classified evidence considered bythe Tribunal is discussed inEnclosure (2) totiieCSRTDecisionReport. 2. Synopsis ofProeeedings The Tribunal conducted the proceedmgon210ctober 2004. TheRecorderpresented ExhibitsR-landR-2duringthe unclassified portion ofthe Tribtmal. The Unclassified Summary ofEvidence, ExlnbitR-1,indicates, among otherthings, that the detainee: traveledtoAfghanistanfi^omCanadaonafi:audulentpassport;receivedl,200to 1,^00 Canadian dollarsfi^omaTunisianmanwho encouraged die detainee to travel to Afghanistan; was instructed to go toaguesthouseinKabuluponhis arrival in Afghanistan,adirectionwhichhe ultimately followed; noted thatanumber ofthe oth^ residents ofthe guesthouse were Talibanfighters; then stayed inaguesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, withanumber of Arabmen; traveled with Tahban fi^tet^ through theToraBoramountains duringthe U.S.bombing campaign; traveled illegally into Pakistan without any documentation and was captured bythe Pakistani military ata mosque; and escapedfi^omabustiiatwasforcibly overtaken by otherprisoners with the detainee, butwas captured agamashorttime later by Pakistani authorities. The Recorder called no witnesses. The detainee didnot attend the Tribunal hearing and affirmatively declined to participate. He also didnot provide the Personal Representative with any statements or evidence to present onhis behalf The detainee'sdecisionis refiected on the Detainee ElectionForm (ExhibitD-A). The Personal Representativepresentedno evidence and called no witnesses. Duringthe classifiedportion ofthe Tribunal hearing, the Recorder presentedExhibits R-3throughR-17. The PersonalRepresentative presentedno classified evidence. The Recorder and the Personal Representative did not have any comments on the classified evidence. I^CLASSIFIED//!^^^
^

#7

1SN#310
Enclosure (1) Pagelof3

2051
028007 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000039

UNCLASSIFIED//^^^

After the Tribunal read all ofthe classified exhibits, the Tribunal requested additional infbrmaticn. Inresponse to the Tribunal'srequest,theRecorder offered into evidence classifiedExhibitsR-18andR-19,aftergivingthe Personal Representative an opportunityto re^ewthe documents, NeithertheRecordernorthe Personal Representative had any comments on the additional documents. After considering the unclassified and the classified evidence, the Tribunal determined thatthe detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant. 3. Evidence Considered by the Tribunal The Tribunal considered the following evidence inreachingits conclusions: a. Exhibits: R-ltiiroughR19andD-A, b. Testimony ofthe fbllowingpersons:None. c. Statement ofthe detainee: None, 4. Rulings by the Tribunal on Detainee Requests for Evidence or Witnesses The detamee requested no witnesses. The detainee requested no additional evidence be produced. ^. Discussion ofUnelassified Evidence The Recorderofti2redExhibitsR-landR-2mto evidence durmgthe unclassified portion ofthe proceeding. ExhibitR-lis the Unclassified Summary ofEvidence. While this summaryis helpfiilin that itprovidesabroadoutiineofwhatthe Tribunal can expectto see, itis notpersuasive in that itprovides conclusory statements wifbout supporting unclassified evidence. ExhibitR-2, the FBIredaction certification, provides no usable evidence. Because there was no otherunclassified evidence fbrtheTribtmal to consider, tbe Tribtmalhad to lookto the classified exhibits to supportthe assertions on the Unclassified Summary ofEvidence and the Tribunal'sconclusions. Adiscussion ofthe classified evidence is found inEnclosure (2) to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal DecisionReport. ^. CensuItationswiththeCSRTLegalAdvisor No issues arose duringthe course ofthis hearingthatrequired consultation witb the CSRTLegalAdvisor.

UNCLASSIFIED//i^^^

1S^#310 Enclosure (1^ P^ge^of3

2052
028008 ^ Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000040

IINCLASSIEIED//^^^^ 7. Conclusions ofthe Tribunal Upon careful review of all the evidence presented in this matter, the Tribunalmakes the following determinations: a. The detainee chose notto participate in the Tribunal proceeding. No evidence was produced that caused the Tribunal to question whetherthe detainee was mentally and physically capable ofparticipating in the proceeding, had he wanted to do so, Accordingly,no medical or mental health evaluation was requested or deemednecessary. b. The Personal Representative informed the Tribunal that the detainee understood the Tribunal process but chose notto participate, as hidicatedinExhibitD-A. c. The detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant because he was part of or supporting Taliban or AlQaida forces. 8. DissentingTribunalMember^s report None, The Tribunal reachedaunanimous decision. Respectfully submitted.

colonel, U.S.Army TribunalPresident

UNCLASSIFIED/ZPgaPGi

ISN #310
. Enclosure (1) Page 3 of3

2053
028009 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

000C0G41

UNCLASSIFIED/, DETAINEE ELECTION FORM Date; 15-Oct-04 StariTime: 1000 End Time: 1020 ISN#: 310 Personal Representative; (Name/Rank) Translator Required? YES Language?. ARABIC

CSRT Procedure Read to Detainee or Written Copy Read by Detainee? YES Detainee Election: I I [x] I I Wants to Participate in Tribunal Affirmatively Declines to Participate in Tribunal Uncooperative or Unresponsive

Personal Representative Comments: Detainee has elected NOT to participate in Tribunals. He has NO witness request

Personal Representative; UNCLASS:
028010 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

Exliibit,

gOA4

00000042

UNCLASSIFIED Combatant Status Review Board TQ: Personal Representative FROM: OIC, CSRT (30 September 2004) Subject: Summary ofEvidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal-AMEZIANE, Djamel SaiidAh 1. Under the provisions of the Secretary of the Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to review the detainee's designation as an enemy combatant 2. An enemy combatant has been defined as "an individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coabtion partners. This includes any person who committed a belligerent act or has dbectly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." 3. The United States Govemment has previously determined that the detainee is an enemy combatant This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that the detainee is associated with al Qaida. The detainee is associated with al Qaida: In late 2000, the detainee, who claims Algerian citizenship, traveled to Afghanistan fi-om Canada on afi'audulentpassport. 2. Prior to his departurefiximCanada, the detainee received 1,200 to 1,500 Canadian dollarsfiroma Tunisian man who had encouraged the detainee to travel to Afghanistan. 3. The detainee was instructed to go to a guesthouse in Kabul upon his arrival in Afghanistan, which direction the detainee ultunately followed. 4. The detainee noted that a number of the other residents of the guesthouse were Talibanfighters. 5. The guesthouse in Kabul was run by anal Qaida communications specialist 6. The detainee then stayed in a guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan witb a mmiber of Arab men. 7. The detainee traveled with Talibanfightersthrough the Tora Bora mountains during' the U.S. bombing campaign. 8. The detainee traveled illegally to Pakistan without any documentation and was captured by the Pakistani military at a mosque.

MS l^-f^
INACLASSIFIED
028011 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ^%Wifp/"f ^ j

00000043

^CLASSIFIED

9. Tbe detainee escapedfiomabusthatwasfi:^rciblyovertaken by otherprisoners with thedetainee,buthe was capturedagainashorttime later by Pakistani audiorities. 4. The detainee has the opportunityto contesthis designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavorto arrange f:^rthe presence ofanyreasonably available witnesses or evidence thatthe detainee desires to call orintroduce to prove thathe is not an enemy combatant. The TribunalPresidentwill determine the reasonable availability of evidence orwitnesses.

UNCLASSIFIED
028012
I

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

^
^^

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

0000004^^

UMCLA^ilHW
Memorandum

To

Department of Defense Date 09/28/2004 O f f i c e of Administrative Review f o r Detained Enemy Combat^ants Col. David Taylor, OIC, CSRT
FBI GTMO Counterterrorism Divi A s s t . Gen. Counsel
REQUEST FOR REDACTION OF LITY INFORMATION

From :

subject

^^ggjjlggg']

Pursuant t o the Secretary of the Navy Order of 29 J u l y 2004, Implementation of Combatant Review Tribunal Procedures f o r Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Section D, paragraph 2, the FBI requests redaction of the information herein marked^. The FBI makes t h i s request on t h e basis t h a t said information r e l a t e s t o the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of the United States'. Inappropriate dissemination o f s a i d information could damage the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of the United States and corrtpromise ongoing FBI i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . CERTIFICATION THAT REDACTED INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE IS NOT AN ENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s the aforementioned r e d a c t i o n contains no i n f o r m a t i o n that would support a determination t h a t the detainee i s not an enemy combatant. The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN 310 have been redacted by the FBI and provided t o the OARDEC: FD-302 dated 04/01/2002

I
I

^Redactions are blackened out on the OARDEC provided FBI document. ^See Executive Order 12958

mU^lf'^"
028013 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2057
^'KtlC^lT

m

^

00000045

tA/if/U'f^'?\f(^

Memorandum from W H R H H H to Col. David Taylor
Re: REQUEST FOR REDACTION, 09/28/2004

I f you need a d d i t i o n a l assistance, please contact Asst. Gen. Counsel i M I M i ^ ^ l f c — ( J B W B B B W B I ) , I J I B I B B B B B B B l M l B B B B B B W B i l i f t or, i n t e l l i g e n c e Analyst

# # (mmmmmmm) ^•MMBMBMHBBBMBMii.or
I n t e l l i g e n c e Analyst

K/uC/LA^';/^^
028014 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2058

00000046

\}f^ct^i'[ficj

Memorandum

To

Department o f Defense Date 10/27/2004 O f f i c e of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review f o r D e t a i n e d Enemy Combatants Capt. Charles Jamison, OIC, CSRT FBI GTMO Counterterrorism D i A s s t . Gen. Counsel REQUEST FOR REDACTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

From :

Subject

Pursuant t o the Secretary of t h e Navy Order o f 29 J u l y 2 004, I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Combatant Review T r i b u n a l Procedures f o r Enemy Combatants D e t a i n e d a t Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, S e c t i o n D, paragraph 2, t h e FBI r e q u e s t s r e d a c t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h e r e i n marked^. The FBI makes t h i s r e q u e s t on t h e b a s i s t h a t s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e s t o t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f the U n i t e d States'. Inappropriate d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d damage t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and compromise ongoing FBI investigations. CERTIFICATION THAT REDACTED INFORMATION DOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE I S NOT AN ENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d r e d a c t i o n c o n t a i n s no i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would s u p p o r t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e d e t a i n e e i s not an enemy combatant. The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN 888 have . been r e d a c t e d by t h e FBI and p r o v i d e d t o t h e OARDEC: FD-302 dated 05/03/02 ( I S N | M | i n t e r v i e w ) FD-302 d a t e d 05/04/02 ( I S N ^ M i n t e r v i e w )

^Redactions are blackened out on t h e OARDEC p r o v i d e d document. I I 'See E x e c u t i v e Order 12958

FBI

W
028015 ^ Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000047

Memorandum from i H H I H B ' t o Capt. Charles Jamison Re: REQUEST FOR REDACTION, 10/27/2004

I f you need a d d i t i o n a l assistance, please contact or I n t e l l i g e n c e Analyst (IA)

-22060
028016 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

#

00000048

UNCLASSIFIED//EOUO Personal Representative Reviewof tbe Record ofProeeedings

lacknowledge that on October 2004,Iwas provided the opportunity to reviewthe record ofproceedings forthe Combatant Status ReviewTribunal involving ISN #310.

^

I have no comments. My comments are attached.

"Za-OSjCA

Date
^ ^ '^ ^ ^ ^ ^ '^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ' ^

^ ^i^iamr^^^^

f
3

ISN #310 Enclosure (4)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
028017 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2061

00000049

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAIID FARHI, Petitioner,
V.

Civil Action No. 05-1347 (GK)

GEORGE W, BUSH, et al, Respondents. )
)

DECLARATION OF TERESA A. McPALMER Pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 1746,1, Commander Teresa A. McPalmer, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the following is true, accurate and correct: 1. I am the Legal Advisor to the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention

of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (OARDEC). In that capacity 1 am an advisor to the Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals. 2. 1 hereby certify that the documents attached hereto constitute a true and accurate

copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal related to petitioner Saiid Farhi that are suitable for public release. The portions of the record that are classified or considered law enforcement sensitive are not attached hereto or were redacted by an OARDEC staff member. This staff member also redacted information that would personally identify certain U.S. Govemment personnel in order to protect the personal privacy and security of those individuals. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is tme and correct.

Dated: 31 Q c Z ^

^oof

fl.

A A v — Teresa A. McPalmer CDR, JAGC, USN

2062
028018 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000050

Department of Defense
Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals

1^ m m
OARDEC/Ser: 383 itoit oimcLhL USE owtar
From: Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals Subj: REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #311 Ref (a) Deputy Secretary ofDefense Order of7 July 2004 (b) Secretary ofthe Navy Order of 29 July 2004

1. I concur in the decision ofthe Combatant Status Review Tribunal that Detainee ISN #311 meets the criteria for designation as an Eneny Combatant, in accordance with references (a) and (b). 2. This case is now consideredfinaland the detainee will be scheduled for an Administrative Review Board.

J.M. McGARRAH RADM, CEC, USN Distribution: NSC (Mr. John Bellinger) DoS (Ambassador Prosper) DASD-DA JCS (J5) SOUTHCOM (CoS) COMJTFGTMO OARDEC (Fwd) CITF Ft Belvoir

FOROFFICL\L USE U N L t

2063
028019 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000051

Department of Defense Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals
12 Oct 04 From; Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals Subj: APPOINTMENT OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL #15 Ref: (a) Convening Authority Appointment Letter of 9 July 2004

By the authority given to me in reference (a), a Combatant Status Review Tribunal established by "Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba" dated 29 July 2004 is hereby convened. It shall hear such cases as shall be brouglit before it without fuither action of referral or otherwise. The following commissioned officers shall serve as members of the Tribunal; MEMBERS: Colonel, U.S, Air Force; President lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Member ieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy; Member

CDll4#4lXA^
J. M. McGARRAH Rear Admiral Civil Engineer Corps United States Navy

2064
028020 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000052

UNCLASSIFIED 7Jan05 MEMORANDUM From: LegalAdvisor To: Director, Combatant Status ReviewTribunals Subj: LEGALSUFFICIENCYREVIEWQFCQMBATANTSTATUS REVIEWTRIBUNAL FQRDETAINEEISN#311 Ref (a) DeputySecretaryofDefense Order of7 July 2004 (b)Secretary ofthe Navy ImplementationDirectiveof29 July 2004

Encl: (l)AppointingQrder^rTribunal#15ofl2Qctober2004 (2) Record ofTribunalProceedings 1. Alegalsufficiencyreview has been convicted on the subject Combatant Status Review Tribunal in accordance withreferences(a) and (b), Afterreviewing the record ofthe Tribunal,l find that: a. Thedetainee wasproperlynotified ofthe Tribunal process and af^rmatively declined to participate in the hearing. b. The Tribunal was properly convened and constituted by enclosure (1). c. The Tribunal couched with the provisions ofre^ences(a) and (b). Note that some infbrmationinexhibitsR-3,R-4,R-8,andR-19was redacted. The FBI properly ceriified in exhibitsR-2andR-21 that the redacted in^rmation wouldnot supportadetermination that the detainee is not anenemy combatant. Additionally, the names oftwo law en^rcement agents andaiingtust was redactedfi^omexhibitR-17,It is clear that such redacted in^rmation would not supporiafinding that the detainee is not an enemy combatant, d. ExhibitsR-3throughR-6,R-13,R-16,andR-17containhandwrittennotesinthe margins. These notes apparently direct the Tribunal to the source ofthe information containedinthe allegations orto exculpatoryin^rmation. These notes do not alter the evidence. The notes are provided as an aid and do not afiect the legal suf^ciency ofthe document. e. The detainee did not request anywitnesses or evidence be presented on his behalf f The Tribunal'sdecision that detainee #311is properly classified as an enemy combatant was unanimous. g. The detainee^sPersonal Representative was given die opportunityto review the record ofproceedings and af^rmatively declined to submit comments to the Tribunal.

i^cr^ssiri^r^
028021 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

^0^5

00000053

UNCLASSIFIED Subj: LEGALSUFFICIENCYREVIEW OF COi^ATANTSTATUS REVIEWTRIBUNAL FQRDETAINEE1SN#311 2. The proceedings and decision ofthe Tribunal as recorded in enclosure (2) are legally suf^cient and no corrective action is required. 3. Irecornmend that the decision ofthe Tribunal be approved and the case be considered final.

^i^^4^^
T.AMcPALMER. CDR,JAGC,USN

2

UNCLASSIFIED
028022 Defense Reciprocai Discovery

^^^^ 2066

00000054

HEADQUARTERS. OARDEC FORWARD
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

4 November 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CSRT FROM: OARDEC FORWARD Commander SUBJECT: CSRT Record of Proceedmgs ICO ISN# 311 1. Pursuant to Enclosure (1), paragraph (I)(5) of the Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba dated 29 July 2004,1 am forwarding the Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report for the above mentioned ISN for review and action. 2. If there are any questions regarding this package, point of contact on this matter is the undersigned at DSN I

CHARLES E. CAPT, USN

2067
028023 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000055

^^^^^^/NQPOItN//^ (U) Combatant Status ReviewTribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet (U)ThisDocumentis UNCLASSIFIED UponRemovalofEnclosures(2)and (3), fU^TRlBUNALPANEi^: (U)1SN#: Ref: 311 #15

(a)(U)ConveningQrderforTribunal#15ofl2 October 2004(U) (b) (U)CSRTlmplementationDirectiveof29July2004(U) (c) (U)DEPSECDEFMemoof7July2004(U)

Encl: (l)(U)UnclassifiedSummary ofBasis fbr TribunalDecision (1^/^^^) (2) (U) Classified Summary ofBasis forTribunal Decision (S/NF) (3) (U) Copies ofDocumentary Evidence Presented (S/NF) (4) (U)PersonalRepresentative^sRecordReview(U/F^^^ 1, (U) This Tribunal was convened by references(a) and (b)tomakeadetermination as to whetherthe detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant as defined in reference(c). 2, (U) On 27 Qct2004 the Tribunal determined, byapreponderance ofthe evidence, tiiat Detainee #311is properly classified as an enemy combatant as defined in reference(c). 3, (U) In particular, the Tribunalfindsthatthis detamee isamember of or affiliated with alQaida, as more fully discussed in the enclosures. 4, (U) Enclosure (l)provides an unclassified account of the basis forthe Tribunal's decision. Adetailed account of the evidence considered bythe Tribunal and its findings of fact are contamed in enclosures (l)and (2).

1, USAF Tribunal President

DERV FM: Multiple Sources

SECRET//NOFORPr//XI
Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2068

om:^:^^

00000056

IINCLASSIFIED//^^^ I^CEASSIEIEDSI^MAR^0EDASISP0RTRI8I1^AE DECISION (Enclosure (I)to Combatant Status ReviewTribunalDeeision Repori) TRIBUNALPANEL: 1SN#: 311 L Introduction As the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) DecisionReport indicates, the Tribunal has determined that this detainee is properly classified asan enemy combatant. In reaching its conclusions, theTribunal considered both classified and unclassified information. The f^^liowing is an accoimt ofthe unclassified evidence considered by the Tribunal and otherpertinent information. Classified evidence considered by the Tribunal is discussed in Enclosure (2) to the CSRT DecisionReport. 2. Synopsis ofProeeedings The imclassified summary ofthe evidence presented to theTribtmal by the Recorder indicated that the detainee left Algeria in 1989 and lived in France fbr six to seven years. It fiirther mdicated that he lefi France, traveled to ltaly,then traveled to England in January 2001. While in England, the detainee attended the Finsbury Park andBaker Streetmosques,whichthe Unclassified Summary characterizedas^^known extremist mosques.^' The Unclassified Summarythen indicated that the detainee lefi England in June, 2001 to look fbrawife inAfghanistan, stayed in an Algerian house inAfgharustan, and then traveled to ^abul, where he stayed fbr one and one half months. Finally,the Unclassified Summary states that the detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities wliile attempting to cross the border into Pakistan and was laterinjured inabus accident while still in the custody ofthe Pakistanis, The detainee chose not to participate in the Tribunal process. He cailednov^tnesses and requested no documents be produced. The Tribunal initially met on21Qct 04, and reconvened to accept additional evidence and deliberate on27 Oct 04. 3. EvidenceConsideredbytheTribunal TheTribunal considered the following evidence in reaching its conclusions: a. Exhibits: D-aandR-ltiiroughR-21. 4. Rulings by the Tribunal on Detainee Requests for Evidence or Witnesses The Detainee requested no wimesses; no rulings were necessary. The Detainee requested no additional evidence be produced; no mlings were necessary. UNCLASSIFIED//i^^^ ISN#311
Enclosure(l) Pagelof3

#15

206^
028025 Defense Reciprocal Discoveiy

0000005^

UNCLASSIFIED//^^

^. Discussion ofunclassified Evidence The Tribunal considered the followingunclassified evidence inmakingits determinations: a. The recorder offered ExhibitsR-landR-2into evidence during the unclassified portion oftiie proceeding. ExhibitR-1 is the Unclassified Summary of Evidence. While this summary is helpfiilin that it providesabroad outline of what die Tribunal can expect to see, it is not persuasive in that it provides conclusory statements without supporting unclassified evidence. ExhibitR-2providedno usable evidence. When the Tribunal reopened fbrmore information, the Recorder of^red, along with certain classified exhibits, ExhibitR-21,which was another FBIrequest fbr Redaction of National Security Infinrmation. This exhibitprovidedno usable evidence. Accordingly, the Tribunal had to look to classified exhibits fbr support ofthe Unclassified Summary of Evidence. The Tribunal also relied on certain classified evidence inreaching its decision. A discussion of the classified evidence is found in Enclosure (2)to the Combatant Status ReviewTribunalDecisionReport. ^.Consultations witb the CSRTLegalAdvisor No issues arose during the course ofthis hearing thatrequired consultation with the CSRT legal advisor. 7. Conclusions of theTribunal Upon careful review of all the evidence presented in this matter, theTribunal makes the following determinations: a. The detainee was mentally and physically capable ofparticipating in the proceeding. No medical or mental health evaluation was deemed necessary. b. The detainee understood the Tribunal proceedings. The detainee chose not to participate in the Tribunal process, as indicated inExhibitD-a,buthis Personal Representative informed the Tribunal that the detainee had been fiilly informed ofhis rights and ofthe allegations in the Unclassified Summary ofthe Evidence, The Personal Representative told theTribunal that the detainee had actively participated in their meetings, but chose not to participate in the proceedings afierthinking about it overnight. c. The detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and isamember of^ or associated with alQaida.

UNCLASSIFIED//^^

ISN #311 Enclosure (1) Page 2 of3

2070
028026 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000058

UNCLASSmED//P^#

8. Dissenting Tribunal Member's repori None. The Tribtmal reached a unanimous decision. Respectfully submitted.

Tribunal President

UNCLASSIFIED//gffffft

ISN #311 Enclosure ( I ) Page 3 of3

2071
028027 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000059

UNCLASSIFIED//Fe» DETAINEE ELECTION FORM Date: 16 Oct 2004 StariTime: 0845 End Time: 0855 ISN#: 311 Personal Representative: p (Name/Rank) Translator Required? Y E S _ j H m ^

Language? ARABIC

CSRT Procedure Read to Detainee or Written Copy Read by Detainee? _YES Detainee Election: I I Wants to Participate in Tribunal Affirmatively Declines to Participate in Tribunal Uncooperative or Unresponsive

[x] I I

Personal Representative Comments: The detainee decided over night that participatmg in the tribunal was not a good decision for him. The detainee was courteous and cooperative during the initial and follow-up interviews. He does not want to participate because he does not believe that the CSRT process is real. He believes that it is a joke and that his case has been pre-decided. When asked ifhe wanted his PR to present any statements on his behalf at the tribunal, he declined.

Personal Representative: UNCLASSIIlED//lTOa
Exhibit I^^y2
028028 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000060

UNCLASSIFIED CombatantStatus Review Board TO; Personal Representative FROM: OIC, CSRT (29September2004) Subjeet Summary ofEvidence fbr Combatant Status ReviewTribtinal^FARI-|l,S2liid. 1, Under the provisions of the Secretary ofthe Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004,.^^^/^^^^^^^ii^^ ^C^^^i^^i^^^^^^^^,/^^vi^^^i^i^^/^^^^^^^^^,^^B^.^^^B^^C^^^^^^^ .^1^1^^/^^^C^^^,aTribunal has i^en appointed to reviewthe detainee'sdesignation asan enemy combatant. 2, An enemy combatant has been defined as ^^anindividual wbo was part of or supporting theTaliban or alQaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities againstthe United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who committedabelligerentact or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces," 3, The United States Oovemment has previously determined that the detainee is anenemy combatant. This determination is based on information possessed by the United States that indicates that he has known alQaida associations. The detainee isamember of or associated with, alQaida: 1, The detainee lefl Algeria in 1989 and wentto Prance, where he lived for six to seven years. 2, Detainee left France in 199^ or 1997 and traveled to ltaly,he then traveled to England in January 2001, 3, While in England, the detainee attended tbe Finsbury ParkMosqu^ and Baker Street Mosque, both known extremist mosques, 4, Detainee left England in June 201^1 to travel to Afghanistan, via Pakistan, to look forawife. 5, Detainee stayed in an Algerian house wiiiie in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, ^, Detainee traveled to Rabul where he stayed fbr one and one halfmonths, 7, Pakistani authorities captured detainee when he attempted to cross the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. ^, Detainee received iniuriesduringabus accident while in the custody of th^ Pakistani authorities. 4, Tbe detainee has the opportunity to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. TheTribunal will endeavorto arrange forthe presence of any reasonably available witnesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove thathe is not an enemy combatant. The Tribunal President will determine the reasonable availability ofevidence or witnesses, UNCLASSIFIED Eiidtibit:R-l ^ 0 ^ ^
028029 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

^^^^^t

Memorandum

To

'

Department o f Defense O^i^ 09/20/2004 O f f i c e o f A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review f o r D e t a i n e d Enemy Combatants Col. David T a y l o r , OIC, CSRT FBI GTMO Counterterrorism Division A s s t . Gen. Counsel REQUEST FOR REDACTIONOF SIGNAL SECURITY INFORMATION

From '

Subj^c^

Pursuant t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e Navy Order o f 29 J u l y 2004, I m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Combatant Review T r i b u n a l Procedures f o r Enemy Combatants D e t a i n e d a t Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, S e c t i o n D, paragraph 2, t h e FBI r e q u e s t s r e d a c t i o n o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n h e r e i n marked^. The FBI makes t h i s r e q u e s t on t h e basis t h a t s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e s t o the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of t h e U n i t e d States'. I n a p p r o p r i a t e d i s s e m i n a t i o n o f s a i d i n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d damage t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and compromise ongoing FBI i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . CERTIFICATION THAT REDACTED INFORl^TIONDOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATION THAT THE DETAINEE IS NOT AN ENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d r e d a c t i o n c o n t a i n s no i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would s u p p o r t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e d e t a i n e e i s not an enemy combatant. The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN 311 have been r e d a c t e d by t h e FBI and p r o v i d e d t o t h e OARDEC: FD-302 dated 0^/27/2002 FD^302 dated 10/10/2002
^^^^^^^^ ^^/^^^^c^^^

^Redactions a r e blackened document. 'See E x e c u t i v e Order 12958

o u t on t h e OARDEC p r o v i d e d

FBI

Exhibit H V
028030 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

ift^
000C0062

Memorandum from Re: REQUEST FOR^R

t o Col. David Taylor ' , 09/20/2004

I f you need addi

stance, please contact

^^lalystHH

-2-

028031

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

14L
00000063

Memorandum

To

Department o f Defense Dai^ 10/27/2004 O f f i c e of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review f o r Detained Enemy Combatants Capt. Charles Jamison, OIC, CSRT FBI GTMO Counterterrorism D i v i s i i : Asst. Gen. Counsel REQUEST FOR REDACTIONOF ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^CURITY ^IR^ INFORMATION

From ^

subje^

Pursuant t o the Secretary of the Navy Order of 29 J u l y 2004, Implementation of Combatant Review Tribunal Procedures f o r Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Section D, paragraph 2, t h e F B I requests redaction of the i n f o r m a t i o n h e r e i n marked^. The FBI makes t h i s request on the basis t h a t said i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e s t o the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of the United States'. Inappropriate disseminationof saidinformationcoulddamage thenational s e c u r i t y of the United States and compromise ongoing FBI investigations. CERTIFICATIONTHAT REDACTED INFORMATIONDOES NOT SUPPORT A DETERMINATIONTHATTHE DETAINEE IS NOT ANENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s the aforementioned r e d a c t i o n contains no i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would support a determination t h a t the detainee i s not an enemy combatant. The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN 311 have been redacted by the FBI and provided t o the OARDEC: FD-302 dated 03/30/02 FD^302 dated 0^/12/02

^Redactions are blackened out on the OARDEC provided FBI document. 'See Executive Order 12958

Exhibit K<^( 2076
028032 Defense Reciprocal Discovery \ 0 ^ 2^

00CG0G64

Memorandum from ^ g ^ g g g y t o Col. David Taylor Re: REQUEST FOR REDACTION, 10/27/2004

I f you n

lease contact

_2_ oP
2077
028033 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000065

UNCLASSIFIED//^^

Personal Representative Review of the Record of Proceedings

I acknowledge that on October 20041 was provided the opportunity to review the record of proceedings for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal mvolving ISN #311.

^

I have no comments. My comments are attached.

ZA)/
Date

ISN #311 Enclosure (4)

UNCLASSIFIED//]^^L
028034 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2078

00000066

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT , FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MUHAMiVIAD KHAJSrrUMANI, Petitioner )
)

Civil Action No. 05-526 (RMU)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH, et al,
)

)
)
)

Respondents.
.

DECLARATION OF TERESA A. McPALMER Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,1, Commander Teresa A. McPalmer, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Navy, hereby state that to the best of my icnowledge, information, and belief, the following is true, accurate and correct: 1. I am die Legal Advisor to the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention

of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (OARDEC). hitiiatcapacity I am an advisor to the Director, Combatant States Review Tribunals. I hereby certify that the documents attached hereto constitate a tme and accurate copy of the portions of the record of proceedings before the Combatant States Review Tribunal related to petitioner Muhammad Khantemani that are suitable for pubhc release. The portions of the record that are classified or considered law enforcement sensitive are not attached hereto or have been redacted by an OARDEC staff member. This staff member also redacted mformation that would personally identify U.S. Government personnel and foreign nationals in order to protect the personal security of those individuals.

2079
028035 Defense Reciprocal Discovery . ,

"

00000067

Ideclareunderpenaltyofpetjurythat the fbregoingistiue and correct.

Dated: if ii/l^ ZoO-T
^ U

.jt^ A.

{^'-L^

TeresaA. McPalmer CDR, JAGC, USN

2080
028036 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000068

Department ofDefense Director, Combatant Status Review Tribimals OARDEC/Ser: 9 9 2
FOR OEEICLa ITQF OMT.' From: Director, Combatant States Review Tribunal Subj: REVIEW OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL FOR DETAINEE ISN #312 Ref: (a) Deputy Secretary ofDefense Order of 7 July 2004 (b) Secretary ofthe Navy Order of 29 July 2004

m

1. I concur in the decision of the Combatant States Review Tribunal that Detainee ISN #312 meets the criteria for designation as an Enemy Combatant, in accordance with references (a) and (b). 2. This case is now consideredfinaland the detainee will be scheduled for an Administrative Review Board.

CZ>yi4#Wt(_
W. M. McGARRAH RADM, CEC, USN Distribution: NSC (Mr. John B. Wiegmann) DoS (Ambassador Prosper) DASD-DA JCS(J5) SOUTHCOM (CoS) COMJTFGTMO OARDEC (Fwd) CITF Ft Belvohr

•TOR OFFICIAL USE OjSH£:

2081
028037 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

000CCC69

Department of Defense Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals
8 Nov 04 From; Director, Combatant Status Review Tribunals Subj: APPOINTMENT OF COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL #20 Ref: (a) Convening Authority Appointment Letter of 9 Jidy 2004

By the authority given to me in reference (a), a Combatant Status Review Tribunal established by 'Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures fbr Enemy Coinbatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba" dated 29 July 2004 is hereby convened. It shall hear such cases as shaU be brought before it without finthira action of refsrral or otherwise. ThefoUowingcommissfened officers shall serve as members of ths TribunalMEMBERS: Colonel, U.S. Army; President Commander, JAGC, U.S. Navy; Meniber (JAG) I Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy; Member

CZ))11#^f^a^__-

./•
L M . McGARRAH Rear Admiral Civil Engineer Corps United States Navy

2082
028038 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000070

HEADQUARTERS, OARDEC FORWARD
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 .

17 December 2004 MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, CSRT FROM: OARDEC FORWARD Commander SUBJECT: CSRT Record of Proceedings ICO ISN 312 1. Pursuant to Enclosure (1), paragraph (I)(5) of the Implementation of CombatantStatus Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba dated 29 July 2004,1 am forwarding the Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report for the above mentioned ISN for review and action. 2. Iftiiereare any questionsregardmgtiiispackage, point of contact ontiiismatter is tiie undersigned at DSI

CHARLES CAPT, USN

2083
028039 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000071

-APfziMfTZ/NnpnuN/niri
(U) Combatant Status Review Tribunal Decision Report Cover Sheet (U) This Document is UNCLASSIFIED Upon Removal of Enclosures (2) and (4),

(U) TRIBUNAL PANEL: _ _ # 2 0 _ (U')ISN#; Ref: 312

(a) (U) Convemng Order for Tribunal #20 of 8 November 2004 (U) (b) (U) CSRT Implementation Durective of 29 July 2004 (U) (c) (U) DEPSECDEF Memo of 7 July 2004 (U)

Encl: (1) (U) Unclassified Summary ofBasis for Tribtmal Decision (U/lJ©6d) (2) (U) Classified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision (S/NF) (3) (U) Summary of Detainee and Witness Testimony (U/E8^0) (4) (U) Copies ofDocumentary Evidence Presented (S/NF) (5) (U) Memorandum for tiie Record of 4 December 2004 (U/E^W) (6) (U) Personal Representative's Record Review (U/E©«0) 1. (U) This Tribunal was convened by references (a) and (b) to make a determination as to whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant as defined in reference (c). 2. (U) On 9 December 2004, the Tribunal determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Detainee #312 is properly designated as ah enemy combatant as defined in reference (c). 3. (U) In particular, the Tribunalfindsthat this detainee is a member of, or affiliated with, al Qaida forces and associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, as more fiilly discussed in the enclosures. 4. (U) Enclosure (1) provides an unclassified account ofthe basis for the Tribunal's decision. A detailed accoimt of the evidence considered by the Tribunal and its findings of fact are contained in enclosures (1) and (2).

Colonel, U.S. Army Tribunal President

DERV FM: Multiple Sources DECLASS: XI
028040

SFrRFT/ZNOF^PN/i^

2084
Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000072

UNCLASSIFIED//^^^^^

UNCLASSIEIEDSUMMARV0E^ASISE0RTRI8UNAEDECISI0N
(Enclosure (I) to Combatant Status ReviewTribunal Decision Repori) TRIBUNALPANEL: ISN#: 312 I . Introduction As the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Decision Report indicates, the Tribunal has determined thatthis detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and was part ofor supporting alQaida forces and associated forces that are engagedinhostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. Inreaching its conclusions, theTribunal considered both classified and unclassified information. The following is an account ofthe unclassified evidence considered bythe Tribunal and other pertinent information. Classified evidence considered bytiieTribunalisdiscussedmEnclosure(2) to the CSRT DecisionReport, 2.SynopsisofProceedings The Tribunal conducted this hearing on9December 2004, TheRecorderpresented ExhibitR-landR-2dufing the unclassified portion ofthe Tribunal. The principal exhibit, the Unclassified Summary ofEvidence (ExhibitR-1), mdicates, among otherthings, that: the detainee is associated with the Taliban or alQaida; the detainee traveled fi:om Syria to Afghanistan in 2001;thedetainee'sfatherisaveteranMuiahidui fighter; the detainee trained at^^^^^^^training camp in 2001;the^^^^^^^^training camp wasabasic training facility fbr Jihadistsagaitistthe coalition; while at^^^^^^^^^^ the detainee trained on the Kalishnikovrifie, pistols, light weapons, grenades, and the Bika weapons system; the detainee admitted to traveling through the Tora Bora Mountains inAfghanistan; the detainee was in Kabul, Afghanistan when itwas defeated; and, afterthe fall ofKabul, the detainee fied to Jalalabad and subsequently to Pakistan, where he was arrested. The Recorder called no witeesses. The detainee participated actively in the Tribunal proceedings, Hesubmittedawritten statement, ExhibitD-b, and then answeredTribtmalmembers'questions. The detainee's swom testimony and the answers to the questions posed to him are summari2;edin Enclosure (3)to the CSRTDecisionReport. The detainee called one witeess. Duringthe classified session ofthe Tribunal, the RecorderpresentedExhibitsR-3through R-24,commentingthatExhibitsR-3throughR-8 supported the Unclassified Summary of Evidence and ExhibitsR-9throughR-25 provided amplifying information. The Personal Representative presented Exhibits D-candDd, providing brief comments. After considering ali ofthe classified and imclassified evidence, the Tribunal determined that the detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant. UNCLASSIFIED//^^^^^^ 1SN^31^
Enclosure (1) Pa^elof3

#20

2085
028041 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

0000007^

UNCLASSIFIED//^^^

3. Evidence Considered by the Tribunal The Tribunal consideredthe following evidence inreaching its conclusions: a. Exhibits: R-1 tiuoughR-24,andD-atiiroughD-d, b. Testimony ofthe fbllowmg person: ISN^ Enclosure(3)totheCSRTDecisionReport). c. Swomstatementofthe detainee: SeeEnclosure(3)totiie CSRTDecisionReport. 4. Rulings bythe Tribunal on Detainee Requests for Evidence or Witnesses The detainee'sone witness request, fbr his father,^ ^^^^^^^^^was approved. See Enclosure(5) to the CSRTDecisionReport. The detainee requested tt^ additional evidence be produced. ^. Discussion ofunclassified Evidence TheTribunal considered tbe fbllowingimclassifiedevidencemmakingitsdeterminatiotis: a. The Recorder ofieredExhibitsR-landR-2into evidence duringthe unclassified portion ofthe proceeding.ExhibitR-1 is the Unclassified Summary ofEvidence. While this summary is helpfid in thatitprovidesabroad outline ofwhatthe Tribtmal can expect to see, itis notpersuasive inthat itprovides conclusory statements without supporting unclassified evidence. ExhibitR-2, the FBIredaction certificate, provided no useful inf:^rmation.Accordmgly,theTribunalhadtd look to other evidence to supportthe assertions in the Unclassified Summary ofEvidence. b. As noted in paragraph2, above, the detainee submittedawritten statement and provided swom testimony,responding to each ofthe allegations on the Unclassified Summaty ofEvidence. Afterwards, he answered questions posed by theTribunal members. In sum, the detainee denied beingamember ofthe Taliban or alQaida. He assertedthathis father drewhimtoAfghanistanfiom Syria, He furtiier stated thathe had no knowledge ofhis father'sactivities while he was inAfghanistan and desired to retum to Syria to complete his stedies, Asummarized transcript ofthe detainee'sswom testimony is attached as CSRTDecisionReportEnclosure (3).

UNCLASSIFIED//1^^^^

1SN^31^
Enclosure (1^ P^ge2of3

2086
028042 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

0000007^

UNCLASSIFIED//^^^^^ 6. Consultations with the CSRT Legal Advisor The Tribunal consulted the CSRT Assistant Legal Advisorregarding allegations made by the detainee in his written statement and inhistestimonythat Pakistani of^cials in the presence ofU.S.officials torturedhim, and inaU.S,facility. He also claims thatUS. soldiers abused him. As per instmctions, the OARDEC Forward Chief ofStaff and the OARDEC LiaisontotheCriminallnvestigationTaskForce and JTF-GTMOwere notified of the matters onllDecember 2004. These allegations, on behalf ofboth detainee andhis father, have previously been reported on22 November 2004, fbllowmgthe father's Tribunal. 7. Conclusions of the Tribunal Upon careful review of all the evidence presented in this matter, the Tribunal makes the following determinations: a. The detainee was mentally and physically capable ofparticipatingmthe proceeding. No medical ormentalhealthevaluationwas deemednecessary, b. The detainee understood the Tribunal proceedings and activelyparticipated throughout the hearing. c. The detaineeis properly classified as an enemy combatant because he was part of or supporting alQaida forces and associated forces thatareengagedinhostihties against the United States or its coalition partners, 8. Dissenting Tribunal Member's repori None. The Tribunal reachedaunanimous decision. Respectfiilly submitted.

Colonel, US. Army TribunalPresident

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

UNCLASSIFIED//PG#8

ISN #312
Enclosure (1) Page 3 of3

2087
028043 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000075

UNCLASSIFIED//E^@. Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement The Tribunal President read the Hearing Instructions to the Detainee, and confirmed that the Detainee understood and had no questions. Making reference to the Detainee Election form, the Tribunal President confirmed the Detainee's participation, and that he had requested one Witness that was readily available. Also indicated on the Detainee Election form was a written statement from the Detainee, Exhibit D-B. The Unclassified Summary of Evidence (ExhibitR-1) was read in full to the Tribunal by the Recorder. Also provided to the Tribunal by the Recorder was Unclassified ExhibitR-2. The TribunalPresident then permitted the Detainee to present evidence, and advised him he had the assistance of his PersonalRepresentative in doing so. The Detainee took the Muslim oath. Tribunal President: Personal Representative, would you read each allegation, and allow the Detainee to respond to each ofthe allegations? Personal Representative: Madam President, the Detainee has prepared in writing a statement he'd like to read to the Tribunal that addresses all of the allegations. Tribunal President: (to the Detainee) Would you prefer responding to the allegations, submitting your statement, or reading your statement? Detainee: If there's no objection, I will read the statement Tribunal President: OK. Personal Representative: I have a translated copy of Exhibit D-B, which is the statement he is going to read into the record. Detainee Statement (Exhibit D-B) Before I begin defendmg myself, I would present my gratitade to all tiie members at this tribunal and to the personal representative and the translator and to everyone who helped in allowing me to defend myself; but unfortunately, I would like to let you know that we have heard, and severaltimes,about this court, that it is merely a game presented against the detainees. As for the two words "Enemy Combatant", this is tiie verdict that has been presented to every detainee, for as I have understood, that the detainee, no matter what he did, this verdict will not be lifted for him even if he did the impossible. But, I said a game, not to mock anyone present now, but that is what I heard and I grew more sure that
ISN#312 Enclosure (3)

Page 1 of 21 UNCLASSIFIED//^©©©
028044 ' Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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UNCLASSIFIED//^^^ it isagamewhenlheard thatall the detainees are enemy combatants andlhaven'theard of one who has left as innocent except fbr one person. At the start of defending myselfl will saythatthere are numerous andmany issues that you must look at, and among these issues is my story a n d l w ^ say it inamoderate maimer, neither longnor short and ifyou want details about everywordthenlwill elaborate. Thestoryis;Iamtiiedetameeowneroftiienumber312 IlefiSyriamtiieyear2001,at the endofthesixthmonth,withmembers ofmy family. Theirnumber comes to nine, andlam theirtenth. Our departure, all ofus, was withpapers that were in order^visa, passport, necessary stamps^so we lefi Syria to Iran. Whenmy father called to the hotel and said come to the Iranian-Afgh^ border, we wentto him. Afterthat, we went to Kabul and we stayedinitthe whole tune, three months, and yet close to two months and more after our stayinKabul,myuncle'swife came andher kids and their arrival was only one week before the events,Imean the event ofthe eleventh ofSeptember. Our stay in Kabul wasmahousethatmy father had rented. During our stay inKabul,Idid not leave the house except to go to the supermarket close by. Iwas always discussing withmyfather and askingto go back to Syria again to continue my stedies, but he said to waituntil he had collectedhis money and afiertiiat we will go to Saudi Arabia. Afier that, the events happened andAmerica announced that there would beawar against Afghanistan, so we left immediately afier America'satmotmcement ofthe war. Weleft to Jalalabad so we could go to Pakistan to save ourselves fiom the war. Westayedin Jalalabadfbraperiod of one month and afterthatwe left withthe family toavillage so we couldleave to Pakistan. At our arrival, and before our family got out, the residents of the village toldmyfatherthattwoofyoushould stay here and two should go with the family so my father chose me to remain withhim and the family lefito Pakistan. The reason thatmade the village'sresidents separate us is thathighwayrobbers and thieves are abundant, so ifthey see you theymightidll you andkill tiie children and take the women. Afterthat, the village people tookmy father andme to another village and we stayed init forafew days. Afterthatvillage,wewenttoanothervillage and we stayed in itforafewdaysaswell. Afterthat, the village people told my fatherthatthere was no means of gettingto Pakistan except bywalkingmthemountaitis, so we walked in the mountains forthree days,keepinginmindthatwedidn'tknowthe name ofthose motmtains orthe name ofthe villages. Upon our arrival in the Pakistani village, we stayed in it forafew days and afterthattheytook us to the prison; that was inthe first dayofEID,mtiieafiemoon Keepmmmdtiiatwehadnotdoneanycrinieoranyillegal act During our stay inKabul, my fatiier'sjobwasmarestaurant Ididnot see the restaurant, butlsaw him, how he prepared the fbodmthehoiise and then wentin the mortiingto the markettosellit As forthe members ofmy family,theywere all withmy family(sixteen individuals). Amongtiiem was my grandmother, aged 67,andaninfant also, his age was eightmonths.
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UNCLASSIFIED/^l^UO As forthe presence ofthese two people in this family,these two people didnothave teeth, so tl^t should clue youinandmake clearto youmyfather'sgood intentions and the purpose fbrwhichhe left. Andhis arrival with two people suchas these should also make clearto youthathe has no relationship withfightingorwar or any groups oral Qaida or Taliban, I w i l l begin the defense ofmyself, Istate thatthe tmth and the facts ofthe storythati presenttoyounow, so ifyou wantthe tmth and the facts, then this is i t Ifyou want otherwise, you can take what you want, Thepersonalrepresentative has presented tiie accusations and the core accusation says tbatlam fiom the Tahban or alQaida. First: Ifyou wishforme to swearthatthis item is mcorrect,Iam prepared andlhavea witness to testify thatlhave no relationship withanyone fiom alQaida orthe Taliban or any other group. Second: As forthe two words Talibanand alQaidaandotherwords like Jihad and Mii^aliiden,Ihadnotheard of all these words before, butlhadheard them forthe first thne in the prisonhere whenlwas asked before bythe interrogators. "AreyouTaliban?"^ Iwould sayno, "AreyouQaida?"Iwouldsayno. Isayto you simply and easilythati am not fiom the Taliban or fiom alQaida or evenfiom any other group. Infact,Iam againstanyperson who commits hostile acts and violent acts.Formy father and I, we wishfbreverypersonmthe world to live withfteedom and safety and peace and peace ofmind whetherthat person was small or big, man orwoman. And we said in the interrogation thatwhen the events happened,Imean the 11th ofSeptember, we cried and we were greatly saddenedand we said in the interrogation also thatmy grandmother, this old woman, cried and said "what is the innocentpeople'sfault, to be killed?" Andme, mywholeli^,Ineverlefl:Syriaandneverlefimy city and this wasthe firsttimelhad lefi my country and my age whenlleftwas close to eighteen years. And you could know,from our stay here in this place, ifwe were combatants to you or noncombatants, for each one of you can go back to my behavior file and lookfbr yourself. But despite tiiat,Iwiilmention to youmanypieces of evidence thatwillshowyouthatwe have no relationship with any ofthe groups atall,neithermyfatiiernorme. From these stories and pieces of evidence: SeveraltimesmyfatiierandIsawapieceofmetaltiiatcouldhave,astiiesoldiersaid aboutit, been used asaweapon and could have causedharm. When we sawthese pieces, we took them immediately and tumed them in to the soldiers, This happened approximately over 15 times and this is allrecorded with the date ^ i ^ m e ^ ^ ^ e ^ ^ recentpast, on the 20th ofNovember,Isawtwo pieces ofmetalm^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ and^vethemtotiiesoldier Also,ontiie29^ofNovember,Isawi^^ ^^^^^^^^^apiece ^ ^ e t a ^ ^ n long andlgaveitto the soldier immediately. Onthe 2 ofDecember,it^^^^^^^^^^^^my father sawapieceofmetal and gave itto the soldier. On the4^^ofDecember,IsawapieceofmetalandIgave itto the soldier and 4^ ofDecember,atnight,in^^^^^^^^^^^^a soldier gave meamask to hangmy Koran. This mask comes withapieceofmetal, and the soldier fbrgotto take the piece ofmetal
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UNCLASSIFIED/^^^^^^ fiom itbefore giving itto me. So, he gave itto me with the piece ofmetal i n i t Itook the metal andlgave itto the soldier andhe thankedme andhe wrote that on the computer. Andlhave mentioned these stories first becauselrememberthe date and the other stories arebiggerandmoredangeroustiiattiiefirststory.Ihavedoneverygooddeedstiiat showyoumygoodintentionsandmyhonestyandmyfatiier'shonesty.Itdoesnotmake sense atah iflwas an enemy combatant, thatlwould give backthose things and the piece^fmet^thatcouldinfiictharm. And another story: one timelwas in the walkway in^^^^^^^^andlsawapiece ofmetal 20 cm long, soltook it immediately and gave it to the soldiers. Afiertbis good deed one ofthe soldiers came andinsteadofthankingme, he proceeded to threaten to kill me. He saidlwill cut your head and yourneck, without me doing anythingto him. Look athowthe reward was fiom this soldier, instead of thanking me forthis deedhe threatened to killme. And the supervisors afterwards kicked him out ofthe Block and wroteareportaboutthat and all the supervisors sawthis that day. And the other storyit^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ also sawapiece ofmetal inside the room and that metal was the remains ofwelding,andItold the soldier about i t And the other story happened in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^inroom^^^ Inotifiedtheautiiorities about i t The room is still there and you canseeitand the soldiers can all testifythatmyfather andlhave done this thing and they will also testify thatwe have no problems with any ofthe soldiers. Wehave maintained good behavior andfine maimers in spite of all the pressuresaround us and in spite ofthe threats and the torture that we have been through. Iwillmention the stories where we have been through torture and threats, andlwill mention where that was, andlwill mention the reason also. During our stay in tbe Pakistani prison, we were subiected to beatings and harsh torture, Thetoriureledtomynosebemgbroken;youcanseeitmfi^ontofyounowDuringtiie time we were beingtortured, there were Americans present During ourstaymthe American prisonmKandahar, we were suiijected to torture. The reason was thattheywanted us to saythatwe were fiom alQaida orthe Tahban by force. Myfather'sfbrehead wasfi;acturedand the Red Cross sawthis and wroteareport My lefihand was fiacturedandlsufferedmany diseases as well and there were also other methods ofpsychological pressure and fatigue like sleep deprivation fbr long hours and notgoingto relieve yourselfandthatisamongthe necessities for humans. Thatprison was tmderthe management of Americans, During oiu: stay in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^we were subjected to bad treatment and the r was so thatwe could say,byfbrce, thatwe were fiom al Qaida ortheTaliban. In one of these stories, one ofthe interrogators broughttwo wires cotmectedto electricity and said that ifyou do not saythatyou and yourfatiier arefi:omalQaida or Taliban,Iwill place
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UNCLASS1FIED//F^^^ these in yotuneck. Anothertime, he drew knives and said " i f you don'tsay you are fiom alQaida or Taliban, we will bringthe knives and cutyour hands and put saltin them." Also, in that same place, one ofthe interrogators beatme inmy face and atthattimel was drinking water, so he hitthe cup andhitme as well. The reasonwas thathe wanted me to say by force thatmy father andlwere fiom alQaida or Taliban. Also,in^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^the soldiers came and threatened us and told us "we killed your family." During out stay in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^we were exposed to death threats and threats of handing us overto other countries so tbey could torture us there, and afterthatthey would bringusbackhere. Andltold you that one time afierlgave the soldierthe metal, which was 20 cm long, the soldierthreatened to killme. Also, the soldiers in this place told us twice that they killed our family and they said we knowthat they are 14individuals. Afterthat, the interrogators tried pressuring and torturingus, to compel us by force to say thatwe were fiom alQaida orthe Taliban. When they failed at what theywanted,tiiey came to us with temptation and enticement and theyproposed to us thatwe lie aboutthe detainees in this place in exchange foracar, ahouse,andAmerican citizenship. Theyto said to us "he about the detainees and we will give you these things"; we refiised because we do not know anyone. Iam sure that this method oftemptationwas followed withmany ofthe detainees. Iam sure thatmany ofthe detainees bed about other detamees without prior knowledge and all this false cooperationhappened forthe sake ofpersonal advantage andfbr the sake ofthe implication ofthe detainees and forthe sake of getting out ofthis place. Solask of you to lookinto my case thoroughly. Andfinally,ofthisaccusationIrepeat again that we are notfiom alQaida orthe Tahban or any other group atall and we don'thave any relationship with wars orfighting. My fatherwihtestifytiiatlamnot of any group atall, andmyfamilywilltestifytiiatlamnotofanygroupatall Theywilltestifytiiatmy father also does nothaveanyrelationship with any group at all. One ofthe interrogators madearequestofme and said to me "ifyou said thatyourfatheris fiom alQaida orthe Taliban we will take you out ofthis place and we will send youhome." Itoldhimthat my fatheris not fiom any group at all and this is the tmth, fbrmy father isafbod seller only and nothing else. ^^^B^^i;^c^t^.^i^^^i^^, and it states tiiatltraveled fiom Syria to Afghatiistanmthe year 2001, The answer is yes,ltraveled fiom Syria to Afghanistan with papers thatwere in order and official and itis available to you. That was in the sixthmonth oftiie year 2001,inthe end ofthe sixtiimonth. Syria, whichismy original counti^,didnotforbidanypersonfi^omgomgtoanyplacem the world exceptfbr one country,and that is Israel. Itwas written onthe passport "travel to everywhere in the world is permitted exceptfbr Israel" and you can go backto the Syrianpassport office andlookinto this piece ofinformation.
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Therefore, I don't see any problem in this accusation because I proceeded with papers that were in order and through legal means. And I did not commit anything illegal. Knowing that I entered before the events of the eleventh and beforetiiewar and in Afghanistan, I stayed at the house during my whole time and I did not leave it and my father can testify to that. The second accusation says that my father is a veteran mujahideenfighter.My father has defended himself against this accusation at his tiial, but I will repeat agam that my father does not have any relationship with al Qaida or the Taliban or any group at all. Neither does he know wars and he doesn't have any relationship with wars and he didn't leave Syria, except twice and both times were in the year 1999, once to Saudi Arabia and the other time to Afghanistan. So how can this accusation say that he is a veteran fighter, when in his entire life he's never left his country except for those two times? My father worked m a restaurant hi Kabul and I haven't seen this restaurant, but I saw how he used to place the food m the housetiiengo in the moming to the market to sell it I swear, if you wish,tiiatmy fatiier is not afighterand not al Qaida or Taliban and does not belong to any other group at all. NOTE: The detamee skipped accusations 3,4 and 5 on the Unclassified Summary of evidence for reasons noted below. The third accusation [Number 6 on the Unclassified Summary] says that the detainee admitted that hetiaveledthrough the mountains of Tora Bora in Afghanistan. At thistime,the Detainee departed momentarily from his written statement and stated the following. Detainee: Would you permit me to ask a question? Tribunal President: Yes. Detainee: Regardmg|||||HB| would you like me to respond to that or not? Tribunal President: Do you want to complete your statement herefirst,then respond to that allegation? Detainee: OK. The Detainee resumed reading aloud his written statement Exhibit D-B. I said in the interrogation, when I was asked how I got out of Jalalabad, I said that I got out of Jalalabad witii my family to a village and aftertiiatwe got separatedfiromour , family. My father and I were left, and the residents of the village took us to another village. We stayed in it for some days and after that we went to another village and we
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UNCLASSIFIED//F8G8 stayed for some days as well. After that, the residents ofthe village said that there was no way to get to Pakistan except for walking in the mountams. So we walked in the mountains for three days, not knowing what the name of those motmtains were, nor the names ofthe villages that we stayed in. That is all what I said in the interrogation and I did not say anything more. The fourth accusation [Number 7 on the Unclassified Summary] says that the detainee was in Kabul when it was defeated. The TribunalPresident briefiy interrupted to make a correction as to the sequence of the allegations. Tribunal President: The third accusation [according to the Unclassified Summary] reads the Detainee trained a t | H 0 t i - a i n i n g camp; just so we clarifytiiisis not actealfy tiie third accusation you just read. If you don't mind, could you please explain or respond to the third accusation. Detainee: Could I ask the Personal Representative a question? Tribunal President: Yes. The Detainee spoke briefly with his PersonalRepresentative Detainee: (addressing the Tribunal President) The other accusation talking about this place is thefirstI have heard of this place; I have never heard ofthis place before. I don't know where it is: is it in Turkey or Syria? I don't know where it is. Tribunal President: What place? Detainee: Th^NUN^camp. Tribunal President: So, if I imderstand you, you did not know whereJ m U f w a s ? Detainee: No, not entirely. Tribunal President: Then let me ask another question. Is the rest of your statement going to correspond to the Unclassified Summary? : Detainee: Yes, but according to the portions a b o u t j | H ^ H l have told you and my Personal Representative that I have not heard of this place before. Tribtmal President: It might be helpfid for us, when we put this into a transcript, that we identify which allegation you're answering and that you read it, so we know what the . answer is; do you understand?
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UNCLASSIFIED//^^©^ Detainee: The thirdaccusation[inDetainee written statementExhibitD-B],is the sixth accusation written on the Unclassified Summary. TribunalPresident: That'sthereasonlwanted to clarify it, so whenit'sadmittedinto the record and someone else is reading it, they won't be confiised when they look at your statementanditreads third orfburthallegation on the Unclassified Summary; do you understand? Detainee: Yes. Verywell. Iwrote nothing about atallnumbers three, four and five, becauselknownothing aboutthis place, andldon'tknow anything aboutthese weapons. TribunalPresident: So does the fourth allegationmyour statement correspond to the fourth allegation on the Unclassified Summary? Detainee:No.Numbers three,fi^urandfive,Iwrotenothing aboutat all becausel wantedto answerthem orally. TribunalPresident: Itmderstand;Ijustwanted to make itamatter of record thatthey acteally do notcorrespond to the Unclassified Summary. Detainee: lerased three, four andfive,andmadenumberthree aboutthe mountains of ToraBora. Tm talking aboutthe fourth accusation, butyouhave the fburthas the seventh accusation.Myfi^urth[fiomhis statement] says thatlwasmKabulwhenitwas defeated. ^^l^^^^^^^^r^^^^^^^^^if^^^^^^^^^e^^^^^^^e. The answer:Isaid in the interrogation thatwhenlheardthatAmerica was goingto start war againstAfghanistan we leftKabul to Jalalabad. Wedidn'tsee the war; we didn't see the defeat ofKabul or even the defeat ofJalalabad, This accusation is incorrectand the dateprovestiiattoyouandmyfatiier,ifyouaskhim,willtellyouwhen weleft The fifth accusation [Number8on the Unclassified Summary]: says afterthe fall of Kabul the Detaineefiedto Jalalabad and then to Pakistan where he was arrested.
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^ri^^^^^^^^^^B^^ Detamee: Willyoupermitmetogoandpray? TribunalPresident Weneedto go aheadand try to complete this. DetaineerThe time is very specific, ifyou would allow it TribunalPresident Yes, we will takeabriefrecess to allowyou to pray
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Detainee: Thank you. The Tribunal President recessed the hearing briefly to permit the Detainee to pray, and reconvened shortly thereafter. The TribunalPresident then allowed the Detainee to continue reading his written statement aloud to the Tribunal; note that the Detainee repeated the last accusation before continuing. The fifth accusation [Number 8 on the Unclassified Summary], says after the fall of Kabul the detainee fled to Jalalabad and then to Pakistan where he was arrested. The Detainee added the following (not from written statement) Detainee: Ofcourse the fifih [firom my statement] is the last accusation [# 8] on the Unclassified Summary. The Detainee continued reading his statement The answer, as I have mentioned to you, is that we left Kabul before the start of the war. So how can the accusation say that we left after the fall ofKabul? I do not know. Regarding our departure from Jalalabad to Pakistan, this is tme, for we left Jalalabad to save ourselves from death and that is the biggest proof that shows every rational person and every individual that we are not combatants and we are notfightersand we are not terrorists and we do not have any relationship with Al Qaida or the Tahban or any other group. This accusation shows you that we escaped from death to save ourselves, for the terrorist or the combatant, as you say, likes to die. But we are the opposite: we do not like death and the proof is that we left Jalalabad to Pakistan. If we liked death, we would not have left Afghanistan. For the person who has a mind knows that we have nothing to do witii any oftiiesewars orfightersandtiieaccusation says he was anrested m Pakistan. It should say he was sold in Pakistan, for we ourselves were not arrested by anyone, but we ourselves entered the Pakistani village and the residents of the village handed us over to the Pakistani Authorities. We did not commit any crime or any illegal act Finally, tiiis is our true story m front of your eyes and firstiy and lastiy I say to youtiiatI have heard before that everyone in this place has been determmed to be an enemy combatant before the trial starts and this verdict I am positive that no matter what I present in terms ofevidence or witeesses or oath, I am sure that this verdict will not be hfted and thank you to everyone who is present in this hearing. The end. This concluded the oral presentation/reading of the written statement by the Detainee. Detainee: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to pray.

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UNCLASSIFIED/^^^^^ TribunalPresident You're welcome.Ihavetoclarifyto you that this is notacourt, and youare not on trial, Itis theresponsibility ofthis Tribunal to determine ifyoushould remain an enemy combatant Detainee: Verywell. TribunalPresident Does that conclude your statement; is there anything else you wish to add? Detainee:No. Tribunal Member Questions to Detainee Q:Wherewasyourpassportwhenyouwereanrested? A: When they caught us inPakistan,Ihadmy father's, andmine. Hedidn^tknowlhad i t Here [in Cubajltoldhimlhaditwitiime.The Pakistani police took them and said they'dgive them to the Americans. QrYousaidyour^tiiertoldyouyou'dleaveAfghanistanafterhecollectedtiiemoney; whatmoneywasthat? A: The money he was working fbr; he would gather all his things and possessions and gc Q:HowlonghadyourfatiierbeenmAfghanistanbeforeyouanrived? A: Idon'trememberthe exact date, approximatelyayear and three orfbur months. Q: Did your father pay fbryourtravel and the rest ofthe family also? A : N o , the moneywe used was ourmoney from Syria. That'swhatIknow,andIdon't knowif myfatherknows somethingdil^rent Q: When you and your father separated from the family,howmany men were still left with the family? A: Idon'tknow. Ididn't see them leave;Iwasayoungman atthe time and you could askmyfather. Q: Did youhave anyweapons with you when you were arrested? A:NeitherwhenIwas arrested, or before my arrest Q: Did your father have anyweapons on him whenhe was arrested? A: No
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Q: What aboutthe fantily, when theywere inAfghanistan, did they have anyweapons? A: InKabul, we did not have weapons, but inJalalabad when the problems started, my father hadasmall gun to defendhimself, to defend the family in case anything happened. Hedidn'tuseitandnooneelseeverusedit
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Q:Howoldareyou? A: Approximately21,nowmaybe22;Iwasbominl982. Q: You speak verywell; whatis your education? A: What do youmean, Arabic or English? Q: Whatlevel of education? A: High school; secondary educationis the same as high school;Ijustwanted to clarify thatfbryou. Q: Iwouldlike to clarify something else; you've made allegations you^ve been abused. Asyouknow,your fatherpreviously spokebefbreaTribunal. Atthattime, the same issues were raised; we've ahreadynotified the appropriate authorities about whatyou told us. A: Yourememberlasttime [when Detainee wasaWiteess fbr his father],when you looked atmynose,Ithinkyouremember. Q: Could you tell me howyougotfrom Syria to Afghanistan? A: Of course, we left Syria bytrain, and itwentfromthere to Iran, On the way between the two there isalake, so we went by boatfromthe border ofTurkeyto Iran. Afterthat, we went on an Iranian train to Tehran. QrAndfrom tiiere? A: Afterthat, by bus to Meshad, and then toahotel. WeleftonSaturday,andmyfather calledtoseewhenweleft. Wegotthere after aboutfburdays. After gettingto the hotel, we called my aunt in Syria, and told them we were there and gave her the address. My father calledmy aunt, and she toldhim where we were, so he called the hotel. He told us to come to the border. Afterthe border, we wentto Herat Q: What was thefirstcity you wentto inAfghanistan? A: Herat Q: Andhow did you getfromHeratto Kabul? A: Onaplane; afterthe plane we gotto Kabul. Q: Whatwas the reason you simply didn'ttakeaplanefromSyria to Kabul? A: Idon'tknow; maybe itwas cheaper. WhenIfirstleft,IdidnotknowIwas goingto Afghanistan, My fatherfirstsaid, come to Iran. Q: You saidyouleftKabul before anyfightingstarted; is thatright? A:Yes. Q: Why didn't youhead back forthe Iran border as opposed to the other direction? A: Idon'tknow; my father saidwe'dgo to the Pakistani border and go outfrom there.
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Q: You didnot askhim why? A: No, Q:WhatdidyoudomSyria? A: Iwasastedent Q:Inhigh school? A: Yes Q: You said youhadn't heard ofthe Taliban until youarrivedhere; is thatright? A: Inthe AmericanprisoninKandahar. Q: In school, theynevertold you the govemment ofAfghanistan was the Taliban? A: Wedonotstedygovemments. Q: And you'dnever heard ofQsamaBmLadenfrom the Russian-Afghan war? A: I'dlike to tell you that in our house we don't evenhaveatelevision. Q: Idon'tunderstandwhy itis you broke up the family when youleftAfghanistan. A:The residents ofthe village told us thatsmce we have womenand children; eight children andft^urwomen; they saidifthehighwayrobberssawyou,thatyouare four men, and they mightkill all ofyouand then taketiiewomenand cinldren. Q: Whywasthatmorelikelywithfburmen than v^th two? Iwould think itwould be justthe opposite. A: Theymightthmk we're combatants; theymightthink anything, do you knowwhati mean? Ifthey saw only two men, theywouldthinkthey're just going out and escorting themoutThat'smyopinion^Ido not know. Q: Howmany guides wentwith the rest ofyourfamily? A: Idon'tknow. Ifyouaskmy^ther,hemightknow,butIdonotknow. Q: Were the guides male? A: Idon'tknow. Q: You didn't see them leave? A: Isawthatthey left, butldidn'tsee howmany went with them. Wehadnonews aboutthem afterthat Q: From Jalalabad, where did you go? A: If you just take the whole storyfrommy father, it would be better, I'll tell you we went by cartoavillage; afterthe village, they saidseparate them so they could go to Paidstan.
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UNCLASSIFIED/^^^^ Q:Youdon'tknowthe name ofthe village? A: No,Idon'tknow. IfIknew,Iwould'vetoldyou;Idon'thaveaproblem [withthat]. Q: Where were youheaded inPakistan? A: Wewent on the presumption the Pakistani residents would take us to an embassy or house or help us findawayto get out instead ofto prison. Q:Didyouhaveawaytomeetupwitiitherestoftiiefamily? A:No;Idon'tknow. Ithinkmyfamilywenthome,andldon'tknowhowtheywentor whentiieygottiiere.TheyleftgomgbacktoSyria,soIdon'tknow. Q: Younever heard ofaplan between your father and the family? A: Ididn'thear anything. I'm sure ifyou askmyfather, he'll tell you the story. Q:You said thatyoudidn'tleave the house the entire time you were there inKabul, exceptto go to the market; why? A: Wherewouldlgo? Idon'tknowtiielanguage,Idon'tknowthepeople,Idon'tknow thewayoranytiiing. Q:Youdidn'twanttosightseeorvisitamosqueoranytiiing? A:No,Iwasaskingmyfatherto go backto Syria. Q: Were there other Arabstherefbryou to talkto? A: Idon'tknow;Ididn't even talkto Afghans. Q: Butyou did go to the market? A:Yes,itwasclosebythehouse,justtobuystefffortiiehouse. Q: But you didn't go to your ^ther'srestaurant? A: No. Q: Why didn'tyouhelp him withhis bushiess? A: Iwas askinghim to retum to Syria. This was hiswork,Idon'tknow,Iwasastedent Q: InKabul, you still didn't see Taliban because you'dnever heard ofthem? A; Ididn't know anyone. Q: Younever had any mn-ms with the authorities? A:Neitherin Syria or Afghanistan;Inever had anyrun-ins with anyone. Q: Igetthe impression you and your father didn't discuss yourplans very much; isthat correct? A: What do youmean plans exactiy?

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UNCLASSIFIED//^^^^^ Q: You don't seem to know of any ofthe plans ormovement ofthe family; I'm wonderingwhythatis. A: Iamayoungperson,it'snone ofmy business.Forme itwas just come, come or go, go; do you understand? Q: Yes,Ido, My understandingisthatyou're the eldestson, is that correct? A: Ihaveasisterthat'solderthanme. TribunalPre^identOuesrionstn Detainee Q: Why did youandyourfamily goto Afghanistan?Help me to understand whyyou leftyourhomecountty for another country. A: Wewenttovisitmyfather;thatwasalllknew. Q:Do youknow whyyourfatherwent to Afghanistan? A: Hesaidhewasleavingtowork;hesaidhewasworkmginSaudiArabia. Q: He saidhe was working in SaudiArabia? A:HesaidhewotildgotoworkmSaudiArabia. Q: YetheendedupmAfghanistan? A: Idon'tknow; you can ask my father. Q: Igetthe impression you didn'thave an option of whetherto stay in Syria or go to Afghanistan. A: Igotoutto see my father. Q: Were you going fbrashort visit orto live in Afghanistan? A: Ididn'tknowlwas going in thefirstplace;my father said come to Iran. Q: So youdidn'timowwhy youwere goingto Iran, either. A: Iknewlwas gomgto see myfathermlran,butldidn't knowwhere he was. Q: Andyoudidn'tknowhowlongyouwere goingto be gone? A: No. Q: You didn'thave the opportunityto complete your education? A: After Afghanistan? Ofcoursenot,lwenttoprison,sohowcouldlcontmuemy education? Q:Ididn'tknowifyouhadreceivedanytypeoftiraminginAfghanistanwhileyouwere there. A: Itold youldidn't leavefromthe house.

ISN#312 Enclosure ^3^

UNCLASSIFIED//^©^
028057 Defense Reciprocal Discoveiy

Pagel4of21 ^^^^

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UNCLASSIFIED//B0BO Q: Do you know if your father was encouraged by anyone in his country to go to Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia? A: No. I wish you could see how I looked when 1 first got captured; if you saw me you'd think I looked aboutfifteenyears old. Q: I need to verify your reasons for leaving Kabul. A: After the problem occurred in America, we heard America was going to start a war against Afghanistan. We left m order to save ourselves, and our family. Q: How did you get that mformation? A: My father maybe heard it on the radio; I don't know. Q: Was your father the only one working in your family in Afghanistan? A: Yes. The rest of us all sat m the house, and wouldn't leave except to buy something, and come back. Q: I guesstiiatwas reaUy uncomfortable; you didn't knowtiielanguage, everybody is there waiting for your father to bring the food; did the family help in the restaurant at all? A: He would prepare his things, and the rest of us just prepared food for us. We washed the clothes, thefloor;we were busy all the time. Q: You were in Kabul one month? A: Three months. Q: Then you traveled to Jalalabad, right? A: Yes. Q: How long were you in Jalalabad? A: About a month. Q: How did you travelfromKabul to Jalalabad? A: By car. Q: Was that your car? A: No, we have no car. Q: You rented it. A; No like a transportation service. Q: Like a taxi? A: Itfitthe entire family; we were all in one car. At thistime,the Tribunal President recessed briefly to bring in the Witness. The Detainee was informed he would have the opportunity to ask questions. The Witness was brought in, and given the Muslim oath by the Recorder.
ISN#312 Enclosure (3)

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TribunalMember Questions to Witness Q: Is the Detainee your oldest son? A: Ihaveadaughterthatisolderthanhim. Q: When[theDetainee]came to visityou, where did he thiokhe was goingto? A: For him to come to me,Itold them to come to me. Tmthfiilly,theyknewlwasm SaudiArabia. Isaid come to Iran, and afterImetthem,Iwould call my sister'shome to know where theywere. Iknewtheywerehiban,andlcalled them atthe hotel, Itold them to come to the border of Afghanistan;fromthere atthe borderlreceived them;
tiiat'sit

Q: FromPakistan, how did theytravel to Afghanistan? A: They didnot enter Pakistan. Q: Tmsorry,Iran to Afghanistan? A: By land, of course, the whole way. Q: Does your sonknowhowto use weapons? A: No. Q: Whofinancedyourfamily'stravel? A: They had money. Q: Whyisittheyshnplydidn'tfiytomeetyouinKabul? A: They didn'tknowIwasmKabul or Afghanistan, Q: Whydidn'tyoutelltiiem? A: This is something personal; his mother knowslwentto work in Saudi Arabia. Q: Did youleave Kabul before thefightingstarted? A: Yes. Q:Why? A: Tosave ourselves, why else? Q: Thefightinghadn't started yet; why did you feel the need to save yourself? A: WhenlheardAmerica was goingto startawar,lleft, Q: Whydidn'tyougobackthroughlran? A: Jalalabad was closerto Pakistan. Q: Why did you go to Pakistan? A: Toretumto Saudi Arabia.
1SN^312 Enclosure (3^

Pagel6of21 UNCLASSIFIED/zSEeee:
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UNCLASSIFIED//^^^

Q: Toretumto SaudiArabiaas opposed to Syria? A: It was myintention to go to Saudi Arabia, that'swhatlthought Q: So when you enteredPakistan, what was yourplanfrom there? A: When we enteredmyplan was to go to SaudiArabia. Q: Right,buthow? A: Bywayoftravel. Q:Frommymap,youweregoingtiiewrongdirection;whatwasyourplantogetfrom Pakistan to SaudiArabia? A: There are manyways available; from Pakistan to Iran, from Iran to Syria, and then Syria to Saudi Arabia. Q: Itmderstand your familywas broken up justafter you leftJalalabad, but before you enteredPakistan; is that correct? A: Yes,that'scorrect. Q: Where did youintend to meetthem? A: Reallyltold them to go to Syria; there theywotildmake do, andme andmy son would travel to SaudiArabia. Tbat'swhatlthought; itwas all thoughts. Q: Mythinkhig is that you'destablishameetmg point inside Pakistan; obviously,you didn't do that, could you explam why? A: No, we didn't agree on anymeetingpoint Tribunal President Questions to Witness Q; What did your son do the three months inAfghanistan? A: Sittingathome. Q: Didhe nothelp you witii your business? A: No;hewasjustathome;hedidn'thelp. Q: Whatwas yourreasonfbr leaving Syria and goingto SaudiArabia, and then to Afghanistan?
^ ^

A: Tohve free, and to work andmake money. Q: Were younotfree in Syria? A:InSyria,youarefree,butdon'thavetiiemoneytoopenyourownplacetosell chickenandotiiertypesoffood,you'dneedaniillionortwomillioninSyriancunency to do that, close to 40,000 Syrian dollars. InAfghanistan,asmallamountwould enable you to open any business you wantto open.
ISN#312 Enclosure (3)

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UNCLASSIFIED//^^©^ Q: Whatwas your business? A: It was small, and thenmy family came; when they came,Iwanted to openalarger venture, solrentedaplace. lhad justrenteditand hadn't started to prepare it yet When Irentedit, all the problems started and all the hopes we had fbrtiiis place were lost Q: Whenyousaywe,whoiswe? A; Myfamily. Q:But your son seems notto knowwhatyou're doing and whyyou wentto Afghanistan? A: Wedidn'tknow, but when they came, they l^ew. Q:Sotiiedreamsandhopes^witiiyourfamilyweren'ttiiereuntilyourfamilygotto Afghanistan? A: The hopes and dreams someone would wantto have in this world; whathappened the currency andmoneywas lost, andnowwe are here. Q: Why did youmove to SaudiArabia? A:IwenttodotiieHa^orPilgrimage.ThemoneyIhadwasnotenoughtobringmy family over;Ididn'thave the money fbrthem to haveaplace to stay and fransportation. Thatpreventedmefromlivingand staying in Saudi Arabia, becauselwanted to live there butlwanted to five withmy family. Q: So why did you go to Afghanistan after leaving SaudiArabia? ABecauselheard you didn'tneedavisa or anything from the TV andmedia. Q: So you were able to get into Afghanistan withoutapassportorvisa? A: lhad the passportanditwas in order, butyou don'tneedavisa there like otherplaces in the world. Q: Likeaworkvisa? A: Residence visa, work visa, you don'tneed any ofthat stuff. Q; Were you encouraged by anyonemSaudi Arabia or Syria to go to Afghanistan? A: Idon'tknow;Idon'tknow anyone really, Q: Did you know anyone inAfghanistan? A: ThepersonIstayedwith,Ididn'tknow. Istayed withhim and the Taliban intelligence tookme in. This person the Taliban intelligence uitroduced me to was^
^ ^ ^ ^
I

^^^^^^^fB^^^ii^r^ri^^^^^^^^r^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Detainee; My father [Witeess] stayed in the hotel, and from the hotel, the Taliban intelligence tookhim to meettiiepersonhe stayed with. ISN^312 Enclosure (3) Pagel8of21 UNCLASSIFIED//^^^^
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^ ^

0000009^

UNCLASSIFIED//EmQ

The TribunalPresident then resumed questioning the Witness Q: Why did you stay witii someone you didn't know anytiung about? A: Because he helped me and was tnce to me, and he would come with things from the market so we could work together. We worked together; me with my efforts and him bringingtilingsfromthe market, and we'd prepare them together. Q: So this was your partner? A: No, but after I got to know him, he became my partaer. Q: Was he an Arab or Afghani? A: AnArab. Q: Was hefromSyria? A: He said he was from Syria and his accent was from Syria, I don't know. Q: Did Mohammed [the Detainee] receive any type of training when he was in Afghanistan? A: No, it was quite the opposite. He was always saymg, "Father, I want to retum to continue my studies." I would tell him to wait a Utile; God willmg I will work, and then we will go to Saudi Arabia and you can contuiue your stedies. That is what I used to say. Q: So it was not your intention to stay in Afghanistan with your business? A: If things were the way they were in the beginning, I would've collected the money and gone. You have to bave a lot of money m the outside world, not just a little bit. The TribunalPresident then asked if the Detainee wished to ask questions of the Witness [his father]. Detainee: I would Uke to comment on the first question the official asked here. He said how did you getfromIran to the Afghan border. That was by car, but after that it was by plane. After we got to Afghanistan, we got on the plane. I would like to agree with what he said;fromban to the border of Afghanistan was by car. Tribunal Member (addressingthe Witness): Do you agree with that, sir? Witness: Yes, of course, and we discussed this in the last Tribunal; all travel was by land except in Afghanistan where they took a plane. And don't say it was a Taliban plane, it was a civiHan plane; just so you have no doubts, and tiie company was called Ariana Afghanistan. Tribunal Member: The Taliban came and met you at the hotel? How did they know you were at the hotel?
ISN#312 Enclosure (3)

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028062 U^&iSSJJfJSQ/i^^^

000C0G94

UNCLASSIFIED//Eee©Witaess: Every govemment has its own intelligence, and they work with the hotels, and know who stays at the hotels. They knew about mefromthe owner of the hotel. The TribunalPresident confirmed there were no more questions for the Witness, and recessed briefly to allow the Witness to be removedfrom the TribunaL Upon reconvening, the TribunalPresident asked observers and members of the press to remain quiet, reminding them that any talking could easily be picked up by the recording devices being utilized in the TribunaL The Tribunal President confirmed there were no additional questions or evidence to present, and began reading the remainder of the hearing instructions to the Detainee. Before the Hearing was adjourned, the Detainee interrupted to state the following: Detainee: Miss, we do not want to retum to our country; is that understood? Tribunal President: You do not want to retum to Syria? Detainee: No. Tribunal President: Do you have a preference of a country; we don't make that decision, but we will make it a part of the record. Detainee: Any country my father and I canfive,and we don't really have problems in Syria, but we heard about political asylum. We don't want to go to Syria because we heard if we retum there, they would kill us. The reason is because for thefirstthree years, you've been saying "terrorists, terrorists." Ifwe return, whether we did something or not, there's no such thing as humanrights;we will be killed immediately. You know this very well. Tribimal President: We'll make that a part ofthe record. Detainee: My father and I; is that OK? Tribunal President: I understand. Detainee: OK, thanks a lot.

ISN#312 Enclosure (3)

UNCLASSIFIED/m@8
028063 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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UNCLASSIFIED//^W@ The TribunalPresident then adjourned the open session.

AUTHENTICATION I certify the material contained in this transcript is a tme and accurate summary of the testimony given during the proceedings.

Colonel, U.S. Army Tribunal President

ISN#312 Enclosure (3)

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UNCLASSlt lJ£U//lf»«^

DETAEVEE ELECTION FORM Date: StariTime; End Tune: ISN#: 312 ILTC, US ARMY Language?. ARABIC YES 2 DEC 04 1000 1145

Personal Representative: Translator Required? YES

CSRT Procedure Read to Detainee or Written Copy Read by Detainee?

Detainee Election: Wants to Participate in Tribunal I I I I Affirmatively Declines to Participate in Tribunal Uncooperative or Unresponsive

Personal Representative Comments:
Detainee will participate and provide a written statement, which he might read into the record. He has requested one witeess, his father who is also detained.

Personal Representative:

UNCLASSIFIED//^©©©028065 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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Exhibit D-a

00000097

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Detainee Statement Before I tiegin defending myselfl would present my gratitude to all the members at this tribunal and to the personal representative and the translator and to everyone who helped in allowmg me to defend myself but unfortunately I would like to let you know that we have heard, and several times, about this court, that it is merely a game presented against the detainees and as for the two words "Enemy Combatant", this is the verdict that has been presented to every detainee, for as I have understood, that the detamee, no matter what he did, this verdict will not be lifted for him even ifhe did the impossible, but I said a game not to mock anyone present now, but that is what I heard and I grew more sure that it is a game when I heard that all the detamees are enemy combatants and I haven't heard of one who has left as innocent except for one person. At the start of defending myselfl will say that there are numerous and many issues that you must look at and among these issues is my stoty and I will say it in a moderate manner, neither long nor short and if you want details about every word then I will elaborate. The stoty is: I am the detainee owner of the number 312,1 left Syria in the year 2001 at the end of the sixth month with members ofmy family their numlier comes to nine and I am theh tenth and our departure, all of us, was with papers that were in oider-visapassport-necessary stamps- so we left Syria to Iran and when my father called to the hotel and said come to the Iranian-Afghan border we went to him and we went after that to Kabul and we stayed in it the wholetime,thiree months, and yet close to two months and more after our stay in Kabul, my uncle's wife came and her kids and their arrival was only one week before the events, I inean the event of the eleventh of Sqitember and our stay in Kabul was in a house that my father had rented and during our stay in Kabul I did not leave the house except to go to the supermarket close by and I was always discussing with myftitherand asldng to go back to Syria again to contuiue my studies but he said wait until I collect my money and after that we will go to Saudi Arabia. And after that the events happened and America announced that there would be a war agamst Afghanistan so we left immediately after America's aimouncement of the war, we left to Jalalabad so we could go to Pakistan to save ourselvesfromthe war and we stayed in Jalalabad for a period of one month and after tiiat we left with the family to a village so we could leave to Pakistan and at our arrival and before our family got out the residents ofthe village told my father tliat two of you should stay here and two should go with the family so my father chose me to remain with him and the family left to Pakistan [and the reason that made the village's residents separate us is that they said that highway robbers and thieves are abundant so if they see you they might kill you and kill the children and take the women] and after that the village people took me and my father to another village and we stayed in it for a few days and after that village to another village and we stayed in it for a few days as well and after that the village people told my father that there was no means of getting to Pakistan except by walking in the mountains so we walked in the mountains for three days, keeping in mind that we didn't know the name of those mountains or the name ofthe villages and upon our arrival to the Pakistani village we stayed m it for a few UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO PAGE 1 OF 6 EXHIBIT D-b

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028066 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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UNCLASS1F1ED//P0U0 days and afterthattheytook us to the prison and thatwasmtiieftrstday ofEID in die afternoon. Keeptnginmind thatwe hadnot done any crimeoranyillegal act. Note#I: During ourstay inKabul myfathers job was inarestaurant,ldidnotsee the restaurant butlsaw him,how he prepared the fnodin the house then go in the momingto themarkettosellit ^ote#2: As forthe members ofmyfamiiytheywere all withmyfamily[sbrteen individuals] amongthemmygrandmotherandherage was 67 and an infantalso,his age was eight months. As forthe presence ofthese two peoplemthis^mily,these two people didnot have teetii, so thatshouid clue you inand make clearto youmyfather's goodintentions andhis purpose forwhichhe left, Andhis arrival with two people suchas these should also make clearto you thathe has no relationship withfightingorwar or any groups orQaeda or Taliban. Iwill begin the defi^nseofmyself.lstate thatthe truth and the facts is the storythati presented to younow,so if you wantthe trutiiand the facts, then this is itandifyou want otherwise you can take whatyou want The personal representative has presented the accusations and the core accusation says thatlamfromtiieTaliban or Al-Qaeda. Fir^t: Ifyou wishforme to swearthatthis itemismconrectlam prepared andlhavea witnesstotestifythatlhave no relationship withanyonefromAl-Qaeda orthe Taliban or anyother group. Seeond: Asforthetwowords TalibanandAl-Qaeda andotherwords like JihadMuiahideen-lhadnotheard ofall these words before butlhad heard them forthe first time in the prisonhere whenlwas asked before bythe interrogators are you Tahbanl would sayno-are you Qaedalwouldsayno....Isayto youinasimpiy and easilythati amnotfrom the Tahban orfrom Al-Qaeda orevenfi^m any other group, i n l ^ t l a m againstanyperson who commits hostile acts and violent acts.Formy father and I, we wishfbreverypersonin the world to live withfteedom and^afety and peaceand peace ofmind whetherthat person was small or big, man orwoman, And we said in the interrogation thatt^en the events happened-1 mean the eleventh ofSeptember-we cried andweweregreatiysaddenedandwesaidmtheinterrogationaisothatmygrandmotiier, this old woman, cried and said what is those innocent people'sfault, to be killed? And me, mywholelifelnever left Syria andneverleftmy city and this was the firsttimel hadleftmycounttyandmyagewhenlleftwasclosetoeighteenyears.Andyoucould know,fromourstay here in this place, ifwe were combatantsto you ornon-combatants, foreach one of yon cango backto my b^haviorfile and lookfbryourself But despite that,lwillmention to youmanypieces of evidence thatv^llshowyou thatwe have no relationship withany ofthe groups atall,neithermyfathernorme. From these stories and pieces ofevidence: Several times myfatherandlsawapiece ofmetal thatcouldhave, as the soldiersaid aboutit, been usedasaweapon and could havecausedharm.When we sawthese pieces UNCLASSIFIED//POUO PAOE20F6

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UNCLASS1F1ED//F0UO we tookthem immediately andtamedthem in to the soldiers and this happened arinroxtmately over I^times and this is all recorded with the date and time. In the.^ recentpast on the 20^ ofNovember,lsawtwo pieces o f t h e t a l i n ^ ^ an^^gav^iem to the soldier and also on the 29^^ ofNovemberlsawi^he walkway of ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ piece ofmetal5c^ong andlgave itto the soldier immedi^^^ on the 2^^ ofDecemberin^^^^^^^^^^byfathersawapiece ofmetal and gave itto the soldier. And also on the4^ofDecemberlsaw^iec^fmetal andlgave itto the soldierand alsoonthe4^ofDecemberatnightin^^^^^^^^^asoldiergavemeamasktohangmy Quran on and usuallythis mask comes withametal and the soldierforgotto take the piece ofmetalfromit before givingitto me so he gave itto me witii the piece ofmetal in it, soltook the metal andlgave itto the soldier andhethankedmeandhe wrote thaton the computer. Andlhave mentioned these storiesfirstbecauselrememberthe date and the other stories are bigger and more dangerous thatthefirststoty.lhave done vety good deeds that show you my goodintentions and my honestyandmyfather'shonestywithyouinall our words and it does notmakesenseat all i f l was an enemy combatahtthatlwouldgive backthose things and the meces ofmetal tbat couldinftictharm. And the sterols one timelwas in the walkwayi;^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^andlsawapieceofmetal20 cm long soltook itimmediately and gave itto thesoldiers and aftertliis good deed one ofthe soldiers came instead ofthankingme him proceeded to threaten to killmeandhe saidlwill cut your head and yourneckwithoutme doing anythingto him. Lookathowthe reward was from this soldier, instead of thatikingme forthis deedhe threatened to kill me. And the supervisors afterwardskickedhimoutoftheBlockandwroteareportaboutthatandall the supervisors s a w t h i ^ a t d a ^ And the otherstoryin^^^^^^^Ialsosawapieceofmetalinside the room and that metal was the remains ofweldin^, andltold the soldi^boutit And the other story happened in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^inroom^^^Isaw breakage in the fiance and Inotifted the authorities aboutit^nd the room is still there and you can see it and the soldiers can all testifythatmyfatherandlhavedone this thmgand theywill also testify thatwe have no problems withany ofhesoldiers and we have maintained good behavior andfinemanners in spite of all the pressures around us and in spite of thetiireatsand the tortarethatwe bave been through Andlwill mention the stories where wehave been through torture and threats andlwillmention where that was a n d l ^ l mention the reason as well. The ^rstst^rv: During our stay in the Pakistani nrison we were subjected to beatings and harsh torture tmtil the torture led to mynose being broken and you can see it infront ofyounow,andduringthe time we were beingtortured, there were Americans present The second story: During our stay in the American prison in Kandaliar we were subjected to torture and the reason was thattheywanted us to saythatwe were from AlQaeda orthe Taliban byfbrce,myfather'sforehead wasfracturedandthe Red Cross saw this and wroteareport andmy lefthand was fractaredandlsufferedmany diseases as well and there were also othermethods ofpsychological pressure and fatigue like sleep UNCLASS1F1ED//F0U0 PAOE30F6

^

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028068 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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UNC1^ASS1F1ED//F0U0 deprivation fbr long hours and not goingto relieve yourselfandthatisamongthe necessities forhumans, and that prison was underthe managementof Americans. ^^e^third^st^:Durmgou^ and the reason was so thatwe could say by force thatwe werefromAl-Qaedaorthe Taliban, In one ofthese stories one ofthe interrogators brought two wires connected to electricity and said thatifyou do notsaythat you and your^therarefromAl-Qaedaor Talibanlwill place these in yourneckandanothertime he drew knives and saidifyou don'tsayyouarefromAl-Qaedaor Taliban we will bring die knives and cutyour hands and putsaltin them. Andalso in thatsameplace one ofthe interrogators beatme inmy ^ e and atthattunel was drinkingwater, so he hitthe cup andhitmeaswell and thereason was thathe wantedme to say by force thatmy :^ther andlwerefromAl-Qaeda or Taliban. And also in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^he soldiers came andthreatened us and told us we Id^^ your^mily. The fourih story: Durini^ outstay in^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^we were exposed to death threats and threats ofhandingus overto other cotmtries so they could torture usthere and after thattheywouid bringusbackhere. Andltold you that one time afterlgave the soldierthe metal, which was 20cm, longthe soldierthreatened to killme, And also the soldiersmthis place told us twice, they said we killed yourfamily and they said we knowthattheyare 14 individuals and aftertheinterrogatorstried pressuring and torturingus to compel us byfbrce to saythatwe werefromAl-Qaeda orthe Taliban, and when theyfailedatwhattheywanted,tiiey came to uswithtemptationand enticement and theyproposed to us thatwe lie about the detainees in this place in exchange fbracarahouse-and the American citizenship and theyto said to us "heaboutthe detainees and we will give you thesetiiings",sowe refiised becausewe do notknow anyone andlam surethatthts method oftemptationwas followed withmany ofthe detainees andlam sure thatmany ofthe detainees lied aboutthe other detainees withoutprior knowledge and all this ftdse cooperationhappened forthe sake ofpersonal advantage and forthe sake ofthe implication ofthe detainees and forthe sake of getting out ofthis place, Sol n^k of you to look into my case thoroughly andfinally.ofthisaccusationlrepeatagain tiiatwe are notfromAl-Qaeda orthe Taliban or any other group at all and we don'thave anyrelationship with wars orfightingand my fatherwilltestifythatlamnotof any group at all andmy familywilltestifythatlam not of any group atall and they vdll testify that my father also does not have any relationship with any ^oup at all One ofthe interrogators madearequestofme and said to me, ifyou said thatyourfatherisfromAlQaeda orthe Taliban we will take you out ofthis placeand we will send youhome sol toldhim thatmyfatherisnotfrom any group atall andthis isthe truthfbrmyfatherisa food seller only and nothing else. and it states thatltraveiedfromSyria to Afghanistanin the year2001-theanswerisyesltraveled from Syria to Afghanistan with papers that were in order and of^cialanditis available with you and that was in the sixth month ofthe year -2001-in the end ofthe sixth year UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO PAOE40F6

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Syria, whichismyorigmalcountrydidnotfbrbidanypersonfromgomgtoanyplacehi the world except fbr one country and that is Israel, itwas written on the passport "travel toeverywhere in the world is permitted except fbr Israel" and you can go backto the Syrianpassport oftice andlookinto this piece ofinformation, Therefbreldon't see anyproblemin this accusation liecauselproceeded with papersthat were in order and throughlegalmeans.Andldidnotcommitanything illegal. Knowing thatlenteredbeforetiie events oftiieeleventii andbefbretiiewarandinAfghanistanI stayed atthe house duringmywholetimeandldidnotleaveitandmy father cantestify tothat ^^^^^o^^^^^^^i^^^^^ and itsaysthatmy^therisaveteranMiiiahideen fighter My father has defi^ndedhunselfagainstthis accusation athis trial, butlwill repeatag^ tilatmyfatiierdoesnothaveanyrelationshipwitiiAl-QaedaortiieTahbanoranygroup at allneither does he knowwars andhe doesn'thaveanyrelationship with wars andhe didn'tleave Syria excepttwice and bothtimeswere in the year 1999-once to Saudi Arabiaand the othertime to Afghanistan, so howcan this accusation saythathe isa veteranfighterwhenin his entire life he'sneverlefthis county except forthose two tunes,MyfatherworkedinarestaurantinKabtilandlhaven'tseen this restaurant butI saw how he used to place the fbodmthe house then go in the moming to the marketto sell itandlswearifyou wish thatmy^theris notafighter andnotAl-Qaeda or Taliban and doesnot belongto any other group atall. ^ 2 ^/i/^i^^^^^^^^^^ says thatthe detainee admitted thathe traveled through the mountains ofToraBorainAfghanistan. The answer:Isaidin the interrogation whenlwas askedhowlgot out ofJalalabad,Isaid exactlythatlgot out ofJalalabad v^thmyfamilytoavilla^ and afterthat we got separatedftomourfamily andme andmyfatherwereleftand the residentsofthevillage took us to anothervillage and we stayed in itft^rsome days and afterthatwe wentto anothervilla^eandwestayedfbrsomedavsaswellandafterthattheresidentofthe village said thatthere was no wayto getto Pakistan exceptfbrwalkingmthemountams so we walkedin the mountains fbrtbree days notknowmgwhatthename ofthose mountains were northe names ofthe villages thatwe stayed in. Tiiat is all whatlsaidin the interrogation andldidnotsay anythingmore. ^ ^^^t^^^/i^t^^^^^^^^saystiiattiiedetameewasinKabulwhenitwasdefeated, The answer:Isaidin the interrogation thatwhenlheardthatAmerica was goingto start war againstAfghanistan we leftKabul toJalalabadand wedidn'tsee the v ^ i n the first place and we didn't see the defeat ofKabul or even the defi^at ofJalalabad, so this accusation is incorrect and the date proves thattoyouandmyfatherif you asked him will tell you when we left. ^i^^^/^^^c^^^^^^^:saysaftertiiefallofKabultiiedetameefiedtoJalalabadandthent^ Pakistan where he was arrested. The answeraslhave mentioned to you is thatwe leftKabul before the startoftiie war so howthe accusation can say that we left afterthe fail ofKabulIdo not know. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO PAGE50F6

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028070 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000102

UNCLASS1F1ED//P0U0 Regarding ourdeparture from Jalalabad to Pakistan, this is true, fbrwe left Jalalabad to saveourselvesfromdeatbandthatis the biggest proofthatshowseveryrationai person and evetyindividual that we are not combatants and we are notfighters and we are not terrorists and we do nothaveanyrelationship withAl-Qaeda orthe Taliban orany other group,fbrthis accusation shows you thatwe escapedfromdeath to save ourselves,for tiie terrorist orthe combatantas yousay likes to die, butwe are theopposite completely we do not like deathandtheproofis that we left Jalalabad to Pakistan and ifwe liked death we wouldnothaveleftAfghanistan,neitiieriis nor our ^mily,fbrtiie person who hasamindknowsthatwehavenothingtodowithanyofthesewarsorfighters andthe accusationsays he was arrested inPakistan,butisshouldsay he was soldmPakistanfbr weourselves were notanrestedby8nyone,butwe ourselves entered the Pakistani village and theresidents ofthe village handed us overto the Pakistani Authorities when we did notcommitany crimeoranyillegal act Finally, this is ourtruestotyinfiontofyour eyes andfirstiyand lastiylsaytoyouthati have heard before that everyone in this place has been determined to be an enemy combatant before the trial starts andthis verdictlam positive thatnomattery^tl present in terms of evidence orwitnesses oroath,Iam sure thatthis verdictwillnot be lifiedandthankyoutoeveryonewhoispresentinthishearing.Theend. 12/2/2001

UNCI^ASSIFIED//FOUO PAGE60F6

2115
028071 Defense Reciprocal Discovery ..^

000^0^0^

UNCLASSIFIED CombatantStatus Review Beard TO: PersonalRepresentative FROM: QIC, CSRT (29November2004) Subject SummaryofEvidence fbr Combatant Status Review Tribunal^KHANTUMANI, Muhammad AbdAl Nasir 1. Underthe provisions oftiie Secretary ofthe Navy Memorandum, dated 29 July 2004,
^^/^^^^^i^^/^^i^Ci^^/ii^^^^^^^^^^^^v^^i^^i^/^^^^/P^^^^^^^

.D^^^i^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^i^A^^^/,2^^^ Ct^^^,aTribtmalhas been appointed^ detainee'sdesignationas an enemy combatant 2. An enemy combatanthas been defined as "anindividual who was part ofor supportingthe Taliban or alQaida forces, or associated forces tbat are engagedmhostilitiesagainstthe United States or its coalition partners. This includes anypersonwho committedabelligerentact or has directly supportedhostihtiesinaid of enemy armed forces." 3. The Utiited States Governmenthaspreviotislydeterrnined thatthe detamee is an enemy combatant This determinationis based on information possessed bythe Uttited States that indicates thatthe detainee is associated with the Tahban or alQaida. The detamee is associated with the Taliban or alQaida. 1. The detameefraveledfromSyria to Afghanistanm2001. 2. Thedetainee'sfatherisaveteranMii^ahidinfighter. 3. The detainee trained at^^^^^^^^^^^^aining camp in 2001. The^^^^^^^traitiingcampwasabasicfraitnngfacilityfbrJihadistsagaitistthe coabtion. 5. While at^^^^^^^^^the detamee trained on the Kalishtiikovrifie, pistols, light weapons, g^naues^nd the Bika weapons system. 6. The detainee admitted tofravelingthroughtheToraBoraMountains in Afghanistan. 7. The detainee was iuKabul, Afghanistan whenit was defeated. 8. Afterthe fall ofKabul, the detaineefledto Jalalabadandsubsequentiy to Pakistan, where he was arrested. 4. The detainee hasthe opportunityto contest his designation as an enemy combatant The Tribunal will endeavorto arrange forthe presence of anyreasonably available witeesses or evidence that the detainee desires to call or introduce to prove that he is not an enemy combatant. The TribunalPresidentwill determme the reasonable availability ofevidence orwitnesses.

UNCLASSIFIED

2116
028072 Defense Reciprocal Discoveiy

00000104

Memorandum

To

:

Department of Defense Date 11/08/2004 O f f i c e of Administrative Review f o r Detained Enemy Combatants Capt. Charles Jamison, OIC, CSRT
F B I GTMO C o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m Div: A s s t . Gen. C o u n s e l REQUEST FOR REDACTION OF

From :

Subject

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Pursuant t o the Secretary of the Navy Order of 29 July 2004, Implementation of Combatant Review Tribunal Procedures f o r Enemy Combatants Detained a t Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, Section D, para^raph2, t h e F B I r e q u e s t s r e d a c t i o n o f the information herein marked . The FBI makes t h i s request on the basis t h a t said information relates t o the n a t i o n a l security of the United States . Inappropriate dissemination o f said information couli3 damage the national s e c u r i t y of the United States and compromise ongoing FBI i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . CERTIFICATION THATREDACTED INFORMATION DOESNOT SUPPORT A DETERl^INATIONTHAT THE DETAINEE ISNOT ANENEMY COMBATANT The FBI c e r t i f i e s the aforementioned redaction contains no information t h a t would support a determination t h a t the detainee i s not an enemy combatant. The f o l l o w i n g documents r e l a t i v e t o ISN 312 have been redacted by the FBI and provided t o the OARDEC: FD-^302 dated 05B03B02

'Redactions are blackened out on the O A R D E C provided FBI document. ^See Executive Order 12958

I
I 028073 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2117

00000105

Memorandum f r o m ^ | | H H m | | | H t o Capt. Charles Jamison Re: REQUEST FOR REDACTION, 11/08/2004

need a d d i t i o n a l

£ a n c e , please contact Asst. A n a l y s t (IA)

2118
028074 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000106

UNCLASSIFIED/^m^ MEMO FOR RECORD TO PR: #52 FROM: TRIBUNAL #20 4 December 2004

SUBJECT: ISN # 312 Request For Witnesses/Documents The Tribunal received and reviewed the witness request from Detainee # 312 to locate DetaineeHB DetaineeJUpwill testify why Detainee #312 went to Afghanistan and what he did while he was there. Detainee # 312's request for his witness is deemed relevant, reasonable and approved.

COL, USA Tribunal President

Enclosure (5)

UNCLASSIFIED//¥©CJ3r

2119
028075 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000107

UNCLASSIFIED//S©©©.
(

Personal Representative Review ofthe Record ofProeeedings

I acknowledge that on j^ecember 2004,1 was provided the opportunity to review the record of proceedings for the Combatant Status Review Tribunal involving ISN #312.

I have no comments. J/f%li^ comments are attached.

Date

I

!

ISN #312 Enclosure (6)

UNCLASSIFIED/ZEOee-

2120
028076 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000108

UNCLASSIFIED//#ee9 PR Comments on the results ofthe Tribunal for #312 I do not believe the Tribunal gave proper weight to exhibit D-c. The purpose of D-c was not necessarily to prove that the detainee was not properly classified as an enemy, combatant, rather is was to shed light on the veracity of the testimony of detainee While the spreadsheet is not a comprehensive documenM^oe^how that detainee has provided information on over 60 detainees, currently atjUH^j^HHg These detainees come from varying countrie^M backgrounds and were in widely separate areas of Afghanistan. In order f b q g ^ p o know over 10% ofthe detainees by sight and name, he would have to have known almost a similar portion of non-detained Taliban and al Qaida personnel in Afghanistan. This thought strains th^maeination. Specifically regarding #312^etaineejm^ndicated that he saw him a t J U m P t r a i n i n g camp during his ^ f l | ^ H } n e week of training in April 2001. All documentary cadence indicates that detainee was not in Afelmiistan until July 2001 andtiiereforeJ § | p c o u l d not have seen him, I investigatec^^Jpfile and prepared the spreadsheet (D-c). After identifying over 60 detainees, I realized that a comprehensive investigation regarding each identified detainee wasnotpossible. However, there were a limited amount that the detainee identified a t m t K t ^ K I then reviewed the travels of each of the detainees thatjjjH^ identified a t f l ^ ^ ^ P P Based o^&^ocuments in our possession, not one of&e detainees that]^Hfdentified a t f l | P f ^ w a s in the country at the time thatJUl^would have been able to identify them as being trained at this camp. Barring each ofthese detainees having elaborate cover stories tiiat have not been compromised over the length of their detainment, the testimony o^Ngshould not be relied upon.

TC, US ARMY

•UNCLASSIFIED//EetJCt,

2121
028077 • Defe^sMiSpfoQfcAcovery

00000109

.- .

.^gMywAaTpxy-^yf, -... -

UNCLASSIFIED Comb*(*nt StHlus Revlei* Board TO: Personal Representative KROM: OIC, CSKI (10 Scpicmbcr 20O4) Siihiec! Sumniars' ot iivukiKc tor Combalaiit Stain* Review Tribunal - AM1,ZIANE. Djamel Saiid All I. VndcT she provisions of the Secretary of die Navy McmnrsMidutii. dated 29 July 2004, tmplcmi'nMkm <if Combataiil iStaru.s- Ht'view Tni^unai Procedtirei fnr Emmy Co/nbaiamn Ih'tairu'dm Gmntamrno BayNmul /We Cuba, a Tribunal ha* been appointed toreviewthe ilctdincc"* dc*i)in»iion-Man enemy tumlwtanl, 2 An enemy comhatimi liax been defined .i> "um individual whu was part ofor supporting (he 1 ulibdii or ai Uaida force*, or as.«i<Kiaicd forces that .ire engaged in hostilities agahm Ihc United Slates i>f its coalition jurtners. 'Ihis includes any person who committed a b«l}igcfent act or has directly nuppuited hnstiliiif% in uid ofcncmy armed forces," 3. The Lhiilcd States Govemment hitt previously delcmiincd thai the detainee is an enemy cnmNdaml ITii* determination is based on iiifortnttU'on fxjssesscd by Ihc United States (hat indicates thai the detainee is associated with al Qaida. r.hc dcuifKC is a.'isociaicd with al Qaida: 1 In late 2000. ihe detainee, who claims Algerian cili/enship, traveled to Afghanistan fro:n Canada on a fraudulent pa&sport 2. Prior to his departure from Canada, the detainee received 1.200 lo 1,500 Canadian dollars from a rumsian man who liad encouraged the dctairKC to trav el lo Afghanistan. 3. The detainee was instructed to go to a guesthouse in Kabul upon hh arrival in Afghaiiislar>, which direction the detainee ultimately followed. 4. The detainee noted that a number of the other residents of tbe guesthouse were Taliban fighter*. 5. The guesthouse in Kabul was run by an al Qaida communications specialist. t>. The detainee then stayed in a guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan wih a number of Arab men. 7 The dciaincc traveled with Taliban fighters through the Tora Bora mmintains during the U.S. bijmbing campaign 8 n*c detainee traveled illegally to PakisLw without any documentation and was cspturcd by the I'akistani military at a mo%;ue. / 11;^ UNCIj\SSIKIFI)

000345
C-^lbK^/r K l

' ^

028106

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000110

UNCLASSIFIED

9. U»e detainee escaped from a bus that vvas forcibly overtaken by other prisoners mth the detainee, but he was captured again a short time later by Paktstani aulhoritici, 4, The detainee hus, the opportutiify to contest his designation as an enemy combatant. The Tribunal will endeavor to arrange for the presence ofany reasonably available wilnesics or evidence that the detainee dcsitcs to call or introdiwe tc prove that he is nol an enemy eomb«iant rh« Inbun^d President wiill delemiine Ihc reasonable availability ofevidence or wilncsscs.

IINO.ASSIFIFD

{>t^t I 7

Id-1

000346
028107 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000111

UNCLASSIFIED Depmrtment of Defense Office for tbe Admfaibtnitive Review of (he Detention of Enemy Conbadints at US Naval Base Gitmalanmmo Bay, Cuba 12 May 2005 From: To: Via. SUBJECT; Presiding Officer A>(EZIANE. DJAMEL SAim ALI Assisting Military Officer UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISIItATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAIID ALI

1. An Admioistrttive Review Board will be convcncd- to review your c4se to determine if your continued detention is necessary. 2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant infoftnatson regarding your case, At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a rccommcndatioa to: (I) role we you to your home state or to a thud state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third stale, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or tbe thiid stale; or (3) continue your detention under United States coiarol. 3. Tlw following primary factors favor contmued detention: a. Commitment 1995, the detainee traveled,^ j^^iw^daAomAwma with & Dutch passport.

2. la late 2000, the detainee, who claims Algerian citlzen^p, traveled to Afi^kanistam fiom Canada on afraudulentFrench passport. 3. The detainee traveled illegally to Pakistan wMiout docmbentadon and was captured by Ae Pakistani military at a mosque. 4 The detainee used an alias to hide his Algerian identity from Pakistani and U S, miiitaiy atitbortties. b. Connections/Associations J. The detainee attended the Al Salaam mosque in Montreal, Cmada. UNCLASSIFIED

DM0 Exhibit ._L Page I qi\
028108 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000112

DNCUSSIflED SUBJECT: UNCLASSHTED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATTVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE. DJAMEL SAUD ALI t . Prior to his depaituiefiomCanidi, the detainee leceivai UOO to 1,500 Caoidiu dolian Irom a Timisiaii ram who had eoccKinged the dettiiwe to travel to Afghanimn. 3. The(ietakM»wa$lMMntctedti>fotoas^ A#aMAm, which the detaiase ultimfttely Mowed. 4. Ih* dmioee oeW that * oumber of * h e other mWmW of *!* gaetoWie
—flgbteit. • "

T*(%»m

5. W 9 t K t t » m iii Kibiil mt nm by aa tl Qakhcoittmuaicatiotti ipecialtti. 6. The detainee ttayod in a gueffhowe in JalW*K#,l#M&an wilh a mmher ^^Kib nm. 1. The detainee Wwled wMh TaPan fighteta tihmipli Te^^ U.S. bombiag campatgA. e. loteal Afkr residing Io CW&da Illegally fbr Uve years, &e detainee traveled England and then to ham and Al^kmibtaA oa a false Freaeh paaepon. d. Other Rdevtmt Oata #be defatnee e$eapedfiomm W that # : AedWy (n#Bkeh by oAmr prisoaers with the .bW was ciqpitmWagaiaa short tWWxT by P«&^^ 4. The fbliowmg primary Actors favor release or tratmSar: a. While In AfiehanSstan, tto detmnec did not leoeive any ailftMy o a r tenodst ttanaag and did ootseeany figfatmg. b. Thedetainee denied ever having paiticipattzd m ary gg^tii% or lemxrWWin^ aW denied be had any intendon of paxtkipation to such activity if he is released. The detainee denied knowledge of future planned terrorist attaeka in the United States and denied knowledge of the locations ofterrorist training camps or the identity of individuals affiliated with al Qaida or other terrorist org»nir»tiorui. c. The detainee stated he left Canada b e c m u a e they would not grant him asylum, He was not eves thinking of jihad when he movedtoAfghanistait d. The detainee decided to Qee Afghanistan because the non-Taliban and the oppwitioa were killing Arabs. e. In the Torn Bora motmtatni the detainee did not see any type of mUitaiy training being Page 2 of3 UNCLASSIFIED
028109 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 1 OB 7

d&isg Ae

00000113

UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATI\'E REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEZIANE, DJAMEL SAUD AU conducted and be wax never issuedaweapoiL f. The detainee slated, "I am not a member of al Qaida." g. The detainee denies ever viewing any extiiemial material or visiting any ladicd Islamic websites. 5. You will be aObidcd arocaniogftJopportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Amsting Milinury Offlcw (AMO) Mil assist you in reviewing a U relevant and reasonably available imclassified information regarding your ease. The AMO is not ao advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED
028110 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

Page 3 of 3 nmneo

001033

00000114

00000115

AJSAOOSIQ iBoojdioay asua^aa

lUSZO

UNClASSIFIEDi/EJOyO
SmnnaiT ef Adadaiatralbe Rey^ Jlc^dnMECrtttAV JlutDt^pUKSMiimmiy OSfktt AeBeiWAgMf<gf J1^Jhr«Hi^€!fflurMHm>m£i»d Oie omvuthtg tnilMortfy tm/pufpet* ffeW AAiMi»e0m AmW jkWjpmwwWa**,
nw>fANfMln!n^^

wmsnfom

]%#WjMWiiyi!M#%o'#kw (4M0) wm sm/m 7%t AMO prt$imttd t/m Etumy Cambatiott NefffkaMon fiitem, ExUM Admk^ttt^ Madie^ Board. Tkt XMOfmmMWAeAMnvCMiWiMrgWW Xf^twwAxrutNe jRfWkw MotrA
tt wat nottiif

0 Ute

Fonn, Exhibit EC^, # the

Um PhoMii^Offlaa'duttJhm Exhibit SCS* tkt AnbAwe tmtdimn

tMtohe j^Ksmtfirr tkg /liWm&AWw Mevkm BoardpT&c*eMnp, 7&#AWAs(gQ^kerogN^^ Mn 4fMr Mgam&v proeoMUrngt,timt^eDtlatit** ^pptmtito mdmiami tktfncm»tltai&t€ Undas^^kdSHa^uyrstfSddmet wmmidtg UttDtetakmtikMa mmknor war w i d m t i i i 0us bikrvkwi witkatAeAMOcoi^mmdlkatfke <wwa#lWer3gK*ks###i#f jW$g#w^ *s TlutPMOpmmtaime Vmhss^iaiSmufimy t^Enimah Eish&itI>MO'J, miDl^ IfikeFBlMeiaadiomMmesmimntothitiJtdn^ Tie IMfa sftH^ iftol« AMOmdBtUikue. Th9 OMQ 0 Ar^dem^pdom dfA < cat$mts i^tke Undm^btd Sammmy ef Efideuac,EickmimO'l,totktAdmbit»ainM^ I*r PreskSng C^gHeet mW the DMOfmr myJknit^r tmdim^ftM btfbrmfOkm. 7*« DM0 camfbjmi Ata *« *** mfmikef tmdksa^ied infimmoha afd rtqatstti a ti0*t4imi^i0pm*McUissifkdb^jhr^^ tvkvtuattttkiedapotitkmftftke ZMmkm
ISH 310 Endosure(5) PageJ of2

UNCLAS8IF!ED//F0OOr

Dooyij

UNCLASSIFIED^GWO
Ht PresUOmg QffUxr adcmm^idged the rtquesL Whm ash*d JfAeAMOksd mtjf iitfmiuma (opment oa behalfofme s p (*« Aimii^str«lhf*Btvie»B4m^ oftkekumlgw, neAM0tkmi^bdfy$mmefk£d&gDa^iisi'g<»mmmii4urhg
ikthittrHm.

TIM Frt3d^Sit$Qfpctrr$MithM rtmnOitder t^Ske undtw^fltdp&rttffa ef #e X4Wi*Mra#e Jteitfew BtMripfWiudbtgt, mtititmta^wntd tktproctt^p. T%€ JhttMfdln^ Q/pctr opened ciasi^kdportim of tit tmkm,
7Ae I'tncnyg^ <;|petr «4ilem /l4fiwl(rirt»«ll»v J t c v ^

AUTHENTICATION

I certify ifae material eoataiaad iti &iatnm«cr%^ toedmooy given d s a s m g the poceadlngs.

US.Axmy Ihmt^xigOfBaet

ISN 310 EaclcswtCS)

UNCLASSIFIED//FOyO'
028112 • Defense Reciprocal Discovery"'

""""hmw
00000116

UNCLASSIFIED
Oepartment <if Defcmc OfTwe for thr Administrative Review of fbe Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Bate Cuaotan»mo Bay. Cuba 2.1 March 2006 TO: SLBJECn AMIIZIAKE. DlAMIiL SAIID ALI UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OP LVIDUNCf; K)R ADMIMSTRAMVU REVinW BOAKl) IN THE CASE OK AMP/IANL. DJAMEL SAIID ALI

1, An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to dciennme if your continued detention is Jiecc&sary. 2, The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. Al the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to; (1) release you to your hraic state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention urxlcr LInited States control. 3, The following primary factors favor continued detention: a. Commitment 1, The detamee paid 20,000 Austrian Shillings for a Dutch pafspon and dover's licm^c. both of which were already altered wilh the detainee's picture on (hem 2. In late 1995, the dctniaee traveled to Canada firom Austria with a fake pa$spon. .3. In lute 2000. the dcutiiMie peld X O O Canadian Dollarsfora «olca I reneh passport; 4. In Octoi^efNovcmlier 2000, the detainee flew fiom Montreal to Londoit, bngland antf then (0 iehrnn, Iran From Tehnm. the detainee traveled by taxi to the ln»n/Afghanistan border and to Kabul The detainee prcxnted his iiauduleni pasnport to Ihc haninn border guards uad purported to be a I tench Muslim traveling lo Afghanistim Air persona] r«*NN&. 5. The detainee assigned himself liis first alias. Abdul Rahim. while living m a gucsfc* house in AfghanisUin- The detainee gave Ihe second alias lo Pakistani military audiorities upon his arrest to prevent them from discovering he was Algerian. The detainee continued to use tW& second a has and false place of birth when interviewed by United States audiorities in Afghanistan and at Camp X-Ray until approximately 2 % .March 2002b, CorWiections'Associations 1. 3 be detainee attended the Al Uniah Mosque in Montreal, Canada.

DMO Exhibit 1 Page I of 3

UNCLASSIFIED 000465
ISN 310
028113 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000117

UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJF.CT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCK FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AlWKZlANB, DJAMEL SARD ALI

2, In laic 2000, while attending the Al IJmab .Moique. the detamee met H Ttmi»iaa ##o l^ve Ihe dewwrwc appmximaltly 1.200 hi 1,300 Canadian Dollan and (old him lo go lo a gwcf, htmw m Kati Parwan, AlghaniaiAn ^ I 'pon arriving in Kabul, the detainee went lo (be g«&$t house m Kaii Parwan.'ii neighborhood of Kabul. The detainee stated ihat the majority of boiiiders in the house wera Taliban tighten; tiiere awaiting tniming or renting atkr retuming (mm the Ironi lino, bu! others were jiist immigmnts. 4, In February 2001, the detamee took a taxi to Jalalabad asking for the Arab guest house in the Intelligence neighborfiOOil ofJalalabad, named for the Taliban Intelligence headquarters located there c. Intent The detainee decided while in Canada that he wanted to go lo .Atfghanistan because be believed the Taliban had created the only country which was truly Islamic, and the detainee wanted to live somewhere with only Sharia Law d. Other Relevant Data 1. The detainee was captured by Pakistnni inifitory in a villo^ mosque, loaded into (rucks and confined to an army barracks for the iiighl, 2. The following day. the dctmnee was Inmded onto a bus with many others Suddenly, the bill eniptcd in #ioii(ing and punfire The detainee allegedly dove to the Itoor and crawlwl io ihc middle aisle. Allegedly, many people fell on top ot the detamee, breaking hi* left arm. The detainee then cnswled out of n window of the bos and hid under :i nearby small bridge The detainee was again arrested and taken (o a nearby prison in Kohat, Pakistan'. 1, After five to sevcti dflys at Ihe prison fn Kohal, tfie detainee was tmrisfearrol to » l^!(pital for his broken ann, where he remained tor approximaiely two weeks. The Pakistani, military eventually turned over the detainee and tbe other prisonen fo the United States who then flew them to Kjmdahsr. 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer; a. While in Afgliamstan. the detainee stated that he did no* receive any military or terrorist training and did not see any fighting. b. The detainee was living in Jalalabad when he learned of the 11 September 20OI terrorist atucka in the United States, The detainee stated lhal he was shocked when be leamed of tbese attacks The dcsataee denied having any advance knowledge of the^c attacks and denied having hcait any mmor$ ofany sucb attack: prior to H September 2001 Page 2 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED
028114 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

0004&6

00000118

UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: U N C I ^ S g l E D NUMMARY OF KVmENCE FOR ADMIMSTRATEVE RKVIEW BOARD IN THR C ASE OK AMEZIANE, WAMELSAMD A H

c. The detainee denied ever having panicipaied in any lighting or icnnoriM Activity and denied that he had any tntention of pimicipjiting in sueh activily ifhe h release*! 1 he detainee denied any knowledge ofany flihirc planned terrorist attacks in Ihe United Siatct; and denied knowledge ofthe locations of any ttrrurisi (ruining camp* or tiie identity ofany usdividuub aflthated with al Qaida orotber terrorist organizations, d. The detainee stated tliat he was not even thinking of jihad when be moved to Afghanistan. The delainee decided lo Oec Afghanistan because the non TaHban and oppo:ibon were killing Arabs. e. The detainee stated that he was nol a member of al Qaida, 5. You will be afkrded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to presem information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be phyaically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassifii^ Infotmation regarding your case, The AMO ia not an advocate for or against ctmiinued detention, nor may the AMO fotm a confidential relationship with you or lepiescm you in any other matter.

Page 3 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED

028115

D e f e n s e Reciprocal D i s c o v e r y

00000119

ys I

UNCLASSIFIED
DcpartDieut of DcfcBfip Office for the Aamialtlrative Revkw of the DeteotWo of Enemy Combstsnti at VS. .Naval Biuc Ctiatttaoomo Bay, Cuba l5May20D7 TOi SUBJECT: ISMAIIL SAUD ALI MX MASK UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE HOR ADMfXISTRATIVR REVlkW BOARD IN TIIE CASL OH ISNiADL SAUD ALI 31N NASR

1. An Adiaimstrativc Review Board will be convMted to review your ease to determine if yuur cuminucd detention is necessary. 2. Tlie Administrative Review Board wil] conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available end relevant infonnwion regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a Tecoroiaendation so; (I) release you to your home staie; (2) transfer you to ycsur home state, wiOi conditions cgrccd upon by the United Sutes and your home state; or (3) continue yo jr detention under United States control. 3 The following primary factors favor continued detention: a Commitment !. The detainee deciccd while in Canada lie wanted tu go to Afgh&niAsii because he believed the Taliban bed created the only want ry *tich was tJiUy Islamic, and the detciiye wanted to live somewhere wilh only Sharia L@w, 1. Tlte dctauicc stated he ir&velod to Afghamstaa with appjOKiiauteiy 5,00^ lo 6,000 Ciuuidian Dcillarg,. 1 En October lo November 3000 the t!et*inecflewfrom Motmnl. Canada to London, CngknU, and (hen to I chrtm, Imn^ }rom Tehran, ;ho dtaainee iravelcd by ki;i to the Irxn. Alglmustaii border and to Kabul, Afgiiimistaii, The detainee prescn*c4 his fraudulent past^oA^ ihe Iranian border gnani* and purpodod to be & Frmch Muslim wvelmg to Afghanistan for
pctoaal reasons,

4, The detainee stoied he traveled to the guest house in Kabul, Afghatiistaa, and s"Ayd there for appro ximatdy ilincc mouth), The majority ofboardcM in the house were Taliban figh M S S awaiting tiammg orjesj^xji a&r leturaing horn the front hnes 5 Tbe detainee stated he stayed for two weeks st an Arab guest hoase located in the same i # g # m W d w the Tshbap in^lj^enoe liead^uatm.

DMO Hxhibit 1 Page i of 3

UNCLASSIFIED
28S 028116 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

OOOOOiCO

UNCLASSIFIED
SURIECT: l-NCLASSIFIKD SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF I S M A H L S A I H ) ALJ BIN N^SR

6. The detainee staicd he traveled w the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan ofler (he itW of ilabul. Afj:l>ani«an, and dug @hcl(ci? ui the girnutid. The United Sttt« bombing was mostly on* nwumsins where Taliban AghietK were fleeing the firont hoe*. .the other stUc b Trainmg 1. A source stated he met ihe detainee at (h« al Farouq Training Camp in AfghW«t*n 2. The Sl Fsrouq Traitimg Camp was funded by ai Qaida and all srudettj received Wc^^ns trainmg, attended a commando course, and received mstructioii m topography and explosives. c. Other Rdevajiit Data 1. The dctaiacc staled he purcJmed a stolen passport and m altered driver's license. In 1995, he wss detained ir. Canada by amhorilies fcr using the lake passpon. .Additionally, the detainee •stated he purchased a stolen passport in 2000 and received money firom a person be met a mosque for travel to Kabul, Afghanistan 2 Thedetainee was captured witli 740 British pounds, 429,000 Afj^ani, 2,300 Pakistani mpccs, and » calculator 4 The following primary factors favor release or iransfart a. Tlie detainee dovod having any knowledge of the attacks in the United State* pnor to their exeaxinn on 11 September 20C1 and also denied knowledge of any lumors *)r plans of lulu:c titiackn on the Unitc^t Strntcg ur United Stalcn iniercsu, b. The detainee it ated he wos not dunking of iiliiid who he moved to Afghamstfci c. The detainee denied ever having participaied in M\y fighting or teaorisi activily and denied he had any intcnlion of participtiting in sucli activity ifhe is released. The detainee denied any knowledge of any fUture plaruned tmorist Attacks in the United States and denied knowledge of the locauons cf any icrrorist irai.iing camps or the identity of aay individuals
af&liatcd with al Qaida or other terrorist organizations.

d. The detainee stated he is not a (Qtnnbcr of ai Qeida. 5. Yov will be affbrded a meaningfiil opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; Ihis includes aa opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Mihtary Of?i<xr (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relc-ant and reasonably available
unclajsificG infornjslion regarding your case. The AMO is not an wivocatf fcf or against

DMO Exhibit 1 Page 2 of3

UNCLASSIFIED
028117 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

2M

00000121

UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECri: UNCI.^SSIF1ED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IS.MAUL SAIID ALI BIN NASR continued detention, nor may the AMO form a coafideniiaJ relattonshtp widi you or represent you in any other matter.

DMO Exhibit I Page 3 of 3

UNCLASSIFIED
028118 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

a«7

00000122

INTHE
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

DJAMEL A M E Z I A N E , Prisoner, U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Petitioner, v. UNITED
STATES.

Defendant.

PETITION AND REQUEST FOR PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES Dated: August 6, 2008 Respectfully submitted on behalf of Djamel Ameziane: Pardiss Kebriaei Shayana Kadidal CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 666 Broadway, 7'" Floor New York, NY 10012 (Tel) 212-614-6452 (Fax) 212-614-6499 Viviana Krsticevic Ariela Peralta Francisco Quintana Michael Camilleri CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (CEJIL) 1630 Connecticut Ave., NW Suite 401 Washington, D.C. 20009-1053 (Tel) 202-319-3000 (Fax) 202-319-3019

028381

Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000123

TABLEOECONTENTS I IL Pi^ELIMINARYSTATEMENT BACKGROUND ANDCONTE^T A. B. Tbe United States^ Response to Septemberll International Network ofDetention Facilities, Including in Kandabar and at Bagrain Air Force Base, Afghanistan; in Ira^; and in Guantanamo Bay,Cuba 1. 2. C. Kandahar Detention Facility Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility 7 8 9 1 4 4

Tbe Legal Framework Goveming Guantanamo Detainees: U.S. Legislation and Litigation 1. 2. 3. Habeas Corpus and Access tc Courts CSRTsand Status Detern^inations Military Commissions 12 12 15 17 1^ 18 20 21 25 27 28 29 30

III

STATEMENTOFFACTS A. B. C D. E. F. 0. H. Background.,^ Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Torture andInhumancTieatment Camp VI Conditions Denial of Adequate Medical Care Religious Abuse Impact on Private and Fan^ily Life Risk of Retum to Algeria

1 028382 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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IV

ADMISSIBILITY A, Mr.Ame^iane^sPetition is Admissible Under the CommissiDn^s Rules of Procedure 1. Tbe CDmmission bas Jurisdiction RationePersonae, RatiDneMateriae,RatiDneTempciis,andRatiDneLocito Consider Mr.Ame^iane^sPetition Mr.Ame:B:iane Has Met tbe Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies Ret^uireinent 3 4. 5. Tbe Petition is Submitted witbinaReasonableTime Tbe Petition is Not Pending before another Intemational Body Conclusion: Mr. Ame^^iane^sPetition is Admissible under tbeCommission^sRulesofProcedure

31 31

31

2.

35 48 49 50 51

V

VIGLATIONSOFTHEAMERICANDECLARATION ONTHE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OFMAN A. Tbe United States bas Arbitrarily Deprived Ml. Ame2:iane of bis Liberty and Denied bis Right tcPrDmptJudicial Review in Violation of Article ^ ^ V of tbe American Declaration 1. Tbe United States^ Failure to Adequately Determine Mr.Ame:^iane^sLegal Status bas Frustrated the Appropriate Application of Article ^ ^ V to bis Case Regardless of Wbetber International Human Rights or Humanitarian Law Governs Mr. Ame^iane^sDetention, bis Imprisonment for over SixYears without Charge ^r Judicial Review Constitutes an ArbittaiyDeprivatiDnDf bis Liberty

51

53

2

57

B,

Ml. Ame^iane^sDetention Conditions andTieatment Amount to Torture and Cruel,Inhuman,and DegradingTreatment inViclation of ArticlesIand^^V of tbe American Declaration 1. 2, Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and DegradingTreatment Are Prohibited in tbe Inter American System Mr. Ame2:iane Has Been Subjected to Physical and PsycbologicalTortuie and Cruel,Inhuman,and Degrading Treatment in Guantanamo and Kandahar

64 65

68

tl 028888 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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(a) (b)

Detention Conditicns, including Prolonged IncDmmunicadcDetentiDn and Isolation Physical andVerbal Assaults,ModifiedWa^eiboarding, Abusive Interrogations, and Sleep Deprivation in tbe Context ofDetention and Interrogation

68

74 77 82

(c)

Denial of Adet^uate Medical Care

C.

(d) Religious Abuse and Interference Mr.Ame^iane^sConditionsofDetentionViolatebisRigbtTDPrivateand Family Life and to Protection for bis Peisonal Reputation under ArticlesVand VI of tbe American Declaration 1. 2 Mr.Ame2:iane bas been Deprived ofDeveloping bis Private and Family Life Mi.Ame2:iane bas Suffered Unfair Attacks on bis Personal Honor and Reputation

84 85 89

D.

The United States Has Denied Mr.Ame:^iane bis Rights to Due Process andJudicial Remedies under Articles ^VIII and ^ ^ V l of tbe AmericanDeclaration L 3 Tbe CSRTs Violate Fundamental Due Prccess Norms US.Legislation Deprives Ml. Ame:^ianeofJudicial Remedies for Violations He bas Suffered in U.S. Custody

90 90 93 95

VI

APPLICATIONOF ARTICLE37(4)OFTHEIACHRRULES A. Tbe Commission^sRules of Procedure Provide for an Exceptional Procedure to Join tbe Admissibility and Merits Phases of Urgent Cases in order to Expedite tbe Proceedings Mr.Ame^iane^scasepresents urgent circumstances tbat callfor Application of Article 37(4)of tbe Commission^sRules

95

B.

98 99 99

VII

RE^UESTFORPRECAUTIONARYMEASURES A. The Commission Has Authority to Issue Precautionary Measures

ill 028384 Defense Reciprocal Discovery 0 0 0 0 0 1 * ^ 0

B,

Tbe Commission Should Issue Precautionary Measures Ret^uii ing tbe United States to Honor its NonRefoulement Obligations andTo Refrain from Transferring Mr, Ame:^ianeToaCountry Where HeWillBeatRiskofHarm 1. 2. 3. Tbe United States Continues toViolatc its Non Refoulement Obligations Mr.Ame^iane Would Be At Risk of Serious Harm ifRetumed to Algeria Request for Precautionary Measures

100 100 102 103

C.

Tbe Commission should Issue Precautionary Measures Requiring tbe United States to Cease All Abusive Interrogations and AnyOtherMistreatmentofMr, Ameziane and to Ensure bim HumaneConditionsofConfinement, Adequate MedicalTreatment,and Regular Communication witb bis Family 1, 2.

104

Mr.Ame^iane^sTreatment and Conditions ofDetention in Guantanamo ContinueToViolate His Right to Human^Treatment.,.. 104 Retjuest for Precautionary Measures 105 106

VIII

CONCLUSION AND PRAYERFORRELIEF

iv
028385 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000127

I.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1. Djamel Ameziane is a prisoner at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,

where he has been held virtually incommunicado, without charge or judicial review ofhis detention, for six and a half years. While arbitrarily and indefinitely detained by the United States at Guantanamo, Mr. Ameziane has been physically and psychologically tortured, denied medical care for health conditions resulting from his confinement, prevented from practicing his religion without interference and insult, and deprived of developing his private and family life. The stigma of Guantanamo will continue to impact his life long after he is released from the prison. These harms, as well as the denial of any effective legal recourse to seek accountability and reparations for the violations he has suffered, constitute violations of fimdamental rights tmder the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties ofMan ("American Declaration"). The U.S. govemment, as a signatory to the Declaration, is obliged to respect these rights vis-a-vis Mr. Ameziane by virtue of holding him as its prisoner. 2. A citizeri of Algeria, Mr. Ameziane left his home country in the 1990s to escape

escalating violence and insecurity and in search of a better life. He went first to Austria, where he worked as a high-paid chef, and then to Canada, where he sought political asylum and lived forfiveyears but was ultimately denied refuge. Fearful ofbeing deported to Algeria and faced with few options, Mr. Ameziane went to Afghanistan, Hefledthat coimtry as soon as the fighting began in October 2001, but was captured by the local police and tumed over to U S. .forces, presumably for a bounty.. 3. From the point ofhis capture, Mr. Ameziane was shipped to a detention facility at

the U.S.-occupied Air Base in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where his torture began. Military prison guards beat, punched and kicked Mr. Ameziane and other prisoners without provocation,

-1028386 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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menaced them with working dogs, subjected them to brutal searches and desecrated their Our^ans. ^. In February 2002, Mr. Ameziane was transferredft^omKandahartoGuantanamo

Bay,justweeksaftertheprisonopened Asoneofthefirstprisonerstoarrive,Mr Ameziane was held in Camp^-Ray^the infamous camp of the early regime at Guantanamo^inasmall wire-mesh cage, exposed to the sun and the elements.^ In March 2007,he was transferred to Camp Vl^the newest maximum security facility at Guant^mo^where, according to imclassified information to date,^he sits in isolation all day,everyday,inasmall concrete and steel cell with no windows to the outside or natural light or air, and where he is slowly going blindB ^. Duringhis imprisonment at Guantanamo, Mr. Ameziane has been interrogated

hundreds of times. In connection with these interrogations, he has been beaten, subjected to simulated drowning, denied sleep for extended periods oftime, held in solitary confinement, and subjected to blaring music designed to torture. His abuse and conditions of confinement have resulted in injuries and long-term health conditions fbr which he has never received proper treatment, despite repeated requests. Medical treatment hasfiirthermorebeen withheld to coerce his cooperation in interrogations. ^. Mr. Ameziane^simprisonment at Guantanamo has also deprived him of precious

years during the prime ofhis life, during which he would have wished to marry,startafamily

* ^

See, e.g., Shafiq Rasul, Asiflqbal, & Rhuhel Ahmed, Composite Statement: Detention in Afghanistan and Guantdnamo Bay (July 26,2004), available at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/RAS408A.html. The information provided in this Petition conceming Mr. Ameziane's confinement in Camp VI is based upon attorney-client meeting notes of visits to Mr. Ameziane at Guantdnamo, as well as his letters to his attorneys, that were unclassified at the time of filing. See Human Rights Watch, Locked Up Alone: Detention Conditions and Mental Health at Guantdnamo (June 2008), available at http://wvTOr.hrw,org/reports/2008/us0608/us0608webwcover.pdf.

'

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00^£ai29

andpursueacareer,Italsodeniedhimthechancetosaygoodbyetohisfather,whopassed away while Mr, Ameziane has been imprisoned. ^. For more than six years, the United States has denied Mr. Ameziane the right not

only to challenge his detention, but also to seek accotmtability and effective relief forthe other harms he has suffered. At no time has the United States charged him with any crime, nor accusedhimofparticipatinginanyhostileactionatanytime,ofpossessingorusmgany weapons, of participating in any military training activity or ofbeingamember of any alleged terrorist organization, g. As this petition is filed, Mr. Ameziane continues to be indefinitely and

inhumanely detained, and he faces an tmcertain future. While theU.S.Supreme Court^smling in ^o^^^i^i^^^v^t^.^^ in June 2008 restores Guantanamo detainees^rightto habeas corpus,^a remedy that Mr. Ameziane will pursue, the fact remains that he is still sitthig in his cell at Guant^amo Bay without charge and that he has been deprived of any semblance of meaningful review ofhis detention fbr over six years. ^. Were Mr. Ameziane to be released from Guant^amo, he would needathird

country in which to resettle safely. He is currently applying fbrresettlement in Canada, where he legally resided fbrfiveyears prior to his detention. Mr. Ameziane confronts an ongoing risk of persecution in Algeria, the coimtry he fiedl6years ago asayoung man in hope offindingpeace and security,onIy to end up at Guantanamo because of circumstances beyond his making or control.

*

Boumediene v. Bush, 128 U.S. 2229 (June 12,2008).

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L

BACI^C^ROUNDANDCONTE^T A^ 10. The United States^ Response to Septembers I I Days afterthe attacks on theWorldTrade Center and the Pentagon on September

II,2001,theU.S. CongresspassedajointresolutionthatbroadlyauthorizedthePresidentto ^^use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.,,in order to prevent anyfiitureactsofintemationalterrorismagainsttheUnitedStatesbysuchnations, organizations orpersons."^ This resolution, the Authorization fbr the Use ofMilitary Force ("AUMF"), provided the legal basis forthe United States^ military campaign against theTaliban regime in Afghanistan and the alO^eda elements that supported it.^ IL Two months later, on November 13, 2001, the President signed an executive order

that definedasweeping category of non-U.S.citizens whom the Department ofDefense was authorized to detain in its "war against terrorism,"^ The order provided that the Presidentalone would determine which individualsfitwithin the purview ofthat definition and could be detained.^ItaIsoexplicitlydeniedallsuchdetaineesbeingheldinUScustodyany^herethe right to challenge any aspect of their detention in anyU.S. or fbreign court or intemational tribunal, and authorized trial by military commissions fbr individuals who would be charged.^

* * '

Authorization for Use ofMilitary Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,115 Stat, 224 (2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/terrorisni/sJres23.es.html. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, Exec. Order No. 66 F.R. 57,833 (Nov, 13, 2001) [hereinafter "Exec. Order No. of Nov. 13, 2001"], available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/tribunals/docs/exec_order.pdf. See Exec. Order No. of Nov. 13,2001 § 2(a). See Exec. Order No. of Nov. 13, 2001 § 7(b)(2). In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled these military commissions unconstitutional in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).

* '

-4028389 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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12.

Pursuant to theAUMF and this order, hundreds ofindividuals were captured in

the weeks and months following Septemberll,not only in Afghanistan, but in areas of tbe world where there was no armed confiict involvingthe United States.^^They were detained and interrogated in U.S. custody in various locations, including in U.S, military bases in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay,infbreignprisonsandinsecretsitesoperatedbytheCIA,^^ 13. Confidential govemment memos written in the days, weeks and months after

Septemberllreveal that the United States did not intend to be bound by its constitutional or intemational legal obligations in responding to the attacks, Amemo from the Director of the CIA from September 16, 2001 declared,"All the rules have changed,"^^whileasubse^uent memo from the Office ofthe Legal Counsel at the Department ofJustice cotmseled the President thattherewereessentiallynolimitstohisauthority"astoanyterroristthreat,theamountof military force to be used in response, orfbe method, timing, and nature ofthe response,"^^ In January 2002, as the first prisoners began to arrive at Guant^amo, additional memos from the Officeofthe Legal Counsel^^ and from the President's White House Counsel advised the

See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Situation ofdetainees at Guantdnamo Bay. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 15,2006) [hereinafter "UN Special Mandate Holders' Report"], available at http://daccessdds.un.0rg/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GO6/l 12/76/PDF/G0611276.pdf?OpenElement. For example, six men of Algerian origin were detained in Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2001 and transferred to Guantdnamo. See id. at para. 25. " See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.eom/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/l 1/01/AR2005110101644_pf html. Amnesty Intemational, USA Justice Delayed and Justice Denied? Trials under the Military Commissions Act, at 2 (March 22,2007), citing Memorandum: We're at war (Sept. 16,2001), available at http://asiapacific.anmesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510442007?open&of=ENG-USA. " U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office ofthe Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion of Deputy Assistant Attomey General John Yoo to Timothy Flanigan, "The President's constitutional authority to conduct military operations against terrorists and nations supporting them" (Sept. 25,2001). U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion of Deputy Assistant Attomey General John Yoo to William J, Haynes II, "Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees" (Jan. 9,2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf; U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Office ofthe Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion of Assistant Attomey General Jay Bybee to Alberto Gonzalez et al.,

'*

-5028390 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

00000132

President that captured members ofalO^eda and the Taliban were not protected by the Third Geneva Convention, reasoning that this "new kind of war,..renders obsolete Geneva^sstrict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners" and that not applying "Geneva"would "substantially reduce" theriskthatU.S.ofticials would later be prosecuted fbrwar crimes under the War Crimes AcL^^ The President issued an order one month later declaring thatTaliban and alO^da detainees were not entitled to prisoner ofwar status underthe Geneva Conventions.^^ 14. The maimer in which the United States has conducted its "war on terror" has

given rise to abuses that have been widely decried by the intemational community. While the UnitedNationsSecurityCounciladoptedastrongantiterrorismresolutiononlytwowceksafter Septemberllcondemning the attacks and calling upon States to take legislative, procedural and economic measures to prevent, prohibit and criminalize terrorist acts,^^subse^uent resolutions also called upon "l^s^tatesl^to^ ensure that any measure^sj taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law,in particular intemational human rights, reftigee and humanitarian law."^^ The United States has failed to respect these obligations. In the report of

"Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees" (Jan. 22,2002), available at http://www,gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.01,22.pdf,, '* Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, Memorandum for the President, "Decision re: application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban" (Jan. 25,2002) (draft), ovaiVflWear http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf Memorandum of the President, "Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees" (Feb. 7,2002), available at http://lawofwar.org/bush.memo,7_Feb_2002_l_0001.jpg. U.N. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/508 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/index.cfhi?docid=5108. See UN Special Mandate Holders' Report, supra note 10, at para. 7, n, 3, (Declaration annexed to S.C.Res. 1456, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20,2003). Relevant General Assembly resolutions on this issue are G.A. Res. 57/219, G.A. Res. 58/187, and G.A. Res. 59/191. The most recent resolution adopted by the U.N, S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005), in which the Security Council reiterated the importance of upholding the rule oflaw and intemational human rights law while countering terrorism.) See also id. at para. 7, nn. 4-6 (Statement delivered by the Secretary General at the Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee with Regional Organizations, New York, March 6,2003, available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=275; Speech delivered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at the Biennial Conference ofthe Intemational Commission of Jurists (Berlin, Aug. 27 2004), available at

'* " "

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his mission to the United States, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and CounterTerrorism criticized the "serious situations ofincompatibility between intemational human rights obligations and the counter-terrorism law and practice ofthe United States" and the fact that "a number ofimportant mechanisms l^in U.S.law^ forthe protection ofrights have been removed or obfuscated under law and practice since the events ofllSeptember."^^Foryears, this Commission and otherintemationalbodies,^^ as well as U.S.officials themselves,^^ have called forthe United States to close the prison at Guantanamo without further delay. Inter^nntionnlNetwor^hofDetentionEneilities^Ineludinginl^nndnhar^nndat Bngr^nmAir^Eor^ce Base, Afghanistan^ in Ii^nt^^nnd in ^nnntannmoBay^ Cnba 15. As part ofits response to Septemberll,the United States seized and detained

hundreds, ifnot thousands, ofindividuals in sites and facilities away fi^om public scrutiny, includingU.S.military bases arotmd the world, fbreign prisons and secret CIA sites,^^ Asan indication that the United States is scaling up, not down, its global detention operations, recent news reports state that the Pentagon has planned to buildanew,larger detention facility on the U.S.Air Base at Bagram, Afghanistan to replace the existing dilapidated one.^^ Current1y,in known sites alone, the United States holds some 270 persons in Guant^amo, some 700 persons
http://www,unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/NewsRoom?OpenFrameSet; Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2003/68,2004/87 and 2005/80). Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection ofhuman rights andfundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, paras. 53,3 (Nov. 22,2007) [hereinafter "2007 Scheinin Report"], available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/149/55/PDF/G0714955.pdf7OpenElement.
20

See, e.g., Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 2/06 (July 28,2006); UN Special Mandate Holders' Report, supra note 10, at para. 96. See, e.g., Tom Shanker & David E. Sanger, New to Pentagon, Gates Arguedfor Closing Guantdnamo, Int. Herald Tribune, March 22,2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/23/america/web0323gitmo.php; Chief of U.S. Military Says Close Guantdnamo to Salvage U.S. Image, Ass. Press, Jan, 13, 2008. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, Nov. 2,2005. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Planning Big New Prison in Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, May 17,2008.

21

22 23

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in Afghanistan, including over 600 in Bagram, and over 20,000personsinlra^.^^ As was the path for Mr, Ameziane, many ofthose held in Afghanistan were subse^uentlytransferred to Guant^mo. L 16. I^ndahnr^DeterrtiouEacility

Duringthe first week ofDecember 2001,in the later stages oftheU.S. invasion of

Afghanistan, U.S.Marines took control ofthe intemational airport in Kandahar and establisheda temporaryU.S. base, includingaprison reportedly capable ofholdinglOOdetainees.^^The U.S. military occupied and controlled the base overthe following months, including the five-week period ofMr.Ameziane^sdetentionthere.^^The prison at Kandahar subsequently became what theU.S, military callsan "intermediate" site,aholdingfacilitywhere detainees await transportation to otherpermanentfacilifies.^^News reports fi^om February 2002, arotmd the period ofMr.Ameziane^sdetention at Kandahar, described the facility as one oftwo main jails inAfghanistan fbrmorethan200 terrorism suspects, many of whom were awaiting transfer to Guantanamo.^^Detention conditions at Kandahar have been described by intemational monitors as below humanrigbts standards.^^

See Solomon Moore, Thousands of New Prisoners Overwhelm Iraqi System, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/world/middleeast/14justice.html (reporting that over 24,000 prisoners are held in U.S. military prisons in Iraq), See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, U.S. to Question Detainees (Dec. 18, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44340.
26

See Steven Lee Myers, A Nation Challenged: In the South; Anticipating Many Captives, U.S. Marines Build a Prison Camp at Kandahar Airport, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16,2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage,html?res=9403E5D61F3FF935A25751ClA9679C8B63&sec=&spon =&pagewanted= 1. See Email Communication from CENTCOM Combined Forces Command Spokesperson Michele Dewerth to Human Rights First, June 9,2004, cited in Human Rights First, Ending Secret Detentions, June 2004. Christopher Marquis, A Nation Challenged: The Fighting; U.S. Troops Reinforcing Safety ofBase in Kandahar, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,2002, Comm'n on Human Rights, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, "Advisory Services and Technical Cooperation in the Field ofHuman Rights," para. 45,61" Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/122 (Mar. 11,2005).

27

28

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2. 17.

Guantdnamo Bay Detention Facility

The territory ofthe Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has been under U.S. control

since the end ofthe Spanish-American War,^° The United States occupies the territory pursuant to a 1903 Lease Agreement executed with Cuba in the aftermath of the war, which expressly provides for the United States' "complete jurisdiction and control" over the area - control it may exercise pemianently ifit so chooses.'' h ^((W v. BtirA, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the government's argument that the right to habeas corpus does not extend to the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay because they are outside of U.S. territory.^^ As one Justice wrote, "Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory" over which the United States has long exercised "tmchallenged and indefinite control."^' 18. Thefirstprisoners were transferred to Guantanamo on January 11, 2002.^'' At its

peak, the prison held more than 750 men from over 40 countries, ranging in age from 10 to 80, most of whom U.S. officials have admitted should never have been held there in the first place.^^ As of August 2008, there were approximately 260 prisoners from about 30 countries being held
30

See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,475 (2004) (describing the United States' "plenary and exclusive jurisdiction" over Guantdnamo Bay). Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U,S,-Cuba, art. Ill, Feb, 16-23,1905, T.S. No. 418. Leaked govemment memosfrom2002 reveal that the administration selected Guantdnamo as a prison site precisely because it believed that detainees being held there would be beyond the reach of U.S. law and the protections ofhabeas in particular. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office ofLegal Counsel, Memorandum of Deputy Assistant Attorney General John C. Yoo for William J, Haynes, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba (Dtc. 28,2001), available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/01.12.28.pdf. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See, e.g., Guantdnamo Bay Timeline, Wash. Post, available at http://projects.washitigtonpost.com/Guantdnamo/timeline/; Amnesty Intemational, United States of America: No substitute for habeas corpus at 11 (Nov. 2007). See Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), Guantdnamo Bay Six Years Later, available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/GuantanamoSixYearsLater.pdf; Joseph Margulies, Guantdnamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power 209 (2006) (citing a former CL^ officer who reported that "only like 10 percent ofthe people [there] are really dangerous, that should be there and the rest are people that don't have anything to do with it... don't even understand what they're doing there"). See also Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, The Guantdnamo Detainees: The Government's Story 2-2 (Feb. 8,2006).

31 32

33 34

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atGuantanamo.^^ These include approximately 50 men, like Mr, Ameziane,who cannot retum to their home coimtry for fear of torture or persecution and needasafe third country fbr reseftlement,^^ 19. The conditions ofdetention at Guantanamo have been described by international

monitors as inhumane,^^ Thefirstprisoners at Guantanamo, including Mr. Ameziane^who arrived blindfolded and goggled, wearing earmuffs and face masks, handcuffed and shackled^ were held fbr the first few months oftheir imprisonment in open airwire-mesh cages in the infamous Camp^-Ray.^^ Formore than two years, the prisoners were virtually cut offfrom the outside world, until i^^,^t^^ opened Guantanamo to lawyers in 2004, but communication with lawyers, family members and other prisoners continues to be severely restricted.^^ Today,about 70^ of all prisoners are held in solitary confinement or isolation in one of three camps^Camps 5and6,andCampEcho.^^ Intemational NGOs have described Camp VI, where Mr, Ameziane is detained, as more severe in some respects than the most restrictive "super-maximum" lacilities

36

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Operational Update, US detention related to the events qr;; Sepremter 200/ mr^f (t; q/krma(A - fAe rok qTzAe /C/{C (July 30,2008), avm/otk http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/usa-detention-update-3007087opendocument. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofDefense, Detainee Transfer Announced (July 2,2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12100 (stating that approximately 265 prisoners remain at Guantdnamo). See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, A Fate Worse than Guantdnamo, Wash. Post, Sept. 2, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.eom/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/31/AR2007083101463.html, See Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 3, at 3. See id at 7. 5 ^ 6 a t 14-15. See CCR, Solitary Confinement at Guantdnamo Bay. available at http://www.ccrjustice,org/files/Solitary%20Confinement%20summary.pdf. See also Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 3, at I.

37

' "
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in theUnitedStates,^^ which have been criticized by intemational bodies as incompatible with humanrights,and the ICRC has described the conditions at Camp Echo as "extremely harsh."^^ 20. Prisonersareroutinelyabusedandmistreatedbymilitaryguardsanditiswell

established by now,after govemment reports and memos, news and NGO reports, and detainees' accounts themselves, that they have been subjected to methods constituting torture during interrogations,^^ Accordingtoareportreleased bythe Office ofthe Inspector General atthe Department ofJustice in May 2008, some ofthe most frequently reported techniques included sleep deprivation or disruption, prolonged shackling, stress positions, isolation, and the use of bright lights and loud music.^^ 21. In response to years ofindefinite and abusive detention, prisoners have engaged

in acts ofresistance and self^harm, including hunger strikes and suicide attempts; in 2003 alone, prisonersreportedlycommittedover350actsofselfharmB^ Todate, there havebeenfive reported deaths at the base.^^ The most recent death was in December 2007; according to news reports, the prisoner suffered fromatreatable form of colon cancer and died from lack of
41^

treatmenL
42

See Amnesty International, United States ofAmerica: Cruel and Inhuman: Conditions of isolation for detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, at 2 (April 2007). Id See, e.g., Dep't of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantdnamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 171-201 (May 2008) [hereinafter "DOJ OIG Report"]; Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantdnamo, N.Y. Times, Nov, 30,2004,

43

43 46 47

See DOJ OIG Report, supra note 44, at 171. See UN Special Mandate Holders' Report, supra mXt 10. See Petitioners' Observations of February 16,2007, Inter-Am. C.H.R, Precautionary Measures No. 259, Detainees in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. Three prisoners were reported dead on June 10, 2006; a fourth on May 30,2007; and a fifth on December 30,2007. The govemment has yet to release the results of its purported investigation into the nature and circumstances of any of the deaths. See Alleged Taliban Member Detained in Guantdnamo Bay Dies of Cancer. Assoc. Press, Dec. 31, 2007, ava/7a6/e a/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contenfarticle/2007/12/30/AR2007123002423.html.

48

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C. 22.

The Legal Framework Goveming Guantdnamo Detainees: U.S. Legislation and Litigation Since 2002, multiple legal challenges have been mounted against the President's

purported authority to hold individuals in indefinite, unreviewable detention. Although U.S, courts have attempted to restrict that authority, the Executive and the Congress have responded time and again with ever-problematic legislation and procedures, namely, the Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") procedures in 2004, the Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA") in 2005, and the Military Commissions Act ("MCA") in 2006. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's ruling in Boumediene striking the MCA's denial ofhabeas as unconstitutional with respect to Guantanamo detainees, the United States has succeeded in delaying effective habeas relief for the detainees for over six years. Furthermore, the MCA's other provisions, as well as the DTA and the CSRT procedures, remain intact. 1. 23. Habeas Corpus and Access to Courts

In February 2002, the first habeas corpus petition on behalf of Guantdnamo

prisoners was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ("D.C. District Court"). The district court dismissed the petition for lack ofjurisdiction, holding that as non-citizens detained outside sovereign U.S. territory, the petitioners had norightto habeas, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S, Supreme Court granted certiorari and, on June 24,2004, held in Rasul V. Bush that U,S. federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions of Guantanamo detainees."' Two years into their detention, Guantdnamo prisoners had access to the courts for thefirsttime. 24. In the aftermath of Rasul, more than 200 habeas petitions were filed in the D.C.

District Court on behalf of over 300 Guantanamo detainees. In January 2005, two district court
/(aW, 542 U.S. at 483-84.

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judges issued conflicting decisions regarding the extent of federal court access mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in RasuL In Khalid v. Bush, one judge held that nonresident noncitizens detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States in the course ofthe "war" against al Qaeda and the Taliban held no constitutionalrights,that no federal law was relevant and applicable, and that intemational law was not binding in this instance.In contrast, in In re Guantdnamo Detainee Cases, another judge held that the detainees were entitled to constitutional due process rights that were not satisfied by the CSRTs created by the Bush Administration in response to Rasul (discussed infra), and that some ofthe detainees held rights under the Third Geneva Convention.^' 25. As the litigation continued, Congress passed two laws pertinent to the quesfion of

the detainees' right to habeas. In December 2005, Congress passed the DTA, which stripped federal courts ofjurisdiction over any new habeas petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo detainees and created as a purported substitute for habeas a limited remedy in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals").^ Under the DTA, the scope ofthe Court's review is limited solely to examining whether the CSRTs were conducted in compliance with procedures established by the Secretary ofDefense for the CSRTs" - m other words, whether the military followed its own mles.^" Although the DTA was

Khalid V. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005). In re Guantdnamo Bay Detainee Cases, 344 F, Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2004). These two cases were consolidated as Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir, 2007). Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA") § 1005(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (2005). The DTA stripped federal courts ofjurisdiction to consider habeas petitions and "any other action" conceming any aspect of detentions at Guantdnamo. In Hamdan. 548 U.S. 557 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the DTA did not apply to habeas petitions pending at the time of its passage.
53

DTA, cit., § 1005(e)(2); Military Commissions Act of2006 ("MCA") § 3(a)(1), 10 U.S.C.A. (2006), amending 10 U.S.C.A. § 950(g) (2006). See Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 at 572.

54

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enacted over three years ago, only one of the more than 150 DTA cases that have been filed since 2005 was recently decided on the merits.^^ 26. In October 2006, Congress passed the MCA, which goes even further than the

DTA by precluding federal courts from considering habeas petitions and "any other action" not only by Guantdnamo detainees or by any other detainee captured after September 11,2001 and held as an "enemy combatant" in U.S. custody anywhere.The limited DTA review by the D C. Circuit Court of Appeals is the only court access such detainees are permitted by the MCA.^'' 27. In February 2007, a divided panel of judges of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals

relied on the MCA in dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction the leading habeas petitions on appeal from the D.C. District Court, consolidated as Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States CBoumediene"),^^ and the detainees petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. In June 2007, in a highly unusual move, the Supreme Court reversed its initial denial of cert and agreed to hear the combined cases. Pending the Supreme Court's decision, judges ofthe D.C. District Court stayed or dismissed the himdreds of habeas petitions pending in the Court.*' 28. On June 12, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court mled in Boumediene that the MCA's

habeas-stnpp'mg provision was unconstitutional with respect to Guantdnamo detainees and that

Parhat v. Gates, No. 06-1397, 2008 WL 2576977 (C.A.D.C. June 20, 2008).
56 57

MCA § 7(aX2). MCA § 950g. All three judges agreed that Congress mtended to strip the right of the courts to hear claims from Guantdnamo detainees when it passed the MCA. However, the decision was split 2-1 on whether common law habeas review extended to Guantdnamo. The majority mled that it did not, and that the MCA was valid and did not constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. One judge, in dissent, found the MCA to be an unconstitutional withdrawal ofjurisdictionfromthe federal courts. Boumediene v. Bush. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

59

On September 20,2007, for example, the D.C. District Court dismissed the habeas corpus petitions of 16 Guantanamo detainees with a one paragraph explanation stating that "federal courts have no jurisdiction over habeas petitions of enemy combatants detained at Guantdnamo Bay." Qayed v. Bush, Mem. Order of Sept. 20,2007, Civil Action No. 05-0454 (RMU).

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the review process under the DTA was not an adequate substitute for full habeas review.*" The Coiut's decision paves the way for the detainees' habeas petitions to be heard in the D.C. District ComX, although no Guantdnamo detainee has yet had a hearing on the merits ofhis habeas petition, and no such hearing has been scheduled to date. 29. Finally, on June 20, 2008, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued its first

decision in a DTA case. In Parhat v. Gates, the Court held that a CSRT's designation of the petitioner as an "enemy combatant" was invalid and ordered the govemment to "release Parhat, to transfer him, or to expeditiously convene a new Combatant Status Review Tribunal."*' 2. 30. CSRTs and Status Determinations

On July 7, 2004, just days after the Rasul decision, the govemment hastily created

an administrative review process under CSRTs - military tribunals composed of three mid-level officers tasked with reviewing whether the detainees at Guantanamo were being properly held as "enemy combatants."*^ In addition to the CSRTs, Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) were established to review annually whether each detainee should continue to be held.*^ According to the govemment, every detainee at Guantdnamo Bay has had a CSRT.*"

60

Boumediene v. Bush/Al Odah v. United States. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (June 12, 2008). Parhat, WL 2008 2576977, at 2-3. The Court stated that "Parhat's principal argument on this appeal is that the record before his Combatant Status Review Tribunal is insufficient to support the conclusion that he is an enemy combatant, even under the Defense Department's own definition ofthat term. We agree."

62

See Dep't ofDefense, Deputy Secretary ofDefense, Memorandum for Secretaries ofMilitary Departments et al. (July 14, 2006), Encl. (1), §§ A & B [hereinafter "CSRT Procedures"], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf See Dep't ofDefense, Deputy Secretary ofDefense, Memorandum for Secretaries ofMilitary Departments et al. (July 14,2006), Encl. (3), § 1(a) [hereinafter "ARB Procedures"], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf. See UN Special Mandate Holders' Report, supra note 10, at para. 28. Response of the United States of America Oct 21,2005, to Inquiry oftiie UNHCR Special Rapporteurs dated Aug. 8,2005, Pertaining to Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, at 47.

63

64

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31.

As the govomme^nt has acknowledged, the CSRTsand ARBs are administrative,

not judicial proceedings.*^ Prisoners cannot see or rebut any information the govemment considers classified, even though the CSRTsin 2004 relied substantially on classified information in making their determinations.** While detainees have the right to present witnesses and evidence theirtribtmal deems are relevant and "reasonably available,"in practice, mostdetameerequeststopresentdocumentaryevidenceweredenied,andallrequestsfor witnesses who were otherthan other Guantdnamo detainees were denied,*^ Formal rules of evidence do not apply and there isapresumption in favor oftiie govemment's"evidence."*^ Evidence obtained through torture oan be used asabasis fbr continued detention.*' The detainees have norightto counsel,^" but onlya"personal representative" who has no legal training, no duty to maintain confidentiality and an obligation, in fact, to disclose to the CSRT any relevant inculpatory information she or he receivesftomthe detainee.^' Not surprisingly, given these procedures, the CSRTsconducted in 2004 found most of the detainees at Guantanamo to be "enemy combatants."^^

65 66

See CSRT Procedures § B; ARB Procedures § 1. See also 2007 Sheinin Report, supra note 19, para. 14. See CSRT Procedures § D(2); Brief for Petitioners El-Banna et al. in Al Odah v. United States, No. 061196, at 33. See CSRT Procedures §§ D & E; Seton Hall University School of Law, No-Hearing Hearings: An Analysis of the Proceedings of the Government's Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantdnamo, at 2-3 (Nov. 17,2006). See also lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (Oct. 28,2005) at 8. See CSRT Procedures §§ G(7) & G(l 1). See id End. (1) § 0(7). See id § F. See Dep't ofDefense, Deputy Secretary ofDefense, Memorandum for Secretaries ofMilitary Departments et al. (July 14,2006), Encl. (3), available at http://www.defenseIink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf. lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (Oct. 28,2005) at 8.

67

68
69 70 71

72

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32.

The CSRTs have been widely criticized by military officers who served on

them," U.S. courts and intemational bodies alike.'" In January 2005, the D.C. District Court held in In re Guantdnamo Detainees Cases that the CSRT proceedings failed to provide detainees "a fair opportunity to challenge their incarceration" and thus fail to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul^^ The Commission has also found the CSRTs inadequate; in 2005, the Commission concluded that "it remains entirely unclearfromthe outcome ofthose proceedings what the legal status of the detainees is or what rights they are entitied to under intemational or domestic law."'* 33. Again, the review provided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals under the DTA

is too limited to correct these flaws. 3. 34. Military Commissions

In June 2006, the military commissions authorized by the President in his

November 2001 executive order were mled imconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. RumsfeldP The MCA was enacted in direct response to Hamdan and authorized a new system of military commissions, but, for the second time, with procedures deviating from traditional U.S. court martial mies and the laws of war.'*
73

See, e.g., William Glaberson, Unlikely Adversary Arises to Criticize Detainee Hearings, N.Y. Times, July 23,2007, available ar http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/23/us/23gitmo.html. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Support of Petitioners in Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196; UN Special Mandate Holders' Report, supra note 10, para. 28; 2007 Scheinin Report, supra note 19, para. 14 See In re Guantdnamo Detainees Cases. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 468-478 (2005). lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (Oct. 28,2005) at 8. Hamdan. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Among other shortcomings, the military commissions authorized by the MCA reject the right to a speedy trial, allow a trial to continue in the absence ofthe accused, allow for the introduction of coerced evidence at hearings, permit the introduction of hearsay and evidence obtained without a warrant, and deny the accused fiill access to exculpatory evidence. The MCA also delegates the procedure for appointing military judges to the discretion of the Secretary ofDefense. See U.S. Dep't ofDefense, Manual for Military Commissions [hereinafter "Military Commissions Manual"]. For a thorough examination of the procedural

74

75 76 77

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35

U,S,officialshaveindicatedthattheyexpecttochargeapproximately80oftiie

remaining prisoners at Guantdnamo." As ofAugust 2008, charges had been announced against 20 detainees*" and one trial has begtm.*' Even if detainees are acquitted byamilitary conunission or complete the term ofimprisonmenthnposed by suchacommission, they are not entitled to releasefromU.S. custody.*^ IL STATEMENTOFFACTS A^ 36. BaekgrountI Mr. Ameziane was born on April 14,1967 in Algiers, the sixth inaclose-knit

family ofeight brothers and sisters. Mr. Ameziane'sbrother remembers that asachild, Mr. Ameziane was quiet and loved to read, and was content to sit in his room fbr hours surrotmded bystacksofbooks.MrAmezianeattendedprimaryschool,secondaryschoolanduniversityin Algeria, and worked asahydraulics technician after obtaining his tmiversity diploma. 37. Mr.Ameziane'shometownisinKabylie,anunstableregioninthenorthof

Algeria known fbrfrequent, violent clashes between the Algerian army and Islamic resistance groups. Practicing Muslims living in that region, such as Mr. Ameziane and his family,are
inadequacies ofthe military commissions created bythe MCA, .^eeCEJIL, CCR, American University Washington College ofLawIntemationalHuman Rights Law Clinic,"Observations presented before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, July 20,2007,Precautionary Measures. No. 259,Detainees in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba," See News Release, U.S.Dep't ofDe:^nse, Charges Referred on Detainee alBahluL No. 156-08 (Feb 26, 2008), ava//a^^earhttp://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx7releaseid^ll718.See.Bi^^e^e^ie^ ^^i,^^^e^-q^^a^,^^a^,^r^i^i^a^r^^a^^^era/^ee,lnt.HeraldTribune,Dec,20,2007. See Donna Miles, ^^^^r^i^a^^^erai^eeC^a^ge^ ^^/^^/ei^^SCi^^e^^^^^^ American Forces Press Service, June 30,2008, ^ai7a^^ei7rhttp://www.de^nselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx7id^50362. See William Glaberson^EricLichtblau,/t^r7^^^a^7^^^a/^egi^^^t^^a^ra^^^^^e July 22,2008 (reporting commencement ofSalim Ahmed Hamdan'smilitary commission). In addition, one ofthe first detainees to be charged,Australian David Hicks, pled guilty. Under increasing pressure from the Australian government to retum their citizen. Hicks was retumed to Australia afterahighly politicized plea agreement was reached in which he admitted toacharge of material support fbrterrorism andreceivedasentenceofninemonths'imprisonment, served in Australia,andayearlong"gag"order. See, e.g.,Spencer S.Hsu,"Guantdnamo Detainee Returns to Australia,"Wash. Post., May21,2007,p. AlO See2007ScheininReport,,^i^^^anotel9,para.32.

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automatically suspected ofbeing supporters ofsuch groups and arefrequentlyharassed and targeted by the govemment solely by virtue ofbeing observant Muslims. Mr, Ameziane left^is family home in 1992 to escape this discriminationand insecurity and to seek greater stability and peace abroad. He obtainedavisa to travel to ltaly,throughwhichhe transited to Vienna, ^ Austria, where he lived forthree years. 38. In Austria, Mr. Ameziane began working asadishwasher,buthis skill and talent

led him torisequickly to become the highest-paid chef at^^C^^^^^^^oT^^^ro^^^,awell-known Italianrestaurant, Inl995,ftillowing the election ofaconservative anti-immigrant govemment, newimmigration policies prevented Mr. Ameziane from extending orrenewing his visa, andhis work permit was denied without explanation, Mr. Ameziane was forced to leave the country. He traveled directlyto Canada, hoping that country'sFrench-speakingpopulation and progressive immigration policies would allow him to settle down and makeapermanent home. Immediately upon his arrival, he told immigration officials at the airport that he wanted to apply fbr asylum because he wasafraid ofbeing deported to Algeria. Asheawaitedadecision,he obtainedatemporaryworkpermitandworkeddiligentlyfbr an office supply company and^ various restaurants in Montreal^^is application wasultimately denied in 2000, andhe w^s forced once again to uproot his life and leaveti:iecountry he hadmade his home fbrfive years. 39. Displaced, fearftil ofbeing fbrciblyretumed to Algeria and^aftereightyears of

searchingforrefugeonlytobedeniedtimeandagain^perceivingthathehadfewoptions,he^ went to Afghanistan, where he feh he could live without discrimmationasaMuslim man, and where he would not fear deportation to Algeria, As soon as the war started, he fled to escape the fighting. He was captured by local police while tryingto cross the border into Pakistan, and tumed over by Pakistani authorities to U.S. forces, presumably fbrabounty. Later,m

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Guantdnamo, soldiers told Mr, Ameziane that the Pakistanis sold people to them in Afghanistan fbr^2,000andinPalristanfbr^5,000. 40. Mr. Ameziane was transferred to the prison at theU.S.-occupied airbase at

Kandahar, Afghanistan in January 2002 and to Guantanamo Bay on or arotmdFebruaryll, 2002, where he was one ofthefirstprisoners to arrive. More than six years later, Mr, Ameziane remains detained at Guantanamo without charge or, to date,judicia1 review ofthe legality ofhis detention. Administrative and^ndicialProceedings 41. Like many other detainees at Guantdnamo, Mr. Ameziane did not participate in

his CSRT in2004 or his subsequent annual ARBs*^ because he did not believe that theyprovided any measure ofdue process and would be used only tojustify his indefinite detention. Indeed, afterasham proceeding held in his absence,aCSRT determined that he was properly detained as an "enemy combatant." His atmual ARBs have alsoftiundhimineligibleforrelease,although it appearsthattheUnitedStateshaspreviouslyattemptedtonegotiatehistransfertoAlgeria, where he would be atriskof persecution. 42. Mr. Ameziane categorically rejects all oftheU.S.govemment'sallegations Eventakenatface

againsthim,whichareentirelyunsupportedbyactual,reliableevidence

value, they do notjustify his detention. He has never been alleged by theU.S.govemment to have engaged in any acts of terrorism or other hostilities against anyone, to have picked upa weapon or participated in any military training, or to beamember of an alleged terrorist organization. Nor has he ever had any involvement with extremism, terrorism or any act of violence whatsoever.

See Mr.Ameziane'sunclassifiedCSRT^ARB records,annexed to this petition.

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43.

Furthermore, the United States itself statesmtiie unclassified "summary of

evidence" presented to Mr. Ameziane'sCSRT panel that he went to Afghanistan fbr religious purposes and not because he wanted tofight.*"The govemmentalso notes that Mr. Ameziane stated to his "personal representative" that he was notamember oftheTaliban or al-Oa'ida; that he neither trained fbr, wimessed, nor engaged in anyfighting;and that he hadno mtention of participating in anyfightingorterrorist activity ifhe were released.** 44 OnFebmary24,2005,MrAmezianefiledapetitionfor^^^^^^^o^^^inthe

D.C. District Court.** He wasamongthefirstto file after .^^.^i^^aftbrded prisoners that righL After surviving several attempts fbr dismissal by the govemment, his case was stayed pending the Supreme Court'sdecisionin.^ot^i^^^^^i^^, That decision now paves the way for his case finally to be heard on the merits, but, more than three years after hefirstpetitioned the court, it remains tmclearwhen this will occur, 45. States, C^ 46. Torture and other Inhumane Treatment Mr. Ameziane has suffered torture and other inhumane treatment in the custody of No criminal charges have been brought againstMr.Ameziane bythe United

the United States at Kandahar and Guantdnamo, which he has recorded in letters to his attomeys. In one letter, Mr. Ameziane describes the bmtality ofhis treatment at Kandahar,where he was transferred byU.S.authorities in January 2002 and held fi^r more thanamonth.*' Upon his

^ ^
86

See unclassified Government Summary ofEvidence, annexed to this petition. See^^. See Petition fbr Writ ofHabeas Corpus in^^e^iai^ev.,^!^^, CiviiActionNo. 05-392 (D.D.C), annexed to this petition. Letterfrom Djamel Ameziane to Wells Dixon, Nov.6,2007 (unclassified). LettersfromMr. Ameziane to his attomeys are on file with the Centerfor Constitutional Rights and can be madeavailable to the Commission onaconfidential basis if necessary.

87

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arrival, Mr, Ameziane describes how soldiers punched, kicked and pushed him to the ground, pinnedhim down with their knees in his back, and slammed his head against the ground.** He and otherprisoners were subjected to abusive searches each day and night, and soldiers would sometimes come armed with working dogs. When prisoners were moved to different sections of the camp, soldiers would take them outside and orderthem to kneel with their hands on their heads facingabarbed-wiref^nce, on the other side of whichadozen armed soldiers would stand with rifles aimed, yellingthings like "kill himl kill himi" to the soldiers handling the prisoners. The soldiers would then push the prisonersflaton the grotmd on their stomachs and bring barking dogs close to their heads while they shackled the men'shands and ankles. Mr. Ameziane remembers the dogs being so close that he could feel their breath on the side ofhis face. The prisoners would then be ordered to get up and walk fbr dozens of meters on bare feet and in shackles until they reached their destination. 47. From Kandahar, Mr.Ameziane was transferred to Guantdnamo, arriving on or

aroundFebmaryll,2002 Fortheduration ofhis 15hourjourney,MrAmezianewashooded, shackled and chained to the floor ofthe plane, and forbiddenfromspeaking. Upon his arrival at Guantdnamo, he was putabus and transported to Camp^-Ray,during which he was once again chained to thefloorofthe bus and forbiddenfromspeaking or making the slightest mov^menL Whenhisbodyswayedtothebusbumpingalongtheroad,soldiersstmckhimrepeatedly onthe back and head. 48. At Camp^-Ray, where Mr, Ameziane was detained fbr his first two andahalf

months at Guantanamo,fromFebmary to April 2002, he was held ina6-feetby6-feet wire meshcell, withacement floor andamake-siiift roof of metal sheets. Inaletter to his attomeys.

88

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Mr.Ameziane described how guards would gratuitously yell obscenities and insults at him every time they walked by his cell or gave him an order, often fbrno reason other, for example, than to demand that he arrange his basic personal items inacertain order. Mr. Ameziane described the abusiveness and cmel absurdity ofthe situation: lhad to put the buckets, the tube oftoothpaste, the toothbmsh, theflask,the bar of soap, and the ^flip-flop'sandals on the side ofthe cage where the door is. A guardasks me to place these articles inarow inacertain order. Afewminutes later, another guard comes by and yells atme to put the toothbmsh to therightof the toothpaste, theflaskto the left ofthe soap bar. Later, another guard yells again forme to place the toothbmsh to the left ofthe toothpaste; theflasktothe right ofthe soap bar and so on; several times per day and often wakingme in the middle of the night to scream at me and tell me to move, fbrinstance, the toothbmsh to the left ofthe toothpaste....things thatlam not sure we should laugh or cry about. 49. Prisoners who replied to the guards'insults or defied their orders were visited by

the "Immediate Reaction Force team" ("IRF team") and punished.'" Mr. Ameziane wimessed these teams beat prisoners and chaintiiemup in painful positions for several hoursatatime, fbr example, with their handsand feet cuffed together behind their backinsuchawaythattheir legs remained flexed." 50. Mr. Ameziane has been moved between dif^rent blocks and camps since Camp

^-ray. Severaltimesfbr stretches ofup to one month, he was held in solitary confinement in Camp I, where he was put inacold steel cell withasteel bed andamstedfloor,with no article of clothing orwarmthotherthanashirt,apairofpantsandflip flops, and where guards would

89

LetterfromDjamel Ameziane to Pardiss Kebriaei, May 2008 (unclassified) (on file with CCR). Comparable to a riot squad, the IRF functions as a disciplinary force within the camps. Military police rotate on and off IRF duty and carry Plexiglas shields andfrequentlyuse tear gas or pepper spray. Guantdnamo prisoners arefrequently"IRF'd" as punishment. See CCR, Report on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, at 21 (July 2006).

"

LetterfromDjamel Ameziane to Pardiss Kebriaei, May 2008 (unclassified).

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prevent him from sleeping by making loud noise at night,'^ Foraperiod of about six months in

2006, fbr no infraction, Mr. Ameziane was transferred to the "Romeo" block of Camp3and the "Mike" block ofCamp 2, which the military reserved fbr detainees who were perceived to be uncooperative Hewasgivenonlyathinmatonwhichtosl^ep,apah^ofpants,asmock,anda pair offlip-flops,andasheet that was handed to him atlOp.m. and taken away at5a.m.'^ At night,guardswouldwakehimeachquarterorhalfhourbykickingontiiewallortiiedoorofhis cell and yelling,"Wakeupl"'" When he was taken out ofhis cell shackled and chained each day to go to the "recreation yard,"hewa^ forbiddenfromspeaking with other prisoners or moving hiseyesleftandrightashewasescortedtotheyard. Sometimes, whenhiseyeswouldshift slightly to the side, his escort guards would bmtally shove him against the wall, slamming his head against the wall with such force oncetiiatblood came out ofhis nose and mouth.'* 5L In another violent incident, guards entered his cell and forced him to the floor,

kneeing him in the back and ribs and slamming his head against thefloor,turning it left and righL The bashing dislocated Mr, A.meziane'sjaw,from which he still suffers. In the same episode,guardssprayedcayennepepperalloverhisbodyandthenhosedhimdownwitiiwater to accentuate the effect ofthe pepper spray and make his skin bum. They then held his head back and placedawater hose between his nose and mouth, running it fbr several minutes over his face and suffocating him, an operation they repeated several times. Mr.Ameziane writes,"I hadtheimpressiontiiatmyheadwassinkinginwater lstillhavepsychologicalinjuries,upto this day. Simply thinking ofit gives me the chills."'* Following his waterboarding, he was
^ « ^ LetterfromDjamel Ameziane to Wells Dixon, Mar. 17,2008 (unclassified) (on file with CCR). LetterfromDjamel Ameziane to Wells Dixon, Nov. 6,2007 (unclassified). Id M LetterfromDjamel Ameziane to Wells Dixon, Mar. 17,2008 (unclassified).

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taken to an interrogation room, where his feet were chained toametal ring fixed to thefloorand he was leftwrithing in painand shivering underthe cold air ofthe air conditioner, his clothes soaked and his body burningfromthe effect ofthe pepper spray." 52 MrAmezianehasalsobeensubjectedtomanyharshinterrogations.Hewasonce

kept inside an interrogation room fbr over 25 hours and allowed out only once fbr half an hour. Anothertime,he was kept in an interrogation room fbr over 30 hours with loud techno music blasting,"enough to burst your eardrums."'* 53. Since the beginning ofJanuary 2008,Mr. Ameziane has had late night

interrogation sessions with an interrogator he identifies as"Antonio,"who chain smokes forthe duration of theirtwohoursessions, blows smoke inMr.Ameziane'sface, yells obscenities and tatmts him, and has threatened him with the use of"other" harsher methods. Before these sessions begin, Mr. Ameziane sits botmdtoachairwaiting fbr up to an hotu^, with his feet shackled to the floor and his wrists cuffed so tightly that his hands are left swollen and discolored. He is left shackled and cuffed in the interrogation room fbr up to another hour after tiiese sessions end waitingto be retumed to his isolation cell, makingthese interrogations an abusive four-hour ordeal. While Mr. Ameziane'sattomeysmadeafbrmal complaint inFcbmary to the military about Antonio'sconduct, the sessions and the abuse have continued. D. 54. Camp VI Conditions According to the most recent imclassified version ofattomey-client meeting notes

from visits to Mr, Ameziane at Guantdnamo,''Mr. Ameziane is being held in solitary

^7

^

The mostrecent meetings between Mr. Ameziane and his attorneysfromwhich unclassified information is available tookplace on June 10-11,2008 at Guantdnamo Bay,Cuba,

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confinement in Camp VI, one ofthe harshest facilities atthe prison.'"" He says his interrogators used to threatenhim with beingmoved to Camp VI as punishment fbrreftising to speak to them. He wasfinallytransferred there in March 2007, 55. Mr. Ameziane is detainedinawindowless6-feet-by-12-feet concrete and steel

cell, withasolid steel door and no openings fornatural light or air.'"' Theonly openings area metal food slotandtiu^ee narrow "windows" thatall face the interior ofthe prison and serve only to allowprison guards to look in and keep watch. The temperature inside his cell is extremely cold, so much so that he describes even the air asa"tool oftorture." 56. The only staple items Camp VI prisoners are permitted in their cellsareathinmat

on which to sleep,apair of pants,ashirt,andapair offlipflops.All other items^thingslikea toothbmsh, toothpaste,aStyrofbam cup, andatowel-are considered "comftirt items" and can be taken away fbr any infraction, Mr.Ameziane writes,"! would even venture that ifthey could confiscate the air we breathe, it would be counted asa[ComfbrtItem^." 57. The only time Mr, Ameziane is allowed outside is foratwo-hour break fbr

"recreation,"but even then, he is surrounded by solid walls two stories high that block the sun and wire mesh stretched across the top that obstructs his view ofthe sky.'"^ The recreation area itselfis partitioned by fencmg into small 4-meters-by-3-meters areas, which Mr, Ameziane likens toakenneL Until recently,each detainee spent his recreation time by himselfin one of these "kennels,"although two prisoners are now allowed in the same area. 58. WhenMr.Ameziane'sattomeys visited him in October 2007,theywereallowed

to meet with him outside inalarge yard adiacentto the prison. He commented that the meeting

S e e Human Rights Watch Report, supra note 3.
SeeW

See id at 12.

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was one oftiie fewtimes in his then eightmontils at Camp VIti^athehad beenin the yard and allowed an unobstmcted view ofthe sky. E^ 59. Denial ofAdequate Medical Care Because Mr. Ameziane spends nearly all ofhis time staring at the walls ofhis

small cell in Camp VI, his vision is steadily deteriorating. He has made repeated requests fbr an eye exam and eyeglasses, which were ignored fbr almostayear. The glasses he did finally receive are the wrong prescription and he cannot wearthem fbr more than half an hourwithout gettmgaheadache. Because ofthe extremely cold temperatures in Camp VL he also suffers fromrheumatism in his legs, fbrwhichhis requests fbr care have been denied as welL 60. Mr. Ameziane has also feltpain in an area onti:ieside ofhis head fbr almosta

year. Afteradoctor at the prison gave himacursory examination and told him there was nothing the matter, Mr. Ameziane asked how he could be sure without conducting furthertests. Thedoctorreplied,"I am the test."HetoldMr, Ameziane thatthere was nothingftirther he could do and left the room.'"^ 61. The medical treatment Mr, Ameziane has received at Guantdnamo has not only

been inadequate and negligent, but also abusive. On one occasion, Mr. Ameziane went into convulsions in his cell, where guards left him writhing on thefloorfbr hours beftire taking hhn to the infirmary. The attending doctor insertedasemm in Mr. Ameziane'sarm,butasked one of the soldiers standing watch to assist him by insertingasyringe needle into Mr. Ameziane'svein. With Mr. Ameziane lying prostrateand cuffed to the examination table, the guard stuck the needle into his forearm, which beganspurtingblood.Thedoctorand the guards laughed while Mr. Ameziane lay chained to the table.

103

Letterfrom Djamel Ameziane to Wells Dixon, Apr. 4,2008(unclassified)(onfilewith CCR).

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62.

Mr. Ameziane'shealth care needs have also been used asatool to coerce him into

cooperating with interrogators. Formonths, Mr. Ameziane has been requestingapair of socks from the infirmary to help with rheumatism he suffers in his feet and legs. Recently, when Mr. Ameziane asked the medical military staff once again forthe socks, he was told,"^the medical' no longer supplies socks. You have to ask your interrogator forthat." 1 ^ ^ 63. l^eligious Abuse Mr.Ameziane has been subjected to various offensive and intentionally dismptive

acts with respect to his Islamic beliefs and practices both at Guantdnamo and Kandahar. He describes one occasion when during dawn prayer,aguard began howling likeadog in imitation oftheritualMuslimcalltoprayer WhenMr.Amezianeaskedtheguardwhyhewasimitating the call, the guard came overto his cell and threw water in his face. Afewminutes later, Mr, Amezianewastakentosolitaryconfinement,wherehewasheldforfivedays Hewastoldit was punishment fbr throwing water at fhe guard. 64. During his time in the "Romeo" and "Mike" blocks in Camps2and3,Mr.

Ameziane suffered routine abuse and dismptions. Guards would yell insults and obscenities at him while he prayed and sometimes throw stones at the metal grill window ofhis celL 65. Now in Camp VI, his conditions ofisolation createastructural interference with

hisreligiouspractice. Sinceheandhisfellowprisonerscanonlyprayintheirseparate, individual cells, they cannot see or hear theirprayer leader well enough to pray communally as they would otherwise. 66. Mr, Ameziane has also witnessed acts ofabuse against his fellow detainees. He

has seen prisoners ptmished by having their eyelids and eyebrows, beards, mustaches, and hair

28
028413 DefenseReciprocalDiscoveiy

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completely shaved,'"" orthe shape ofacrossorasoccer ball shaved onti^eirheads. He has also described incidents where soldiers have desecrated prisoners'O^ ans, fbr example, by spraying water on them, trampling on them, or scrawling obscenities into them. 67. At Kandahar, Mr. Ameziane has told of similar desecration ofthe O^^^during

guards'daily searches of prisoners'cells, fbr example, by throwing the holy books on the grotmd, stepping on them, orrippingthcirpages and throwing them away. On one particular occasion,asoldierbrandishedaOur'an in his hand fbr all the prisoners in the vicinity to see, and then plunged it intoatank frill of excrement into which prisoners'toilet buckets had been emptied. Following this incident, the prisoners decided to retum their Om'ans to the camp authorities so as to prevent further abuse, but the authorities refused to take them back. G. 68. Impact on Private and Family Life Mr. Ameziane has been deprived of critical moments with his family during his

morethansixyearsatGuantdnamo Hisfatherpassedawayduringtiiisperiod,beforeMr Ameziane could see ortalkto him one last time. His brothers and sisters have had wedding ceremonies he has been unable to attend and have had children who have never known their uncle. He has also been deprived ofnewsoffamily events because letters sentfromhis family often do not reach him until years later. He saw photographs ofhis nieces and nephews forthe first time in years when his attomeys brought the photographs to Guantanamo. 69. Mr, Ameziane has told his attomeys that had he not been imprisoned in

Guantdnamo ftirthe past six andahalfyears, he would have wished to train as an automobile mechanic and open his own garage, and get married and startafamily.

This level of shaving apparently no longer occurs, but Mr. Ameziane says detainees'beards are sometimes still closely shaved, leaving only about one centimeter ofhair, 29
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Risk of^eturn to Algeria 70. Mr. Ameziane would be at risk ofpersecution ifhe is forcibly repatriated to

AlgeriaandneedstheprotectionofatiiirdcountryfbrresettlementinordertoleaveGuantdnamo safely. 71. His family still resides in Kabylie and ifhe were retumed, he would facea

continuingriskofbeingtargetedandsubjecttoarbitraryarrestanddetention^andindetention, further harm by virtue ofthe fact that he and his family are observant Muslims. Mr. Ameziane'sprior application fbrpolitical asylum in Canada on the basis ofafear of persecution in Algeria would also likely drawtheatiention of the Algerian security services and put him at fiirther risk ofbeing targeted and imprisoned. The tact that Mr. Ameziane has spent time in Guantdnamo, and the resulting stigma ofthat association, would alone be enough to puthim at risk ofbeing imprisoned ifhe is retumed. 72. Mr. Ameziane has been threatened on at least one occasion by U.S, interrogators

who told him that he would be sent back to Algeria ifhe did not cooperate with them. Theytold him knowingly that knew how he would be treated ifhe were to retum. His brother believes

that Mr, Ameziane would be shot ifhe were retumed to Algeria and, according to him, "everyone thinks my family is connected to terrorism because l^Mr.Amezianej is in Guantdnamo."The Algerian Ambassadorto the United States has also stated to lawyers for Guantdnamo prisoners that all Algerian citizens in Gu^tdnamo would be considered serious securitythreats, and would be subject to further detention and investigation if retumed. The Ambassador stated specifically that there is no reason an Algerian citizen who had lived in Canada or Europe would go to Afghanistan except to engage in unlawful activity. 73. MrAmezianeiscurrentlyseekingresettlementin Canada, thecountryin which

he legally resided fbrfiveyears and would not have left had he not been denied asylum in 2000.
30
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IIL

ADMISSIBILITY A. 74. Mr. Ameziane's Petition is Admissible Under the Commission's Rules of Procedure. Mr. Ameziane's petition is admissible in its entirety under the lACHR Rules.'"*

In particular, the Commission has jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione temporis and ratione loci to examine the petition, and Mr, Ameziane is exempt from the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement under the terms of 31.2 of the lACHR Rules, The Commission should therefore reach a favorable admissibilityfindingand proceed in earnest to examine the merits ofthis grave case ofhuman rights abuse. 1. The Commission has Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, Ratione Materiae, Ratione Temporis, and Ratione Loci to Consider Mr. Ameziane's Petition.

75.

The Commission is competent ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione

temporis and ratione loci to examine the complaints presented by Mr. Ameziane. 76. The Commission is competent ratione personae to consider Mr. Ameziane's

complaint because Mr. Ameziane is a natural person who was subject to the jurisdiction ofthe United States and whose rights were protected under the American Declaration when the violations detailed in this petition occurred.'"* Although the violations took place outside the formal territory of the United States, the Commission has long established that it may exercise jurisdiction over conduct with an extra-territorial locus where the person concemed is present in

Article 28 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights sets forth the Requirements for the Consideration of Petitions, in which it details factual information that the Commission needs to initiate proceedings in a contentious case and procedural requfrements with which petitioners must comply. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter "lACHR Rules"], Art. 28.a-i. See Jessica Gonzales and others v. United States. Petition 1490-05, Inter-Am. C.H.R,, Report No. 52/07 (Admissibility), para, 37 (2007).

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the territory of one State, but subject totiieauthority and control of another OAS Member State.'"' 77. The Commission's authority to hear such extra-territorial claims was directly

addressed and upheld in two 1999 decisions, Coard et al v. United Sto/es'"* and Alejandre v. Cw6<3.'"' In Coard, the Commission, considering allegations of U.S. violations during its 1983 invasion of Grenada, held that the Commission's jurisdictional analysis focuses on the state control over the individual whose rights have been violated."" The Commission found that the phrase "subject to [the OAS country's] jurisdiction," the jurisdictional language commonly used in intemational humanrightsinstruments,'" "may, tmder given circumstances, refer to conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concemed is present in the territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state...."' '^ 78. In Alejaruire, the Commission foimd that Cuba, an OAS member state, exercised

"authority and control" over the unarmed civilian aircraft the Cuban military shot down,

107

See, e.g., Coard et al. v. United States. Case 10. 951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, para. 37, (1999). Case 10.951, Report No. 109/99 (1999), Case 11.589, Report No. 86/99 (1999) See Cose of Coard. See, e.g., Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], Art. 2 ("[T]o respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction"); European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1, ("[Sjhall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction"); American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1, ("[T]o ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction"). While article 2 ofthe ICCPR refers to all individuals within a State's territory and subject to its jurisdiction, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted these two grounds to be independent as regards application ofthe ICCPR. See, e.g., Burgos/Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay. Communication No. 52/1979 (29 July 1981), U,N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (1984). The Intemational Court of Justice endorsed this position in its Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Advisory Opinion, July 9,2004,43 Intemational Legal Materials 1009 (2004). One U.S. court, however, has stated that the ICCPR applies to the United States only when the affected person is both within U.S. territory and subject to its jurisdiction. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2002).

112

See Case of Coard.

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sufficient forthe Commission to hearthe petitioners'complaint,"^ In^^^^^^^^^, there was no territorial nexus between the victims ofthe alleged violations and the state ofCuba, or between the actions themselves and Cuban territory. Two ofthe victims had been bom in the United States; none ofthe activities relevant to the petition took place on Cuban soil; and none ofthe victims were inaCubanairplane.""Nevertheless, in taking aim upon the civilian passenger plane, the Commission fbtmd,^^he agents of the Cuban state, although outside their territory, placed the civilian pilots...undertheir authority.""* This placed the victims within the jurisdiction ofCubafrirpurposesoftriggeringCuba'shuman rights obligations: "In principle, the ljurisdictionalj investigation refers not to the nationality ofthe alleged victim or his presence inaparticular geographic area, butto whether, inthose specific circumstances, the state observed the rights ofaperson subject to its authority or control.""* In other words, the jurisdictional analysis is not predicated on the nature and characteristics ofthe alleged victim of tiieclaimR^tiier,whetiiertheCommissionhastheauthoritytocontemplateanOAS Member State'sactionstums on whether the state has lived up to its responsibilities regarding the human rights of persons over whom the state exercised controL 79, Underthe "authority and control" theory,the Commission has already established

that Guantdnamo detainees are subject to thejurisdiction ofthe United States and therefore benefitfromthe protection ofthe AmericanDeclaration."'On this basis, the Commission has exercised its ownjurisdiction to enforce the American Declaration to the benefit ofsuch

113 114 115 116 117

See Case ofAlejandre. Id Id Id See lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (March 13,2002) at 2,

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persons."* In the present case, there is no doubt that Mr. Ameziane has been subject to the jurisdiction ofthe United States since bemg transferred to Guantdnamo Bay^he has been detained by the United States onaU.S,military base governed by an indefinite lease establishing U,S. control since 1903, The U.S.Supreme Court itselfhas referred to the "obvious and uncontested fact that the United States, by virtue ofits complete jmisdiction and control overthe [^Guantanamo Bay Naval] base,maintains^^^c^osovereigntyoverthisterritory""' The Commission is therefore competent B^^o^^^^^,^^^^^ to hear claims based on Mr. Ameziane's detention at Guantdnamo. 80. Furthermore, Mr.Ameziane was under the authority and control of the United

States while detained by the U.S. military at the airbase in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The airbase was occupied byU.S. Marines in December 2001'^^ and, duringthefive-weekperiod whenMr. Ameziane was detained therefromJanuary to Febmary 2001 the facility was clearly under U.S. controL The Commission maytherefbre exercise its ^^^i^^^^^i^.^^^^^ jurisdiction with respect to all the facts described in this petition, whetherthey occurred in Kandahar, Afghanistan or Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. 81, As Mr, Ameziane'spetition alleges the violation of several articles of the

American Declaration, the Commission is also competent i^^^ii:^^^^^^^^^^^ to consider the complainf'^' Although the United States has repeatedly contested the authority ofthe Commission to declare violations of rights enshrined in the American Declaration, the

See id.
119

Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. 2229,2253 (June 12, 2008). See Myers, A Nation Challenged: In the South; Anticipating Many Captives, U.S. Marines Build a Prison Camp at Kandahar Airport, supra note 26.

121

See id. at para. 38.

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Commission has long held that the Declaration constitutesasource ofbinding intemational obligations forthe United States.'^^ 82. Furthermore, the Commission is competent ^i::^^^Oi^^^^^o^^,^ to consider the

petition, as the violations ofMr.Ameziane'srights occurred subsequent to the adoption of the American Declaration in 1948, to the United States'ratification oftheOAS Charter on June 19, 1951,and to thecreationoftiielACHRin 1959'^^ 83. Finally,the Commission is competent ^^^io^^^oc^to consider the violations

alleged by Mr. Ameziane, as the petition alleges facts which occurred while he was tmder the jurisdiction ofthe United States as described above,'^" 2. 84. Mr.Ameziane Has Metthe Exhaustion ofDomesticI^emedies Requirement.

Pursuant to Article31 of the lACHR Rules ofProcedure, individual petitions are

admissible only where domestic remedies have been exhausted or where such remedies are tmavailable asamatter oflaw or fact.'^* The mle that requires prior exhaustion ofdomestic

See, e.g, l^^eS^ir^v.^^^re^Srare,!^, Petition 8-03,Inter-AmCHRReportNo,56/06(Admissibility^ paras 32 33 (2006). Seei^.atpara.34.
124 1^5

SeeCa,^eq^t^^^^/e,^atpara.40. SeeIACHRRulesofProcedure,art.31: 1. In order to decide on the admissibility ofamatter, the Commission shall verify whether the remedies ofthe domestic legal system have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with the generally recognizedprinciples oflntemational law. 2. The provisions ofthe preceding paragraph shall not applywhen: a. the domestic legislation ofthe State concemed does notafford due process oflaw fbrprotection of the right or ri^ts that have allegedly been violated; b. the party alleging violation ofhis or herrights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or c. therehasbeenunwarranteddelayinrenderingafinaljudgmentundertheaforementioned remedies.

3. When the petitioner contends that he or she is unable to prove compliance with the requirement indicated in this article, it shall be up to the State concemed to demonstrate to the Commission thatthe

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remedies was conceived intiteinterest ofthe State, as it seeks to dispense the Statefromhaving to respond to an intemational body fbr actions imputed to it before having had the opportunity to remedy them by its own means.'^* However, because this fundamental admissibility requirement is directiy related to the need to protect victims ofhuman rights abusefromthe arbitrary exercise of govemment power,'^'domestic remedies must be "adequate to protect the rights allegedly infringed and effective in securing the results envisaged in establishing them."'^* It must also be clearthatthedesiredremedyisachievable'^' g5. The admissibility decision inacase in which the petitioner requests an Article3I

exception turns on the Commission'sfindingthatadomestic remedy has been proven unavailable asamatter oflaw or fact, inadequate or ineffective to rectify the violations alleged'^"

remedies under domestic law have not been previously exhausted, unless that is clearly evident from the record. See In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et a/,, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. G 101/81, para. 28 (1984). Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), Judgment of June 26,1987, para. 95.
128

El Mozote Massacre v. El Salvador, Case 10.720, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 24/06 (Admissibility), para. 33 (2006); see also Case of Velasquez Rodriguez Case, cit., paras. 62-66; Fairin Garbi and Soils Corrales Case Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Preliminary Objections, Judgment of March 15,1989, paras. 86-90; Godinez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989, paras. 65-69; Santander Tristan Donoso v. Panama, Petition 12.360, Inter-Am. C.H.R,, Report No. 71/02 (Admissibility), paras. 21-22 (2002). The Commission has incorporated the longstanding jurispmdence of the Inter-American Court which states that "[ajdequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the legal system of every country, but not all are applicable in every circumstance. Ifa remedy is not adequate in a specific case, it obviously need not be exhausted." Fernando A. Colmenares Castillo V. Mexico, Case No. 12.170, Inter.-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/05 (^admissibility), para. 37 (2005), citing Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct, H.R., Merits, Judgment of July 29,1988 (Ser. C N° 4), para. 64. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, cit., at para. 72; Fairen Garbi and Soils Corrales Case, cit., at para. 97; Godinez Cruz Case, cit.. at para. 75.

130

See Mariblanca Staff Wilson and Oscar E Ceville R, v. Panamd, Case No. 12.303, Inter.-Am. CH.R., Report No 57/03 (Inadmissibility), at para. 42 (2003),

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a) g6.

The Adequate Domestic R^emedies" in Mr.Ameziane's Case

Mr. Ameziane alleges violations of several substantive rights enshrined in the

AmericanDeclaration^therightnottobearbitrarilydeprivedofhisliberty;tofreedomfrom torture and cmel, inhumane and degrading treatment; to health; to religiousfreedomand worship; to private and family life; and to protection ofhis personal reputation^in addition to the proceduralrightsprotected by articles ^ V l l l and ^ V I ofthe Declaration, In orderto assess tiieadmissibilityofhispetition,itisnecessaryfirsttoidentifywhetherthereareavailablc domestic remedies that would have been adequate and effective to address the violations ofthese rights, and then to determine whether such remedies have been exhausted or whether Mr. Ameziane is exempt from exhausting domestic remedies tmder one ofthe exceptions contemplated in Article31of the Commission'sRules ofProcedure. 87. As the violations Mr. Ameziane alleges stemfromhisdetention bythe United

States and theabuse he has suffered while detained, Mr. Ameziane hadaduty to exhaust the domestic remedies that were uniquely suitable to addressing the infringement ofthese rights before petitioning this Commission; ^^^^i^,^i:^^^t^,^, in relation to his arbitrary and indefinite detention; and criminal proceedings, in relation to the torture and mistreatment he suffered at the hands of theU.S.govemmenL In addition, Mr. Ameziane had the duty to seek itiiunctive relief from the violations ofhisrightsto health, religiousfreedom,private and family life, and protection ofhis reputation, as well as criminal sanctions(whereapplicab1e)againstthe individual State agents responsible fbrthese violations. 88. With regard to Mr. Ameziane'sclaim of arbitrary detention, the Commission's

jurispmdence clearly establishes the writ ofhabeas corpus as the appropriate domestic remedy to be pursued. In issuing precautionary measures in favor of Guantdnamo detainees, the

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Commission referred to the "longstanding and iundamental role that the writ ofhabeas corpus plays asameans of reviewing Executive detention,"'^' The Commission'sresolution also favorably cited theU.S.Supreme Court'sdecision in ^^.^^^to uphold Guantdnamo detainees' rightto habeas,'^^ Indeed, habeas is specifically protected by theU.S,Constitutionand has long served as theU.S.legal system'sultimate bulwark against arbitrary deprivations ofliberty.'^^ As theU.S.Supreme Courthasstated,"The writ ofhabeas corpus is the fimdamental instmment for sa^guarding individualfreedomagainst arbitrary and lawless l^govemment] action,"'^" Thus, this Commission and the U.S.govemment alike considerthe writ ofhabeas corpus to be the appropriate remedy fbr addressing arbitrary and unlawful detention. g9. With regard to Mr, Ameziane'storture and mistreatment while in U.S.custody,

the Commission has repeatedly held that in such cases the appropriate remedy is criminal prosecution ofthose responsible forthe harm. In^^i^^o^Gt^^^^^^^^^o^^^vCo^o^^ii^,fbr example, the victim allegedaviolation of Article5of the American Convention fortorture he suffered while detained bythe Colombian National Police,'^* Although the petitioner had multiple remedies available to him underColombianlaw,including the possibility offilinga civil suit against the state, the Commission declared the case admissible based solely on the fact that criminal proceedings against the individuals accused oftorturing the petitioner had concluded.'^* As the Commission made clearmanother Colombian case, whenacriminal law remedyisavailable,neitherdisciplinaryproceedingsagainstindividualstateemployeesnorcivil
131 132 133 134 135

lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (Oct. 28,2005), para. 8. Id See U.S. Const, art. I, § 9; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (June 12, 2008). Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). See Wilson Gutierrez Soler v. Colombia, Case 12.291, Inter.-Am. C.H.R., Report. No. 76/01 (Admissibility), at paras. 8-9 (2001). See id paras. 11, 16,19,

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suits against the State itself need be exhausted in order for a case to be deemed admissible.'" Notwithstanding the availability ofcivil, disciplinary and administrative remedies, then, the Commission has clearly established that the appropriate remedy in cases of torture and abuse is the criminal prosecution of the responsible individuals. 90. With regard to Mr. Ameziane's remaining claims - those based on violations of

his rights to health, religious freedom, private and family life, and protection ofhis personal reputation - the Commission's jurispmdence is less clear but reveals a more ad hoc approach based on thejudicial remedies available in the relevant national jiuisdiction. In general, past precedent suggests that the appropriate avenue for relief in Mr. Ameziane's case would be some combination of injunctive relief and criminal proceedings, respectively aimed at halting and punishing the violations of these fundamental rights. In Maya Indigenous Communities and their Members v. Belize, for example, the petitioners alleged that the Belize govemment had issued licenses permitting logging activities to occur on Mayan traditional land, in violation, inter alia, of the commtmities' rights to family, health and religious freedom and worship.'^* In declaring the case admissible, the Commission found that the petitioners had attempted to exhaust the appropriate judicial remedy by seeking an injunctive order from the Supreme Court of Belize suspending the licenses for resource extraction.'^' In Santander Tristan Donoso v. Panama, the petitioner, an attomey, alleged a violation ofhis right to privacy based on the wiretapping of a conversation between him and one ofhis clients, and on the subsequent dissemination ofthe

See La Granja, Ituango v. Colombia, Case 12.050, Inter.-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 57/00 (Admissibility), at para. 41 (2000). See Maya Indigenous Communities and their Members v, Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 78/00, at paras. 36-37 (2000). Id at paras. 38, 54,

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content ofthe conversation bythe Attomey General.'""hi admitting the right to privacy claim, the Commission found that the petitioner had exhausted domestic remedies by filingacriminal complaintagainstthe Attomey General,which was ultimately dismissed by the Panamanian Supreme Court.'"' 91. In summary,theCommission'sjurispmdence makes clear thatmcases of

arbitrary detention and torture, the adequate domestic remedies thatmust be exhausted before presentingaclaim to the Commission are the writ ofhabeas corpus and criminal proceedings, respectively. The Commission has been less firm in establishing the appropriate domestic remedies fbrviolations oftherightsto health, religiousfreedomand privacy,oftendisplayinga degree of deference to the remedies available at the national leveL In order to be adequate and effective, however, such remedies must be capable ofestablishing criminal sanctions against the responsible individuals orprovidinginiunctiverelieftohaltan ongoing violation. (b) Mr.Ameziane is Exempt from the Exhaustion ofDomestie Remedies Requirement under Artiele3I(2) ofthe Commission'sRules.

92,

Article31(2) of the Commission'sRules ofProcedure establishes an exception to

the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement where:(a) the domestic legislation of the State concemed does not afford due process oflaw; (b)the party allegingviolation ofhis or herrights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or(c)there has been unwarranted delay.'"^ In the present case, Mr,Ameziane has been denied access to the appropriate domestic remedies identified in the previous section by acombinationof ^^^^^^^ and ^^^^^o prohibitions and unwarranted delays. Mr. Ameziane may

See Case ofSantander, cit., at para. 2. W. at para. 18.
142

lACHR Rules ofProcedure, art, 31.2(a)-(c).

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tiierefbre successfiilly invoke the exceptions contemplated in Article3l(2)oftheIACHRRules, and the Commission should consider his petition admissible on such grounds. (i) 93. Mr.Ameziane H^s Been Denied the Rightto ^^^^^C^r^rr^ for over Six Sears.

The Commission'sjurispmdence establishes the writ ofhabeas corpus as ti^e

appropriate remedy fbr addressing Mr. Ameziane'sarbitrary deprivation ofliberty,but more than six years into his detention, Mr, Ameziane has been prevented from exhausting this remedy, Mr. Ameziane'sclaim is thus exempt from exhaustion onArticle31(2)(b)and(c)grounds. 9^. The Commission tmderlined the purpose of^^^^^,^^i^^^,^asa"timely

remedy,"'"^ while theU.S. SupremeCourthasdescribedits "principal aim" as providingfr^r "swift judicial review."'""Perhaps more than any other judicial remedy,habeas claims must be resolved quickly ifthe writ is to serve itsftmdamentalpurpose ofproviding relieffrom arbitrary deprivations ofliberty. After being denied access to lawyers and the courts fbr overfwo years, Mr. Amezianefiledapetitionf:^r^i^^^i^,^co^^,^ on Febmary 24,2005. After pending in federal court formore than three years, his petition wasfinallystayed in anticipation ofthe Supreme Court'sdecisionin.^o^^^^i^i^^. On June 12,2008,the Court mled in^^t^^^^^^^^thatsection7 ofthe MCA "operates as an unconstitutional suspension ofthe writ" and that Guantdnamo detainees haveaconstitutional right to habeas.'"*

lACHR, Precautionary Measures No. 259,^e^ar^ees^^t^^a^ra^a^^^a^,Ci^^a,October28,2005,^8. ,PeiBr^^v,^^e,39lU.S.54,63(1968)
145

See^^i^^ei^^e^e,128S.Ct,at 2240,TheMCA,cit,,^7estabIished: No court,justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application forawrit ofhabeas corpusfiledby oron behalf of analiendetainedbytheUnitedStates who has been determined bythe United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. [ ] The amendment..shall take effect on thedate ofthe enactment ofthis Act, and shall applyto all cases, without exception, pending on or afterthe date ofthe enactment ofthis Act whichrelate to any aspect of

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95.

Asaresult of ^^t^^^^^^^^, Mr, Ameziane mayfinallyhave the opportunity to

challenge his detention in federal court in the nearfuture. His access to this remedy,however, is more than six years after he wasfransferredto Guantdnamo, and more than three years after he first soughthabeas relief This isafar cryfromthe "timely remedy" envisioned by the Commission and the guarantee of review "without delay" explicitly enshrined in the American Declaration, In the case ofMr.Ameziane and other Guantdnamo prisoners,justice delayed is indeed justice denied. Mr. Ameziane maythus successfully invoke the exceptions contemplated in Article31(2)(a)and31(2)(c)ofthe Commission'sRules ofProcedure witi:iregard to the admissibilityofhisarbitrarydeprivationofliberty claim. (ii) 96. The DTAI^eview is nn Inadequate Substitute for Habeas Corpus and Need Not Be Exhausted,

The DTAcreates and the MCA incorporates an altemative process oflimited

review by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, whereby the Courtmay only examine whetherthe CSRTswere conducted in accordance with military procedures promulgated forthe CSRTsand, to the extenttheyapply,the laws and Constitution of the United States,'"*The govemment created this limited review process asasubstitute fbr habeas and intended it to be the only access that Guantdnamo detainees such as Mr.Ameziane would have to the courts,'"'

the detention, transfer,tt^eatment,triaL or conditions of detention of an alien detained bythe United States since Septemberll,2001.
146 147

DTA,cit,^ 1005(e)(2), ^^i^^edie^e, 128 S.Ct. at2266 ("In passingthe DTA Congress did not intend tocreateaprocessinname only. It intended to createamore limited procedure...It is against this background that we must interpret the DTAand assess its adequacy asasubstitute for habeas corpus.").

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97.

The reviewprovided under the DTAis exceedingly limited.'"* Limiting the scope

ofreviewtowhetherCSRTscomplied with procedures that themselves violate fundamental due process norms does little to ensure an adequate review ofdetainees'status or the legality oftheir detention. While the language of the DTAdoes allow ibrjudicial review of the constitutionality ofthe CSRT procedures, the United States has arguedtiiattheConstitution and laws ofthe United States do not apply to detainees held in Guantanamo or anywhere outside theU.S. mainland,'"' In addition, neithertheDTAnorthe MCA require theD.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to orderadetainee released uponfindinghis CSRT's"enemy combatant" determination to be invalid, which the Supreme Court fbtmd"froubling"m^o^^^i^i^^^.'*" The government's position is that the appropriate remedy would beanew CSRT. 98. In.^0^^^^^^^^, the Supreme Court exammedti:ieDTA'smyriadflawsbefore

concludingthat its review procedures are an inadequate substitute fbr habeas corpus.'*' Furthermore, the Court explicitly stated that detainees need not exhaustthe DTA before proceeding with their habeas actions,'*^ 99. The D.C. Circuit Court ofAppeals has itselfrecognizedti^e severe limitations of

the DTAreviewin.^^^^^^the first and, thus far, only DTApetition on behalf ofaGuantdnamo
For a thorough discussion ofthe procedural shortcomings in the DTA review process—including the prohibition on presenting evidence, the rebuttable presumption in favor of the govemment's evidence, the lack of speed, the restrictions on the attorney-client relationship, and the lack of authority to order releasesee Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 15-20, Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. 2229, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/reply%20brief%20boumediene.pdf See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office ofLegal Counsel, Memorandum of Deputy Assistant Attomey General John C. Yoo for William J. Haynes, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NS AEBB127/01,12.28.pdf.
150

See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2271 ("The DTA does not explicitly empower the Court of Appeals to order the applicant in a DTA review proceeding released should the court find that the standards and procedures used at his CSRT hearing were insufficient tojustify detention. This is troubling."). Mat 2274. Id at 2275.

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detainee to be decided, Concludingthat the petitioner's"enemy combatant" designation was invalid, the Court noted thatahabeas corpus proceeding wasabetter path to release thananew CSRT,'*^The Court noted that the "habeas proceeding will have procedures thatare more protective ofParhat'srights than those available underthe DTA,...Most important, in that proceeding there is no question but that the court will have the power to order him released."'*" 100. The recent federal court decisions in ^ot^^^^i^^^and^^^^^^ make abundantly

clearthatDTAreviewisadeeplyflawedprocessincapableofremedyingMrAmeziane's arbitrary detention. Requiring Mr. Ameziane to exhaust this remedy would thus compel him to jump through an additional, ineffective legal hoop that does not contemplate the desired remedy and promises only to delay the process further so as to render intemational support ineffective,a resuh that the Commission has found unacceptable.'** Asaresult, and in light ofthe Commission'sdetermination that "ifaremedy is not adequate inaspecific case, it obviously need not be exhausted,"'** Mr. Ameziane need not pursue DTAreviewunderthe exhaustion of domestic remedies mle. (iii) The DTAand tbe MCABar Mr.Ameziane from Pursuing Criminal Sanctions against Individuals Responsible for hisTorture and Mistreatment.

101.

The United States sought not only to strip Mr. Ameziane'sright to habeas, but to

bar him from pursuing criminal proceedings against those responsible for his torture and abuse in
153 154

Parhat v. Gates, No. 06-1397,2008 WL 2576977,* 15 (C.A.D.C. June 20,2008). Id See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter. Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of June 26, 1987, Series C No. 1, para. 93; Godinez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Inter. Am. Ct. H.R,, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Series C No. 3, para. 93. As the Commission has indicated, remedies which are unduly delayed essentially lose their efficacy. See, e.g., Ramon Mauricio Garcia-Prieto Giralt v. El Salvador, Case 11.697, Inter.-A.. C.H.R., Report No. 27/99 (Admissibility), at para. 47 (1999),

156

See Fernando A. Colmenares Castillo v. Mexico. Petition 12.170, Inter.-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/05 (Inadmissibility), at para, 37 (2005), citing Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Merits, Judgment of July 29,1988, Ser. C N" 4, para. 64.

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U.S. custody.'*' U.S. legislation currently provides ongoing and retroactive immunity to the State agents responsible fbr Mr.Ameziane'smistreatmem.'** 102. The DTAestablishes that inacivil or criminal action againstaU.S,agent

engaged in the "detentionand interrogation of aliens" determined by the President or his designees to be engaged in terrorism,afinding thatthe activities were "officially authorized and determined to be lawful at thetimethat they were conducted" and that the agent "didnot know thattiiepracticeswereunlawftilandapersonofordinarysenseandunderstandingwouldnot knowthe practices were unlawful" shall actasacomplete defense to the civil or criminal action.'*' 103. The MCA exacerbates this immunity provision by making it retroactive fbr both

civil actions and criminal prosecutions related to actions occurring between Septemberll,2001 and theenactment ofthe DTA onDecember 30,2005.'*"Asmodifiedbytiie MCA, therefore, Section1004 of the DTAprovides official retroactive immunity fbr actions authorized by the Executive branch that constitute torture or cmel, inhuman or degrading treatment under internationallaw, 104. ThislegislativelyenshrinedimmunityeffectivelybarsMrAmezianefrom pursuingcriminal law remedies underU.S. law, Mr.Ameziane'sdesignationasan"encmy combatant" means that alleged actions in violation ofhis rights fall within the scope ofthe
157

Petitioners do not ignore the fact that in cases of grave humanrightsviolations, such as torture, the State has an e^q^^/^ obligation to investigate, an obligation that the United States has failed to discharge for over six years in the present case. See, e.g.,.^aCa^r^rav.Be^i^, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R.,November 29,2006, para.110. Wecontend that even if the onus were on Mr. Ameziane to initiate criminal proceedings, he is legislatively barredfromdoing so, SeeMCA,cit.,^8(b). DTA,cit.,^1004. Furthermore,"Good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whetheraperson of ordinary sense and understanding would have known the practices to be unlawful."

160

MCA,ciL,^8(b)(3).

45
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DTA'simmunityprovision

AshisdetentionbeganafterSeptember11,2001,theentiretyofhis

detentionperiodiscoveredbytheimmunityprovisionasamendedbytheMCA.Andasthose responsible fbr his detention and interrogation were agents of theU.S.govemment whose actions were officially authorized and considered lawftil at the time they were committed,'*'the DTAas modifiedbythe MCA effectivelyblocksMr.Amezianefrompressing criminal charges
Since September 11,2001,the U.S.govemment has repeatedly permitted and even authorized military personnel to employ aggressive interrogation tactics such as the ones used against Mr. Ameziane. In early 2002, as the first detainees were arriving at Guantanamo Bay, President Bush announced that the Geneva Conventions would not apply toTaliban and alQaeda suspects. See Amnesty IntemationaLL^^^^^edSrares q^B^^e^^ea. ,Bi^srree^e/a^e^a^d.^i^riee^e^^ed, 7'^ia/si^^deB^^/ie 2007). Furthermore, on December 2,2002, then Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld authorizedaseries of interrogation techniques that included,"yelling at the detainee,""stress positions (like standing) fora maximum of four hours,""the use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days,""deprivation of light and auditory stimuli,""removal of all comfort items (including religiousitems),""20hour interrogations," "removal of clothing,""fbrcedgrooming(shaving of facial hear, etc.),""exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring)," and "use of wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation," In approving theDecember 2, 2002 memorandum, SecretaryRumsfeld signed the document and addedahandwritten note stating,"! stand fbr 8-IOhoursaday, Why is standing limited to4hours7" Documentava^/a^/ea^http://www.gwu,edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02,12,02,pdf Though Rumsfeld later rescinded this memorandum, the U.S.govemment has continued to issueadizzying series ofinterrogation technique authorizations and Department ofJustice Office ofLegal Counsel opinions that provide official cover for U.S. agents who engage in conduct prohibited by intemational law. One suchopinion, issued on August l,2002,acknowledgedtheU.S.legislativeprohibitionontorturebut established that the legislation was intended to proscribe only "physical pain...equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanyingserious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairtnentofbodilyfrinction,oreven death" Document avar/a^^ea^http://www,gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBBI27/02.08.01.pdf.This memorandum was rescinded in June 2004 after it was leaked to the media, bul its replacement, issued in December 2004,includedafbotnoteclari^ing that it was not declaring previousinterrogation tactics illegaL See Scott Shane etal.,Se^^e^^.S..^^d^^se^e^rq/^Sevei^e7^re^^ogari^^s, N.Y.Times,0cL4, 2007,ava^/a^/ear http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/washington/04interrogate.html7pagewanted-all. Many of therulesandopinionsregarding the treatment and interrogation ofdetainees remainsecret, including the rulesgovemingthemoreaggressiveinterrogationsconductcdby the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)Thepressandhuman rights organizations have reported, however, that in2005 the OLC explicitly authorized the CL^ to employ "a combination of painftil physical and psychological tactics, mcluding head-slapping, simulated drowning and frigid temperatures."See id Moreover,inearly2008,ClADirectorMichaelY,Haydenpubliclyacknowledgedforthefirsttimethatthe Agency had used the torttire technique known as waterboarding as part of its "enhanced intcrt^o^ation" program. The Bush Administration subsequently asserted that waterboarding is legaL and that the President had the authority to continue authorizing the CIA to use the technique See Greg Miller, l^are^^^a^di^g /s /ega/, IfTiire ^^i^e sq^s, L.A. Times, Feb, 7, 2008, ovai/a^/e a^ http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-torture7feb07,I,3156438.story. TheWhiteHouse fiirther stated that "every" enhanced interrogation technique employed by the CIA had been determined to be lawftilby thcDepartment ofJustice SeeDan Eggen, ^^re^^i^sei^^^d^C^^s L^eq^ l^are^^^a^d^g /^ B^re^^^garr^^, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2008, avai7a^/e ar http://www,washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020502764,htmL Indeed,

46
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105,

In light ofthe fact thatU.S,law provides retroactive immunity forthosewho

participated in Mr, Ameziane'storture and mistreatment, any and all ofMr.Ameziane'sclaims fbr which the adequate remedywouldbeacriminal proceeding against the responsible individuals should be deemed admissible tmderthe Article31(2)(a) exception to the exhaustion ofdomestic remedies mle. (iv) The DTAand the MCABarMr.Amezianefrom Pirrsuing^^AnyOther Action" Capableol^ RemedyingtheViolationsHehasSuffered.

106.

In addition to provisions thatseekspecificallyto prohibit habeas corpus claims

(ruledtmconstitutional in .^oi^^^i::^^^^^)and criminal complaints regarding torture and mistreatment, the DTAand MCA also include sweeping language barringthose detained as "enemy combatants" bythe United Statesfrompresenting any claims, civil or criminal, in U.S. courts,'*^

Attomey General Michael Mukasey subsequently announced that the Justice Department "cannot possibly" investigate the use of waterboarding by CIA agents because the technique was part of the program approved by Justice Department lawyers. Mukasey remarked, "That would mean that the same department that authorized the program would now consider prosecuting somebody who followed that advice." See Dan Eggen, Justice Department 'Cannot' Probe Waterboarding, Mukasey Says, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/07/AR2008020701542,html?hpid= topnews. In March 2008, President Bush vetoed a bill passed by Congress that would have explicitly outlawed waterboarding by the CIA. See Steven Lee Meyers, Bush vetoes bill to limit CIA interrogation methods. Int. Herald Tribune, March 9, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/09/america/policy.php. Finally, recent press reports confirm that top government officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell, met in the White House, with President Bush's knowledge, to personally discuss and approve the details of the CIA's enhanced interrogation program. See Jan Crawford Greenburg et al.. Sources: Top Bush Advisors Approved 'Enhanced Interrogation'. ABC NEWS, April 9, 2008, available a: http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story7id=4583256; Editorial, 7%e Torture Sessions, N.Y. Times, April 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/opinion/20sunl.html? r=l&ref=opinion&oref=slogin.
162

See MCA and DTA, cit.

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107.

As previously discussed, the MCA'sretroactiveimmunityprovision applies not

only to criminal prosecutions but also to civil actions.'*^ UnderU.S. legislation, Mr. Ameziane is therefore prohibitedfrombringing both civil and criminal actions fbr any ofthe other substantive harms he has suffered in detention at the hands ofU.S, officials and agents. The MCA also providesasweeping provision eliminating the right of non-citizens determined to be "unlawful enemy combatants" or "awaiting such determination"frombringing any claim "relating to any aspect ofthe detention, transfer, treatment, trial or conditions of confinement."'*" This provision applies to cases pending at the time ofthe MCA'senactment, as well as those brought subsequently,'** With the exception ofthe DTAreviewprocess and, only recently,the writ ofhabeas corpus, existingU.S. legislation thus bars Mr, Amezianefrompursuing any other avenue ofreliefin U.S,courts. 108. Based on the preceding considerations, Mr. Ameziane'spetition is wholly

admissible under one or more ofthe exceptions to the exhaustion ofdomestic remedies mle established in Article31(2) ofthe Commission'sRules ofProcedure. 3. 109. The Petition is Submitted withina^easounble Time.

Article 32(2) ofthe Commission'sRules ofProcedure provides that where, as in

this case, an exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies mle is invoked,"the petition shall be presented withinareasonabletime,"with the Commission considering the date ofthe alleged

163

DTA,cit,^ 1004: No court, justice or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United Statesor itsagentsrelating toany aspect of thedetention, transfer, treatment,trial orconditionsof confinement of an alien who is orwas detained by the United States andhas been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. MCA,cit,^7(a) MCA,cit,^7(b),

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violation and the circumstances ofeach case,'** In considering the timeliness of petitions filed under an exception to the exhaustion mle-and therefore exempt from the sixmonth deadline provided by Article31(1)ofthe Rules ofProcedure-the Commission has taken into account factors such as the existence ofprecautionary measures in favor ofthe petitioner and whetherthe violations alleged continued to be committed following the adoption of such measures,'*'as well as the fact thatthe petitioneris in detention.'** 110, In the present case, Mr. Ameziane has been in detention since early 2002 and isa

beneficiary ofthe precautionary measuresfirstissued bythe Commission in tavor of Guantanamo detainees in 2002, expanded severaltimessince then, and continuing in eflect.'*' Nonetheless, the violations ofMr.Ameziane'sfundamental rights have continued unabated. Given the continuing nature ofthese violations and Mr.Ameziane'sdetention, andti^efact that the United States has repeatedly failed to comply with the precautionary measures, the Commission should conclude that Mr. Ameziane'spetitionhas been presented withina reasonable time. 4. 111, The Petition is Not Pending before another International Body.

Article 33 ofthe Commission'sRules ofProcedure establishes that the

Commissionmay not considerapetition ifits subject matter is pending before another intemational govemmental organization or essentially duplicatesapetition already decided by the Commission or another intemational govemmental organization, "^Neither of these
166

See lACHR Rules ofProcedure art. 32(2). See Members of Jose Alvear Restrepo Lawyers' Collective v. Colombia. Petition No. 12,380, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 55/06 (Admissibility), at para. 41 (2006). Sec Antonio Zaldana Ventura v. Panama. Petition No. 977-06, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report 77/07 (Admissibility), at para. 54 (2007).

169

See lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259. See lACHR Rules of Procedure art. 33.

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provisions applies to the present case, as Mr. Ameziane'scase is not pending before, and has not been decided by,any other intemational govemmental organization. Mr.Ameziane'spetition therefore complies with the prohibition on duplicate proceedings. ^. 112 Conclusions Mr.Amezinne's Petition is Admissible under the Commission's R^ules ofProcedure.

MrAmeziane'spetitionplainlycomplieswitiitheadmissibilityrequirements

established in the Commission'sRules ofProcedure.The Commission has jurisdiction ^1^^^^^^ ^^^^1^^^^ because Mr. Ameziane isanatural person who is subject to the complete jurisdiction and control ofthe United States and whoserightshave been protected under the American Declaration since the ongoing violations alleged in the petition commenced. The Commission has ^^^r^^^^^^^^i^^,^i^rio^^^^^^^^^.^ and ^^^10^ ^^c^ jurisdiction bec^^^ violations ofrights protected under the American Declaration; the violations occurred subsequent to the adoption ofthe American Declaration, the United States'ratification ofthe OAS Charter and the creation ofthe Commission; and they occurred while Mr. Ameziane was underthejurisdictionofthe United States, Furthermore, one or more exceptions to the exhaustion to the domestic remedies mle applies to each ofthe violations alleged in the petition because judicial remedies are either unavailable by law or have been rendered ineffective by excessive delay, Finally,this petition complies with the formal requirements outlined in Article 28 of the Rules ofProcedure,with the timeliness requirement, and with the prohibition on duplicate proceedings. The Commission should therefore determine Mr. Ameziane'spetition to be admissible.

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lY.

VIOLATIONSOFTHEAMERICANDECLARATIONONTIIERIGIITSAND DUTIESOEMAN^'^ A^ The Urrited States has Arbitrarily Deprived Mr.Ameziane ofhis Liberty and Denied his Right to Prompt ,Iudicial Review in Violation of Article ^ V o ^ the American Declaration. The ongoing detention ofMr, Ameziane as an "enemy combatanf'-until recently

113,

without the prospect of court review-constitutes an arbitrary deprivation ofhis liberty anda denial ofhis right to promptjudicialrevievB ofthe legality ofhis detention in violation of Article ofthe American Declaration. Whileti^eU.S.Supreme Courtrecently ruled in^ot^^^^^^^^ that Guantdnamo detainees have therightto habeas, as it did in 2004,"^ the fact is that Mr. Ameziane remains imprisoned aftermore than six years, andacourt has yet to examine the lawftilness ofhis detention, despite his best efforts to seek review. The violation ofhisrightnot to be arbitrarily detained and to haveacourt ascertain the legality ofhis detention without delay occurred years ago, and it will continue until the day thataU.S.federal court mies on his habeas petition.

171

Petitioners note at the outset of this section that in "interpreting and applying the Declaration"and its individual protections, the Commissionhasreiteratedon numerousoccasions that "it isnecessary to consider its provisionsin light of developments in thefield of intemational human rights law since the Declaration was first composed." Following this reasoning, the Commission has found that the American Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention" or "Convention") "may be considered to represent an authoritative expression of the fundamental principles set forth in the American Lleclaration."S^/^da^ir^ Srare^^^dC^^^/^^eev. ^^redSrares,CaselL204, Inter-Am C.HR,Report No.98/03, atpara. 87,n. 79 (2003). See,eg,.7^a^^ai^/t7aB^av.^^iredSrares, Case 12.243,InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 52/01,at paras. 88, 89 (2000 )(ei^i^g Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties ofMan Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC10/89 of July 14, 1989, Inter-Am. CLHR. (Ser. A) N^ 10 (1989), at para. 37). See a^s^ Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Reftigee Determination System, InterAm. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/ILI06, doc. 40 rev,, at para. 38 (2000)(confirming that while the Commission clearly does not apply the American Convention in relation to member states that have yet to ratify that treaty, its provisions may well be relevant in informing an interpretation of the principles of the Declaration). ^as^^,542U,S 466(2004).

172

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Article

oftiie American Declaration provides;

No person may be deprived ofhis liberty except...according to the procedures established by pre-existing law.

Every individual who has been deprived ofhis liberty hastii^erighttohave tiie legality ofhis detention ascertained without delay byacourt."^ 114, These protections, like intemational human rights law in general, apply in all the latter context, however, intemational

situations, includingthoseof armed conflict, ""hi

humanitarian law may serve as the ^^,11: ^^^^i^^i^ in interpreting intemational humanrigbts instruments, such as the American Declaration. "*Under intemational humanitarian law, certain deprivations ofliberty, which would otherwise constitute violations oflntemational human rights law,maybejustified. 115. Properly determiningthe legal status ofMr.Ameziane, and whether intemational

humanitarian law is indeed the ^^:i^.^^^^^^^.^ in interpreting his rights or whether hisrightsare governed sfrictly by international humanrightslaw,is of critical importance in assessing the legality ofhis detention, and is an obligation of the United States as the detaining state,"*This determination has been rendered impossible by the U.S.govemment'sdefinitionof"enemy combatant,"pursuant to which Mr, Ameziane is being held at Guantdnamo,and ftirthermore by the madequacy ofthe CSRT reviewprocess. The failure ofthe United States to determine Mr.

173

American Declaration of theRights and Duties of Man,Mar.30-May 2, 1948,OAS Res OEA/SerL/V/IL82doc6revLArticle^V. See, eg, lACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para^ 61; 2007 Scheinin Report, si^^^a notel9,para.7.

175 176

lACHR Report onTen^orism and Human Rights, cit, atpara. 61. See lACHRPrecautionary Measures No.259 (March 13, 2002), at3(citingArticIe5of the Third Geneva Convention),

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Ameziane'sstatus and define the law pursuant to which his detention is governed has deprived him and other Guantdnamo detainees ofthe ability to know and exercise their rights, 116. The sections that follow begin by establishing the United States'allure to

properly determine Mr. Ameziane'sstatus under intemational law, the result of which is thatthe exactlegalframeworkapplicable to Mr, Ameziane'sdeprivation ofliberty remains unclear. As the subsequent sections demonstrate, however, regardless of whether Mr, Ameziane'sright to personal liberty would be properly analyzed under intemational humanrightsor humanitarian law,his detention at Guantdnamo Bay fbr more than six years without charge orafair judicial process to challenge his detention constitutesaclear violation ofhis Article arbitrarily detained. L The UnitedStates'Failureto Adequately DetermineMr.Ameziane's Legal Status has Frustrated the Appropriate Application of Article ^VtohisCnse^ right not to be

117.

The United States has an obligation to determine Guantdnamo detainees'legal

status Ithasfailedtosatisfythisobligationintwoways:byapplyinganambiguousdefinition of"enemy combatant" as the basis fbr holding detainees at Guantanamo, and by creating the flawed CSRTsas the only mechanism to review detainees'status. 118. Since itfirstadopted precautionary measures in March 2002, the Commission has

insisted that the United States take the "urgent measures necessary to have the legal status ofthe detainees at Guantdnamo Bay determined byacompetent tribunal,"expressing concem that "it remains entirely unclearfromtheir treatment by the United States what minimum rights under intemational human rights and humanitarian lawthe detainees are entitled to.""' The Commission reiterated this request in 2003, 2004 and 2005, before calling on the United States

177

See lACHRPrecautionary Measures No,259(March 13,2002),

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to close Guantdnamo in 2006,"* As the Commission has explained, determining detainees' status is indispensable to identifying the scope oftheirrightsand assessing whethertheir rights have been respected."' 119, Notwithstanding the Commission'srepeated admonitions, the United States has

failed in its obligation to determine detainees'legal status in two critical ways. 120. First, the definition of"enemy combatant" eludesadetermmate status for

detainees. The class ofindividuals whose detention the United States has authorized pursuant to its ^^ar on terror" has been variously defined since 2001,'*" but atthe time ofMr, Ameziane's CSRT in 2004, Guantdnamo detainees were determined to be properly held ifthey metthe tbllowing definition: An "enemy combatant",..shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or alOaida Ibrces, or associated forces thatare engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition parmers. This includes any personwhohascommittedabelligerentactorhas directly supported hostilities in aid ofenemy armed forces,'*' Currently,the MCA authorizes the detention of"unlawful enemy combatants" at Guantdnamo and underU,S,custody elsewhere, which are defined as: (i)aperson who has engagedinhostilities orwho has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against tine United States or its co-belligerents who is notalawftil enemy combatant (includingaperson who is part ofthe Taliban, al Oaeda, or associated forces); or
See lACHRPrecautionary Measures No. 259 (March 18, 2003; July 29,2004; and OcL 28, 2005); Press Release No. 27/06. See, e.g.,lACHRPrecautionary Measures No. 259(March 13,2002), at3. See Exec. Order No. ofNov.13,2001,s^^anote7(defining the class of individuals as "any individual who is notaUnited States citizen with respect to whom [the President] determine[s] from time to time in writing that: (l)there is reason to believe tliat such individuaL at the relevant times, (i) is or wasamember ofthe organization known as al Qaida; (ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of intemational terrorism or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States...; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described [above]: and (2) it is in the interest ofthe United States that sucb individual be subjectto this order").
181

CSRTProcedures,cit.,^B.

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(ii)aperson who, before, on, or afterti^e date ofthe enactment ofthe Military Commissions Act of2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant byaCombatant Status Review Tribtmal or another competent tribunal established tmder the authority ofthe President orthe Secretary of Defense.'*^ 121. The breadth and vagueness ofthese definitions, which conflate different

categories ofindividuals whose detention and rights would be govemed by diflerent regimes of intemational law,render it impossible to determine the specific rights of Guantanamo detainees and the obligations ofthe United States,'*^ In the context ofarmed conflict, intemational humanitarian law distinguishes between, and provides different protections fbr,"combatants," who take direct part in the hostilities and whose rights are governed bythe Third Geneva Convention, and "non-combatants"(or civilians), who are present in the zone of conflict but do not directly participate in the hostilities and whose rights are govemed by the Fourth Geneva Convention.'*" The Geneva Conventionsfiirtherdistinguish between lawful(orprivileged) and un1awful(or unprivileged) combatants, the former of which are entitled to prisoner-of-war (POW)status.'**

The MCA is the first instance in which "unlawful enemy combatant" is statutorily defined. MCA,cit.,^ 3(a)(l),amending^948a(l)(A), Commenting on the inadequacy of status determinations by the CSRTs, the t ^ Special Mandate holders concluded,"[i]n determining the status of detainees the CSRT has recourse to the concepts recently and unilaterally developed by the United States Govemment, and not to the existing intemational humanitarian law regarding belligerency and combatant status[.]" UN Special l^andate Holders'Report, si^^^anote 10, para28(d). Combatants are defined as persons who take direct part in the hostilities by "participating in an attack intended to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or objects." lACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, at para. 67 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to theTreatment of Prisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 4). Generally, non-combatants are defined as persons who are present in zones of intemational armed confiict, but who do not directly participate in the hostilities; they fall under the protection of theFourth Geneva Convention.Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian PersonsinTimeofWar,Aug.I2,1949. Privilegedcombatants are entitled to all the protections and rights emanating from thcThirdGeneva Convention, or from the First and Second Conventions if they are wounded or otherwise placed ^o^s^e ^^^^ar Unprivileged combatants are not entitled to POW stattis, although they do enjoy non-derogable, fundamental protections under both intemational humanrightsand humanitarian law. These include, r^^e^

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122.

The definition of"enemy combatant" or "unlawful enemy combatant" collapses

all ofthese categories into one, blurring the distinctions between individuals who may have participated directly in hostilities and may be classified as POWs,'** individuals who may not havedirectlyparticipatedinanyattacks,'*'andindividualswhomaynothavebeencaptured^^ the context ofan armed conflict at all and whose rights would be govemed strictly by intemational humanrightslaw.'**Thus, as an initial matter, the classification the United States uses to purportedlyjustily the detention ofMr.Ameziane and other Guantdnamo detainees makes it impossible to determine their rights and assess the legality oftheh detention with any precision. 123. Second1y,theCSRTsonly review whether detainees are properly held according

to this broad and muddled definition and, because oftheir myriadflawsand procedural shortcomings, are incapable of making even that determination fairly and accurately.As such, they are wholly inadequate in clarifying detainees'status andrights.As the Commission has previouslyfound,"itremainsentirelyunclearfromtheoutcomeof[theCSRTsandARBsjwhat

a//a, the right that their status be determined by a competent court or tribunal, as opposed to a political authority, and other fundamental guarantees embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 75 of the First Optional Protocol. See Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of "Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants." 85 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 45, 50-51,73 (2003).
186

For instance, the MCA presumptively classifies members of the Taliban and "associated forces" as "unlawful enemy combatants," instead of POWs. Commentaries on the Geneva Protocols define the term "direct" as requiring "a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the activity takes place," a standard not satisfied by merely providing financial support to persons involved in hostilities against the United States, See INT'L COMM. O F THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, PARA. 1679

187

(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
188

For example, a number of detainees were captured farfromAfghanistan, in Europe and in Africa.

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thelegalstatusofthedetaineesisorwhatrightstheyareentitledtounderintemationalor domestic law."'*' 124. The failure of the United States to adequately determine Mr. Ameziane'sstatus-

in clear defiance of repeated admonitions by the Commission since 2002-has had serious consequences fortheclarityandexerciseofhisrights,particularlythoseprotectedby Article ^ ^ V . In effect, the lack of an effective status determination makes it impossible to know whether his detention should be analyzed exclusively under intemational humanrightslaw,or whether intemational humanitarian law should also apply as ^^^,^^cii^^i.^. However, regardless ofwhich legal regime is applied, the ensuing sections demonstrate that Mr. Ameziane has been and continues to be arbitrarily deprived ofhis liberty. 2. Regardless ofV^hether Intemational Human Rights or Humanitarian Law Governs Mr.Ameziane's Detention, his Imprisorrment for over SixYears without Charge or judicial Review Constitutes an Arbitrary DeprivntionofhisLiberty.

125.

The United States has violated Mr, Ameziane'sright not to be arbitrarily deprived

ofhislibertybyimprisoninghimformorethansixyearswitiioutchargeandbydenyinghimthe opportunitytochallengethelegalityofhisdetentionii^^^^^^^^^^i:^^inacourt,regardlessof whether his detention is govemed exclusively by intemational human rights law or whether intemational humanitarian law also applies as in interpreting his rights. For

detainees whose treatment is govemed strictly by international humanrightslaw, prolonged and indefinite detention without charge orpromptjudicial review violates established norms, even in

189

See lACHRPrecautionary Measures No. 259 (Oct. 28, 2005) ("While the State argues that the procedures befbrethe Combatant StatusReviewBoard and the AdministrativeReviewBoardslikewise satisfy the Commission's request, it remains entirely unclear from the outcome of those proceedings what the legal status of the detaineesis or what rights they are entitled to under intemational or domesticlaw. [,..] Accordingly,the Commission does not consider that these procedures have adequately responded to the concems at the base ofthe Commission'srequest fbr precautionary measures.").

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the context of alleged terrorism, ""For detainees where the mies oflntemational humanitarian law are the ^^^,^^c^^^^.^, the United States'failure to make proper status determinations and to try or release detainees at the end ofhostilities constitutes an arbitrary deprivation ofliberty. (a) UnderaStrict Human Rights Law Analysis, the United States has Violated Mr^Amezinne'sRight Not to be Arbitrarily Detained.

126.

Given that intemational humanrightslaw applies to the conduct of states atall

times, including in times of threats to national security,and that intemational humanitarian law providesspecificmlesofinteipretationonlyinthecontextofarmedconfiict,'"thedetentionof Guantdnamo prisoners captured in the i^^,^^^c^ ofarmed conflict isgoverned solely by intemational human rights law. IfMr. Ameziane was captured outside ofasituation of armed conflict, then under international humanrightslaw,his imprisonment fbr over six years without charge and the opportunityto seek prompt judicial review ofhis detention constitutesaviolation ofhisrightsunder Article ^ ^ V . 127. As stated above, Article ^ V ofthe Declaration provides that anyone deprived of

his liberty has therightto have the legality ofhis detention reviewed without delay byacourt."^ Article 7(6) ofthe American Convention, which govems the remedy ofhabeas corpus, echoes this guarantee, providing that anyone who is deprived ofhis liberty "shall be entitled to recourse toacompetentcourt,inorderthatthecourtmaydecidewithoutdelayontiielawftilnessofhis arrest or detention and order his release ifthe arrest or detention is unlawfiil.""^ The Conunission has emphasized, including in its precautionary measures in favor ofGuantdnamo
See lACHRReport onTerrorism and Human Rights, cit,, at paras. 139-40. Seer^, atparas. 136, I4L AmericanDeclaration,s^^^anote 173,art. ^ V , American Convention, art.7.6. See a/s^ ICCPR, art. 9(4)("Anyone who is deprived ofhis liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings beforeacourt, in order that that courtmay decide without delay on the lawfulness ofhis detention and order his release ifthe detention is not lawftiL").

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detainees,"ti^e longstanding and fundamental role thatthe writ ofhabeas corpus plays asa means ofreviewing Executive detention" in particular."" 128. WhileneithertheCourtnortheCommissionhasestablishedadefinitivemle fbr

determining the length ofdetention without charge orjudicialreviewthat wouldriseto the level ofanarbitrarydeprivationofliberty,thejurispmdenceoftheInterAmericansystemindicates thatmore than six years would clearly constituteaviolation. The Commission has emphasized thathabeasisintendedtobeatimelyremedy."*Inordinarycircumstances,theCommissionhas suggestedthatadelayofmorethantwoortiireedaysinbringingadetaineebeforeajudicial authority would generally not be considered reasonable."* In the context of alleged terrorism, both the Conunission and the Court have fbtmd that holding an individual suspected ofterrorism fbr 20 days without charge orjudicialreviewviolated the right to befreefromarbitrary detention.'" 129. Furthermore, while derogations oftiie right to personal liberty are permissible in

certain contexts, the Inter American system'sjurispmdence makes clearthatcertain fundamental aspects oftheright,such as the writ ofhabeas corpus, are non-derogable even in times of

lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (OcL 28,2005), at 8.
195

See, e.g„ lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (Oct. 28,2005), at 8 (citing Castillo Paez Case, InterAm. Ct. H.R., Judgment ofNovember 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 34, para. 83). lACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para. 122, n. 334. See also Suarez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. CL H.R., Judgment ofNovember 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35 (finding that a judicial proceeding occurring one month after a defendant's arrest constituted arbitrary detention), available at http://www I lunm.edu/humanrts/Inter-Am. C.H.R./C/35-ing.html. See, e.g., Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct H.R., Judgment of August 18, 2000 (Ser. C) No. 69, at paras. 63,66,74.

196

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emergency andtiireatsto national security"* position in accordance with the interpretations of UNbodies.'" 130, Mr. Ameziane was transferred to Guantdnamo on or around Febmary2002, "enemy

purportedly onthebasisofaunilateraldeterminationbytheExecutivethatheisan

combatant." He has been held without charge and withoutjudicial review ofthe lawftilness of his detention during the six intervening years since then, and the United States has made no indication ofeither charging or releasing him in the future. 131, Forthe first two years ofhis detention, Mr.Ameziane was held virtually

^^co^^t^^^c^^o, without access to cotmsel or even administrative review ofhis status and detention. In Jtme 2004, with the U.S.Supreme Court'smling in .^i^^t^^, he and other detainees were forthefirsttime afforded access to lawyers and the right to habeas in U.S,courts, but the govemmentopposedandsuccessfrillystalledeachandeveryoneofdetainees'habeaspetitions, including Mr, Ameziane's, and ultimately stripped theirright to habeas through the DTAin 2005 andtiieMCAin2006, 132, Habeas is now again available to detainees pursuant to the Court'srecent decision

in i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ and will be pursued, but Mr. Ameziane'shabeas petition will have been pending fbr at least three andahalf years by the time it is heard. Todate, notasingle Guantanamo prisoner has hadahearing on the merits ofhis habeas case. The only reviewthe prisoners have had is bythe sham CSRTsand ARBs, whichhave been amply criticized by the Commission and other intemational human rights bodies.

lACHRReport onTerrorism and Human Rights, cit., at paras. 127,139. The Inter-American Courthas ruled that the right to habeas corpus under Article 7(6) may not be subject to derogation in the InterAmerican system, atpara. 126,n. 342. SeeU.N, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 (2001), para.ll(expIainingthatArticle 9(4) is non-derogable even in times of emergency); 2007 Scheinin Report, s^^^a note 19,para. 14.

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133.

Thus, notwitiistanding the habeas remedy now available and being pursued, in tiie

case ofMr.Amezianeand the over 250 other detainees past their sixti:i year ofimprisonment without charge, habeas has long since ceased to be the timely remedy it was intended to be. Underastrict intemational human rights framework, Mr. Ameziane'sright not to be arbitrarily detained under Article ^ ^ V ofthe American Declaration was violated long ago, and the violation will continue untilafederal court reviews and mies on the legality ofhis detention, (b) Even iflnternational Humanitarian Law is the L^^^cr^^r^ in Mr.Ameziane'sCase, the United States has Violated his Right Not to be Arbitrarily Detained.

134.

With respect to detainees such as Mr.Ameziane who may have been captured by

the United States in the context of an intemational armed conflict, the American Declaration and other intemational human rights instmments still apply,but intemational humanitarian law provides the ^^^,^^c^^^^^ in interpreting their rights and assessing the legality oftheir detention.^""Evenifintemational humanitarian law were to prove relevant in the case ofMr. Ameziane,hisdetentionforoversixyearsbytheUnitedStateswouldstillconstitiiteanarbitrary deprivation ofhis liberty. 135. UndertheThird Geneva Convention, in the context of an intemational armed

conflict,"combatants" who have fallen into the hands ofaparty to the conflict may be detained for the duration ofthe hostilities, so long as the detention serves the purpose of preventing them from continuing to take up arms against the detaining party.^"' Lawfu1(or privileged) combatants are entitled to POW status during the period ofdetention, and detainees whose status

200

See UN Special Mandate Holders' Joint Report, supra note 10, paras. 15-16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug, 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135[hereinafter "Third Geneva Convention"]; see also UN Special Mandate Holders' Joint Report, supra note 10, para. 22.

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is in doubt are also presumptively considered POWs.^"^ The Fourth Geneva Convention also permitsaparty to the conflict to detain "non-combatants"(orcivilians)if they poseasecurity threat or otherwise intend to harm the party,or forthe purposes of prosecution on war crimes charges.^"^ The power to continue holding detainees duringasituation of armed conflict, regardless ofhow they are classified, is limited by the existence ofan ongoing armed conflict and safeguards by which detainees can challenge their continued detention,^"" Once the conflict has come to an end, prisoners of war and non-combatants must be released, although they may be detained until the end ofany criminal proceedings brought against them,^"* As the rationale forthe detention of combatants not eti^oying POW status(uiilawfulorunprivileged combatants) is to prevent themfromtaking up arms against the detaining party,they,too, should be released or charged once the conflict is over.^"* 136. The basic position ofthe United States is that itshouldbeable to detain Mr,

Ameziane and the other prisoners at Guantdnamo as "enemy combatants,"without charge or access to counsel orthe courts, forthe duration ofits "war on terror,"which by the govemment's ow^ admission isawar without end. However, as the UN Special Mandate Holders have noted.
Third Geneva Convention, arts.4^5.See a/s^ lACHRReport on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para. 130(^/ri^g Third Geneva Convention art. 5). ^ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time ofWarart.42,1949,6U.S.T, 3516[hereinafter "Fourth Geneva Convention"]; see a^s^ UN Special Mandate Holders Joint Report, si^^^a note 10, at para. 22. See, e.g., 2007 Scheinin Report, si^^a note 19, at para, 14("[T]herightto judicial review of any form of detention does not depend on whether humanitarian law is also applicable. All Guantdnamo Bay detainees are entitled to this righL irrespective of whether they were involved in armed confiict or the status of proceedings against them."). Third Geneva Convention, arts.118-19; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 133. See a^s^ UN Special Mandate Holders'JointReport,si^^^anote 10, atpara. 22.
206

Third Geneva Convention, art.118; see a^s^ LIN Special Mandate Holders'Joint Report, si^^a note 10, at para. 22. An unprivileged combatant, although unable to enjoy the protections of theThird Geneva Convention, still enjoys the core protections ofCommonArticIe3to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocollin addition to the fiuidamentaL non-derogable protections of intemationalhumanrightslaw.See,e.g.,^utI^rmann,7^/ie^ega/S/riBar/i7^q^^^^^/aii^/i^L^^^^ C^iTi^ara^rs, 85 85 Int'IRev.RedCross45, 50-51 (2003).

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"ti^e global stmggle against intemational terrorism does not, as such, constitute an armed conflict forthe purposes ofthe applicability oflntemational humanitarian law."^"' Assuming ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ thatthe United States'invasion ofAfghanistan in October 2001 effectively launched an intemational armed conflictas defined underthe laws ofwar,^^* according toti:ieICRC, that conflict ended with the establishment ofthe new Afghan govemment in June 2002.^"'Thus, while the detention ofboth lawful and unlawftil combatantsand civilians captured bythe United States in Afghanistanmay have been permissible during the period ofhostilities, such detainees shouldhave been repatriated or charged once the hostilities were over on or about June 2002. Any detention continuing past that point in time, unless of detainees against whom criminal proceedings were pending, would be in violation oflntemational humanitarian law. While the United States continues to be involved in combat operations in Afghanistan and in other countries, as the UN Special Mandate Holders have observed, itis "not currently engaged in an intemational armed conflict between two Parties to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions,"^'" Furthermore, the govemment itselfhas confirmed thatthe objective ofthe ongoing detention ofGuantdnamo detainees is not primarilyto prevent any individuals from taking up arms againstthe United States, but to obtain information and intelligence.^" 137. Given thatany intemational armed conflict between the United States and

Afghanistan ended long ago, the detention of any Guantdnamo detainees who may have been captured in the course and zone ofthat conflict can no longer bejustified by intemational
207 208

UN Special Mandate Holders'Joint Report, si^^^anote 10, at para.21. See, ICRC, International Humanitarian Law andTerrorism: Questions and Answers at3(May 5,2004), ova^/a^^e arwww.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/5YNLEV.
Seei^.

209 210 211

UN Special Mandate Holders'Joint Report, si^^^anote 10, at para. 24. See/^.atpara. 23. See a/s^ ARB Procedures, cit.,^3F(l)(c)(factors fbr continuing detention includes intelligence value).

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humanitarian law.^'^ Such detainees should have been released once the hostilities ended, and their continuing detention would have been lawful only ifcriminal proceedings were pending against them. Even ifMr.Ameziane'sdetention was initially permissible under the ^e:i^,^^^^ii^^r,^ ofmtemational humanitarian law, the fact thathe continues to be held without charge more than six years after the conclusion ofany intemational armed confiict in Afghanistan clearly constitutes an arbitrary deprivation ofhis liberty. 1^^ Mr.Ameziane's Detention Conditions andTreatmentAmonntto Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and DegradingTreatment in Violation of Artielesland ^ ^ V of the American Declaration. The Inter-American System prohibits and condemns the use oftorture and cmel,

138.

inhuman, or degrading treatment or ptmishment("CIDT") for any purpose and in all circumstances.^'^ 139. It is nowwell-established through govemmentmemos and investigations, direct

detainee accounts, and news andNGO reports that detention conditions and interrogation techniques amounting to torture were sanctioned and imposed at Guantdnamo, ThelCRC-the authoritative voice on govemment obligations under intemational humanitarian andhuman rights law in detentions operations-has described the entire detention regime at Guantdnamo as an intentional system of cmel and degrading treatment andafbrm of torture. 140. Mr.Ameziane has personally been subjected to conditions of confinement and

mistreatment that this Commission and other intemational bodies have recognized as rising to the level oftorture and other inhumane treatmenL The fact that these conditions and his mistreatment were part ofadeliberate and purposefiil system, whether to break his resistance fbr
See LIN Special Mandate Holders'Joint Report, si^^^a note 10, at para. 23. The System'sprohibitions are embodied in the American Declaration ofthe Rights and Duties ofMan; the American Convention on Human Rights; the Inter-American Convention to PreventandPunishTorture; and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication ofViolence agamst Women.

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the purposes ofinterrogation orto punish and discipline him, and that they were authorized and carried out by U.S,government officials and agents, renders them violations of Articlesland ^ ^ V ofthe American Declaration forwhich the United States must be held accountable. L 141. Torture ^nd Cruel, Inhuman, nnd Degrading Treatment Are Prohibited in the Inter-American System.

Protections against torture and abuse are guaranteed by at least two articles ofthe

AmericanDeclaration. Articlelprotects the right of"l^e]very human being..,to life, liberty and the security ofhis person."^'" The Commissionhas consistently interpreted personal security to include the rightto humane treatment andhasfiirtherspecified that "l^ajn essential aspect ofthe right to personal security isti:ieabsolute prohibition oftorture,"^'* Article ^ V ofthe American Declarationspecificallyprotectstherightofpersonsinstatecustodytohumanetreatment: "l^ejveryindividualwhohasbeendeprivedofhisliberty hastherighttohumanetreatment

duringthe time he is in custody."^'* Article5ofthe American Convention, theanalogto Article l o f the Declaration, in more explicit terms guarantees therightof"[ejvery person ...to have his physical,mental,andmoralintegrityrespected Nooneshallbesubjectedtotortureorto

cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment ortreatmenL All persons deprived oftheir liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity ofthe human person,"^" 142, In interpreting the scope and content ofthe prohibition on torture, the

Commission and the Court have generally looked to the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
•^'^ ^'^ American Declaration, supra note 173, art. I. See lACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, at para. 155, n.389; see also Ovelario Tames v, Brazil, Case 11.516, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 60/99, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev., para. 39 (1998), American Declaration, supra note 173, art. XXV. The Commission has found that, by depriving a person ofhis liberty, the state "places itself in the unique position of guarantor ofhis right to life and to humane treatmenL" Minors in Detention v. Honduras, Case 11.491, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 41/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev., para. 135 (1998). ^" American Convention, art. 5. The Commission has interpreted Article I of the American Declaration as containing a prohibition similar to that under the American Convention. See lACHR Report on TeiTorism and Human Rights, at para. 155 n.388.

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andPunishTorture("Inter-AmericanTortureConvention").^'* Article2(l)oftheInterAmericanTorture Convention defines torture as follows: "For the purposes ofthis Convention, torture shall be tmderstood to be any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted onaperson fbr purposes of criminal investigation, asameans ofintimidation, as personal ptmishment,asapreventive measure, asapenalty,or fbr any other purpose. Torture shall also be tmderstood to be the use of methods uponaperson intended to obliterate the personality ofthe victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, eveniftheydonotcausephysicalpainormentalanguish The concept oftorture shall not mclude physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence oflawftil measures, provided that they do not include the performance ofthe acts oruse ofthe methods referred to in this article,"^" 143, Guided bythis definition, the Commission has indicated that the following

elements must exist fbr an act to constitute torture: (l)it must produce physical and mental pain and sufleringinaperson; (2) it must be committed withapurpose(such as personal ptmishment or intimidation) or intentionally(e.g,, to produceacertain result in the victim); and (3) it must be committed byapublic official or byaprivate person acting at the instigation of the former.^^" 144. The Commissionhas held that the key factorthat distinguishes torture from other

cmel, inhuman or degradingfreatmentorpunishment is "the intensity ofthe suffering

Raquel Martin de Mejia v. Peru, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No 5/96, at 185 (1995) (declaring that, while the American Convention does not define "torture," "in the Inter-American sphere, acts constituting torture are established in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture"). The Inter-American Court has stated that the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture constitutes part of the Inter-American corpus iuris, and that the Court must therefore refer to it in interpreting the scope and content of Article 5(2) of the American Convention. See Tibi v. Ecuador, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, para. 145 (2004).
219

Unlike many other international bodies, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture is not limited to acts committed for the purpose of extracting information through interrogation but instead covers acts committed for any purpose whatsoever. See lACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, at para. 154 n.385; see also Robert K. Goldman, Trivializing Torture: The Office ofLegal Counsel's 2002 Opinion Letter and International Law Against Torture, in 12 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief (2004).



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inflicted."^^' Fortreatment to be considered inhuman or degrading, it must attainaminimum level of severity, which the Commissionhas held isarelative measurement and dependent on the specific circumstances ofeach case, including the duration ofthe treatment, its physical and mental effects, and the sex, age and health ofthe victim, among other factors.^^^ Severe mental and psychological suffering alone, including humiliation, can constitute inhuman and degrading treatment, even in the absence ofphysical injuries,^^^ In,^o^^^7^i:^^^^^, the Court described degrading treatment as the fear, anxiety and inferiority induced inavictim fbr the purpose of humiliating the victim and breaking his physical and moral resistances^" It also noted that the degrading aspect oftreatment can be exacerbated by the vulnerability ofan individual unlawfully detained,^^* 145. The law ofthe Inter-American system, like intemational law in general, considers

the prohibition of torture to beanon-derogable,^^^,^^^^^^^ norm, meaning that it cannot be suspended for any reason, including war or any other emergency situation,^^* The InterAmerican Court has repeatedly referred to the^t^,^c^^^^^ character ofthe absolute prohibition of

lACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para. 158 {citing Case ofLuis Lizardo Cabrera, at para. 80); see also Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am, Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, para. 70 (Mar. 11, 2005); Lori Berenson-Mejia v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 119, para. 100 (Nov. 25,2004).
222

lACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, ciL, at para. 157; see also Case of Hermanos Gomez Paquiyauri, cit,; Case ofLoayza Tamayo, cit,; Case ofJailton Neri da Fonseca v. Brazil, cit, lACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at paras. 156, 159. Id atpara. 159n,395. Id atpara. 159.

223

226

See lACHR, Report on the Sittiation of Human Rights Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Refugee Determmation System, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 40 rev., para. 154 (Feb. 28, 2000); Case of Lori Berenson-Mejia, cit., at para. 100. The Court has stated that "the fact that a State is confronted with terrorism [or a situation of internal upheaval] should not lead to restrictions on the protection of the physical integrity of the person." See Case of Gomez Paquiyauri, cit., at para. 37; Case of Cantoral Benavidez, cit., at para. 143; Case of Castro, cit., at para. 271; Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct, H,R. (ser. C) No. 123, para. 70 (Mar. 11,2005).

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all forms oftorture,^^'and it is now clearthat it also considers the prohibition on otiier forms of ill-freatment to be customary internationallaw,^^* The Inter-AmericanTorture Convention provides specifically that the existence ofastate of war, threat of war, state of emergency, domestic disturbance or other type ofemergency cannot be invoked tojustily acts that constitute torture.229 146. The Inter-American and "tmiversal condemnation oftorture precludes any state

not onlyfromengaging in torture, butalsofromexpelling, retuming,^rendering,'orextraditinga person to another state where there are substantial grounds fbr believing that the person would be in danger ofbeingtortured."^^^ 2. Mr.Ameziane I^as Been Subjeeted to Physical and Psychological Torture and Cruel, Inhumnn, and DegradingTreatment in Guantdnamo and I^andahar. (a) 147. Detention Conditions, including Prolonged Incommunicado Detention and Isolation

Mr.Ameziane'sconditions of detention at Guantdnamo, including in particular

his solitary confinement in Camp VI since March 2007,fail to meet the basic standards required by the American Declaration for the personal security and humane treatment of persons in state custody,as well as by other sources oflntemational lawto which the Commission looks in interpreting the Declaration'sprovisions. As the ICRC has said ofthe conditions ofdetention at Guantdnamo,^^e constmction ofl^the detention facilities],whose stated purpose is the

^

Goiburu v. Paragucry, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, para. 128 (Sept. 26, 2006); Cose of Tibi, cit., at para. 143; Gomez-Paquiyauri Brothers v, Peru. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, para. 112 (July 8, 2004); Urrutia v. Guatemala. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103, para. 92 (Nov. 27,2003). Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (ser. C) No. 139, para. 127 (Nov. 30,2005). Inter-American Torture Convention, art. 5. See Goldman, supra note 220.

™ "°

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production ofintelligence, cannot be considered other than an intentional system of cmel, unusual anddegradingtreatmentandafbrmoftorture."^^' 148. The Inter-American system'sjurispmdence on the rightto humane treatment

establishes that persons deprived oftheir liberty have the right to conditions ofdetention that respect their personal dignity and that the State, as the primary entity responsible for prisons, is obligated to ensure conditionsthat safeguard prisoners'ftmdamental rights.^^^The Commission and the Court have specifically foundtitatdetention conditions similar in many respects to those mwhich Mr.Ameziane has been held e.g.,prolonged incommunicado detention, isolation ina small cell without natural air or light, deficient medical care(discussed^^i^)-amotmtto inhumane treatment and even torture, and fail to safeguard those basic rights, 149. Forexample, in the I^^^^^t^^^^^i^^^^t^^^ case, the Courtheld that "[pjrolonged

isolation and deprivation of communication are in themselves cruel and inhuman treatment, harmful to the psychological andmoralmtegrity ofthe person andaviolation oftiierightof any detainee to respect for his inherent dignity asahuman being" aposition the Courtand the Commissionhaveconsistentiy held in their jurispmdence on prisoners'rightto humane treatmenL 150. The system'scaselaw has also specifically addressed situations of solitary

confinement, holdingti^at such conditions constitute cmel and inhuman treatmentand even torture tmder certain circumstances, In ^^^^,^^^^^,^o^^l^^^^v,7^^^t^, the Court fbtmd thata
ICRC, The ICRC's Work at Guantdnamo Bay (Nov. 30,2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList4/C5667B446C9A4DF7C1256F5C00403967. See Cose of Bulacio, cit., at para. 126; Case of Cantoral Benavides. cit., at para. 87; Case of Lori Berenson Mejia, cit., atpara. 102; Cose of Tibi, ciL, at para. 150; Case of the "Juvenile Reeducation Institute", cit., at para. 151. ^" Velasquez Rodriguez case, (ser. C) No, 4, para. 156 (July 28, 1988); see also Godinez Cruz case, (ser. C) No. 5,para. 164 (Jan. 20, 1989); CamiloAlarconEspinozav. Peru, Cases 10.941, 10.942,10.944,10.945, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.98, doc. 6 rev,, para. 83 (1997); Case of Lori Berenson, cit., at para. 103; lACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para. 162,

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detention regime resembling Mr.Ameziane'sconditionsmmany respects-continuous solitary confinement fbr one year inasmall cell without ventilation, natural lighting or heating, adequate food, sanitary facilities or necessary medical care(fbr vision problems resultingfromthe lack of natural light in the small cell), and with severe restrictions onreceiving visitors-constituted cmel, inhuman and degradingtreatment,^^" The fact that some ofthese conditions changed or improved afteracertain point in time, such as the continuous solitary confinement, did not affect the Court'sfinding,^*The UN Committee AgainstTorture similarly found that the detention conditions in the .^^^^^o^^lB^^^ case amounted to cmel and inhuman treatmentand ptmishment.^^* 151. In addition to the suffering inherent in solitary confinemenL such conditions place

individuals "inaparticularly vulnerable position, and increase[^] theriskof aggression and arbitrary acts in detention centers.''^^'Thus, in/l^^^^^o-B^B^^^i^^^^vI^^^^^i^^^^, the Court held that "solitary confinement cells must be used as disciplinary measures or fbr the protection of

234

Case q/"ion 5ereKson, ciL, at paras. 106,109; see a/so Case q/Titi, ciL, at para. 150; Case ofthe "Juvenile Reeducation Institute, cit., at para. 151; Case of Cantoral Benavides, ciL, at para. 89; Martin Javier Roca Casas v. Peru, Case 11.233, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 39/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., para. 90 (1997); Case ofLoayza Tamayo, cit., at paras. 57-58; Case of Castillo-Petruzzi. cit., at para. 197; Nicaragua, Case 9170, Inter-Am. C.H.R, (1986) (holding that a man who had been kept in isolation for nine months had been denied hisrightto humane treatmenL in violation of Article 5 ofthe American Convention). See also First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 22-Sept. 3,1995, U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Res. 663C (XXIV) (July 31, 1957) and Res. 2076 (LXII) (May 13,1977) [hereinafter "UN Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners"]. See Case of Lori Berenson, cit., at para. 108; see also Case ofLoayza Tamayo. cit., at paras. 57-58; Case of Castillo-Petruzzi. cit., at para. 197, See Cose of Lori Berenson, cit., at para. 107 (citing U.N. Committee Against Torture, Investigation in relation to Article 20: Pern,A/56/44, paras. 144-93 (May 16, 2001); Inquiry under Article 20, paras. 18384). Bdmaca-Veldsquez v. Guatemala. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, para. 150 (Nov. 25, 2000). See also De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, Inter-Am. CL H.R. (ser. C) No. 115, para. 129 (Nov, 18, 2004); Urrutia v. Guatemala. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No, 103, para. 87 (Nov, 27,2003); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, InterAm. CL H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, para. 195 (May 30, 1999); Sudrez-Rosero v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Series C) No. 35, para. 90 (Nov. 12, 1997); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, para. 323 (Nov. 25, 2006).

235

236

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persons only duringtiietimenecessary and in strict compliance with the criteria of reasonability, necessity and legality," and specifically stated that minimum standards for conditions of detention must still be met.^^* 152. treatment. ^^' 153. In Cabrera v. Dominican Republic, the Commission found that the solitary Even the threat of solitary confinement may be enough to constitute inhuman

confinement to which Mr. Cabrera had been subjected amoimted to torture, reasoning that: (i) it was deliberately imposed on the applicant; (ii) the measure was imposed tmder circumstances in which the applicant's health was In a delicate state; (iii) the solitary confinement was imposed for the purpose of personal ptmishment; and (iv) the act of torture was attributable to the State as it was perpetrated by its %ents in the course of official duties.^"" 154. The Commission has also interpreted Article XXV's guarantee of humane

treatment for individuals in state custody along the lines of intemational standards for the confinement and treatment of prisoners. In Oscar Elias Bisect v. Cuba, the Commission made specific reference to the United Nations' Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners as prescribing basic benchmarks^"' in such areas as accommodation,^"^ hygiene,'^"^

Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela. Inter-Am, CL H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, para. 94 (July 5, 2006). The InterAmerican Court specifically referred to other intemational instances in this regard, including the report of the UN Committee Against Torture on Turkey, the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and thefindingsof the European Court in Mathew v. Netherlands. No. 24919/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) .
240

Case ofthe "Juvenile Reeducation Institute," cit., at para. 167; see a/so swpra section 3.1.1. Luis Lizardo Cabrera v. Dominican Republic, Case No. 10,832, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 35/96, at para. 86(1997). Oscar Elias Biscet et ai v. Cuba. Case 12.476, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 67/06, at paras. 153-58 (2006) . See also Paul Lallion v. Grenada, Case 11.765, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/02, at para. 86 (2003); Benedict Jacob v. Grenada, Case 12.158, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 56/02, at para. 43 (2003). See also lACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para. 167. "All accommodation provided for the use ofprisoners and in particular all sleeping accommodation shall meet all requuements of health, due regard being paid to climatic conditions and particularly to cubic

241

^"^

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clothing and bedding,^"^ exercise and sport,^"*discipline, punishment, and histruments of restraint,^"* and contact with the outside world.^"' 155, For the first few years ofhis Imprisonment at Guantanamo, Mr, Ameziane and

other prisoners were largely cut offfrom and unknown to the outside world, TheU,S. govemment denied anyone otherthan military and govemment officials and the ICRCaccess to the base, andrefused to disclose eventide names and nationalities ofthe prisoners publlclyuntll frittr years afterthey were broughtto Guantdnamo, Lawyers werefinallypermittedto visit the base after Jtme2004,although Mr. Ameziane did not actually meet withalawyer until several monthslater Prisoners'abilitytocommunicatewitiitheirlawyersandtiieirfamilies,andaccess

to any outside news or information remains extremely restricted. Letters from Mr. Ameziane to his family often do not reach them forayear or more. Letters from his attomeys are often held fbr weeks. While incommunicado detention has been the norm at Guantdnamo fbr over six years, the law ofthe Inter-American system has wamed that "[ijncommtmicado may only be

content of air,minimum fioor space, lighting, heating and ventilation,"U.N.Minimum Rules forthe Treatment ofprisoners, mle 10."ln all places where prisoners are required to live orwork, a) the windows shall be large enough to enable the prisoners to read or work by natural light, and shall be so constmcted that they can allowthe entrance offreshairwhetherornotthere is artificial ventilation; [and]b)[a]rtificial light shall be provided sufficient forthe prisoners to read orwork without injury to eyesight."^^.atmlell. "The sanitary installations shall be adequate to enable everyprisonerto comply with the needs ofnature when necessary and inaclean and decentmanner."^^atmlel2."Adequate bathing and shower installations shall be provided so that every prisoner may be enabled and required to haveabath or shower, atatemperature suitable to the climate, asfrequentlyas necessary fbr general hygiene according to season and geographical region, but at least onceaweek inatemperateclimate."7^. at rule 13, "Everyprisonerwho is not allowed to wear his own clothing shall be provided with an outfit of clothing suitable fbrtheclimate and adequate to keep him in good health."7^.atmle 17(1), "Everyprisonerwho is not employed in outdoor work shall have at least one hour of suitable exercise in the open air daily ifthe weatherpermits."7^atmle.21(l). "Discipline and order shall be maintained withfirmness,but with no more restriction than is necessary ft3r safe custody and well-ordered community life."7^. at rule 27.
247

"Prisoners shall be allowed undernecessary supervision to communicate with theirfamilyandreputable friends at regular intervals, both by correspondence and by receiving visits."./6^. at mle 37,"Prisoners shall be kept informed regularly ofthe more important items ofnews by the reading of newspapers, periodicals or special institutional publications..,,"^^.

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used exceptionally,taking into account its severe effects, because ^isolationfromthe exterior world produces moral suffering and mental stress on any individual, which place him in an exacerbated situation ofvulnerabllity,...,"^"* 156. In addition to the general isolation ofprisoners at Guantdnamofromthe outside

world, Mr, Ameziane'ssolitary confinement in Camp VI fbr overayear has been further isolating, restricting his contact even with otherprisoners. His small cell is cold, completely sealed and lets in no natural air or lighL The only openings are two thin "windows" that face the interior of the prison and allow guards to look in and keep watch day and night, andafbod slot in his door, which he crouches down to and yells through to other prisoners in his block-one of the few ifonly ways they can communicate. He sits, sleeps, eats and uses the toilet all in the same small space, which he is unable to clean because he is given no cleaning supplies. He is confined to this space fbr most of every day,with the exception ofafive minute shower, often without any hot water, andashort"recreation"time, when he is shuffled outside in chains toa small fenced in area surrounded by walls five meters high and covered in wire mesh. Even outside,hlsonlyviewoftheskyisthroughmetalwires. 157. His confinement in these conditions has takenaheavy physical and psychological

tolL His deteriorating eyesightand rheumatism are some ofthe physical manifestations ofbeing held in solitary confinement fbr so long. There are also psychological scars that are less visible. As the Court has held,"theinluries, sufferings, damage to health orprejudices suffered by an individual while he is deprived ofliberty may becomeaform of cmel punishment when, owing

^"^

Case ofLori Berenson. cit., at para, 104; (f. Case ofMaritza Urrutia v. Guatemala. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103, at para. 87 (Nov. 27, 2003); Case of Bdmaca-Veldsquez, cit., at para. 150; Case of Cantoral Benavides, ciL, at para. 84.

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to the circumstances ofhis imprisonment, there isadeteriorationinhis physical, mental and moral integrity."^' 158. Giventi^elength and severity ofMr.Ameziane'sincommunicado and solitary

conditions at Guantdnamo, in general and in Camp VI specifically,their intentional and purposefiil nature, whetherto produce intelligence and^ortoptmish and torture, and their authorization and enforcement byU.S.govemment officialsand agents, Mr. Ameziane's conditions of detention at Guantdnamo rise to the level of torture in violation of Articlesland ^^C^ ofthe American Declaration, (b) Physical andYerbalAssaults,ModifiedV^aterboarding, Abusive Interrogations, and Sleep Deprivation in the Context ofDetentiou and Interrogation.

159.

In addition to his incommunicado and solitary conditions of confinement, Mr.

Ameziane has been subjected to specific acts oftorture and abuse in the context ofhis detention andinterrogationsoverthepastsixyearsti^tconstituteadditionalviolationsofArticlesIand ^ V ofthe AmericanDeclaration, These include physical beatings resulting in injuries, simulated drowning, 30-hour interrogation sessions, prolonged periods of sleep deprivation, threats ofrendition and menacing by military dogs. These methods were often applied in combination, compounding his suffering. 160. Inter-Americanjurisprudence has held that many ofthe acts to which Mr.

Ameziane has been subjected constitute inhumane treatmenL including beatings,^*" holdinga person'shead in water until the point of drowning,^*'threats ofabehaviorthat would constitute
249

Cose of Lori Berenson. cit,, at para. 102. See also Case of "Juvenile Reeducation Institute," cit., at para. 168 (finding that the subhuman and degrading detention conditions that inmates were forced to endure inevitably affected their mental health, with adverse consequences for the psychological growth and development of their lives and mental health). lACHR Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para. 161 n.405. Id. at para. 161 n.403.

250

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^^d,

inhumanetreatment,

death threats,

and standing orwalking on top ofindividuals.

More

broadly,the Court has held that "any use offeree that is not strictly necessary to ensure proper behavior^by]thedetaineeconstitutesanassaultontiiedignityofthepersoninviolationof Article5of the American Convention,"^** 161. Intemational authorities also provide guidance inidentilying specific acts that

constitute torture or other inhumane treatmenL The UN Human Rights Committee has considered beatings and stress positions such as fbrcingaprisonerto remain standing fbr extremely long periods oftime to constitute torture or other inhumane treatment.^** Ina1997 report on interrogation tactics used bythe Israeh Defense Forces, the UN Committee Against Torture concluded that sleep deprivationfor "prolonged periods" constitutes torture fbrpurposes of Articlelofthe Convention AgainstTorture,^*' The UN Special Rapporteur onTorture has identified similar and additional acts that involve the infliction of suffering severe enough to constitute torture, including beating, suspension, suffocation, exposure to excessive light or noise, prolonged denial ofrest, sleep or medial assistance, total isolation and sensory deprivation, and being held in constant uncertainty in terms of space and time.^**
252 253 254 255 256

7^atpara.l61n.4I0.
atpara. 161 n.412. B^, atpara, 161n.404. atpara. 166. 7^. atpara. 162 n.414. See Office ofthe High Commissioner fbr Human Rights, Concluding Observations ofthe Committee AgainstTorture: IsraeL A/52/44,para, 257(SepL 5, 1997) [heremaftei^"ConcludingObservations: Israel"]. The Committee does notstate what constitutesa"prolonged period"; however, in making this determination, the Committee consideredacase in which the detainee was "interrogatedand tortured over the course ofthe next 30 days" while another detainee was "forced to sithandcuf^dandhooded in painftil andcontortedpositions,subjectedtoprolongedsleepdeprivationandbeatenoverthecourseofthree weeks."Report ofthe Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S.Rodley,submitted to the UN Commission on HumanRights,E/CN.4/I998/38/Addl(Dec 24,1997).

258

lACHRReport onTerrorism, cit, atpara. 162 n.413. See ai^o Concluding Observations: IsraeLsi^^^anote 257,atpara.257,

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162,

The Commission and the Court have also relied on European Court ofHuman

Rights jurispmdence, including the case of 7B^^^i^^v,^, and suggested that techniques similar to those addressed by the European Court, including forcing detainees to remain in stress positions fbr periods ofseveral hours, hooding, subjecting detainees to continuous loud noise and depriving detaineesof sleep pending their interrogations are prohibited in any interrogations by state agents.^*'The European Court has also fbtmd that shackllngaprisoner, where shackling causes pain and discomfort, constitutesabreach of Article3of the European Convention.^*" 163. Mr.Ameziane has been subjected to numerous acts of mistreatment at the hands

of theU.S.military at Guantdnamo that this Commission and other intemational bodies recognize as torture or other inhuman treatmenL He has endured violent beatings and head bashings that have resulted in physical injuries, includingadislocatedjaw,abloody nose anda split lip. He has been subjected toamethod similar to waterboarding, with the same intended effect of suffocation, whereby guards held his head back and placedahoseofmnning water between his nose and mouth for several minutes, giving him the sensation "that my head was sinking in water." He has been denied sleep fbr stretches oftime, fbr example, in the "Romeo" and"Mike"blocks,whenguardswouldwakehimeveryquarterorhalfhourbykickingonthe wall or the door ofhis cell and yelling at him to wake up. He has been subiected to dozens, if not himdreds ofinterrogations, some ofwhich have lasted more than 25 and 30 hours. During one ofthese sessions, he was chained to the floor and held inafreezing room with techno music blasting his eardrums. Interrogators have also threatened him withretum to Algeria ifhe does notcooperate,wheretheyhavesuggestedhewouldbetortured,Morerecentlyandroutmely, with the interrogator"Antonio,"he has been forced to sit through hours ofhaving Antonio assail
lACHR Report on Ten-orism and Human Rights, ciL, at para, 164 n. 419-22. ^ See Henafv. France. App. No, 65436/01, 2003-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 56.

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him with obscenities, insults and threats, and blow smoke in his face. At Kandahar and at Guantanamo, he has been subjected to bmtal searches and, at Kandahar, guards were sometimes accompaniedbymilitarydogs Theseactshavenotonlyinflictedseverephysicalpainand injuries, but traumatized him psychologically as welL Ofhis waterboarding experience, for example, Mr, Ameziane writes,"! still have psychological ir^uries, up to this day. Simply thinking ofit gives me chills." 164, In addition, these acts have all been intentional and purposeful,whether for

interrogationpurposesorasameansofpunishmentorintimidation,andtheyhaveallbeen carried out and sanctioned asamatter of policy by the state and its agents. 165, Mr.Ameziane'smistreatment thus constitutes torture in violation of Articlesland

^^^C^ ofthe American Declaration because ofthe high intensity ofsuffering it has caused, particularly In considering the cumulative effect his abuse, its purposeful and deliberate nature, and the fact that it was sanctioned and perpetrated by state agents. (e) 166, Denial of Adequate Medical Care

Mr. Ameziane has sustained specific injuries and developed chronic health

conditions asaresult ofhis inhumane conditions and treatment at Guantdnamo, fbr which he has neverreceivedadequatemedicaltreatmenLThedeteriorationofhisphysicalandpsychological health over the course ofhis more than six years ofunlawftil detention, and the denial of medical care to address the iriluries and effects ofhis imprisonment, constitute additional violations under Articlesland ^ V of the Declaration, in conlunction with therightto health under Article ^I^*'

Article XI ofthe American Declaration guarantees "every person...therightto the preservation ofhis health through sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by public and communityresources."

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167.

The Inter-American system's jurispmdence has consistentiy held that the denial of

regular and adequate medical care to prisoners in state custody constitutes a violation of their right to humane treatment. 168. In Tibi v. Ecuador, a prisoner detained by state agents, who was physically beaten

and on one occasion had his head submerged in a water tank during interrogation, was denied a proper medical examination and treatment for injuries resultingfromhis abuse. Citmg UN standards, European Court case law, and its own jurispmdence, the Inter-American Court held that the State has a duty to provide medical examinations and care to detainees in its custody on a regular basis and when necessary for specific health conditions, and that Ecuador's denial of adequate and timely medical treatment for the prisoner constituted a violation ofhis right to humane treatment tmder Article 5 of the American Convention.^*^ 169. In Juan Hernandez v. Guatemala, a prisoner incarcerated in a Guatemalan jail

diedfroma common and easily curable case of cholera for which prison authorities neglected to provide treatment,^*^ The Commission held that the Guatemalan govemment had a duty to take the necessary measures to protect the prisoner's health and life.^*" The govemment's failure to take reasonable steps and act with a certain level of diligence, including transferring the prisoner to a hospital, violated the prisoner'srightto humane treatment under Article 5.^* 170. In Montero-Aranguren v. 'Venezuela, the Court emphasized that assistance by a

doctor without links to the detention center authorities constitutes "an unportant safeguard
Case of Tibi, cit., at paras. 154-57 (citing United Nations, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Principle 24). See Kudla v, Poland, No. 30210/96, 2000-Xl Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 93-94; Case of Bulacio, cit., at para. 131; Z)e i a Cruz-Flores. cit,, at paras. 131-34,136.
263

See Juan Hernandez v. Guatemala. Case No. 11.297, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997). See id at paras. 58-60. See id. at para. 61.

264 265

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gainst torture and physical or mental ill-treatment ofinmates" and protection of theirright to humane treatment.^** 171. The Commission has also previously found the denial ofadequate medical care to

prisoners in state custody to constitute an additional violation ofArticle^I ofthe Declaration. Inaseries of cases on behalf of political prisoners in Cuban jails,ti^eprisoners were subjected to torttu^e and inhuman conditions and treatment, including the denial of adequate medical care. The provision of care was also made contingent ontiieprisoners'compliance with authorities' demands, such that, ifthe prisoners refused to cooperate, their needs fbr medical treatment were alsoreftised. The Commission found that the facts constituted bothaviolation of the prisoners' right to humane treatment under Article ^VV of the Declaration, as well asaseparate violation oftheirrightto the preservation ofhealth and well-being under Article ^1.^*' 172, The Commission'sprecautionary measures also provide guidance in determining

the scope ofstates'obligations to protect prisoners'rights to humane treatment and health. The Commission has regularly issued precautionary measures to address the inadequate provision of medical care in prison contexts and to protect prisoners'health, including asking states to provide inmates with necessary medical exams and specialized care. In one case, the Commission asked the Cuban govemment to transfer an inmate sufferingfromaltmgtumor toa specialized hospital and provide him with specialized medical care administered withaphysician selectedbyhisfamily Despite being diagnosedwithtiietumoralmostoneyearbeforethe Commission'sintervention, the only medical attention the inmate had received tmderthe prison'swatch,andonlyafterhecommencedahungerstriketoprotesthislackoftreatmenLwas

Case of Montero-Aranguren, cit., at para. 102. The Court made reference to thefindingsof the European Court in Mathew v. Netherlands (2005) in this respect. See Cuba, Case No. 6091, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 3/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982).

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byaphysician who told the prisonerthere was nothing wrong with him and retumed him to the prison,^** In another case, the Commission asked the Pemvian govemment to provideamedical exam and treatment toaprisonerwho was being denied medical care fbraprostate condition.^*' 173, The Commission and the Court have also often looked to UN standards and the

case law ofthe European humanrigbts system infindingthatstates haveaduty to provide adequate medical care to prisonersmtheir custody. TheUNBodyofPrinciplesfbrthe Protection ofPersons under Detention or Imprisonment provides that "l^a] proper medical examination shall be offered toadetained or imprisoned person as promptly as possible after his admission to the place ofdetention or imprisonment, and thereafter medical care and treatment shall be provided whenever necessary."^'" The UN'sStandardMinimtun Rules forthe Treatment ofPrisoners further define the scope and content ofthe rights ofpersons deprived of their liberty to medical treatment, providing fbr example: Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialized institutions orto civil hospitals.Where hospital facilities are provided in an institution, their equipmenL furnishings and pharmaceutical supplies shall be proper for the medical care and treatment of sick prisoners, and there shall bea staffofsuitable trained officers,^" The medical officer shall see and examine every prisoner as soon as possible after his admission and thereafter as necessary, withaviewparticularly to the discoveryofphysicalormentalillnessandtiietakingofallnecessarymeasures

See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2001, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 114, doc. 5 rev. (2002), ch. III.C.l, para. 28. See Annual Report ofthe Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2002, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2003), ch. IILC. 1, para. 78. See also Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, para. 50 (issuing precautionary measures asking state to provide a specialized medical exam for a prisoner to protect her health), UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by General Assembly resolution 43/173, Dec. 9, 1988, Principle 24.
271

UN Minimum Rules for the Treatment ofPrisoners, rule 22(2), I d mle 24.

^

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The medical officer shall have the care ofthe physical and mental health ofthe prisonersandshoulddailyseeallsickprisoners,allwhocomplainofillness,and anyprisonertowhomhisattentionisspeciallydirected;and(2)Themedical officer shall report to the director whenever he considers thataprisoner'sphysical or mental health has been or will be iniurlously affected by continued imprisonment or by any condition ofimprisonment.^'^ 174, ThecondltionsofMr. Ameziane's imprisonmentat Guantanamo and the torture

and abuse he has endured have led directlyto the deterioration ofhis health and wellbeing over the past six years. His failing vision, convulsions and rheumatism are some ofthe physical manifestations ofhis declining health. Like other detamees, his conditions and treatment combined with the reality ofindefinite detentionhave also takenatoll on his psychological health and well-being. 175, In response to Mr. Amezlane'sneedsformedical care, the govemment has either

deliberately deniedhimcareorprovidedhimwitiiwhollylncompetentcare.Hisrepeated requests fbrasimple eye exam to address his deteriorating eyesight were denied fbr almosta year, and he has still notreceivedapair of eyeglasses with the correct prescription. He has also not received any care for the rheumatism he has developed in his legsfromthe cold temperatures in Camp VI, let alone socks or additional clothing to stay warm. When he has received treatmenL It has been more abusive than healing, for example, when he was taken to the infirmary fbr his convulsions and recklessly stuck withaneedlebyaguard who had been asked bythe attending doctortoassisthim, 176, His requests fbr healti^ care have also beenmetwitharesponse to ask his

interrogator, thus conditioning the provision of care on his cooperation in interrogations, which is unlawful pertheCommlsslon'scaselaw.^'"

W. mle 25(1). See, e.g., Cuba, Case No. 6091,tater-Am,C.H.R., Res. No. 3/82, OEA/Ser.L/V/n.57, doc. 6 rev. 1 (1982). -81 028466 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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177.

Therighttohumaneti^eatmem,taken togetherwithArticle^I ofthe Declaration's

right to health, createaduty of states not only to provide adequate medical care to persons in their custody,butto take other affirmative measures to ensure the health and well-being of such individuals. As Inter-American and intemational humanrightsstandards make clear, the right to health is not confined to the rightto health care, butshould be "understood to mean the eti^oymentofti:ie highest level ofphysical, mental and social well-being."^'* Mr. Ameziane's currentpoor state ofhealth-the result ofbothhis conditions and treatment at Guantdnamo and the denial ofadequate medical care fbr his iniuries and ailments is thus farfromthe high standard ofhealth that this system and intemational bodies envision asaftindamentalrightfbr all human beings, whether in detention ornoL and evidencesabreach ofthe govemment'sduties to protect hisrightto humane treatment and health under Articlesland ^ ^ V in conjunction with Article ^ I . (d) 178. Religious Abuse and Interference

Mr. Ameziane has suffered religious insulL humiliation and interference during

his imprisonment at Guantdnamo, which amounts to an additional violation ofhis right to humanetreatmentunderArticle^V,lnconjunctionwitiihisrighttoreligiousfreedom under Article III. 179. As previously discussed, the Commissionhas held ti:iattheconceptof"inhumane

treatment" includes that of degradingtreatment.^'*The Courthas described degradingtreatiuent as "the fear, anxiety and inferiority induced forthe purpose ofhumiliating and degrading the

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area ofEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights,"ProtocolofSanSalvador,"art.lO(l).Seea/s^ Committee onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14(2000), para.l("[E]very human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highestattainable standard ofhealth conducive to livingalife in dignity,").
276

See Cose q^i^isii^a^^^Ca^^e^a, ciL, atpara. 79(ei^i^gtheGreek Case, ciL, at para. 186).

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victimandbreakinghisphysicalandmoralresistance,"whichcanbefeltevenmorelntenselyby aperson unlawfiilly detained,^" 180. In addition. Article III of the American Declaration provides,"l^e]very person has

the rightfreelyto professareligious faith, and to manifest and practice it both in public and in private."^'* Article 12 of the American Convention more explicitly provides that the right to profess one'sreligion or beliefs may be done individually or togetherwith others, and that any permissible restrictions ofthisrightmust be prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety,order, health ormorals, or the rights orfreedomsof others.^" While the Commission has not considered therightto religious freedom in the context ofacase such as Mr. Ameziane's, it has emphasized that measures to prevent and punish terrorism must be carefully tailored to recognize and guarantee due respect fbr the right to freedom of conscience and religion,^*" 181. The UN Human Rights Committee has consideredacase involving religious

abuse similar to that which Guantdnamo detainees have suffered. The Committee found that Trinidad andTobago had violatedadetainee'sright to religiousfreedomwhere the detainee's govemment captors had forcibly shaved him, removed his prayer books and prevented him from participating in religious services.^*' 182. The verbal and physical abuse to which Mr.Ameziane has been subjected with

respect to his Muslim faith, either personally or in witness, has had the purpose and effect of humiliating and demoralizing him. Mr. Ameziane has described howprison guards have

277 278 279 280 281

Cose ofLoayza Tamayo. cit., at paras, 36,57. American Declaration, supra note 173, art. III. American Convention, arts, 12(1), (3). See lACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, cit., at para. 363. See Clement Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 721/1996, para. 6.6, UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/721/1996 (Apr. 2,2002).

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screamed insults and obscenities at him during his daily prayers and imitated howling dogs during the distinctive Muslim call to prayer. He has witnessed guards shave crosses into his Muslim brothers'hair and demand prisoners to turn over their pants so that they cannot pray. At Kandahar, he and otherprisoners were subjected to watchingaguardrippages fromaO^^^an and then toss it intoabucket ofhuman cxcremenL The degrading aspect ofthese acts is all the more injurious given the unlawfulness ofhis imprisonmenL In addition to the harm to his personal dignity and security,this mistreatment has also had the effect ofinterfering with his religious practicefreelyand in peace. As such, the religious abuse Mr. Ameziane has suffered amounts to inhuman treatment and an interference with hisrighttofreedomof religion in violation of ArticleIand^V,in conjunction with Article III, C^ Mr.Ameziane's Conditions ofDetention Violate his RightToPrivate and FnmilyLifeandtoProtectionforhisPersonnlReputation under ArtielesY nnd VI ofthe American Declaration. Mr. Ameziane'simprisonmentat Guantanamo has profoundly impacted his

183,

private and family life. He has effectively been denied any meaningful contact with his family fior over six years, and deprived of tbunding his own family and developing his own personal life during some ofthe prime years ofhis life. The stigma ofbeing labeled an "enemy combatant" anda"terrorist"hasalsodamagedhisandhisfami1y'sgoodnameandreputation,andwill continue to follow him ibr years after his release. The deprivations and stigma ofhis imprisonment and their far-reaching repercussions, particularly in light ofthe fact that he is unlawftillydetained,amounttoanarbitraryandillegallnterferencewithhisrightsunder Articles Vand VI of the American Declaration, ArticleVof the Declaration provides: Every person has therightto the protection ofthe law against abusive attacks upon his honor,his reputation and his private and family life.

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Article VI ofthe Declaration provides: Everyperson has the rightto establishafamily,tiTebasicelement of society,and to receive protection therefore, 184. The Commissionhas established that ArticlesVand VI ofthe American

Declaration, taken together, prohibitarbitrary or illegal govemment interference with family life,^*^where"arbifraryinterference"referstoelementsof"lnjustice,unpredictabilityand tmreasonableness."^*^ While therightsto private and family life are thus notabsolute, they may only be circumscribed where restrictions are prescribed by law,necessary to protect public order, and proportional to that end.^*" 185. Withregard to Article VI ofthe Declaration specifically,the Commission has

noted thatthe rightto establish and protect the family cannot be derogated under any circumstances, however extreme.^** Thus, while situations such as incarceration or military service inevitably restrict the exercise and enjoyment ofthe righL they may not suspend it.^** L 186. Mr.Ameziane has been Deprived ofDeveloping his Private and Family Life^

The Commission has consistently held thatthe State Is obliged to facilitate contact

betweenaprisoner and his family,notwiti:istanding the restrictions of personal liberty implicit in the condition ofimprisonment,^*' In this respecL the Commission has repeatedly indicated that visltingrightsareafundamental requirement fbr ensuring therightsof prisoners and their

lACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Refiigee Determination System, OEA/Ser,L/V/II.106, Feb. 28,2000, para. 162.
283 284

Xand Yv. Argentina, Case No. 10.506, Inter-Am. C.H.R,, Report. No. 38/96, para. 92 (1996). lACHR, Report on the Situation ofHuman Rights of Asylum Seekers within the Canadian Refiigee Determination System, cit., at para 166; Case of X and Y v. Argentina, cit., at para. 92. See id. at para 96; see also Case ofBiscet et al, ciL, at para 236. See Case ofXand Yv. Argentina, cit., at para 96. See id. at para. 98.

285 286 287

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families.^**The Commission has gone fiirther and statedtiiatbecause ofthe exceptional circumstances of ImprisonmenL the State must indeed take positive steps to guarantee prisoners' right to maintain and develop family relations.^*' 187. Similar1y,the European Court ofHuman Rights has held thatatotal prohibition

on visits byadetainee'sfamily constitutesaviolation of Article 8,the European Convention on Human Rights'analogic ArticleVofthe Declaration.^'" The Courthas held that the State must enableadetainee to maintain contact with his family and,fiirther,that there isapositive obligation on the State to assist the detainee to maintain that contact if need be.^" 188. Article 37 ofthe United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of

Prisoners provides that "l^jrisoners shall be allowed undernecessary supervision to communicate with their family and reputable friends at regular intervals, both by correspondence and receiving visits."^'^Principle19ofthe Body ofPrinciples forthe Protection of All Persons under Any Form ofDetentionoflmprisonment provides that "l^a] detained orimprisoned person shallhavetherighttobevisltedbyandtocorrespondwith,inparticular,membersofhisfamily

288

See Case of Biscet, cit., at para 237; Case of X and Y v, Argentina, cit., at para. 98. See also lACHR, The Situation ofHuman Rights in Cuba Seventh Report at Chap. Ill, para. 25 (1983); lACHR, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Umguay) Chap. IV, para. 10 (1983-1984). See Case of Xand Yv. Argentina, cit., at para. 98; Case of Biscet, cit., at para. 237. See McVeigh. O'Neill and Evans v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 8022/77, 8025/77 and 8027/77,5 Eur, Ct, H.R. 71, at paras. 52-53 (1983) (Commission Report), in which the European Commission on Human Rights held that a failure to allow persons detained under anti-terrorism legislation to communicate with their spouses constituted a denial of private and family life conttary to Article 8. Similarly, m PK, MK and BK V. United Kingdom, App. No. 19086/91 (1992), the European Commission noted, whilstfindingno violation in the instant case, that significant limits on visits from family members may well raise Article 8 issues. Xv. United Kingdom, App. No. 9054/80 30 DR 113 (Oct. 8,1982); Baginski v. Poland, App. No. 37444/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 89 (Oct. 11, 2005). U.N. Minimum Rules for the Treatment ofPrisoners, cit.

290

291

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and shall be given adequate opportunityto communicate with the outside world, subject to reasonable conditions and restrictions, as specified by law or lawful regulation."^'^ 189. Since he was taken intoU.S.custody in 2002,Mr. Ameziane has been deprived of

virtually all commtmication with his family. He has not seen his parents, his seven brothers and sisters, or his nieces and nephews fbr over six years, as family visits are prohibited under the regime at Guantanamo. Until recently,telephone calls between detainees and theirfamilies were prohibited as well, although in March 2008, theU.S, Department ofDefense announced that it would allow detainees one hour-long telephone call up to twiceayeartoafamily member.^'" OnFebmary 29,2008, the ICRC facilitated thefirsttelephonecall Mr Ameziane has been permitted to make toafamily member orto anyone since 2002. The only other more "regular" method of communication available to Mr.Ameziane is the mail system, but letters between him andhisfamilyhavesometimestakenayearormoretoreachtheotherside. 190. Mr. Ameziane'sfather passed away while he has been at Guantdnamo. He was

deprived not only ofthe chance to see or speak to his father before his death, but to attend his funeral, pay his respects and be with his family during an emotionally difficult time instead of alone in his cell thousands of miles away. While the Commission has not directly considered circumstances such as these, the European Court has found thatarefusal to permitaprisonerto aftend his parents'ftmeral constituted an unlustified interference withhis private and family lifi2.^'*ThatCourtalso held that whereadetainee'srequestto visit his dying father had been refused, respect fbr his Article8right to private and family life required the state to afford him

^

Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or ImprisonmenL supra note 270, Principle 19. Reuters, U.S. sqys some Guantanamo prisoners can phone home. Mar. 12,2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN12190031.

^

Ploski V. Poland, App, No. 26761/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 39 (2002).

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an altemative opportunity to bid farewell to his dying fatirer. Afailure to permit the detainee to do so constitutedaviolation of Article 8.^'* 191. In addition to being deprived of all meaningfiil contact with his family,his years

at Guantdnamo have prevented himfromdeveloping other personal relationships and aspects of his life during what would otherwise have been prime years ofhis life. As the European Court has held, the concept ofprivate life "encompasses the right fbr an individual to form and develop relationships with other human beings"^" and should be interpreted broadly.^'* For over six years, the only individuals Mr. Ameziane has seen or spoken to are his prison guards, his interrogators, his fellow prisoners, his lawyers, and the ICRC, and because ofthe security regime atGuantdnamoandhisisolationinCampVI,hiscontactwitiiotherprisonersandhislawyershas been extremely restricted. 192. Beyond arresting his ability to develop personal and social relationships, his

imprisonment at Guantdnamo has also deprived him of opportunities for educational and vocational developmenL Tofill this void, his lawyers can only mailarestricted range ofbooks and magazines toageneral detainee library, which take months to reach him, if at alL He has also taken it upon himself to teach himselfEnglish. He describedthe painstaking process ina lettcrtohislawyers: "Since we weren'tallowed to haveadictionary and we didn't have the right to keep more than one book in our cells, the library had some ^Harry Potter'books inEng1ishandFrench,soltookoutaHarryPotterbookinEnglishandcopieda htmdred and seventy pagesfromthe book onto sheets of paper, thenlretumed the book and took out the same book in French.lwouldreadasentence in French, translate it myselfinto English, then compare my translation with the one on the paperthatlhad copied and correct my mistakes. Iwould move on to the next sentence, translate iL and compare my translation to that on paper, and so on.
Lindv. Russia, App. No. 25664/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 98 (2007). C V. Belgium, App. No. 21794/93, Eur. Ct. H.R., at para. 25(1996). ^ Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, at para. 29 (1992).

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sentence by sentence untillhadfinishedthe bundled and seventy pages. When the guards who walked by my cell asked whatlwas doing, seeingmy copy from the book,Ianswered thatlwas an illiterate and thatlwas leaiTiing how to write, I told them that becauselwas afraid that if they knew my real intentions,they would talk about them to their superiors who would confiscate mypapers."^" 193. In depriving him of meaningful communication with his family and the ability to

develop the personal and professional aspects ofhis life, theUnited States has violated Ml. Ameziane'srights under ArticlesVand VI of the American Declaration, The violation is even more egregious given the unlawful nature ofMiAme2:iane'simprisonmenL 2 194. Mr.Ameziane has Suffered Unfair Attacks on his Personal Honor andReputatiom

The Commission has previously found thatapetitioner'shonor and reputation

were harmed by the imposition ofapenalty that the State recognized as "arbitrary.'^^"" Further, the InterAmerican Court has found that descriptions of detainees as "terrorists^'byastate in circumstances where such individuals have not been convicted ofacriminal offence may constituteaviolation of therightsof the detainees and their next of kin under Articlellof the American Convention.^"' 195. Mr.Ameziane has been classified and held by the United States for ov^r six years

at Guantdnamo as an "enemy combatant,"astatus labeling him as an individual who isa member of or associated with al(^aeda or theTaliban,and who committed or was otherwise involved in hostilities against the United States orits allies. Despite thegravity of this classification,Mr.Ameziane was neither allowed to see the govemment'spurported evidence against him, mount his own defense, nor seek review of his status and the legality of his detention byacourL Rather, he was designated an enemy combatant solely on the basis ofa
^ Letter from Djamel Ameziane to Wells Dixon, June 15, 2008 (unclassified) (on file with CCR), Cirio V. Uruguay, Case 11.500, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No, 124/06 (2006). Case of The Miguel Castro Prison v. Peru, Case 11,015, Inter-Am. C.H.R., para, 359 (2006).

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unilateral determinationbythePresidentandasubsequentreviewbyaCSRTdesignedineffect to mbber stamp that determination. Despite the fact tbat his enemy combatant status was derived throughaprocess wholly lacking in rigor and faimess, that the legality ofhis detention has yet to receivejudicial review and that he has never been charged,tiieUnited States persists in describing him and other detainees as,frirexample,"dangerousterrorists,"andfueling public misconceptions. 196. Wereacourt to find his imprisonmentunlawfiil and order him released, the stain

ofGuantdnamo would continue to trail him andhis family long after his name is officially cleared,impactinghlslifeinmyriadways-inhissocialrelationships,hisemployment prospects, his mobility and abilityto travel, and his safety,among others. 197. In arbitrarily imprisoning Mr.Ameziane at Guantdnamo, labeling him an "enemy

combatant" on the basis of an unfairprocess and persisting in calling detainees terrorists despite thefactthatthemajorityhavenotbecnchargedandnonehavereceivedjudicialreviewoftheir status or the legality of their detention, the United States has damaged Mr. Ameziane'shonor and reputation in violation of ArticleVof the Declaration. H^^ The United Stately Has Denied Mr.Ameziane his Rights to Due Process and ^udiciall^emedies under Articles ^ V I I I and ^ ^ V I ofthe American Declaration. L 198. The CSRTs ViolateFundamentnl Due Process Norms.

The factthat Mr. Ameziane was tmtil recently denied access to judicial review of

the legality ofhis detention and afrbrded the CSRTsand the DTAas his only recourse constitutes not only an Article ^^C^ violation ofhis rightto liberty as previously discussed, buta separate violation ofhisrightsto due process andafair hearing under Articles ^VIIl and ^ V I ofthe American Declaration,

90
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^ O O O O ^ ^ I

199.

The Commissionhas held thatArticles^IIIand^^VI ofthe American

Declaration guarantee certain fundamental due process protections to defendants,^"^ including the right toahearing byacompetent, independentand impartial tribunal withinareasonable time,^"^ to have access to the evidence against oneself and to obtain wimesses and evidence in one'sdefense,^^ and to the assistance of counsel,^"*These protections are non-derogable even in situations ofarmed conflict.^"* 200, The due process protections of Articles ^VIII and ^ V I have been considered

mostfrequentlybythe Commission and the Court in the context of criminal proceedings, butthe system'sjurispmdenceclearlyestablishestiiatsuchprotectionsarealsoapplicablein"non criminal proceedings forthe determination ofaperson'srights and obligations ofacivil,labor, fiscal or any othernature."^"'The Inter-American Cotut has observed, fbr example, that "the due process oflaw guarantee must be observed in the adminisfrative process and in any other procedure whose decisions may aflect the rights ofpersons."^"*

See lACHRReport on Human Rights andTerrorism, cit., atpara.2l8. Seei^.atpara.218.
304 305 306 307 308

See 1^. at para. 238. See/^.atpara. 236. See/^atparas. 258-59; see a/s^ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29 (2001), atpara.Il. See lACHR, Report on Human Rights andTerrorism, ciL, at para. 240. Case q^r^eSa^/iqi,^a^a:i^a7^^^ge^^i^sC^^^i^^/i^v.^a^agi^qiB,Int-Am.CLH.R., Merits, Reparat Costs, Judgment ofMarch29,2006 (Ser. C), No, 146, atpara. 82.See a/s^ Case q^.^ae^a-^/ea^^^e/a/, V. ^a7^a^a,Int-Am.CLH.R., Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment ofFebmary 2, 2001 (Ser. C), No. 72, atparas. 127. Thejudgment, atparas.124-126, fiirtherstates: "Although Article8of the American Convention is entitled ^RighttoaFairTriaL'its application is not limited to judicial remedies inastrictsense,^but [to] all the requirements that must be observed in the procedural stages,'in order fbr all persons to be able to defend their rights adequately vis-a-vis any type of State action that could affect them. That is to say that the due process oflaw must be respected in any act or omission on the part of the State bodies inaproceeding,whetherofapunitiveadministt^ative, or ofa judicialnattu^e, I ] "the individual has the right to the due process as constmed under the terms of Articles 8(l)and 8(2) in both penal matters, as in all ofthese other domains.

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201.

In more than six years of detention at Guantanamo, Mr. Ameziane has never bada

fair hearing in court on the legality ofhis detention, although the right isfinallyavailable to him. He has only been permitted theflawedadministrative proceedingsofthe CSRTsand ARBs,^"' and the limited review of theD.C. Circuit Court underthe DTA, which individually and together fall far short ofthe due process and fair hearing guarantees ofArticles^VIII and ^ ^ V L 202. As previously discussed, the composition and the lack ofinstitutional safeguards

of the CSRTsand ARBs render them insufficiently independent and impartial to make fair determinations ofdetainees'status. In addition, the mies and evidentiary procedures ofthe tribunals deny detainees access to and the ability to confront much ofthe "evidence" against them;thegovernmentneedonlyprovidedetaineeswithasummaryofitsunclassifiedevidence supporting continued detention and none ofthe classified information otherwise considered by the tribunals. In practice, detainees'ability to call wimesses in their defense has been limited to calling fellowprisoners, and even those requests are regularlyrefused. The mies forthe fribunals also deny detainees access to cotmsel, affording them onlya"personal representative" who is not alawyerandwhoowesnodutyofconfidentialitytothedetainee.Theseandothershortcomings leave detainees without any meaningful opportunity to mount an effective defense or otherwise receiveafairhearing.While detainees may appeal the determination of their CSRT to the D.C.
[ ] "In any subject matter, even in labour and administrative matters, the discretionality of the administration has boundaries that may not be surpassed,onesuchboundary being respect for humanrigbts. ft is important forthe conduct ofthe administration to be regulated and it maynot invoke public orderto reduce discretionallytheguaranteesof its subjects. For instance, the administration may not dictate punitive administrative actions without granting the individuals sanctioned the guarantee ofthe due process. "The righttoobtain all the guarantees through which it may be possible to arrive at fair decisions isa humanright,and the administration is not exempt from its duty to comply witb iL The minimum guarantees must be observed in the administrative process and in any other procedure whose decisions may affect therightsofpersons." See 2007 Sheinin Report, s^^anotel9,atparas, 13,14; UN Special Mandate Holders'Report, si^^^anote 10, atparas. 27 29

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Circuit Court of Appeals, that Court is limited to examining the compliance of the CSRTswith their ownflawedprocedtues and does not have the authorityto take up the merits ofthe case, as fundamental fair hearing protections require.^'"Denied access toacourt to seek review ofthe legality ofhis detention, and with the deficient CSRTsand DTAas his only recom^se until now, Mr. Ameziane has been deprived ofhisrightstoafah hearing and the accompanying due process guarantees necessaryto ensure fahnesstmderArticles^VIII and ^ ^ ^ ^ I ofthe American Declaration, 203. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court in^o^i^^^^^^^ held that Guantdnamo and thatthe DTA'sproceduresfbrreviewing

detainees are entitled to seek the writ of

detainees'status are not an adequate or effective substitute frir^^^^^.^, the Courtwas also clear in stating that the DTAand CSRT process remain intact.^" Thus, despite the CSRTs'failure to comport with intemational due process and fair hearing standards, tmder the existing domestic framework, they continue to serve as initial status reviewtribunals fbr "enemy combatants" held bytiieUnited States.^'^ 2^ 204, U.S. Legislntion Deprives Mr.Ameziane of judicial Remedies for Violations He has Suffered in U.S. Custody.

The Commissionhas established thatArticle^VIII protects the right of victims of

humanrightsviolations to have their violations investigated, prosecuted and ptmished, as well as to receive compensationfbrthe damages and iniuries they sustained.^'^

310

See lACHR, Report on Human Rights and Terrorism, cit., at para. 239 {citing Case of Castillo Pettuzzi et al., ciL, atpara. 161). Boumediene, 128 S. CL 2229,2275 (2008). Id. at 66-67 (holding that the Executive is entitled to a reasonable period of time to determine a detainee's status, via the CSRT, before a court entertains that detainee's habeas corpus petition). See Franz Britton v. GiQ>ana, Case 12.264, Inter-Am. H.R., Report No. 1/06, at para. 30 (2006),

311 312

313

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205,

As discussed in the admissibility section ofthis petition, the United States has

effectively eliminated therightof Guantdnamo detainees such as Mr.Ameziane to seekjudicial remedies forthe human rights violations (includingtorture and other CIDT) they have suflered at the hands ofthe United States, The DTAand MCA establish broad and refroactive immunity— both civil and criminal—^fbrU.S,agents involved in the detention and interrogation of noncitizens determined bythe President or his designees to be "enemy combatants."^'" 206, As discussed above, the DTAfurther contains sweeping language barring those

detainedasnoncitizen"enemycombatants"fromprcscnting"anyotheraction"againstthe United States or its agents in U.S, courts,^'* Theresuh, in practice, isalegal frameworkthat denies Mr, Ameziane the rightto pursue justice—criminal,civil or administrative—in any court oflaw formany ofthe harms, enumerated elsewhere In this petition, committed against him by theU.S,govemmenL 207, The denial ofarighttoaremedyfrir violations ofMr.Ameziane'sftmdamental

rights mns contrary to clearly established principles ofhuman rights law^'* and the terms of Article ^VIII ofthe American Declaration. In particular, it is worth recallmgthe longstanding andoftrepeatedjurisprudenceofthelnterAmericansystemestablishingthat: "all anmesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and ptmishment ofthose responsible for serioushumanrightsviolationssuchastorturc,cxtraiudicial,summaryor

314 315

SeeDTA,ciL,^ 1004;MCA,cit,^8(b)(3). DTA,cit,^ 1004: "No court,justice,orjudge shall havejurisdictionto hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relatingto any aspect ofthe detention,ttansfer,Ureatment, trial or conditions of confinement ofan alien who is orwas detained bythe United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination."

316

SeeB^/^^^ai:^/^-Bf^e//a^^ eta/. v.C/ii/e, Inter-Am. CLH.R., Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations andCosts,JudgmentofSeptember26,2006(SerC),No.l54atpara.ll0.

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arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all ofthem prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights recognized by intemational human rights law,"^" 208. This Commission has likewise found that laws granting amnesty for humanrigbts

violations committed in response to perceived threats to national security violate Article ^VIII ofthe American Declaration.^'* 209. The broad immunity and anmesty provisions adopted into law bythe United

States recall the now infamous "forgive and forget" legislation adopted by several Latin American govemments in the I980sand 1990s, The Inter-American system has stood firm against such systematic attempts to deprive the victims ofgross humanrigbts violations their day in court, even contributingtotheovertuming of some ofthe aforementioned laws. This Commissionmust now stand equally firm in the face ofthe United States'atiempts to shield its officialsfromany form ofaccountability forthe torture and abuse suffered by Mr, Ameziane and others like him. The Commission should thereforefindthat the United States has violated Mr. Ameziane'sArticle^VIII right to resort to the courts to protecthis legal rights, and that the immunityprovisions adopted into law bythe United States^^^^^ violate Article ^ I I I . V. APPLICATION OF AI^TICLE37.40FTIIEIACIIRRULES A^ The Commission's Rules ofProcedure Provide for au Exceptional Procedure tojoin the Admissibility and Merits Phases ofUr^ent Cases in order to Expedite the Proceedings. The Commission'sRules ofProcedure provide friran expedited process whereby,

210.

"in serious andurgent cases, orwhen it is believed thatthe life or personal integrity ofapersona is inreal and imminent danger,"the Commissionmay hearthe admissibility and merits phases of acase simultaneously.

^" ^"

Barrios-Altos v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment of March 14,2001 (Ser. C) No. 75 at para. 41. See lACHR, Report No. 28/92 (OcL 2,1992) and Report No. 29/92 (OcL 2,1992).

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211.

In this regard, Article 30.4of the Rules states: In serious and urgent cases, or when it is believed that the hfe orpersonal integrity ofapeison is in real and imminent danger, the Commission shall request the promptest reply from the State, using for this purpose the means it considers most expeditious.^' Article 307of the Rule states: In the cases envisioned in subparagiaph4, the Commission may request that the State presents l^sic] its response and observations on the admissibility and the merits of the matter. The response and observations of the State shall be submitted withinareasonable period,to be determined by the Commission in accordance with the circumstances of each caseB^" Finally,Article37.4of the Rules provides: When the Commission proceeds in accordance with Article 30.7of these Rules of Procedure,it shall openacase and inform the parties in writing that it has deferred its treatment of admissibility until the debate and decision on the
^^1

merits 212 As Article 37(4) was only recently incorporated into the Commission^sRulcs of

Procedure, it is difficuh to glc^n^n interpretation of the article from the Commission's jurisprudence. Two considerations,however,shed light on the Commission^sintcntions in adopting Article 37(4) and on the circumstances in which it should be applied. The first such consideration is that Article 30(4) minors Article 25(1)'sreferencc to "serious and urgent cases."^^^ Article 25 ofthe Commission'sRules defines the circumstances under which the lACHR may adopt precautionary measures. In cases where precautionary measures have already
lACHR Rules, art. 30.4. /^arL307
.121
322

/^ /^. art. 25 ("In serious and i^rgent cases, ^ndwlienever necessary according to tlie infoi mation availal^le^ Commission may,on its own initiative or at tlie request ofaparty.request tliat tlie State concerned adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons.").

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beenadopted, a presumption of seriousness and urgency maytitereforebe said to exist, potentially requiring the application of Article 37(4) in the event that a petition alleges facts similar to those that led the Commission to issue precautionary measures. 213. Second, the Commission has a long record of combining the admissibility and

merits phases of contentious cases, although it has traditionally done so under the more ambiguoustermsof Article 37(3) of the Rules^^^ Article 37(3) refers generally to "exceptional circumstances," without defining such circumstances. The Commission's jurispmdence, however, sheds some light on its interpretation The Commission applied Article 37(3), for example, in tbe T^^^^r^^^^^^y 7^^rr^^,^^nv l^^ir^^.^r^^^ case, after the State violated tbe precautionary measures issued by the Commission by putting the petitioner to death while his case was still pending^^ Article 37(3) was also applied in the ^^r^m^^^ic^C^^rcv. Gt^^^m^^case, in part due to an ongoingriskof harm to the victims, relatives of an indigenous humanrightsdefender who had been arbitrarily executed by members of Civil Self Defense P^ls^AC^^ 214 If the Commission's interpretation of Article 37(4) is guided by its prior

interpretationof Article 37(3), it is likely to apply the former in cases where precautionary meastues have been issued and the State has failed to comply with such measures, and^or where tiiereisanongoingriskof harm to the lifie or integrity of the victims. Indeed, a plain reading of Article 30(4), which alludes to "serious and urgent cases, when it is believed tbat tbe life or

323

Id. art. 37,3 ("In exceptional circumstances, and after having requested information from the parties in keeping with the provisions of Article 30 of these Rules of Procedure, the Commission may open a case but defer its treatment of admissibility until the debate and decision on the merits. The case shall be opened by means of a written communication to both parties."). Toronto Markkey Patterson v. United States, Case 12.439, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 25/05 (2005), Martin Pelico Coxic v, Guatemala, Case 11,658, Inter-Am C H R., Report No, 80/07 (2007),

324 325

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personal integrity ofapersona is in real and imminent danger,"rcveals that Article 30(4)(and thus,Article 37(4))laigely codifies the Commission'shistoricinterpietation of Article 37(3), B^ 215, Mr.Ameziane'scase presents urgent circumstances that call for Application of Article 37(4) of the Commission's Rules. In light of the pteceding analysis, it is imperative that the Commission invoke

Article 37(4),and proceed to examine the admissibility and merits of Mr. Ameziane'spetition simultaneously and with all due speed. 216, Shortly after Mr.Ameziane'sarrival at Guantdnamo Bay,thc Commission

adopted precautionary measures in favor ofMr.Ameziane and all other Guantanamo detainees. The Commission subsequently reiterated and expanded these measures in 2003, 2004 and 2005 (while also calling for Guantdnamo'sclosuie in 2006), in response to emerging information on the situation at Guantdnamo and Ihe United Statcs'continuing non-compliance with the measures,eg,by est^iblishing the flawed CSRTsas the initial statusicvicw mechanisms for detainees by stripping detainees'right to habeas in the DTAand later Ihe MCA, by continuing to detain and intei^og^tc detainees under conditions and using techniques amounting to torture, by continuing to retum detainees to countries where they faceaieal risk of torture or pcrsecutionin short, by continuing the illegal and inhumane regime at Guantdnamo for more than six years and counting. 217. As this petition demonstrates, Mr Ameziane has directly and intensely suffered-

legally,physically,psychologically,morally,andsocially-the effects of the United States' refusal to comply with the Commission'sprecautionary measures These hai^s will continue as his illegal detention drags on into what will soon be its seventh year 218. Given the United States^consistent noncompliance with precautionary measures

meant to protect Mr.Ameziane from iiT^eparablc harm,as well as the ongoing ^nd serious nature

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of the harm to Mr Ameziane'speisonalintegrity,the Commission should not hesitate to invoke Article 37(4)of its Rules of Procedure in the instant case. Aftersix andahalf years without charge, Mt . Ameziane should be affoided the most expedited procedure possible before this Commission He therefore respectfully urges the Commission tojoin the admissibility and merits of his case. VL REt^UESTEORPRECAUTIONARYMEASURES A^ 219 The Commission H^as Authority to Issue Precautionary Measures. Under Article 25(l)of its Rules of Procedure,the InterAmerican Commission

has the authority to receive ^nd grant requests for precautionary mcasures.^^*Whete such measures ^ii^cssenti^l to preserving the Commission'sm^nd^tc under the OAS Ch^rtei,OAS member states such as the United States are subject to an intemational legal obligation to comply witharequest for such measures^^' 220. Since 2(^2, the Commission has tepeatedly exercised its authority to issue

precautionary measures in Older to protect Guanatdnamo detainees from irreparable harm. Mr. Ameziane is undoubtedlyabeneficiary of these collective precautionary measures. Nonetheless, given the individualized nature of the harm to which Mr.Ameziane is exposed, as well as the U.S.govcrnmcnt'spast failure to comply with precautionary measures in favor of Guantdnamo detainees, petitioners lespectfully request that the Commission issue additional precautionary measures to prevent the particular harm to which Mr.Ameziane is uniquely exposed.

•'^

lACHR Rules, art, 25,1 ("In serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according to the information available, the Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, request that the State concerned adopt precautionaiy measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons."). See lACHR, Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, OEASer.L/V/II, 111 doc. 21 rev., paras. 71-72 (2001); Juan Raul Garza v. United States, Case No, 12.243, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 52/01; Annual Report ofthe Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2000, at para, 117.

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B.

The Commission Should Issue Precautionary Measures Requiring the United States to Honor its NonRefoulement Obligations andToRefrain from TransferringMr.AmezlaneToaCountiy^hercHe^illBeatRiskof Harm. L The United States Continues to Violate its Non-Refoulement Obligations.

221.

In issuing its Precautionary Measures of October 28, 2005 on the situation of

Guantdnamo Bay detainees, the Commission considered information that the United States had at that point repatriated some 240 detainees from Guantdnamo, including to countries where the US.govemment itself had documentedarecord of disappearances,torture,arbitraiyarrests and detention,and unfair trials,and where some detainees facedasubstanti^l risk of harm upon retum. While the United States, for its parL indicated that its policy was to obtain specific assurances from the receiving State against torture of the detainee being transferred, the Commission held that such assurances were inadequate safeguards because the United States had no method of enforcing or monitoring compliance with the assurances once the detainee was removed-a"defect" that the Commission noted had been criticized by other intemational human rights bodies. Notingthe "absolute nature" of the obligation of ^i^^^^^i^^^^i^^/-an obligation that does not depend on the claimant'sstatusasarefugee-the Commission requested that the United States: "l^T^ake the measures necessary to ensurethat any detainees who mayface^risk of torture or other crueL inhuman or degrading treatment if transferred, removed or expelled from Guantdnamo Bay are provided an adequate, individualized examination of their circumstances throughafair and transparent process beforea competem, independent and impartial dccisionmaker.Wheie there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other mistreatmcnL the St^tc should ensure that the detainee is not transferred or removed and that diplomatic assurances are not used to circumvent thcState'snonrefoulementobligation."^^*

lACHRPrecautionary Measures No 259 (2005)

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222.

In the faceofthisrequestin2005andagainin2006,^^'ti^e United States has

continued to repatriate detainees to countries with well-doctmiented records of abuse where detainees have facedasubstantial risk oftorture ormistreatment-arisk thathas played out in each case. Since 2005,the Department ofDefense has transferred more thanhalfadozen detainees to Libya,^^"Taiikistan,^^'andTtmisia,^^^ where they have effectively disappeared, been tortured and^or sentenced to lengthy prison terms aftertmfairtrials. These are cotmtries where, again, the United States itselfhas recognized torture, arbitrary arresL incommunicado detention, poorprison conditions and unfairti^als as persistent concems, despite the prohibition ofsuch practices tmderthe domestic laws ofthese countries,^^^ and where persons detained on terrorism-related charges in particular receive harshertreatment than other detainees.^^" 223. In Jtme2007,fbr example, the United States repatriated twoTunisian detainees,

relying in part on promises ofhumane treatment from theTunisiangovemment.^^* Oneofthe menhad been convicted in absentia on terrorism-related charges byaTunisianmilltary courtand was transferredfromGuantdnamo without ever being informed ofthe conviction or afforded the chancetospeakwithhis1awyerB^*BotiimenwerehoodedandtakenIbrseveraldaysofabuse interrogation byTunisian authorities upon arrival, and then held in solitary confinement fbr more

329 330

lACHRResolution No. 2/06 on Guantdnamo Bay Precautionary Measures, Jul. 28,2006. SeeU.S.Dep'LDefense,"DetaineeTransferAnnounced,"NewsReleaseNol287-06,Dec 116607,SepL 29,2007, 17,2006; No.

331 332 333

SeeU.S.Dep'L Defense, "Detainee Transfer Announced,"News Release No,233-07,Mar.L2007. SeeU.S.Dep'LDefense,^T^etainee Transfer Announced,"News Release No, 765-07,June 19,2007, See, e.g.,U.S, Dep'L State, CounttyReportsonHuman Rights Practices 2007,Libya(Mar,lL2008). The reportnoted,e.g.,that domestic lawprohibits torture and cruel and inhuman treatment, but security personnel routinelytorttired prisoners during interrogations or as punishmenL See, e.g.,U.S. Dep'L State, CounttyReportsonHuman Rights Practices 2007,Tunisia(Mar.lL2008). See Human Rights Watch, 7//^re^,^i7^ee^^/^gs. B^7i^^/s/a^ Case S^^^q/^^^ai^^a^o^^^^ 3,Voll9,No4(E)(SepL2007)
See/^at4,

334 335

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tiianamonth,^^' One ofthe detainees reported that things were so bad that he would have rather stayed in Guantdnamo.^^* 2^ 224. Mr.Ameziane ^ould Be at R^ishofSeriousHlarmifReturned to Algeria.

Should the United States transfer Mr. Ameziane to Algeria, It would expose him

toareal risk ofbeing mistreated ortortured and arbitrarily deprived ofhis liberty. As previously stated, separatefromhis association with Guantdnamo, Mr. Ameziane would already be at risk ofbeing targeted by the Algerian govemment ifreturned by virtue ofhis and his family's religious observance, and the fact ofhis prior application fbr asylum in Canada. His association with Guantdnamo andAfghanistan alone are enough to createasubstantialriskthat he would be subjected to abuse ortorture in detention and during interrogations upon his retum, and perhaps convicted and sentenced to several years of ImprisonmenL 225. Concems for Mr. Ameziane'ssafety are warranted by thefindingsoftheU.S.

govemment itself In its latest report on humanrightsconditions inAlgeria, the Department of State noted reports that govemment officials and members ofthe Department ofinformation and Security (DRS)-tiiemilitary'sintelligence agency, which playsakey role in interrogating though to possess infbrmationaboutalleged terrorist activities^^'-frequently use torture to obtain confessions, despite the prohibition of torture in the Algeria Constitution and penal code, and that individuals arrested in connection with alleged terrorist activities are at particular risk.^"" Such detainees have reportedly been beaten, tortured with electric shocks, suspendedfromthe

See id at 4-8. See id at 8. See Amnesty Intemational, Unrestrained Powers: Torture by Algeria's Military Security at 7 (July 10, 2006), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE28/004/2006 (last visited August 5,2008). See U.S. Dep't. State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007, Algeria (Mar. 11,2008).

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ceiling and forced to swallow large amounts ofurine, dirty water or chemicals to force confessions,^"' 226. Amnesty Intemational reports that individuals suspected ofterrorism can legally

be held by the DRS without charge or access to lawyers ibr as long as 12 days-aperiod of detentioncalled^^^^^^v^^-andthattiieDRSfrequentlyviolatesthisalreadyexcessivetime limiL in some cases by several months or even years,^"^ During^i^^^^^vue detention by the DRS, detainees are routinely held incommunicado in effectively secret facilities and denied access to medical care.^"^ In one ofthe mostfrequentlyused DRS facilities, detainees are held in small, poorly ventilated cells withoutaccess to daylighL They are forced to sleep on concrete floors, and are allowed little or no access to toilets and showers.^"" 227. In July 2008, the United States transferred two Algerian detainees from

Guantdnamo. The men were held incommtmicadoin^^^^^^v^^ foraperiod of approximately 12days.^"* Theirtreatment during this time is still unknown. They have since appeared and currently face terrorism-related charges. 3. 228. R^equestfor Precautionary Measures

As the Commission stated in its October 2005 Precautionary Measures,"[tjhere is

no question that transferring or removingadetaineetoacountry where he or she may faceareal risk of torture or other mistreatment can give rise toaserious and urgent risk ofirreparable harm

See id. (citing Amnesty Intemational Report 2007). Amnesty International, Unrestrained Powers: Torture by Algeria's Military Security, supra note 339, 1617. Id at 19.
344

Id at 22-23. See U.S. Dep't. Defense, "Detainee Transfer Announced," News Release No. 561-08, July 2,2008; Human Rights Watch, "US/Algeria: Reveal Location of Guantdnamo Detainees," Press Release, Jul. 11,2008.

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warranting precautionary measuresfromthis Commission."^"* In light ofti:ie real risk of irreparable harm that Mr. Ameziane would face iffbrcibly retumed to Algeria, petitioners respectfiilly request thatthe Commission issue precautionarymeasures requesting the United States to honor its non-refbulement obligations withrespect to Mr. Ameziane. Specifically,the United States should: LTakethemeasuresnecessarytoensurethat,priortoanypotential transferor release, Mr, Ameziane is provided an adequate, individualized examination ofhis circumstances throughafair and transparent process betbreacompetent, independent, and impartial decision-maker. 2. Ensure that Mr. Ameziane is not transferred or removed toacountrywhere there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger ofbeing subjected to torture or other mistreatmenL and that diplomatic assurances are not used to circumvent the United States'non-refbulement obligations; 3. Comply wlthacotu^ order in Mr. Ameziane'shabeas case to provide 30 days' advance notice to his lawyers priorto any transfer from Guantdnamo Bay, includingthe proposed destination and conditions of transfer; and^^^ 4.1n the event that his releasefromGuantdnamo is authorized by the govemment or ordered byacourt, accept him into the United States or facilitate his resettlement inasafe third country (fbr example, Canada). C^ TheCommissionshouldlssue Precautionary Measuresl^equiringthe United States to Cease All Abusive Interrogations nnd Any Other Mistreatment of Mr.Ameziane and to Ensure him Humane Conditions of Confiinement, Adequate Medical Treatment, and Regular Communication with his Family. L 229, Mr.Ameziane's Treatment ^nd Conditions ofDetention at GunntdnamoContinueToViolnte His Right to Humane Treatment.

Despite the Commission'srepeated emphasis in its jurisprudence as well as its

precautionary measures regarding Guantanamo detainees on the nonderogable nature ofthe right to humane treatment and the prohibition against torture, Mr. Ameziane'sphysical, psychological and moral integrity have been and continue to be violated daily by his treatment

^

lACHR Precautionary Measures No. 259 (Oct. 2005), See Order, Ameziane v. Bush, Civil Action No. 05-392 (D.D.C. April 12, 2005), annexed to this petition.

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and conditions at Guantdnamo. He continues to be subjected to abusive and unlawful interrogations, despite his lawyers'repeated requests to the authorities at Guantdnamo fbr an Investigation into the matter. For overayear, he has been detained inasmall cold cell in Camp VI in conditions of solitary confinemenL deprived ofnaturallightand air, contact with other prisoners and exposure to the sun or exercise save fbr his "recreation" time inasmall caged-in area. In Camp VI, his "comfort items,"such as his toothbmsh ortoothpaste, can be taken away ft^ranyinfractionathisguards'discretion,andthefacility'sstmctureandacousticsmake communalprayereffectivelyimposslble Tothlsday,hehasneverreceivedadequateand effectivemedlcaltreatmentforhistailingeyesighLhisrheumatismorhisvariousinjuries resultingfromphysical beatings by guards. The provision ofcare for his needs has also been made contingent on his cooperation with interrogators. For six andahalf years, he has also been deprivedofvirtuallyallcommunicationwitiihisfamily 230. In its previous precautionarymeasures, the Commissionhas repeatedly called fbr

the United States thoroughly and impartially to investigate, prosecute and punish all instances of torture and othermistreatment against Guantanamo detainees. No one has ever been investigated or held accotmtable fbr any ofthe mistreatment Mr. Ameziane has suffered at Guantanamo, or, if any inquiries, reviews or disciplinary action have been carried ouL they have not resulted in effective protection against continuing harm both in his conditions and treatment at Guantdnamo, 2. 231. ReqnestforPreeautionar^ Measures

In light ofMr.Ameziane'scontinuing mistreatment and his cturent conditions of

confinemenL petitioners respectftillyrequest that the Commission issue precautionary measures to protect Mr.Amezianefromfiirther irreparable physical and psychological harm while he remains inU.S,custody. Specifical1y,the United States should: 1. Cease all abusive interrogations ofMr.Ameziane; -105028490 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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2. Ensure that Mr.Ameziane'sconditions of confinement comply with intemational standards forthe treatment ofprisoners forthe remainder ofhis detention at Guantdnamo, namely: prohibit his detention in conditions of isolation; ensure that his cell meets minimum requirements fbrfloorspace, lighting,ventilation and temperature, and has windows affording natural light and air, and ensure that he is permitted adequate daily exercise in open afr; 3 Prohibitallcorporalpunishmentandpunishmentthatmaybeprejudicialto Mr, Ameziane'sphysical or mental health, and prohibit the use of chains and irons as restraints; 4. Take immediate measures to provide Mr. Ameziane with prompt and effective treatment fbr his physical and psychological health, and ensure that such car^ is not made contingent on his cooperation with interrogators or any other condition; 5. Ensure that Mr. Ameziane is able to satisfy the needs ofhis religious life witiioutinterference,includinggroupprayerwithotherprisoners; 6EnableMrAmezianetocommunicateregularlywithhisfamilythrough correspondence and visits, IL CONCLUSION AND PRAYERFORRELIEF 232, For the aforementioned reasons, Petitioners respectfiilly request that the

Honorable Commission: L a. WitiiregardtoMr.Ameziane'srequestforprecautionarymeasures; Urgently issue the necessary and appropriate precautionary measures to prevent fiirther irreparable harmtoMr.Ameziane'sfundamentalrights, in accordance with Sections VLB.3 and VI,C.2;

2. With regard to Mr. Ameziane'sindividual petition against the United States: a Considertheadmissibilityandmeritsofthispetition simultaneously,in accordance with Article 37(4) of the Commission'sRules ofProcedure, given the serious and urgent nature ofthe case and the ongoing violations ofMr.Ameziane'sfundamental rights; Declare the petition admissible and find that the United States has violated Mr, Ameziane'srights enshrined in ArticlesI,III,V,V1,^I,^VIII,^^V,and^VIof the AmericanDeclaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and -106028491 Defense Reciprocal Discovery

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OOC00233

c

Older the United States to provide prompt and adequate reparations for the violations suffered by Mr, Ameziane.

The Petitioners thank the Commission for its careful attention to this pressing matter. Dated: August 6, 2008 Respectfully submitted.

/

Pardiss Kebriaei Shayana Kadidal CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 666 Broadway, 7"' Floor New York, NY 10012 (Tel) 212-614-6452 (Fax) 212-614-6499

'^(yt' <•

Viviana Krsticevic Ariela Peralta Francisco Quintana Michael Camillen CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (CEJIL) 1630 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 401 Washington, D.C, 20009 (Tel) 202-319-3000 (Fax) 202-319-3019

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LIST OF APPENDICES 1. 2. 3. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ameziane v. Bush, Civil Action No. 05-392 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2005) Order, Ameziane v. Bush, Civil Action No. 05-392 (D.D.C. April 12,2005) Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB) imclassified records from 2004-2006

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The Road to Guantanamo [FULL Documentary] - YouTube.flv

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U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Hantjbook Volume 5 Handbook 2 Telecommunications

5 FAH-2 H-440 CAPTIONS AND HANDLING I N S T R U C T I O N S FOR THE I N F O R M A T I O N MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST ( I M S )
(CT:TEL-30; 03-01-2011) (Office of Origin: IRM/BPC/PRG)

5 FAH-2 H-441 CAPTIONS
(CT:TEL-29; (State Only) 07-16-2008) The special handling captions, distribution captions, and channel captions described in this subchapter include advice for IM personnel in transmitting, handling, and delivering these messages at post. You must send your requests to add or delete special handling captions, distribution captions, or channel captions to IRM/BPC/PRG who will coordinate the action with the appropriate bureau(s), IRM/OPS/MSO and S/ES-0.

5 FAH-2 H-442 WHAT ARE SPECIAL HANDLING CAPTIONS
(CT:TEL-29; CSfafe On/y; 07-16-2008) Special handling captions as a group are not inherently similar in content, but are used to meet specific internal dissemination and sorting requirements in the Main State Messaging Center and at posts abroad. (See 5 FAH-1 H-216.1.) A special handling caption, when used, is the first caption listed after the message reference number (MRN).

5 FAH-2 H-442.1 When and How to Use AGREMENT CHANNEL
rCT; 751-29; 07-16-2008; ('S^afe On/y;
a. Use AGREMENT channel for communications between the ambassador and the Secretary. b. Messages with this caption deal with AGREMENT requests for U.S.

DEFEr^m)M!im{^^imfication PAGE OFFERED: PAGEADMITTED: PAGE of PAGES ^

O.S.Oepartment OfState foreign A^air5Hant:ll^ookVolume5Handbook^^ Telecommunications ambassadors and ministers, and issues relating to the appointment, resignation,or transfer ofaU.S.chief of mission or charge d'affaires. c. Oonotassi^n NODIS or E^OIS captions to AGREMENTchannel messages astheAGREMENTchannel itself ensures the most restricted dissemination. d. You must classify or administratively control AGREMENTchannel messages. You can send this caption laterally in the field if the Department is also an addressee.

^ F A H 2 H 442^2 CHANNEL
^^7^.-T5129; ^^^a^^O^^y; 07162008;

WhenandHowtoOseO^RGEN

a. DIRGENCI^ANNEL is used for communications between the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Fluman Resources (M/DGFIR) and the chief of mission regarding sensitive humanresource issuesotherthanAGREMENTand medical matters. b. You must not use this caption laterally in the field. c. DIRGENCI^ANNEL must not be used with any other captions. d. DIRGENCI^ANNEL messages may contain personally identifiable information (PII), which must be protected in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1^^7^,as amended,5U.S.C.552a,and other applicable Federal requirements within the Department, the transmission of P I I ( e g , social security numbers,individuals^names,dates of birth,home addresses,etc.)is predicated on the recipient havinga^^need to know. Often, in DIRGEN communications, messages may contain PII as there is no other option due to the subject matter being discussed. If that is the case, PII is not to be included in the subject line of the message. PII may,however,be placed in the body ofamessage,and appropriate SBU marking, handling and dissemination requirements should be observed.

5FAH 2 H 4 4 2 ^ ^ ^^st^^^i^t^on^
(^T.T5129; ^^^a^^O^^y; 0 7 1 6 2008;

WhenandHowtoUseN^^^^^No

a. The use of the NODIS caption identifies messages of the highest sensitivity between the President, the Secretary of State, and chief of mission. You must not distribute NODIS messages to anyone other than the intended recipient without prior approval from the Executive

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Secretariat (S/ES O). b. Send NODISmessagesfrom post only to the Department asasingle addressee. You must not send NODIS messages laterally between posts unless S/ESOspecifically grants you authorisation (for example,fora NODIS subcategory). In order to sendaNODIS message to other posts, you must forward the NODIS directly to the Operations Center (part of the Executive Secretariat) with the attention indicator ^^FORS/ES O^^ and requestthe NODIS be repeated to the desired post(s)inaseparate slug line. c. NODIS information must be processed under the most stringent access controls available on the automated information system (AIS). Use the NOFORN warning notice when classifying or administratively controlling NODIS messages Refer to ^2 FAM 5^^.^ and 1 ^ 2 FAM 6^2.1^ for more information on handling NODIS messages. d. To verify receipt of the NODIS message from the recipient IPC,you must e n t e r Z F F ^ o n format l i n e 5 o f the message. e. Domestically: Only the Main State Messaging Center Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC) and the Operations Center Senior ^ a t c h Officer may handle an incoming NODIS message. The Executive Secretariat controls the dissemination of NODIS messages through the Senior ^ a t c h Officer. f. Abroad: Only IPC personnel and authorised recipients may handle incoming and outgoing NODIS messages. Executive management when required will determine any further distribution. IPC personnel must maintain an official record of clients who have read NODIS messages. g. NODIS messages must be returned to the IPC for storage at the end of the normal business day to be stored in an approved locked container in accordance withl^2 FAM 5^1^- NODIS messages must not be stored outside of the IPC after close of business hours. h. Clientsmustnotsend NODIS messages viae mail. i. Authorised originator clients can send NODIS captioned messages from their ClassNet workstations only if these requirements and conditions are met: (1^) IPC personnel must establishaseparate inbox on the Cable^press (C^) server for sending NODIS messages electronically. Restrict access to this inbox to those officers who have an ^^essential need to know.^^ The inbox must be restricted from receiving any messages fromTERPV,such as incoming NODIS messages or comeback copies of outgoing NODIS messages. Clients are not allowed to reroute NODIS messages from this inbox. Refer to the Cable^press Administrators Manual to configure the inbox-

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(2)

IPC personnel must createagroup^^inbox^^ for clients that are authorised NODIS access. Grant the group ^^read^^ and ^^delete^^ access Clients must periodically delete NODIS outgoing messages from this inbox In the inbox^s replication settings, set the retention period that is agreeable to executive management, in order to provide additional manual housekeeping control of the inboxIPCpersonnelmustdelete boththe NODIS text fromTERPVand the soft copy distribution database(SCD.nsf) on the C^ server after the messages are processed and sent to the NODIS inbox-and IPC personnel must also exempt the inbox from the nightly backup by excluding the database files D:^SCD^NODIS.nsf(assuming the Inbox is named NODIS.nsf) from the backup set located on the backup software used for the C^ server.

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EnhancedAlternateCommunicationsTerminal(EACT) is not approved for NODIS traffic unless explicitly authorised for specific posts by the Executive Secretary.

5FAH2H442^4 CHANNEL

W h e n a n d H o w t o Use R^GER

^CT.-T5129; 0716 2008; ^^^a^^G^^y;
a. Use ROGER CFIANNEL for communications between the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research (INR)and the chief of mission. b. Use the NOFORN warning notice to administratively control ROGER CI^ANNEL messages, and ensure security classification of ROGER CI^ANNEL messages as appropriate. c. ROGER CI^ANNEL messages may be transmitted laterally between posts, and to other U.S. Government agencies with discretion, if the Department is an addressee. d. Authorised users may transmit ROGER CI^ANNEL messages electronically from their workstations if the post has classified network capability. e. ^ h e n using internal electronic transmission and distribution of ROGER CFIANNEL captioned messages, the following restrictions must be followed: (1^) IPC staff must useaseparate inbox on the Cable^press(C^) server for electronic dissemination. Restrict access to this inbox to those officers determined to have an^^essential need to k n o w . R e f e r to the Cable^press Administrators Manual to configure this inbox, the groups, and the office symbols required to coordinate withTERPV

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settings^ (2) Posts must developamethod for senior management to decide which messages they must delete. Create two groups on C^-the first group contains the users, the second group contains those users who are designated the task of deleting messages from this inbox. This second group must review this inbox onaregular, frequent, and recurring basisIn the replication settings of this inbox, set the retention period to the number of days agreed upon by senior management, to backstop their manual deletion of messagesConfigureTERPVto route incoming ROGER CHANNEL messages and comeback copies of outgoing ROGER CFIANNEL messages to the designated Coinbox. Follow configuration procedures outlined intheTERPVOperator^sManualIPCstaffmustdelete ROGER CI^ANNEL text from both TERPVand the soft copy distribution database (SCD.nsf) on the C^ server after the message is processed and sent to the designated inboxIPC staff must also exempt this Coinbox from the nightly backup by excluding the database files D:^SCD^RGCI^.nsf(assuming the inbox is named RGCI^.nsf) from the backup set on the backup software used for the C^serverIPC staff may retrieve and print copies f o r a u s e r o n a l i m i t e d basis and only at the request of senior management. Provide this paper copy ofaROGERCI^ANNEL message only when an authorised user needs it for reference to completeaspecific task or response. Users may store paper copies of ROGER CFIANNEL messages, but theymustbekeptseparatefromsubjectfiles(see5FAI^ 4FI 200)and Users must review their storage of paper copies of ROGER CI^ANNEL messages every t o d a y s to determine their continuing need for retention. They must destroy the paper copy when they no longer need it.

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EnhancedAlternateCommunicationsTerminal(EACT) is approved for ROGER CI^ANNEL traffic, subject to the following restrictions: (1) ROGER CFIANNEL captioned messages are delivered by the EACT server located at the Main State Messaging Center (MSMC) to the NATO Unclassified to Secret Restricted Caption (NUSERC) mailbox atEACTposts. The NUSERC mailbox serves asaclassified EACT mail receptacle and receives all restrictive captioned messages. The NUSERC mailbox is created onaclassified MS^ server at an EACTpost. l^owever,ifaclassifiedMS^ server does not exist at

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post, then the NUSERC mailbox is created onaclassified MS^ serverlocated atthe Combined Bureau Processing Center(CBPC) at MainState(2) Access to the NUSERC EACTmailboxes must be limited to cleared Americans, based on their duties that authorise them to view restrictive captioned messages. The^^Outlook^^ user accounts ofthe cleared American must be configured to limit access only to the EACTmailboxes that the user is authorised to view. Because EACT posts are characteristically small inside,access to the NUSERC mailbox is normally assigned to the chief of mission, deputy chief of mission and EACTpost coordinator(s). l^owever,post management may grant authorisation to cleared Americans based on their position and o n a n e e d t o k n o w b a s i s EACTpost coordinators must ensure that no Outlook rules are created or used to automatically disseminate restrictive captioned messages from the NUSERC mailbox. Post coordinators must ensure that ROGER CI^ANNEL messages reside only in the NUSERC mailboxROGER CI^ANNEL messages must be processed under the most stringent access controls available on the system and temporarily reside in the NUSERC mailbox foraminimum amount of time. A daily review of the NUSERC mailbox must be conducted by the post coordinator to ensure minimal retention of ROGER CFIANNEL messages. IPC personnel are responsible for briefing users that they or the EACTpost coordinator must be informed whenaROGER CI^ANNEL message is stored onaworkstation. ^ h e n the ROGER CI^ANNEL message is no longer needed, the post coordinator is responsible for deleting it from the workstationArchiving EACTmailboxes: Prior to manual or automatic archiving, the post coordinator must ensure ROGER CFIANNEL messages are deleted from the NUSERC mailbox, ifaROGERCI^ANNEL message is found in the archive file,the archive file(.pstfile)must be deleted from the systemDelivery ofaROGER CFIANNEL captioned message to an unclassified EACTmailbox on the OpenNet is strictly prohibited. If aROGERCl^ANNEL restrictive captioned message is inadvertently delivered to an unclassified EACTsystem, the post coordinator must immediately remove the misrouted message from the unclassified EACTmailbox and notify the Main State Messaging Center (MSMC)You may retrieve and print copies f o r a u s e r o n a l i m i t e d basis and only at the request of senior management. Provide this paper copy of the ROGER CI^ANNEL message only when an authorised user

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requires it for reference to completeaspecific task or response. Users may store paper copies of ROGER CI^ANNEL messages, but they must be kept separate from subject f i l e s ( s e e 5 F A I ^ ^ F I 200)and (^) Users must review their storage of paper copies of ROGER CI^ANNEL messages every t o d a y s to determine their continuing need for retention. They must destroy the paper copy when they no longer need it.

5 E A H 2 H 4 4 2 ^ ^ When and How t o Use ^ ^ A ^ ^ ^ ^^tate^^st^^hi^t^on^n^^^
(C7^.-TiEL2^; ^^^a^^O^^y; 07 16 2008;

a. STADIS is used to preclude initial distribution to other Federal agencies for internal deliberative processing in State. It is used also when disclosure of the information to other agencies would be premature and therefore not in the best interests of the Department. b. STADIS messages must be classified or administratively controlled.

5 F A H 2 H 4 4 2 ^ ^ When and How t o Ose E^O^^ ^E^^^i^s^^e^^st^^hi^t^on^n^^^
^CT-T5L29; ^^^a^^G^^y; 07 16 2008;

a. The use of E^DIS captions identifies messages needing exclusive distribution to officers with an essential need to know. Use this caption only for highly sensitive traffic between the ^hitel^ouse, the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Under Secretaries of State. b. E^DIS messages are not releasable to foreign nationals and must be classified or administratively controlled with the NOFORN warning notice. c. If the message is not between the Secretary andachief of mission,the drafter must include the attention indicators ^^FOR^title or name of addressees,^^^^FROM^title or name of the addressers. d. E^DIS messages may be transmitted laterally if the Department is included as an addressee. e. Enhanced Alternate CommunicationsTerminal (EACT) isapproved for E^DIS traffic. See 1 ^ 2 FAM 5^^.^ for more information on E^DIS handling. f. E^DIS messages should be transmitted and internally disseminated via electronic means if the post has classified network capability, ^ h e n using
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internal electronic distribution Of E^DIS captioned messages, these restrictions must be followed: (1^) Information Program Center (IPC) staff must useaseparate inbox on the Cable^press server for electronic dissemination. Restrict access to this inbox to those officers determined to have an ^^essential need to k n o w . R e f e r to the Cable^press Administrator's Manual to configure this inbox, the groups, and the office symbols required to coordinate withTERPVsettingsPosts must developamethod for senior management to decide which messages they must delete. Create two groups on C^-the first group contains the users, the second group contains those users who are designated the task of deleting messages from this inbox. This second group must review this inbox onaregular, frequent, and recurring basis^ In the replication settings of this inbox, set the retention period to the number of days agreed upon by top management, to backstop their deletion of messagesConfigureTERPVto route incoming and comeback copies of outgoing E^DIS messages to the designated Coinbox. Follow configuration procedures outlined in theTERPVOperatoBsManualIPC staff must delete E^DIS text from the soft copy distribution database (SCDnsf) on the C^ server afterthe messages are processed and sent to the designated inboxIPC staff must also exempt this Coinbox from the nightly backup by excluding the database files D:^SCD^E^DLnsf(assuming the Inbox is named E^DLnsf) from the backup set on the backup software used for the C^serverIPC staff may retrieve and print copies f o r a u s e r o n a l i m i t e d basis and only at the request of senior management. Provide this paper copy of an E^DIS message only when an authorised user needs it for reference to completeaspecific task or response. Users can store paper copies of E^DIS, but they must be kept separate from subject f i l e s ( s e e 5 F A I ^ ^ F I 2 0 0 ) - a n d Users must review their storage of paper copies of E^DIS messages every t o d a y s to determine their continuing need for retention. Paper copies of E^DIS messages must be destroyed when they are no longer needed.

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^ F A H 2 H 4 4 ^ WHAT ARE DISTRIBUTION CAPTIONS^
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^CT.-T^i^^O; 0 ^ 0 1 2 0 1 1 ; ^L^^^^^^^A^^A^^^c^^^s; Distribution captions direct and restrict dissemination according to arrangements made when the caption was approved for use. ^ h e n y o u u s e these captions you must list each one onaseparate line and each caption must be spelled exactly as shown in this section: (1^) (2) (^) (^) (5) ADM AID^for messages regarding administrative issues for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)employeesAFSA CFIANNEL DELETEDAIDAC^for messages drafted by AID employees, at field posts, or intheDepartmentAIDACAFDROUGI^TandAVSECBNDELETEDCODEL^for messages concerning congressional delegation visits to field posts. Used with the name of the congressional committee or group chairman, i.e., CODELBAUCUSDEA^^for Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) messagesE^CON DELETED^ E^DIS^for messages needing exclusive distribution to officers with essential need to know. Use this caption only for highly sensitive traffic between the ^hiteFlouse, the Secretary, Deputy, or Under SecretariesofStateandchiefsofmission-see5FAl^ 2 I ^ ^ ^ 2 . 6 , ^henandFlowtoUseE^DISFASTOandFODAGDELETED-

(6) (7) (B)

(^)

(1^0) I^PASS^for messages to members of Congress, including district offices(1^1^) ICAODELETED(1^2) INFORM ALL STATE EMPLOYEES^for messages from, or approved by senior Department management at the Under Secretary or higher leveL intended to convey information to all Department of State employees (including FSN,TCN,L5s^a^,andEFM). Classification of messages will be limited to UNCLASSIFIED. This caption may not be used laterally in the field(^^) LOCUST and NESCODELETED(1^^) NODIS^for messages of the highest sensitivity between the President, the Secretary of State, and chief of mission. You must not distribute NODIS to any office or post other than the addressee withoutpriorapprovalfromS/ESO-see5FAI^ 2 l ^ ^ ^ 2 . ^ , ^ h e n andl^owtoUseNODIS^

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(1^5) OBIT^for messages pertaining to the death ofaU.S.Government employee,or dependent. Thiscaption must be followed b y a diagonal (/) and the acronym for the specific agency (i.e., OBIT/USAID)(1^6) OFFICIAL INFORMAL^for messages expressing personal opinions or preliminary information on policy, ^ h e n addressed to the Department, include an attention indicator for the action office(see 5FAI^^1^2^6.^)(1^7) SIPDIS^for messages intended for automatic ^ e b publishing to the originating post^s or officers ^ e b site.(see5FAM 770 for policies regarding information on Federal ^ e b site a n d 5 F A I ^ 2 F l ^ ^ ^ . l ^ , ^henandFlowtoUseSIPDIS)(l^B) STADIS^for messages that require State Department only distribution ( s e e 5 F A I ^ 2 l ^ ^ ^ 2 . 5 ) (1^^) TERREP^for messages relating information about terrorism. These messages may only be distributed to members of the emergency actioncommittee(seel2FAI^ 1^1^ 2^0). The first paragraph must state any action requested and classify according to content. TERREP messages may be transmitted laterally in the fields (20) TERREP EXCLUSIVE and TOFASDELETED(21^) TOPEC^for messages between Peace Corps headquarters and field representatives(22) TOPEC MED EYES^for messages regarding health information protected bythe PrivacyAct, and/orl^ealth Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of ^^^6 (I^IPAA) and distributed only to the Peace Corps medical staff at post or Peace Corps headquarters(2^) USDOC,USOECD,USSTART,andUSSCCDELETED(2^) VISAS^for messages about individual immigration, visa and deportation cases and operational and procedural aspects of the visa function.

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5 F A H 2 H 4 4 ^ ^ ^ When and How t o Use ^ ^ ^ O ^ ^ ^^e^^et^nte^net^^oto^o^Ron^te^Netwo^^^^^^RNet ^^st^^hi^t^on
^CT.T5129; 07 16 2008; ^^^a^^G^^y;
a. The SIPDIS caption should only be applied to reporting and other informational messages deemed appropriate for release to the U.S. Government interagency community. SIPDIS captioned messages must notincluderestrictivecaptions(e.g., NODIS, E^DIS, STADIS, ROGER, DS,or DS^) that explicitly limit distribution. Ifamessage carries conflicting captions, the more restrictive caption will be controlling and the message will not be loaded into the NCD (Net Centric Diplomacy) database. (Refer to Department Notice, 2007 1^1^1^22, Correction: Sharing Washington Outbound Cables with Other Agencies via ^^SIPDIS^^ regarding cables containing Privacy Act protected information that should NOT include the SIPDIS caption.) b. Posts must follow the standard message template,and ifaSIPDIS captioned message does not appear in the NCD system on line-there are afew common causes: (1^) (2) (^) (^) (5) The message must includeasingle blank line between the subject line and body text of the messageThe message must have at leastonesubjectTAGS (Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject). See5FAI^^,TAGS/TERMS ^andbookThe TAGS line must say ^^TAGS:^^The Subject line must begin with ^^Subject:^^SIPDIS cannot be used on the same line as another caption.

c. The SIPDIS caption should be used on all messages appropriate for sharing with the broader U.S. Government community. SIPDIS can be used in conjunction with NOFORN, CODEL, SENSITIVE, TERREP. d. SIPDISisadistributioncaption,notaTAGS,and must be appended to the caption line of the message. If SIPDIS is used in conjunction with another distribution caption such as TERREP or CODEL, the SIPDIS caption should be placed onaseparate line below the primary distribution caption. Post information management officers can add ^^SIPDIS^^to post^slocally managed Cable^press(C^) or enhanced alternate communications terminal (EACT) application since it isadistribution caption. NoTerminalEquipmentReplacementProgram(TERP) related action is required to process SIPDIS messages. e. Drafting officers are encouraged to use the SIPDIS caption only on those
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messages deemed appropriate for sharing such as reporting messages, analytical pieces, and policy instructions. Posting or making available personal information ofU.S.citizens or lawful permanent residents (including Social Security Numbers-information concerning employees, such as travel messages, performance reports, and medical assessmentsandarrestreportsofU.S.citizens) may violate the PrivacyAct and/or new Federal requirements on safeguarding personally identifiable information (PII). f. Information protected bythe PrivacyAct (Public Law ^ ^ 5 7 0 ) i s not suitable for posting on SIPRNET and thus messages containing privacy information should not include the SIPDIS caption. g. Contact SIPDIS^I^elp^state.sgov.gov for assistance ifatransmitted SIPDIS message does not appear on the NCD or post homepage.

^ F A H 2 H 444 CHANNEL CAPTIONS
^CT-T5L29; 07 16 2008; ^^^^^^^A^^A^^^c^^s; a. Channel captions are intended to restrict distribution to the executive office or the office designated by the caption,as explained in paragraphb of this section. No other distribution caption is required on communications that have channel captions. b. Messages sent with channel captions frequently contain personal information that is subject to limitations on access and disclosure and that should be appropriately safeguarded under the PrivacyAct,5U.S.C. 552a, and other applicable Federal requirements: (1) (2) AGSDELETEDAID/OIGCHANNEL^for messages between the AID Inspector General (IG) and the regional inspectors general and their staffs in thefieldDISSENT CFIANNEL^for messages between the Department and any person a t a p o s t abroad submitting dissenting views on policy. The first paragraph should identify the drafter. DISSENT CI^ANNEL messages are distributed in the Department initially only to the Executive Secretary of the Department and to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff(S/P),who has responsibility for handling any response. The Director of S/P determines further distribution, in consultation with the Secretary, as appropriate, and with regard to the sensitivity of the message and the desires of the drafterDOCI^LAMPCFIANNEL^for messages between the Defense Intelligence Agency and defense attaches. Disseminationof

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DOCI^LAMP messages should be limited to the defense attache. The defense attache, if required, will determine additional distribution. DOCI^tAMP files will be maintained only by the defense attache office (DAO)and all paper copies must be returned totheDAO(5) DSCI^ANNEL^for messages between the Assistant Secretary and/or DeputyAssistant Secretaries of Diplomatic Security,other authorised DS personnel, and the responsible DS officer concerning criminal and special investigations involving: U.S. citizens or foreign nationals,who are not U.S.Government employees-special protective equipment-and other sensitive subjects which the drafter deems should be restricted to DS personnel at posts or within the Department. Limit field dissemination of DSCI^ANNEL messages to the regional security or post security officer- limit domestic dissemination to offices within DS. The Executive Director for Diplomatic Security (DS/E^) authorises access to DS Channel message traffic at the headquarters level. This caption may be used laterally in the field. ASECmustbetheonlyTAGSusedon this traffic(see 1 ^ 2 FAM ^ 2 2 . ^ 2 , D S and DS^Channels)DSBI CFIANNEL DELETEDDS^CFIANNEL^for messages between the Assistant Secretary and/or DeputyAssistant Secretaries of Diplomatic Security,other authorised DS personnel, and the responsible DS officer concerning criminal and special investigations involving: U.S. citizens, U.S. Government employees or DS employees-counterintelligence investigations-adverse personnel security actions-investigations concerning domestic abuse-confidential sources^undercover operations^ and other sensitive subjects which the drafter deems should be highly restricted. Limit field dissemination of DS^ CFIANNEL messages to the regional security officer or post security officer- limit domestic dissemination to specific offices within DS. The Director of the Office of Investigations and Counterintelligence (DS/DSS/ICI) authorises access to DS^ Channel message traffic at the headquarters level. This caption may be used laterally in the field. ASEC must be the onlyTAGS used on this traffic(see 1 ^ 2 FAM ^22.^2,DSandDS^Channels)DTS CFIANNEL^for messages between IRM, the Area Telecommunications Office (ATO)l^eadquarters, directors of regional information management centers (RIMC),IMOs, IPOs and ITOs-concerning technical security and operational matters that affectjoint operations within the DiplomaticTelecommunications Service (DTS). This caption may be used laterally in the fieldEEO CI^ANNEL^for messages between the Office of Civil Rights and
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officially designated EEO counselors at posts abroad regarding discrimination complaints. Topreservethe privileged nature of this information, dissemination of EEO CFIANNEL messages should be strictly limited to S/OCR in the Department and EEO counselors in thefield. Communications intended for individuals other than the officially designated EEO counselor in the field should bear the attention indicator ^^FOR(NAME)^^ one blank line following the EEO CI^ANNELcaption(^0) ERG and GRIEVANCE CI^ANNEL DELETED(1^1^) I^RCI^ANNEL^for messages between the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service and posts on matters relating to personnel administration involving U.S. citizen employees. These matters include, but are not limited to, assignments, transfers, training, performance evaluations, compensation, employment, health benefits, life insurance, employee-management relations, title and rank, position descriptions, military service status, campaigns and retirement. I^RCI^ANNEL should not be used for personnel related issues covered under other channel captions, i.e., Agrement requests and certain other matters relating to chiefs of mission and charge d'affaires, sensitive personnel matters requiring theattention ofthe Director General or DeputyAssistant Secretary for l^uman Resources, medical matters, grievances between individual employees and the Foreign Service Grievance Board, or travel messages. FIR CFIANNEL may be used laterally in the field with discretion, if the Department is an information addressees (1^2) IMCI^ANNEL^for messages between the Deputy Chief Information Officer for Operations and field operations at RIMCs,IPCs and ISCs concerning technical communications operations not requiring dissemination outside IRM(may be used laterally in the field)(^^) IMCl^ANNEL EXCLUSIVE DELETED(1^^) MED CI^ANNEL^for messages between the Director for Medical Services (M/MED)and the chief of mission,medical officer,nurse, or designee, containing protected health information regarding Department of State employees or their dependents or employees or dependents of other U.S. Government agencies under direct or participating agency support agreements. MED CI^ANNEL messages at missions abroad must be disseminated o n a m i n i m u m need toknow basis and will be limited to the medical officer or the chief of mission^s designee. MED CI^ANNEL messages should be delivered in sealed envelopes marked ^^MED CFIANNEL TO BE OPENED ONLY BYADDRESSEE.^^ In the Department, dissemination must be ona minimum need to know basis. DonotuseMEDCI^ANNEL messages for reports of death, requests for medical supplies or

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U.S.Department of state foreign A^airs Handbook V o l u m e 5 H a n d b o o k 2 ^ Telecommunications

requests for approval of emergency visitation travel. MED CI^ANNEL may be used laterally in the field. Protected health information should be safeguarded in accordance with both the PrivacyAct and the l^ealth Insurance Portability and Accountability Actofl^^^6(I^IPAA). FIIPAA implementing regulations(see5C.F.R. sections 1^60,1^62,andl^6^) govern both access to protected health information (the^^PrivacyRule^^) and the means by which such information can be transmitted electronically (the^^SecurityRule^^)(1^5) MGT CI^ANNEL^for messages between the Under Secretary for Managementand posts,with post dissemination only to those persons or offices specified by the attention indicator,^^FOR (NAME OF PERSON OR OFFICE) ONLY.^^ This caption may not be used laterally in the field(1^6) NAROPCI^ANNEL^for messages between the Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA representatives abroad, Department of Justice, chiefs of mission, the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters regarding narcotics issues. NAROPCl^ANNEL messages must be classified or administratively controlled. IPC should deliver NAROP messages only to the chief of mission and the DEA agent in charge. The Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters will determine distribution of NAROP messages in Washington o n a s t r i c t n e e d t o k n o w basis. NAROP messages may not be transmitted laterally. Only the chief of mission or designee can approveaNAROP message for transmission. NAROP CFIANNEL can only be addressed to SECSTATE and DEA(^7) OIG CFIANNEL^(State and Broadcasting Board of Governors only) for messages between the Office of Inspector General and OIG employees and/or other Department of State or BBG personnel in the field-and laterally in the field between OIG employees. The OIG channel may also be used for messages between the OIG and OIG employees in the field and chiefs of mission, regional and post security officers, and other officials when appropriate to carry out the mission of the OIG. Employees who wish to report fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement to the OIG are authorised to use theOIGchannel(l^B) RODCACI^ANNEL^for messages relating operational intelligence communications between authorii^ed Department of Defense agencies and defense attaches. Dissemination of RODCA communications is limited to the RODCA control officer in the defense attache office. RODCA message files will be maintained only by the DAO and all copies must be returned to the DAO(^^) STR CFIANNEL DELETED5I^AH2H440 ^aget5o^t^

U.S.Department ot state l^oreignAftairs Handbook Volume5Hant^book2-^ Telecommunications

(20) TMCFIANNEL^for messages between the Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service and posts for all travel messages (TMs),i.e.,TMONE through TMEIGl^T,as defined b y ^ F A M ^760, Travel Messages. TheTMCI^ANNELis notto be used on any other matters relating to personnel administration. Dissemination and control of TMCI^ANNEL communications are subject to the same restrictions as I^RCI^ANNEL communications. TheTMCI^ANNEL caption may be used laterally in the field if the Department is an addressee.

^FAH2H44^ CAPTIONS

DEPARTMENT REVIEW OF

^CT.-75129; 07 16 2008; ^L^^^^^^^^a^^BL^^Al^; a. The Department's Operations Center (S/ESO)and Main State Messaging Center (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC) regulate the proper use of captions. If Messaging Center analysts haveaquestion about adding or changinga caption on an incoming message, they consult the Operations Center to decide how to caption the message. b. IfS/ES Odecidestoaddorchangeacaptiononamessage,S/ES Owill sendarecategori^ation notification to all addressees with specific instructions. Store copies of all messages with captions, whether upgraded or modified,according to post procedures. ( S e e 5 F A I ^ ^ F I 21^^.1^, General, for more information on storing captioned material.)

^FAH2H44^

^ O I N T MESSAGE CAPTIONS

^CT-T5129; 07 16 2008; ^^^^^^^A^^A^^B^c^^s; 9. You may use joint message captions only on messages with specific action instructions for bothaDepartment mission andaseparate military activity that is not part ofaDepartment mission. The DAO a t a Department mission is notaseparate command,but an integral part of themission. ( S e e 5 F A I ^ ^ ^ 2 ^ 6 . ^ . ) b. The caption is in the form ^^JOINTEMBASSY/USEUCOMMESSAGE^^ and placedaccordingtoguidanceprovidedin5FAFI 21^ 2^1^,l^andling Instructions.

5 ^ A H 2 H 440 ^ a g e t 6 o f ^ 7

U.S.Department of state l^oreignA^airsHant:^bookVolume5Handbook2^ Telecommunications

S F A H 2 H 4 4 ^ PASSING INSTRUCTIONS A N D RESPONSIBILITIES
^CTT5L29; 07 16 2008; ^^^^^O^^^^a^^B^^Al^; a. Use the passing instructions ^^PASS^^ and ^^ALSOPASS^^ in messages addressed t o a p o s t with relay responsibilities to another agency or an activity that does not haveadata circuit. b. ^^ALSOPASS^^ indicates that the relay post itself is also addressed by the message. c. Insert the passing instructions below the caption line (ifacaption is used). Include the name of the relay post, the passing symboL and the name(s)of the agency or activity to whom the message is relayed. Example DEPT PASS EPA d. Collective address message captioned ^^INFORMCONSULS^^ or ^^INFORM CONSULS AS APPROPRIATE^^ requires the principal posts to forward the message via pouch, fax, or other means to their constituent posts.

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STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PATRICK KENNEDY UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Govemmental Affairs "Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration" March 10,2011

Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, Members of the Committee, good aftemoon and thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to address the status of information sharing in light of the WikiLeaks disclosures, and in particular to discuss efforts within the executive branch both to improve the security of its systems, and to ensure that information is shared effectively and in a manner that continues to advance national security objectives. The Department of State and our interagency partners here today have long been closely engaged in achieving the dual objectives of appropriate informationsharing and protection, and in light of the WikiLeaks compromises, we are working together with renewed attention on achieving these dual objectives.

As you may be aware, I bring a rather unique perspective to the challenges of sharing and protecting information. I have served most of my career at the State Department — overseas, at the United States Mission to the United Nations and here in Washington, and I was also honored to serve as the first Deputy Director of

DEFENSE EXHIBITDDDfor identification PAGE OFFERED: PAGE ADMITTEDPAGE of PAGES

National Intelligence for Management at the creation ofthe Ofltce ofthe Director ofNational Intelligence(ODNl). Given this experience,Iespecially appreciate the commitment ofthis Cotnmittee to work with us in addressing the challenges of information security and sharing. Despite events ofthe past eight months,Iwant to assure Members ofthis Committee at the outset that we at the State Department maintain our commitment to fully share our diplomatic reporting on which our interagency partners rely. Ourcollectivechallenge is to do so inamannerthat provides safeguards and protections that are reasonable, pragmatic, and responsible, not to stop sharing. The focus ofmy testimony this aftemoon is threefold: first, to explain briefiy the Department'sunique role within the executive branch asasouTce of diplomatic reporting that is essential toavariety of diflerent agencies-second, to provide an overview ofthe State Department'smitigation efforts-and finally,to highlight the challenges as we move forward to share and protect our classified information. ^ol^o^^^^Io^^t^c^^^o^ti^^ The State Department has historically accomplished basic communication bet^eenWashington and overseas posts through the use of diplomatic telegrams or cables. These communications serve as the vehicle for our intemal deliberations

relating to all aspects ofour foreign relations and include candid assessments of conditions overseas and ofdiplomatic instructions that are vital to national-level decision-making. This formal channel bet^eenWashington and our overseas posts provides the Department and OtherU.S.Ciovemment agencies crucial inlormation about the context in which we collectively advance our national interests ona variety ofissues. For example, these communications may contain information about promoting American export opportunities, protecting American citizens overseas, and supporting military operations. Weconsider this reporting from posts around the world to be one ofour most valuable contributions to every facet of national security,and we share this diplomatic reporting through automatic dissemination to over agencies based on profiled requirements these agencies

provide to the DepartmenL Recent events have not changed our commitment to sharing this vital information. ^^^^^^^I^^^c^ost^^^s^^^St^t^^^^^^^^^tl^^ti^^t^o^ Actions July 2010 When DoD material was leaked in .luly2010,we worked with DoD to identify any alleged State Department material that was inWikiLeaks'possession. Weimmediately asked Chiefs ofMission at aflected posts to review any purported State material in the release and provide an assessment, as well asasummary of

the overall effect the WikiLeaks release could have on relations with the host country. Following the completion ofthe review in August, when it was believed that purported State cables might be released, the State Department instmcted all Chiefs ofMissions to familiarise themselves with the content in the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD)database shouldarelease actually occur.

November 2010 When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 2^, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions:!) Establisheda24^7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials ftom throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus-2) Createdagroup to review potential risks to individuals-and^) Suspended SIPRNetaccesstoNCD(SIPRNetisaDODnet^ork) The Department also createdaMitigationTeam to address the policy,legal, security,counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release ofthese documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised ofboth the intemational fallout caused by the WikiLeaks^ disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members ofboth the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate within

days (December 2, 2010)ofthe first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared t^ice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December7and^, 2010) Ongoing Mitigation Efforts State continues its thorough review ofpolicies and procedures related to information security to ensure that they fttlly meet the current challenges. Efforts are being coordinated throughout the DepartmenL as well as with the interagency, to ensure that we share classified information in an effective and secure manner with those who need it in theirwork to advance our national security.

^ While the Department already had strong safeguards in place,we have further enhanced and updated our computer security policies that prohibit the downloading of classified inlormation to removable media(e.g.,thumb drives, CDs^^Ds)on the Department'sclassified network. ^ The Department continues to deploy an automated tool that audits and monitors the Department'sclassified network to detect anomalies that would not otherwise be apparenL This capability is backed up by professional staff who promptly analyse detected anomalies to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system.

^ The NCD database ofdiplomatic reporting and the State Department's classified web sites, although now inaccessible through SIPRNeL remains available via the more limited distribution Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). ThroughouL the State Department has continued to share its diplomatic reporting among federal agencies through its traditional system of cable dissemination. ^ Toheighten awareness ofwhat is and is not permitted when working on the Department'sclassified network and on classified systems, user awareness reminders are now available for Department employees on its classified network, in addition to the standard in person briefings about handling classified material andasoon-to-be-released computer-based course on identifying and marking classified and sensitive information. In addition, the Department is exploring solutions to improve how we share and protect information with those who are not direct recipients ofour telegrams. One such solution would involve the creation ofawebsitewithasearchable database that would allow appropriately cleared personnel to use key word searches to discover relevant State cables-the search would reveal cable metadata, such as the subject line, but would not provide the fttll text ofthe cables ina potentially vulnerable database. This would ensure that cleared personnel are awate ofcables they have an operational or strategic need to see. Cleared

personnel ftom other agencies would then be able to seek cables necessary for their work functions through their own organi^ation'sintemal distribution system. The responsibility will be on the receiving, not the originating, agency to disseminate information to its intemal personneL The Department has continued to work with the interagency on information management issues by participating in meetings ofthe new Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) chaired by the Special Advisor for Information Access and Security policy as well as existing IPCs such as the Information Sharing and Access IPC.

CIi^l^^^^^^

The interagency is grappling with the complexities ofthree main challenges in the aftermath ofWikiLeaks. The first main challenge is ensuring information sharing policies are consistently directing the use oftechnology to solve problems, not the otherway around. The post-^^llmindset was focused on providing technical solutions to information sharing problems. Asaresult, technical experts were asked to develop solutions to the barriers inhibiting information sharing. Thepost WikiLeaks environment reminds us that technology isatool to execute solutions but is not in

itself the answer. Simply puLwe must more consistently sort out what we share before determining how we share iL Connecting systems and networks may provide the means to share information, but we must still manage and share the content in the most appropriate way. Mr. Chairman, the national security community must doabetter job of articulating what information is appropriate to share with the widest appropriate distribution, and what is more appropriately confined toanarrower audience, in orderto ensure adequate safeguards. The State Department believes that the way in which we share cables through our traditional means of dissemination and the steps we have taken already since November are leading us firmly in this direction. The second main challenge involves each agency'srigorous adherence to existing, or improved, information security policies. This includes improved training ofcable drafters in the use oflabels to indicate appropriate breadth of dissemination based on the sensitivity ofacable'scontenL The executive order on classified information (E.O. 1^^26) establishes the basic levels of classification within the Executive Branch. From that foundation, individual agencies may still have their own captions that denote how information should be disseminated because not all cleared personnel need to see every diverse piece ofclassified information. Agencies that receive information need to understand how to handle

that captioned information, so that it is not inappropriately made available toa wide audience, which would undermine the intent ofthe captions. The Office ofManagement and Budget(OMB)directed agencies to create teams to address security,counterintelligence, and information assurance issues. Webelieve that the State Department'sMitigationTeam serves asamodel for broad, cross-discipline coordination, or govemance, because it brings together various subject matter experts ftom differentfieldsto address information sharing andsecurity issues inacoordinated manner. Many information sharing and security issues can be resolved at the agency level as long as there are standards in place for agencies to execute. Forthe most part, standards have been created by existing interagency bodies, but there are some areas where ftirther coordination is needed. The third main challenge involves the coordination, or govemance, of information management in the interagency community. Numerous interagency groups are wrestling with issues related to the technological aspects ofinformation sharing, such as those dealing with data standards, systems, and networks. Others are wrestling with the policy decisions ofwho should have access to what classified information. New interagency govemance structures to coordinate information sharing have been developed, including those focused on sharing with state, local, and tribal govemments, as well as with foreign partners. In keeping

with the first main challenge, these new structures should maintain or increase their focus on defining the content to be shared and protected as well as onthe technology by which it is shared and ptotected. Each agency must be confident that security processes and procedures are applied inauniform and consistent manner in other organisations. In addition, it must be understood that material originating in one agency will be treated by other agencies in accordance with mutually understood handling instmctions. The State Department shares information with the intent ofproviding the right information to the right people at the right time. Wewill continue to share this reporting appropriately so that we can continue our diplomatic mission as well as our role in the national security community. Werecogni^e the imperative to make diplomatic reporting and analysis available appropriately with the interagency community. Wecontinue to review how our information is disseminated at other agencies. Co^cl^s^o^ Torecap, the State Department has long been, and remains, committed to both appropriately sharing and protecting information critical to ournational security. This commitment requires ongoing efforts to conftont multiple, complex challenges associated with information sharing. FirsL national security agencies must consistently put policies about content ahead oftechnological solutions. to

Second, each agency must manage the sharing and protecting ofinformation it originates and receives. Third, the interagency asawhole must continue to coordinate betterto improve all facets ofinformation sharing. Thank^ you for this opportunity to appear here today. Ilook forward to working with the Committee on the challenges ofsharing and protecting diplomatic and other sensitive information, and would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

tt

Defense ExhihitE 3pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record ofTrial

.US soldier kidnapped by the Taliban is 23-year-old Army paratrooper Bowe Bergdahl - N,,. Page I of 2

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DAILY NEWS
World

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US soldier ki(inapped by the Taliban is 23-year-old Army paratrooper Bowe Bergdahl
BY STEPHANIE GASKEI.L / DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER SUNDAY. JULY 1<) 2 005) 2 02 PM

The family of Private Fir.sl Class Bowe Bergdahl released me above photo

The U.S. soldier captured by the Taliban is a 23-year-old Army paratrooper from Idaho on his first deployment to Afghanistan, Pentagon officials said Sunday.

Private 1 st Class Bowe Bergdahl, who joined the Army just last year, was shown pleading for his life on a video released by his captors Saturday night,

"Please, please bring us home so that we can be back where we belong and not over here, wasting our time and our lives," said a terrified Bergdahl. who appears to be in good condition. He is shown with his head shaved, eating and wearing local garb and said the date was July 14.
.•.ijTV!Qra//>P

"To my fellow Americans who have loved ones over here, who know what it's like to miss them, you have the power to make our government bnng them home," he said

This liame grab taken from a Taliban propaganda video shows an American soldier who went mi.ssing from his base in eastern Afghanistan on june 30, .2009 (Watch the video below )

RELATED 'YOU WILL BE HUNTED' IF WE DON'T GET OUR SOLDIER, U S TELLS TALIBAN

Military officials said Bergdahl, who went missing from a small combat outpost in southeastern Afghanistan on June 30, is a paratrooper with the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment. 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division in Fort Richardson. Alaska. The unit deployed to Afghanistan in March

Bergdahl's family, who were notified of his capture shortly after he went missing, broke their silence Sunday and released a heart-wrenching statement to the media

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US soldier kidnapped by theTaliban is 23ycarold Army paratrooper Bowe Bcrgdahl-N,,, Pagc2of2

"V^e hope and pray for our son's safe return to his comrades and then loourfamily and we appreciate ail Ihe support and expressions of sympathy shown to us by our family members, our friends and others across the nation Thank you and please keep Bowe in your thoughts and prayers,"the family said. In the 2^minute video, firstshownonaTalibanweb site. oneofhiscaptorsholdsBergdahl'sdog tags upto the camera-hts name and rank cleariy visible-and prompts him to answer questions. RELATEDCAPTUREOUSSOLOIER WAS'SOLD'TO LOCAL INSURGENT OROUP "Well,I'm scared,"he said"Scaredlwon't be able to go home It is very unnerving to beaprisoner" Bergdahl choked up as he talked about his family and his girifriend "I ha^e my gtrifriend,who is hoping to marry,"he said"! have my grandma and grandpas.lhaveavery,very good family lhalllove back home in America Andlmiss them every day when I'm gone Imiss them and I'm afraid thatlmight not ever see them again and that I'll never be able to tell them thatllove them again and I'll never be able to hug them " Bergdahl also talks about his desire to learn more aboul Islam and the morale of American soldiers, which he said was low RELA^TED OESPERATE SEARCH FOR CAPTURED SOLDIER CONTINUES It is unclearwhere Bergdahl is being held.He was captured in Paklika province,astronghold of the Hagt^ahi networi^,aparticulariy brutal group of terrorists with ties to ai Oaeda that operates freely along both sides of the border with Pakistan Last week,Talibah commanders said Bergdahl would be killed ifUS forces didn't withdraw from Ghan^i and Paktika provinces in southeastern Afghanistan, but did not release any images or video of him. On Sunday,ataliban spokesman told Reuters that the video was proof that the soldierwas in their custody "He is fine and healthy as you saw in the video tape,"the spokesman said,"y^ will decide in the futt^re as to what needs to be done with him " U S military officials condemned the video as propaganda and vowed to find BergdahL "We strongly condemn thispublice^ploitation and humiliationofaprisonerlt'saviolationoftheintemational law of war and we will continue to use all resources available to us to return this soldier to safety."said US military spokesman Col. Gregory Julian in l^abuL U S troops have blanketed the area with two flyers. One of them asked the Afghan people for information on the missing soldier and offereda^25.000 reward for his return The otherwas aimed at insurgents and shows twoUS soldiers knocking downadoor.wtth the message "Please return our soldier safely^or^ we will hunt you." sgaskell^nydailynews.com

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Soldier held in Afghanistan is from Idaho | The Salt Lake Tribune

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^^^^^^^^^^^^l^^^lt^
Soldier held in A^hanistan is from Idaho
BY JOHN MILLER ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER PUBLISHED JULY 19, 2009 12:03 AM

This is an archived article that was published on sltrib.com in 2009, and information in the article may be outdated. It is provided only for personal research purposes and may not be reprinted. Hailey, Idaho » A soldier from Idaho who disappeared from his base in Afghanistan has been captured, the Pentagon confirmed Sunday, a day after he was seen in a Taliban \ndeo posted online. The Defense Department released the name of Pfe. Bowe (pronounced BOW) R. Bergdahl, 23, who was scning with an .Alaska-based infantry regiment. The private was last seen walking away from his base near the border with Pakistan in an area known to be a Taliban stronghold. E\'en before his name became public, two U.S. defense officials confirmed to The Associated I'ress that the man in that 28-minute video was the captured soldier. The video, in which Bergdahl said he was "scared I won't be able to go home," provided the first public glimpse of the missing American. The Pentagon statement said Bergdahl's whereabouts became unknown on July 1 and his status was changed July 3 to missing-captured. It wasn't clear who initially captured Bergdahl, but the U.S. command in Afghanistan said he was being held by the Taliban and condemned the video as a violation of international law. "I'm glad to see he appears unharmed, but again, this is a Taliban propaganda \ideo," spokeswoman Lt. Cmdr. Christine Siden.stricker said. "They are exploiting the soldier in violation of international law." Bob Bergdahl, the soldier's father, told The Associated Press on Saturday that the family was requesting media respect their privacy. "We hope and pray for our son's safe return to his comrades and then to our family, and we appreciate all the support and expressions of svTnpathy shown to us by our family members, our friends and others across the nation," Bob Bergdahl said in a statement issued through the Department of Defense. "Thank you, and please continue to keep Bowe in your thoughts and prayers." On the video, which was posted on a Web site pointed out bj- the Taliban, Bergdahl says he is from Hailey, Idaho, a town of about 7,000 people that lies 160 miles east of Boise. The Pentagon identified his hometown as Ketchum, which is about half the size ot Hailey and about 12 miles north. His family says he grew up in Blaine County, closer to Hailey. Before enlisting, Bergdahl worked as a barista at a coffee shop in Hailey, Zaney's River Street Coffee House, where a sign on the counter encouraged patrons to keep Bergdahl in their thoughts and prayers, "Join all of us at Zaney's holding light for our friend Bowe Bergdahl, Bowe has been captured in Afghanistan," the handwritten sign says. A similar message posted July 8 on the coffee shop's Facebook page suggests many in the small town have known for some time that Bergdahl was in danger. Friends and former co-workers at the coffee shop declined to speak on the record Sunday to an Associated Press reporter, sajing they were abiding by the Bergdahl family's wishes for privacy. One of the directors of the Sun Valley Ballet School in Ketchum said Bergdahl performed with the group for four or five years up to about
2008.

"He's athletic," Jill Brennan said, "He just had a knack for it. He's a wonderful young man." In the video, Bergdahl had his head shaved and was seen with the start of a beard. He was sitting and dressed in a nondescript, gray outfit. Early in the video one captor held the soldier's dog tag up to the camera. His name and ID number were clearly \isible. He was shown eating at one point and sitting cross-legged. He said the date was July 14 and that he was captured when he lagged behind on a patrol. It's clear the video was made no earlier than July 14 because Bergdahl repeated an exaggerated Taliban claim about a Ukrainian helicopter that was shot down that day. He was intei-viewed in English by his captors. He was asked his views on the war, which he called extremely hard; his desire to learn more about Islam; and the morale of American soldiers, which he said was low. Asked how he was doing, the soldier said: "Well I'm scared, scared I won't be able to go home. It is verv' unner\ing to be a prisoner," He later choked up when discussing his family and his hope to many his girlfriend.

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Soldier held in Afghanistan is from Idaho^Thc Salt LakcTribunc

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"I haveaver^', very good family thatllove back home in America. Andlmi.ss them everyday when I'm gone,"he said. He was prompted by his interrogators to giveamessage to the American people, "Tomy fellowAmericans who have loved ones over here,who know what it's like to miss them,you have the power to make our government bring them home,"he said,"Please, please bring us home so that we can be back where we belong and not over here,wasting our time and our lives and our precious life that we could lousing back in our own country. Please bring us home,It is.America and American people who have that power." Bergdahl isamember of 1st Battalion,501st Parachute Infantr^Regiment,4th Brigade CombatTeam,25th Infantrv'Division,based at Fort Richardson, Alaska, On July 2,theU.S.militar^'saidan.^erican soldier had disappeared after walking off his base in eastern Afghanistan with three Afghan counterparts and was believed to have been taken prisoner. Details of such incidents are routinely held ver^'tightly by the militaryas it works to retrieveami.ssing or captured soldier without giving away any information to captors. But Afghan Police ^n.^abil^ullakheil said the soldier went missing in eastern Paktika province near the border with Pakistan from an American base.The region is known to be Taliban-infested. Afghans in contact with theTaliban told the AP that the soldier was held byaTaliban group led byacommander called I^auhiSangin, who operates in the area where the American was reported missing. They said the fighteisinitially planned to smuggle the soldier across the border into Pakistan but ruled that out because ofU.S.missile strikes and Pakistani bombing attacks against militant targets in the area. Instead, they decided to move him north intoTaliban-controlled areas of ^haB.ni province. The Afghans spoke on condition ofanonymity for fear ofarrest or reprisal. It was impossible to independently confirtTi their information. Abrigade commander forthe Afghan national army in southeastern Afghanistan,Oen.Asrar Ahmad Khan, said Afghan and coalition forces have been working together for 15 days searching for the missing soldier. A^aliban spokesman, Zabiullah^uiahid, said the militants holding the soldier haven't yet set any conditions for his release.

^Copyright 2013 The Salt LakeTnbune All Rights Reserved This Material May Not Be Poblishedaroadoast Rewritten Or Redistributed

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Bowe Bergdahl - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Bowe Bergdahl
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Bowe Robert Bergdahl (bom March 28, 1986) is a United States Army soldier who has been in the captivity of the Taliban-aligned Afghanistan Haqqani network since June 2009.f^"^"''l
Bowe Robert Bergdahl

Contents
1 Early life 2 Military status and disappearance 3 Capture • 3.1 Threat of reprisal • 3.2 Reports of joining the Taliban • 3.3 Release efforts 4 See also 5 References

Born Allegiance Service/branch Years of service Rank Unit

March 28, 1986 Sun Valley, Idaho, U.S. • B United States of America United States Army 2008-present'"
Sergeant (promoted in absentia)

Early life
Bergdahl was bom on March 28, 1986 in Sun Valley, Idaho.

Military status and disappearance

1st Battalion, 501st Infantry RegimenL 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division War in Afghanistan

Battles/wars

Bergdahl was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 501 st Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, based at Fort Richardson, Alaska.'^' During his unit's normal deployment rotation to Afghanistan, he went missing on June 30, 2009, near the town of Yahya Khel in the Paktika Province, which is in the south-east of Afghanistan, right on the border to Pakistan. The area in which Bergdahl was captured is right next to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. He is believed to be held by the Haqqani network, an insurgent group affiliated with the Taliban, probably somewhere in Pakistan.'^' Since then, the Taliban has released five videos showing him in captivity. The Taliban originally demanded $1 million'^^ and the release of 21 Afghan prisoners and Aafia Siddiqui in exchange for Bergdahl's release. They threatened to execute Bergdahl if Siddiqui was not released. Most of the Afghan prisoners are being held at Guantanamo Bay.'^''^' The Taliban later reduced its demand to five Taliban prisoners in exchange for Bergdahl's release,'

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Bowe Bergdahlwikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Pagc2of5

Bergdahl wasaPrivate First Class (E-3)whcn captured,In June 2010,he was promoted to Specialist (E4)'^^^andtoScrgcant(E5)onJuncl7,20ll'^^^

Capture
On Julyl8,2009,theTaliban rclcascdavidco showing the captured Bergdahl,In the video,Bergdahl appeared downcast and frightened,ADcpartmcnt ofDefense statement issued on Julyl9confimicd that Bergdahl was declared "missing/whereabouts unknown" on Julyl,and his status was changed to "missing/captured" on July3.'^^^ In the 28-minutc video his captors held up his dog tags to establish that the captured man was Bergdahl.Bergdahl gave the date as Julyl4and mentioned an attack that occurrcdthatday'^^^'^^^'^^^ Accountsofhis capture diffcr.Thc version offered by Bergdahl,in the video, is that he was captured when he fell behind onapatrol.'^^CNi^,in its report, cites bothTaliban andU.S.military sources, the former alleging he was ambushed after becoming drunk offbasc,and the latter denying that claim stating: "TheTaliban arc known for lying and what they arc claiming (is)not true."'^^ Other sources said Bergdahl walked offhis base after his shifi.'^^^ADcpartmcnt ofDefense spokesperson, Lieutenant Commander Christine Sidcnstrickcr,said,"l'm glad to sec he appears unharmed, but again, this isa Taliban propaganda video.They arc exploiting the soldier in violation oflntemational law."'^^'^' According to the Associated Press, General NabiMullakhcil ofthe Afghan National Police said the capture occurred in Paktika Province.Their other sources inform them that he was captured bya Taliban group led by MaulviSangin,who has moved him to Ohazni Province.7^^^ C^t^^^^^^^ quoted sources who speculated about the increased difficulty ofarcscuc mission ifBcrgdahl had been smuggled across the nearby border into Pakistan, CNN described two PashtolanguagclcafictsthcU,S,military was distributing in seeking Bergdahl, One showcdasmiling 01 shaking hands with Afghan childrcn,withacaption that called himagucst in Afghanistan,The other showcdadoor being broken down, and threatened that those holding Bergdahl would be hunted down. In December 2009,fivc months afier Bergdahl's disappearance, the media arm of the AfghanTaliban announced the release ofanew video of"aU,S,soldier captured in Afghanistan,"titlcd "One ofThcir PcoplcTcstificd,"In the announcement theTaliban did not name the American, but the onlyU,S,soldier known to be in captivity is BcrgdahLU.S.military officials have been searching for Bergdahl,but it is not publicly known whether he is even being held in Afghanistan or in neighboring Pakistan, an area off limits toU.S.forces based in Afghanistan.'^^^ On December 25,another video was released that shows Bergdahl inacombat uniform and hclmct.'^^^'^^^iJc described his place ofbirth, deployment to Afghanistan and subsequent capture. Ue then made several statements regarding his humane treatment by his captors, contrasting this to the abuses suffered by insurgents in prisons. iJcfinishedby saying that America should not be in Afghanistan and that its presence there is just another Vietnam.On April7, 2010, theTaliban rclcascdathird video ofBcrgdahl,now withafull head ofhairandabcard, pleading for the release ofAfghan prisoners held at Guantanamo and Bagram.'^^^'^^^ In November 2010, Bergdahl appeared briefiy inafourth video.'^^^ In May20ll,Bergdahl appeared briefiy inafifih video.'^^^

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http://cn.wikipcdia.org/wiki/Bowc Bergdahl 7/2/2013

Bowe Bergdahl wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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In December 2011, it was reported that Bergdahl tried to escape three months earlier but was recaptured afier three days.'^^^ In June 2013,Bergdahl's parents rcccivcdalcttcr fiom him through the Red Cross.'^^^ ^^^^^t^^^t^^^t^i^^^ OnFcbruary 4,2010, the Afghan Taliban demanded the release of Aafia Siddiqui,aPakistani scientist who was convicted byaU.S.court on charges of attempting to murdcrU.S.soldiers in Afghanistan, and threatened to execute Bergdahl if their demand was not mct,'^^^'^^^ TheTaliban claimed that members of Siddiqui's family had requested their assistance. ^^^^t^^^t^^^^i^i^^^^^^^^iH^^^ Fox News reported in August 20l0thataTaliban commander named iJajlNadccm said Bergdahl was helping to train theTaliban in bomb making and infantry tactics.The Pentagon dismissed the reports as Taliban propaganda.'^^^'^^' ^^^^^^^^^^o^^^ The missing serviceman's fate is tied up inU.S.efforts to brokcrapcacc deal between theTaliban and the Afghan govcrnmcnLahighlcvcl,high-risk diplomatic initiative which appeared to be on the cusp of abrcakthrough before theTaliban suspended preliminary talks in March 2012.For months, U.S, negotiators were seeking to arrange the transfer of fivcTaliban detainees held at Guantanamo Bay military prison to the Gulf state of(^atar,Thc transfer was intended as one ofascrics of confidencebuilding measures designed to open the door to political talks between theTaliban and Afghan President Uamidl^arzai'sgovcmmcnt.'^^^ That movc-at the center ofU.S.strategy for ending the long, costly confiict in Afghanistan-was also supposed to lead directly to Bowc's release.TheTaliban has consistently called for the United States to release those held at Guantanamo Bay in exchange fi^r ficcing western prisoners. But the Guantanamo transfer proposal, which would have required notification to Congress, ground toahalt when theTaliban rcjcctcdU.S,conditions designed to ensure transfcrrcdTaliban would not slip away and rc-cmcrgc as military leaders,The Obama administration has since become pessimistic that any such peace deal with theTaliban will occur before the bulk of NATO forces leave in20l4 '^^^

^eealso
^ Ahmed l^ousayAltaic, United States Army^Thc last American serviceman missing in Iraq,Uis remains were recovered in Fcbruary20l2, ^ Michael Scott Spcichcr AUnited States Navy F/A-l8Uomct pilot shot down in the Gulf^ar whose status became the subject ofunccrtainty and headlines, and whose death was not confirmed until August 2,2009,aficr positive identification ofhis remains afier they were discovered near his crash site.

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. Bowe Bergdahl - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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References
1. Hastings, Michael (June 21, 2012). "The Last American Prisoner of War" (http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/americas-last-prisoner-of-war-20l20607). Rolling Stone. Jann Wenner. Retrieved February 19, 2013. A «6 ^''^ZPamela Hess, Lolita Baldur (July 19, 2009). "Bowe Bergdahl: Soldier Captured In Afghanistan Identified As 23-Year-Old Idahoan" (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/I9/bowe-bergdahl-soldiercap_n_239930.html). Huffington PosL Retrieved July 19, 2009. ^ " * ^ Declan Walsh (July 19, 2009). "Taliban release video of captured US soldier" (http://www.guardian.co.uk/worid/2009/jul/I9/afghanistan-captured-american-soldier-video). The Guardian (London). Retrieved July 19, 2009. " * ^ "U.S. soldier captured by Taliban: 'I'm afraid'" (http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/19/afghanistan.soldier.hostage/). CNN. July 19, 2009. Retrieved July 19, 2009. ^ John Miller (July 19, 2009). "Soldier held in Afghanistan is 23-year-old Idahoan" (http://www.sltrib.com/ci j 2871687). Associated Press, Retrieved July 19, 2009, ^ http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.eom/_news/2012/05/10/l 16331 15-frustrated-dad-of-taliban-prisoner-bowebergdahl-takes-matters-into-own-hands71ite ^ http://www.magicvalley.com/news/local/wood-river/article_5143da36-6583-5f6a-bb395b9ba8cf9232.html "Pakistan News Service" (http://web.archive.Org/web/20100208153710/http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml7224245). PakTribune. Retrieved 2010-05-13. Heintz, Jim; Amir Shah (December 25, 2009). "Family pleas for captive US soldier's release" (http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2009-12-25-928925036_x.htm). USA Today. Associated Press. Retrieved October 24, 2011. ^ http://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/national/article_d8d8c366-d9b6-I Ie2-9db6-001a4bcf887a.html ^ http://www.idahostatesman.com/2010/06/30/1251404/bowe-bergdahls-hailey-family-and.html ^ "Press release 14580" (http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid= 14580). U.S. Department of Defense. ^ United States Department of Defense (July 19, 2009). "DoD Announces Soldier Status as MissingCaptured" (http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx7ReleaselD= 12827). United States Department of Defense. Retrieved December 25, 2009. Miller, John (July 19, 2009). "Pentagon IDs Soldier Held by Taliban" (http://www.cbsnews.eom/stories/2009/07/l 9/world/main5173084.shtml). CBS News. Associated Press. Retrieved December 29, 2009. ^ Video: U.S. Soldier, Bowie Bergdahl Captured By raZ/Zia/i (http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=3NJVlXIRfWs). CNN. Retrieved December 29, 2009, ^ "U.S. soldier captured by Taliban: 'I'm afraid'" (http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/19/afghanistan.soldier.hostage/index.html). CNN. July 19, 2009. Retrieved December 29, 2009. ^ http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32007586/ns/woHd_news-south_and_central_asia/t/parents-captured-giplead-privacy/ ^ Riechmann, Deb (December 16, 2009). "Terror monitor: Tape of captured US soldier due" (http://abcnews.go.com/lnternational/wireStory7id=9351352). ABC News. Associated Press. Retrieved May 18, 2010. ^ "VIDEO: Talibani objavili snimku zarobljenog vojnika (Video: Talibans publish a recording of captured soldier)" (http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/video-talibani-objavili-snimku-zarobljenog-vojnika.html) (in Croatian). Dnevnik.hr. December 25, 2009. Retrieved December 29, 2009. ^ "Taliban video shows captive US soldier Bowe Bergdahl" (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/8430431.stm). BBC News. December 25, 2009. Retrieved December 29, 2009. "American captured soldier Bowe Robert Bergdahl "Plea to his government"" (http://www.youtube.com/watch7v=2KzcTq5NFBY&feature=player_embedded). YouTube, 2010-04-07, Retrieved 2010-05-13,

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3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

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Bowe Bcrgdahl-Wikipcdia, the ficc encyclopedia

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22. ^l^l^(http://www,google,com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gyu1qyNrWNI^buwyFXg5D463YYDgD9FUI^2B01) 23. ^bttp://www.^rmytimes.com/news/2010/12/ap-afghanistan-taliban-video-bowe-bergdahl-120810/ 24. ^"DadofCaptiveU.SSoldier Makes Public Appeal to Pakistan" (http://www.foxnews.com/world/20II/05/07/dad-captive soldier makes public appeal-pakistan/). /^^^/^^^^May 7,2011. 25. ^http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/06/usprisoner-bowebergdahlsfailedattempttoescapefrom-taliban.html 26. ^http://www.cbsnews.com/8301 201_162 57588087/powbowe-bergdahlsparentsreceiveletterfromcaptive-son/ 27. ^Paktribune staff (February 5,2010)."Taliban to execute USsoldier if Aafia not released" (http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml7224245). paktribune. 28. ^MushtaqYusufzai (February 5,2010)."Taliban to execute USsoldier if Aafia not released" (http://www.webcitation.org/query7url^http^3A^2F^2Fwww.thenews.com.pk^ 2Ftop_story_detail.asp'^3FId^3D27072^date^20I0 02 06). The News IntemationaL Archived from the original (http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp7Id^27072)on February 6, 2010. "The Afghan Taliban onThursday demanded the release ofDr Aafia Siddiqui,aPakistani scientist who has been convicted by the US court on charges ofber alleged attempt to murder USsoldiers in Afghanistan, and threatened to execute an American soldier they were holding currently.They claimed Aafia Siddiqui^sfamily had approached theTaliban network throughaJirga of notables, seeking their assistance to put pressure on theU.S.to provide her justice." 29. ^http://www.ktvb.com/news/ReportsaboutcapturedIdahosoldiernottruel01339234,html 30. ^"Taliban: Captured Soldier Joined Cause" (http://www.myfoxny .com/dpps/news/taliban^3A-capturedsoldier joined cause dpgonc km 20I00822 9290058) FoxNews. 2010 08 22. Retrieved20I2 03 05, 31. ^Ryan, Missy (May9,2012)."Family pleads forU.S. prisoner at heart of Afghan peace push" (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/10/us usa afghanistan prisoner idUSBRE8481BI20120510) .^^1^^^^,^ (Washington). 32. ^Rosenberg, Matthew; Nordland,Rod(Octoberl,20I2)."U.S.Abandoning Hopes for Taliban Peace Deal" (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/world/asia/us-scales-back-plans-for-afghan-peace.html7 pagewanted^all).7^^^/^^ii^^t^^^7^^^^^,^. Retrieved fiom "http://cn,wikipcdia,org/w/indcx,php7titlc^Bowc Bcrgdahl^oldid^56l243088" Categories: 1986 births Living people People fiom SunVallcy,Idaho American military personnel of thcWar in Afghanistan (2001 present) American prisoners ofwar United States Army soldiers War in Afghanistan (2001 prescnt)prisoncrs of war

This page was last modified on 23 June 20l3atl8:49, Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution SharcAlikc License; additional terms may apply,By using this site,you agree to thcTcrmsofUsc and Privacy Policy, Wikipedia^ isarcgistcrcd trademark ofthe WikimcdiaFoundation, Inc,,anon-profit organization.

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Family picas for captive US soldier's rclcasc-USATOOAY,com

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Family pleas for captive US soldier's release
Posted 12/26/2009 3:57 AM I Comment I Recommend E-mail | Print |

Vi

By Jim Heintz And Amir Shah, Associated Press Writers KABUL — The Taliban released a video Friday of an American soldier captured in Afghanistan, showing him apparently healthy but spouting criticism about the U.S. military operation. In Idaho, Pfc. Bowe Bergdahl's family pleaded on Christmas Day for his release and urged him to "stay strong," Bergdahl disappeared June 30 while based in eastern Afghanistan and is the only known American serviceman in captivity. The Taliban claimed his capture in a video released in mid-July that showed the young Idaho soldier appearing downcast and frightened. He hadn't been heard from until Friday's video, in which he looks well and speaks clearly. Although the video was released Friday, it was unclear when it was made, and NATO spokesman Col. Wayne Shanks told The New York Times it was not evidence that Bergdahl is still alive. He suggested the video may be a pastiche of clips from earlier this year. "We are not using this as a proof-of-life video," Shanks told the newspaper. "It's still to be determined when it was made, but it could have been made even several months ago. It has a lot of editing pieces." The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force confirmed hours later that the man in the video was Bergdahl, but denounced both its timing and content.
Insure SAfgt in one

I Enlarge This is an image from video made available by IntelCenter shows a video frame grab from the Taliban propaganda video released Friday Dec 25. 2009 purportedly showing U.S. soldier Pfc. Bowe Bergdahl. 23, of Ketchum Idaho who was captured more than five months ago in eastern Afghanistan,It could not be confirmed immediately that it was Bergdahl in the new video, which was released to The Associated Press and other news organizations The man identifies himself as Bergdahl, born in Sun Valley, Idaho, and gives his rank, birth date, blood type, his unit and mother's maiden name before beginning a lengthy verbal attack on the U.S. conduct of the war in Afghanistan and its relations with Muslims. (AP Photo/via IntelCenter) IntelCenter Logo must not be cropped NO SALES

"This is a horrible act which exploits a young soldier, who was clearly compelled to read a prepared statement," said a statement from U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, ISAF's spokesman, "To release this video on Christmas Day is an affront to the deeply concerned family and friends of Bowe Bergdahl, demonstrating contempt for religious traditions and the teachings of Islam." Lt. Col. Tim Marsano ofthe Idaho National Guard issued a statement Friday from the family of Bergdahl, who live outside Hailey, Idaho, in their statement, the family urged the captors "to let our only son come home." And to their son, the family said, "We love you and we believe In you. Stay strong," Marsano met with the family Friday morning at their home. He told the AP that the family had not seen the video but had talked to other relatives who had seen it. In the video, Bergdahl is shown seated, facing the camera, wearing sunglasses and what appears to be a U.S. military helmet and uniform. On one side of the image, it says: "An American soldier imprisoned by the Mujahideen

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http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2009-l2-25-928925036_x.htm 7/2/2013

AP Exclusive: Taliban offer to free US soldier Bowe Bergdahl - AP Exclusive: Taliban of,. Page I of I

AP Exclusive: Taliban offer t o free US soldier Bowe Bergdahl
KATHY GANNON,Associated Press KAY JOHNSON,Associated Press | Posted: Thursday, June 20, 2013 8:36 am KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The Taliban proposed a deal in which they would free a U.S, soldier held captive since 2009 in exchange for five oftheir most senior operatives at Guantanamo Bay, while Afghan President Hamid Karzai eased his opposition Thursday to joining planned peace talks. The idea of releasing these Taliban prisoners has been controversial, U.S. negotiators hope they would join the peace process but fear they might simply retum to the battlefield, and Karzai once scuttled a similar deal partly because he felt the Americans were usurping his authority. The proposal to trade U.S. Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl for the Taliban detainees was made by senior Taliban spokesman Shaheen Suhail in response to a question during a phone interview with The Associated Press from the militants' newly opened political office in Doha, the capital of the Gulf nation of Qatar. The prisoner exchange is the first item on the Taliban's agenda before even starting peace talks with the U.S., said Suhail, a top Talibanfigurewho served as first secretary at the Afghan Embassy in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad before the Taliban govemment's ouster in 2001. "First has to be the release of detainees," Suhail said Thursday when asked about Bergdahl. "Yes. It would be an exchange. Then step by step, we want to build bridges of confidence to go forward." The Obama administration was noncommittal about the proposal, which it said it had expected the Taliban to make. "We've been very clear on our feelings about Sgt. Bergdahl and the need for him to be released," State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said. "We have not made a decision to ... transfer any Taliban detainees from Guantanamo Bay, but we anticipate, as I've said, that the Taliban will all raise this issue." Bergdahl, 27, of Hailey, Idaho, is the only known American soldier held captive from the Afghan war. He disappeared from his base in southeastern Afghanistan on June 30, 2009, and is believed held in Pakistan. Suhail said Bergdahl "is, as far as I know, in good condition."

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http://www,idahostatejournal.com/news/national/article_d8d8c366-d9b6-lle2-9db6-00la4b„. 7/2/2013

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In another town, Iraqis say US killed civilians

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In another town, Iraqis say US killed civilians
By Reuters 06/01/06 — SAMARRA, Iraq (Reuters) - U.S. forces denied on Wednesday a new accusation, from Iraqi officers, that American troops killed unarmed civilians in their home this month. Amid mounting public interest in the United States in an inquiry into a suspected massacre at Haditha, the allegations about the deaths of three people at Samarra are among many that Iraqi Prime Minister Nun al-Maliki said this week were trying his patience with the U.S. military's "excuses" over "mistakes". Iraqi army and police officers and several people who said they were witnesses and relatives of the dead said U.S. soldiers killed two women, aged 60 and 20, and a mentally handicapped man in their home on May 4 after insurgents fired on the troops. Spokesmen forthe 101st Airbome Division, which controls Samarra and Salahaddin province north of Baghdad, said soldiers from its 3rd Brigade Combat Team killed two unnamed men and a woman in a house who had "planned to attack the soldiers". In an initial statement on May 5, the unit had said troops killed three people who had already fired on them from a roof A senior Iraqi police officer from the province's Joint Coordination Center (JCC), a unit that liaises between the U.S. and Iraqi security forces, said: "There was shooting outside the house. Samarra police told us that American soldiers went inside and shot three people, including a mentally handicapped man. "They were not armed and there were no gunmen in the house," said the officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear ofbeing targeted by insurgents who routinely kill policemen. There are frequent disputes over incidents between U.S. military and Iraqi officials in Salahaddin, where the Sunni Arab revolt against occupation and the Shi'ite-led government has been strong. U.S. officers have complained of "disinformation" from police as part of an insurgent campaign to discredit them. RELATIVES' STATEMENTS On May 6, Army Colonel Fadhil Muhammed, assistant manager of the JCC, said in a statement: "Multinational forces raided the house of a citizen and killed three people and wounded two from one family at 7 p.m. on May 4." He described the dead as "martyrs", indicating the authorities believed them innocent. In his family home in the Sikaak district of Samarra, 100 km (60 miles) north of Baghdad. Zedan Khalaf Habib told a Reuters reporter that the soldiers killed his 60-year-old wife, Khairiya Nisiyif Jassim, his son Khaled Zedan Khalaf 40, who was mentally handicapped, and daughter
Defense Reciprocal Discovery 011122

http://www.infonTiationclearinghouse,info/articlel3459.htm[9/ll/2012 12:53:48 AM]

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In anotbertoivn, Iraqis say US l^illed civilians

Anaam Zedan Khalaf, 20. Habib, 66, said he was hit in the arm when soldiers fired fromadoorway intoaroom wherel5 people had taken reftige in his house afteragunfight broke out nearby.Another daughter said soldiers placedarifie next to her brother's body and took photographs to suggest he had been armed when killed. "Iwas sitting next to my house when clashes erupted between gunmen and U.S.fbrces,"said Habib, sitting in his home three weeks later."l went indoors with my family toasafe room." U.S.soldiers then broke down the door, he said: "Four soldiers stood at the door ofthe room where we were hiding.Therewere15ofus.They started firing.lwas shot in the arm and then one ofthe soldiers dragged me ouL "The firing went on against my family,Iwas lying face down in another room and they dragged one ofmy relatives over me." Habib said he woke fi^omafaint as someone called his name: "It wasapoliceman.He was crying,The room was full ofblood.Afew minutes later he showed me the bodies of my relatives. "Theywere in black body bags,"he said, providingahome video showingthe room streaked with blood "STACEO EVIDENCE" Shireen,his36yearolddaughter,said:"Afterthey killed my brother Khaled they shothim three more times in the chest and they putarifie between his legs to show he was armed and they took aphotographofhim." Asked to comment on tbe allegation. Master SergeantTerry Webster of thelOlst Airbome said the soldiers came under fire tromarooftop after arresting three people nearby who were suspected ofplanting roadside bombs: "The troops suppressed the rooftop fire, entered and cleared the home.Three people in the home, one woman and two men,were killed in the ensuingfirefighLAsecondwoman was injured and transported toanearby hospital,"Webster wrote in an e-maiL "The injured woman conlessed that the three people killed had planned to attack the soldiers as they drove by the house. "No Coalition forces were injured during the engagement." The unit's initial statement on May5said that the three dead were those who had opened fire from the roof:"As the soldiers began to leave the area with the detainees, they came under attack with small arms fire fi^omanearby rooftop, "The troops suppressed the rooftop fire and entered and killed the three attackers from the rooftop. An Iraqi citizen was injured during thefirefighLbut still provided the soldiers with information about the rooftop firers." The White House pledged onTuesday to provide ftill details once investigations are complete into whether Marines killed up to 24unarmed civilians in Haditha,aSunni city in the wesL and whether they tried to cover it up.
Defense Reciprocal Discovers http:i^/^www.intbrmationclearingboiise.intb^articlcl3459.btm^9^II^2t^I2 12:53^^^ 01112:^ 000^0'I^^^B^

In another town, Iraqis say US killed civilians

(Additional reporting by Michael Oeorgy and Alastair Macdonald in Baghdad) © Reuters 2006 Click on "comments" below to read or post comments - Click Here For Comment Policy Comments (32) Are Comments Offensive? Unsuitable? Email us
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011124 O O O C O O J 4

Defense Exhibit EEE have been entered into the record as a CD/DVD and v^ill be maintained with the original Record of Trial

,Diaft:The Most Wanted Leaks of 2009 - WikiLeaks

T

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DraftiThe Most Wanted Leaks of 2009
Frum WikiLeaks Jump Ur. iiiivitLiHioii, sciirvh 2009'.<i Mosi Wiiiitcd Leaks —the concealed document or recordings mosi sought after by a country's journalists, aclivists, historians, lawyer.), police, or human rights investigators.

Help us cliirily and background the nominuiions so v e can discover which are significant and which arc nol. You may secuicly and anonymously add infomiation to this page fbr each entry (click "«dil" next tu each coiiiitiy). WikiLenks will prioritize the list based on the available infomiation and seek to obtain the leading candidates directly, through the legal system, or indirectly through ours network ut'jiHirnalisfs, inielligence souix;es, volunlccts and fenders. I t you email us ([email protected] ) we will alert you when the record has been obtained. The current order reflects the order of submission and is unlikely tu be related to the final oi-der. W iiiners for each country will receive a cash prize uplo 1000 EUR, depending on how many countries submit. Documents or other material s added nominated must: • Be likely to have political, diplomatic, ethical or historical impact on release • Be known to exist or have existed. • Be plausibly ubtiiiiiable to a well motivated insider or outsider. For nstJincc :hc entire collection of documents held bythe Chinese Ministry of Public Security ( ' I ' AlAiJvfnlll^i-'Ctnfi) is not plausibly obtainable, but a specific document or group of documents may be, • Be well defined, and if possible, specific. Three examples of wvU (.kfiiiedmt\ sped fir. • Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in l.'S Custudv. 20 Nov . 'WH. • [ K l Tiimn rmiAm*)W.9imi»iwl'w, intcllltynct; inlfrt-t-pl m.i;i !(XW. • C'lmip Ucltn Standard Operating Proixduie (20C4), An acceptable example, which is known ir> e.ti.rl and well ckfwed, but not specific: • The eun oni list of websites or URLS filtered by the Chinese Public Security Bureau's "Great Firewall of China" censorship system. • Be described in enough detail so that a court, dissident insider or visiting outsider not already familiar with the material or its suhjecl iiiiitler may be able to quickly locate il, and will be motivated tu do so. • Shoulc, where possible, list all organizations, locations and-'or \v«bsites suspected of holding the material or having infwmation iihoiii how to access it. He atleiitivE to the content ol your nomination Do not worry about making fomiatling mistakes. All copies ofthis page are kept and reviewed. Ill the rare cases were a document might be destroyed ur vaulted if it appeared on this list, .send your nomination privately lo wl-cdilor;<;j3ljsf.org or securely via CJiat,

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2',) New /ciihiiid 21 NiKW 22 NoTMrav 23 Puerto Rico 24 RonmriL RvNariJii 2b Russia 2 7 Slovenia 25 Smith A'tri^;^ 29 Sudan Ml Syria % i Svvilzcrliilld .^2 Swa?tblld .^3Tnni«b.JantlTobaho

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.IS I'liitcd Kitmdiiiii .Vl 1. riilfd St.iles • "MI.I Bi.lkdalub.i>e--. « I'edcral ;xi'iiics • .V'.' HmikiiiK
• .Wi.4 h i IVII Ul line 1 1

International organizations

• Media • 3f».(> Kehmion J7 Vatican

BildeibBi^" Crniup meeting minute.\ papers aid annual reports ofsince I") 54 WikiLeaks has so'TO,gaj?>a'rg»dY. Bilderberg is an annual off-the record conference of transatlantic political econoini: and ideological agenda setters. As ail historically impuilani confidential dociincnl collection it is probably only equaled by Cabinet minutes and high level intelligence and diplomatic assessments. Leads: There are some older, previously unnoticed records in boxes at Uni of Illinois ll*t|\''l''3'%ji|?i'ar.)%jll!iMm.e.dU'4ivluvcs u isW ISS(i51.niir(19Sf>-19701 Ihe Geiage Bush library,

l^^^|.^v^lglc^^^,^^i^rafFThc_Most_WaiUixl_Lcuks_i)r_2009

Saturday, June 01, 2013 15:37:47 PM

,Draft:The Most Wanted Leaks of 2009 - WikiLeaks

Page 2 of 9

h;tp:.,'bush!ibraiv.tamu.i;du,'i'esgarch''fiiKl:ni; aids'ndfs.tlK-ttAV'f-t-.pdf, the Eisenhower Library in Kansas h:in;.,'www.ciseiihnwer.ule\ns edij/Rcsearch,'Kindinf Aid»rDf !i.'Jackswi CD Recotds.ixlf andal the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam (1953-1989) hitn:.vwww.usa,iii'aiv:hives-en.'filcK.'wai)X()7tlK?tull.nliP • Requests to the Security Council in 2003 that the Security Council look at what was happening in Darfur, and any notes ofdiscussions leading to the decision not to look at the situation • Documents regarding the founding and operation of Alluince Base, cover name for a secret Western Counterlerrorisi Intelligence Center in Paris.

.Austria
• K-M»il traffic between minister offinancePixiell and Christian Konrad, who is advocate general of Raiffeisen bank. • E Mail I rattle of Fl'O delegate Anton Mahdalik with Viennese mayor Michasl Ihtupl and/or deputy mayor Michael Ludwig containing threats when renting municipal ground to the Viennese trailor park ("Wagenplatz Wien"). • Source-code as we l as cerlificatuins for the Austrian e-Voling system used in students elections,

Australia
• • • • Federal cabinet minutes fiom the special session held on 18 March 2003 QjJiiSiSi rhc report ofthe national broadband network expert working group. Versions of the ACMA URL blacklist newer than 19 March 2009. Full details of filtering hardwaic'softwaic vendors paiticipatmg m government-sponsored ISP-level censorship technology trials, including (but not limited to): " Any and all communications between filter vendors and government departments prior to, during, and afier the trials " Any and all transactions, contracts, and other financial arrangements involving filler vendors • URL blacklist(s) used during above trials. Alleged (by government) to be ACMA URL blacklist, • Full statistical breakdown of results of above Iriafs, since Enex Testl.ab will not make them publicly available, and the public report will be compiled by the same government department wh;ch is spearheading the censorship proposal (see licit, and h£r£• URL blacklist as used by Watchdog NZ curing iwivale censorship technology trial by ISP Kxelel in May 2009, Alleged (by Watchdog) to have been IWF list (-lee United Kingdom), > Written exam NSW police officers must take annually before they can be issued with Tasers. • Volume 1 of the New South Wales-Commonwealth .loint Task Force Report on Drug Trafficking, It was suppressed at time of publication and lias no I yet been released. Possibly contains information on Kugan Hand Dank, CIA and drug trafficking ami/or conneclioirs of Peter Alleles and Dela Csidei to drugs. But we wuni know until il is no longer suppressed. • Speed Camera jonlracloii; - in parliciilar • Revenue derived from contractors privately operating speed cameras • The amount and value of incentive/bonus payments or kickbacks paid to these contractors for every ticket issued • Details ofthe shady (often verbal] fmc "quotas" issued lo the staff operating the cameras • Details of training, guides and or manuals given to camera operators and Iheir mnnagemcni " Any documentary evidence explaining why operators persist in operat.ng cameras in violation of police camera policy (ie. less than 200 metres from a speed zone change, using forged calibration certificates (for instance the elusive Mr Burden who works in the non existent department of communications at RMIT, and seems unable tci sign his own signature (he same way twice), using illegally modified or concealed speed cameras, operating near known sources of reflection or interference which will have the etTcct of incicasiiig the incidence of "over reading" resulting ir. morefinesheing generiited) • Any memos or documenlui^ evidence of compliance between court officers and speed camera prosecutors explaining why courts keep niling in favour of often cut and dry cases that should have been otherwise dismis.ied • Details, memos and reasons why lax payer (liiuled prosccutore are supplied free of charge to often known shady camera contracting companies » Details, memos or other documentary evidence that explains why costs are always offered or awarded lo the prosecutor, ami contrary to law denied fo the defendant even when they win a case. • Details of any links between camera contractors banned from operatin^^ cameras due to fraud, and puppet coinpiitncs who pick up their entire flcsl and work force overnight and continue lo illegally operate them. (lor example whul is the Tcnix and Scrco relationship) • What the revenue raised by these cameras is actually spent on; and what percentage is actually used in any sort of road safety initiatives. « Details of speed related accidents and deaths that occurred on speed camera siles ° Details ofthe number offinesissued tn deceased people who would have otherwise been alive had the site been operated by a |X)lice officer who pulled them over instead of covertly taking a photo of thctn • Any proof that speed contractor witnesses are otkn i legal unultribulcd "proxies" specially coached for giving testimony and committing fraud • Details of anti-spam systems that are abused lo automatically block or disconnect users and companies inteiiiet/websiles (ie Denial of service. coiporate.'Tinansial sabotage.) when they have not actually been spamming. (eg, deliberately add a companies email to hundreds of spam lists, until they start generating bounce messages, then report them for spamming to take them offthe inleriicl possibly even putting I hem out af business as a result)

Bahrain
• Documents disclosing Ihe number of citizenships that have been granted in the last few years, in an effort to change the country's demography. See Political naturalisationUJ-

1^hi|t^|:jjiv^c^g^^l^^ran:Thc>losl_Wu]iled LL^^

Saturday, June 01, 2013 1 5:37:47 PM

,Diaft:The Most Wanted Leaks of 2009 - WikiLeaks Canada

Page 3 of 9

• Documents disclosing the number of.4uthorizaf ion to Carry permits the provinces have issued for the purposes of presei-vation of life Provincial Chief Firearms Officers have lofused toreleasethis information citing that il could potentially compromise the identities ofthose that hold licenses.

China
• A list of URLs and keywords censoredfilteredby the Great Firewall of Chii ai. WikiLeaks ha.s previously released related iiiforinaiioii, for example, watch lists, policies and several thousand URLs for CCTV and Baidu, but nor for general http filtering. • Policy options on Darfur formulated in response to the so-called Genocide Olympics campaign led by American actress, Mia Farrow, and notes of meetings in 2007 between Stephen Spielberg and Chinese Foreign Ministry officials prior to .Spielberg's resignation as Artistic Director ofthe 200S Beijing Olympics.

Colombia
• The DAS (Depuitamenlo Adniinistintivo de Seguridad) isrepottedto have surveilled a wide array of public officials, private citizens, and organizations. Documents wanted: contracts to supply software for internet surveillance to Colombian pol.cy agencies and details ofthe software supplied,

Egypt
• The complete list of current polilieal prisoners and the charges against them.

Finland
• riie so called Tiitisen Lista, the list of 18 persons claimed to have been in active contact with East German security ser\'ic«s (Stasi). The list was received from the West German intelligence serv ices (BND) in 1990 and since classified by the order of President Koivisto as adviced by the head of the Finnish Security Police (Suojelupoliisi), Seppo Tiitinen. It is rumoured that several cumenl or fonner ley Finnish politicians appear on the list • The Bilderberg 2009 raport, Finnish President Taija Halonen secured the papers. The request comes Finnish ex-President Martti Ahtisaar., a former Bilderberg participant.

France
• The list of people with an office at the Elys^e and Iheir function (lo expose resident lobbyists, etc.) • Document regarding Ihe founding m n A operation of Alliance Base, cover name for a secret Western Counterterrorist Intelligence Center in Paris. • The Monthly Health Report of President Nicolas Sarkozy, as promised by himself during the last presidential elections.

Germany
• The SiaSlfilesofFederal Chancellor Angela Dorothea Merkel (maiden name Kasner) and other leading poliHciaiis, which are known fo exist, but withheld from public, • The StHsi liles relating to operation Gladio / stay behind organisations in relation to riyhi-mim icrrori.sni m Gcmiarv. as per a parliamentary request by the Green party. • The complete Toll-CloUect contracts. • Cross-Border Leasing contracts of the Berlin Transport Corporation (BVG), • The so called ".4tlas der Wut", a document about die risk ofriotsin different german regions. The list is said to be updated regulary and was first v/riltcn in 2005. • The list of NPD party members, • The censorship filter list for llie proposed national, mandatory censorship system. The list will be compiled by Gennan federal criminal police BKA and distributed to intemet service providers. • The contents of the contract between the BKA and some ISPs lhal has already been signed, but is kept secret due to "public safety" and copyright concerns (see hltp:c'bloK Iefe.de/.'ts h4iaKaffi). • The List of Media Harmful to Young People (the censorship system already in place). The "virtual medio" part ofthis list is distributed to search engine providei-s and is illegal to publish. It probably could be reverse engineered using ihe differences between googlecom and google,de search results. Also, ifyou want to know ifa specific medium is on the list, you can send an enquiry to lisiciifibuixicspructsk'l e dc ("Bundespnlfstelle'" is the agency responsible for keeping lho list). • • • • Ursula von der Leycn's driver's logs (Fahitenbuechcr) that she rcfu&es lo make public. Specifics of the "Stcuer-ldciitifikaiionsnummer'"8 structure (see de,wikipedia,org.'wiki/Steuer-lD) Complete/partial database of "Stcuei-ldentifikationsnumnier's A list of vaxincs ordered (and its order cMifinnations) by the german government

1^
l^^|l^j^^^lL-^^^,i|i^l^rafl:Thc Most Wanted_Lcaks_of_20()9 Saturday, June 01, 2013 15:37:47 PM

Di afLThc Most Wanted Leaks of 2009 - WikiLeaks

Page 4 of 9

Greece
• Documents related to Ihe Athens affair that have yet to be released (including those from countries other than Greece,)

Guatemala
• All documents on Plan Victoria 82. Plan Sofia and Plan Finneza 83. • Final report ofUnited Nations' Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) inio the killing of 200.000 Mayan people and the involvement of Ihe US government and American corporations. The report official sources (militar interviews, campaign plans, etc) are kepi secret by the UN in NYC, • Documents on Canadian corporation named Goldcorp with a mining operation in Guatemala, especially infornialion nn where the Cio,d they exhract is processed and who is buying the gold (we think it might be a Swiss ctimpany).
Detail:

PLAN VICTORIA AND PLAN SOFIA* in Ihe process of trying to bring military personal involved in human rights violations and massacres lhal happen during the civil war in Guatemala to justice, the military have been required lo declassify many war documents. In a case, that wcni all the way to Ihe Supreme Court of Guatemala, the Court dictateti a sentence that con firmed the obligation of the Ministry of Defense of Guatemala to hand over the official documentation of four specific military operations: Campana Sofia 82, Victoria 82, Firmeza 83 and Operacion Ixil. The Supreme Court sentence indicated that this achieves had to be declassified and made public yesterday. These military operations were carried out in the SOs, According to the CEH, Historical Clarification Commission of Guatemala final neport contained in "Guatemala: Memory ofSilence", these militai-y operations resulted in massacres and severe human rights violations. The .Minister of Defense .Abraham Valen/.uela only delivered ptininl information about plans Victoria 82 and Firmeza 83. two ofthe four requested plans. He indicated that he had no knowledge of ihe other two plans before he became Minister of Defense and that he ignores where Ihe documentation could be. He stated thai lie could not deliver Ihe coinplele plans "Victoria 82" y "Firmeza 83" because certain information was consitlcred state secret and a concern of national security, • "Plan Sofia" a derivative of "Plan Victoria 82", was of special concern to human rights activists; this plan was conceived in July 1982, four months afier General Ffrain Rios Monti came into power, '• • SO WE WILL RbALLY LIKE TO OBTAIN THE COMPLETE DOCUMENTS OF PLAN VICTORIA 82, PLAN SOFIAAND PLAN FIRMEZA 83* • CEII ARCHIVES* The United Nations' Historical Clarification Commission (CLH) lor Guatemala issued a report where the US government and several American corporations were accused of complicity in Ihe genocide of nearly 200,000 Mayan people during Guateinala?s bloody 36-year civil war. The final 3,600-page CEH report clearly places the blame for mast of the 200,000 deaths on the ".'racist? policy of the Guatemalan government and holds ihc counfryYs military and paramililai^ foives responsible for the actual killings, tortures and disappearances. However, it accuses the US of directly and indirectly supporting a ^fratricidal confrontation? by providing sustained training, inns and financial aidThe report is based on the testimony uf 9,200 people from all sides ofthe conflict and other documents*, classified and Secret, protected in the UN headquarters in NYC* The CEH investigated 42,000 human rights violations, 29,000 ofwhich resulted in deaf lis or disappearances and therefore, the documents under UN custody arc fundamental for the prosecution ofthose responsible of the crimes, • GUATEMALA. SWITZERLAND AND CANADA* A Ciiiiadlan coiporation named Goldcorp has a mining operation in Guatemala with poor cr.virormiental conditions and harming health of many workers and a community as a whole. We will like to know. - Where the Gold they extract is processed, - Who is buying the gold (we think it might be a Swiss company)

Italy
• /(// documents pertaining to Nazi Germany and the Vatican, as well as those relating to the post war rat line to Argentina, Refer lo
liH|),,','i;cwx,hiH, C O Ilk. 2 lii. aii'upe,'J(i I 1X4',' >l:n

• The/nil Italian censorship, of which Wikileaks currently only has a sub.^ei.

I^^^ll^(^^^^^^^

rafl:Thc Most Wanted Leaks of_2009

Saturday, June 01, 2013 15:37:47 PM

Drafi:The Most Wanted Leaks of 2009 - WikiLeaks Kenya

Page 5 of 9

• Ttie international investigative finn Kroll associates produced at least fom reports on high level Kenyan corruption af)er first term ofthe Kibaki government, A draft version of one of the reports llie Itmlini.'. nf Keiiyii, was previously published by WikiLeaks. Ihe reports were given lo selected members ofPresident Kibaki's cabinet at the time and are likely still held by h tip:' • www .kroll com, uk/. notably lead investigator Andrew Marshall.

Libya
• Documents iiulicaling arrangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers fVom Libya (Civilians and administrators on the ground in Darftir indicate this has been taking place).

Madagascar
Both sides of the political conflict in Madiigiiscar are crying fouls about the deals made by their counterparts with foreign entities. The release ofthe official documents with respect to contract negotiations about: • • • • • Oil exploitation in the reginii of Bemolnnga ( South uf Madagascar] by Total & otheiu an obvious one but the proposed final contract before rejection of Ihe land deal with Daewoo Logistics. The recent agreement with Saudi investment group or. staple products and proposed % 2 billion USD investment. The revised mining exploitation agreement wilh Sheritt in .Ambatovy and Rio Tinto in Fort-Dauphin. Least but not lest, the complete list ofcurrent political prisoners and Ihe charges against them.

Mali
• Documents indicating aiTangenients with Ihe Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfiir to Arab settlers from Mali (Civilians and adminisrators on the ground in Darfxir indicate this has been taking place)

Mexico
• Zapotec indigenous people demand transparency from U.S Scholar and full disclosure ofall the agreements between U.S. Government and their agencies and U.S. geography scholar Peter 1 lerlihy, especially confidential agreements with Foreign Militaiy Studies Office. Prof Herlihy failed to mention that he received funding from the Foreign Military Studies OHlce ofthe U.S. Armed Forces on the research of "Mexico Indigena" project. Mexico Indigena Project forms part of the Bowman Expeditions, a more extensive geographic research project backed andfinancedby the FMSO, among other institutions. The FMSO inputs information into a global database that forms an in leg ml part of the Human Terrain System (HTS). a United Stales Army counterinsurgency strategy designed by Foreign Militaiy Studies Office and applied within indigenous communities, among others, • Documents to unveil Ihe real purpose of "Ruta Maya 2002 Isuzu Challenge" The convoy was commanded by Ben Nun Avihu, Israeli militar and Moshe Savir, geography expert and around 50 tourists in 40 Isuzu Jeep, Some communities linked the incursion with biopiracy. The teirain they explored is controled by the R/l.N. • Documents related with Ihc fraud and corruption around FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario de Protecci6n al Ahorro), • Documents offinancialoperations just before thefinancialcrisis of 1994 (some say the government knew before that the crisis was coining and took advantage ofthe infonnation protecting I heir interests). • Documents related with the World Bank credit and application of the budget fo combat swirte flu, • Documents related with the technology currently used in cellphones in Mexico to implement the RF.NAUT nro jram Information about (he security technology used to protect data collected from users. • Documents related to Ihe transparency of Plan Men da

New Zealand
• The New Zeal and internet censorship list

Niger
• Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese governirent to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Niger (Civilians and adminisrators on llie gruond in Dai fui indicate this has been taking place).

Norway
• The secret verdict in the court case between Ihe ISP Lyse Tele and the law finn Simonsen, decided the 5th of May 2009, whwc Simonsen demanded Lyse Tele disclose the identity infonnaiion ofa file sharer suspected of uploading a copy ofthe movie Max Manus to the filesharing communiry,

1 ^
l^|p^j/^^lgle^g^^^ipraft:Thc Mosl Wanted Leak Saturday, June 01, 20! 3 15:37:47 PM

DraftiThe Most Wanted Leaks of 2009 - WikiLeaks

Page 6 of 9

Puerto Rico
• The FBI has not yetfinisheddeclassilying all the secret files related to surveillance of Puerto Rican individuals and organizations from tire 1930-70's littn ''www p: sccrvl 1 1 Ic s. •ici; uuk-s, htm i (not lo mention, large sections ofthe files are blacked out by the FBI), In addition, there are thousands of secretfilesproduced by Puerto Rican police that were only briefly made aval lable to individua Is them.selvcs, and have now been closed off to the public, fhcse documents provide evidence of quite a significant spying and intimidation operation by the United States and local police against leftists and independence movcmenl leaders.

Romania
Documents disclosing what really happened regarding Hie kidnapping of three lomaninn journalists in Irak in 2005 , Omar Htiyssiim was accused ol orchestrating the kidnapping, but aftetwaiti he mysteriously disappeared from Romania

Rwanda
• Documentation of financial assistance given by Ihe Rwandan government to General Laurant Nkunda for iipenitions in the DRC.

Russia
• Internal Kremlin. FSB and SVRR documents and emails into the series of Moscow apparement building bombings shortly before Putin's Presidential election • Complete technical documentation of the "Perimetr" system (a,k.a. 'Dead Hand"), along history of deployment and removal from deployment (if done). Political documentsrelatingto the deployment of "Perimetr". • Maps, flour plans, and blueprints of Mount Yamantaw and Kosvinsky Mountain, and any other facilities similarto the conjectured fac il hies there, including names and locations. • Documents related lo the VRYAN crisis, especially political documenis, analyses of intelligence, and specific steps taken. Information or. the * .* intelligence services, and what exactly they feared, and how credible they believed their fear to be. mindset of Ihe Politburo, as well a • Soviet psychological profiles and political analyses of American poliliciaiis. ' A list and description uf the various a gems prepared by the various Soviet and Russian bioweapons programs. Indications of whether they developedrecombinantDNA based agents, and what those are specifically. Weaponization of agents, including re-entry vehicle mounting. Doctrine for use, including deniable use. Vaccines and treatments for affected personnel. • Technical plans, manuals, and blueprints for the SS-27 Sickle B (Topol-M), along wilh the Bulava. • Documents relating to nuclear warplans ofthe Soviet Union and Russia. • Documents relating to orbital weapons systems, and vvhethsr the Soviets ever deployed them (or still deploy them) such as orbital HANE devices.

Slovenia
• Taped convei-salions between Slovenian opposition leader Janez JanSa and Croatian prime minister Ivo Sanader in the summer of 2004, held by Slovenian intelligence service SOVA,Tlie tapes supposedly show the two were arrangeing incidents on the couiiy border that could help Slovenian opp(Viition win the parfinmentaTy elections in the fall.

South Africa
• • • • • • • • • Prosecution evidence for Jacob Zuma trial Eskoili board minules 2007-2009 Minutes of South African inter-bank security meetings and agreements Arguments presented to Parliament by Vodaconi, M TN & Cell-C against reduction in mobile termination rates S.\ Competilion ( ommission internal informati<Hi on Cartels Details of agreement not to prosecute Mark Thatcher Minutes of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) fo exonerate Cape Judge President John Hlophe possible deaths in world cup Eskoni electricity rates to BHP Billiton. Arcclor-Mittel and others

Sudan
• Documents detailing discussions during 2005 meeting between Salah Gosh and the CIA (for which the CIA flew Gosh on private jet from Khaileum lo CL\ HQ). See: htlpi/'wAvw Mid.mtribung cciiiv-iidit;lc4).ip.''.''id uiticle H.'2fl5

Syria
All flic documents related to the assasination, in 1965, ofMehdi Ben Barka still held in France, USA, Israel and Morocco, In 1976. lhanks to the Freedom of information Act, the US governeinent recognized itiat the IT A had aboul 1800 classified docuinenis iibuul his assassination. Theses documents are still classified.

^^^^t^^^^^^^^^^^^^

raft:The_Mo.st_Wantcd_Lcaks_of_2009

Saturday, June 01, 2013 15:37:47 PM

Dran:Thc Most Wanted Leaks of 2009 - WikiLeaks Switzerland
• The full Comu Report, See httn:"'en wikiDcdia.ortz'wiki.T'ioieki ZfifThc Cornu Report

Page 7 of 9

Swaziland
• Expense accounts of King Mswati, the Queen Mother and the King's wives, • Inielligence memos from the Ministry of Defence or Police about the pro-democracy organization. PUDEMO,

Trinidad and Tobago
• Hie Report on Ihe Commission ofEnquiry into the construction of Ihe new Piarco Aiiport. This identified coiTupl practices in the spending uf public funds, Tlie Commission's repori was delivered in August 2(Hi3. Neariy 6 years Inter, its findings have not been made public. • The Report nn the Caroni Bridge Collapse. A man was killed when a bridge collapsed a few years ago: again tlic public has not been made aware ofthe report's findings. • Documents in relation to payments of atkuneys by slate Numbers ofthese payments are being kept secret from the pubhc. • A copy ofthe contract for the billion-dollar Waterfront Development Project, • List ofrecipients and amounts of scholai-ships sponsored by Ministi-y ofCulture for smdy abroad. • Report of the findings ofthe cunent Ccmimission of Entjiilry Into the local conntrticiion sector Detail: As far aa Trinidad and Tobago goes, our government tends to pay lip service lo Ihe principles of transparency and accountability. For instance, there is a Freedom of Information Act which, by law, allows the public to seek infonnation from government departments. But quite often, when such attempts are made by the citizenry, the government bars full disclosure. Depending on how important a piece of information is to Joe Public, he may actually have to tum to the courts to "force" the government tu reveal facts that should be disclosed voluntarily. Following are a few examples of documents that should be made public, but have not been: • The Report on the Commission of Enquiry into the construction ofthe new Piarco Airport This identified coirapt piacticcs in Ihc spending uf public funds. The Coininiss.oil's leiwrt was delivered in August 2003. Nearly 6 years later, itsfindingshave nol been made public. • The Report on the Caroni Bridge Collapse. A mon was killed when a bridge collapsed a few years ago; again Ihe public has not been made aware ofthe report's findings, • The Opposition recently brought up in Parliament the issue of taxpayers' money being used to pay attomeys by slate. .Although the public has 1 1 right to know how much ofits funds were used in paying said attoniey.s, the Atloiney General refused to disclose the sums, saying it would be an invasion of Ihe lawyeiV privacy • T he same goes for a recent request in Parliament, whereby *the Minister of Planning and Development was asked to pioduce a copy of the contract for the billion-dollar Waterfront Development Project", fhe Minister's response was that she could not produce said contract for public discussion because there was a confidentiality clause contained thei-ein (for a project being buih with public funds). • The Ministry of Culture recently awarded scholarships for students to study abroad - when asked in Pnrlianieni to disclose the list of recipients and the dollar value ofthe scholarships, the response was that this was private information. As such, many citizens are concerned that thefindingsof the current * Commission ofEnquiry into Ihe local constniction sector*, like many Commisions before it, will never see the light of day.

Uganda
Hie goveiiimenf of Uganda has recently signed a number of profit-sharing agreements with several oil companies that are conducting explorations in southwestern Uganda, My friend was in Kampala in January and spoke with a number of journalists who believe that releasing these documents would be a major step in increased transparency wilh respect to the country's emerging oil industry. • Ugandan profit-sharing agreements with oil companies in south-western Uganda

United Kingdom
• • • • • • • • List of current and expired D-Notices [2^ The letter - KU and its DA Notice The secret viibnici miiiiitcs and legal ;idviwc pertaining to the ongoing occupation ot Iraq. Documentsrevealingwhy the trial of Wang Yam, who was convicted ofkilling Allan Chappelow, was held in camera, the fust UK murder trial ever heord behind closed doors without access by press or public. UK Government documentation info Ihe investigation ot Roger Hollis, head of MI5 between 1956 and 1965, including the report by Loi-d Trend, into Ihe serious but apparently unproven allegations ofbeing a Russian Spy. Copies of government minutes of meetings betv»een Guidon Brow n und'or Alistair Darting and represcsifatives of Lloyds Bankrelatinglo Ihe proposed takeover of IIBOS, A copy of the police intelligence handed to E ON about climate change protestors. Lii Documents detailing the information stored and collected by tlie Wythenshawe intelligence centre. [4]

iviK%M68'!g%%'

raft:The__Most^Wantcd_Leaks_of_2009

Saturday, June 01, 2013 15:37:47 PM

^Or^ft:The Most Wanted Le8k^of2009-WikiLe^tks

Pa^e^of9

^ Censoi^hip list for the tJniled Kingdom's''vohinfary"filfersystem.Kno^vn to be held by The Internet'^'a^^^ subsidiaries whichare currently beingsnpplied with the IWF list,Most ISP's in theLKhaveacopy of the IP's on delist. ^ The piioper reasons for iiafionalisalionofNorfhern Rock and Bradford^Bingley,and the subsequent sale of the latter's savings btrisiness Santander ^ litformation regarding the valuation process todetertuine compensation for firmer shareholdersofNorthem Rock and Biadfoid^Bingl^^^ that is, the infoiniafion the independent vainer uses to determine the fmal value ofthe comapanies. ^ Recordsofeveiilsduiini^ the twelve months leading up fo die nationalisation ofBradford^Bingley, ^ Di^uments from Solicitors Regulation Authority's investigatioii info DavenportLyons threatening letteisrelafe^l to filesharing, ^ The frill iiniedaciedct^py of receipts and documentation relating to MP's expensesas was partly released by the Daily Telegraphs in addition, any private communications regarding the leak ofthese expenses, especially ifsaidcoiiiinunicatioiis are politically ^ Climate Change orGlobal warming research, and thepoliticalaiidlinancial influence,

l^^nited Stated
^ttl^^lttt^t^tt^e^ ^Amirtoroffhecompletelntcllipediositeai^ofll^l^200^,includingaiticleh^^^^ ^ Amirr^iroftlieCommonLoiedataha^easoffLIB2008 ^ The complete CIA Open SourceCenteranalyticaldatabase. The database is extensive, unclassified, nonpablic,but relatively accessible fo ceriain outsiders al)er jumping throui^h hoops l^ttps: w,vw^^^ ^ The coinplerePAtllliR database.ThePACER database contains nr^^^ bcbindapaywall and unsearchable,Were the document,^ to be public the behavior of many coi'poiationsvvould come to light lillti^iil,^ic^lini,.ii,Coil|,tecliiiolicv'iiew l^^tJ^r^l^^llt^^^ ^ The missing five million Wliite House emails -possibly no longer in existence. ^ Cheney and Rumsfeld Archives ^ The Whifellousevisifor's list ^ Minutes or notes for VP Cheney's I2ncrgy Conference. ^Thcll41pagesofACTAbackgrounddocumeiltsiiotieleasedtotheEFFbytheIlSTradeRepresentalive(seeti:^) ^ Alist of all Whifelioiisc and senior federal govemment employees holdingdual citizenship and the countries they represent.
t^^ttkitt^

^ The complete list of identifies ofthe 52,000 wealthy Americanclients suspected ofhiding^l5billion at UBS to avoid taxes, including the nonaes ofany elected or appointed government or former government officials. ^ fhe complete details ofGoldman,Siichs^Co,'s counterparty exposure to AIG priorto the Federal bailout of AIG in Sepicmber.2008,
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' Unearthed secret audio or video recording inside Mormon temple with the temple members swearing "blood oatli" before removal in 1990. UiU " Documented Church leaders' and lay clergy's cover-up of physicaL'scxunl abuse and rape of minors by missionaries and members without reporting to law enforcement in some cases j j j j . ' Older editiors of Church Handbooks of Instructions from the first edition up 112] for comparison to recent leaked 1968 (truncated). 1999 and 2006 editions.

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Saddam hospitalized due to hunger strike
Updated 7/24/2006 11,20 A U ET E-mail I Print j g^'^^jgj

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BAGHDAD (AP) — Saddam Hussein wras hospitalized Sunday and fed wilh a lube on the 17th day of a hunger strike to ensure he was healthy enough to continue wilh his trial, the chief prosecutor said. The procedure came as the ex-leader's troubled trial nears a verdict that could lead to his hanging. Prosecutor Jaafar al-Moussawi said he leamed that Saddam's health had become "unstable because of Ihe hunger strike" during a visit to the U.S.-run prison where the lormer ruler and his seven fellow defendants are held. "We look him to the hospital, and he is being cun'ently fed by a tube," al-Moussawi told The Associated Press without elaboration. VIDEO: Saddam is hospitalized Al-Moussawi said Ihe feeding lube had stabilized Saddam's health and the former president would appear in court as scheduled this week. Saddam was nol scheduled to appear Monday when the trial resumes after a two-week break, because other delendants are to give their final summations. II appeared that al-Moussawi had become concemed over the impact of televised pictures of a frail, weakened Saddam appearing in court and decided to check on the ex-president himself since the Americans were continuing lo insist that a 69year-old man's health was unaffected despite two weeks without food.

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Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein holds a copy of the Ouran as he sits in his chair during his inal Feb. 14. 2006 in Baghdad Hussein was hospitalized Sunday on the l7th day of a hunger strike, thfc chief fjrosecutor m his fnai said

The hunger strike was launched to demand better security for the delense team Three of Ihem have been assassinated since the trial began, most recently Khamis al-Obeidi, who was abducted and slain June 21. The defense rejected an offer ol Ihe same security provided to Ihe judges and prosecution lawyers: residence inside the Green Zone, the fortified Baghdad neighborhood where the court is located. Instead, they wanted bodyguards. Saddam and Ihe seven others have been on trial since Oct. 19 for Ihe deaths of Shiite Muslims after a crackdown in the town of Dujail, which was launched after an assassination attempt there in 1982. They could receive the death penalty if convicted. But Saddam's lawyer Khalil al-Dulaimi said none of the defendants or their lawyers would appear Monday unless the court "meets Ihe minimum requirement ensuring a fair trial for the defendants." Al-Dulaimi told The Associated Press that Saddam was "in high spirits and his health very good " despite the hunger strike. U.S. oflicials had acknowledged that Saddam and three other detainees were refusing food since the evening meal of July 7 but were drinking coffee and sweet tea. The Americans insisted that Saddam was still in good health despite two weeks without food, and that he had been advised by "medical professionals"" of the dangers of not eating. A spokesman for the U.S. detention command would not say whether Saddam had been hospitalized bul said he was under medical supervision and was '"voluntarily" taking nutrients through a feeding tube "He's continuing to refuse meals," Lt. Col. Kelr-Kevin Curry said. "He remains in coalition care and custody, and we're providing appropriate medical care." U.S. officials have nol identified the others who were refusing food, but defense lawyers said they are codefendants Barzan Ibrahim, Saddam's hall brother; former Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan; and Awad alBandar. The defense team blamed al-Obeidi's killing on Shiite militiamen and announced it would boycott the trial in protest over Ihe lack of security. In a letter to the court, Ihe defense said il wanted U.S. authorities lo provide security for the lav#yers and their families. It also demanded a 45-day recess to allow it to prepare closing statements and as much time as they want lo present final arguments. Chief Judge Raouf Abdel-Rahman suspended the proceedings July 11 and warned that if the defense did not appear Monday, he would appoint other attorneys lo make Ihe final summations.

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Al-Bandar and Ramadan were lo make final arguments Monday, followed by Saddam and Barzan. The four other lawyers have already presented their summations. Following summations, the trial will be suspended while the live -Judge panel deliberates a verdict. The verdict is expected by mid-Augusl. Saddam is also due to stand trial Aug. 21 for a crackdown against the Kurds in the 1980s during which an estimated 100,000 Kurds were killed. Security had been a contentious issue even before the current trial began. Some human rights organizations had questioned whether a lair trial could be held in a country wracked by bombings, killings and armed insurgency — some of it fanned by the former president's supporters. U.S. and Iraqi officials brushed off such criticism and insisted that Saddam should face justice before his own people for the suffering caused by his totalitarian regime. But the trial has been dogged by other problems, including boisterous behavior by Saddam and his half brother. The first chief judge, Rizgar Mohammed Amin, stepped down in January after complaints of political interference and criticism that he tailed to control the proceedings. Abdel-Rahman has been strict with the defendants and lawyers, throwing some of them out of court on occasion and ordering Barzan silenced for speaking without permission. Copynght 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. Posted 7/23/2006 8 56 AM ET Updated 7/24/2006 11 20 AM ET Newspaper Home Delivery . Subscribe Today Home • News • Travel • Money • Sports • Lite . Tech • Weather About USATODAY.com: Site Map | FAO | Conlad Us | Jobs with Us | Terms ol Service Privacy Policy/Youf Cairfornia Privacy Right j Adverti.se I Press Room | Developer j Media Lounge | Reprints and Permission,^ News Your Way: Mobile News | Email News | Add USATODAY com RSS leeds | Widgets Tv^iHerj Podcasis | E-mail | Prim |

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Hunger-strike Hussein in hospital
Sunday, July 23, 2006; Posted: 12:33 p.m. EDT (16:33 GMT)

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BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) - Former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein has been taken to the hospital after suffering from the effects of a hunger strike, launched in protest of his ongoing trial, the chief prosecutor in his trial said.
U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Keir-Kevin Curry said the 69-year-old Hussein voluntarily received nutrition through a feeding tube, and continues to be monitored. He is continuing his hunger strike and his life is not in danger, Curry said. After hearing the report, Hussein's defense attorney Mohamed Moneib questioned whether the hunger strike was to blame, saying Hussein was in "very, very good health" on Saturday during a three-hour meeting in Baghdad, "He discussed a lot of issues with us, pitched ideas and even discussed the Israeli aggression on Lebanon," Moneib said. 'There was no indication that he is ill or suffered of poor health." Hussein and three other defendants have been refusing food since the beginning of the month to protest the proceedings and to push for better security for defense lawyers, three of whom have been killed since the trial began in October. Though a military spokesman said Hussein has been drinking coffee with sugar and water with nutrients, the former Iraqi leader has refused all meals since July 7. Hussein's refusal to eat marks the third time he has gone on a hunger strike since last October, when the trial began. Curry said the hunger strikers are monitored regularly and evaluated daily. Moneib told CNN that Hussein's hospitalization was a dangerous development, voicing his concern that it might be an attempt by the Iraqi High Tribunal to keep ttie fonmer Iraqi leader away from the trial proceedings.

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Shortly after their clients began their hunger strike, the defense team submitted a list of demands to the Iraqi High Tribunal on July 8, including an unlimited number of defense lawyers to present closing arguments and unlimited time to speak without interruption, no matter what they are talking about.

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Iraqi High Tribunal's Raed Juhi said he responded to the demands on July 10, saying the court follows procedural laws that allot time for attorneys to speak, but limits their comments to case and defense-related arguments. But Moneib said the court ignored their list of demands, prompting the entire defense team to resume its boycott of the trial, scheduled to resume Monday. "Our defense (closing arguments) is ready and we are ready to attend at any moment as soon as our legal demands are fulfilled," Moneib said. "The minimum we would accept is allowing the defense to present all that we have without interruptions and time limits - this should apply to the lawyers and the clients." Hussein is being tried on charges related to the killings of more than 140 males in the town of Dujail in 1982 after a failed assassination attempt against him.

Latest violence
Meanwhile on Sunday, at least 50 people were killed and 165 wounded when two car bombers targeted a Kirkuk city courthouse and a busy Baghdad market. The first suicide car bomb exploded at 9 a.m., ripping open a packed open-air market in the Sadr City section of eastern Baghdad, Baghdad police said; 32 were killed and 65 were wounded. The suicide bomber was driving a minibus and detonated the bomb after picking up commuters at the entrance of the market in the densely populated Shiite neighborhood, said an Iraqi who saw the bomb. The explosion was so powerful the witness said he was blown backwards from 150 meters away. Video from the scene show survivors rushing the wounded out of the blast site while some lingered, crying over pools of blood in the street. The footage also showed several cars, trucii;s and vans destroyed in the blast, many of them sprayed with shrapnel. The second car bomb exploded near the courthouse in the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk, killing at least 18 people and wounding 100, Kirkuk police said. The blast ignited an intense fire that hampered rescue efforts. South of the capital, U.S. soldiers killed 15 "terrorists" in a three-hour firefight in Babil province, the U.S. military said. An Iraqi soldier was also killed in the fighting, which began in Musayyib. Meanwhile the U.S. military said Saturday an American soldier was killed when his convoy was hit by a roadside bomb in eastern Baghdad. Another soldier died from a "non-combat related injury" Thursday and military investigators are looking into the incident, the U.S. military said Saturday. The number of U.S. military fatalities in the Iraq war now stands at 2,560.

PM: Lebanon issue dangerous'
Also Saturday Iraq's prime minister, whose country is mired in Sunni-Shiite sectarian fighting and a relentless insurgent violence, said he wanted to put another conflict on his busy agenda next week when he meets

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with the Bush administration and other officials - Lebanon. Nuri al-Maliki - who spoke to reporters in a press conference after the first meeting of the Higher Commission for Dialogue and National Reconciliation - said he would discuss the conflict with the United Nations and the U S, government during his trip, Al-Maliki said he would urge the speeding up of a cease-fire and the implementation of International resolutions.

Iraqis inspect wrecked car at site of explosion in Sadr City. Image: H E H T h»

"We have a new and dangerous issue: the military and security situation that came as a result of the Israeli attacks and raids on Lebanon and the destruction of infrastructure and the bombing of water, electricity and airports and what the Lebanese people are living and how it could affect the situation in the region," al-Maliki said. Al-Maliki, noting that the trip had been planned for some time, said the Iraqi delegation would be focused on the importance of building of Iraqi security forces and security that "would lead to reconstruction, rebuilding and services." But al-Maliki's comments on Lebanon reflect the political complexities and priorities in the region. Al-Maliki's government is an ally of the United States and relies on U.S. security for its existence. However, his words on the conflict in Lebanon are at odds with the Bush administration's support of Israel's fight against the Hezbollah guerrilla network in Lebanon. Al-Maliki, a Shiite who had been in exile in Syria during the Saddam Hussein era, represents a government dominated by Shiites, who number 60 percent of Iraqis. Hezbollah is a Shiite Muslim movement and it has support across the Shiite worid, including the huge Shiite population in Iraq. Some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, have questioned the wisdom of Hezbollah's raid into Israel that spari^ed the Israeli offensive in Lebanon. They are largely Sunni nations. But al-Maliki joins other leaders across the Muslim world - both Shiite and Sunni who have solely laid the blame on Israel in the conflict. Also Saturday, around 2,000 demonstrators marched from Sadr City to a square near the headquarters ofthe Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shiite group, to protest "Israeli acts of terror on the Lebanese people" and to express solidarity with the Lebanese people. CNttl's Nicky Robertson. Jomana Karadsheh and Arwa Damon contributed to this report.
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Saddam Hussein, three co-defendants are on hunger stril^e
Updated 7,'12/2006 5 53 PM ET The Associated Press Saddam Hussein and three of his co-defendants have been on a hunger strike for neariy a week to protest what the defense says is a lack of security for their attorneys, Ihe U.S. military said Wednesday. Law/yers for Saddam and co-defendants Barzan Ibrahim, Taha Hussein Ramadan and Awad al-Bandaron announced a boycott of the proceedings this week unless their demands were met for greater security after one of their colleagues was killed last month. g Enlarge 3/ David Tyrsi AP Saddam and the three others "have now refused meals since Iheir evening meat on July 7," Lt. Col. Keir-Kevin Curry, spokesman for U.S. military detainee operations, told the Associated Press in an e-mail. "All are protesting the Iraqi High Tribunal procedures and security for Ihe defense attomeys," he said. E-mail | Print | jj^|XCJ|

Former Baath Party official Abdullah Ruwayyid presents Final arguments during a trial held in Eiaghdad Tuesday Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussem and three co-defendants are on a hunger sinke

SADDAM ON TRIAL
Kurd speaks of chemical attack Lawyers appeal death sentence Case re.sumes after 19.day hiatus Mubarak. Execution could ignite region Defense wants ransacking prober! Saddam Can't we ali get along'' Blair opposes death penalty _ , Graphic: Saddam s rise and fall

The lour defendants were in "good health and receiving appropriate medical care," with access lo physicians al all time, he said, adding that more medical altenlion will be focused on those detainees who continue lo refuse meals "Saddam has participated in various hunger strikes during his detention, but his health has never been in danger," Curry said. The judge called a two-week recess in Saddam's trial on Tuesday and warned Ihe defense attorneys that if they did not attend the next session, court-appointed lawyers would make Saddam's closing arguments. The defense walkout was sparked by the June 21 slaying of Khamis al-Obeidi, the third member ol Ihe team to be assassinated since the trial began last October. The defense team has blamed Shiite militiamen for al-Obeidi's death.

In a letter lo Ihe court, the defense said il wanted U.S. authorities to provide security for the lawyers and Iheir families. II also demanded a 45-day recess to allow it to prepare its closing statements and a promise from the court that il would be allowed to take as long as it wishes in its final arguments Court spokesman Raid Juhi said the defense had rejected an offer of Ihe same security precaution given to the judges and prosecution lawyers: residence inside Ihe Green Zone, the fortified Baghdad neighbortiood where Ihe court is located, II was nol clear if the adjoummeni until July 24 will mean a delay in Ihe issuing of verdicts in the 9-month-old trial. Court officials had predicted Ihe verdicts would come in mid-August. Saddam and seven former members of his regime are charged in the crackdown on Shiites in Ihe town of Dujail following a 1982 assassination attempt against the Iraqi leader. Copyright 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed. Posted 7.M2;2006 5 50 PM ET Updated 7/12,2006 5.53 Pivl ET Newspaper Home Delivery • Subscribe Today Home • Nsws • Travel • Money • Sports • Life • Tech • Weather About USATODAY.com: Site Map i FAQ j Contact Us | Jobs with Us | Terms of Service Privacy Policy/Your California Privacy Right j Advertise j Press Room j Developer \ Media Lounge j Repnnts and Permissions News Your Way: Mobile News j Add USATODAY.com RSS feeds | Widgets Twitter | Podcasts | E-mail I Print | g^Pj^j-gH

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Fiji Times ONLINE
Copyright © 2013, Fiji Times Limited, All Rights Reserved. Print I Back to Story

Chiefs out to solve State-army impasse
(Tuesday, November 21, 2006) Fiji's Great Council of Chiefs remains confident of resolving the long-standing impasse because it "trusts in the good judgement" of military commander Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama and Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase. In a statement yesterday. Council chairman Ratu Ovini Bokini said the GCC mediation committee had equal respect and faith in the two leaders, "The committee trusts in the good judgment of the two leaders in coming together to resolve the impasse," Ratu Ovini said. "The mediation committee appreciates the confirmation of the military's participation and is expecting to receive the military officers as agreed," Ratu Ovini has also called on stakeholders to exercise good judgment and refrain from spreading irresponsible rumours and speculation during this time of uncertainty. Commodore Bainimarama could not be reached for a comment. Unconfirmed reports yesterday said Commodore Bainimarama would leave for New Zealand this moming. However, military spokesman Major Neumi Leweni has denied any knowledge of the trip and refused to comment on the army's version of a "clean up campaign" which will reportedly target the Govemment. In an interview with Fiji One News on Sunday, Commodore Bainimarama commented on the planned campaign. When asked if the clean-up meant a coup, he denied it. Further, Commodore Bainimarama said he would not meet with the GCC mediation team, Mr Qarase nor Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes. A team of senior army officers was instead tasked to meet the mediation team which includes a lawyer, an academic and a psychotherapist. He said his team was compiling some documents which would be presented to the mediators when they meet but no date has been disclosed.

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Commodore Bainimarama explained that his absence on the first day ofaspecial GCC meeting in Suva was because he saw no use in attending. He said some members ofthe GCC were the very ones who supported the 2000 coup and, as such, he felt it would have beenawaste of time for him to explain the military's stand to such people. Copyright©2013,Fiji Times Limited, All Rights Reserved,

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Fiji's Slow March Toward a Military Takeover
Sanjay Ramesh, Sydney, Australia, December 11, 2006 On Nov. 13, the Fiji Military Forces (F.M.F.) came up with a list of demands for the government. In a letter to Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, the army put forward the following demands: • Public declaration by the government that the coups of 2000 were illegal. All those associated with them must be removed from office. • Withdrawal of three contentious bills: The Racial Tolerance and Unity bill, the Qoliqoli bill and the Land Claims Tribunal bill. • Investigations against Commodore Frank Bainimarama and senior army officers terminated. • Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes contract terminated. • No foreign intervention under the Biketawa Declaration of 2000. • Disband the armed Police Tactical Response Unit. • Review the commercial arm ofthe Native Land Trust Board (N.L.T.B.): the Vanua Development Corporation. • Ministry of Home Affairs address RFMF concerns about force structure, allowances and promotions. • Government of Fiji to institute good governance. The chain of events that started with Bainimarama's independence day speech saw the army and the government caught in a dangerous standoff. Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes was drawn into this ongoing conflict after he refused to release the ammunitions that had arrived for the army at Suva harbor (The Fiji Times, Oct. 30). Under Schedule 5 of the Fiji Arms and Ammunitions Act, only the police commissioner can issue import licenses for any arms importations. On the morning of Nov. 1, heavily armed soldiers boarded the vessel and took possession ofthe ammunitions. However, there is a 1969 ordinance that exempts the military from seeking police approval. On Oct. 31, Prime Minister Qarase sought audience with the Vice President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi and a decision was made to change command at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks at Nabua (Fijilive). Lt. Col. Meli Saubulinayau was summoned to the president's office with orders to take over as the new commander ofthe F.M.F. However, Col. Subulinayau declined, stating that he did not have the support of the army. With Cpmmodore Bainimarama away in the Middle East, Land Forces Commander Pita Driti, Acting Commander Esala Teleni and military spokesperson Maj. Neumi Leweni expressed deep concern over government moves to oust Bainimarama. On Nov. 1, Qarase convened a National Security Council meeting, threatening that his government would resign if Bainimarama stayed on. The Police Tactical Squad guarded government buildings as Fiji's Pacific neighbors, Australia and New Zealand, upgraded travel warnings and sent warships and personnel for a possible evacuation of their citizens {AAP, Nov. 1). Meanwhile, the Fiji police came out with a press release confirming that investigations had started against Bainimarama for his outbursts against the government (TTiefi/i Sii^.Nov. 1). Bainimarama arrived in the country on Nov. 4 and remained silent over the events that transpired during his absence. The police, nevertheless, continued to press ahead.

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With the police waitingto interview Bainimarama, the army lashed out atAustraliaforgettinginvolved in Fijian affairs after Australian DefenseForce chief. Air ChiefMarshal Angus Houston,called on Bainimarama not tocarry out his threat to force the resignation ofPrime Minister Qarase's government. ^^^,^^^^t^^,Nov5)ln addition, t h e F M F a l l e g e d t h a t A u s t r a l i a had covertly sentaSpecialAir Services team on N o v 3 t o Fiji to carry out reconnaissance forapossible "invasion" ^^^^^^^^^^^^^,Nov^)These allegations were strenuously refuted by the Australian High Commission media liaison officer,Matt Anderson. On N o v 7 , t h e military called on the police commissioner to resign ( ^ ^ ^ i ^ i ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ , N o v 8 ) as the political drama unfolding in Suva shifted to the Croat Council of Chiefs ^O.C.C),which met on Nov.9at the request ofPrime Minister Qarase.On Nov.^,Bainimarama broke silence and accused Qarase oflying. "Let me say that corruption is about lies and in the indigenous context the greatest lie is when it is told byaP.M.,a^o^^o^^^^oilpreacher^orachiefforpersonal gain for the simple reason that these are the three entities that we hold dear and look up to for advice ...This was seen in 2000 in parliament when people in positions ofleadership in our society lied to the people ofthis nation that Oeorge Speight was correct in all senses of the word when we knew that these were losers and opportunists jostling for positions and money. "Wein the R.F.M.F.represent the silent majority of this land and say we are tried ofbeing lied to Stop now or our children and grandchildren will suffer" ^^^^^^^^^i^^,Nov 9) Bainimarama boycotted the ^rst day of t h e C C C meeting, arguing that Qarase's move to bring in the high chiefs wasapoorjudgmenton the part of the prime ministerOn Nov 10, Bainimarama addressed the chiefs and expressed personal disappointment with the leadership of Qarase.In response to the crisis,theCC.C. formedasix member mediation committee,which was expected to report to theC.C.C.meeting in Levuka Dec. 1214^^^^oi^^^^i^^i^^^^, Nov 10)The two d a y C C C m e e t i n g passed seven resolutions: The BoseLevuVakaturaga(CCC)remains committed to supporting at all times the legally elected governments the BoseLevuVakaturaga upholds the role ofParliament in its law making process as stipulated in the Constitutions the BoseLevuVakaturaga upholds the rule oflaw,respect for democracy as well as customary laws and strongly urges all citizens to respect, abide and protect these at all times^ the BoseLevuVakaturaga urges the two leaders to communicate and resolve their differences^ the BoseLevuVakaturaga has resolved thata committee chaired by the chairperson of the BoseLevuVakaturaga with three members representing the three confederacies and two advisers to facilitate the mediation process between government and the military,as part of its term of reference,the committee will study the underlying causes of the strained relations which have developed between government and the FijiMilitary Forces and the projected ultimate results of such serious strained relations Nov 11) As both theF.M.F.and the government started the next phase of their maneuvers,it was becoming clear that both sides were dug in and not giving an inch.The minister for home affairs,^osefaVosanibola,warned that the commodore was not above the law and should not be making any demands on an elected government ^Fijilive, Nov.16). On Nov. 19, Bainimarama told Fiji T'V that the government was wrong to involve chiefs in the standoff between the military and the government and argued that most of the chiefs in theO.C.C.were involved in the 2000 coup and could not be "honest brokers."Bainimarama further criticized the government for attempting to oust him from of^ce while he was overseas ^^^^.^^,^i^i^^^,^^o^^,Nov.20). Bainimarama warned that if the Racial T^olerance and Unity,Qoliqoli and l^andsClaimTribunal bills were passed,thenationalsecuritysituationwoulddeteriorate^^^^^i^^^oii^,^^o^^,Nov 16)Onnov 19, Bainimarama questioned the appointment ofapsychiatrist,SelinaI^uruleca, as an advisorto the special committee of theCC.C.^.^i,^^^^^^o^^A^^i^^).On Nov.20,Bainimarama gave two weeks notice to the government to acquiesce to his demands, warning that he would "clean up" the government himself (Fiji TV). On Nov.21,Bainimarama flew to Auckland to attend the christening of his grand daughter.At Auckland airport, journalists, without success, sought clarification from Bainimarama on his "clean up" campaign ^.^oii^^:!::).

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Back in Fiji, Police Commissioner Hughes revealed on Nov. 23 that five senior officers including the commodore were likely to be charged with seditionOn the same day,police officers armed with summonses went and confiscated documents relating to the army from the office of the president ^Fijilive, Nov 25) In the ABC ^oi^^^i^^programthe same night, Australia's Minister forForeign Affairs,Alexander Downer, expressed new fears thatacoup would occur within weeks ^ABC, Nov.24). Word reached Bainimarama in NewZealand that the office of the president was searched by the police.He reacted angrily,arguingthataforeigner had violated the office ofthe president by not followingtraditional Fijian protocols and ordered Police Commissioner Hughes out ofthe country ^Fijilive,Nov.2^). Armed soldiers in full battle gear began patrolling the streets of Suva on Nov.25.On Nov.27,the New Zealand High Commission in Suva closed its doors and advised its citizens to leave Fiji. The Australian Department ofForeignAffairs also made similar calls as fears ofacoup escalated (^^,^i^i^^^o^^A^^i^^)Prime Minister Qarase called on citizens to work together and the home affairs minister reiterated that demands by the commodore to drop all investigations against him was contrary to the rule oflaw (Fijilive). I n a b i d to thwartacoup,the Australian Department ofForeign Affairs organizedaForumForeign Ministers'meeting in Sydney on Dec I F i j i T ^ on Nov.27 reported that Qarase requested assistance from regional Pacific island states under the Biketawa Declaration. There was growing nervousness among government members as well as consular officials in Suva afterathousand members of the territorial forces were recalled to the army camp On Nov2^,^^^^i^^^^^^^^ reported that an arrestorderwas out for Commodore Bainimarama and that two police officers went to New Zealand to seek assistance from Interpol The^i^i ^^^^01^^ A^^i^^ reported that the police commissioner had moved his family to Australia and changed residence for security reasons ^Nov 28) Commissioner Hughes told Radio NewZealand that there wasareal and credible threat from the army barracks to arrest him ^^^^A^^,Nov.28).Meanwhile, Britain joined Australia and NewZealand in upgrading its travel warning (BBC,Nov.27). Rumors circulated that Bainimarama would place government ministers and the police commissioner under house arrest after arriving back in Fiji. Feeding the rumors was the apparent breakdown in the progress towardamultiparty governance framework.OnWednesday,Nov.22,four Fiji Labor Party (F.L.P.)cabinet ministers voted against thel997 budget.TheF.L.P.leader, MahendraChaudhry,had warned earlier that all nineF.L.P.cabinet ministers must be present for the vote.However,five members were granted leave of absence by Prime Minister Qarase Chaudhry was unhappy after the budget passed with 40 votes in favor and 26 against.OnFriday,Nov.24,Quarse came up withacompromise,which was rejected by Chaudhry. Qarase proposed that he would allow the f o u r F L P cabinet ministers to stay provided t h e F L P d i d not take disciplinary action against the otherfive.Adding to the multiparty woes was the outburst byF.L.P. cabinet minister LekhRamVayeshnoi,who attacked the police for raiding the president's office on Nov.23 ^FijiTV,Nov.27).On Nov.28,threeF.L.P.members,'Atu Bain, Prem Chand and Vijay Singh, and two cabinet ministers, I^ishnaDatt and PoseciBune, were expelled from the party (^^^^^^^.Oi::i^^^^o^^, Nov 29).The fate of three other cabinet ministers,AdiSiviaQoro,CyaniNand and DrCunasagaranOoundar, was yet to be determined by theF.L.P.caucus (^^,^^^^1^^). Oxford academic Victor Lai argued that the governmentshould acquiesce to the military's demands and urged the president to takealeadership role in resolving the crisis.If there was no consensus between the government and the army,then Lai suggested that the president suspend Parliament for three to six months and seek resolution between the disputingpartieswithahelp of advisors ^^^^^^^^^i^^,Nov28) The New Zealand governmentattempted to brokerapeace deal, followingprivate discussions on the security situation in Fiji between New Zealand's minister for foreign affairs, Winston Peters, and Commodore Bainimarama inWellington.On Nov.28,Prime Minister Qarase,chief executive in the prime minister's office ^iogil^otobalavu and Folice Commissioner Hughes went toWellington after Bainimarama agreed toa meeting ^^^^Ai^^^^o^^i^^,Nov.28).Withadiplomatic solution in sight,two Fiji politicians,cabinet minister LekhRamVayeshnoi and opposition leader Mick Beddoes,urged police to drop all investigations against the Bainimarama for the sake of political stability ^^i^^^^t^^). United Nations Secretary Ceneral I^ofi Annan warned that more than 500 Fijian soldiers serving in peacekeeping duties in the Middle East would be sent home if the Bainimarama carried out his threat to

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oust an elected government in Fiji.TheU.N. chief spoke to Prime Minister Qarase on Nov.28 and refused to take calls from Bainimarama (Fiji TV). The European Union (EU) reaffirmed its support for the Qarase government as the diplomatic corps in Suva attempted without success to talk to senior army officers at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks. In NewZealand, Bainimarama remained defiant and told Indo-Fijian^i^^^o^i:^^!^^^ that his meeting with Qarase would be short (A^^i^^^oi^oi^i^^^^o^^i^, Nov.29).New Zealand's prime Minister,Helen Clark, remained optimistic. However, Bainimarama arrived at the meeting late and had to leave early to catch his flight to Fiji. Despiteatwo-hour discussion,asolution to the crisis was still not in sight as Qarase called for "good sense to prevail" ^^^^^^i^^^o^^^A^^i^^).^^^^^^^^^^^^ reported that the army would start preparing fora "possible" invasion byAustralia by holding military exercises.Inapress statement released by military spokesperson Capt. Leweni, the army planned to secure strategic sites within the greater Suva area between midnight and3a.m. Both Bainimarama and Qarase arrived in Fiji in the evening ofNov.29 and did not make any comments to the media (Fiji TV). At 8:15 p.m., Bainimarama arrived at Nadi International Airport and left through the back gate to the Nadi military camp Police Commissioner Hughes did not return with Qarase and took leave to be with his family in Australia:"Ahigh-level source told the ^^^o^^i^ that Mr.Hughes has suffered acute stress asaresult of events in Fiji and will not be returning as commissioner" (^,^^^^^.^0^^^^^^^^^^!^, Nov, 30) On Nov,30, the military announced further exercises in Suva following news of an Australian Black Hawk helicopter crash near Fiji, The army alleged that the Australian Defense Force was planning an invasion from its navy ships (Fijilive).The army alleged that the ForumForeign Ministers'meeting in Sydney on Dec. Iwould allowAustralian intervention under the Biketawa Declaration of 2000. At 11a.m.,Prime Minister Qarase met with the president and in the afternoon spoke withVice President Madraiwiwi andF.L.P.leader Chaudhry.At 4:30 p.m.,Qarase thanked the New Zealand's Prime Minister Clark,Foreign Minister Winston Peters and CovernorCeneralAnandSatyanand for providing supportand advice for the meeting between him and the Bainimarama inWellington on Nov.29.Qarase requested that theF.M.F.provide evidence against all those involved in the 2000 coup to the police for investigation. Starting immediately, the Racial Tolerance and Unity, Qoliqoli and Land Claims Tribunal bills are suspendedAnindependentcommittee will be formed to determine whether any of the bills contravene theI997 Constitution ...Qarase said that his government cannot interfere in ongoinginvestigations against senior members of the army but .^would support droppings charges against the army for the sake of national interest. Qarase confirmed that Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes'contractwas due toexpire soon and Ithat^ any decision to The Ministry ofHome renew it will be based on his performance in the past three years Affairs win review the armed Police Tactical Unit.The Native Land Trust Board ^N.L.T.B.)will be directed through the Ministry ofFijianAffairs to review its commercial arm: Vanua Development Corporation. Starting immediately, Qarase will start work on leadership code, freedom of information legislation and anticorruption measures. Two Ministers from the Qarase government. Minister for Tourism TomasiVuetilovoni and Minister for Foreign Affairs I^aliopate Tavola, will attend the Forum meetingin Sydney o n l D e c l T h e two will request theForum Island Countries ^F.I.C.'s) to support NewZealand brokered dialogue between the Fiji government and the army. The United Nations'secretary general spoke to Qarase and has promised assistance for peacefully resolving the political impasse in Fiji. P.M. Qarase will write to Bainimarama and invite him to further talks (Radio Sargam,Nov.30) Commodore Bainimarama remained unimpressed.Atapress conference in Suva on the evening ofNov.30, the army commander gave the Qarase government until noon on D e c . I t o "clean up" his government. Fiji T V , i n its 10p.m.report, stated that the army was ready to takeover and impose military rule.There were also rumors that the armywould confiscate the business assets of those involved in the 2000 coup. The military commander says he will hold the prime minister,the head of his department and the attorney general personally responsible ifone ofhis soldiers is hurt or killed.He is confident the transition — setforonelp.m.N.Z.T. — will be peaceful,but there isafear that if Bainimarama doesn't have the full backing of his men then his declaration could lead to

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bloodshed. Bainimarama's actions have drawn opprobrium from throughout the world (TV NZDecl) New Zealand's Prime Minister Clark andForeign Minister Peters expressed surprise at Bainimarama's statements, confirmed that discussions brokered by New Zealand were successful and warned Bainimarama not to depose an elected government. Meanwhile,Prime Minister Qarase told ABC that he hoped for"divine intervention" to resolve the crisis.Australian minister for foreign affairs Alexander Downer argued thata military coup would haveanegativeimpacton the entire South Paci^cregionAtIOam,Bainimarama visited the president and held discussions on the current situation for 40 minutes. He then went to the Post Fiji Stadium where senior army officers were b r i e f e d A t l l : 3 0 , the University of the South Pacific anda number ofbusinesses closed forthe day in the Suva City Business District ^Legend FM, Dec 1) In another development. Legend FM confirmed that Police Commissioner Hughes had not resigned as earlier alleged by some news reports. Speaking live from Cairns in Northern Queensland, Australia, Hughes explained that the office of the Director ofPublic Prosecutions ^D.P.P.)could decide that it is not in the "public interest" to proceed with sedition charges against Bainimarama. Hughes further stated that he was monitoring the situation in Fiji and was scheduled to return on Dec. 18. At noon, Bainimarama told journalists that since the government had failed to accede to his demands, he assumed that it was now up to him to start the "clean up" process (Radio SargamDec. 1). Meanwhile, Prime Minister Qarase confirmed that he would not resign,following rumors that the NewZealand government had offered him safe haven. Ministers in the Qarase government were taken to undisclosed location for fear ofmilitary action ^Fijilive). Prime Minister Clark cast doubt about whether NewZealand would continue making its ^8.^millionayear contribution to Fiji.Worse,the EuropeanUnion's ^48 million aid was in jeopardy,as was nearly^l2 million in United Nations payments for Fiji's peacekeeping duties overseas (^^^A^^i^ .^^01^^^^ ^^^^^^,Dec 2) Following theForumForeign Minister's meeting,AustralianForeign Minister Downer,stated that the Australia-Fiji defense cooperation would be suspended, including ^39 million in aid. On D e c . I , F i j i TV reported that the United States had joined the chorus of protest against any military intervention ^CBS News, Dec. 2). On Saturday,Dec2, Vice President Madraiwiwi held separate meetings with Commodore Bainimarama and Prime Minister Qarase (.^i^^^^t^^). Bainimarama remained defiant and told Qarase to resign or be removed. On Dec.3,one ofthe options on the table was for Qarase to request the president to dissolve parliament ^Fijilive)Qarase told Legend FMthataNational Security Council meetingwould be convened on D e c 5 t o discuss the current impasse. Meanwhile, Bainimarama reiterated that Qarase was no longer the prime minister as of noon, Dec ITheongoingtensions between the army and the government started to hurt the hotelindustry and Nadi landowners urgedaquick resolution (Legend FM,Dec3) The Fiji Trade Union leaders,Attar Singh andFelix Anthony,requested the army to uphold the constitution and the rule of law.Fijian lawyer I^tioneVuataki,SDLSen.TupeniBaba,former president of the Methodist Church ^osatekil^oroi and Fiji's supervisor ofelectionsSemesal^aravaki expressed support for the elected government (Fiji TVDec. 3). The A^^i^ ^^^^01^^ ^^r^^^ and ^^^^^^^0^^^^^^^^^^^, meanwhile, pi^^^ story from the ^^^^^^^^,^^0^^, which reported that: Tomorrow lDec4^ at 0300 hrs,the capital cityisexpectedto be blockaded by armed soldiers as they begin with the much awaited clean up The intention is to shut down an effective operation of the Qarase government.Once it is immobilized, grounds for its dismissal will be satisfied. One can also expect interruptions to the telecommunication networks. Sources claim this is one of the scenarios the military is contemplating, there may be well others under consideration One mitigating factor in all of this would be the unity of the army and whether it will hold together or split apart with government loyalists versus the commander's rebels, sources said Meanwhile, some observers say the struggle for democracy in Fiji hasatribal dimension too with the House of Bau leading the overthrow. This is where the potential for bloodshed is most probable and the world may well see Fiji go the way of the Solomons, Tonga, or worse (Dec. 3).

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Commodore Bainimarama clarified that there would be no army officers in any new interim government. "Feople that are interested in positions will be asked to apply Whoever is lit will be part o f i t A l o t has been said about names of people we have chosen but we have no names in mind,"he said. Bainimarama then referred toatime in 2000,when one ofhis senior officers suggested that he be appointed president: "Isaid it then a n d l w i l l say it again,no military officer should and will benefit from the interim administration" ^^^^ .^ii^^^i^^,Dec.4). On Dec. 4, armed soldiers went to the Police Tactical Response Units in Nasinu and Nasova and removed weapons from the armory ^Legend FM)LandForces Commander Driti con^rmed that weapons in possession of police were removed so that they would not poseathreat to the military (Fijilive)Meanwhile, some 30 armed soldiers set upamilitary roadblock at Sawani near the Naitasiri province At the checkpoint, soldiers disarmed the prime minister's bodyguards At 3:30pm,^^^^^^^^o^^^^^o^^ closed its head office in Suva after reports that it was one ofthe "targets" in the army's "clean up" campaign. At night, armed soldiers set up roadblocks throughout Suva and in the west. Prime Minister Qarase's residence was surrounded and he was not allowed to seeVice President Madraiwiwi (FijiTV).On the morning o f D e c 5 , the military tightened its grip on Suva city and confiscated the official vehicles of government ministers (^i^^^ii^^o^^^A^^i^^). At 11:30 a.m., Fijilivereported that the President Ratu Josefa Iloilo had dissolved parliament and given the army the go ahead to take over government LegendFM contradicted this news when reporter VijayNarayanreadastatement from the president's office a t 4 p m , which stated that "his Excellency neither condones nor supports the actions of the army " At6p.m.,Bainimarama assumed executive authority and establishedamilitary council to run the affairs of the country with the assistance oflnterim Prime Minister ^onaBaravilalaSenilagakali Bainimarama said he had stepped into the shoes of the president and "in this capacity" under Section 101^1)of our Constitution... Idismissed^ Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase. He said theI997Constitution remained intact: "Wereiterate that while this cause of action is taken with great reluctance,it is necessary to steer our beloved nation into peace, stability and justsolution and to preserve our Constitution. Therefore the constitution will remain in place except those parts as necessitated under the doctrine of necessity" Bainimarama said the takeover will not be permanent (Fijilive, Dec. 5) On the evening o f D e c 5 , ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ and Fiji TV were warned not to publish any "propaganda" from the deposed prime minster or any ofhis ministersFiji Broadcasting Limited, which operates Radio Fiji stations, including Radio Fiji One, Radio Fiji Two, Radio Fiji Cold and Radio Mirchi, had theirevening news contents checked and cleared by the army before going on air (^^^^^^^1^^^^). On Dec. 6, ^^^^,^^^ci^^^^o^^ reported that the militarywaspreparingto publish martial law decrees At 4:30 a.m. on Dec. 6, Prime Minister Qarase and his family were flown from his official residence in Suva to his home in L a u T h a t same day,CCCchairman Ratu OviniBokini confirmed that the council meeting scheduled for Dec.12-14 was postponed due to military takeover. Bokini stated that President Iloilo was still the head of state, even though Bainimarama had assumed the powers of the president. Meanwhile, the speaker of the House of Representatives, Pita Nacuva, revealed that he had received no directive from the president on the dissolution of parliament and as far as he was concerned, it was 'business as usual" ^Legend FM). At about midday,armed soldiers surrounded the Parliament and detained NacuvaAlso taken into custody were Solicitor Ceneral NainendraNand and Public Service Commission chairman StuartHuggett^^^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ) . Acting Police Commissioner Moses Driver was taken by soldiers to the army barracks in Nabua and the Senate was adjournedindefinitely^AA^The army declaredastate of emergency and Bainimarama ordered all soldiers to march into camp so they could be deployed at various strategic locations Bainimarama said the primary objective of the interim military government was to "take the country forward toward good governance, rid us ofcorruption and bad practices and, at the same time, promote the well being o f F i j i and its people at the earliest possible opportunity" (Fijihve)

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In response to the military takeover,Australia imposed an immediate ban on all travel by senior army officers and their families from Fiji and the Australia-Fiji Defense Cooperation program was suspended indefinitely.Britain, New Zealand and the EuropeanUnion all imposed similar restrictions and sanctions, with Fiji once again on the brink oflosing its membership in the Commonwealth ^^^^^^i^^^^).At5p.m.on, Bainimarama swore Senilagakah into office as interim prime minister.At about9p.m.,soldiers raided the SDLoffice on McOregor Road and 30 armed soldiers later detained ousted state minister for provincial development TedYoung.He was taken to the Queen Elisabeth Barracks in Nabua for questioning and later released (^^^^^^^^i^^,Dec.7) Vice President Madraiwiwi was removed from office on Dec6as well, sparkingfears that the military had deposed the vice president, who was appointed by t h e C C C S p e a k i n g on Radio Fiji T w o , C C C c h a i r m a n Bokini hoped that Bainimarama would come back to the negotiation table to work with the council in ending asolution to the political mess. On Dec.7,the military sacked Police Commissioner Hughes,Public Service Commission ^P.S.C.)chairman StuartHuggett,P.S.C.C.E.O.AnareJale,prime minister's office C.E.O.I^otobalavu,Solicitor Ceneral Nand,Acting Commissioner ofPolice Moses Driver and Assistant Commissioner ofPolicel^evueli Bulamainaivalu. The military warned that public servants not cooperating with relevant C.E.O.'s will also have their employment terminated ^Fijilive). The newly appointed interim prime minister, Senilagakali, gave an interview on ABC Radio and requested Australia and NewZealand not to interfere in the political situation.Senilgakali defended the takeover of the government as the only way to implementacorruption-free administration and to heal racial wounds caused by the previous three coupsAustralianministerfor foreign affairs Downer argued that the coup was an attempt by Commodore Bainimarama to scuttle investigations into the death offourrebel soldiers, who were supposedly "murdered" by soldiers loyal to the commander, following an attack on the army barracks in November 2000 (^^^Ai^^^^o^^^o^). Fiji has had three military coups since independence from Britain in I970 The first, on May 14, 1987, deposed the multiethnic government ofTimociBavadra.Following the takeover, coup leader Lt.Col.Sitiveni Rabuka establishedamilitary council, abrogated the 1970 constitution and imposed martial l a w O n Sept 25,Rabuka deposed the governor general and declared Fijiarepublic.By December,an interim government was established under the leadership of Ratu Mara and Ratu PenaiaCanilau. In 2000, Ceorge Speight, with the support ofmembers ofthe army's Counter RevolutionaryWarfare Unit abducted the Peoples'Coalition government and held ministers hostage in Parliament for 56 days Ceorge Speight's group argued that the government oflndoFijian Prime Minister Chaudhry was implementing policies detrimental to indigenous Fijians. Similar arguments were made by Rabuka in 1987. This time around,the Dec.5coup was executed by army commander Bainimarama,who was involved i n a fiveyear fight with the SDLover moves to bring Speight supporters into the governmentMoreover, the tensions between the army and the government were further fueled by three controversial bills, the Racial T^olerance and Unity,Qoliqoli and Land Claims T^ribunal bills, which were seen by the army asathreat to nationalsecurity Bainimarama usurped power by deposing President Iloilo and invoking the "doctrine of necessity" that had also allowed military intervention in Thailand and Pakistan. As in previous coups, there are concerns that this one may not have supportof the t^oi^i^o^ (Fijian people)In 1987, Rabuka had their support ,and some sections of the community supported Ceorge Speight in 2000. Fiji's Council of Chiefs has come out strongly against the takeover,placing Bainimarama inadifficult and potentially dangerous situation.If there isamass uprising ofFijians against the army,the coup may collapse as soldiers refuse to violently subdue popularprotest
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Defense Exhibit FEE have been entered into the record as a CD/DVD and will be maintained with the original Record of Trial

Defense Exhibit G 7 pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason 2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated 20 August 2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record of Trial

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Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review Summer 2011 Article *3U A FREE IRRESPONSIBLE PRESS: WIKILEAKS AND THE BATTLE OVER THE SOUL OF THE NETWORKED FOURTH ESTATE Yochai Benkler [FNal] Copyright (c) 2011 the President and Fellows of Harvard College; Yochai Benkler [I]t is very necessary that we should not flinch from seeing what is vile and debasing. There is filth on the floor, and it must be scraped up with the muck-rake; and there are times and places where this service is the most needed of all the services that can be performed. But the man who never does anything else, who never thinks or speaks or writes, save of his feats with the muck-rake, speedily becomes, not a help but one ofthe most potent forces for evil. There are in the body politic, economic and social, many and grave evils, and there is urgent necessity for the sternest war upon them. There should be relentless exposure of and attack upon every evil man, whether politician or business man, every evil practice, whether in politics, business, or social life. I hail as a benefactor every writer or speaker, every man who, on the platform or in a book, magazine, or newspaper, with merciless severity makes such attack, provided always that he in his turn remembers that the attack is of use only if it is absolutely truthful. [FNIj Wikileaks was born a century after President Theodore Roosevelt delivered the speech that gave muckraking journalism its name, and both hailed investigative Journalism and called upon it to be undertaken responsibly. In 2010, four years after its first document release, Wikileaks became the center of an international storm surrounding the role of the individual in the networked public sphere. It forces us to ask how comfortable we are with the actual shape of democratization created by the Internet. The freedom that the Internet provides to networked individuals and cooperative associations to speak their minds and organize around their causes has been deployed over the past decade to develop new, networked models of the fourth estate. These models circumvent the social and organizational frameworks of traditional media, which played a large role in framing the balance between freedom and responsibility of the press. At the same time, the Wikileaks episode forces us to confront the fact that the members of the networked fourth estate tum out to be both more susceptible to new forms of attack than those of the old, and to possess different sources of resilience in the face of these attacks. In particular, commercial owners of the critical *312 infrastructures of the networked environment can deny service to controversial speakers, and some appear to be willing to do so at a mere whiff of public controversy. The United States government, in tum, can use this vulnerability to bring to bear new kinds of pressure on undesired disclosures in extralegal partnership with these private infrastructure providers. The year of Wikileaks began with the release of a video taken by a U.S. attack helicopter, showing what sounded like a trigger-happy crew killing civilians alongside their intended targets. It continued with two large-

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scale document releases from Iraq and Afghanistan, about which Defense SecretaryRobert Gates wrote tothe Senate,representing that ^^the review to datehasnot revealed any sensitive intelligence sourcesand methods compromised by this disclosure.^^1^FN2^ The year ended withthe verycareful release ofafewhundred^as of this writing, it has risen to overl^OO)cables fromU.S.embassies in cooperation with five traditional media or ganizations. At the time of the embassy cable release, about two thirds of news reports incorrectly reported that Wikileaks had simplydumpedover2^0,000 classified cables onto the Net.1^FN3^ In fact,Wikileaks made that large number of cables available only privately,to the NewYorkTimes,the Guardian, Der Spiegel,Le Monde, and El Pais,andlater toother inediaorganizations. Theseorganizationsputtheirown teams to work tosift through the cables and selected onlyafew,often in redacted form,to publish.Wikileaks then published almost solely those cables selected by these traditional organizations, and only in the redacted form released by those organizations. lFN4^0fthisrelease,Secretary Gates stated: ^^lsthisembarrassing7 Yes. Isitawkward7 Yes. Consequences forU.S.foreign policy7Ithink fairly modest.^^IFN^^ Despite the steadily more cautious and responsible practicesWikileaks came to adopt over the course of the year, and despite the apparent absence ^313 of evidence of harm, the steady flow of confidential materials through anorganizationthatwasnot part of thefamiliar^^responsiblepress^^wasmet by increasinglevels of angry vitriol from the Administration,politicians,and media commentators.By the end of the year,U.S. Vice President losephBiden responded to the quitelimited and careful release of the embassy cables by stating that Wikileaks founder lulian Assange is ^^morelikeahigh-tech terrorist than the Pentagon Papers,^^IFN^^leading to predictablecalls forhisassassination onthe model of targeted killings of Al Q^^daandTaliban leaders in Afghanistan-by Fox News commentators and likelyRepublican presidential candidate Sarah Palin.lFN7^ The NewYorkTimes'flagship opinion author,Thomas Friedman,declared Wikileaks one of the two major threats to apeaceful world underU.S.leadership,parallel to the threat of an ascendant China. IFN^^ The rhetorical framing ofWikileaks in the sociopolitical frame of global threat and terrorism,in tum,facil itated and interacted witharange of responses that would have been inconceivable in the more factually appropriate frame of reference,such as what counts as responsible journalism,or how we understand the costs and benefits ofthe demise ofmore traditional models ofjoumalistic self-regulation in the age ofthe networked public sphere.Onthelegal front,thcDepartment of lustice responded to public callsfrom Senator DianneFeinstein and others and began to explore prosecution of lulian Assange under the Espionage Act.The military held^and continues tohold as ofthis writing) the suspected source ofthe leak in solitary confinement forovereight months,while theleading Republican presidential candidate at that time,Mike Huckabee,called for his execution. IFN^^ The sociopolitical framing makes more comprehensible the vigilante responses in other subsystems of the information environment. Responding to a call from Senate Homeland Security Committee Chairman loe Lieberman,several commercial organizations tried to shut downWikileaks by denial of service of the basic systems under their respective controLWikileaks'domain name server provider, EveryDNS,stopped pointing at the ^314 domain^^wikileaks.org,^^trying tomake it unreachable. Amazon, whosecloudcomputingplatform was hosting Wikileaksdata,cutoffhostingservicesfor the site,andApplepulleda Wikileaks Appfrom its App Store. Banks and payment companies, like MasterCard, Visa, PayPal, and Bank ofAmerica, as well as the Swiss postal bank, cut off payment service toWikileaks in an effort to put pressure on the site's ability to raise money from supporters around the world. These private company actions likely responded to concerns about being as sociated publicly with^^undesirables.^^Thereis no clear evidence that these acts were done at the direction ofa government official with authority to coerce them.The sole acknowledged direct action wasapublic appeal for and subsequent praiseoftheseactionsby SenatorloeLieberman. Inthat regard, theseactsrepresentadirect

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vulnerability in the private infrastructure system andapotential pathway of public censorship.It is impossible to ignore the role that adiffuse, evenif uncoordinated, setofactsbygovernmentofficials—beginning with the phrasing ofHaroldKoh's letter toWikileaks on November 27,cited by PayPal as its reason for closure, and extending tonumerousother public statementsandorganizationalactions-playedintriggeringthecommercial services'denial of-servicc attack. I^F^IO^ In combination, the feedback from public to private action presents the risk ofagovernment able to circumvent normal constitutional protections to crack down on critics who use the networkedpublic sphere. Thisoccursthroughthe influence of informal systemsof pressure andapprovalon market actors who are not themselves subject tothe constitutional constraints. This extralegal public private partnership allows an administration to achieve,throughamultisystem attack on critics,results that would have been practically impossible to achieve within the bounds ofthe Constitution and the requirements oflegality. Partsland 11 tell the story ofWikileaks,the release of the documents,and the multi-system attack on the organization,the site, and lulianAssangebybothpublic and private actors. Part lllexplains the constitutional framework and why it is not, asamatter of law,sustainable to treatWikileaksorAssange any differently than theNewYorkTimes and its reporters,for purposes of prior restraint or ex post criminal prosecution consistent with the First Amendment's protection offreedom ofthe press.Prosecution ofWikileaks or Assange will almost certainly falter under present First Amendment doctrine. In the unlikely event that prosecution succeeds, it will only do so at the expense of making very bad First Amendment law from the perspective of freedom of the press in the networked age. Part III concludes with what causes of action, if any, may be open for future members of the fourth estate against government officials who instigate extralegal attacks on critics, and what responsesin private law,against the private partners in the^3I^ public-private partnership, can to some extent replace the First Amendment protections available against direct action by their public partners.Part IVexplores the ways inwhichthe Wikileaks caseintersects with larger trends in the newsindustry.lt describes the economic chai lenges faced by traditional media and the emerging pattern of the networked fourth estate.In particular,what we see is that the new,networked fourth estate will likely combine elements ofboth traditional and novel forms of news media; and that ^^professionalism^^ and ^^responsibility^^can be found on both sides of the divide,as can unprofessionalism and irresponsibility.The traditional news industry's treatment ofWikileaks throughout this episode can best be seen as an effort by older media to preserve their own identity against the perceived threat posed by the new,networked model.Asapractical result, the traditional media in the United States effectively collab oratedwithpartsofthe Administration in paintingWikileaks and Assange in terms that made them more susceptible to both extralegal and legal attack. More systematically,this part suggests that the new,relatively more sociallypolitically vulnerablemembersofthenetworkedfourthestateareneedlessly beingputatriskby the more established outlets'efforts to denigrate thejournalisticidentityof the newkids on the block to preserve their own identity. Aslwrite these words,the story is ongoing.It is too soon to tell how this specific debate will progress.The experience of the music industry suggests that the conflict over the shape of the fourth estate will continue well intothecomingdecade.Itmay well impose serious collateraldamage on some citizenjoumalists. And it will likely end up with an improved watchdog function, reaching some accommodation between the more traditional representatives of the fourth estate, like theNewYorkTimes,and the more edgy,muckraking elements of the networked environment. As we will see over the course oflooking at this one major event,each party will sometimes be responsible and sometimes irresponsible,sometimes professional,and sometimes not, each in its own special way. I.The Provocation:Wikileaks Emerges asaNew Element of the Fourth Estate

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A. 2006-200^:AwardWinning Site Exposing Corruption and Abuse Around theWorld Wikileaks registered its domain name in October of2006 and released its first set ofdocuments in December of that year. IFNll^Thefirst two sets ofdocuments related toAfrica. l^FN12^In December 2006,the site releasedacopyof^3I^adecision by the rebel leader in Somalia to assassinate Somaligovernment officials.In August 2007,it released another document identifying corruptionbyKenyan leader Daniel ArapMoi. 1FN13^ November of2007 was the first time that Wikileaks published information relating to theU.S.:acopyofStandard Operating Procedures for Camp Delta, exposing a formal source outlining the details of how the Guantanamo Bay detention camp was run.In 200^,Wikileaks releasedawide range of documents related to illegal activities of public and private bodies.On the private side,these includedaSwiss bank's Cayman Islands account,intemaldocuments of the Churchof Scientology,and Apple'siPhone application developer contract, which had included an agreement not to discuss the restrictive terms.1^FN14^ On the public side,it includedU.S. military rules ofengagement in Iraq permitting pursuitof former members of Saddam Hussein'sgovernment across the border into Iran and Syria, l^FNl^^ an early draft of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (^^ACTA^^),lFN16^emailsfromSarahPalin's Yahoos accounts while she wasacandidateforVicePresident, andamembership list of the far-right British National Party.Most prominently,Wikileaks released documents pertaining to extra judicial killings and disappearances in Kenya, for which it won Amnesty International's New Media award in 200^. 1^FN17^ Wikileaks also received the Freedom of Expression Award from the British magazine Index ofCensorship in the category ofnew media.IFNl^^ Wikileaks'activity increased in 200^.The pattern of releasing information relating toarange of very different countries,and to potential corruption,malfeasance,or ineptitude continued,including oil-related corruption in Peru,banking abuses in Iceland, andanuclear accident in Iran. IFNl^^ Most prominent that year was Wikileaks'release of copies ofemail correspondence between climate scientists, which was ^317 the basisof what right-wing U.S. mediatried to tum into ^^Climategate.^^ 1FN20^ What seems fairly clear from this brief overview of activities priorto 2010 is that Wikileaks was an organization that seems to have functioned very much as it described itself:aplace where documents that shed light on powerful governments or corporations anywhere in the world, or, in the case of the climate scientists'emails,onamatter of enormous global public concem,could be aired publicly. B. March 2010: Leaking the 200^ Pentagon Report on theThreat ofWikileaks Things changed in 2010.In March 2010,Wikileaks releaseda 200^ Pentagon report arguing that Wikileaks isathreat,while recognizing the site asasource of investigativejoumalismcriticalofU.S.military procure ment and its conduct in war.l^FN211TheNewYorkTimes,describingWikileaks as ^ ^ a tiny online source of informationanddocuments thatgovemmentsandcorporations around the world wouldprefertokeepsecret,^^ 1FN22^ reported that the Army confirmed the authenticity of the report. 1FN23^ The Pentagon Report provides significantinsightintowhatWikileakswasdoingby 200^,andwhy the military was concerned about it.The Report was dated about sixweeks afterWikileakshad published the document revealing the rules ofengagement and permission for cross-border pursuit. 1FN24^ The Executive Summary opens with the words: ^^Wikileaks.org, apublicly accessible Intemet Website, representsapotential forceprotection,counterintelligence, operational security^OPSEC),and information security ^INFOSEC) threat to the US Army.^^1FN2^1 Mixing its own assessments with Wikileaks self descriptions taken at face value, the Report describes Wikileaks as founded by ^^Chinese dissidents,^31^ journalists, mathematicians, and technologists from the United States, China,Taiwan, Europe, Australia, and South Africa,^^l^FN26^ and dedicated ^^toexposling^uneth ical practices, illegal behavior, and wrongdoing within corrupt corporations and oppressive regimes in Asia, the

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former Soviet bloc, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East.^^lFN27^ The Report clearly identified the potential status ofWikileaks as ajournalistic outlet protectedby the First Amendment, subject topotential legal threats over privacy,disclosure ofclassified materials,orlibeL 1FN2^^ Asan example,the report identifiesa suit brought by the Cayman Islands branch of the Swiss bank lulius Baer that shut down U.S. access to Wikileaks documents,whichajudicial order later lifted.In what would becomeaprescient statement,the 200^ Pentagon Report states: Efforts by some domestic and foreign personnel and organizations to discredit the Wikileaks.org Web site include allegations that it wittingly allows the posting of uncorroborated information,serves asan instrumentof propaganda,and isafront organizationoftheUSCentrallntelligence Agency ^ClA). The governments ofChina, Israel, North Korea, Russia, Thailand, Zimbabwe, and several other countries have blocked access toWikileaks.orgtypeWeb sites,claimed they have the right to investigate and prosecute Wikileaks.org and associatedwhistleblowers,or insistedtheyremovcfalse,sensitive,or classifiedgovernment information, propaganda, or malicious content from the Intemet. 1FN2^^ The Report states that ^^Wikileaks.org supports the US Supreme Court ruling regarding the unauthorized release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg,which stated that^onlyafree and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in govemment.^^^1FN30^ The recognitionofthejournalisticroleWikileaksplaysis clear inthe discussionofseveralexamples of Wikileaks publications,which the Report repeatedly describes as ^^newsarticlelsf^and in the description of lulian Assange as the organization's ^Toreign staff writer.^^l^FN31^In the process of describing what the Report's authorsconsiderariskofmisinformationcampaigns,they identify several articles that Wikileaks published that rely on leaked Pentagon documents about equipment deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.Amajor part of the con cern is that opponents of the U.S. could use ^31^ some of this information, released in 2007, to plan attacks on U.S. troops. There is no mention of any evidence of such actual use or feasible action in the Report. Instead, the Report mentions several disclosuresandarguments about weapons systems deployedin Iraqandcritiquesof their high expense, low effectiveness, and in the case of chemical weapons, illegality.1FN32^ It is harder to imagineaclearer case ofinvestigative journalism critical of the Pentagon's procurement policy than when the report says: The author of the above-mentioned article incorrectly interprets the leaked data regarding the components and lieldingof the Warlock system,resulting in unsupportable and faulty conclusions to allege war profiteering,price gouging and increased revenues byDoD contractors involved in counterlED development efforts.This article provides an example ofhow theleaked TOE information can be manipulated and misinterpreted to produce inaccurateinformation foranews article.^S^^F)The author of the article then argues that the US Army receivesapoor retum on its investment in counterlEDs.1FN33^ Note that the claim carefully avoids stating that the documents or data are false. The complaint is over inter pretation of facts accepted as true.The report follows up with other items it calls variously ^^newsarticlels^,^^or ^^reportls^,^^ related to abuses in Guantanamo Bay, based on the leaked Camp Delta Operating Procedures, and in one case states:^^Avariety of newspapers,wire services,and other news and media organizations wrote numer O U S articles based on the original Wikileaks.org news article and actual classified document posted to their Web site.^^lFN34^ The 200^ Pentagon Report, then, sees Wikileaks asajournalistic organization whose structure and organization make it dangerous to theU.S.military.Areview of all news stories in the Lexis-Nexis database in 2007 and 200^ reveals, however, that Wikileaks'analysis(as opposed to documents)was not reported on in media covered

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by that dataset; instead, the roughly 400 reports present during that period referenced the materials themselves, with occasional references to the brief overview offered by the site.There are only lOmentions of Assange over this period; none refer to the kind of writing the Pentagon Report identifies. 1^FN3^^ The absence of signilicant contemporaneous news reports onWikileaks'or Assange's analysis, as opposed to the documents revealed,may reflectalack of willingness of more traditional media to recognize the writing, but may also represent an overstatement in ^320 the Pentagon Report as to the importance ofthis aspect of the site's operation. The Report locates the danger that Wikileaks presents in its nontraditional organizational structure: Anyone can post information to theWikileaks.org Web site,and there is no editorial review or oversight to verify the accuracy of any information posted to theWeb site.Persons accessing theWeb site can form their own opinions regarding the accuracy of the information posted, and they are allowed to post comments.^^lFN36^ This makes the siteparticularlysusceptibleto^^misinformation,disinformation,andpropaganda;or to conduct perception management and influence operations designed to conveyanegative message to those who view or retrieve information from the Web site.^^1FN37^ This characterization of the threat of excessive openness appears to be eitheramisunderstanding driven by the^^Wiki^^part of the name or deliberate mischaracterization. Promiscuous publication by anyone of anything was not the model thatWikileaks adopted, although that model was far from unheard of at the time.Acontem poraneous report by the Los Angeles Times compares Wikileaks to another then-operating site, Liveleak: ^^LiveLeakhasasimple editorial philosophy: Anyone can post anything that does not violate the site's rules.Es sentially,no pornography and nothing overtly criminal.^^1^FN3^^ By contrast,^^Wikileaks...goes out of its way tomakesure the doeumentsit posts are authentic,saying fewer than l ^ o f itsnewlyposteddocuments ^fail verification.^^^ ^FN3^^ Fromthe vantage point ofearly2011,this policy seems tohavebeenconsistently fol lowed and remarkably successful. After over four yearsinoperation, Wikileaks hasbeencriticizedfor many faults, but none ofits significant postings were found to be inauthentic. The report concludes witharecommendation for attacking the site:cracking down very heavily on whistleblowers so as to make Wikileaks seem less safe asapoint of distribution: Wikileaks.org uses trust asacenter of gravity by assuring insiders,leakers,and whistleblowers who pass information to Wikileaks.org personnel or who post information to the Web site that they will remain anonymous.The identification, exposure,or termination ofemployment ofor legal actions against current orformer insiders, leakers,orwhistleblowerscoulddamageordestroythiscenterofgravity and deter others from using Wikileaks.org to make such information public.1FN40J ^321 C.April-October 2010: Collateral Murder,Afghanistan,and Iraq April 2010marked the beginning ofaseries of four releases of documents embarrassing to theU.S.govemment.All four releases are thought to originate fromasingle major transfer of documents,allegedly provided by atwentytwoyear-oldPrivateFirstClassintheU.S. Army,BradleyManning. ^FN41^The first releasewasa video entitled ^^CollateralMurder.^^On luly 12,2007,twoApache attack helicopters fired onagroup of individuals in Iraq, killing about twelve.Among the dead were two Reuters employees:aphotographerandadriver. Reuters tried to get access to the video footage from the helicopter itself, so as to investigate what had happened and whether there was indeedathreat to the helicopters that would have explained the shooting.TheU.S.government successfully resisted information requestsfor recordings of the events. 1FN42^ Wikileaks made available both the full,raw video and an edited version on April ^,2010.1^FN43^ In it,and in its soundtrack, the heli

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copter pilots exhibit triggerhappybehavior and sound as thoughtheytookpleasureinhuntingdown their targets,some of whom appear to be unarmed civilians.The video and its contents became front-page news in the major papers.1^FN44^ The release ofthe video was swiftly followed by identification ofManning as the source of the leak, based on selectivelyreleased chat messages he allegedly wrote to Adrian Lamo,ahacker convicted of felony hackingin 2004,whohadlongstandingcontacts witha Wired Magazine reporter towhom he conveyed these chat messages.1FN4^^ As of this writing. Manning has been in solitary confinement for over eight months, denied pillows and sheets, and locked inacell for twenty-three ^322 hoursaday.1FN46^ The treatment seems consistent withthePentagon Report's emphasis ondeterrenceagainstpotentialsources of leaks asthe core tactic to undermine Wikileaks. The Collateral Murder video was released atanews conference in theNational Press Club inWashington, D.C. This was the first move that Wikileaks made toward the cooperation with traditionalmedia that would mark its operation in the following eight months.At that early stage,however,Wikileaks was only using the established press asamechanism for amplifying its message.The second element of this episode wasaflirtation withadvocacyjournalism. lFN47^The edited versionof the video came under attack; Fox News in particular emphasized the claim that the video was edited to highlight the killed journalists,but not the presence ofaperson witharocketpropelled grenade.lFN4^^Acareful review ofboth videos—the uncut original and the edited version—side by side suggests that the editing primarily did three things. First, it excluded many minutes of irrel evant periods in which no action was taking place, just as any video journalist would do. Second, it added text slides that gave information about the Reuters photographer and driver, as well as contemporaneous quotations from news reports,to give context to what was being seen. And third, it emphasized shots that made the point aboutcollateraldamage—shots that highlight that the Reuters cameraman's cameras were clearly visible, or that suggest that the children who were injured in the helicopter attack were visible from the helicopter's gun camera through the side window of the van in which they were sitting,avan that the helicopter shot so as to prevent its occupants from evacuating an injured individual that the helicopter crew clearly saw was unarmed, 1FN4^^ pos sibly oneoftheReutersemployees. Boththeeditedanduneditedversionsshow,withsoundtrack, thatthere were at least two individuals who had AK 47s; both the edited and unedited versions show that the pilot thought he saw an RPGpeekingaroundacomer, and that is when he asked for permissionto shoot,although inboth versions it appears that the RPG may have been the zoom lens of one of the cameras used by the^323Reuters cameraman. IFN^O^ The editing did nothing to obscure any of this, or to highlight the possible mistake. There wereseveraldamning parts of theuncutversionthatwerenotincludedintheeditedversion, IFN^ljandtwo ambiguous references to the RPG that might confirm that there was indeed one, but not necessarily that it was where the pilot thought it was.1FN^2^ In Iuly2010,Wikileaksreleasedanew cache of documents-war logs from the field in Afghanistan,The technique here representedacompletely new model.l^FN^31Beforepublication,Wikileaks teamed up with three major intemational news organizations: theNewYorkTimes, the Guardian,and Der Spiegel.The major organizations were then given a period to verify the contents, analyze them, and prepare them for presentation. |^FN^4^ All four organizations published on the same day: Wikileaks,amuch larger portion ofthe full database of documents, and the news organizations, their analysis. IF^^^^ The reporting on these documents found nothing that, in broad terms,was not ^324 already publicly known: the degree to which the U.S.was deploying targeted assassinations againstTaliban leaders,and the large number of civilian casualties caused by drone attacks and other coalition activities.The drudgeryofwar,lowlevels of trust betweenU.S.and Afghanofficials and forces—all of this was on display. The precision and detail of the incident descriptions -such as the shooting of eight children inaschool bus byFrench troops,or of fifteen civilians onabus byU.S.troops-added concrete

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evidence and meaning toabackground sense of futility and amorphous knowledge of civilian casualties.1FN^6^ The Afghanistan war logsreleaseinitially included about 77,000 documents;another l^,OOOdocumentslater followed after they were initially held back to allow time for Wikileaks to redact names ofpeople who might be put in danger. 1FN^7^ Therelease was treated with consternationby the Administration, and theNew York Times'initial story quoted National SecurityAdvisor General lames lones as saying that theU.S. strongly condemns the disclosure ofclassified information by individuals and organizations which couldputthelivesof Americans and our partners at risk,and threaten our national security. WikiLeaks made no effort to contact us about these documents the United States government learned from news organizations that these documents would be posted. IFN^^^ Chairman ofthe loint Chiefs ofStaff, Admiral McMullen,was reported as having said that Wikileaks would have blood on its hands.IFN^^^Followingafull review,however, and in response toadirect request from Senator Carl Levin,Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,Secretary Gates later represented that ^^the review to date has not revealed any sensitive intelligence sources and methods compromised by the disclosures^ IFN^O^McClatchy later quoted anunnamed Pentagon source confirming that three months later there was still no evidence that anyone had been harmed by information in the Afghan war logs released. 1FN61^ ^32^ In October,Wikileaks added one more major release.It consisted of war logs similar to those released in luly,this time pertaining to the Iraq war. Here, Wikileaks posted close to 400,000 field reports from Iraqin what the BBC described as ^ ^ a heavily censored form.^^1FN62^ TheNewYorkTimes framed the documents as having relativelylowsignificance:^^Like the first release,some 77,000 reports covering six years of the war in Afghanistan,the Iraq documents provide no earthshaking revelations,but they offer insight,texture and context fromthepeopleactually fighting the war.^^ 1FN^3^ Other newsorganizationsframedthereports quite differ ently. Der Spiegel entitled the reports A Protocol of Barbarity. 1FN64^ The BBC used the headline: Huge Wikileaks release shows US^ignored Iraq torture.^IFl^^^j Regardless of framing differences,the organizations agreed on the core facts established by the reports: Iraqi civilian casualties were higher than previously reported; the U.S. military was wellaware that Iraq'smilitary andpolice weresystematically torturingprisoners; and whilediscreteunitsintervenedto stop suchtortureontheground, there wasnosystematicefforttostopthe practice.l^FN66j The Pentagon denounced the release asa^^travesty^^ and demanded the return of the documents. 1FN67^ Secretary ofState Clinton was quoted as saying,^^We should condemn in the most clear terms the disclosureBl^FN^^^ This round of document release was also done by release to media outlets first, but one way in which this round was different wastheintroductionof personal attacks on lulian Assange.The day after therelease,the NewYorkTimespublishedaderogatory profile of Assange entitled,Wikileaks Founder on the Run,Trailed by Notoreity.lFN^^^ The opening paragraph conveys the tone ofthe piece: lulian Assange moves likeahunted man.Inanoisy Ethiopian restaurant in London's rundown Paddington district,he pitches his voice barely aboveawhispertofoiltheWestern intelligence agencies he fears.He demands that his dwindling number of loyalists^32^use expensive encrypted cellphones and swaps his own the way other men change shirts. He checks into hotels under false names, dyes his hair, sleeps on sofas and floors, and uses cash instead ofcredit cards, often borrowed from friends.1FN70^ All the elements of the profile of an untrustworthy,shifty character are presented inabreathless tone.Here perhaps is thefirsttextualevidence of the major transition inthe perceptionofWikileaksinmainstreamU.S. media. In March 2010, theTimes had described Wikileaks asThe Little EngineThat Could of new media muckraking journalism. lFN71^Bymid-December,Wikileaks would come to be described byTom Friedman on the

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Times'op-ed page as one of two threatening alternatives toastrong,democratic America, alongside an authoritarianChina. lFN72^Inbetweenthese two descriptions of Wikileaks,theTimes'profile of Assange marks the transition point. D.The Last Straw:The Embassy Cables November 2^,2010ushered in the next document release.This release was more careful and selective than any of the prior releases.Apparently,the caution came too late.The release of the final batch was followed bya massive escalation of attacks onWikileaks as an organization and website and on Assange as an individual.It is the mismatch between what Wikileaks in fact did in this final round and the multi-system attack on it that drives the need foradeeper explanation. The release of the State Department embassy cables^confidential internal communications from embassies to Washington) was the most professionally-mediated,conservatively-controlled release Wikileaks had undertaken. The document set included 2^1,2^7 cables. 1FN73^ Unlike the previous document releases, this time Wikileaks worked almost exclusively through established media organizations. It made the documents available to the Guardian,Der Spiegel,LeMonde, and El Pais; the Guardian made the documents available to theNew YorkTimes.lFN74^ Wikileaks also sought advice from theU.S.State Department, just as theNewYorkTimes had, to aid in redaction and to help it avoid causing damage. Unlike the State Department's response to the traditional media organizations,Wikileaks'letter was met withastrongly-worded letter from the Department's legal advisor, Harold^327Koh, stating,^^We will not engage inanegotiation regarding the further release or disseminationof illegallyobtainedU.S.Government classified materials^^and demanding that Wikileakssimply not publish anything, retum all documents, and destroy all copies in its possession.1FN7^^ This, despite the fact that the date of the letter is one day before revelation, and the text of the letter explicitly states that the State Depart ment knewof and consulted withthe mainstream news organizations that were about to publishthe materials, and therefore that ifWikileaks were to return all the materials,the other media entities would have the freedom and professional obligation to publish the materials.The claim of illegality,coupled withademand for return of thedocuments, appears to reflectdraftingthat is grounded inthe Espionage Act, which applies toone who ^^willfully retains lany document which^lthe possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States^and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it.^^ 1FN76^ This legal strategy appears to have followed the model already set by the Pentagon during the Afghanwar logs release. lFN77^LaterreportsfromWikileaks'media partners support the observation that the Obama Administration treated Wikileaks as though it were inafundamentally different category than it did the newspapers. 1FN7^^ Wikileaksthenproceededtomakepublicly accessible onitsownwebsitecablesthat had beenpublishedbyatleastoneofthesemediaorganizations, in theredactedformthat those outletshadpublished.lFN7^^Despite the actual care and coordinated release model that Wikileaks in fact practiced, over 60^ of print news reports at the time explicitly stated thatWikileaks had released thousands of documents (usually over2^0,000),andanother20^impliedthatitdidso. IFN^O^ lnfact,over the course of thefirst month and more, the site releasedafew hundred documents, limited almost exclusively to those published and redacted by other organizations. Thecontentsoftheoverwhelmingmajority of released cables ranged fromthegenuinely important ^e.g., Saudi and Gulf state support foraU.S.led attack on Iran to prevent proliferation; Yemeni acquiescence inU.S. ^32^ bombing on its own territory;U.S.spying onUNstaff;U.S.intervention in Spanish,German,and Italian prosecution processes aimed atU.S.military and CIA personnelover human rights abuses of citizens of those

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countries; the known corruption and ineptitude of Afghan President Hamid Karzai) to the merely titillating (Libyanleader MuammarGadaffi'sUkrainian nurse described as^^voluptuousblonde^^). Although none broke ground inaway that was likely to influenceU.S.policy inafundamental way,this was not always true of other countries.IFN^l^The most ambitious speculations,in theNewYorkTimes and Foreign Policy,suggested that Wikileaks'cables'blunt descriptions of the corruption ofTunisian President Ben Ali helped fuel the revolution that ousted him in Ianuary2011.1FN^2^ Whether anything so fundamental can indeed be attributed to the em bassy cables leak is doubtful, but the sheer range of issues and countries touched, and continuous media attention for two months,make it undeniable that theWikileaks U.S.embassy cable release wasamajor news event that captured headlines all over the world for weeks,providingasteady flow of smallto mid-sized revelations about theU.S.in particular and the world of high diplomacy more generally.It wasamajor scoop,or, as the Guardian put it proudly, ^^the world's biggest leak.^^1^FN^3^ Despite the generally benign character of the cables,one cable,one response toacable,and one threat to release all raise particular concerns about potential damage.The cable that raised the greatest concem wasaFebruary 200^ eablelisting^^Critical Foreign DependencieslnitiativeList,^^ which listed specificfacilities whose disruption wouldharm U.S. interests. 1FN^4^ TheserangedfromaManganesemine inGabonandundersea communications cables in China, toapharmaceutical plant in Melbourne, Australia andaDanish supplier of pediatric form insulin.l^FN^^^ Unlike the overwhelming majority of cables,this one appears to have been released initially by ^32^ Wikileaks.1FN^6^ The argument against this release,made at the time by theU.S.govemment, was that it offeredatarget list for terrorists seeking to disrupt criticalglobal supplies by rendering criticaldependencies transparent.1FN^7^ The second cable,or rather response toacable,includedareference to ^imbab we Prime Minister MorganTsvangirai's private support for sanctions against the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, providing an excuse for the Mugabe regime to explore prosecutingTsvangirai for treason.IF^^^^ It appears that thiscable, like the majority of cables, waspublishedat the same time ^and likely incoordination with) the Guardian.IFN^^^ Furthermore,it is unclear whether use of the cable as an excuse byarepressive regime to prosecute or threaten itsleadopponent is equivalent torevealing names of unknown human rights workers, much lessundercoveroperatives, who would nototherwisebeknowntotheregime. Finally, inanticipationof the pressure, arrest, andpotential threatsof assassination, lulian Assange threatened to release a^^poisonpill,^^a large cache of encrypted documents that is widely replicated around the Net and that would be decrypted, presumably with harmful consequences to the U.S.,should he be arrested or assassinated.This latter of the three events is the one most foreign to the normal course of democratic investigation and publication.^FN^O^Depending on the contents of the file,it could beagenuinely distinct, threatening event, and publication of ^33^ the decryption key may be an appropriate target for suppression consistent with First Amendment doctrine that permits constrainingdisclosure of ^^thesailingdates of transports or thenumberandlocationof troops.IF^^l^ Itis doubtful,however, that the contents ofthe insurance file would fall under that category,assuming that the entire set ofcables is not fundamentally different from those that were released and recognizing that none ofthe cables were classified in top-secret categories. ILTheResponse:AMulti-System Attack onWikileaks The response to the Wikileaks embassy cable release in the United States was dramatic and sharp. The integrated, cross-system attack on Wikileaks, led by the U.S. government with support from other governments, private companies, and online vigilantes, provides an unusually crisp window into the multi system structure of freedom and constraint in the networked environment and helps us to map the emerging networked fourth estate. The attack's failure provides us with insight into how freedom of action is preserved primarily by bobbing and

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weaving between systems to avoid the constraints of those subsystems under attack and harness the affordances of those that are out of reach of the attacker.The response also highlights the challenges thataradically decentralized global networked public sphere poses for those systems ofcontrol that developed in the second half of the twentieth century to tame the fourth estate-to make the press not only ^^free,^^ but also^^responsible.^^ Doing so allows us to understand that the threat represented byWikileaks was not any single cable,but the fraying of the relatively loyal and safe relationship between theU.S.government and its watchdog.Nothing captures that threat moreironicallythanthe spectacle of ludithMiller,the disgraced New YorkTimesreporterwhoyoked that newspaper's credibility to the Bush Administration's propaganda campaign regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction in the run-up to the IraqWar,lFN^2^ using Fox News asaplatform to criticize lulian Assange for neglecting the journalist's duty of checking his sources and instead providing raw cables to the public. 1FN^3^ The criticism is particularly ironic in light of the fact that despite all the attacks on the cables'release, the arguments were never that the cables were inauthentic. It is important to emphasize that the myriad forms of attack onWikileaks thatldescribe in the coming pages areunlikely torepresentasingle coordinated responseby an all-knowing Administrationbentoncensorship. Mostly,they appear to representaseries of acts by agents,both ^331 public and private,that feed into each other to produceaneffect that is decidedly inconsistent with the kindof freedomof thepressand freedomof speechtowhichthe United Statesis committed.That no distinct attack pattemthatldescribe clearly violates Wikileaks' constitutional rights asagainst thestate isno salve; indeed, it isprecisely the vulnerability todestructive attacks, none of which is in itself illegal but that together effectively circumvent the purposes of consti tutionality and legality that requires our attention.

A.Sociopolitical Framing: Situating Wikileaks in the Frame of theWaronTerror The political attack onWikileaks as an organization and on lulian Assange as its public face was launched almost immediately upon release of the cables. Their defining feature was to frame the event not as joumalism, irresponsible or otherwise,but asadangerous,anarchic attackon the modelof the super-empowered networks of terrorism out to attack the U.S.The first salvowas fired by SecretaryofState Hillary Clinton,who stated, ^^Let's be clear:This disclosure is not just an attack on America's foreign policy interests....It is an attack on the intemationalcommunity—the alliances and partnerships,the conversations and negotiations,that safeguard global security andadvance economic prosperity.1FN^4^ The trope of anattackon the international community provided the backdrop foraseries of comments aimed at delegitimizingWikileaks and locating it in the same comer, in terms of threats to the United States, as global terrorism. This was the backdrop for Vice President Biden's statement that Wikileaks founder lulian Assange is ^^morelikeahigh-tech terrorist than the Pentagon Papers.^^lFN^^^ This assessment was not uniformly supported by the Administration. Defense Secretary Robert Gates called the public response ^^overwrought,^^and concluded with: ^^Is this embarrassing7Yes.Is it awkward7 Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy71think fairly modest.^^lFN^^^ Echoing this sentiment, the German Interior Minister described the revelations as ^^annoying for Germany,butnotathreat.^^lFN^7^ These measured voices did not prevail in the first few weeks after the disclosures began. The invitation by Secretary Clinton and Vice President Biden to respond to dissemination of confidential in formation as an assault on our national pride and integrity, on par with terrorism, was complemented by calls to use the techniques that theU.S.has adopted in its ^^WaronTerror^^ against lulian Assange or Wikileaks asasite. Bob Beckel,the Fox News ^332 commentator who had beenaDeputyAssistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration and had been campaign manager toWalterMondale,said,^^^Adead man can't leak s t u f f . . . .

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This guy'satraitor, he's treasonous,and he has broken every law of the United States.And I'm not for the death penalty,so...there's only one way to do it: illegally shoot the son ofabitch.^^^lFN^^^This proposal was met with universal agreement by the panel on the program. IFN^^^ Republican Representative Pete King, thenincoming ChairmanoftheHouse Homeland Security Committee,sought tohaveWikileaksdeclaredaforeign terrorist organization. IFNIOO^ Right-wing commentators picked up this line. William Kristol wrote in the Weekly Standard: Why can't we act forcefully against WikiLeaks7 Why can't we use our various assets to harass, snatch or neutralize lulian Assange and his collaborators, wherever they are7 Why can't we disrupt and destroy WikiLeaks in both cyberspace and physical space,to the extent possible7Why can't we wam others of repercussions from assisting this criminal enterprise hostile to the United States71FN101^ Heconcludes withtheremarkable statement:^^ Acting together to degrade,defeat,and destroy WikiLeaks should be the first topic discussed at today'sWhite House meeting between the president and the congressional leadership.1FN102^ Sarah Palin linkedtothiscommentary onherTwitterfeed,andonherFacebookpage stated that Assange ^^is an anti-American operative with blood on his hands. His past posting of classified documents revealed the identity of more than lOOAfghan sources to theTaliban. Why was he not pursued with the same urgency we pursue AlQaeda andTalibanleaders7^^1FN103^ By the end of the first decade of the twentyfirst century,these statements show that we in the United States know quite well what to do to terrorists or SUSpected terrorists. Whether one uses the euphemisms of ^^targeted killings,^^extraordinary renditions,and ^^enhancedinterrogations,^^orsimplycallsthingsby their names assassination,kidnapping,and torture—these practices have becomeastandard, i f controversial, part of the U.S.arsenal in its war on terror since the early days after September 11th. Whilethe^333 Obama Administration hasrenouncedtorture, ithasembracedtargeted killings asalegitimate part of its own war onterror,lFN104^ and chosen asamatter of stated policy to turnablind eye to the illegality of the Bush Administration's torture program.IFNIO^^ Asaresult, these contin ue to be options that can be publicly proposed by major public outlets and speakers.They remain part ofthe legitimate range of options for discussion. It is unthinkable that theU.S.will in fact assassinate Assange.But the range of actions open to both govemment and nongovernment actors isin important ways constrained byour understanding of the social frame,or social context inwhichwe find ourselves. IFl^lO^^Thelegaloptions that the lustice Department thinks about when confronted withacaseofajournalist who publishes sensitive materials are fundamentallydifferent than those it thinks about when it is developingaprosecution strategy against terrorism suspects.The pressure to cut off payment systems flows is fundamentally different when considering whether to cut off payments toapoliticallyodiousgroupthanwhenconsideringcuttingoff payments toaterroristorganization. Itis verydifficultto understand the political and market dynamics that could have led to the decision by MasterCard and Visa to cut off payments to Wikileaks except against the background of theframing efforts that located Wikileaks inthe same rubric as theTaliban,rather than the same rubric as theNewYorkTimes or the Progressive.1^FN107^ B. Media Misinformation and Misdirection Traditional media outlets provided substantial support for the Administration's framing by exaggerating the number of cables and implyingacareless approach to their release.Astudy of major print newspaper stories that mentioned the quantity of cables during the first two weeks after the November2^th release shows thatasubstantial majority of newspapers stated as fact that Wikileaks had ^^released,^^^^published,^^or^^posted on its site,^^ ^^thousands^^or^^over2^0,000^^cables.lFN10^^ About 20^ of the stories in major ^334 newspapers were clear

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andaccurateonthequestionofhowmany cables were released at that time and how vetted and redacted the published cables were.Typical of this type of story are ChicagoTribune and Los AngelesTimes reports from November 30,2010:^^WikiLeaks released 272 diplomaticcablesfromatrove of more than 2^0,000.There mainder are to be dribbled out for maximum impact, group members say.^^IFNIO^^ The existence ofasubstantial minority of accurate reports underscores the degree of misleading information published in the majority of stories during the initial period after release,when public perceptions ofWikileaks and Assange werebeingframed. Reportscategorized asbeing unambiguously misleadingincludedsentences such as ^^WikiLeaks showed relatively little such discretion in its online posting of more than 2^0,000 diplomaticcables,^^ l^FNllO^or^^thousandsof StateDepartment cables,just releasedby WikiLeaks, wereprovidinga glimpse into what U.S. diplomatsreally thought.^^ I F N l l l ^ Sixty-eightoutof 111 storiescodedmade these kinds ofclaims. Anothertwenty stories weremore ambiguous.These storiesusedcharacterizations that were truthful but easily misinterpreted as describingafull release.1^FN1121 Reporting of the events at the time suggests not so muchaconspiracy but confusion and lack of clarity about the facts. Some papers published reports that contradicted each other from one day to the next, sometimes even in the same edition.For example,on November2^,2010,the ChicagoTribune published three stories: in one it accurately said that hundreds of thousands of cables were^^obtained^^ by Wikileaks,lF^113^in another it mis stated ^^more than 2^0,000 U.S.diplomatic cables released Sunday by theWeb siteWikiLeaks,^^lFN114^ and in athird it ambiguously wrote:^^The online whistle-blower site WikiLeaksbegan publishing more than 2^0,000 diplomatic cables from U.S. embassies around the world Sunday.^^IFNll^^ On November ^33^ 30th, the Christian Science Monitor misleadingly referred to ^^hundreds of thousands of cables released byWikileaks,^^ 1F^116^ but in other stories usedamore ambiguous phrasing 1FN117^ and an accurate description.l^FNll^^ Capturing the treatment oftelevision is less comprehensive and much can be missed. Conclusions made here about television coverage are thus more tentative. An identical search of transcripts available in the Lexis Nexis database suggests that Fox News and CBS News consistently misreported the number ofcables released.For example,CBS EveningNewsineludedastatementthat^^Assangeand WikiLeaks deny that their publicationof 2^0,000 StateDepartment cables putthe lives of spies ordiplomats at risk;^^ IFNll^^ the CBS News show Sunday Moming stated,^^Aweek after publishing those thousands of secret U.S.diplomatic cables,WikiLeaks is struggling to stay online;^^l^FN120^ and The Early Show included the statement,^^Those classified cables over twohundredandfifty thousandof them werereleased by the whistleblowing website WikiLeaks.Inamove that White House calls reckless....^^lFN121^NBChadamore mixed record.NBC Nightly News stated: ^^Now to the latest onWikileaks.One week after the release ofhundreds of thousands ofState Department cables,after companies in this country and France took down the WikileaksWeb site,Sweden and Switzerland became the main access points. As for the man behind Wikileaks, he says he continues to receive death threats.^^1F^122^ Threeweekslater,however,theTodayshowexplicitly stated that ^^WikiLeaks has sofar released lessthan 1 percent ofthe classified documents it claims to have lobtaineda.1FN123^ ABC had fewer reports, but the December 1st episode of Good Moming America stated that ^^We'regonnatum now tomore fallout fromthe WikiLeaks release ofthousands ofdiplomaticcables.^^lFN124^ CNN had many more reports, and, like the print newspapers, included descriptions regarding the number ^33^ of cables actually released, ranging from precise reports to claims of profligate release. FigureLFrequency of terms used in stories mentioning Wikileaks August 2010-Ianuary2011

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TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SETFORTHATTHIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE Asecond dimension of media coverage that merits note is the relatively heavy emphasis on the sexual molestation charges against Assange in Sweden. It is not difficult to understand why media outlets that need to sellcopy would add sex and violence to politics and diplomacy.The Swedish prosecution made forasalacious story too reminiscent of what Bill Keller, executive editor of theNewYorkTimes,would later call ^ ^ a missing StiegLarssonnovel^^lFN12^j to pass up.One need not hold the position that there wasaconspiracy involved in reporting on the rape investigation to see that it is what formed the foundation for the depiction of Assange asa^^hunted man.^^1F^126^ At an aggregate level, it is possible to observe an interference pattern created by the rape or molestation charge in media coverage of Wikileaks. The interference pattem is neither perfectly matched nor completely effective, but is clearly identifiable in atimeline of the frequency,in twentyfive top mainstream media outlets in theU.S.,of the terms ^^Iraq,^^ ^^embassy,^^^^rape,^^ and ^^molestation^^ in stories that mention ^^Wikileaks^^ between August 2010andlanu ary 2011.1FN127^ ^337 C. Direct Legal Action: Espionage Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Conspiracy Withinaweek of the initial release of the cables,Democratic Senator and Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee DianneFeinstein called for Assange's prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1^17.1FN12^^ The call forusingtheEspionage Actof 1^17 isaremarkableexerciseinhistoricalamnesia. It is consistent, however, with the wording ofboth the Pentagon's response in August and the State Department's letter in November. 1FN12^^ The Act wasthe primary legaltooldeveloped in what was^^one of themost fiercely repressive periods in American history.1FN130^ Efforts by judges, most prominently Leamed Hand in the Masses case, lFN131^to constrain its use to preserve press freedom failed, and courts of appeals followed the approach that the govemment had the power to punish publication of materials that hada^^natural and probable tendency^^ to produce the result that the Act was intended to prevent.1FN132^ Under the Act, Rose Pastor Stokes was convicted to ten years imprisonment for saying inapublicmeeting,^^! am for the people and the govern ment is for the profiteers'^ ^FN133^; although her conviction was overturned on appeaLlFN134^0thers were not asfortunate.Afilmdirector, Robert Goldstein,receivedatenyeartermforproducingamovie about thcRevolutionaryWar that portrayed not only the Midnight Ride,the signing of the Declaration of Independence,and Valley Forge,but also theWyoming Valley Massacre,showing British soldiers bayoneting women and children. 1F^13^^ The trial court found that these depictions ^^mayhaveatendency or effect of sowing...animosity or want ofconfidence between us and our allies.^^lFN136j Goldstein's ten-year prison term was not overturned, but was later commuted byWoodrow Wilson.lF^137^EugeneV.Debs would have to wait for President Warren G. Harding to be released,alongside other ^^politicalprisoners^^ ^33^ prosecuted under the Act during WorldWar I. 1FN13^^ Asamatter of law,parts of the Act are indeed on the books.Asamatter of constitutional culture,invoking the Espionage Act against an act of public expression is more akin to calling for the prosecution of dissenters under the Sedition Act ofl7^^.News reports suggest that the lustice Department is considering prosecu tion,but likely underatheory of conspiracy to violate one of several other provisions,like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. lFN13^^AsIdiscuss in Part III,this path of attack is effectively blocked by the First Amendment.Here, in painting the dimensions of the attack onWikileaks,Inote only the most obvious form of govemment action: prosecution, subject to the requirements of legality, due process, and constitutional protections for free speech. D.Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest7Denial-of-Service Attacks by an Extralegal Public-Private Part-

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nership i.Technical Infrastructure Denial ofService Beginningafew hours after the release of the first embassy cables, theWikileaks site came underadistrib uteddenialofservice(^^DDoS^^)attack.l^FN140^Apattern of denial-of-service attacks continued over the next few weeks.It is difficult to pindown whether these attacks came from govemment bodies,and i f so,whether fromoneofthecountriesfearingembarrassingrevelationsorfromtheUnitedStates. 1^FN141^ Newsreports about the initial set of attacks emphasized the self-congratulatory tweets ofahacker who took the name ^^lester^^ and claimed responsibility for some of these attacks:becauseWikileaks is ^^attempting to endanger the lives of our troops,mother assets'^foreign relations.^^1FN142^ The sheer scale of the attacks,on the one hand,and the technique adopted by the lester,which was not DDoS,on the other hand,suggest that the lester was merely taking responsibility for the acts of other sources of attack that have not been identified or reported upon,^33^ at least intheearly stages, usingarelatively smallnumberofmachineslocatedinRussia,eastern Europe,and Thailand. 1FN143^ In describingany DDoS attack, identifying the culprits is extremely difficult, i f not im possible. What is quite clear isthat oneresponse Wikileaks adopted wastomoveitsdatato Amazon's cloud hosting services,whereit would be safefrom such attacksbecause of the sheer size and sophisticationof the hosting site.1^FN144^ This move,in turn,made it vulnerable toanew threat. OnDecember l,2010SenatorIoeLieberman,Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, launchedadifferent kind of denial-of-service attack.Lieberman releasedastatement in which he stated: Icall on any other company or organization that is hosting Wikileaks to immediately terminate its relationship with them.Wikileaks'illegal,outrageous,and reckless acts have compromised our national se curity andput lives at risk around the world. No responsible company-whether American or foreign-should assist Wikileaks in its efforts to disseminate these stolen materials.1FN14^^ The response to Lieberman's call was swift andwide ranging. That same day, Amazon, whichhosted Wikileaks' embassy cables on its cloud computing platform, removed Wikileaks' content. 1FN146^ Amazon denied that it had acted under government pressure,but its own denial notice clearly stated that it madeajudgment that the content did not belong toAmazon,was likelydamaging,could not have been properly redacted, and therefore violated the company's terms of service.lFN147^1n other words, Amazonwas making precisely thedeterminationthatagovernmentofficialmakingadecision to imposeprior restraint would havetomake. Because the company apparently^340 acted without direct order from the government, this decision is unreview able byacourt.Given what we know of the materials as they have come out to this point, there is little likelihood that an official order to remove the materials would have succeeded in surmounting the high barriers erectedby First Amendment doctrine in cases of prior restraint. The fact that the same effect was sought tobe achieved throughapublic statement by an official, executed by voluntary action ofaprivatecompany,suggests adeepvulnerabilityof the checks imposed by the First Amendment in the context ofapublic sphere built entirely of privatelyowned infrastructure.^FN14^J The next private infrastructure to deny service toWikileaks was EveryDNS,the registration company that provided domain name service toWikileaks.The company ceased to point the domain name ^^wikileaks.org^^ to the site. When EveryDNS removed service, Internet users who would type ^^www.wikileaks.org^^ into their URL bar, or users who clicked on online links to the mainWikileaks site would come up with nothing.The site was quickly up and running again, however, using the Swiss domain name wikileaks.ch. The content itself was hosted on serversin Sweden and France.1FN14^^ EveryDNSissuedanotice claiming that they cut offWikileaks

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because the sitewas subject tomassivcDDoSattacks that adverselyaffected its other clients. In an amusing ^^protest too much^^moment, the company's notice ended with:^^Lastly,regardless of what people say about the actions ofEveryDNS.net,we know this much is true—we believe in our New Hampshire state motto,^Live Free orDie.^^^ IFNl^O^ When it became clear that the materials were nowhosted by aFrench firm,theFrenchIn dustry Minister, Eric Bresson, called upon Intemet companies to deny service and not to host the cables. lFNl^l^Twodayslater,the French company OVH,whichwas hosting the embassycables,went offline.The cables were moved toaserver hosted by the Pirate Party in Sweden,apolitical party dedicated to digital copy right reform in Sweden. Beginning the next day, the party's server, on which the cables were hosted, came under massive DDoS attacks.These were not,however,sufficient to disrupt service significantly.The last major distributton infrastructure company to deny service to Wikileaks content (albeit indirectly) was Apple, whichremoved an iPhone App,developed and sold byadeveloper with no connections toWikileaks,providing access to the informationWikileaks made available free online.Apple's formal reason was the claimed illegality and harm caused by the materials.1FN1^2^ ^341 ii.PaymentSystems Disruption Wikileaks isanonprofit that depends on donations from around the world tofund its operation. Asecond system that came under attack onamodel parallel to the attack on technical infrastructure was the payment system.The first platform to go was PayPal,which suspended service toWikileaks on Saturday,December4,2010. That Wednesday,the company's vice president of platform,mobile,and new ventures stated: What happened is that on November 27thlthe day beforeWikileaks began releasing cables^the State Department, the U.S. government basically, wrote a letter saying that the Wikileaks activities were deemedillegal intheUnitedStates. And so our policy grouphadtotakeadecisiontosuspendtheac count....It was straightforward from our point of view.lFN1^3^ Theletter was not necessarily evidence of direct pressure from the State Department on PayPal,however, but ratherareferencebyPayPaltotheletter sent byHaroldKoh to Wikileaks as evidence thatWikileaks en gaged in illegality, and hence violated the company's terms ofservice.l^FN1^4^ That letter, however, stated that the materials were provided toWikileaks illegally,not that their publication by Wikileaks was illegal.It wasa careful piece oflawyering, insinuating,but not asserting, illegality on the part ofWikileaks itself.lFNl^^^ That PayPal would act so swiftly againstaclient, misstating the illegality and identifying the State Department as its sourceallstrongly suggest that even i f the action was notdirectlycoordinatedwiththeU.S.government,the companycertainly thought it wasimplementing the policy that SenatorLieberman had called for and was the course ofaction desired by the government. The other major payment systemsfollowedsoonthereafter.OnMonday,December 6th, MasterCard announced that ^^MasterCard is taking action to ensure thatWikiLeaks can nolonger accept MasterCard-branded products.^^1^FN1^6^ That same day,the Swiss postal bank shut down lulian Assange's personal bank account because,the bank's announcement stated, he^^provided false information regarding his place of residence during the account opening process.^^1FN1^7^ The irony ofaSwiss bank shuttingabankaccount^342 because its own er provided lessthan-transparent information about his residential addressis practically more revealing thana frank admission ofapoliticaldecision.Visa followed suit the next day,and Bank of America ten days after that. IFNl^^^ The pattern of attack through the payment system was similar to the pattem of the attack on the technical system.The initial impetus from the rhetoric equating Wikileaks with global terrorism was followed by Senator

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Lieberman's express request that U.S.companies cutWikileaksoff.The companies then complied,and the U.S. government did nothing to distance itself from these acts. Indeed, when MasterCard came under attack for its actions, SenatorLieberman publiclycametoitssupport. IFNl^^^ If we were to consider what judicialprocess would berequiredforthegovernment to exert this kindof force directly—cuttingofftechnicalinfrastructures and excluding an organization from the payment systems—because of the content of information that organizationdisseminated,thebarriersin law would havebeen practically insurmountable.However,theimplicit alii ance—a public-private partnership between the firms that operate the infrastructure and the govemment that en courages them tohelpin its waron terror, embodiedby thisparticularly irritatingorganization—wasable to achieve extra-legally much more than law would have allowed the state to do by itself. iii. Organizational Power On December 3,2010, the Office ofManagement and Budget issuedamemorandum to the various government departments,emphasizing that theWikileaks documents were stillclassified, and that access to them re mained subject to all the legal limitations appropriate to their classification.l^FN160jAsaresult,awide range of federal agencies prohibited or technically blocked their employees from reading theWikileaks materials online from their federal computers. Perhapsthemostsymbolicofthese was that patrons of theLibrary of Congress could not read materials available everywhere else in the world ^^becauseapplicablelawobligates federal agencies to protect classified information.^343 Unauthorized disclosures of classified documents do not alter the documents'classified status or automatically result in declassification of the documents.^^lFN161^0ne wonders whether this meant that congressionalstaffortheCongressionalResearchService, too, weredisabledfromreaching the cables tomake their own independent judgment about the events. At least asironic was the result that employeesintheU.S. DepartmentofDefensewerenotpermittedtoreadcablesavailabletoevery terrorist andforeignintelligence analyst withacomputerandaterminal. 1FN162^ Plainly,these blocks could not possiblydo anything tolimit further leakage of already leakeddocuments.lt also seems highly implausible that these blocks represented an effort to prevent federalemployees from seeing the paucity of the threat and the exaggerated nature of the response— for themselves. Muchmore likely is that these were uncoordinated acts intendedaspublic performances of allegiance in the face of threat to the national pride.More than most other acts we have seen, these publie announcements suggestafutile panic response. The internal moves within the government translated through other organizational systems into constraints on reading and accessing the materials elsewhere.Most clearly,these are represented inaseries of memoranda that university offices ofcareer services throughout the country sent to their students, waming them that reading the Wikileaks cables couldendanger their fiiture employment prospectsintheU.S.government. l^FN163^This becomesaserious exercise of power over speech through the power of the government to hire or refuse to hire. As such,it isadirect and effective constraint on reading publicly available truthful information with clear political import. And, as with the case of the companies,here universitycareer services offices provided accreditation and dissemination services to the initial move by the government, so that the chilling effect was amplified through the organizational power ofrecruitment and hiring in the country's institutes ofhigher education. One particularly interesting source of accreditation was theWashingtonPost,whichpublishedacareer advice column on the threat that reading the cables presented to one's eligibility to getagovernment job.1FN164^ The article, ^344 authored by the Post's leading expert on federal career placement, 1^FN16^^ opens with the following sentences:

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You have always had an interest in theU.S.government and the missions of the agencies that deal with national security and international affairs. You even hope to work for the feds or serve in the military one day. Then you find yourself- an avid reader and seeker of knowledge face to face with the WikiLeaksWeb site.This rare look inside government operations could also cost youapotential security clearance.1FN166^ It is hard to imagineamore effective way to prevent young people aspiring toacareer in politics or public service from reading the materials that the govemment would prefer they not read. iv. Indirect Legal Assault Themultisystem attackon Wikileaks employsthelegalsystemontwodimensionsthatarenot directly aimed at the actions of Wikileaks in leaking the cables. Each attack is likely to put pressure on the continued ability ofthe organization to function. The first ofthese is the actual legal action against the soldier who is accused ofhaving leaked the materials: a22-yearold army intelligence analyst named Bradley Manning.As of this writing, little is known about Manning or his motivations beyondaseries of articles inWired Magazine,based on materials provided by the hacker who turned Manning in, Adrian Lamo. lFN167^That Manning can be prosecuted under militaryor civilian criminal law is certainly true.It is clear, however, from what littleis available,that while Manning was under stress and self-medicating, he was operating at least inpart from motives that we would normallyconsider the paradigm case of whistleblowing: moral and political disagreement with the course of action of the state. 1FN16^^ Whether the actions exposed inthe documents areindeedillegalorimmoralinamanner that would justifyblowing the whistleis not obvious. After almostayear of revelations fromthissetof materials,they seem moreabroad affirmation of what is widely believed to be the case than offering any new smoking guns. Their disclosure largely serves to confirm readers'views—both positive and negative ofU.S.policy.The contours of what protection, if any,is due federal employees generally,and military personnel in particular,who engage in whistleblowing under these^34^ circumstances or where unambiguousillegality is exposed is beyond the scope of this article.lFN16^^From the perspective of the assault onWikileaks,the important aspect ofManning's treatment is the effort to use him to deter future whistleblowers and the question of whether his culpability could serve to anchor conspiracy liability against Assange and Wikileaks.Given the Pentagon Report's focus on disrupting the trust of whistleblowers inWikileaks by exposing them, 1^FN170^ Manning's long-term solitary confinement seems clearly intended asawarninglFN171^and possibly asalever to obtain his cooperation in bringingaconspiracy charge against Assange.However, the long confinement may undermineacourt's willingness to credit his testimony in suchacase. The second dimension of indirect legal attack onWikileaks is the Swedish investigation into accusations of sexualassaultby lulian Assangeagainst two womenduringan August 2010 visit toSweden. On August 20, 2010,after release ofthe Collateral Murder video and the Afghanistan documents,the Swedish prosecutor's office issued an arrest warrant against Assange in an investigation of allegations of rape stemming from accusa tions by two women whom he had met ataconference in Sweden on Augustl4thandl7th.The accusations and issuance of the arrest warrant were leaked to the press.The next day,the arrest warrant was withdrawn,anda chief prosecutor inthe Swedishprosecutor's office stated,^^Idon't think thereisreasonto suspect that he has committed rape.^^1^FN172^ On Septemberlst,the Director ofProsecutions decided to overturn the investigating prosecutor's decision, and reopen the rape investigation. 1FN173^ On November l^th, three weeks after release oftheIraqdocuments,theDirectorofProsecutionsobtainedawarranttodetain Assange for questioning. Assange,then in the United Kingdom,offered to come to the Swedish embassy or ScotlandYard for the interview.

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OnNovember20th,Sweden issued an internationalarrest warrant. OnNovember30th, Interpol issueda^^red notice^^against Assange,and on December7th,Assange gave himself up toLondon police and was denied bail until ^34^ the extradition hearing. 1FN174^ While the U.K. government did not comment on the arrest, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded that it was ^^good news,^^1FN17^^ lending support to concems raised by observers from the moment of the initial issuance of the arrest warrant and its retraction that the charges were part ofacampaign to undermine Wikileaks.1FN176^ On December 14th, the judge awarded bail,but the prosecution appealed the grant ofbail so that Assange's release was delayed. 1FN177^ The decision to appeal may have been requested by the Swedish prosecutor's office. 1FN17^^ The facts underlying the effort to extradite Assange before charging him raise questions about the relationship betweenthe aggressive pursuit of the extradition request and appeals over bail and the general assault on Wil^ileaks. According toareport in the Guardian,based on police reports leaked to the newspaper, 1FN17^^ the accusers suggested that Assange behaved aggressively with at least one of the two accusers, and inconsiderately with both.IFNl^O^ It is entirely possible that under Sweden's definition of rape and sexual molestation laws,reOeetingsignificantrespect for women'srighttorefuseat any point inthe interaction, IFNl^l^ that Assange committed an offense.1FN1^2^ The treatment ofthe case issuance ofthe warrant, its retraction and reissuance, the leaks to the press, and most importantly the issuance ofan international arrest warrant,requesting extradition without consenting to an initial interview at the embassy or ScotlandYard,and repeated efforts to seek denial of bail and appeal of the bail decision-suggests that the manner of pursuit wasapolitical act, rather than purely standard procedure in suchacase.1^FN1^3^ Whether the politics were about Wikileaks or simply using the name recognition of the accused to makeapoint about sexual assault law in Sweden^347 is unclear. 1FN1^4^ Certainly,it created the materials for the media interference pattern described above. E.Sources ofResilience ofthe Networked Fourth Estate,and Their Limits Despite the multi system assaults it sustained, Wikileaks continued to operate throughout the period following release of the cables,and its supporters continued to function and indeed respond to the attack along many dimensions, lust as the attacks provideinsightintothewaysinwhichhumanpracticeinvolves action in and through multiple intersecting systems, so, too, do the responses. lurisdictional arbitrage.The first and most obvious feature of the operation ofWikileaks is its presence outside the jurisdiction of the affected country the United States. Even ifU.S.law were to permit shutting down the site or arresting lulian Assange, that alone would be insufficient. The fact that the actors and servers are in other countries, and in particular, in countries with strong rights protecting whistleblowers—initially Iceland and later Sweden- provided Wikileaks withadegree of robustness against the most predictable legal attacks.The defense is,ofcourse,only as strong as the self-imposed limits ofpotentially offended countries on applying ex tra territorial jurisdiction, and the degree to which the host countries are, or are not, susceptible to legal process or diplomatic pressure. Shifting to redundant backup technical systems. When EveryDNS,aCalifomia company, cut off domain name service, Wikileaks used a Swiss domain name service, Switch, and a Swiss domain name-Wikileaks.ch to remain reachable. DespiteU.S.and French pressure to shut down the Swiss domain name, the Swiss DNS registrar refused to do so. l^FNl^^^ Wikileaks then usedTwitter to disseminate the new URL.The redundancy of naming platforms, and the availability of uncontrolled pathways to disseminate information necessary to coordinate on the alternative platform, meant thatWikileaks was again available within hours.Com-

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bining jurisdictional arbitrage with technical system redundancy, Wikileaks quickly set up fourteen domain servers, in multiple countries, to respond to searches for its domain. lFN1^6j Similarly, when Amazon denied Wikileaks service,the organization was able to quickly shift to copies hosted on servers provided by OVHin France; and when the French government cracked down on that backup ^34^ system, Wikileaks moved to pointing at copies hosted in Sweden,which has stronger press freedom and whistleblower protection laws. Shifting to backup payment systems. When payment systems were denied toWikileaks by PayPal,Master Card, and Visa, several pathways remained. These included a German bank, an Icelandic bank, Datacell ^a Swiss-Icelandic online payment system processing money transfers from banks in several European countries), as well as simply using PayPal to paylulian Assange's U.K. lawyer directly (instead of sending the payments to Wikileaks'account).lFN1^7^ Unlike the technical backup solutions,these are obviouslyless efficient avenues, and the need to resort to them inflicted real damage onWikileaks.IFNl^^^ Socio political framing as journalism. Throughout the events, Assange and Wikileaks emphasized their role as journalists.Inverting the practices of those who sought to analogizeWikileaks to terrorists,some commentators and reporters emphasized the basic argument that Wikileaks isareporting organization,fulfillingareporting function. In particular, Glenn Greenwald of Salon provided the most detailed and systematic coverage in support ofWikileakslF^l^^^ Backup organizational systems.Perhaps the most important strategic choice ofWikileaks in this case was to release through several established news sites in differentjurisdictions and markets. This approach achieved several things. First, it provided accreditation for the materials themselves. Second, offering the materials to several organizationsmeantthatnosingleorganizationcould, actingalone, suppress thecables. Competitionfbrthe scoop drove publication.Third,it located Wikileaks squarely within the^journalist,^^andeven^^responsiblees tablishedmedia^^ rubric.This effort failed,at least in the public framing of the release,although it may yet playa role in the decision as to whether to prosecute anyone atWikileaks.By hamessing the established fourth estate to its materials,Wikileaks received accreditation and attention, and was able to exercise power over the public sphere well beyond what it could have commanded byasingle document dump on its own site,or an edited set of its own.By releasing anexclusivescooptomajoroutletsindifferent global markets,it was able to create enough exclusivity tomakepublication commercially valuableto each of the^34^ news organizationsintheir respective markets, and enough competition to prevent any organization from deciding, in the name of responsibility,not to publish at all,or, as theTimes did in the case of the NSA eavesdropping report,to delay publicationforayear. IFNl^OJ Doing soalso solved theproblemof how to sift throughthese vast amounts ofdata without having to hamessalarge army of volunteers,thereby defeating the purpose of releasing carefully so as not to harm innocent bystanders. IFNl^l^ DDoS attacksby supporters. Inthe daysfollowing the denial-of-service attacksby the payment systems companies,anetwork of online activists called Anonymous launchedaseries of DDoS attacks against PayPaL lFN1^2^The group knew that its combined power was insufficient to cause substantial damage, and its members responded in an interview that they were mounting the attacks ^^to raise awareness,^^^^to show the prosecutor that we have the ability to act.^^l^FN1^3^The attacks were investigated by the FBL ^nd they lead toabacklash concemed with anarchic protests aimed at major components of the market system.1FN1^4^ Rather than providing support toWikileaks,as they clearly were intended to do,these attacks helped to underscore and legitimate the framing ofWikileaks asadangerous and anarchic actor. Participants rapidly abandoned this strategy.IFNl^^^ Threat of major embarrassment: the ^^insurance^^ file. In anticipation of arrest or assassination, Assange pos-

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ted onWikileaks as early as I u l y a l . 4 G B file,much larger than all the available materials,which was available for download. It was also made available asatorrent peer-to-peer sharing tile. lFN1^6^Thefile is encrypted, apparently with sufficiently secure encryption^3^0 to assure that it will not be broken.1FN1^7^ The threat was clear: if Assange is arrested or harmed, or Wikileaks attacked, the decryption key will be released. Of all the actions by Wikileaks or Assange,this was the one that most conformed to the profile ofadangerous activist.The file remains at large; the decryption code remains secret; it was not released despite Assange's arrest. Mutation and replication. On the larger, longer term scale, another important response during the first month following the release ofthe embassy cables was mutation and replication.Some former Wikileaks members an nouncedcreationofaparallelorganization,OpenLeaks, intendedtoreceive leaksandrelease themsolely to subscribing NGOs and media organizations.IFNl^^^Acompletely separate organization, Brussels Leaks,was launched to provide leaks specifically regarding the EU Commission. IFNl^^^ Both organizations plan to insti tutionalize in their structure the strategy that Wikileaks rapidly evolved over the course of2010—the dedication to release through the mediation of^^legitimate^^ real world organizations,both media and NGOs. Amonth later, Allazeeralaunched(and theNewYorkTimes was considering launching) its own copy ofWikileaks,asecure platformfor decentralized submissionof leaked documents. 1FN200^ AlIazeera'sTransparencyUnitlFN201^ waslaunchedwiththeleaked^^PalestinePapers.^^lFN202^Tothe extent that the campaign against Wikileaks was intended not to quash the specific documents, but to tame the beast of distributed online systems providing avenues for leaking documents outside of the traditional responsible media system, the emergence of these new sites suggests that the social and culturalphenomenonofdistributed leaking is too resilient to be defeated by this type of attack.lust as the closure ofNapster was merely the invitation for the development of morelitigation-proofsystems like Gnutella and Ka^aa, so,too,here it appears that even the destruction ofWikileaks itself is unlikely to lead to the abandonment ofthis new model ofprovisioning one important aspect ofthe fourth es tate. Reporting based on documents leaked securely online and using multiple overlapping systems to reach the public and evade efforts at suppressing their publication is here to stay. ^3^IF.The Response toWikileaks:Wrap Up. The response toWikileaks was dramatic,extensive,overwrought,and ineffective.If the purpose was to stop access to the cables,it failed. If the effort was to castadoubt on the credibility of the cables,it failed.If the pur pose was to divert attention from the cables, it failed. And i f the effort was to prevent the future availability of decentralized dissemination of leaked documents outside of the confines of the responsible press, it failed. Indeed,it is possible that, had Secretary Clinton adopted the same stance as Secretary Gates and shrugged off the events as embarrassing, but not fundamentally destructive,ameasured response toWikileaks could have significantly advanced the State Department's Internet freedom agenda by allowing the United States to exhibit integrity and congruence between its public statementsin support of Intemet freedom and its actions. lFN203^The actual response will createavisible incongruity should the State Department continue to assert Intemet freedom asamajor policy agenda. Part III will be dedicated to outlining the constitutional limits on the State's ability to prevent such dissemination directly through law,and the legal avenues open to constraining the capacity ofthe State to use extralegal avenuestoachieve what itcannotdo directly withinthoseconfines. Part IV will usetheevent to outline the emerging shape of the networked public sphere, the emerging structure of the networked fourth estate, and the new challenges it faces and affordances it has relative to those of the mass mediated fourth estate.

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III. The Legal Framework

A.Baseline: Freedom ofthe Press and the National Interest Toanchor our understanding of theWikileaks case,it is useful first to provideabaseline of what law is relevant for more traditional media.Consider the release of the embassycables by theNewYorkTimes and the Guardian.Each of these newspapers receivedacache of classified cables it^correctly) believed to be authentic. Each spent time negotiating the details of receipt and publication of these documents with its source (Wikileaks). Each ultimately released over one thousand cables, some in redacted form, others without redaction where it deemed release in full to be safe. What is the legal framework governing the govemment's response to the actions ofthese organizations in this very case7 Thebasic frameworkforthis questionisprovidedby New YorkTimes v. United States, 1FN204^ the Pentagon Papers case.TheUnited States was at war. ^3^2DanielEllsberg,aDefenseDepartment employee, leakedtotheNewYorkTimesacopy of aforty-seven volume internal study commissionedby Robert McNamarainl^67 on the VietnamWar, including details of military operations and secret diplomatic negotiations. 1FN20^^ AssoonastheTimesbeganpublishingthepapers, the Attomey Generalof theUnitedStates,lohn Mitchell, sent a telegram to the New York Times worded very much like the letter Harold Koh sent to Wikileaks, claiming that publication would ^^cause irreparable injury to the defense interests ofthe United States,^^ and demanding that theTimes show that it had ^^made arrangements for the return of these documents to the Department of Defense.^^1FN206^ The govemment sought an injunction against publication. Within seventeen days of the original publication,the case reached the Supreme Court and was decided in favor of theTimes and freedom of publication. As lustice Stewart,withwhomlusticeWhite joined to provide thefifth and sixth votes for the decision, put it: Weare asked, quite simply,to prevent the publication by two newspapers of material that the Execut ive Branch insists should not, in the national interest, be published.Iam convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some of the documents involved.Butlcannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the First Amendment be but onejudicial resolution ofthe issues before us.1FN207^ It isparticularly pertinent tothe questionofWikileaksthatlusticeStewart was wellaware of the consequences of disclosure.Writing as though for the Wikileaks cable embassies case itself, lustice Stewart writes: ll^t is elementary that the successful conduct of intemational diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation inanatmosphereofmutual trust unlessthey canbe assuredthattheirconfidenceswillbekept. And withinourownexecutive departments,the development of considered and intelligent international policies wouldbe impossibleif those chargedwiththeirformulationcouldnotcommunicatewitheach other freely, frankly, and in confidence.1FN20^1 Indeed, lustice Stewart opened his opinion by emphasizing that in areas ofnational defense and international relationstheExecutivehasrelatively^3^3uncheckedpowers,bycomparisonto other areas of policy where Congress and the ludiciary are more closely engaged, makingarobust, critical,free press all the more important as theonly foundationforacritical andenlightenedpublic thatcouldactas acheckonabuseof Executive power. 1FN20^^ This very powerful executive had theresponsibility of maintaining its own operations with enoughsecurity and wisdomtomake sure thatonly what needsclassilyingisindeedclassified,andthat that

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which isclassifieddoesnotgetleaked. But itcouldnot,consistentwiththeFirst Amendment,call uponthe courts to enjoin publication ofleaked materials. That messy balance between the administration's need for secrecy and the public's right and need to know,while far from perfect, means that the administration continues tofunetionundernormalconditions,subject to occasionaldisclosures to keepit honest. lFN210^Therareex ceptions would requireacombination ofhigh likelihood,magnitude,and immediacy ofharm to justify suppression.In the area of national defense,this is captured by the phrase,^^the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.1FN211^ Or, as lustice Stewart put it, tojustify suppression, the publication must ^^surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.^^lFN212j But the Pentagon Papers case concerned prior restraint,which the Court recognized as requiring extraordinary care. What of prosecution ex post7 In the first instance,imagine what would have happened had the lustice Departmenttumed aroundandbroughtcriminalchargesagainsttheeditorsandjournalistsof theNew York Times and theWashington Post after publication of the Pentagon Papers.Do we think thatacourt that held that the First Amendment requires that the newspapers be permitted to publish them would have simply allowed the government to charge and imprison the journalists after the fact7 That would makeamockery of the protection and imposeamuch greater chill on publication than the risk of an injunction.The long history from the Masses case, l^FN213^Schenckv.United States,1FN214^ and the ^^badtendency^^era to Brandenburgv.Ohio'slFN21^^ overturning of Whitney v.Califomia 1FN216^ to embrace the^^clear and present danger^^frameworkended up requiringasimilar combination ofhigh damage,high probability,and immediacy for prosecutions,as well as for prior restraints.As the Supreme ^3^4 Court put it in the context of considering criminal liability ofabroadcaster who had broadcast illegal materials, the First Amendment does not permit prosecution ofajoumalist transmitting tmthful information of public interest ^^absentaneed of the highest order.^^lFN217^ The distinction,then,is minimal in practice. The standard for prior restraint and the standard for criminal prosecution over the publication oftruthful materials ofpublic concem seems to be largely the same,and exceedingly stringent.1FN21^^ On the background ofthis extremely high barrier to both prior restraint and to criminal prosecution,it is perhaps not surprising that efforts by theBushAdministrationto prosecute theNew YorkTimesforitsrevelations of the Nationalsecurity Agency's program ofdomestic eavesdropping, andthe Washington Post for its reportingon the existence ofClA-operated black sites in Eastem Europe, were abandoned. 1FN21^^ Against the background ofthis legal regime,and what we know ofthe contents ofthe embassy cables eight weeksafter their initialpublication, it isforallpracticalpurposesimpossibletoimaginethat theNew York Times would be prosecuted, or that i f such an ill-advised prosecution were to be brought, that it could survive judicial scrutiny under prevailing First Amendment doctrine.Now,what of the Guardian7 Could it be thatU.S. statutory law—say, theEspionage Actor theComputerFraud and Abuse Act—extendstononeitizens'actions outside of the United States, but the protections afforded by the First Amendment do not apply to such defendants7 In that case,non-U.S. defendants whopublish materialsthatharm theinterestsofthe United States in ways that arelegal in their own jurisdiction could be prosecuted under U.S. law without either legal system's protections.That noncitizens are ^^persons^^covered by the substantive guarantees of the Bill ofRights is longsettled law.l^FN220^Thatarange of provisions ofUnited States criminal law can apply extra-territorially is sim ilarlysettled,lF1^221^and that the extensionofconstitutionalprotections and limitations does not necessarily travel with the extra territorial reach of the criminal law is also quite clear. The intuition, and the area of primary application, is criminal procedure: ^3^^ questions such as how to deal with thecriminalprocedure owedforeignnationalsintrialscarriedout abroad. 1FN222^ lnthepastdecade,post-^^ll detentionofenemy combatantshasplaced significant pressureby the executive,oncourts,tolimitextra-territorialapplicationof constitutionalguarantees.The Supreme Court, however, has not taken theformalist path argued t o i l ^thatthe

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Constitution stops at theborder),holdinginsteadthateven non-citizens designated as enemy combatantsand held in Guantanamo can assert habeas corpus. lFN223j The Court reemphasized that ^^le^ven when theUnited States acts outside its borders, its powers are not ^absolute and unlimited^ but are subject ^to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.^^^1FN224^ Ahypotheticalsuit against the Guardianor,for that matter, Assange,for publishing the embassycables would be vastly simpler than the post^^ll cases.First, it would proceed within theUnited States,not abroad. Even the absolutist version would not deny protection in trials conducted here. Second, the rights to be asserted are those involving the First Amendment's freedoms of expression and of the press. Over one hundred years ago the Supreme Court, in one of the most important precedents limiting the extension of constitutional protections beyond theborders ofthe United States, nonetheless specifically stated that ^^freedom of speech and of the press^^ were among those rights so ^^indispensable toafree governments^ that they would apply abroad. 1FN22^J Do we imagine,for example,that if the Guardian were to publishareport making revelations aboutaU.S.political figure, that person could sue the Guardian for libel in the United States without having to comport with the constraints ofNewYorkTimesv.Sullivan71FN226^ Indeed,Congress is pushing to have our own constitutionalconstraints protect our citizensfrom libel suits in perfectlydemocratic countries that givelessdeferenceto press freedom in the area of libeLlFN227^ It seems highly unlikely,then, that the mere fact ofapublisher being acompany or person who is notaU.S.citizen or resident,or of the publication being disseminated outside the United States,as would be the case were the government to prosecute the Guardian,would entailalower level of First Amendment protectionthantheNewYorkTimesitself would receive.This conclusion ismade even clearer when we remember that the core purpose driving freedom of the press is the democratic necessity of an informed citizenry,to avoid the^^farce,or tragedy,orboth^^ that lames Madison wamedof.lFN22^^ Function ally,whether the American public leams of official misconduct fromaU.S.based publication^3^^oraforeign publication is immaterial to the real beneficiaries of robust First Amendment freedom of the press—these are always and foremost the American public and American democracy. Looking at both the Guardian and the NewYork Times,then, any effort on the part of the U.S.government to prosecute either of these two publications for their publication of the embassycables would founder on the bulwarks ofthe First Amendment. What, i f anything, would make Wikileaks sufficiently different from the Guardian or theTimes to justify treating its publications underadifferentstandard7 B.Does the First AmendmentTreatWikileaks and lulian Assange as Less Protected than theNewYorkTimes and Its Editors and Reporters7 The most obvious difference betweenWikileaks and the more traditional media outlets is the organizational identity. The latter are culturally familiar as major media outlets; they have established editors and boards, and we haveageneral cultural assumption about their organizational culture: they care about getting the facts right, and being ^^responsible^^ in presenting the news. Perhaps, then, the important dividing line is between established media andjoumalists,on the one hand, and the decentralized,informal,and quasi-formal culture of speech on thelntemet7 What might account for suchadifference7 The intuition would likely take the form of what lonathan Klein saidjust before takingover as president of CNN^U.S.: that ^^you couldn't haveastarker contrast betweenthe multiple layersof checks andbalances, andaguy sittinginhis livingroom inhis pajamas writing what he thinks.^^lFN22^^He was speakingof the bloggers whohadexposedthe fact thata60MinutesreportbyDan

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Rather on President George Bush's military record was based on inauthentic documents. While Klein no longer leads CNN^U.S.,1FN230^ the disdainful treatment of the blogosphere by traditional media has not disappeared. The New York Times' own coverage ofWikileaks paired coverage of the substance of the materials that Wikileaks made public with unflattering portraits of lulian Assange, describing him variously asa^^huntedman^^ who ^^checks into hotels under false names, dyes his hair, sleeps on sofas and floors, and uses cash instead ^3^7 of credit cards,often borrowed from friends,^^lFN231^or^^likeabag lady walking in off the street,wearinga dingy,light-coloredsportcoatandcargopants,dirty white shirt,beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed around his ankles. He smelled as ifhe hadn't bathed in days.^^^FN232j These descriptions seem to representadeep anxiety and identity crisis of the traditional media; perhaps they exhibit existentialfear that the glory days of their profession are past, perhaps simple envy over the fact that the biggest scoop of2010,ascoop that dominated thefront pages of allthemajoroutletsfor weeks, wasgenerated by someone whowasnota member of the club.Whatever the reason for this unflattering portrait, it cannot form the basis ofaconstitutional principle. IfManning had walked offamilitary base in Oklahoma and handed the disc with the files to the editor ofa tiny local newspaper ofasmalltownlOO miles away,and that newspaper had published the materials,we would not conceivably have treated that local newspaper, even i f i t wereatwo-person operation,as categorically different from the NewYorkTimes.Indeed,we lionize the local newspaperman asabulwark against local corruption.lF1^233jThe Progressive does not have the organizational heft of theNewYorkTimes,but this lack does not affect its constitutionalprotections. AstheSupreme Court put it,^^Libertyofthepressistherightof the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper oramimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.^^lFN234^ Organizationally, the tiny local newspaper cannot possibly institute the kinds of institutionalprocedural^^checks andbalances^^ that Klein spoke of.Their presence or absence cannot sustainadistinction that makesaconstitutionaldifference i f we are not willing to leave the small local newspaper out of the protective umbrella of freedom of the press. The difference between the constituents ofthe networked fourth estate and the mass media cannot, then, be organizational size or complexity. Functionally, it is more important to provide robust constitutional protection totheweakermembersofthefourthestate, whohaveless public visibility and wherewithaltowithstand pressure from govemment officials, than it is to emphasize the rights of the organizationally and economically strongermembersofthepress.WhenSenatorBunningandRepresentativeKingcalledtheNew YorkTimes' disclosure of thcNSAdomestic eavesdropping agenda^^treason,^^lFN23^1 there was little risk that theTimes could successfully be prosecuted criminally, or that its editor would find himself under house arrest wearing an ankle bracelet.The sheer economic,social,and cultural^3^^ power of theTimes meant that the constitutional limitations will not have tokick into prevent such aneventuality.The sameis not necessarily true ofaman whom theVice President of the United States describes asa^^high-techterrorist,^^l^FN236^ and whom the New YorkTimes publiclydescribesas^^a hunted man,^^1FN237^ while its executive editor emphasizes that he sees him as^^a source,^^emphatically notapartner, and not reallyajoumalist. 1FN23^J Recallthat inthis case,the source,Manning, is insolitary confinement precisely becausehe isasource. 1^FN23^^ It ispossiblethatthe Times' efforts to distance itself from Assange were driven by aconcern to insulate itself from prosecution, should theDepartmentof lustice decide toproceedonaconspiracy theory.But,the emphatic rejectionof the idea ofapartnershipwithWikileaks is equally likely to be an assertion of identity by the flagship of an industry and profession that feels itself to be under threat. Whatever the reason, it increases the threat level to members of the networked fourth estate.The emphatic denial of membership in the club does not makeaformal constitutional difference,but, asamatter of constitutional culture,it puts the practitioners of the networked fourth estate

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at greater risks than fringe journalists have been in the United States for almostacentury. The difference is not organizational complexity or formal membership in the Press Club, but the difference also certainlycannot be technology.The portions of theNewYorkTimes that are published onlyonline are no less protected from those published in print; nor would anyone argue that the online-only publication launched bylegendary magazine editorTina Brown,The Daily Beast,or Glenn Greenwald's coverage of Wikileaks over the course of2010in the online-only publication,Salon,count for less,constitutionally,than does the NewYork Times. Repeatedly,over the course of this past decadc,wehave seen Internet-only publications,primarily in what we currently see as the blogopshere, take on investigative reporting and critical opinion-writing and evaluation that are at the very heart of the function of the fourth estate.1FN240^ Whether it is the role that bloggers played in exposing Dan Rather's error, the central role that loshMarshall'sTalking Points Memo played in exposing theU.S. Attorney scandal, 1FN241^ orSheri Fink's Pulitzer-^3^^Prize-winning workforProPubliea, lFN242^it is by2011beyond cavil that these outlets deserve as much First Amendment protection as do traditional media. In law,the area where the efforts to define the line between ^journalist^^ and ^justaguy in his pajamas^^ have come toahead has been in the definition ofeligibility for thejoumalist's privilege under state laws.Here,the need foradefinition is obvious,because law offers much more than the First Amendment's core protection from criminalprosecution for whatonehaspublished. In vonBulow v. vonBulow,theCourtof Appeals forthe Second Circuit held that ^^the individual claiming the privilege must demonstrate...the intent to use material-sought, gathered or received to disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the incep tion ofthe newsgathering process.1FN243^ ^^The intendedmannerof disseminationmay be by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broadcast medium, handbill or the like, for ^It^he press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affordsavehicle of information and opinion.l^FN244^The court concluded by emphasizing that membership in the club of established joumalists is not required for protection: Although prior experience asaprofessionaljoumalist may be persuasive evidence of present intent to gather for the purpose ofdissemination, it is not the sine qua non. The burden indeed may be sustained by one who isanovice in the field. Further,the protection from disclosure may be sought by one not traditionally associated with the institutionalized press because ^^It^he informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press...is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists.^^1^FN24^^ In following the Second Circuit, and integrating it with the Ninth Circuit,lFN246jtheThird Circuit in In re Madden summarized: ^^Wehold that individuals are journalists when engaged in investigative reporting,gathering news,and have the intent at the beginning of the news-gathering process to disseminate this information to the public.^^lFN247^ The critical definitional element here is intent at the time of gathering and function, the intent togather for publicdissemination,not mode ofdissemination. Theresimply cannot^3^0betheremotest doubt that the entire purpose of Wikileaksis the gathering of information for public dissemination.The use of traditional media outlets as the primary pathway emphasizes this fact,although it is not constitutive oranecessary element of the defense. The professionalism, niceness, or personal hygiene of the reporter are not germane to the inquiry. The interest concemed is not individual, but systemic; it is ^^society's interest in protecting the in tegrity ofthe newsgathering process,and in ensuring the free flow ofinformation to the public.^^1FN24^^ Perhaps, though, there is nonetheless something about the ^^intent^^ test required by the courts ofappeal in the

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journalists'privilege cases that allows us to separate Assange and Wikileaks fromTalking Points Memo's role in exposing theU.S.Attomey's scandal,or from Free Republic 1FN24^^ and Power Line,1FN2^0^ the main movers of the Dan Rather scandaL Most relevant here isamemorandum apparently authored bylulian Assange in 2006, whichwaspostedbyCryptome,amucholderwebsitethat was already publishing materialuncomfortableto someoneinpoweradecadebefore Wikileaks wasfounded. Assange opens the 2006 paper,StateandTerrorist Conspiracies,withaquotefromTheodoreRoosevelt:^^Behind the ostensible government sits enthroned an invisible government owing no allegiance and acknowledging no responsibility to the people.Todestroy this invisible govemment, to befoul this unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics is the first task of statesmanship.^^lFN2^1^The core of the paper's claim includes three elements: ^l)authoritarian regimes depend on secret internalcommunications to organize their functioning suppressionofopposition;^2) secrecy is necessary fortheseregimes tofunctionbecause iftheseinternalcommunications werepublicly known, they would inducemoreresistancethanthe regime caneffectivelydeal with; and ^3) exposing theinternalcommunieationsofauthoritarian regimes will drive these regimes to clamp down on their internal communications, and by slowing internal communications, will lead these regimes to function less effectively and weaken them. 1^FN2^2^ The purpose of transparency,in this ideological framework, is to decrease the effective functioning of itstargets,not throughthe criticismthatsunlight will induce,but throughthe decline ininternalinformation flows caused by the effort to evade that sunlight. Now, nowhere in the essays does Assange say that the ^^conspiratorial regime^^ he is talking about is the U.S.government.lFN2^3^ At the time of this memorandum, recall fromthe PentagonReport,^36I 1^FN2^4^ Wikileaks was focusedonprovidingaplatformforexposing communications of regimes whose designation as authoritarian or at least non-democratic and oppressive would be mainstream.Yet the quote from Roosevelt, and the current context of disclosure ofU.S.documents,certainly lends itself toareasonable interpretation that the secret functioning of theU.S.government, and the powerful role that corporate interests are seen to play in definingU.S.policy,all out of the public eye,fall under the um brella oftargets ofthis strategy. So,imagine that we were satisfied by these essays from 2006,in the context ofthese revelations,that Assange's primary purpose for exposing the embassy cables was to force the administration to limit the sharing of information across agencies and increase the difficulty ofinformation spreading into and across the government, and that the ultimate motivation is specifically to make the government's functioning less effective, so that it can oppress its own people less.lFN2^^^Would that motivation change the constitutional analysis-particularly given the role of^^intent^^ in defining who isajournalist7 The answer seems to be quite clearly not.The ^^intent^^entailedby theconstitutionalanalysis isintenttoacertainaction: disseminationtothe public,as distinguished from research for private use.The purpose ofprotecting the press is systemic and functional—to serveamore enlightened public,which isapreconditiontoawell functioning democracy.The motivation driving any given in dividual to advance that goal is entirely irrelevant to the core question. Ajournalist is not measured by whether sheinvestigates and publishesinorder to serve democracy,aggrandizeher name,or make money;Fox News would be no less deserving of freedom of the press if we were tofindaset of internal memos revealing that its prime motive were to undermine the capacity ofPresident Obama to govem, rather than to inform the public.Inquiring into the political or personal motivations ofspeakers opens the door to the most pernicious form of censorship—the definition ofsome political motivations as legitimate bases for speech and others as illegitimate and not eligible for protection. The intent has to focus on the intended action: public dissemination. By this measure, irrespective ofthe political theory underlying the investigation and publication,Horace ^362 Greeley is no more and no less protected thanWilliam Randolph Hearst or Upton Sinclair.Areporter operating out of political conviction is every bit as protected asareporter out to makeabuck,becomeacelebrity,or humbly serve the public interest.

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Wecome, then,to the conclusion that asamatter ofFirst Amendment doctrine,Wikileaks is entitled to the protection available toawide range of members of the fourth estate,from fringe pamphleteers to the major press organizations of the industrial information economy.Asamatter ofFirst Amendment values,what is being protected by this refusal to privilege theNewYorkTimes over Wikileaks is the continued access of the public toa steady flow of truthful, publicly relevant information about its government's inner workings. As the networked from individual bloggerslikeInstapundit,lFN2^6^ to publicspheredevelops,asamorediversesetofactors nonprofits like the Sunlight Foundation, 1^FN2^7^ small commercial online publications like Talking Points Memo,1F^2^^^ and large decentralized groups of political activists like Daily Kos orTownhall.com 1FN2^^^-come to play an ever larger role in the construction of the public sphere, 1FN260^ the functional importance of divorcing the constitutional protection from the degree to which the actor isafamiliar part of the twentieth century model of mass media increases. Wecannot afford asapolity to create classes of privileged speakers and press agencies,and underclasses of networked information producers whose products we take into the public sphere when convenient, but whom we treat as susceptible to suppression when their publications becomeless palatable.Doing so would severely undermine the qualityofour public discourse and theproductionofthefunctionofthefourthestateinthenetworked information society. Fortunately, clarifying that this freedom extends to ^^every sort of publication which affordsavehicle of information and opinion^^and that ^^ll^iberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper oramimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher^^ is notamatter of policy discretion or moral belief.l^FN261^0ur ^3^3 constitution requires it, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has made this clear. C.The Prospects ofProsecution:The Espionage Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Conspiracy. Senator DianneFeinstein,Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for Assange's prosecution under theEspionage Act of 1^17. 1FN262^ News reports suggest more specifically that the lustice Department considered,and perhaps continues to consider as of this writing,conspiracycharges associated either withthe Espionage Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, oradifferent provision pertaining to publication of classi fiedmaterialsasinchoateliabilitypredicatedontheprimary liability of BradleyManning. l^FN263^The intuition behind such an approach is fairly obvious.Imagine thatareporter suspects that the Governor of the State of Ruritania is corrupt, and is selling mining rights in the state for large personal payments. The reporter could not break into the house of one of the contractors, looking for documentation of the payments, and hope to defend againstaburglary charge by claimingajournalist's privilege.The same would be true of vicarious liability if the journalist were to hireaprofessional burglar to do the job.These laws of general applicability apply to journal ists asto others,and theincidentaleffectonfreedomofspeechputstheminthemorerelaxedframeworkof United Statesv.O'Brien review.1FN264J There islittle doubt that the govemment has the power to prosecute its own employees,particularly those whoseemploymentrelatestonationalsecurity and whohave access to classifiedinformationby dint of their public employment,for revealingclassified materials. 1FN26^^ Specifically,one could imaginePfc. Manning being charged underavarietyofprovisions,lFN266^rangingfrom^7^3(e)ofthe Espionage Act, which prohib its any person from willfully communicating ^^any document...relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation;^^l^FN267^ to l^U.S.C. ^^^2,which specifically prohibits disclosure ofdiplomatic cables, 1FN26^^ to the provisions ofthe Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ^364 ^^^CFAA^^),which would appear to cover

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Manning's having exceeded his authorized access to government computers willfully intending to transmit classified information that ^^could be used to the injury of the United States,or to the advantage of any foreign nation^^toaperson not authorized to receive it.1FN26^^ That Manning can be prosecuted, or that anyone who had hacked in to government computers from the outside could be,1FN270^ even if the intent is to publish and deliver the material to the press,lFN271^is not legally controversial.What is controversial is the idea that this initial liability can form the basis ofliability for thejournalist or publisher who publishes the information. It is well settled thatajoumalist who passively receives illegally obtained information is privileged to publish it.Both NeilSheehan,theNew YorkTimes reporter whoreceived thePentagon Papers from Daniel Ellsberg,1FN272^ and FredVopper, the radio commentator whose broadcast of illegal telephone intercepts pertaining to local school and union negotiations was the basis for the Supreme Court's holding in Bartnickiv.Vopper, 1FN273^ clearly received materials from someone whoviolatedcriminallaw inthe acquisition andtransfer of the materials.If the^^receipt of stolen goods^^rationale were applicable,or i f inchoateliability (such as aiding andabettingorconspiracy) weretriggeredby suchpassivereceipt,thejoumalistsinthese cases wouldhave been liable. Passive receipt of illegally obtained materials is, then, not subject to prosecution.1^FN274^ What, then, are wetomake of the spacebetweenhiringaburglar,orbribingapublicemployeetobreach her obligations of secrecy,on the one hand, and passive receipt ofabrown paper envelop in the mail,on the other hand7 What are we to make ofajournalist who is contacted byapotential source,meets her inacafe once or twice; hears her out;listenstoher complaints,fears,and anxieties;promises her anonymity,and arrangesfor another meeting when the materials can be delivered7 What of the journalist who receives one set of documents in the mail, and then isrequiredby the sourcetomeet that sourceagaintoreceivefurther caches ofdocuments7 What if the joumalist sees the source wavering, believes that publication itself would be legal and politically significant, and encourages the source: ^^1 know this ishardto do,but you're doing theright thing; what you'veuncoveredis really important and the public hasaright to know^^7 Casting the shadow of potential criminal liability on these kinds of conversations would createasignificant chilling effect on joumalists and journalism,and, as Professor Stone has argued against the background of theNew YorkTimes case conceming NSAeavesdropping, likely causes too greataloss of press^36^freedom tojustify except under extremelylimited conditions that include the joumalist knowing both that the information would cause imminent harm and that it did not have high public valuelFN27^1 Tobuildaprosecutionof Assange onthefoundationofthisgrayareawouldpresentgraveriskstopress freedom. As we have seen, distinguishing between Assange and other joumalists is not feasible without effect ively excluding core pillars of the emerging networked public sphere and the networked fourth estate. The kind of gray area that would have to be probed to expand liability throughaconspiracy theory would cover behaviors that areadaily part of journalists'lives as theycontact and cultivate sources. As Glenn Greenwald explains,it would cover contacts that NewYorkTimes reporters developed while reporting on the NSA eavesdropping pro gram,during which they promisedadozenofficials anonymity,as well as the Washington Post's communications with sources about the CIA black sites.1FN276^ Moreover, buildingaconspiracy claim on the testimony of Manning,who would be consideredaco-conspirator, after thelatter had spent over eight months in solitary confinement, should give pause to any court adjudicating suchacase. If journalists who cultivate sources and promise anonymity,or who appealtotheir sources that transmitting theinformationtheyaretransmitting isa public service,canbe prosecuted criminally underaconspiracy theory,on the testimonyof sources held under conditions ofextreme duress,then the only real protectionjournalists have is the political clout oftheir employ ers. That is insufficient to secure the press freedom necessary for an informed and engaged public that is at the

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very foundation ofthe First Amendment's distinct protection ofthe institution ofthe press. D.Legal Responses to Extralegal Public-Private Actions to RestrainWikileaks What the govemment could not achieve through law within the boundaries ofthe Constitution,it arguably tried to achieve through extralegal avenues,1FN277^ in particular, through pressure on skittish private companies more concerned with preserving their public image with consumers than preserving their customers'continued accesstotheir facilities. Asystemthat depends on privately-ownedcriticalcommunicationssystems and privately-run payment systems is clearly susceptible to an indirect violation ofcivil rights.^FN27^J This is not, fundamentally,anew threat. Blacklisting during McCarthyismwasaparticularly extreme form of economic per secution of political undesirables, achieved not directly by government, but throughapublic-^36^ private partnership between Senator McCarthy's hearings,the House Un American Activities Committee,privatelist compilers,andtheprivateemployers whoadhered tothem.Therest is an all-too-familiar story of repression and persecution overadecade that was not one of the finest hours in the annals of American political freedom.Most recently,the resort to an extralegal public-private partnership was used asameans to circumvent constitutional privacy protections and became the subject of litigation in Heptingv.AT^TCorporation,l^FN27^^ where cus tomers sued AT^Toveritseollaboration with the federal government inimplementingillegal wiretaps. The company was given retroactive immunity by Congress in the FISA Amendments Act of200^,lFN2^0^ and the case against it was subsequently dismissed.1FN2^1^ The basic framework is clear.What makes the networked public sphere generally,and the networked fourth estate in particular, especially democratic, open, and diverse, is the relatively large role that decentralized, non traditionalspeakers andjoumalists canplay. 1FN2^2^ These online media and citizen speakers arenewlyen abled by the widespread availability oflow-cost machines and platforms for speech.The susceptibility of the basic infrastructure,or platform providers,to public pressure of the kind we saw developing around theWikileaks embassy cablesreleasethereforerepresentsathreat not tothe fourthestateingeneral,but specifically tothe politically weak, technically-dependent on widespread information, communications, and payment utilities elements of the networked economy. Inthe print environment,accessibility to the mails asacommoncarrier was central;inthephysical,soapboxworld,accesstostreetsandparksindispensable. What the Wikileaks cables case emphasizes is the extent to which the networked environment is made up of private speech spaces, and in particular the susceptibilityofthesekinds of spacestoademonizationattackpatternby the opponents of the speaker—both within the govemment and outside it. i. Suits against officials Because the pressures involved in this kind ofpublic-private partnership need not be forceful or explicit, but rather can act subtly and indirectly, it would be extremely difficult to bring action against the govemment or its officials.ABivens action against this kind of subtle request toathird party ^367 provider would be all but impossible,1FN2^3^ particularly given the attitude that the right wing of the Court exhibits toward the continued existence ofaprivate right of action against federal officials for civil rights violations.lFN2^4^Moreover,the few cases that havelooked at ^^regulation by raised eyebrow^^or^jawboning^^suggest that the barrier for courts treating informal government pressure on private actors as state action sufficient to trigger First Amendment re view, even where it is intended to achieve results that could not be achieved directly by the regulator, is far from trivial.1FN2^^^ Amore likely,but still difficult,avenue might be suit for tortious interference with contractual relations against the participating government officials themselves, in this case, perhaps against Senator Lieber-

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man.lFN2^6^Here,aplaintiff must show that^l)the defendant knew of the contractual relationship, ^2) intentionally and ^3)improperly interfered withthe relationship,^4)thatinterventioncausedthepartycontracting with the plaintiff to terminate or impair the contractual relations, and^^) the plaintiff suffered damage.1^FN2^7^ It would be trivial to establish elements one, two, and five. Determining whether scolding companies about their patriotic duty would be ^^improper,^^ and whether indeed it was the intervention that ^^caused^^ EveryDNS, Amazon, MasterCard,Visa, or PayPal to terminate their contracts withWikileaks or Assange,would be the difficult part. However, action along these lines, however tentative, appears to be the primary legal avenue available to disrupt the extralegal avenues of enforcement that we observe in theWikileaks event and others like it. Moreover,aslongasthe actioncansurviveamotionto dismiss,sothat the parties canreachdiscovery, the threat of public disclosure of govemment pressure on companies to deny service to members of the networked fourth estate could provide a measure of deterrence to improper extralegal efforts to circumvent the First Amendment requirements for obtaining an injunction by hamessing private companies to shut down the undesirable speakers.Nonetheless, it seems that legal avenues against the govemment itself, barringadirect^^smoking gun^^ type communication from the Executive to the private actors, would be diflrcult to sustain. ii. Suits Against the Private Partners One potential path to temper the threat of extralegal action from service providers of critical platform services—like DNS service, datahosting,orpayment systems—is tobringsuit against thecommercial firms for wrongful denial of service.Clarifying the existence ofalegal duty to customers to ^36^ continue service absent aclearcontractualviolation on the part of the customer orasignificantnecessityonthe part of the provider would give service providers the cover they need to resist government requests for aid in extralegal suppression of inconvenient publications, and provide an adequate public explanation for continued service to an unpopular customer that would avert the market pressure to comply.Afirm asked to stop pointing its DNS server to the offending material or to remove it from its cloud hosting service can answer both the govemment official and the complaining public: ^^Tmsorry;lhavealegal obligation to continue to provide this service unlesslgetacourt order telling me to stop providing the service.That is an answer that is complete and adequate legally, politically,and culturally.Recognizingalegal duty would not mean that suits would be forthcoming left and right; recognizing the right would by itself, in large measure,prevent the harm to begin with. The most direct path to suchacause of action would be to argue an implied contractual obligation not to unreasonably,or without good faith,withhold service.The services we are speaking of are all in consumer markets, subject to standard contracts. Amazon's hosting service contract, for example, includes termination provisions, both for cause and at wilL Most pertinent here would be provisions for termination for cause, that give the company the right to terminate service effective immediately if ^^(vii) we receive notice or we otherwise determine,in our sole discretion,that you may be usingAWS Services for any illegal purpose or inaway that violates thelawor violates,infringes,or misappropriates the rights of any third party;^viii) we determine,incur sole discretion,that our provision of anyof the Services to you is prohibited by applicable law, or has become impracticalor unfeasiblefor any legalor regulatory reason.^^1^FN2^^^ The termswere changed on December 6, 2010, the week following termination ofWikileaks's services; copies of earlier versions in thelntemet Archive areunreachable. lFN2^^^Thevagueness of the combination of ^^inour sole discretion^^and ^^impracticable or unfeasibleforany legalor regulatory reason^^essentially invite thekindofgovemment pressure that Senator Lieberman apparently applied to Amazon. This is precisely the kind of contract of adhesion that provides room foracourt to exercise its judgment as to whether the term should be applied.At least where the Restatement is concerned, these terms should be construed against the drafting party,1FN2^0^ and are subject to an obligation of good faith.lFN2^1JIt is hard to imagineacourt striking this kind of provision down as,in general,uncon-

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scionable,lFN2^2^ but the obligation^36^ of good faith may provide sufficient basis foracourt to review and constrainaservice provider from cutting off critical services toaclient,when it is done to suppress their speech rather than because there is genuine illegal behavior. Asamatter of public policy,it is conceivable that sucha right would be tailored to denial of service that undermines the facilities of the press, although one suspects that such special treatment of the press under generally applicable law,like contract law,would not beaparticularly attractive path. 1FN2^3^ An alternative approach may be to developatort claim modeled ontortious interference with prospective economic advantage.1FN2^4^ In the case of volunteer organizations likeWikileaks,the economic advantage or contractualrelation aspect maybe somethingofastretchinasuit against the provider, as opposedtoasuit against the government official.1F^2^^^ The other elements ofthe tort can, under the right facts, be present: intent to bring about an interference,arelationship ^between the networked journalists and their readers) that the providerseekstointerferewith—indeed sever and which is advantageous to the journalist. For members of the networked press who are of the small commercial type,there is no difficulty in establishing this.It might bea mild stretch to argue thatadonation-dependent organization like Wikileaks,which depends on reaching its audience,hasapecuniary interest in continued access to its materials and website.Intentional efforts to prevent that communication, and thus to harm the network journalists'pecuniary advantage, are sufficient. No actual malice, in the sense of ill will toward the party interfered with, is required. 1FN2^6^ Certainly such an effect would be trivial to establish in the case ofMasterCard,Visa,and PayPal,whose denial ofservice was clearly intended to prevent Wikileaks from using their payment services to receive donations that sustain the organization. The hard part here would be to establish the intent requirement, and that the claims of violation of terms of service were pretextual.Despite the difficulty, this kind of factual dispute would make discovery necessary and,with it, the salutary effects of shining a light on back channel communications between government and private actors aimed to ^^disrupt and degrade^^ the operations ofmembers ofthe networked fourth estate.1FN2^7^ The private law solutionsloffer here are small steps in the direction of solvingabasic problem: core facilities and infrastructure necessary to communicate^37^ effectively in the networked environment can be arbitrarily denied by their private owners.By looking at currently available means in tort and contract lawlaim to underscore the necessity of achievingabasic outcome—the introduction ofaright to communicate and not tobe un reasonably excluded from services critical to achieving that end. In the early republic and since, basic mailing privileges overacommon carrier mail system playedafoundational role in the development of the fourth estate in the United States. 1F^2^^^ As capitalcosts of production rose, carriage was transposed into public interest obligations for radio and television. But when privately deployed cable and satellite met the neoliberal revival of the Reagan era, the concept ofcommon carriage began to fall out offavor, and ^^the public interest^^ found itself on the defensive. Most recently, even where the case for common carriage of Internet service was most clearly indicated legally and economically,in the last mile to the home, the FCC shied away from treating broadband carriage to the home as common carrier service. 1FN2^^^ The basic problem presented by the denial-of-service attacks onWikileaks is that some of the core facilities necessary to enable precisely those actors who make the networked environment open, participatory,and available for critical insight are susceptible to arbitrarydenial of service by private providers.This power that private actors have, given these actors'incentives to avoid offending thepublicat large,createsanewversionofthemucholder vulnerability of speechto ostracism and boycott, one that is particularly effective against the new players that depend on these critical infrastructures. To counterthis vulnerability, weneedamenuoflegalconstraintsthatwillpreserve the ability to communicate against unreasonabledenials of service. Inan environment where light-weight, lowcost, lowretummodels, both commercial and nonprofit, play an important role, we leam from this case that private payment systems are

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alsoacorecomponentofthenew infrastructure, alongsidehosting services, logicaladdressing,andcarriage. Given the range and diversity ofessential facilities, it is possible that these very humble foundations in contracts and tort law willofferamore general basis for developingasystem of legalconstraints that will be robust to manipulation and control by govemment actors in particular, and less susceptible to shut down by skittish private actors more generally. Part IV. From Mass-Mediated to Networked Fourth Estate The constitutional analysis of theWikileaks case must be informed by an understanding of the emerging shape of the networked fourth estate.The attack onWikileaks,in particular the apparent fear of decentralization that it represents, requires us to understand the current decline ofthe traditional ^371 model ofthe press and the emergence of itsnew,networkedform. At core,themulti-system attackon Wikileaks,including massmedia coverage and framing, is an expression of anxiety about the changes that the fourth estate is undergoing. This anxiety needs to be resisted, rather than acted upon, i f we are to preserve the robust, open model of news production critical to democracy in the face of economic and technological change.

A.The Crisis ofthe Mass-Mediated Fourth Estate The American fourth estate is in the midst ofaprofound transformation,whose roots are in the mid-l^^Os, but whose rate, intensity,and direction have changed in the past decade.1FN300^ The first element of this trans formation includes changes intemal to the mass media increasing competition for both newspapers and television channels,and the resulting lower rents to spend on newsrooms,and the fragmented markets that drove new strategies for differentiation.Many of the problems laid at the feet of the Intemet-fragmentation of the audience and polarizationof viewpoints,in particular—have their rootsinthis element of the change.The second element oftransformation was the adoption ofthe Intemet since the mid-l^^Os.The critical change introduced by the network was decentralized information production, including news and opinion, and the new opportunities for models based on neither markets nor the state for financing to playanew and significant role in the production ofthe public sphere.1FN301^ As Paul Starr showed inThe Creation of the Media, the middle of the nineteenth century sawafundamental shift inthe cost structureof journalism. 1FN302^ Starrhademphasizedtherise of thelarge,professionalized newsroom.1FN303^ lames Beniger, identifying the same trend, emphasized the high capital costs ofthe electric press,automated setting, and paper folding machines.1FN304^ Regardless ofthe relative importance and causal relations between organizational and technical innovations,it is quite clear thatacomhination of technological andorganizationalchangesbeganadynamicthat, withinafewdecades,cametoreplacetheparty pressand postal service patronage systems that preceded it.The modelof high physicalcapital and high fixed-cost labor investments created the basis for the rise of major advertising-supported dailies that typified the first half of the twentieth century.These high costs, coupled with the relatively high proportion of the cost related to physical distribution,created significant barriers to entry in local news markets.Over the course ofthe twentieth century, local newspapers had become local monopoly businesses.1FN30^^ By 1^^4,the average market share ofthe top and in medium-sized cities just over ^3^. By 2006, the mar^372 newspaper in small towns was close to ket share of thelargest newspapers insuchtowns wasover^7^. Inlargecities, that share was around60^ throughout this period.lFN306JThe absence of competition, in turn, sustained unusually high rents. 1FN307^ This ability to extract rents and use them to subsidize newsrooms had begun to change just before the emer-

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gence of the Internet into widespread use.As early asl^^O,Warren Buffet's annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholdersstated withregard tohismediaholdings: ^^Whilemany mediabusinesses willremaineconomic marvels in comparison with American industry generally,they will prove considerably less marvelous than I , the industry,or lenders thought would be the case onlyafew years ago.^^1FN30^^ The main cause of this change, which he saw as part ofalongterm secular trend rather thanaeyclical downturn,was that ^^the number ofboth print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. Asaconsequence,advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of our major media investments....^^lFN30^^Ayear later he explained further: ^^The fact is that newspaper,television, and magazine properties have begunto resemble businesses more than franchises in their ^373 economic behavior.^^lFN310^ What he called an^^economicfranchise^^is what we would sometimes callpossessing market power:being able to demand and obtain high prices for its product, getting high rents, and being relatively free of competitive pressures on the quality of the product or the management. lFN311^He concluded: Until recently,media properties possessed the three characteristics ofafranchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information and entertainment ^their primary interest being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them....The result is that competition has intensified,markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some—though far from all of its franchise strength.1FN312^ His conclusion foreshadows the media industry woes in the years that followed them:cost cutting,often at the expense of newsrooms, and failures of management and financing deals, like those of theTribune company. ^^In contrast,^^continues Buffet, ^^abusiness^^eams exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or serviceistight.Tightnessinsupply usuallydoes not last long. With superior management,acompany may maintain its status asalowcost operator foramuch longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibilityofcompetitive attack. Andabusiness,unlikeafranchise,canbe killed by poor management. 1FN313^ The dispersionof attention and increasingcompetitionthat Buffet observed before thelnternet age meant that there weremore outlets that consumers couldgotothatsimplydid not provide news.Thetelevision six o'clock news was no longerafixture; nor was the front page of the local paper.The ease with which Americans need not confront news at all,together withthe incentives to provide news that would attractalessinformed ^374 and politically engaged audience, likely contributed to the observed decline in the level ofknowledge of Americans exposed primarily to, say, moming broadcast news shows or local television news about public af fairs. 1FN314^ Audience dispersion alsomeant that there was an opportunity to capture narrower market segments than were most profitable during the more concentrated period.Where there is only one outlet, providing content that is highly mobilizing t o 3 0 ^ of the audience but alienates70^isabad strategy. You gain strong commitment to 30^,but i f you arealocal monopoly,those 30^ have no realoptions and would have bought your product anyway,while the70^who might have boughtabland informative media product will be tumed offby,say,ahighly partisan screed. lFN31^^Thesameisnot true whenoneisfacedwithafieldof.for example,seven media outlets of roughly similar coverage.Now,if one outlet is able to mark itself as uniquely rep resentative of asignificant minority of the population, it can generate for itself anaudience segment within which itcan enjoy thekindsoffranchiseeconomicsBuffethaddescribedthemediaindustry as losing. This ^together with the contemporaneous elimination of the faimess doctrine) 1FN3161 is why Rush Limbaugh's show,launched in 1^^^,became not onlyeconomically viable,but economically advantageous,astrategy fol-

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lowed with enormous success by Fox News eight years later. In combination,these changes within the industrial organization of American mass media were leading to disinvestment in newsrooms, audience fragmentation, and the emergence of right-wing media that used polarization asadifferentiation strategy.The two major criticisms of the networked public sphere fragmentation and polarization—are at least as muchtheproductof industrial structure changesinternaltothe commercial mass media as they are the product of an asserted ^^DailyMe^^ Internet culture, lFN317^the extent of whose actual empirical existence continues tobe amatter for investigation, not assertion. Boththe disinvestment and the niche targeting placed significant pressure on the will and ability of many outlets to commit to and pursue serious journalism consistent with professional norms. At the same time, the Internet rapidly shifted from being primarilyaresearch and education platform toa core element of our communications and information environment.The defining characteristic of thcNet was the ^37^ decentralization of physical and human capital that it enabled. 1FN31^^ In l^^^,acute observers of the digital economy saw Encarta as the primary threat to Britannica in the encyclopedia market, and the epitome of what the new rulesfor the digitaleconomy required. lFN31^^Thataradicallydecentralized, non-proprietary project, in which no one was paid to write or edit and that in principle anyone could edit,would compete with the major encyclopedias was simply an impossibility. And yet, ten years later,Wikipedia was one of the top six orsevensiteson thenet, whileEncartahadclosed itsdoors. Peerproductionandotherformsofcommonsbased,non-market production becameastable and important component of the information production system, 1FN320^ an observation not lost on business writers, lFN321Jand,increasingly,govemments.lFN322^ lust as free and open source software became an important complement to and substitute for some proprietary software models; just as photography,lFN323^cookbooks,lFN324^ travel guides,lFN32^^restaurant and consumer reviews, 1^FN326^ and video 1FN327^ came to develop important components of their industrial organization that were based on peer production and social production more generally, so too has been the case with news reporting and opinion.Ifthe first GulfWar was the moment ofthe twenty-four-hour news channel and CNN,then the IranianReformmovementof200^ was the moment of amateur videoreportage,as videostakenby amateurs were uploaded toYouTube, and from there became the only significant source of video footage of the demon strations available to the major intemational news outlets.Most recently,theTunisian revolt was in part aided by amateur videos of demonstrations,^376 uploaded toaFacebook page of an activist, LotfiHajji,and then re transmitted around the Arab world byAlIazeera;lFN32^^ and video taken by protesters was mixed with that taken by professional joumalists to depict the revolt in Egypt. But the networked public sphere is constructed of much more, and more diverse, organizational forms than ad hoc bursts of fully decentralized activity. B. The Emerging Networked Fourth Estate As of the end of the first decade of the twenty-first eentury,it seems that the networked public sphere is constructed of several intersecting models of production whose operation to some extent competes with and to some extent complements each other.One central component of the new environment is comprised of core players in the mass media environment. However, these now haveaglobal reach and have begun to incorporate decentral ized elements within their own model.It is perhaps not surprising that CNN,the NewYorkTimes,NBC News andMSNBCNews,the WallStreet lournal,Fox News,the Washington Post, and theLos AngelesTimes are among the top-ranked news sites on the Internet. 1^F^32^^ But alongside these are major international sites. The publicly-funded BBC and theU.K.nonprofit the Guardian playalarge role alongsideU.S.commercial media. The Guardian's editor-in-chiefclaimed to have 36 or 37 million readers per month, in comparison to the paper's

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daily circulation of about 2^3,000.l^FN330^These major players are,in tum, complemented by the online presence of smaller traditional media platforms and sources from other countries,accessed by U.S.readers through Yahool and Google News, both among the top news sites in the world.TheWikileaks case presents quite well how central these large, global online news organizational players are, but it also shows how, because they are all in the same attention market, it is harder for any one of them to control access to the news. One of the stra tegically significant moves that Assange made was precisely to harness these global mass media to his cause by providing them with enough exclusivity in their respective national markets to provide them with economic benefits from publishing the materials, and enough competition in the global network to make sure that none of them could,if they so chose,bury the story.The^377 global nature of the platform and the market made this strategy-byasmall player withasignificant scoop both powerful and hard to suppress. Alongside the broader reach of these traditionaloutletsinanew medium,we are seeing the emergence of other models of organization,which were either absent or weaker in the mass media environment. Remaining, foramoment,within the sites visible enough to make major Internet rankings lists, the Huffington Post,acommercial online collaborative blog, is more visible in the United States than any other news outlet except for the BBC,CNN,and the NewYorkTimes.l^FN331^There are, of course, other smaller scale commercial sites that operate on advertising, like the Drudge Report,Pajamas Media, orTalking Points Memo.These formasecond element in the networked public sphere. Talking Points Memo, for example, has an Alexa reach and rank somewhere between the Baltimore Sun and the Atlanta loumal Constitution, 1FN332^ although it hadastaff of only eleven people as of mid-200^.1^FN333^ Athird model that is emerging to take advantage of the relatively low cost of distribution, and the relatively low capital cost of production,of news is the nonprofit sector.Here,Ido not mean the volunteer, radically decentralized peer-production modek but rather the ability of more traditionally organized nonprofits to leverage their capabilities in an environment where the costs ofdoing business are sufficientlylower than they were in the print and televisionerathat they cansustaineffective newsrooms staffedwithpeoplewho,like academic faculties,are willing to sacrifice some ofthe bottom line in exchange for the freedom to pursue their professionalvalues.One example is ProPublica,afoundation-supported model for an otherwise classic-style professional newsroom. lFN334j Asimilarapproachunderlies thejournalistie awardwinninglocal reporting workof the Center for Independent Media, founded in 2006 and renamed in 2010the American Independent News Network. This organization,as of this writing, fundsanetwork of localindependent nonprofit media in Colorado,Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, and New Mexico.lFN33^^Arelated model is the construction of university-based centers thatcanspecializein traditional media roles. Aperfect example^37^ofthis isFactCheck.org,basedin the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, which plays a crucial watchdog role in checking the veracity ofclaims made by political figures and organizations.1FN336^ Alongside these professional-journalism-focused nonprofits,we are seeing other organizations usingacombinationof standard nonprofit organization with peer production to achieve significant results in the public sphere.An excellent example of this model is offered by the Sunlight Foundation,which supports both new laws that require government data to be put online, and the development ofweb-based platforms that allow people to look at these data and explore government actions that are relevant to them.l^FN337^LikeWikileaks did before the most recent events. Sunlight Foundation focuses on making the raw data available for the many networked eyes to read.UnlikeWikileaks,its emphasis is on the legal and formal release of government data and the construction of technical platforms to lower the cost of analysis and construct collaborative practices,so as to make it feasible for distributed social practices and people with diverse motivational profiles, embedded in diverse organizational models, to analyze the data.

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In addition to the professionals based in large-scale global media, small-scale commercial media, high-end national andlocal nonprofit media outlets,and other nonmedia nonprofits,we also see emerginganew party press culture.OverlO,000 Daily Kos contributors have strong political beliefs,and they are looking to express them and to search for information that will help their cause.1FN33^^ So do the contributors toTownhall.com on the right, although the left-wing of the blogosphere uses large collaborative sites at this point in history more than the right.lFN33^^For digging up the dirt onyour opponent's corruption,political ambition and contestation isapowerful motivator, and the platforms are available to allow thousands of volunteers to work together, with the leadership and support ofatiny paid staff^paid, again,through advertising to this engaged community, or through mobilized donations, or both). Finally,although less discretely prominent than the large collaboration platforms like Daily Kos or Newsv ine,^FN340^ and much more decentralized than any ofthe other models,individuals play an absolutely critical role in this new information ecosystem. First, there is the sheer presence of millions of individuals with the ability to witness and communicate what they witnessed over systems that are woven into the normal fabric of networked life. This is the story of the Iranian reform videos, and it is of course the story of much more mundane political reporting,from lohn McCain singing ^^Bomblran^^ ^37^ tothe tune ofaBeach Boys song to George Allen's Macaca. Second, there is the distributed force of observation and critical commentary,as we saw in the exposure of the error inthe CBS^Dan Rather expose.Third,there are the experts.For instance,academic eco nomists like Brad DeLong, on the left, andTylerCowen, on the right, playedamuch greater role in debates over the stimulus and bailout^which can be observed by looking at traffic pattems to their individual blogs during the debates over thebailout)thanthey could haveamere decade ago. Collaborative websitesbyacademics, like BalkinizationlFN341^or Crooked Timber, 1^FN342^ provide academics with much larger distribution platforms to communicate, expanding the scope and depth ofanalysis available to policy and opinion makers. The Wikileaks events need to be understood in the context of these broad trendsin the construction of the networked fourth estate. Like the Sunlight Foundation and similar transparency focused organizations, Wikileal^s isanonprofit focused on bringing tolight direct,documentary evidence about govemment behavior so that many others, professional and otherwise, can analyze the evidence and search for instances that justify publiccriticism. Liketheemerging party presses, it actsout ofpoliticalconvietion. Andlikesomany other projects on the Net,it usesacombination of volunteerism,global presence,and decentralized action to achieve its results.As such,Wikileaks presents an integral part ofthe networked fourth estate—no less than the protesters who shoot videos on the streets ofTehran,Tunis, or Cairo and upload them to theWeb,or the bloggers who ex posed the Rather^CBS story. Whatever one thinks about the particular actions ofWikileaks in the particular in stance of the release of the embassy cables,the organization and effort put forth byWikileaks to bring to light actual internal govemmentdocumentsbearingonquestionsofgreat public import isessentiallyanetworked versionof thePentagonPapers and Roosevelt'sManwiththeMuck Rake. 1FN343^ Anattackon Wikileaks -legalor extralegal,technicalor commercial—needs to be assessed from that perspective,and allows us to explore the limitations and strengths of the emerging networked fourth estate. C. Mass Media Anxiety over the New Neighbors in the Networked Environment ln 200^-2010,thestateofmassmedianewsreporting—newspapers in particular—and the financial future of these organizations became a matterof substantial public debate. The Senate held hearings onthe future of journalism,lFN344^andtheFederalTrade Commission launchedaseries of public^3^0 workshops under the title How Will lournalism Survive thelnternet Age7 1F^34^^Arange of publications tried to understand what

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was happening to journalism, and what its future would look like. The New Republic, for example, ran a thoughtful cover on the end ofthe age ofnewspapers,lFN346^NPR's On the Media carefully explored the sense ofcrisis,lFN347^ and academics weighed in as welLlFN34^J Many treatments,like those cited, were careful and thoughtfuLMuch of the debate, however,involved name-calling ofthe ^^guy in his pajamas,^^ ^^echo-chamber ofthe blogosphere^^ variety.The core ofthe critique of the networked forms ofthe press has been the same since Klein's memorable quote: the concem that the Intemet and the blogosphere provide misinformation, while the traditional media are necessary to provide reliable invest igative reporting. An event study that does not involveWikileaksoffersabaselineportrayalof what is,in fact, the much more complex interaction between the traditional and networked components of the fourth estate, and the distributionof responsible and irresponsiblejournalismonboth sides of that divide. It turns out that being part of the mass media is no guarantee ofhigh quality and effective journalism; nor is being onlineaguarantee of falsehood andecho-chamber effects.Thenewsystemwillhavehigh quality,effective participants ofeach type,and low quality rumormongers on either side ofthe traditional^networked media divide.Understanding this fact, as well as the dynamic that seems to lead serious writers on the traditional side to discount it, provides im portant insight into the ways in which theWikileaks case,in tum,has been perceived. On Novemberl7,2010the NewYorkTimes published an oped byThomasFriedman,Too Good to Check, whose opening beautifully explains the whole: On Nov.4,Anderson Cooper did the countryafavor. He expertly deconstructed on his CNNshow the bogus rumor that President Obama's trip to Asia would cost ^200 millionaday.This was an important ^story.^It underscored just how far ahead ofhis time MarkTwain was when he saidacentury before the Internet, ^Aliecantravel halfway aroundthe world while the truth isputtingon its shoes.^ But it also showed that there is an antidote to malicious joumalism—and that's good joumalism. ^3^1 In case you missed it,astory circulated around theWeb on the eve of President Obama's trip that it wouldcostU.S.taxpayers^200millionaday....lFN34^^ The quote tells the whole of the story. The villain is ^^thelnternet,^^ which enables the lie traveling halfway aroundtheworld—in this case,from India to the U.S.public sphere—where it circulates around ^^theWeb.^^ The hero is the expert journalist in an established news outlet who exposes the lie,airs his expose onamass media outlet, and thereby administers the antidote. There is only one problem with this story: it wasn't quite so. The initial source of the 200 million dollar per day story was an established media outlet, the PressTrust of India; it was primarily followed by the right-wing mass media in theUnited States,with one bloggerplayingakey importation role.^^Thelnternet,^^on the other hand, was actually the first place where investigative joumalism occurred to debunk the falsehood. A t l l : 2 ^ am ESTon November 2,2010, New DelhiTelevisionlFN3^01postedastory with the byline of the PressTrust of India, India's equivalent of the AP and Reuters,entitled US to spend ^200 mnaday on Obama's Mumbai visit. 1FN3^1^ This story was linked to within the next twohoursby the Drudge Report, 1FN3^2^ MichelleMalkin'ssiteat 1:^3 pm, 1F^3^3^ as wellas three otherlower-visibility,right-wingblogs. 1FN3^4^ The afternoon and evening belonged to the mass media. That aftemoon. Rush Limbaugh repeated it on his radio show.lFN3^^^ The story was repeated in the British Daily Mail 1FN3^6^ at about ^:00 ^3^2 pmEST,and that evening, Mike Huckabee repeated the story on Fox News election coverage.1^FN3:^7^ By the end ofNovember 2nd,astory had been created by some oflndia's most respected news outlets, im-

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ported to the United States by two highly visible right-wing blogs, and then repeated and amplified by two major right-wing mass media outlets—Fox News and Rush Limbaugh. Limbaugh's story actually revived and combined the new 200 milliondollars meme with an earlier one: claiming that thepresident was taking40 airplanes. 1^FN3^^^ This story was picked up two days later by the same Doug Powers who later posted Michelle Malkin's 200-million-dollars-a-day story on his own blog.1FN3^^^ His post was picked up in an opinion column for the WashingtonTimes on October 2^th,lFN360jbut this part of the story did not take off until combined with the 200 million dollars claim made by Limbaugh. On November 3rd, the right-wing mass media propagation continued. Fox News'program Follow the Money createdawhole segment, by Eric Boiling, repeating the claim with vivid images and the tag ^^TheObamas:The NewAmerican Royalty7^^1FN361^That same evening, Sean Hannity's program repeated the claim and conductedapaneldiscussion around its inappropriateness given the election results and the financial condition of the country.lFN362j Afew hours later. Representative Michele Bachmann repeated the accusation in an interview on Anderson Cooper 360; the interview that ultimately led Cooper to investigate and refute the claim, on CNN twenty-four hours later, on his November 4th show.1FN363^ But that refutation, the one to which Friedman paid such high respects,was by no means the first.The initial refutation, on November3rd,was not in mainstream mediabuton theNet. FactCheck.orgprovidedaclearbreakdownofthe sourceandflowof ^3^3 thestory. 1FN364^ Media Matters for America postedalong story in the afternoon ofNovember3rd,providingasimilar flow and debunking of the story.lFN36^^Snopes.com also provided enough debunking either on November 3rd or early November4th 1FN366^ tobelinkedtoby aNovember4th, 3:16pm Wall Street lournalblogpost. 1FN367^ By the end ofNovember 3rd, only Internet-based reporting was doing the ^^goodjournalism^^ work; the only established media working thestorywereeither purposefully repeating themisstatement—inthecase of Fox News—or being used by right-wingpoliticians to propagate the slander, as in Bachmann's interview on Cooper's show. ByNovember4th,the tide of the story was turning.Glenn Beck started the day by repeating the slander. 1FN36^^ But an increasing number of blogs and mainstream outlets were picking up the White House and Pentagon denials.Over the course ofthat day,the Media Cloud database identified thirteen blogposts within the politicalblogosphere that continued to support and propagate the story,and fourteenblogposts that pointed to the critique and refutations of the story. 1FN36^^ Interestingly,severalof theblogpostsunderscoring anddisseminating the debunking reports were right-wing blogs: HotAir,lFN370^InstapunditlFN371^^although these sites framed the debunking with: it's not our fault we believed this bunk given Obama's reputation for extravag ance), and Outside the Beltway.1FN372^ In the mainstream,USAToday,theWashington Post, theWall Street loumal, and the Kansas City Star all had various versions ofthe refutation ^3^4 in their web-based versions. At 10:00pm that night, Anderson Cooper airedalong segment that specifically emphasized the vacuity of the sources,and the central role that the right-wingconservatives Limbaugh, Beck, Don Imus, and Michael Savage—played in repeating and amplifying thelie. 1^FN373^ Itwas indeedagood pieceof joumalism. Its story capturedtheright tone of how thestory emerged,why it was unreliable,and who repeated thelie.Cooper then went to his ^^databoard^^and explained how the 200-million-dollar claim could not possibly be true, given what we know from public sources about the daily cost ofthe war in Afghanistan and what we know based on an old GAO report about the costs ofBill Clinton's Africa trip in 1^^^. All of these pieces of evidence, down to the comparison to the 1^0-million-dollar-a-day cost of the Afghan war and the GAOreport on Clinton's trip,had already been reported over twenty-four hours earlier by FactCheck.org. Cooper played an enormously important role in giving voice to and amplifying the excellent research that was done by FactCheck.Given the continued importance of mass me-

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diaoutlets in reaching very large audiences,that isindeed an important rolefor someone withamassmedia voice to play.It is certainlyanecessary counterweight to the kind of propagandist reportage that Fox News and talkradioemploytosolidify their brand and retaintheir franchise,as well as perhapsto support the owner's politics. But the story is emphatically not one where ^^thelntemet^^ spreads lies and professional joumalism combats them. The story of these three days in November 2010offers some insight into the emerging stmcture of the global,networked fourth estate.It identifiesamore complex relationship than simply either ^^good professionals vs. bad amateurs^^or ^^pure-hearted, net-basedjournalists vs.acorrupt mainstream media.^^Itrevealsanetworked alternative to the more traditional model of media checks and balances. Here,publication by an Indian outlet wasglobally visible; ^^thelnternet,^^orratheroneentrepreneurialright-wingblogger,movedthat information quickly, and the network and its relationship to mass media created and elevated the memes. But the networked environment also included nonprofit academic and professional groups ^FactCheck.org; Media Matters), as well asasmall commercial professional publisher ^Snopes),all of whom were able to check the reporting and criticize it. And theNet included over two dozen sites that sifted through the original and the refutation.The mass media, in tum, took both the false and the correct story lines, and in each case amplified them to their respective audiences. ^3^^D. MassMedia Anxiety Playedout inthe WikileaksCaseEndangerstheNetworked Fourth Estate visavis the State,and Makes CooperativeVentures Across the Divide Challenging The concern that the incumbent news industry has exhibited in the past two years over the emerging compel itors in the networked information environment, played out in the way Friedman ascribed blame for the 200 milliondollaraday story,was also on display in the way that American newspapers dealt withWikileaks after the release of the embassy cables.This anxiety has two practical consequences.The first is that the kind of cooperative venture that Wikileaks entered into with the major newspapers was clearly difficult to manage. The cultural divide between established media players and the scrappy networked organizations that make up important parts of the networked fourth estate makes working together difficult, as the published reports from the media partners in this enterprise clearly reveak The second practical consequence is that, in seeking to preserve their uniqueness and identity,the traditional media are painting their networked counterparts intoacorner that exposes them to greater risk of legal and ex tralegal attack.As we saw in the analysis of the legal framework, fromaconstitutional law perspective,the way inwhichthetraditional media respondto,andframe, Wikileaks or other actorsinthe networked fourthestate does not matteragreat deal.But from the practical perspective of what is politically and socially feasible fora government to do, given the constraints ofpublic opinion and the internalized norms ofwell-socialized elites in democratic countries,the more that newspapermen,in their effort to preserve their own identity,vilify and se gregatetheindividuals and nontraditionalcomponents of the networked fourth estate,the more they put those elements at risk ofsuppression and attack through both legal and extralegal systems. i.ADiffieult Relationship Two major pieces in the NewYorkTimes exemplify the effort to assert the identity of the traditional media as highly professional,well organized, and responsible by denigrating the networked alternative.The first wasa Tom Friedman op-ed piece published on Decemberl4,2010.In it, Friedman wrote:

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The world system is currently being challenged by two new forces:arising superpower, called China, andarising collection of superempowered individuals, as represented by theWikiLeakers, among others. What globalization, technological integration and the general flattening of the world have done is to su perempower ^3^^ individuals to such adegree thatthey canactually challenge any hierarchy—froma global bank toanation state—as individuals.1FN374^ He explains: Asfor the superempoweredindividualssomeare constructive,some are destructive. Ireadmany WikiLeaks and learned some useful things. But their release also raises some troubling questions.Idon't want to live inacountry where they throw whistle-blowers in jaiLThat's China.Butlalso don't want to live inacountry where any individual feels entitled to just dump out all the internal communications ofa government orabank inaway that undermines the ability to have private,confidential communications that are vital to the functioning of any society.That's anarchy.1FN37^^ Asafactual matter,^^acountry where they throw whistleblowersinjail^^ is, infact, the United States. l^FN376^^^They,^^read^^we Americans,^^ have been keeping BradleyManning,the only whistleblower involved in this case,in solitary confinement for months. lFN377^But the important insight from this op-ed is the expressed fear of anarchy and the fear that the decentralized network,with its capacity to empower individuals to challenge their govemments or global banks, is not democracy, but anarchy. The fact that the individual in question did not in fact ^^dumpoutall the internal communications ofagovemment,^^butratherpartneredwithmajor traditional news outlets,including theTimes,to do so,is eliminated from the oped.By mischaracterizing what Wikileaks in fact did and labeling those imagined actions ^^anarchy,^^ Friedman is able to paint it as the danger O U S ^^other^^;just like China,adecentralized, open network isadangerous threat to what he concludes is the only thing standing between us and either anarchy or authoritarianism: ^ ^ a strong America.^^lFN37^^ More revealing yet is an ^,000-word essay by NewYorkTimes executive editor Bill Keller inaNewYork Times Magazine cover storyonlanuary 26, 2011. lFN37^^Parts of the essay, particularly around its middle, seem intended to emphasize and legitimate the fourth estate function of theTimes itself against critics who argue that theTimes should not have published the materials.Keller writes,for example: Afree press inademocracy can be messy.But the altemative is to give the governmentaveto over what its citizens are allowed to ^3^7 know. Anyone who has worked in countries where the news diet is controlled by the government can sympathize withThomasIefferson's oft-quoted remark that he would rather have newspapers without govemment than govemment without newspapers.1FN3^0^ But any close reading ofthe essay makes crystal clearthat acentral purpose it serves is to separate WikileaksfromtheTimes,andtoemphasize the Times'professionalism, care, andorganizational rationality while denigrating the contribution and reliability ofWikileaks.Immediately in the first paragraph,Keller refers to^^an organization called WikiLeaks,asecretive cadre of antisecrecy vigilantes.^^l^FN3^1^Compare this to the Times'own characterization ofWikileaksamere ten months earlier as ^ ^ a tiny online source of information and documents that governments and corporations around the world would prefer to keep secret,^^lFN3^2^ or to the 200^ Pentagon Report's detailed analysis of Wikileaks asawebsite dedicated to ^^exposl^ing^ unethical practices, illegal behavior, and wrongdoing within corrupt corporations and oppressive regimes,^^or the Pentagon Report's claim that ^^Wikileaks.org supports the US Supreme Court ruling regarding the unauthorized release of the Pentagon Papersby Daniel Ellsberg,which stated that^onlyafree and unrestrained press caneffectivelyex pose deception in government.^^^lFN3^3^Afew paragraphs later, Keller then emphasizesWikileaks'mistake in releasing the editedversionof the Collateral Murder video,writing:^^ll^n its zealtomake the videoaworkof antiwarpropaganda, WikiLeaks alsoreleasedaversionthatdidn'tcallattentiontoanlraqi who wastotinga

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rocket-propelled grenade and packaged the manipulated version under the tendentious rubric ^Collateral Murder.^^^ ^FN3^4^ This sentence repeats the Fox News accusation against the edited version, ignoring the fact that the opening slide of the edited footage states,^^Although some of the men appear to have been armed, the behavior of nearly everyone was relaxedl,^^^lFN3^^^ and the interpretive disagreement at the time about whether what the pilots thought was an RPG was in fact so.1FN3^6^ Later, Keller writes: ^^TheTimes was never asked to sign anything or to pay anything. For WikiLeaks, at least in this first big venture, exposure was its own re wardl,^^^ implying that perhaps, in the long term,Wikileaks'intentions were to profit from its relationships with the ^3^^ press.Atadifferent point, Keller implies,without pointing to any evidence, that Wikileaks volunteers hacked into theTimes'computers duringarocky period of the relationship.1FN3^7^ Beyond Wikileaks as an organization, it is clear that Assange and theTimes hadavery bad relationship, and Keller peppers the essay witharange of what reads more like gratuitous name-calling than substantive criticism. Inthefirst paragraph, Keller introduces Assange as ^^aneccentricformer computer hacker of Australian birth and no fixed residence.^^lFN3^^^ Keller then introduces and frames Assange by describing the impressions of the first Times reporter who met him: Assange slouched intoThe Guardian office,aday late....^^He was alert but disheveled, likeabag lady walking in off the street,wearingadingy,light-colored sport coat and cargo pants, dirty white shirt, beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed around his ankles.He smelled as ifhe hadn't bathed indaysBlFN3^^1 Afew paragraphs later, Keller recounts: Schmitt told me that for all Assange's bombast and dark conspiracy theories,he hadabitofPeter Pan inhim. Onenight, whenthey wereallwalkingdownthestreetafterdinner,Assangesuddenly started skipping ahead of the group. Schmitt and Goetz stared, speechless. Then, just as suddenly, Assange stopped, got back in step with them and returned to the conversation he had interrupted.1FN3^0^ Bycomparison,theGuardian, which had as difficult and stormyarelationship with Assange as did the Times, introduced Assange in its editor's equivalent ofKeller's overview essay very differently: ^^Unnoticed by most of the world,lulian Assange was developing intoamost interesting and unusualpioneerinusing digital technologies to challenge corrupt and authoritarian states.^^ lFN3^1j As Der Spiegel put it, inreporting on Keller's essay: ^^For some time now,lulian Assange has been sparring with NewYorkTimes Executive Editor Bill Keller.Assange claims the paper didn't publish the ^3^^ material in its entirety and made too many concessions to the White House before going to print. Now,Keller is fighting back.^^l^FN3^2^ These kinds of jabs make separating out the personal animosity from aspects of the essay that reflect structural,systemic concems difficult.Nonetheless,it is possible to observe in the pieceaclear core theme: asserting acategorical distinction between the NewYorkTimes as an institution and organizational form and the decent ralized, networked form represented by Wikileaks.Keller says,^^Weregarded Assange throughout asasource, not asapartner or collaborator.^^ lFN3^3^He later concludes by repeating what appears to beacentral argument of the essay: ^^Throughout this experience we have treated Assange asasource.Iwill not say ^asource, pure and simple,^because as any reporter or editor can attest,sources are rarely pure or simple,and Assange was no ex ception.^^ lFN3^4j Further, even when asserting that First Amendment values require that Wikileaks not be suppressed,Keller prefacesby restating: ^^Idonotregard Assange asapartner,andl would hesitateto describe whatWikiLeaks does as joumalism.^^1FN3^^^ By contrast, the Guardian frames its own account of its relationship quite differently: ^^IT^he fruit ofDavies'eager pursuit of Assange would result in an extraordinary,if sometimes strained, partnership between a mainstream newspaper and WikiLeaks: a new model of co operation

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aimed at publishing the world's biggest leak.^^lFN3^6^It is certainly possible that the difference in framing reOectsjurisdictionalsusceptibility andthe advice ofcounsel;theTimes maybe trying to preempt possible C O conspirator charges against it should the Department oflustice decide to proceed against Assange and Wikileaks on suchatheory.lt seems more likely,however, that the difference reflects the Guardian's strategic embrace of the networked models ofjournalism,on the one hand,and theTimes'continued rejection of the model. The professional^reliable vs. unprofessional^unreliable dichotomy is repeated throughout Keller's essay in more contextspecific instances. At one point he describesacertain problem theTimes reporters had with displaying the data: ^^Assange, slipping naturally into the role of office geek, explained ^3^0 that they had hit the limits ofExcel.^^lFN3^7^ By contrast to Assange,who was merely like ^^the office geek,^^ Keller later describes thechallengeof organizing thedataandexplainshow,^^lw^ithhelpfromtwo of TheTimes'sbest computer mindsltheleadreporters^figured out how to assemble the material intoaconveniently searchable and secure database.^^lFN3^^1When discussing the redaction efforts,Keller writes of theTimes'efforts: Guided by reporters with extensive experience inthefield,we redacted the names of ordinary citizens,localofficials, activists,academics and others who had spoken to American soldiers or diplomats. Weedited out any details that might reveal ongoing intelligence-gathering operations,military tactics or locations ofmaterial that could be used to fashion terrorist weapons.1FN3^^^ KellerdoesrecognizeWikileaks'effortstoavoidharminginnocents,but thetoneis quite different. He writes: ^^In the case of the Iraq war documents, WikiLeaks applied a kind of robo redaction software that stripped away names(and rendered the documents almost illegible),^^and there were instances in whichWikiLeaks volunteers suggested measures to enhance the protection of innocents....WikiLeaks advised everyone to substituteadozen uppercase ^'s for each redacted passage, no matter howlong or short.. ..WhetherWikiLeaks's^harm minimizations is adequate,and whether it willcontinue, is beyond my power to predict or influence. WikiLeaks does not take guidance fromThe NewYork Timesl^FN400^ When writing about responsible joumalism, Keller again focuses on differentiating between the traditional media participants in the disclosure, and the networked elements, this time explicitly using Wikileaks as an an chor for denigrating the networked fourth estate more generally: IW^efelt anenormous moral and ethicalobligationto use the material responsibly. While we assumed we had little or no ability to influence what WikiLeaks did,let alone what would happen once this material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogosphere, that did not free us from the need to exercise care in our own joumalism.1^FN401^ The essay was written two months afterthe initial release. Keller, by this point, knew full well that Wikileaks in fact did not release materials irresponsibly. Nor did anyone else in what he calls ^^the echo chamber o f t h e ^ 3 ^ I blogosphere.^^ The assertionofdifference doesnot reflect an actualdifferencein kind relativeto what was disclosed by one or another ofthe traditional media players.Instead,the aside largely seems to express theTimes'own anxieties about Wikileaks and the more general genre that it represents for Keller. This sense of self appears to have been complemented and reinforced by the Obama Administration. Comparing the Obama Administration'sresponse to Wikileaks tothat of theBush Administration's response to the NSA eavesdropping story, Keller recounts: l^T^he Obama administration's reaction was different. It was, for the most part, sober and professionaL

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TheObamaWhiteHouse, while stronglycondemningWikiLeaksfor making the documents public,did not seek an injunction to halt publication.There was no OvalOffice lecture.On the contrary,in our dis cussions before publication of our articles. White House officials, while challenging some of the conclu sions we drew from the material, thanked us for handling the documents with care.1FN402^ This basic story line repeats itself in the Der Spiegel recounting. In describing their meetings with the Ad ministration, Rosenbach and Stark state quite clearly: ^^The official fury ofthe us government was directed at thepresumed source, BradleyManning, and, most of all, WikiLeaks. The govemment wasnot interested in quarreling with the media organizations involved.^^l^FN403^1t appears as though the Administration either really did not fear disclosure, as long as it was by organizations it felt were within its comfort zone, or it was using the distinction and relative socialcultural weakness ofWikileaks to keep the established media players at the table and, perhaps, more cooperative with the Administration's needs. It is precisely in these descriptions of the relationship with the Administration, from both theTimes and Der Spiegel, that we see the danger that mixing the press'own identity anxiety with reporting on the press presents for the networked fourth estate.As one observes the multi-system nature of the attacks onWikileaks,as well as its defenses, it becomes obvious that law is but one dimension in this multidimensional system of freedom and constraint.As we saw in Part III,law,at least First Amendment law,is largely on the side ofWikileaks; no less so than it is on the side of the NewYorkTimes or Der Spiegel.Law,however, is not the only operative dimension.The socialpolitical framing of the situation,alongside the potential constraints the govemment feels on its legal chances and political implications ofattempting to prosecute, as well as the possibility ofusing the various extralegal avenues we saw used in this case, haveareal effect on how vulnerable an entity is to all these various forms of attack. Keller writes: ^3^2 As one of my colleagues asks:If Assange were an understated professorial type rather thana characterfromamissingStiegLarssonnovel,andifWikiLeaks were not suffused with suchglib anti pathy toward theUnited States,would the reactiontotheleaksbe quite soferocious7 And would more Americans be speaking up against the threat of reprisals7 1FN404^ The question, of course, is what role traditional media players in the United States played in creating that perception of Assange,and with it the license for what Keller described as the^^ferocious^^responses.Compare Keller's ^^dirty white shirt^^ or ^^filthy white socks^^ description to Der Spiegel's description of Assange as ^^wearingawhite shirt and jacket and sportingathree-daybeard,was even paler thanusual and hadahacking cough. ^Stress,^ hesaid,by way of apology.^^1^FN40^^ Similarly,Rosenbach and Starkdescribe Assange asa man who is very difficult to work with but one with whom, after extensive interactions involving lawyers, dinner, and long negotiations over wine,adealcould be, and was, reached.Keller's vignettes describe someone whowas only marginally saneand certainly malevolent. ElPaiseditorlavierMorenoclaimedthatthemany hours ofameeting with Assange were insufficient toformarigorously-researchedprofile,but he could attest that the discussion was purely focused onacommon publication calendar and on how critical it was to protect names,sources,and dates that could put people at risk. 1FN406^ Keller and theTimes,then, are not innocent bystanders in the perceptions ofAssange that made the response to him so ferocious, but primary movers. It was theTimes,after all,that chose to runafront page profile of Assangeaday after it began publishing the Iraq war ^ a hunted man^^who^^demands that his dwindling number ofloyalists use exlogs in which it described him as ^ pensive encrypted cellphones and swaps his own the way other men change shirts,^^and^^checksinto hotels under false names, dyes his hair, sleeps on sofas and floors, and uses cash instead of credit cards, often borrowed fromfriends.^^l^FN407^ What responsibility does the established press have toward the newcomers in the networked fourth estate not

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to paint them in such terms that they become fair game for aggressive, possiblylife-threatening, and certainly deeply troubling pressures and threats of prosecution7 There isadirect intellectual line connecting Klein's ^^you couldn't haveastarker contrast ^3^3 between the multiple layers of checks and balances, andaguy sitting in his livingroominhispajamaswritingwhathethinks^^lFN40^j toKeller's^^bag lady walking in off the street,^^ 1FN40^^ twice denied as^^a source,not asapartner.^^lFN410^ Incombinationwiththe Administration's clear deferencetothe traditional media, on theonehand,and itsrepeateddenunciationsof, threats to,andmulti systems attacks onWikileaks and Assange on the other, the need of the incumbent media organizations to assert their identity and shore up their own continued vitality threatens emerging elements of the networked fourth estate.^^Multiple layers of checks and balances^^are merely one way of creating accountability; the social relations among elite players that make these meetings feasible and that allow Keller to present cables to the administration are central aspects of what both the govemment and the incumbents of the fourth estate value, and it is the absence of such relations in the new organizational forms run by social outsiders that is so threatening. The risk is that the government will support its preferred media models, and that the incumbent mass media players will, inturn,vilify and denigrate the newer models in ways that make them more vulnerable to attack and shore up the privileged position of those incumbents in their role asamore reliable ally-watchdog.This threat is particu larly worrisome becauseit comes as the economics of incumbent media forceustolook for newand creative networked structures to fill the vacuum left by the industrial decline of mid twentieth century media models. ii.Collaboration Between Networked and Incumbent Models oflournalism The events surrounding Wikileaks mark the difficulties with what will inevitably becomeamore broadly applicable organizational modelfor the fourth estate.This new modelwill require increased integration between decentralized networked and traditional professional models of information production, and concentration of attention. On the production side,even looking narrowly at the question ofleaks,whatever else happens,spinoffs from Wikileaks—OpenLeaks or BrusselsLeaks, efforts by established news organizations like Al lazeera and the New York Times to create their own versions of secure, online leaked document repositories-markatransition away from the model of the leak to one trusted joumalist employed byawell-established news organization.The advantages of this model to the person leaking the documents are obvious.Aleak to one responsible organization may lead to non-publication and suppression of the story.The NewYorkTimes famously delayed publication of ^3^4itsstoryontheNSAdomestic eavesdropping programforayear. 1FN411^ Wikileaks has shownthat by leaking to an international networked organization able to deliver the documents to severaloutletsin parallel, whistleblowers can reduce the concern that the personal risk they take in leaking the document will be in vain. Major news organizations that want to receive these leaks will have tolearn to partner with organizations that, like Wikileaks, can perform that function. Leaking is,ofcourse,but one ofmany ways in which news reporting can benefit from the same distributed economics that drive open source development or Wikipedia.The usercreated images from the LondonUnderground bombing in 200^ broke ground for this modeLThey were the only source of images.During thelranian reformmovementprotestsin 200^, videos and images created by users ontheground became the sole video feed for international news outlets, and by the time of theTunisian and Egyptian uprisings in early2011,the integrationofthesefeedsintomainlinereportinghadbecomeallbut standard.lust asinopensourcesoftware ^^given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow,^^l^FN412^adistributed population armed with cameras and video recorders,andadistributed population of experts and insiders who can bring more expertise and direct experience to bear on the substance of any given story,will provide tremendous benefits of quality,depth, and context

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to any story. But the benefits are very clearly not only on the side oftraditional media integrating distributed inputs into theirownmodel.Lookingspecifically at Wikileaks and the embassy cables shows that responsible disclosure was the problem created by these documents that was uniquely difficult to solve in an open networked model. The problem was not how to release them indiscriminately; that is trivial to do in the network.The problem was not how to constructasystem for sifting through these documents and identifying useful insights.Protestations of the professional press that simply sifting throughthousands of documents and identifying interesting stories cannot be done by amateurs sound largely like protestations from Britannica editors that Wikipedia will never be an acceptable substitutefor Britannica. At this stage of our understanding of the networked informationeconomy,we know full well that distributed solutions can solve complex information production problems.It was the decisionto preserve confidentiality that made the usual approachto achieving largescale tasks inthe networked environment—peerproduction, largescale distributed collaboration unavailable. One cannot harness thousands of volunteers on an open networked platform to identify what information needs to be kept secret. To get around that problem,^3^^ Wikileaks needed the partnership with major players in the incumbent media sys tem, however rocky and difficult to sustain it tumed out to be. Another central aspect of the partnership betweenWikileaks and its media partners was achieving salience and attention. There is little doubt that mass media continues to be the major pathway to public attention in the United States,even as the role oflntemet news consumption rises.lFN413^Debates continue as to the extent to which the agenda set through those organizations can, or cannot, be more broadly influenced today through nonmainstream media action. 1FN414^ Both the Wikileaks case and the brief event study of the 200-million-dollar-a-day story suggest that, ataminimum, ultimate transmission to the main agenda of the pop ulation requires transmission through mass media.However importantasubject, i f it cannot ultimately make its way to mainstream media, it will remain peripheral to the mainstream of public discourse, at least for the intermediate future. 1^FN41^^ Networked organizations needapartnership model withtraditionalorganizations in large part to achieve salience. As more mature sectors in which collaboration across the boundary between traditional organizational models and new networked models show,creating these collaborations is feasible but not triviafOpen source software is the most mature ofthese, and it shows both the feasibility and complexity ofthe interface between more hierarchical and tightly structured models and Oat, networked, informal structures.1FN416^ The informality of loose networks and the safety of incumbent organizations draw different people, with different personalities and values; working across these differencesis not always easy.In looking at the Wikileaks case,it is difficuh to separate out how much of the difficulties in the interface were systemic and how muchafunction of interpersonal antipathy,Assange's personality,and the ^3^6 Times'ambivalence about working withWikileaks.1^FN417^ In thinking of the events asacase study,it is important not to allow these factors to obscure the basic insights: collaboration is necessary,it is mutually beneficial,and it is hard. The networked fourth estate will be made up of such interaction and collaboration, however difficult it may be initially. The major incumbents will continue to play an important role as highly visible, relatively closed or ganizations capable of delivering much wider attention to any given revelation, and to carry on their operations under relatively controlled conditions.The networked entrants,not individually,butasanetwork of diverse individuals and organizations, will have an agility, scope, and diversity of sources and pathways such that they will,collectively,be able to collect and capture information onaglobal scale that would be impossible for any single traditional organization to replicate by itself. Established news outlets find this partnership difficult to ad-

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just to.Bloggers have beencomplaining for years that journalists pick up their stories or ideas withoutgiving thekind of attributionthey would normallygivetojournalistsinotherestablishedorganizations. Butjust as software companies had to leam to collaborate with open source software developers,so too willthis industry have to developits interactions. We already see outletslike the Guardian well ahead of the curve, integrating what are effective expert blogs into their online platform as part of their menu of offerings.Wesee the BBC successfully integrating requests for photographs and stories from people on the ground in fast-moving news situations-although not quite yet solving the problem of giving the sourcesapersonality and voice ofacollaborat ive contributor.One would assume that the networked components of the fourth estate will follow the same arc thatWikipedia has followed: from something that simply isn't acknowledged, toajoke,toathreat, to an indispensable part oflife. Conclusion Astudy of the events surrounding theWikileaks document releases in 2010providesarich set of insights about the weaknesses and sources of resilience of the emerging networked fourth estate. It marks the emergence ofanew model of watchdog function, one that is neither purely networked nor purely traditional,but is rathera mutualistic interaction between the two. It identifies the peculiar risks to, and sources of resilience of, the net worked fourth estate inamultidimensional system of expression and restraint, and suggests the need to resolvea major potential vulnerability-theability ofprivate infrastructurecompaniestorestrict speech withoutbeing bound by ^3^7 the constraints oflegality,and the possibility that government actors will take advantage of this affordanceinanextralegalpublic-privatepartnership forcensorship. Finally, itoffersarichly detailedevent study of the complexity of the emerging networked fourth estate, and the interaction, both constructive and destructive,betweenthesurvivingelements of the traditional modelandtheemergingelements of thenew. It teaches us that the traditional,managerialprofessional sources of responsibility inafree press function imper fectly under present market conditions,while the distributed models of mutual criticism and universal skeptical reading, so typical ofthe Net, are far from powerless to deliver effective criticism and self-correction where necessary.The future likely is, as the Guardian put it,^^a new model of co-operation^^ between surviving elements ofthe traditional, mass-mediated fourth estate, and its emerging networked models. 1FN41^^ The transition to this new model will likely be anything but smooth.

IFNal^. lack N. and Lillian R.Berkman Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; Faculty Co-Director, Berkman Center for Internet and Society,Harvard University.lam grateful to Bmce Ackerman, Marvin Ammori, lack Balkin, David Barron, Fernando Bermejo, David Isenberg, Susan Landau, Micah Sifry,Ionathan^ittrain, and Ethan tuckerman for comments and criticisms. l^FNl^. TheodoreRoosevelt, Address of President Rooseveh at theLayingof the Corner Stone of the Office Building of the House ofRepresentatives:The Man with the Muck-Rake^Apr. 14,1^06),available atVoiees of Democracy,http:^^voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu^theodore-roosevelt-the-man-with-themuckrake-speech-text. 1FN2^.Adam Levine, Gates: Leaked Documents Don't Reveal Key Intel, But Risks Remain, Cnn^0ct.l6, 2010, ^:2^AM),http:^^articles.cnn.com^2010-10-16^us^wikileaks.assessment l^ulian-assange-wikileaks-documents. lFN3j.See media analysis infra, text accompanying noteslO^ 124.

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1FN4^. See detailed description and sourcing infra, notes ^3^^. IFl^^^. U.S. Dep'tofDefense,NewsTranscript,DODNewsBriefingwithSecretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon (Nov. 30, 2010), available at ht tp:^^www.defense.gov^Transcripts^Transcript.aspx7TranscriptID^472^. GatessaidataPentagonpressbriefing on the day ofthe release: Now,I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described asameltdown,asagamechanger, and so on.Ithink—I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought.The fact is,governments dealwith theUnited States because it's in their interest,not because theylike us,not because they trust us,and not because they believe we can keep secrets.Manygovernments—some governments deal with us because they fear us,some because they respect us,most because they need us.Weare still essentially,as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work withus. Wewill continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing7Yes.Is it awkward7Yes.Consequences forU.S.foreign policy7Ithink fairly modest. Id 1FN6^.Biden Makes Case ForAssangeAsA^HighTechTerrorist,^The Huffington Post ^Dec. 1^,2010,3:^1 PM), http:^^ www.huffingtonpost.com^2010^12^1^^joe-biden-wikileaks-assange-high-tech-terroristn7^^^3^.html ^^^If he conspired,to get these classified documents,withamember of theUSmilitary,that'sfundamentallydifferent than if somebody drops in your lap,^Here David, you'reapress person, here is classified materials ....^Iwould argue that it's closer to beingahigh tech terrorist than thePentagonPapers.^^). 1FN7^.See infra, notesl01103^describing comments ofBobBeckel,William Kristol,and Sarah Palin). IFN^^. Thomas L. Friedman, Op Ed., We've Only Got America A, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1^,2010, at A31, available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^12^1^^opinion^l^friedman.html; see infra, notes 33^-37^. l^FN^^. Haroon Siddique ^ Matthew Weaver, US Embassy CablesCulprit Should Be Executed, Says Mike Huckabee, guardian.co.uk, Dec. 1, 2010, http:^^ www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^dec^01^us embassy cables executed mike huckabee; Nick Collins, WikiLeaks: Guilty Parties ^Should Face Death Penalty,^ The Telegraph, Dec. 1, 2010, http:^^ www.telegraph.CO.uk^news^worldnews^wikileaks^^l72^16^WikiLeaks-guilty-parties-shouldfacedeath-penalty. htmL l^FNlOj.See infra section II.A,II.D.2,II.D.3.See infra Koh,note7^;as well as organizational attack. IFNll^. See WikiLeaks, Wikipedia,http:^^en.wikipedia.org^wiki^Wikileaks^lastvisitedFeb. 23, 2011). 1 use this source advisedly; following the citation lists in the article suggests that it isaparticularly good entry point into the history ofWikileaks. 1^FN12^ WikiLeaks Timeline, The Globe and Mail, Dec www.theglobeandmail.com^news^technology^wikileakstimeline^articlel^37131. ^FN13^Id lFN14^.SeeWikiLeaksTimeline,supra note 12,at 200^tab; see alsoThomasClabum, Apple's Controversial 14, 2010, http:^^

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iPhone Developer Agreement Published, InformationWeek (Oct. 2^, 200^, 3:^0 PM), http:^^ www.informationweek.com^news^personaltech^smartphones^showArticle.jhtml7articlelD^211601121. IFNl^^.Eric Schmitt^MichaelR. Gordon, CrossBorder Chases From Iraq O.K.,Document Says, N.Y.Times, Feb 4,200^,atA10 1FN16^. MikeMesnick, DebunkingThe Faulty PremisesOfThePirate BayCriminalizationTreaty, Techdirt ^May 23 200^,6:21PM),http:^^wwwtechdirtcom^articles^200^0^23^1203101212 shtmL 1FN171. Amnesty Announces Media Awards 200^ Winners, Amnesty Int'l UK (lune 6, 200^), http:^^amnesty.org.uk^news details.asp7NewslD^1^227. IFNl^^. Winners of Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Awards Announced, Index on Censorship ^Apr 22, 200^), http:^^ www.indexoncensorship.org^200^^04^winners-of-index-on-censorshipfreedom-of-expression-award-announced. IFNl^^.WikiLeaksTimeline,supra note 12,at 200^ tab.Thelist includes: in lanuary,telephone intercepts of Peruvianpoliticians andbusinessmeninvolvedinanoil scandal; inFebruary, 6,7^0Congressional Research Service reports; in March,aset of documents belonging to Barclay's Bank; in luly,areport relating toanuclear accident at thelranianNatanz nuclear facility;andinSeptember,intemaldocumentsfromKaupthingBankof Iceland,showing what appeared to be self-dealing ofbank owners. lFN20j. See Ben Dimiero,FO^LEAKS: Fox Boss Ordered Staffto Cast Doubt on Climate Science, County Fair ^Media Matters for America) ^Dec. 1^,2010,^:0^ AM), http:^^mediamatters.org^blog^2010121^0004; Andrew C Revkin, Climategate Fever Breaks, Dot Earth (N Y Times) (luly 7, 2010, ^:02 AM), http:^^ dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com^2010^07^07^gate-fever-breaks. l^FN21LThe report was originally availableon Wikileaksitself. lulian Assange,U.S. IntelligencePlannedto DestroyWikiLeaks,WikiLeaks ^Mar. 1^,2010).Since the assault onWikileaks has made access to the site difficult,that particular report can more easily be accessed elsewhere as ofFebruaryl^,2011:MichaelD.Horvath, U.S. Army Counterintelligence Ctr., Wikileaks.org-An OnlineReferencetoForeignlntelligenceServices,Insurgents, or Terrorist Groups7 2 ^Mar. 1^, 200^) l^hereinafter Pentagon Reports, available at http:^^ www.scribd.com^doc^2^3^^7^4^UslntelWikileaks, or in PDF format at http:^^ www.wuala.com^WikiLeaks^new^us-intel wikileaks.pdf. 1FN22^.Stephanie Strom,Pentagon SeesaThreat from Online Muckrakers,N.Y.Times,Mar.l7,2010, a t A l ^ . lFN23LId 1^FN24^.That report was apparently an early instance of collaboration betweenWikileaks andamajor news outlet; Assange explains that the report was published in collaboration with NewYork Times reporter Eric Schmitt. Annotationsby lulian AssangetoFeb. ^,2011 draft ofthis Article(Mar 10, 2011)^onfile withauthor) l^hereinafter Assange Annotations^. 1FN2^^.Pentagon Report, supra note21,at 2. 1FN26^.Id.at^.These are descriptions that largely appear to take Wikileaks'own self-description as true.

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1FN27^ ld at2 lFN2^jIdat3 lFN2^^Id ^FN30^1dat6^quotingNcwYorl^ Times C o v U n i t e d States, 403 CS713.717^1^71)) 1FN31^.Id.at^^^^The foreign staff writer for Wikileaks.org,lulian Assange,wrote several news articles,coauthored other articles, and developed an interactive data base for the leaked documents. In addition, other Wikileaks.org writers and various writers for other media publications wrote separate news articles based on the leaked information posted to theWeb site.^^). 1FN321 I d a t l l l^FN33^1d lFN34^1datl^ 1F1^3^^. A search in the Lexis-Nexis ^^News, All^^ database forarticles published fromlanuary 1, 2007 until December31,200^ using the term^^Wikileaks^^ yielded 407 results.A^^focus^^search for ^^Assange^^ yielded ten results. 1FN36L Pentagon Report, supra note21,at 2. lFN37^1d 1F^3^^.David Sarno,Burst ofLeaks Getting Slippery,L.A.Times,Apr. 16,200^,atEl. 1FN3^^.Pentagon Report,supra note21,at 3.Assange notes that this is an overstatement of inaccuracy; his annotations suggest that l ^ o f received documents fail verification and are not posted,while no documents posted to date onWikileaks have failed verification.Assange Annotations,supra note 24. 1^FN40^.Pentagon Report, supra note21,at3. 1^FN4I^. Wikileaks itselfhas provided no public statement about the source.Manning was charged by the Army only with the first release.Glenn Greenwald of Salon makesapowerful case that the evidence against Manning originates in ahighly unreliable source. Glenn Greenwald, The Strange and Consequential Case of Bradley Manning, Adrian Lamo and Wikileaks, Salon ^lune 1^, 2010, ^:20 AM), http:^^www.salon.com^news^opinion^glenn greenwald^2010^06^1^^wikileaks Ihereinafter Greenwald, Strange and ConsequentialL For the background story,see Chris McGreal,HackerTums in US Soldier over WikiLeaks Iraq Video, The Guardian, lune ^, 2010, at 1^, available at http:^^ www.guardian.co.uk^world^2010^jun^07^hacker wikileaks-iraq-video-manning. The underlying materials Greenwald discusses include Kevin Poulsen ^ Kim better, Suspected Wikileaks Source Described Crisis of Con science Leading to Leaks, Threat Level ^Wired) ^lune 10, 2010, ^:41 PM), http:^^ www.wired.com^threatlevel^2010^06^conscience. lFN42j.Elizabeth Bumiller,Video Shows U.S.Killing ofReuters Employees, N.Y.Times, Apr. ^,2010, atA13, available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^04^06^world^middleeast^06baghdad.html7hp.

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1FN43^. Collateral Murder, WikiLeaks (Apr ^, 2010). Full version available at ht tp:^^www.youtube.com^watch7v^lS^sxRfU-ikl^hereinafter Collateral Murder, full versions. Edited version available at http:^^www.youtube.com^watch7v^^r^PrfnU3G0 1hereinafter Collateral Murder, edited versions. lFN44^.SeeChrisMcGreal, Wikileaks Reveals Video ShowingUS Air Crew Shooting Down Iraqi Civilians, The Guardian, Apr. 6, 2010, at 2, available at http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^apr^0^^wikileaksus-army-iraq-attack;WikiLeaksPostsVideoof^US Military Killings'in Iraq, BBC^Apr. 6, 2010), http:^^news.bbc.co.uk^2^hi^americas^^603^3^.stm. 1FN4^^.Greenwald,Strange and Consequential,supra note41. 1FN46^. GlennGreenwald,The Inhumane Conditions of Bradley Manning's Detention,Salon (Dec. 1^,2010, 1:1^ AM), http:^^ www.salon.com^news^opinion^glenn greenwald^2010^12^14^manning^index.html Ihereinafter Greenwald,InhumaneConditions^;IoshuaNorman,Bradley Manning, Alleged WikiLeaks Source,inSolitary Confinement, CBS News ^Dec 1^,2010), http:^^www cbsnews com^^301^03^43 162 2002^724^03^43 htmL lFN47j. SeeRadioBerkman 171: Wikileaks and tbeinformation Wars,BerkmanCtr. forlnternet^Soc'y at Harvard Univ (Dec ^, 2010), http:^^ wilkins.law.harvard.edu^podcasts^mediaberkman^radioberkman^files^2010-12-0^ 004I^LESSIGTRANSCRlPTpdf(transcriptofpodcast) l^FN4^^.Iustin Fishel, Military Raises Questions About Credibility of Leaked IraqShootingVideo, Fox News ^Apr 7, 2010), http:^^ www.foxnews.com^politics^2010^04^07^military-raises-questions-credibility leaked iraq shooting video. 1FN4^^.The helicopter circled the struggling,injured man,as one of the pilots is heard saying,^^Come on buddy, all you gotta do is pick upaweapon.^^ Collateral Murder, full version, supra note 43,at 6:^^7:03. IFN^Oj.Collateral Murder,fullversion,supra note 43,at 2:30-2:42;CollateralMurder,edited version, supra note43,at4:0^4:17 IFl^^lL The edited version excludes the moment when the pilot hears that the ground troopshave found a wounded girl and says,Ah, damn, oh well,^^ in an aural shrug. Collateral Murder, full version,supra note43,at 17:11. Similarly,anunrelatedincident,fifteenminuteslater and caught as part of thefullcut,clearlydisplays the same gunship's crew shootinghellfiremissiles into abuildingjust as an unarmed civilian walks by the house,and again describesin conversation among the pilots another missilehitting the same building as three apparently unarmedcivilians walkthrough the rubble looking forsurvivors. Collateral Murder, full version, supra note 43, at 34:00. At least some individuals walking into the building before that point appear unarmed. These much more damning images were not part ofthe edited version, presumably because they were not part of the story about shooting the Reuters crew. An advocacy piece aiming to besmirch the U.S. military would clearly have highlighted those unambiguous examples ofcallous disregard for human life by the same gun crew, minutes after they had seen that they shot and injured two children in the course of trying to prevent the evacuation of an unarmed person they had injured in their prior volley. lFN^2j.At minutel6:00 of the full video,the pilot reiterates seeing the RPG as the reason to ask for permission tofire; at minute 1^:22 26 of that video,one of the ground troops is heard saying,^^I got one individual looks likehe'sgotanRPGroundlayingundemeathhim.^^CollateralMurder,full version,supranote43,at 16:00,

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1^:22 26. lFN^3j. SeeDavid Leigh, Afghanistan WarLogs: Howthe GuardianGotthe Story, TheGuardian,Iuly 26, 2010, at 2,available at http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^jul^2^^afghanistanwar-logs-explained-video. 1FN^4^. SeeDavidLeigh^LukeHarding, WikiLeaks: Strained Relations, Accusations-andCrucialRevelations. The Guardian, Feb. 1, 2011, at 16, available at ht tp:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2011^jan^31^wikileaks-embassy-cables-publieation; Bill Keller, Dealing with Assange and theWikiLeaks Secrets,N.Y.Times,Ian.26,2011,at MM32,later online version of article available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2011^01^30^magazine^30Wikileakst.html7 r^l^pagewanted^all; Marcel Rosenbach^HolgerStark, An InsideLook at Difficult Negotiations with lulian Assange,SPIEGEL,Ian.2^, 2010, available at http:^^www spiegel.de^international^world^0,l^l^,742163,00.htmL IFN^^j. Assange explains that posting thematerialsincluded removing about onefifth of thematerials to prevent potential harm to individuals mentioned in them,processing to provide distribution and statistical analyses, and in particular that he himself identified the documents relating to one of the most significant finds, the description ofTaskforce 373,aforce that undertook targeted assassinationsin Afghanistan. Assange Annotations, supra note 24.Forapublication of this story,see Nick Davies,AfghanistanWarLogs:Task Force 373—Special Forces Hunting Top Taliban, The Guardian, luly 2^, 2010, at 4, available at http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^jul^2^^taskforce 373 secretafghanistan-taliban. 1^FN^6^.C.I.Chivers etal.,View is Bleaker than Official Portrayal ofWar in Afghanistan,N.Y.Times, Iuly2^, 2010, atAl,available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^07^26^world^asia^26warlogs.html; Nick Davies^David Leigh, AfghanistanWar Logs: Massive Leak of Secret Files ExposesTruth of Occupation,The Guardian,luly 26,2010,ati,available at http:^^www.guardian.CO.uk^world^2010^jul^2^^afghanistan-war-logs-military-leaks. 1FN^7^.Eric Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents,WikiLeaks Seeks^Transparency,^N.Y.Times,luly26, 2010, at A l l IF^^^^. Terence Burlij, The Moming Line: Leaked Afghanistan Field Reports to Shape Political War Debate At Home, The Rundown ^PBS Newshour) ^luly 26, 2010, ^:30 AM), ht tp:^^www.pbs.org^newshour^rundown^2010^07^themoming-lineleaked-afghanistanfieldreportsto-shapepoliti cal-war-debate-at-home.html. IFN^^j Adam Brookes, Huge Wikileaks Release Shows US ^Ignored Iraq Torture,^BBCNews^Oct 23, 2010), http:^^www.bbc.co.uk^news^world-middle-east-1161131^. lFN60^.Levine, supra note 2. 1FN61^. Nancy A. Youssef,OfficialsMay be Overstating the Danger from WikiLeaks,McClatchy^Nov. 2^, 2010),http:^^www.mcclatchydc.com^2010^1L2^^104404^officials-maybe-overstating-the.htmL lFN62j.See Adam Levine,TopMilitary Official: WikiLeaks Founder MayHave^Blood^on His Hands,CNN (Iuly2^, 2010), http:^^www.cnn.comi^2010^US^07^2^^wikileaksmullengates^index.htmLABBC report attributedasimilar statement to Defense Secretary Robert Gates.Brookes,supra note l^FN63^The Iraq Archive: The Strands ofaWar,NYTimes,Oct 23,2010, a t A l .

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1FN64^.Hans Hoyng etal.,TheWikiLeaks Iraq Logs:AProtocol of Barbarity,Spiegel Online, Oct. 2^,2010, http:^^www.spiegel.de^international^world^O,l^l^,724026,00.html. 1^FN6^^. Brookes, supra note 1FN66^.For an example, see SabrinaTavemise^AndrewW.Lehren, Detainees Fared Worse in Iraqi Hands, Logs Say,NYTimes,Oct 23, 2010, at A^ l^FN67^.^^Mr.Morrell, of the Pentagon, told the BBC that the leak wasa^travesty^ which provided enemies of theWest with an^extraordinary database to figure out how we operated.He said the cache of documents contained ^nothing new^ with regards to fundamental policy issues. And he once again asked Wikileaks to remove the documents from the web and return them to the Department ofDefense.^^ Brookes,supra note l^FN6^^Id. lFN6^^.IohnF.Burns^RaviSomaiya,WikiLeaks Founder on the Run,Trailed by Notoriety,N.Y.Times,Oct. 23,2010, available at http:^^www.nytimes.com^2010^10i^24^world^24assange.html. lFN70^1d 1FN7I^.See Strom, supra note 22 (^^l^A^ tiny online source ofinformation and documents that governments and corporations around the world would prefer to keep secret.^^). 1FN72^. Friedman, supra note ^. 1FN73^ Scott Shane, Keeping Secrets WikiSafe,NYTimes, Dec 12, 2010, at WK1;US Embassy Cables: The Background, BBC News (Nov.2^,2010), http:^^www.bbc.co.uk^news^world-us-canada-11^62320. 1FN741. Shane, supra note73; David Leigh, How2^0,000 US Embassy CablesWereLeaked,The Guardian, Nov.2^,2010, at 2,available at http:^^www.guardian.co.uk^world^2010^nov^2^^ow-us-embassy-eablesleaked. 1FN7^^. Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to lennifer Robinson, attomey for lulian Assange (Nov 27, 2010), available at ht tp:^^media.washingtonpost.com^wpsrv^politics^documents^Dept of^State Assange letter.pdf. 1^FN76^ l^L^SC^7^3(d)^2006) 1^FN77^.Pentagon spokesman GeoffMorrell used language very similar to that which would be used by the State Department's legal counselafew months later, claiming that the documents threaten our forces and Afghan ci vilians, and demanding their retum.U.S.Dep't of Defense, NewsTranscript,DODNews Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon ^Aug. ^, 2010), available at ht tp:^^www.defense.gov^transcripts^transcript.aspx7transcriptid^^3001. 1F1^7^^. See infra note 14^; Keller, supranote ^4; Marcel Rosenbach ^ Holger Stark, Lifting the Lid on WikiLeaks: An Inside Look at Difficult Negotiations with lulian Assange, Spiegel Online, Ian. 2^, 2011, http:^^ www.spiegel.de^intemational^world^0,l^l^,742163,00.htmL l^FN7^^.BrettI.Blackledge^IameyKeaten,RespectedMedia Outlets Collaborate with WikiLeaks, ABC News (Dec.3,2010), http:^^abcnews.go.com^Business^wireStory7id^l2302107;Shane, supra note73.

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[FN80]. See infra text accompanying notes 108-124. [FN81]. Lists of the relevant cables are maintained by several news organizations. One that tracks releases by a wide range of organizations is the Guardian. See WikiLeaks Embassy Cables, The Key Points at a Glance, guardian.co.uk, Dec. 7, 2010, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-embassy-cables-key-points. A shorter list is maintained by the BBC. See At a Glance: Wikileaks Cables, BBC News (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-l 1914040. [FN82]. Elizabeth Dickinson, The First WikiLeaks Revolution7, Foreign Policy (Jan. 13, 2011), http:// wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/13/wikileaks_and_the_tunisia_ protests; Scott Shane, Cables from American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence on Tunisia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2011, at A14. [FN83]. Leigh & Harding, supra note 54, at 16. [FN84]. See, e.g.. At a Glance: Wikileaks Cables, supra note 81; Cable 09STATE15113, WikiLeaks, http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/02/09STATE 15113.html #par 15 (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). [FN85]. In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Julian Assange explained that the "[n]ews value of this cable was two fold 1) to further show that US diplomats were being illegally used to conduct foreign spying (it is explicitly stated in the cable to keep such inquiries secret from the host government), and to reveal 'assets' the US might fight a war over or otherwise use its diplomatic muscle to control." Assange Annotations, supra note 24. [FN86]. In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Julian Assange reports that this release was done in coordination with the Times of London, rather than with one of the five main organizations that collaborated on the release. Id. [FN87]. WikiLeaks Publishes List of Worldwide Infrastructure 'Critical' to Security of U.S., MSNBC.com (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ id/40526224/ns/us_news-wikileaks_in_security. [FN88]. David Smith, Morgan Tsvangirai Faces Possible Zimbabwe Treason Charge, guardian.co.uk, Dec. 27, 2010, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/27/wikileaks-morgan-tsvangirai-zimbabwe-sanctions. [FN89]. The cable was posted to the Guardian on December 8, 2010 at 21:30 GMT. See US Embassy Cables: Tsvangirai Tells US Mugabe Is Increasingly 'Old, Tired and Poorly Briefed,' guardian.co.uk, Dec. 8, 2010, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/241595. It was posted to Wikileaks that same day, apparently about an hour later. See Cable 09HARARE1004, WikiLeaks (Dec. 8, 2010, 22:31 GMT), http:// 213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09HARARE1004.html. Assange confirms that the release was coordinated and simultaneous. Assange Annotations, supra note 24. The release appears to fall within the practice of following thejudgment of the mainstream media organizations rather than releasing independently. [FN90]. In his annotations to the February 8, 2011 draft of this article, Assange explains: This is absolutely false. I have never used "poison pill," nor ever made a threat. I have stated on many times that we have distributed backups, to insure that history will not be destroyed. I f we are not in a position to continue publishing ourselves, we, in understanding the significance of history, will release the passwords to these backups of future publications to ensure that others can take up the work. The disincentive is not of a

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threatening nature,but rather tomakemassarrests,sabotage or assassinationspointlessexercisesinprior re straint. Assange Annotations, supra note 24.This annotation suggests no misunderstanding.The term "poison pill" impliesameasure taken byapotential target of hostile action(originally,ashareholder plan intended to dilute the holdings of the winner inapotential hostile corporate takeovers battle in the 1980s)to make itself toxic to the predator consuming it.This appears to be the implication ofthis explanation as welL lFN91^NearvMinnesota,283 CS 697,716 (1931) 1FN92L See JackShafer,TheExorcismof theNew YorkTimes, Slate (Oct 20,2010,6:52 PM), ht tp://www.slate.com/id/2128429. 1FN93^.Judith Miller Criticizes Julian Assange For NotVerifying Sources,Video Cafe (Jan.2,2011,7:59 AM), http://videocafe.crooksandliars.com/scarce/judith-miller-criticizesjulianassangenot. lFN94j. Glenn Kessler, Clinton, in Kazakhstan for Summit, Will Face Leaders Unhappy over WikiLeaks Cables, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 2010, available at http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/ll/30/AR2010113001095 htmL 1F1^95^.Biden Makes Case For Assange AsA'HighTechTerrorist,'supra note 6. lFN96^.DODNews Briefing, supra note5. lFN97j.Holger Stark^MarcelRosenbach,'WikiLeaks Is Annoying, But NotaThreat,'Spiegel Online, Dec. 20,2010,http://wwwspiegel.de/intemational/germany/0,1518,735587,00.htmL 1FN98^.Fox News'Bob Beckel Calls For'Illegally'Killing Assange:'ADead Man Can't Leak Stuff (VIDEO), The Huffington Post (Dec 7, 2010, 5:50 PM), ht tp://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/fox news-bob-beckel calls n 793467.html. lFN99^Seeid I^FNIOO^ Michael O'Brien, Republican Wants WikiLeaks Labeled As Terrorist Group, The Hill (Nov 29,2010, 8:38 AM), ht tp://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/130863-top-republican-designate-wikileaks-as-a-terrorist-org. IFNIOI^. William Kristol, Whack Wikileaks, The Weekly Standard (Nov 30, 2010, 8:25 AM), ht tp://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/whack wikileaks 520462.htmL lFN102^Id 1FN103^. Peter Grier, WikiLeaks' Julian Assange, Does Sarah Palin ThinkCIA Should 'Neutralize' Him7, Christian Sci Monitor, Nov. 30, 2010, http:// www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/TheVote/2010/1130/WikiLeaks-Julian-Assange-Does-Sarah-Palin-thinkCl Ashouldneutralize-him. ^ 1FN104^.Harold Koh, Legal Adviser,U.S.Dep't ofState, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society oflntemational Law (Mar. 25,2010),available at http://www.state.gOv/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.

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1FN105^. As the President put it explicitly, in response to questions about investigating the torture of Spanish citizens at Guantanamo: "Tmastrong believer that it's important to look forward and not backwards,and to remind ourselves that we do have very real security threats out there."Sam Stein, Obama On SpanishTorture Investigation: I Prefer To Look Forward, The Huffington Post (Apr. 16, 2009, 11:51 AM), http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/16/obama-on-spanish-torture_n 187710.html (reporting onaCNN en Espanol interview with President Obama on April 15, 2009). 1FN106^.See, e.g.,ErvingGoffman, Frame Analysis(1974). 1FN107^ United Statesv Progressive, liic,467 FSupp 990 (WD Wis 1979); Howard Morland,TheHbomb Secret,The Progressive, Nov.1979,at3,available at http://www.progressive.org/images/pdf/1179.pdf. 1FN1081.The data was collected from the LexisNexis database on January 29,2011.The date range searched was November 28,2010 to January 14, 2011.The dataset was "Major Newspapers."The search string was pur posefully broad: "wikileaks w/25 ((thousands or 250,000)/7 cables)."The resulting 353 reports were manually coded to exclude non-U.S.publications,and then identified as"thousands"or"250,000"released;"correct"or "ambiguous." 1FN109^. Paul Richter, U.S. Tries to Contain Damage; WikiLeaks Cables Reverberate in Global Hot Spots, Chi. Trib,Nov 30, 2010, atC12;USRushes to Reassure Edgy Allies,LATimes,Nov 30, 2010, a t A l IFNllO^.Editorial, Undiplomatic Tales; On the WikiLeaks Revelations, S.FChron.,Nov.30, 2010, atA17. l^FNlll^.ClintonTreads Carefully in Leading Massive Damage-Control Campaign,Wash. Post, Nov.30, 2010, atA13 1FN112^. The Associated Press in particular was careful not to say that 250,000 cables were released, but rather said that Wikileaks "began publishing" the 250,000 documents.This was true at the time, but was coded in this study as "ambiguous"relative to the much clearer stories explaining the limited nature of the release.See,e.g., David Stringer, British Court Grants Bail toWikiLeaks'Julian Assange,San Jose Mercury News,Dec. 14,2010. lF^113^.KristenSchorsch, Leak: Afghan President's Brother Loves Lakeview,Chi.Trib.,Nov.29,2010, at C3 (correctly categorized in the data set). 1FN114^. CableLeaks: U.S. UrgedtoHit Iran; Latest WikiLeaks Release Also SaysU.S. EnvoysSpiedon Counterparts, Chi.Trib.,Nov.29,2010, atCl (incorrectly categorized in the dataset as "thousands"). 1FN115^.Return of WikiLeaks;White House Says New Round of Document Releases Puts Lives at Risk,Chi. Trib.,Nov.29,2010, at3(categorized as ambiguous). 1FN116J. Marisa L. Porges, 'We Cannot Deal with These People': WikiLeaks Shows True Feelings on Guantanamo, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1130/We-cannot-deal-with-these-people-WikiLeaks-shows -true-feelings-on-Guantanamo. |^FN117^. Sara MillerLlana, Ecuador and VenezuelaCompetetoPraiseWikiLeaks'JulianAssange,Christian Sci. Monitor,Nov. 30,2010 ("The Venezuelanpresidentseemsto seize every chancetocriticizetheUnited States, and he didn't missabeat by praising the'bravery'of controversial websiteWikiLeaks-which is releas-

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ingacache of250,000 classified us diplomatic cables—and calling for the resignation ofUS Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.").That is. Christian Science Monitor continued to use the "this hurts America"frame. 1FN118^ Ariel 2^irulnick,WikiLeaks: What the World is Saying, Christian Sci Monitor,Nov 30, 2010 ("The latestWikiLeaks trove of 250,000 diplomatic cables,obtained in advance by five news outlets,has generated enough fodder in the US alone to occupyAmerican readers.But people all over, from Germany toLebanon to Australia, are alsotalking about the sometimestroubling, sometimes mundane cablesthatWikiLeaksfounder lulian Assange is gradually releasing for public consumption."). 1FN1191.CBS Evening News, Saturday Edition(CBS television broadcast Jan8, 2011). 1FN120^ Sunday Morning(CBS television broadcast Dec. 5,2010). lFN121^The Early Show(CBS television broadcast Nov 29,2010) 1FN122^ NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Dec 5, 2010). l^FN123^Today (NBC television broadcastDec 24, 2010) 1FN124^. Good Moming America(ABC television broadcast Dec.1,2010). 1FN125^ Keller, supra note 54 lFN126^.Bums^Somaiya, supra note 69. 1FN127^. Data collected and analyzed using Media Cloud. See Media Cloud, http://www.mediacloud.org. 1FN128^. DianneFeinstein,Op-Ed., Prosecute Assangeunder the Espionage Act, Wall St. J.,Dec. 7,2010, available at http://online wsj com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575653280626335 1FN129^. See supra, notes 76 77 andtext accompanying notes (describing how thelanguage used in boththe Pentagon and State Department documents,concerning threat toU.S.forces,illegality of origin, and demand for retum are consistent with laying the foundations of the elements of an offense under the Espionage Act againsta person possessing documents). lFN130^.GeoffreyR. Stone,PerilousTimes: FreeSpeechin Wartimes FromtheSedition Actof 1789 tothe War onTerrorisml53 (2004) lFN131^Masses Publ'gCovPatten,244 F 535,542 43 ( S D N Y 1917) lFN132^SeeStone,supranote 130, atl71 (quoting ShaffervUnited States, 255 F 886 (9th Cirl919)) lFN133^1datl71-72 lFN134^StokesvUnitedStates.264F18,26(8thCirl920) ^FN135^.Stone, supra note 130, atl73. 1FN136^ ld(citing United StatesvMotion Picture Film "The Spirit of'76." 252 F 946, 947 48 (DCal 1918) )

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11N137^ Revive "Spirit of '76," Film Barred in 1917, N Y. Times, July 14, 1921, available at ht tp://querynytimescom/mem/archivefree/pdf7 res^F50D14FD3C5AlB7A93C6A8178CD85F458285F9; see also Timothy Noah, The Unluckiest Man in Movie History, Slate (June 13, 2000, 10:13 AM), http:// www.slate.com/id/1005493. 1FN138^ Harding Frees Debs and 23 Others Held for War Violations,NY Times, Dec 24, 1921,available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf7res^9B0DE2D71539E133A25757C2A9649D946095D6CF. 1^FN139^ Charlie Savage, BuildingACase For Conspiracy By Wikileaks, N.Y.Times, Dec. 16, 2010, a t A l . |^FN140^.Charles Arthur, WikiLeaksUnderAttack:TheDefinitiveTimeline,guardian.co.uk, Jan.8,2011,http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/07/wikileaks-under-attack-definitive-timeline. 1^FN141^. The 2008 Pentagon report identified China, Israel, and Russia as having developed and deployed denial-of-service attack capabilities against terrorist or dissident websites.Pentagon Report, supra note21,at21.In his annotations to the February 8,2010version of this article,Assange expresses the belief that the scale of the attack, together with the fact that "It^here is almost no-one in the capable computer underground that is opposed toWikiLeaks on political or philosophical grounds" supports the inference that the attacks were statebased. Assange Annotations,supra note 24. 1FN142^. Nathan Olivarez-Giles, 'Hacktivist' Takes Credit for WikiLeaks Attacks via Twitter, L.A. Times (Nov 30, 201L ^^1^ PM), http:// latimesb logs.latimes.com/technology/2010/ll/hacktivist-takescreditfor-wikileaks-attacks-via-twitter.htmL 1FN143^. Craig Labovitz, Wikileaks Cablegate Attack, Arbor Networks (Nov. 29, 2010, 1:17 PM), ht tp://asert.arbornetworks.com/2010/ll/wikileakscablegate-attack; Craig Labovitz, Round 2 DDoS against Wikileaks, Arbor Networks (Nov 30, 2010, 4:51 PM), http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2010/ll/round2 ddos versus wikileaks; Ethan tuckerman. If Amazon Has Silenced Wikileaks . , My Heart's in Accra (Dec. 01, 2010, 6:38 PM), http:// www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2010/12/01/if-amazon-has-silenced-wikileaks, l^FN144^.Zuckerman, supra notel43. lFN145^.Arthur,supra note 140. 1FN146^. EwenMacAskill, WikiLeaks WebsitePulled by Amazon afterUSPolitical Pressure,The Guardian, Dec. 2, 2010, at 11, available at http:// www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-website-cables-servers-amazon. Most readers will know Amazon from its e-commerce site; Amazon is alsoamajor provider of consumergrade cloud computing platform services,and Wikileaks was using its platform to host the cables. lFN147^.AmazonWeb Services, http://aws.amazon.com/message/65348: It's clear that WikiLeaks doesn't own or otherwise control all the rights to this classified content. Further, it is not credible that the extraordinary volume of250,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been carefully redacted in suchaway as to ensure that they weren't putting innocent peoplein jeopardy.... IW^hen companies or people go about securing and storing large quantities of data that isn't right fully theirs,and publishing this data without ensuring it won't injure others,it'saviolation of our terms of ser-

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vice.... 1FN148^. SeeMichaelD.Bimhack^NivaElkin-Koren,ThelnvisibleHandshake: TheReemergenceofthe State in the Digital Environment,8Va.lL^Tech 6,48 53 (2003). 1^FN149^. Arthur, supra note 140. lFN150^1d. 1FN151^.Josh Halliday^AngeliqueChrisafis,WikiLeaks: France Adds to US Pressure to BanWebsite, guardian.co.uk, Dec. 3,2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-france-ban-website. 1FN152^. Andy Greenberg,AppleNixesWikileaks iPhone App. Will Google Follow7,Forbes (Dec.21,2010, 6:33 AM), http:// blogs.forbes.com/andygreenberg/2010/12/21/apple-nixes-wikileaks-iphone-app-will google-follow (quoting an Apple spokesperson as saying that the app was removed because"la^pps must comply with alllocal laws and maynotputanindividualortargetedgroupinharmsway");AlexisTsotsis,AppleRemoves Wikileaks App from App Store, TechCrunch (Dec. 20, 2010), http:// tech crunch.com/2010/12/20/apple-removes-wikileaksappfromappstore. 1FN153^.Arthur, supra notel40(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1FN154^.See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, supra note75. 1FN155^.See infra. Part IV.The demand made in the letter, coupled with the assertion of injury,mayitselfhave been crafted to createapotential violation of the Espionage Act.See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 1FN156^. Arthur, supra note 140. lFN157^Id 1^FN158^. Tom Murphy, Bank ofAmerica Stops Handling WikiLeaks Payments, Yahool Finance (Dec. 18, 2010), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Bank-of-America-stops-apf-3526927234.htmLAstatement from the bank said that "It^his decision isbased upon our reasonable belief thatWikiLeaks may be engaged in activities that are,among other things,inconsistent with our internal policies for processing payments."Id.In the case of Bank of America, since it was rumored at the time to be the potentialtarget of leaked materials held by WikiLeaks, the other financial institutions'decision probably gave cover to the bank's own need to seeWikiLeaks deterred and shut down, rather than response to pressure. l^FN159^.RyanSingel,KeyLawmakersUpPressureonWikiLeaksand Defend Visa and MasterCard,Threat Level (Wired) (Dec 9, 2010, 3:27 PM), http:// www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/wikileaks-congress-pressure. 1FN160^.David deSola,U.S.AgenciesWamUnauthorized Employees Not to Look atWikiLeaks,CNN (Dec. 4,2010,3:05 AM),http://edition.enn.com/2010/US/12/03/wikileaks.access.warning/index.htmL 1FN161^.Id.(quoting Library ofCongress spokesman Matthew Raymond). 1^FN162^.Id.('"Wehave put outapolicy saying Department ofDefense military,civilian and contractor person-

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nel should not access theWikiLeaks website to view or download the publicized classified information,'Department ofDefense spokesman Maj.Chris Perrine told CNN."). 1FN163^. EmanuellaGrinberg, WillReading WikiLeaksCostStudents Jobs WiththeFederalGovernment7, CNN (Dec 8, 2010), ht tp://articles.cnn.com/2010 12 08/justice/wikileaks.students 1 wikileaks-security-clearance-students. |^FN164^ See DerrickTDortch, Job Hunters Should Steer Clear ofWikiLeaks Site, WashPost,Dec9,2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content/article/2010/12/08/AR2010120806796 htmL 1FN165^. Our Leadership: Derrick T. Dortch, President, The tp://www.diversagroup.com/DerrickTDortchBio.html(lastvisitedFeb.l9,2011). 1FN166^.Dortch, supra notel64. 1F^167^.Kevin Poulsen^KimZetter,ICan't Believe What I'm Confessing toYou, Threat Level (Wired)(lune 10, 2010, 9:01PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/wikileakschat. lFN168^Seeid l^FN169^.See,e.g.,GeoffreyR.Stone,First Amendment Ctr.,Govemment Secrecy vs. Freedom of thePress 1-10(2006), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/Govt.Secrecy.Stone.pdf. 1F^170^.See Pentagon Report, supra note21. 1FN171^.See Greenwald, Inhumane Conditions, supra note 46; see alsoThe Law Offices of David E.Coombs, Manning Case, http:// www.armycourtmartialdefense.info/search/label/Manning^20Case (providing updates from Manning's counsel); Jeffrey L.Meltzner^JamieFellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons:AChallengeforMedicalEthics,38J Am.Acad. Psychiatry^L 104, 104 (2010) ("Solitary confine ment is recognized as difficult to withstand; indeed, psychological stressors such as isolation can be as clinically distressing as physical torture.").On the psychological effects, seeP.S.Smith,The Effects ofSolitary Confine ment on Prison Ininates:ABriefHistory and Review of the Literature,34Crime^lust.441(2006). 1^FN172^. Timeline: Sexual Allegations Against Assange in Sweden, BBC News (Dec. 16, 2010), ht tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11949341. 1FN173^. Sweden Reopens Wikileaks Founder Rape Investigation, BBC News (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11151277. 1FN174^. Wikileaks Founder Julian tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-1 1937110. lFN175^ld 1^FN176^. See,e.g., Alan Nothnagle,SwedesOuestion Rape Accusations Against WikileaksFounder,Lost in Berlin (Aug 21, 2010, 1:13 PM), http:// open.salon.com/blog/lost in berlin/2010/08/21/swedes question rape accusations against wikileaks founder. 1FN177^. Wikileaks Founder Assange Bailed, but Release Delayed, BBC News (Dec. 14, 2010), ht Assange Refused Bail, BBC News (Dec. 7, 2010), ht Diversa Group, ht-

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tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11989216. 1^FN178^ Wikileaks Founder Julian Assange Freed tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12005930. on Bail, BBC News (Dec 16, 2010), ht

1FN179^.Nick Davies, lOdays in Sweden:The Full Allegations Against Julian Assange, guardian.co.uk, Dec. 17,2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/17/julian-assangesweden. lFN180^Seeid lFN181^1d 1FN182^. See Wikileaks: Julian AssangevSweden's Broad Sexual Laws, BBC News (Dec. 8,2010),http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11946652. lFN183j.The only statisticslhave been able to obtain state that in 2009-2010,Sweden madeatotal of six extradition requests from the United Kingdom underaEuropean Arrest Warrant,which is not the same as an Interpol RedNotice.NickHerbert,HouseofCommonsWrittenAnswers: European ArrestWarrants,Parliament of the United Kingdom, Nov. 9, 2010,http:// ser vices.parliament.uk/hansard/Commons/ByDate/20101109/writtenanswers/part004.htmL 1FN184^.The accusers'lawyer isaSwedishpoliticianwhosesignatureissueisgenderequality.lt was apparently he who advised the accusers that they could challenge and reverse the prosecutorial decision not to pursue Assange.See David Leigh^Luke Harding,WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange'sWar on Secrecyl62-63 (2011). 1FN185^.Josh Halliday,WikiLeaks Site's Swiss Registry Dismisses Pressure toTake it Offiine, guardian.co.uk, Dec.4,2010,http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/04/wikileaks-site-swiss-host-switch. 1FN186^ Jane Wakefield, Wikileaks' Struggle to Stay Online, BBC News (Dec tp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology 11928899. 7, 2010), ht

1FN187^. For a time-sensitive snapshot, see Arthur, supra note 140; see also WikiLeaks - Donate, http://wikileaks.ch/support.html (last visited Jan.11,2011). 1FN188^. Assange notes that it is tme that the back-up payment systems did function, "but by knocking out the most popular payments systems,some 80 t o 9 0 ^ o f revenue stream was lost,at least ^5Mdollars. Wehave since worked around this, and can now take PayPal, Visa and Mastercard through the appropriate proxies, but the Bank of America interdiction remains."Assange Annotations,supra note24. 1FN189^.See,e.g.,Glenn Greenwald,Attempts to ProsecuteWikiLeaks Endanger Press Freedoms,Salon (Dec. 14, 2010, 6:15 AM), http:// www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/14/wikileaks/index.html Ihereinafter Greenwald,Attempts to Prosecuted; Clint Hendler,TheWikiLeaksEquation:Secrets,Free Speech, and the Law, Colum. Journalism Rev. (Dec. 28, 2010), ht tp://www.cjr.org/behind the news/the wikileaks equation.php; Shane,supranote73. lFN190LP^ul Farhi, At theTimes,aScoopDeferred,Wash. Post, Dec. 17,2005, at A7,available at ht tp://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR2005121601716.htmL

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1FN191^.Of less importance, but worth noting nonetheless,was the role of thePirate Party in Sweden,which hosted the data, and the Swiss Pirate Party, which had registered wikileaks.ch months earlier and made it immediately available as the backup domain name that has provided access since the shutdown by EveryDNS.These partiesareregisteredintheir national systemsaspoliticalparties; the SwedishPirateParty actually has two members ofparliament in the European Parliament.They refiect the beginnings ofthe institutionalization ofthe anti-authoritarianculture of peer-to-peer file sharing and its conversion into amore establishedpart of the European political system. 1FN192^ B G , The 24 Hour Athenian Democracy, The Economist (Dec tp://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/12/more wikileaks. lFN19311d 1FN194^. FBI in Hunt for Pro-WikiLeaks Hackers: Report, Agence France Presse, Dec. 31, 2010, available at 12/31/lOAgenceFrPresse 19:50:53 (Westlaw) 1FN195^.B.G., supra note 192. Assange's annotations to this article suggest that at least Assange disagrees with my assessment of the effect, and he believes that "li^t appears that the supportive attacks won us more popular support than we lost and possibly also asa'social discipline'mechanism, these'online protests'may be valuable in policing future extrajudicial censorship attacks."Assange Annotations,supra note24. 1^FN196^.Kim ^etter,WikiLeaks Posts Mysterious'Insurance'File, Threat Level (Wired) (July 30, 2010, 3:09 PM),http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/wikileaks-insurance-file. 1^FN197^ Ashley Fantz, Assange's 'Poison Pill'File Impossible to Stop, Expert Says, CNN (Dec.8, 2010), ht tp://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-08/us/wikileaks.poison.pill l_iulian-assange-wikileaks-key-encryption. l^FN198^.0ssiCarp,"ANewWikiLeaks"Revolts Against Assange, DN.se, Dec. 9,2010(MajsanBostrom, trans.),http://www.dn.se/nyheter/varlden/a-new-wikileaksrevolts-against-assange-l.1224764. 1FN199^. Id.(describing OpenLeaks); BrusselsLeaks About, http://brusselsleaks.com/about (last visited Feb. 22,2011) 1FN200^. Michael Calderone, NY Times Considers Creating an 'E^ Pass Lane for Leakers,' The Cutline (Yahoos) (Jan 25, 2011, 8:38 AM), http:// news.yahoo.com/s/yblogthecutline/20110125/tsyblog_thecutline/nytimesconsiderscreating-an-ez-pass-laneforleakers. 1FN201^.About theTransparency Unit, AlJazeeraTransparency Unit, http://www.ajtransparency.com (last visitedFeb 19,2011) 1FN202^. The Palestine Papers, Al Jazeera, http:// english.aljazeera.net/palestinepapers (last visited Feb. 19, 2011) 11N203^. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y ofState, Remarks on Intemet Freedom at theNewseum (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://wwwstate.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. 1^FN204^ 403 L^S713(1971) 8, 2010, 11:48 AM), ht

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1FN205^.See generally NeilSheehan etal.,The Pentagon Papers: As Published by the NewYorkTimes(1971). 1FN206^.Stone, supra note 169,at 11; see also Hedrick Smith, Mitchell Seeks toHalt Series onVietnam, but Times Refuses, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/04/13/reviews/papers-mitchell.htmL lFN207^^cwYork Times. 403 U S a t 730 (emphasis added) lFN208^.Id.at 728. 1FN209^.Id. at 727-28 ("In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas ofnational defense and intemationalaffairsmaylieinanenlightenedcitizenry in aninformed and criticalpublicopinionwhich alone can here protect the values of democratic government.For this reason,it is perhaps here thatapress that is alert, aware,and free most vitally serves the basic purpose ofthe First Amendment.For without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people."). 1FN210^ See Stone, supranote 130 lFN211JNearvMinnesota,283 US 697,716 (1931) lFN212^NewYork Times, 403 U S a t 729 lFN213^MassesPubl'gCovPatten,244 F 535 ( S D N Y 1917) 1FN214^249 US47(1919) 1FN215^ 395 CS 444(1969) 1^FN216^ 274 CS 357 (1927) lFN217^.Bartnickiv Voppei,532 US 514, 528 (2001)(quotingSmithvDaily Mail Publ'gCo,443 U S 9 7 , 103 (1979)). 1FN218^ See,eg,Landinark Commc'ns, Inc v Va,435 US 829 (T978); Worrell Newspapers o f l n d v West hafer,739 F2dl219,1223 (7thCir 1984), affd 469 US 1200 (1985j;GeoffreyR Stone, Perilious Times: Free Speech inWartime From the Sedition Act of 1798 to theWar onTerrorism (2004); Stone,supra notel69, at 14 (citing David A. Strauss,Freedomof Speech andthe Common-Law Constitution, in Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modem Era 32, 57-59 (Lee C.Bollinger^GeoffreyR. Stone ed.,2002)(arguing that "it is difficult to believe that the Court would have allowed newspaper editors to be punished, criminally, after they published the IPentagon^Papers"). 1FN219^. See Mary-Rose Papandrea,Lapdogs, Watchdogs and Scapegoats, 831nd.L.1.233,234-35 (2007); see also Stone, supra notel69,at 27 n.2. lFN220^YickWovHopkins,118CS 356, 374 (1886); seealsoBoumedienevBush,553 US 723 (2008) 1FN221^ See GeraldLNeuman, Whose Constitution7 100YaleLJ 909 (1991); see also JoseACabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application ofU.S.Constitutional Law, 118 Yale

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LJ 1660 (2009) lFN222^Id lFN223^Boumediene,553 US723 l^FN224^1dat 765 (quotingMurphyvRainsey,114CS 15,44 (1885)) lFN225^DownesvBidwelL182US 244,282 83 (1901) 1FN226^ 376 US 254(1964) 1FN227^.See SecuringThe Protection Of Our Enduring And Established Constitutional Heritage ("SPEECH") Act of2010,28 CSCA^^41014105 (West 2010) 1FN228^. JamesMadison, Letter to W. T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), i n 9 The Writingsof James Madison 103, 103-09 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,1910)(1822)("ApopularGovemment,without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,is butaProloguetoaFarceoraTragedy; or, perhaps both.Knowledge will forever govem ignorance: Andapeople who meantobe their ownGovernors,must armthemselves withthe power which knowledge gives."). 1FN229^.Special Report w/Brit Hume: How the BlogosphereTook on CBS'Docs (Fox News television broadcast Sept. 14,2004), available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,132494,00html(transcript). 1FN230^ Brian Stelter, Jonathan Klein to Leave CNN, Media Decoder (N Y Times) (Sept 24,2010,10:12 AM),http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/jonathankleintoleave-cnn;CatherineTaylor, With Jonathan Klein Dismissal, CNN Finally Pushes the Panic Button, bNet (Sept 27, 2010), ht tp://www.bnet.com/blog/new-media/with-jonathan-klein-dismissal-cnn-finally-pushes-the-panic-button/6204. l^FN231^.Burns^Somaiya, supra note 69. lFN232^ Keller, supranote 54 1FN233^.Paul Starr,Goodbye to the Age ofNewspapers (Hello toaNewEra of Corruption),The New Republic, March 4, 2009, at 28, available at http:// www.tnr.com/article/goodbye-the-age-newspapers-hello-neweracorruption. lFN234^BranzburgvHayes,408 US 665,704 (1972) 1F^235^.Stone, supra note 169,atl. 1FN236^. Meet the Press (NBC television tp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40720643 (transcript). l^FN237^.Burns^Somaiva, supra note 69,atAl. l^FN238^ Keller, supranote 54 ^FN239^.Greenwald,Strange and Consequential,supra note41. broadcast Dec. 19, 2010), available at ht

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1FN240^.See, e.g.,Yochai Benkler,TheWealthofNetworks: How Social ProductionTransforms Markets and Freedom ch.7 (2006); see generally Clay Shirky,Cognitive Surplus (2010); Dan Gilmore,Wethe Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People,for the People (2006). 1FN241^. Paul McLeary, How TalkingPointsMemo Beat the Big Boys on the U.S. Attorney Story, Colum. Joumalism Rev (Mar 15, 2007, 1:53 PM), http:// www.cjr.org/behind the news/how talkingpointsmemo beat the.php. 1FN242^. Pulitzer Prize in Investigative Reporting: Deadly Choices at Memorial, ProPublica, ht tp://www.propublica.org/awards/item/pulitzer-prize-in investigative-reporting-deadly-choices-at-memorial (last visited Feb 19,2011) 1FN243^ vonBulowv vonBulow,811F2dl36,144(2dCir 1987) lFN244^Id(alterationinoriginal)(emphasisadded)(quotingLovellvGriffin,303 US 444,452 (1938))The Third Circuit, in In re Madden,interpreted this as "the Supreme Court's recognition that the'press'includes all publications that contribute to the free fiowofinformation."151F.3d 125,129 (3dCii,1998). 1FN245^.von Bulow.811F.2d at 144 45(alteration in original)(quotingBranzburgv.Hayes,408 U.S 665,705 (1972), and later quoting Branzburg language on the lonely pamphleteer). lFN246^SeeShoenvShoen,5F3d 1289. 1293 (9th Cir 1993) l^FN247^Madden,151F3datl30 1FN248^ ld atl28 1FN249^. Free Republic, http://www.freerepublic.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 1^FN250^. Power Line, http://www.powerlineblog.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 1^FN251^. Julian Assange, State and Terrorist Conspiracies, iq.org, Nov. 10, 2006, available at http://eryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf. lFN252^Id 1FN253^.The closest he comes toit is the implication,in the second version of the essay,that the Republican and Democratic parties would fit his definition of'conspiracy."See Julian Assange,Conspiracy as Governance, iq.org, Jul. 31, 2010, available at http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf. 1FN254^.See supra notes21-40 and accompanying text. 1F1^255^. If that was the purpose, it is hard to tell whether it was successful in the long term. Initial public statements suggest that the responseisless oriented towardlimiting information sharing,andmoretoward tighter controls on how easy it is to copy information,on identifying patterns ofleakage,and on identifying individuals at risk for disaffection.See,e.g.,DOD News Briefing,supra note5.The primary available formal action known publicly isamemorandum from the Office ofManagement and Budget detailing appropriate agency efforts that seemtobefocusedonpreventing leakage,bothtechnicalandhuman,ratherthaneffortstolimit information sharing. How these will be implemented remains, of course, to be seen. See Memorandum for the Heads of Ex

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ecutive Departments and Agencies,from JacobJ.Lew,Director,Office of Management and Budget,re:lnitial Assessments of Safeguarding and Counterintelligence Postures for Classified National Securitylnformation in Systems (Jan. 3, 2011), available at http:// msnbcmeAutomated dia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/OMB Wiki memo.pdf. 1FN256^. lnstapundit.com, http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 1FN257^.Sunlight Foundation, http://sunlightfoundation.com (last visitedFeb.23,2011). 1FN258^. Talking Points Memo, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 1^FN259^.Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com (last visited Feb.23,2011);Townhall.com,http://townhallcom (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). Note, however, that it appears that these kinds ofengaged, larger scale participatory platforms are more typical of the lefi wing of the blogosphere than the right wing.SeeYochaiBenkler^Aaron Shaw,ATaleofTwoBlogospheres: Discursive Practices on the Left and Right 23 (Berkman Ctr. for Internets Soc'y at Harvard Univ., Apr 27, 2010), available at http:// cy ber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Benkler Shaw Tale of^ Two Blogospheres Mar2010.pdf. lFN260^.SeeYochai Benkler, Giving the Networked Public SphereTime to Develop, inWill the Last Reporter PleaseTurn Out the Lights:The Collapse of Journalism and What Can Be Done to Fix It (Robert McChesney^ Victor Packard, eds.,forthcoming 2011); Benkler, supra note240. lFN261^BranzburgvHayes,408 US 665, 704 (1972). l^FN262^.Feinstein, supra notel28. 1FN263^.Charlie Savage, Building Case for Conspiracy by WikiLeaks,N.Y.Times,Dec.16, 2010, atAl,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/16wiki.htmL 1^FN264^.United StatesvO'Brien,391US 367 (1968)(draft card burning case) 1FN265L See,eg,SneppvUnited States, 444 US 507 (1980); P i c k e r i n g v B d o f E d u c , 3 9 1 U S 563,568 (1968); Stone, supranote 169,at 1418 1FN266^.For an overview of sources ofliability,see StephenLVladeck,The Statutory Framework, in Geoffrey R.Stone, First Amendment Ctr.,Govemment Secrecy vs.Freedom of the Press 35 (2006), available at http:// www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/Govt.Secrecy.Stone.pdf. 1^FN267^ 1 8 U S C ^ 793(e)(2006) 1^FN268^ 1 8 t ^ S C ^ 952 (2006) 1F1^269^ 18USC^1030(a)(l)(SuppIlI2010) 1FN270^ 1 8 U S C ^ 1030(a)(5)(SuppIII2010) lFN271^SeeUnitedStatesvMorison,844 F2d 1057 (4th Cirl988)

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1FN272^.See generally Sheehan, supra note 205;see also Stone, supra notel30, at 500-16. 1FN273^ 532 US 514(2001) 1^FN274^ Stone, supranotel69,at2123. lFN275^Idat23 1FN276^. GlennGreenwald, Gettingto AssangeThrough Manning, Salon(Dec 16, 2010, 8:17 AM), ht tp://www.salon,com/news/opinion/glenn_ greenwald/2010/12/16/wikileaks Ihereinafter Greenwald, Getting to Assange^. 1FN277^.See supra. Parts II.D.lIl.D.3(describing the multi-system attack onWikileaks). 1^FN278^ See Birnhack^ElkinKoren, supra note 148, at 25. lFN279^439 F S u p p 2 d 974 ( N D C a L 2006), superseded by statute, FISA Amendments Act of2008. Pub L No 110 261, 122 Stat 2436, as recognized in H e p t i n g v A T ^ T C o r p , 5 3 9 F3d 1197(9th Cir 2008) (remanding in light of the FISA Amendments Act).Foracolleetion of documents from the case, see Heptingv. AT^T,Electronic Frontier Found.,http://www.eff.org/cases/hepting^242 (last visited Apr.l,2011). lFN280^FISAAmendmentsActof2008,PubL No 110 2 6 1 ^ 802,122 Stat 2436, 2468 70 (codified as amendedat50CSC^ 1885a(Supplll2010)) lFN281^1nieNat'l Sec AgencyTelecommRecordsLitig,633 FSupp2d 949 ( N D C a L 2009) lFN282^Benkler, supra note240, at c h 7 l^FN283^SeeWilkievRobbins.551US 537 (2007^ 1FN284^.See id.at 568 (Thomas!.,concurring in part). 1FN285^ See,eg,Writers Guild of A i n , W , l n e v Am Broad Co,609 F2d 355. 365(9th Cir 1979) (describing and citingawide range of cases on regulation by raised eyebrow,or jawboning). lFN286^Restatement (Second) ofTorts^ 766 (1979) lFN287^.ProsserandKeetononTorts^ 129(W.PageKeetonetaLeds.,5thed. law). 1984)(citing extensive case

lFN288^.AWSCustomer Agreement, Amazon WebServices, http:// aws.amazon.com/agreement (last visited Feb. 6, 2011). These terms were superseded by terms updated on February 8, 2011, but purported to apply to actions at the time of the events described here. l^FN289^AttemptsonJan.29,201L 1FN290^ Restatement (Second) ofContracts^ 206(1981) lFN291^Idat^205

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lFN292^1dat^208 1FN293^.See United Statesv.Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (refusing to createaspecial antitrust law for the press). lFN294^Restatement(Second)ofTorts^ 766B(1979) lFN295^ Seesupranotes 290 292 1FN296^ Restatement(Second)ofTorts^ 766 cmts rs(1979) 1^FN297^.Kristol, supra note 101.It is worth noting that organizations,likeWikileaks, that depend on bobbing and weaving hetweenjurisdictions may not choose to employ this technique,so as not to risk jurisdictional exposure.On the other hand, corefacilities the organization needs like DNS service and hosting-are subject to the jurisdiction, so bringing action may not be seen as fundamentally increasing the organization's exposure. 1FN298^.Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins ofModern Communication 88 90 (2004); 1th ieldeSolaPool,TechnologiesofFreedom 75 80 (1984) 1FN299^ Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Red 17905, ^ IV (F C C. 2010), available at ht tp://wwwfccgov/Daily Releases/Daily Business/2010/dbl223/FCC 10 201Al pdf 1^FN300^.See generally Benkler, supra note240,at chs.67. 1FN301^ See generally id.at chs.24,7 1FN302^. See generally Starr, supra note 298. lFN303^Id l^FN304^1amesRBeniger, The Control Revolution(1986) lFN305^.Benkler,supranote240,atchs.6. 1^FN306J.Eli M.Noam,Media Ownership and Concentration in America 377 Tablel5.4(2009). 1^FN307^.Warren Buffet explained this most clearly inaletter to shareholders ofBerkshire Hathaway inl984: The economics ofadominant newspaper are excellent, among the very best in the business world.Owners, naturally, would like to believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because they unfailingly turn outawonderfulproduct.Thatcomfortabletheory wilts before an uncomfortable fact. While firstelassnewspa pers make excellent profits, the profits of third rate papers are as good or better as long as either class of paper is dominant within its community. Of course, product quality may have been crucial to the paper in achieving dominance.Webelieve this was the case at the News, in very large part because of people such as Alfred Kirchhofer who preceded us. Once dominant, the newspaper itself, not the marketplace, determines just how good or how bad the paper will be.Good or bad,it will prosper.That is not true of most businesses: inferior quality generally produces inferior economics.But evenapoor newspaper isabargain to most citizens simply because of its "bulletin board" value.Other things being equal,apoor product will not achieve quite the level of readership achieved byafirstclassproduct.Apoor product, however,will still remain essential to most citizens, and what commands their at

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tention will commandtheattentionofadvertisers. Sincehighstandardsarenot imposedby themarketplace, management must impose its own. Letter fromWarrenBuffett,Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway,Inc.,to Shareholders ofBerkshire Hathaway, Inc.(1984),available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.htmL 1^FN308^.Letter fromWarrenBuffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway,lnc.,to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway,Inc.(1990),available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1990.htmL lFN309^Id 1FN310^.Letter fromWarrenBuffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway,lnc.,to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway,Inc.(1991),available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1991.html lFN311^Buffetputit: An economic franchise arises fromaproduct or service that: ( l ) i s needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers tohave no close substitute and;(3)is not subject toprice regulation.The existence of allthree conditions will be demonstrated byacompany's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of retum on capitaL Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminishafranchise's profitability,but they cannot infiict mortal damage. Id lFN312^ld lFN313^Id 1FN314^.Summary ofFindings, Public Knowledge ofCurrent Affairs Little Changed by News and Information Revolutions: What Americans Know: 1989-2007,PewResearchCenter for thePeople^thePress (Apr. 15, 2007), ht tp://people-press.org/report/319/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed-by-news-and-information-re volutions. lFN315^.Foramore detailed analysis of this phenomenon andareview of the literature,see generally Benkler, supra note 240, at chs. 5-6. 1FN316^.Inquiry into Section73.1910of the Comm'n'sRules^Regulations Concerning the Gen.Faimess Doc trine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102F.C.C 2d 142,246 (1985)(declaring that the Fairness Doctrine was no longer in the public interest). 1FN317^. See generally Cass R.Sunstein, Republic.com (2001). 1FN318^.See generally Benkler,supranote240,at chs.2-4. 1FN319^.Carl Shapiro^HalR.Varian, Information Rules:AStrategic Guide to the Network Economy 19-27 (1999) 1^FN320^.See, e.g.,Benkler,supra note 240, at ch.3;see generally Clay Shirky,Here Comes Everybody (2008); Siva Vaidhyanathan, Anarchist in theLibrary: HowtheClashBetweenFreedomandControlisHackingthe RealWorld and Crashing the System (2005).

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1FN321^. See, e.g., Don Tapscott ^ Anthony Williams, Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything (2006); RobertDHof, The Power ofUs, Business Week, June20, 2005,at 74 82, available at http:// www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05 25/b3938601.htm. 1FN322^. For example, the peer-to-patent initiative, developed by Beth Noveck as an academic, seeks to hamess distributed knowledge to improve the quality of patents granted.SeePeerto-Patent,Open Government Initiative,The WhiteHouse,http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/innovations/PeertoPatent. Onthelocal level,efforts range from very practical strategies to improve services through harnessing distributed citizen reporting systems, like Boston's New Urban Mechanics initiative, see The Mayor's Office of New Urban Mechanics, http://www.newurbanmechanics.org, toa widerangeofeffortstoengagecitizensinparticipatory budgetingor planning,see Jennifer Shkabatur,Cities^Crossroads:DigitalTechnology and Local Democracy in America, 76BrookLRev(forthcoming2011). lFN323^.Flickr,http://www.fiickr.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) 1FN324^. allrecipes.com, http://allrecipes.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). lFN325^.TripAdvisor, http://www.tripadvisor.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 1FN326^. Yelp, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 1FN327^. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2011); Revver, http://www.revver.com (last visited Apr. 19,2011); metacafe,http://www.metacafe.com (last visited Feb.22,2011). lFN328^.RobertF.Worth^DavidD.Kirkpatrick,SeizingaMoment,Aljazeera Galvanizes Arab Frustration, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2011, at Al, available at ht tp://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28jazeera.html. 1FN329^, Top Sites, Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/News (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) lhereinafterAlexaRankingsj(ranking the most popular news websites). 1FN330^.David Reid^TaniaTeixeira, Are People Ready to Pay for Online News7,BBC Click (Feb 26, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/programmes/click online/8537519.stm.It is difficult totranslate exactly from daily subscriptionnumbers which may include multiple readers per household and need to be multiplied to reacha monthlyfigure—andto know what 36 million online readers really means. The numbers should therefore be read for illustration purposes only. 1^FN331^. Alexa Rankings,supra note 329.lexcludehereTheWeather Channel andYahool News from whati consider to be "news outlets."Both are ranked ahead ofthe Huffington Post, however. 1FN332^.SeeTalkingpointsmemo.com, Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/talkingpointsmemo.com (last visited Apr. 1,2011).TocompareTalking Points Memo with theBaltimore and Atlanta newspapers,click onthe "TrafficStats"tab,type http://www.baltimoresun.com and http://www.ajc.com into the"Compare" boxes,and click"Compare."The"TrafficRank" tab describes the sites'Alexa traffic rank, and the"Reach" tab describes the percent ofglobal Intemet users who visit the sites. 1FN333^.Noam Cohen, Now Hiring atTalking Points Memo, N.Y.Times,July 12,2009,at B5,available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/business/media/13marshall.htmL

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1FN334^. See About Us, ProPublica, http://www.propublica.org/about (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 1FN335^.See About, The American Independent, http://tainews.org/about (last visited Apr.3,2011). 1FN336^.See About Us,FactCheck.org, http://factcheck.org/about (last visitedApr. 3,2011). 1FN337^. See About Us, Sunlight Foundation, http://sunlightfoundation.com/about (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). lFN338^.Benkler^Shaw,supranote 259,at4. lFN339^Idat23 lFN340^.Newsvine, http://www.newsvine.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). lFN341^.Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 1FN342^.Crooked Timber, http://crookedtimber.org (last visited Apr.3,2011). 1FN343^.See supra noteland accompanying text and Part III.A and accompanying text. 1FN344^. Chris Lefkow,CORRECTED: Future of Joumalism Debated inUS Senate, Agence France Presse, May 7,2009,available at 5/7/09 AgenceFrPressel8:16:00 (Westlaw) 1FN345^. See How Will Journalism Survive the Intemet Age7, Fed. Trade Comm'n, ht tp://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml(last visited Apr. 1, 2011); Fed.TradeComm'n,Staff Dis cussion Draft: Potential Policy Recommendations to Support the Reinvention ofjournalism (2010), available at www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/junl5/docs/new-staffdiscussion.pdf. 1^FN346^. Starr, supra note 233. 1FN347^. Govemment Intervention to Save Journalism (WNYC radio broadcast July 16, 2010), available at http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2010/07/16/02. 1FN348^.See generally,e.g.,RobertW.McChesney^JohnNichols,The Death and Life of American Journalism(2010); LeonardDownie,Jr.^MichaelSchudson,TheReconstructionof American Journalism,Colum. Journalism Rev.,Oct.l9,2009,http://www.cjr.org/reconstruction/the reconstruction of^american.php. 1FN349^ Thomas Friedman, OpEd,Too Good to Check,NY Times, Nov 17,2010, at A33,available at ht tp://www.nytimes.com/2010/ll/17/opinion/17friedman.htmL 1FN350^.Amajor Indian news outlet that Forbes Magazine described ina2006 article as "India's top-rated Eng lish-languagenews channel."NaazneenKarmali,NewsDelhiTV,Forbes.com(Sept. 18,2006),http:// membersforbescom/global/2006/0918/034htmL 1FN351^ Press Trust oflndia, US to Spend ^200 mnaDay on Obama's Mumbai Visit, NDTV (Nov 2,2010, 8:54 PM IST), http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/us to spend-200-mn-a-day-on-obama s-mumbai-visit-64106. 1FN352^ The Drudge Report www.drudgereportarchives.com/data/2010/ll/02/20101102 (Nov 2, 2010), http:// 155942.htm (precise timestamp unavailable).

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1FN353^.Doug Powers, Obama to See India on ^200 MillionaDay,MichelleMalkin(Nov.2, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://michellemalkin.com/2010/ll/02/india. lFN354^2ndUPDATE Obama IndiaTrip: 34 Warships^lkmLong AC BombProofTunnell, Daily Paul (Nov. 2, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www dailypaul.com/node/148219; Joe Biden Making His Move on Obama, Lame Cherry (Nov 2, 2010, 11:22 AM), ht tp://lamecherry.blogspot.com/2010/ll/joe-biden-makinghismoveon-obama.html;Obamas'IndiaTrip Costing USA ^200 Million PER DAY, KatABlog (Nov 2, 2010, 12:28 PM), http://wwwkatablogcom/display blogcfm7bid^0E0FDD3CB83EF4FC82ElFA3F39F534A8 1FN355^ Stack of Stuff Qi^i^k Hits Page, The Rush Limbaugh Show (Nov 2, 2010), ht tp://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site ll0210/content/01125104.guest.htmll^hereinafter Rush Limbaugh Show^. 1FN356^ James White,'^200maDay'Cost ofBarack Obama's Trip to India Will Be Picked Up b y U S Tax payers. Mail Online (Nov. 2, 2010), http:// www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1325990/Obamas-200m-day-India-visit-pickedUS-taxpayers.htmL 1FN357J.The Media Desk, Election Night:LiveBlogging the Media Coverage, Media Decoder (N.Y.Times) (Nov 2, 2010, 11:26 PM), http:// mediadecoder,blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/electionnightwatching-the-media-coverage/^carter-on-fox-huckabeeputs -a-price-tag-on-a-state-visit ("On FoxNews,one of the potential futureRepublicanpresidentialcandidateson the network's payroll,Mike Huckabee,said that the president was about to takeahuge entourage tolndia this week that would cost the American people ^200 millionaday-but that was less than the government spent each day in the United States, so the people were probably gettingabreak."). 1FN358^.Rush Limbaugh Show,supra note 355. 1FN359^.Doug Powers, Details of Obama's Big'Carbon Footprint Felt 'Round theWorld'Tour,ThePowers That Be (Oct 29, 2010), http:// dougpowers.com/2010/10/29/details-of-obamas-bigcarbonfootprintfeltround-the-world-tour. 1FN360^.Robert Knight, Pulling Back the Curtain on Obama's Audacity,WashingtonTimes, Nov. 1,2010, at Bl, available at http:// www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/29/pullingbackthe-curtainonobamas-audacity. 1FN361^. EricBolling,Follow theMoney(FO^ Business televisionbroadcast Nov. 3,2010),available at http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/201011030048. 1FN362^ Hannity, (FO^ NEWS television tp://mediamatters.org/mmtv/201011030052. broadcast Nov 3, 2010), available at ht

1FN363^.Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Nov.4,2010) Ihereinafter Anderson Cooper 360^. 1FN3641. Trip to Mumbai, FactCheck.org factcheck.org/2010/ll/ask-factcheck-trip-to-mumbai. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://

1FN365J.Sarah Pavlus,White House Debunks "Wildly Infiated"S200MperDayPriceTag for Obama's India

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Trip, County Fair (Media Matters tp://mediamattersorg/blog/201011030032

for

America)

(Nov

3,

2010,

4:31

PM),

ht

IFN.366^.Foreign Currency,Snopes.com,http://www.snopes.eom/politics/obama/india.asp (last updated Nov.5, 2010). The precise time of the original Snopes.com post has been obscured by the November 5th update of that site's analysis. lFN3671.JonathanWeisman, Fuzzy Math Dogs Obama's AsiaTrip,WashingtonWire (The Wall Street Joumal) (Nov.4,2010,3:16PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/ll/04/fuzzy-math-dogs-obamas-asia-trip. 1FN368^. Details on Obama Trip Remain Unclear, Glenn Beck (Nov tp://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/47729. 5, 2010, 12:53 PM), ht

1FN369^. See Media Cloud, http://www.mediacloud.org (last visited Apr. l,2011)(results of analysis on file with author). Media Cloud isaresearch platform developed at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University.The lead developer ofthe project is Hal Roberts.The development team includes David La rouchelle,CatherineBracy,and associated researchersincludeEthanZuckerman,BruceEtling, John Palfrey, Urs Gasser,Rob Faris,andYochai Benkler. 1FN370^ No, Obama's Not Taking 34 Navy Ships to India with Him, Hot Air (Nov 4, 2010,7:02 PM),http://hotair.com/archives/2010/ll/04/no-obamasnottaking34-navy-ships-to-indiawithhim. 1FN371^.Glenn Reynolds, Debunking:No,Obama'sNotTaking34Navy Ships tolndia with Him, Instapundit.com (Nov. 4, 2010, 8:21PM), http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit/109224. ^FN372^.Doug Mataconis, Obama's India Trip CostingS 200MillionADay7 Don't Believe It, Outside the Belt way (Nov 4, 2010), http:// www.outsidethebeltway.com/obamasindia-trip-costing-200-million-adaydontbelieve-it. 1FN373^. Anderson Cooper 360, supra note 363. 1FN374^. Friedman, supra note 8. lFN375^Id 1FN376^. See, e.g., Greenwald, Attempts to Prosecute, supra note 189. 1F^377^.See Greenwald,Strange and Consequential,supra note41;see also Greenwald,Inhumane Conditions, supra note 46; Greenwald, Getting to Assange, supra note 276. 1FN378^. Friedman, supra note 8. 1^FN379^ Keller, supra note 54 lFN380^Id lFN381^Id 1FN382^. Strom, supra note 22.

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1FN383^.See Pentagon Report, supra note21,at 2,6. lFN384^Keller,supranote54 1FN385^. See Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War and American Diplomacy, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2011/video/opensecrets/edited.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (containing the edited version ofthe footage). 1FN386^. Ironically, given the general concern about distributed editorial platform, among the better sources colleeting and providing an objective overview of the competing interpretations of the edited volume is theWikipe dia article on the subject. See luly 12, 2007 Baghdad Airstrike, Wikipedia, http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/July 12, 2007 Baghdad airstrike (last visited Apr.2,2011). 1^FN387^.Keller, supra note 54 ("Atapoint when relations between the news organizations and WikiLeaks were rocky,at least three people associated with this project had inexplicable activity in their e-mail that suggested someone was hacking into their accounts."). In his annotations to this article, Assange stated: "This allegation is simply grotesque."Assange Annotations,supra note 24. lFN388^Keller,supranote54 lFN389^Id lFN390^Id 1FN391^. AlanRusbridger, WikiLeaks:The Guardian's RoleintheBiggest Leak in theHistoryof the World, guardian.co.uk, Jan. 28, 2011, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jan/28/wikileaks-julian-assange-alan-rusbridger. 1FN392^.Rosenbach^Stark,supra note78. Assange,in his annotations tothis article,explained that the disagreement with Keller was over Keller's decision tokillapieceonTask Force 373,the targeted assassination squad, authored by national security reporter Eric Schmitt, and widely considered by other papers to be one of themost important revelations in the Afghan War logs. Assange Annotations, supranote 24. A Lexis-Nexis search of the NewYorkTimes suggests that,indeed,Task Force 373is mentioned only once,inabrief, highly sanitizedversion:"SecretcommandounitslikeTaskForce 373—a classified group of Army and Navy special operatives—workfroma'capture/kill list' ofabout 70 topinsurgent commanders.Thesemissions, whichhave been stepped up under theObama administration, claim notable successes, but have sometimes gone wrong, killing civilians and stoking Afghan resentment."C.J.Chivers etal.,The Afghan Struggle: ASecret Archive, NYTimes, July 26, 2010, a t A l lFN393^Keller,supranote54 lFN394^Id lFN395^Id lFN396^.Leigh^Harding, supra note 54. lFN397^Keller,supranote54

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l^FN398^1d lFN399^Id lFN400^Id lFN401^ Id (emphasis added) lFN402^1d lFN403^.Rosenbach^Stark, supra note 78 1^FN404^ Keller, supranote 54. lFN405^Id 1FN406^. Javier Moreno, Lo Q^^ de Verdad Ocultan los Gobiernos, El Pais, Dec. 19, 2010, http:// www.elpais.com/articulo/intemacional/verdad/ocultan/Gobiernos/elpepuint/20101218elpepuint 23/Tes ("Pero sibastanteparadartestimoniodequelounicoquesediscutioentodoslosencuentrosfuelaconvenienciade acordaruncalendariocomundepublicacionylaexigenciadeprotegernombres,fuentesodatosquepudiesen ponerenriesgolavidadepersonasenpaisesenlosquelapenademuertesiguevigente,oenlosquenorigeel Estadodederechocomosedisfruta en Occidente."). My thanks to Fernando Bermejo for the pointer and translation. l^FN407^.Burns^Somaiya,supra note 69. 1FN408^.Special Reportw/Brit Hume, supra note 229. lFN409^ Keller, supra note 54 l^FN410^1d 1^FN411^ Paul Farhi, supranote 190 l^FN412^.EricRaymond,The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary 19, 30 (Tim O'Reilly ed, rev ed 2001), available at ht tp://www.catb.org/-esr/writings/cathedralbazaar/cathedralbazaar/ar01s04.htmL 1FN413^.See Internet Gains onTelevision as Public's Main News Source,PewResearch Center for the People ^ the Press (Jan 4, 2011), ht tp://people-press.org/2011/01/04/intemet gains on-television-as-publics-main-news-source. Although the Internet is gaining asadelivery vehicle,much of what is used ontheNet is the online version of major traditional media outlets.See Matthew Hindman,The Myth ofDigital Democracy 58-67 (2009). 1FN414^.See generally Benkler, supra note 240,at212-73;DanielW.Drezner^HenryFarrel,The Power and Politics ofBlogs,134 Pub.Choicel5 (2007);KevinWallsten,Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of theRelationshipbetweenMainstream Media and Political Blogs, 24Rev. Pol'y Res. 567 (2007); Kevin Wallsten,Political Blogs:Transmission Belts,Soapboxes,Mobilizers,or Conversation Starters7,4J.Info.Tech. ^PoL19(2008)

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|^FN415^.See, e.g.,Ethan Zuckerman,Tunisia, Egypt, Gabon70ur Responsibility toWitness, My Heart's In Accra (Feb 9, 2011, 1:40 PM), http:// www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2011/02/09/tunisia-egyptgabon-our-responsibility-to-witness(discussingdifficultyof getting Gabon's revolution covered by GlobalVoices,throughthe media focus on Egypt andTunisia); Ethan tuckerman. The AttentionDeficit: Plenty of Content, Yet an Absence ofinterest, NiemanRep. (Fall 2010), ht tp://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102448/The-AttentionDeficitPlentyofContent-Yet-an-Absenceoflnterest.aspx(describingmoregenerally the difficultiesfaced by Global Voicesintranslating the excellent on the ground reporting its journalists were performing throughout Africa into attention in U.S. media outlets). 1FN416^.See generally SiobahnO'Mahony^Beth A.Beehky,Boundary Organizations: Enabling Collaboration Among Cnexpected Allies, 53 Admin Sci 0 422 (2008). 1FN417^. Assange notes thatWikileaks had been working with individual Times reporters since 2007. Assange Annotations,supra note 24.This is,perhaps,not surprising,atatime whenWikileaks was less well known and playeda role that fit muchmoreclosely the traditional perceptionof "source." Bythe timeofthe embassy cables, Wikileaks was no longer playing that role, and the relationship was no longer up to the individual report er writing the story. |^FN418^.Leigh^Harding, supra note 54. 46HarvCRCLLRev311 ENDOFDOCUMENT

^20l3Thomson Reuters.No Claim to Orig. us Gov.Works.

ANNUAL
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DET PAC

PAUL

A T T A f

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T R A I N

Front Cover Image: U.S. Soldier uses a metal detector to search for possible improvised explosive devices during a security patrol in Afghanistan. Photo: Cpl. Artur Stivartsberg

Message from the Director Image: A U.S. Marine Corps mine-resistant, ambusti-protected vetiicle, equipped Witt) a mine-roller, is parlced at ttie Combined Anti-Armor Team 2's patrol base in Afghanistan. Photo: Lance Cpl. James Purschwitz

TABLE OF CONTENTS
MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THREATS A N D TRENDS l 3 5

jlEDDO MISSION AND MISSION AREAS
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE RESOURCES FUNDING PERSONNEL AND STAFFING COUNTER-IED SENIOR INTEGRATION G R O U R FISCAL YEAR 2010 JlEDDO FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2010 MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS ATTACK THE NETWORK. DEFEAT THE DEVICE TRAIN THE FORCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010 TRANSFERS, TRANSITIONS, TERMINATIONS APPENDIX: ACRONYMS

9
9 10 10 12 12 13 15 15 17 19 21 22 27

MESSAGE f ROAA THE DIRECTOR

' .'4!/*-*,

For five years, the critical purpose of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JlEDDO) has been to rapidly provide counter-IED (C-IED) capabilities to warfighters. JlEDDO has provided significant support along three lines of effort — Attack the Network, Defeat the Device, and Train the Force. ^ -^'^^"

This annual report provides an accounting of JIEDDO's efforts and investments in fiscal year (FY) 2010. Highlights include: ::. \ " ' ' -'',^-.. . • Supporting increased Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) C-IED requirements via rapid acquisition, reprogramming of funds, and repurposing of previous investments on the magnitude of $1,2 billion from an overall $2,7 billion effort • Providing fused information tools for warfighters in the field to enable and enhance their capabilities to attack enemy IED networks • Streamlining organizational processes to speed acquisition efforts & . " ^: ^ -: ,".., ; ^ ^ . ... . As 2010 closes, we have witnessed the return on our significant: C-IED investments that reduced the volume, as well as lethality, of lEDs in Iraq, IED use has leveled off to the lowest in six years.
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\ ' •

V

In Afghanistan, as we have witnessed escalated use of lEDs in response to the surge, we have accordingly shifted our resources to enable and enhance mission accomplishment for the warfighter, » ( We are in an extended era of persistent conflict that spans the globe. On average, more than 260 lEDs are employed every month outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, Terrorist and criminal networks have continued to demonstrate remarkable skills in development and delivery of lEDs, As we move forward into 2011 and previous years' investments and acquisitions come to useful fruition, JlEDDO will continue to seek the most responsible use of funding and programs to fulfill the needs of combatant commanders with improved capabilities wherever they serve.

k g

\

Michael L Gates Lieutenant General, U,S, Army Director

^ ^ ^ B ^ ^ ^ ^

^ ^ ^ li^ I ^ B ^ ^

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I ^

FY 2010 ANNUAL
^ \\j$'^f<t4fr#)#

RE pp RT E ^ G U T I
SUMMARY X
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' ^

lEDs continued to be the main threat to coalition forces (CF) in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, IED casualties continued at elevated seasonal cycles that began in May 2009. In Iraq, IED activity continued to decline. lEDs increased as the weapon of choice for global insurgents and terrorists with an average of more than 260 IED incidents per month outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, Device effectiveness and lethality continued to improve in diverse regions around the world. Supported by Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations, JlEDDO critically reviewed its mission statement, existing structure, and processes with the objective of enhancing clarity and streamlining ^ processes. Early in FY 2010, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) established the C-IED Senior Integration
An improvised explosive device blast hole slows traffic near Nawa, Afghanistan. Photo: Sgt Justin Howe

the right theater at the right time, JlEDDO committed to rapidly field prioritized C-IED technologies in accordance with C-SIG instruction. JIEDDO's Attack the Network (AtN) Line of Operation (LOO) enables offensive operations against complex networks of financiers, IED makers, trainers, and their supporting infrastructure by providing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations, counter-bomber targeting, biometrics, and weapons technical intelligence capabilities. Supporting the warfighter in this fiscal year, JlEDDO developed several AtN enablers.

initiatives to enable warfighters to organize, plan, and conduct C-IED operations; properly employ C-IED equipment; and improve understanding of new IED threats. JIEDDO's rapid technology development program focuses activities in a number of areas spanning the three lines of operation. JlEDDO seeks to transition or transfer proven C-IED initiatives to the military services, combatant commands (COCOMs), or government agencies for lifecycle management and sustainment within two years. Similarly, JlEDDO seeks to terminate initiatives that met an urgent requirement and are no longer needed or have failed to deliver anticipated results. Timely initiative transition, transfer, ortermination (T3) prevents long-term resource commitments residing within JlEDDO and enables the organization to apply limited resources to the most urgent C-IED requirements.

JIEDDO's Defeat the Device (DtD) LOO enhanced freedom of maneuver and safe operations for CF, focusing on providing defensive technologies to detect lEDs, neutralizing them before they can be detonated, or mitigating the effects of detonations. Supporting the warfighter in FY 2010, JlEDDO developed multiple DtD enablers and initiatives. JIEDDO's Train the Force (TtF) LOO assessed joint and service C-IED training requirements and supported the development and improvement of training

Group (C-SIG), charged with the mission to integrate and prioritize C-IED efforts with the goal of ensuring the right capabilities are deployed to

A T rA#^ K

K^C* L A i

IT F t / A

I N

THREATS AND TRENDS
IED OVERVIEW FOR AFGHANISTAN AND IRACL
< 2500 1 2000 ~ 1500 1000 u a tu 500 0 Oct

1

— —

\AA ^

ISF an i Iraqi Civ Cas ANSF and Afg Civ Cas >n Force Cas in Afg — on Fofce Cas in Iraq

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Oct Oct

- .1

I
AFG

. lm,.

FY2008 4,124 18,962

FY2009 7.691 14,445

FY2010 9,137 10.256

lEDs continue to pose the main threat to CF in both Afghanistan and Iraq as seen above. The number of lED-related casualties for CF, host nation security forces, and civilians in Afghanistan increased 19 percent during the previous year. In Iraq, the number of CF, host nation security force, and civilian IED casualties declined 29 percent.

ri
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A Mine Roller is damaged by a roadside IED in Afghanistan. Photo: USMC

AFGHANISTAN IED EFFICACY TRENDS FY 2009-2010
1600 IEfffec(iv« lEO Attaclis 1200 ln«ffecliv« IED Attack* nta
123 « « * ll»1 ,SJ4

Trar
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800 400

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Oct Nov Oec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep

Not*: EMetlWe lEO attack* ar* IhoM Sut cautad colaition fbrc* and/or Iwtl nation catualHas. Iiwfiactiva IED attack* caused no c**«alil>« and in-cludo detonatioii* wilh no (aaualMte*, early delectton, pre^l«tcm»|joiw, and Iufn4n*.

A F G H A J M ISTAN Afghan insurgents used lEDs effectively to cause casualties, restrict CF freedom of maneuver, challenge legitimate government authority, and isolate CF from civilians. Widespread insecurity, intimidation of local populations, and readily available sources of homemade explosives (HME) enabled insurgents to elevate IED use rates. Insurgents leveraged external support and safe havens to sustain IED campaigns. The volume of IED use increased significantly from FY 2009, alongside an increased CF operational tempo. Despite this increased volume of attacks, efficacy rates remained steady in the last half of FY 2010 as seen above. Decreased severity of IED events, combined with other operational factors led to a decreasing rate of U.S, personnel killed in action (KIA) per effective IED attack, Non-U.S. CF KIA per effective attack remained constant.

A U.S. Soldier with a counter Improvised explosive device team moves through an Afghan Village to ensure the roads are safe for travel. Photo: U.S. Army Spc. Theodore Schmidt

6

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

T R A I N

Afghan insurgents continue to rely predominantly on victim-operated lEDs (VOIEDs) and command wire lEDs employing simple, yet effective technologies and designs often used with large net explosive weight charges. The incorporation of HME and other block explosives into lEDs continued to be the most significant IED threat to CF in Afghanistan. Insurgents also continued elevated targeting rates of dismounted forces due to the increase of dismounted operations by CF forces in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Afghanistan Outlook. Afghan insurgents will continue to use low-tech solutions and increased volume of IED emplacements to conduct their IED campaign. Most devices will be constructed with simple technologies and readily available materials.

iRACL
In Iraq, the overall number of IED attacks occurred at consistently reduced levels not seen since August 2003. The overall effect of attacks remained generally stable through the year, as noted in the IED trend chart below.

1RAQ_1ED EFFICACY TRENDS, FY 2009 -2010
leoo
|Etff«c«r« IED Attacks Ineffecliv* IED Attacks

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Out Nov Ooe .tan F*& Mir Apy May Jun Jul Aug Sm^ Oet Nov Oee Jan Fab Mw Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep

mmMMmMMMM

Note: Eftective ED Mtack* ar* thoea that cauaed colaMon fbrc* andHsr boat ration cawaHka. tneHecWy* KO attack* cniaad no t#*wlW«$ and Inctud* detonttiont with no casualWM, early dsttctlon, pm-delonttloits. and tum-Ni*,

^LOEAL
Globally,IEDs increased as the insurgent and terrorist weapon of choice. The average number of IED incidents per month outside of Afghanistan and Iraq was 2^0, up from the previous year as noted below. JIEDDO'sreview of worldwide IED reporting showed device effectiveness and lethality. Complex suicide attacks in Pakistan and areas of Ll.S. Africa Command are notable IED events of F Y 2010. Communications and coordination among threat groups has continued the proliferation of IED technology and techniques worldwide.

GL08AL1ED INCIDENTS

^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

actors tram, practice^ and emphy lEDS i woridwide
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I- ^
O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S
Monthly Global Terrorist Events I minus Iraq & Afghanistan)

Jk

IED Events*

* actual IED allacks oi devices found and cleaied Sep 2008 Sep 2010

The average numb«r of monthly IED incidents outside Iraq and Afghanistan was 260 fo the last 6 moths.

8

A T T A C K

DE#=EAT

T R A I N

JlEDDO MISSION AND MISSION AREAS
During 2010, JlEDDO critically reviewed its mission statement, existing structure, and procedures with the objective of enhancing clarity and streamlining processes, J I E D D O ' S REVISED M I S S I O N STATEMENT: JlEDDO leads Department of Defense (DoD) actions to rapidly provide C-IED capabilities in support ofthe combatant commanders and to enable the defeat ofthe IED as a weapon of strategic influence. Deputy Director of T r a i n i n g (DDT) The DDT serves as the training lead for JlEDDO, maintaining and managing the distributed Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) that facilitates individual, collective, and unit C-IED training; enabling the development The director determined that JlEDDO should be organized as a headquarters element with three operating arms to execute JlEDDO efforts across three lines of operation. A deputy director structure to provide the command group a single point of accountability for each mission area was implemented. A revised organizational chart is provided on page 10. Deputy director responsibilities are; Deputy Director of Rapid Acquisition and Teclinology (DDRA&T) The DDRA&T serves as the lead for JlEDDO in rapidly Deputy Director of Operations and R e q u i r e m e n t s (DDOR) The DDOR serves as the lead developing, acquiring, integrating, assessing, and fielding proven materiel and non-materiel C-IED initiatives and propagation of new operational techniques and tactical procedures; and providing a venue for training and support for the experimentation and testing of emerging C-IED equipment and concepts. The DDT also serves as the director ofthe JlEDDO JCOE. Deputy Director of Operations Intelligence I n t e g r a t i o n (DDOi) The DDOI serves as the lead for JlEDDO in supporting the C-IED mission through the supervision of relevant information collection, intelligence analysis, fusion, and dissemination to deliver rapid C-IED and networkattack capabilities in support of COCOMs. The DDOI also serves as the director o f t h e Counter-IED Operations/ Intelligence Integration Center (COIC). for JlEDDO in managing C-IED requirements, synchronizing JlEDDO operational activities, coordinating C-IED operational support to COCOMs, identifying C-IED gaps, and facilitating C-IED concepts of operations and doctrine. to counter known, newly deployed, and emerging IED threats. The DDRA&T ensures the initiatives program includes required training, sustainment, an effective feedback loop, and product improvement spirals and provides lifecycle management oversight of JIEDDO-funded C-IED solutions. With the science advisor, the DDRA&T oversees science and technology (S&T) efforts on behalf of JlEDDO and works with the services to coordinate C-IED science and technology investments for the future. The DDRA&T also serves as the director of the Capabilities Acquisition Center (CAC).

ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

9

Notable changes from the previous organizational design are; ^The Competitive Strategies Group was disbanded and its functions were realigned within the COIC and CAC ^ T h e Joint J^rainingCIED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) transferred to LI.S. Army Training and Doctrine Center. DDTcoordinates training support requirements provided by JJ^COIC

JlEDDO ORGANIZATION CHART
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• OMMral CwmKH t o o • SeMfW* AdvltM • EngavtmHit Dirsctw tOuuaacW " • Oncicr'i Sun Orvup 't

Director i^rHtri^
vice 04rector c Command Sergeant Major c CMaf of Staff

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Deputy Director RwM AoquWllon & Tech CAC

Deputy Director Operationsi'lntetHgenoe b>tegnten

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— J 8 IComptroHert -i J 9 (ORSA] Cmigrealonal Affairs <CAI Strategic • Communlea*35» Peniegi Coordlnai Protocol;

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J3 ACOf' NCOE MCOE AfCOE

- "mB"^
TRID AW - Contracting 1 TDD Evaluation Support JT8 . i f i Oat* analysis •^-Heaoifch & iColaboration _. Nat-Centric binovation Trahtog Integration MlaeWn

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- J 3e/JKn(FE J38 J39/S« SAB

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Surgeon (Medical Advisor)

X CJTF Paladin TFTiay

lotemel Aeview

RESOURCES
FUNDING
Established by Congress in FY 2007 as a new appropriation, the Joint IED Defeat Fund (JIEDDF) provides flexible, three-year duration funds enabling JlEDDO to rapidly develop capabilities that counter constantly morphing lEDs and the highly adaptive networks employing them.

This annual report provides a snapshot of the $2.7 billion drawn from the FYs 2008, 2009, and 2010 appropriations JlEDDO expended in FY 2010 (see JlEDDO Funding Highlights on pages 13-14). During FY 2007 through FY 2010, Congress provided more than $13 billion for the JIEDDF, primarily through supplemental appropriations (see chart on page 11). For FY 2007 through FY 2008, JIEDDO's main effort was

countering the Iraq IED threat. In FY 2009, JIEDDO's focus shifted as national priorities changed and forces surged to Afghanistan. Anticipating this shift, JlEDDO requested and received $1.1 billion in funding planned for FY 2010 to provide C-IED resources essential to support the expected surge. Due to this early appropriation of multiyear funds in anticipation 10

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IDt

F E

A T

T R A I N As an example, the FAR requires contracting officers to negotiate in good faith, meaning they must know with certainty funds are available when soliciting proposals for goods and services. Another example deals with letter contracts, where contracting officers are limited in the amount of committed funds they can obligate. Up to 49 percent ofthe funds can be obligated when a letter contract is awarded; the amount can increase to 75 percent if a qualified proposal is received within 120 days. JlEDDO closely tracks initial commitment to obligation rates, typically within 60 days. These are examples of many procurement requirements delaying obligations. Consequently, JlEDDO has little control over the typical six-month lag between fund commitment and obligation and its unique financial execution profile.

of the build-up of forces in Afghanistan, JIEDDO's FY 2010 execution included significant funding drawn from FY 2009 appropriations. The FY 2010 DoD Appropriations Act provided both overseas contingency operations (OCO) supplemental and base budget funding to JlEDDO through the JIEDDF. Approximately 95 percent of the total budget authority was OCO supplemental funds, with the remaining 5 percent in the base budget. JIEDDO's financial execution profile differs significantly from traditional DoD programs — and consequently leaves observers believing that JlEDDO is under-executing its resources. Commitments, rather than obligations, are a better reflection of JlEDDO meeting COCOMs'

requirements. JlEDDO is not a contracting activity and consequently relies exclusively upon other organizations to obligate JIEDDF funds that deliver C-IED solutions. Other factors contribute to JIEDDO's unique financial execution profile. First, a significant portion of JIEDDO's budget is dedicated to responding to joint urgent operational needs (JUONs), Each year when the budget is approved, neither specific nor aggregate JUON costs are known, making financial targets difficult to set and more difficult to achieve as JlEDDO shifts resources to meet IED threats that can surface or change in weeks.

Complex measures written into the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) protect the government's interests but delay full obligation.

JlEDDO BUDGET I N HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
3.000

2.500
2,000

EQ tn

1,500

•o to © o
1,000

II
is

500

FV06

FY07

FY08

FY09

FY 10

11

PERSONNELAND STAFFING An institutional review, reassessment, and revalidation ofthe organization'smission and functions, supported by repeated GAO recommendations,highlighted the urgent need to increase government oversight and direction. To address the noted concerns,141 new government civilian billets were approved to provide an experienced, mid level leadership team raising the percentage of JlEDDO military/government personnelfroml0tol4 percent In F Y 2010,JIEDDO filled 69 percent of its joint manning document personnel authorizations. While making great strides to fill the additional government civilian billets, .^lEDDO continued to have challenges filling its military personnel billets. To further reinforce government oversight and direction of its largely contractor-based workforce, JlEDDO also received approval to convert 192 contracted manpower equivalent authorizations to government civilian positions in F Y 2012, Once the conversion is complete, JlEDDO will improve the percentage of military/

government personnel from 14 to 24 percent. Recognizing the military services'difficulty in providing active duty military personnel, JlEDDO initiated an aggressive effort to develop and gain approval for reserve component augmentation, JlEDDO received approval for 119 Army Reserve,13 Air Force Reserve, and 23 Marine Corps Reserve augmentation positions, with 30 requested Navy Reserve billets pending the Navy F Y 2011 Rrogram Objective Memorandum review, JlEDDO continued to rely heavily on service contracts to quickly acquire the variety of skill sets not easily found in the services or through government civilian recruiting,To this end, JlEDDO implemented acomprehensive services support contract providing aflexible and enduring contracting vehicle, enabling JlEDDO to respond quickly to warfighters'needs, GOUNTER lED SENIOR INTEGRATION GROUP At the beginning of F Y 2010, the SECDEF established theC-SIGto^^harmonize resources organizationally across the Department and allocate them efficiently in

order to more effectively counter the IED threat in Afghanistan,"TheCSIG's mission is to integrate and prioritizeCIED efforts with the goal of ensuring the right capabilities are deployed to the right theater at the right time, JlEDDO committed to rapidly field prioritizedCIED technologies in accordance withCSIG instruction, beginning in July 2010, JlEDDO began to perform secretariat roles for theCSIG, providing relief for the Joint Chiefs ofStaff,J34This handover was completed in August 2010

1^

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

T R A I N

FISCAL YEAR 2010 JIEDD(

$2.78
• COIC: $249.0M* •WTI: - Exploitation Laboratory Enhancements: $14.5M* - National IED Exploitation Facility: $6.0M - Radial - Blue [ -Speck - Sand I • Addition - VADEI - BIstati • Predict! -Keyho - Route

Attack the Network $1.0B

- Torchlight: $7.6M*
- TED AC: $59.5M* • Special Programs: - Wolfhound: $49.8M* -Zionbobcat: $22.9M - Forgersnoop: $8M* • Detect Air: - Desert Owl: $27.4M* - Copperhead MinlSAR: $31.8M* • C-IEO Electronic Warfare: - CREW Fixed Site CVRJ: $47.7M* - CREW Universal Test Sets: $49.3M* - E W O Kits: $12.5M • Detect Ground: - Persistent Threat Detection System: $376.0M - Persistent Group Surveillance System: $119.0M - Handheld Ground Penetrating Radar (Minehound): $23.6M* - Goldie: $19.5M' - Counter Bomber: $7.2M - Beachcomber: $21.7M* - PBIED/VBIED Defeat - Entry Control Point: $134.3M • Neutralize: -Jackal: $17.7M • Joint Center of Excellence: - C-IED Training Support Mission: $26.9M* - Exportable Training Support JATAC; $29.5M* - C-IED Support Element & C-IED Team Training: $18.9M* - C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams; $8.4M* - CJTF Paladin Training Support: $10M* - C-IED Force on Force Environment: $6,6M - C-IED Live Fire Environment: $13.8M - Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer: $15.4M* - Home Made Explosives Training Program $1.0M* - Tactical Site Exploitation: $3.5M

- Quiet -BCT <
Anal^i - Robot (RMD! - Devil I -Sheric -MaxP - Gray F • Mitigate -USMC - IED R< - Joint I - Hard I, - Ghost -ARDEi -Sentlfl »Systems (JTCOIC •JTCOIC Simulatii • Syntheti Environr • Biometri • Infantry • Immersi' • C-IEO lm

Defeat the Device

$1.38

S&l FY10

• Headquarters: $121.5M*

13

D FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS

I t Falcon: $24.1 M )evil: $61.9M les: $9.9M* Dragon: $5.8M al Detect Air: R: $41.3M* cs: $13.0M ind Prevent: le: $74.6M Clearance Optics Suites: $47.tM Storm: $6.1 M Operational Research and Systems iis (ORSA): $19.1M» ic Mounted Detection System J) with LADAR: $5.0MJ >up EGD Mini Robot: $32.8M ick: $4.7M* ower: $7.1 M* ox: $6.3M* Mine Roller System: $13.8M >llers (Sparks II): $236.0M ED Neutralize Roller (JOLLER): $11.9M mpact: $12.6M Ship: $1.3M Z Objective Armor Protection: $7.9M el Scout: $2.4M Integration and Modeling and Simulation Database): $22.5M Systems Integration, Modeling and jns: $4.7M c Environment Core Common Virtual nent: $12.2M* cs & Forensics Virtual Training: $4.2M Immersion Trainer: $5.6M /e Training Environment: $1.2M tegration Cell (CLZC): $14.5M*

-Integrated Signatures Program: $12.1M -Saturn Arch: $43.7M* - Person-Borne IED Counter Architecture: $15M - London Brook: $4.9 M - Tripwire Analytic Capability: $22.4 M • Other 77 R&D Investments and Remaining Programs: $123.1 M*

• Joint Test Board: $46.5M* • Other 62 R&D Investments and Remaining Programs: $106.7M*

• Technical Collection: $23.0M • Joint Expeditionary Team (MTAT): $13.3M* • 1st Army Combat Training Center Leveling: $9.4M • Joint Knowledge Information Fusion Exchange: $5.8M* • Virtual Medical Training: $22.6M* • Tissue Stabilization Program: $10.3M • Lost Limb Mitigation: $6.5M* • Remaining 13 Programs: $18.3M*

'Multi-year Funds: FY2008 - S9.4M, FY2009 - $1,064.0M. FY2010 - $1.66«.SM

14

A T T A C K

D E F E A T

T R A X N

FY 2010 MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
This section describes new initiatives in FY 2010 on which JlEDDO expended budgetary resources from the JIEDDF. Descriptions of initiatives started in other years can be found in the JlEDDO annual report for that fiscal year. Descriptions of initiatives started and terminated within FY 2010 are listed in the table of T3 initiatives on pages 23-26.

ATTACK THE NETWORK
JIEDDO's AtN LOO enables offensive operations against a complex networks of financiers, IED makers, trainers, and their supporting infrastructure by providing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations, counter-bomber targeting, biometrics, and weapons technical intelligence capabilities. COIC Technology I n t e g r a t i o n . The International Security Assistance Force (iSAF) commander established the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) as the principal command and control system to enable real-time collaboration and information sharing across the coalition. COIC provided hardware, software, and technical engineering support enabling JlEDDO COIC Analytic Support Team analysts to transition quickly to the AMN. The Joint Staff designated the COIC as the lead for establishing the AMN in the National Capital Region. COIC Training I n t e g r a t i o n . COIC made 41 tool and process training modules available to classified computer users supporting pre-deployment and deployed unit needs. These modules included familiarization, tool integration, network analysis, and advanced integration and collaboration. COIC developed 13 interactive e-learning modules for tool familiarization and training. Weapons T e c h n i c a l Intelligence (WTI). WTI is a process and a category of intelligence derived from the forensic and technical exploitation of lEDs, associated components, and improvised weapons. WTI uniquely combines service, intelligence community, federal law enforcement, and national laboratory capabilities to produce actionable intelligence not only enabling the identification and disruption of low-signature networks employing lEDs, 15

but also contributing to the development oftime sensitive countermeasures, targeting of enemy combatants,material sourcing efforts, and supporting the prosecution ofthose attributed to attacks onLI.S. andCF. zionbobcat. 2ionbobcat isaproofofconcept passive integrated airborne tactical deployment sensors system for interrogation of communications devices. Detect ^ i r . Detect Air systems enable the warfighter to detect insurgent IED emplacement activity and all observables associated with lEDs and their emplacement, BlueDe^ii. ^lue Devil is aunique,developmentaL integrated,multi intelligence,autotipping, and cueingC IED airborne intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, ^lue Devil integrates the highest resolution wide field of view electro-optical (EO)sensor with high definition cameras and signals intelligence geo location sensors l^he imagery is simultaneously sent toatactical operations center and remote video terminals in real time.

Specifies. Speckles isa developmental 35 pound unmanned aerial vehicle with EO and short wave or long wave infrared (IR) sensors for route clearance patrol (RCR) operations. Runway independent, rail launched, and belly landed. Speckles is capable of eight hour mission endurance and direct video downlink,This enables the R C R to rapidly investigate areas of interest and maintain immediate area situational awareness.

moving target indicator (GMTI) radar providing highdetection probability, low false-alarm rate, and precise geo-location against moving targets. The system uses inexpensive radars to cue EO/IR sensors.
Predict and Prevent.

Predict and Prevent efforts facilitate the rapid fielding of sensitive C-IED materiel and non-materiel technologies to give the warfighter collection, exploitation, and analytic

A developmental Speckles system takes off for a test route clearance patrol operation. Photo: JlEDDO

Sand Dragon. Sand Dragon is a small, long-endurance, runway independent, unmanned aerial system asset suited for the detection of IED observables during RCP operations in OEF.
Bistatics Surveillance System (BSS). BSS is a tower-mounted ground

advantage in multiple intelligence disciplines. Quiet Storm. Quiet Storm funds intelligence analysts focused on the IED supply chain. Leveraging federal law enforcement data made available to DoD, IED facilitators are identified and intelligence and law 16

A T T A C K

a ^ ^ a

^

^T^7^^N making through quantitative analytics. DEFEAT THE DEVICE JlEDDO enhances freedom of maneuver and safe operations for CF through the DtD line of operation. DtD focuses on providing defensive technologies to detect lEDs, neutralize them before they can be detonated, or mitigate the effects of detonations. Counter IED Electronic Warfare (CIEW). CIEW seeks to integrate counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW) systems with other capabilities operating within the electromagnetic spectrum to ensure compatibility and interoperability within U.S. DoD and coalition nations, CIEW broadens the aperture expanded from jamming to include C-IED sensor capabilities. JlEDDO funded the research, development, and procurement of manportable, vehicle-mounted, and fixed-site jamming technologies. CREW Universal Test Set (UTS). CREW-UTS is a follow-on capability configured to give operators a go/no-go test capability to confirm CREW equipment

enforcement operations are synchronized against IED facilitation networks. Brigade Combat Team/ Regimental Combat Team Operations Research Systems Analysis (ORSA). This AtN C-IED capability provides operations research capability in immediate proximity to tactical problems, enabling real-time analysis of issues addressing Brigade/ Regimental Combat Team Command's needs. Person borne IED (PBIED) Counter Architecture. The PBIED counter architecture effort is a JlEDDO and Department of Homeland Security cooperative project. This detection system incorporates a

family of sensors, a software information backbone, and software that assists in prioritizing threats and allocating detection assets against those threats. London Broolt. This target audience analysis study examined how to best affect insurgent behaviors, including those involved in commission and execution of IED attacks. The complete report was delivered to ISAF. Tripwire Analytic Capability (TAC). TAC is a Web-based analytic and decision support system enabling real-time and collaborative analysis through persistent querying of streaming and stored data. TAC supports the JlEDDO mission by enhancing C-IED-related decision

PBIED sensors must be able to conduct multimodal scans with a predetermined percentage of the crowd, accurately scan people approaching at differing angles, address crowd-blocking and proximity effects, and target people of interest within a wide field of view. Photo: SPIE paper April 2010; Paper Number 7666-60

17

performance at the warfighter level. Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO)Tool l^its. EWO tool kits provide the next level of maintenance and diagnosis support for C R E W systems complementing the C R E W UTS Detect Ground. Detect Ground systems seek to detect person borne, vehicle-borne, and buried lEDs, as well as suspicious activity associated with IED emplacement. Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS).ThePTDSisa tethered aerostat (balloon) equipped withasuite ofhigh resolution EOBIR equipment.

The PTDS providesa persistent surveillance and situational awareness capability. Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS).ThePGSS system isasuite of single-and dual configurable sensors, mounted onatethered aerostat (balloon). PGSScan operate atahigher altitude, hasalarger balloon,anda greater payload option than the PTDS li^andheld Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR)Minehound.The Minehound G P R system isa lightweight, hand-held, ground penetrating radar enabling dismounted patrols to find lEDswithlow orno metallic signature. Goldie.The Goldie system isalightweight,man portable, handheld device for detecting IED components while conducting dismounted patrols. This initiative isa one-time commercial off-the shelf(COTS) procurement. Subtle Madness. Subtle Madness isamagnetometerbased system for detecting suicide bombers in unstructured crowds, at installation entry checkpoints, and traffic control points.

Robotic Mounted Detection System (RMDS) w i t h Laser Detection and Ranging.

RMDSisadevelopmental effort designed to remotely operate the Husky Mounted Detection System. RMDS allows remote detection of lEDsfromatrailing vehicle. NEUTRALIZE Neutralize systems seek to deny IED actuation atatime and place of the enemy's choosing.
Devil Pup Mini Robot.

Devil Pup isamanpackable, highly agile, miniature robot specifically designed for dismounted explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators. Sherloci^. Sherlock isa COTS trace detector for identifying suspicious solids and liquids. Sherlock provides portable trace detection of explosives. BiuePo^. Blue Fox is an effort to characterizeaCOTS, manportable,radiography system exceeding current EOD radiography penetration capabilities. GrayPo^. Gray Fox isa backscatter)(-ray imaging system. Gray Fox enables the EOD operator to remotely
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T R A I N is installed on a vehicle to permit remote operation from a control panel in a trailing vehicle. The semi autonomous vehicle control system is designed to enable remote detection and neutralization of lEDs using C IED enablers such as rollers and ground penetrating radar on an unmanned vehicle.

^-ray thick cased containers and munitions to determine the presence of an IED fusing system or haz^ardouslic^uids. MITIGATE l i t i g a t e systems seek to minimize the effects of IED blasts on personnel, ec^uipment, and facilities. I^.B llHar^neCorp^

culverts and determining which options within the Hard Impactdesigns willbe most effective. e h o ^ ^ h l p . Ghost Ship is a k i t installed in High mobility multipurpose wheeled Vehicles allowing complete remote operation o f t h e vehicle by an operator in a trailing vehicle.

^ o l n t IED D e f e a t T e s t The Army 6^^a^^^lT^^Th6J^ validates that JlEDDO funded C-IED initiatives are proven capabilities, and allows DoD The leadership to confidently field new technologies. In FY 2010, Ji^ODOfunded^^J^test events, evaluating 317 C IED efforts across the JlEDDO LOOs^ Tl^^T^^^OI^C^ JlEDDO s TtF LOO assesses Joint and service C-IED training requirements and 8 e n t ^ n e l BcoMt. This developmental applique kit supports the development and improvement of training initiatives to enable warfighters to ofganize, plan, and conduct C IED operations; properly employ C-IED equipment; and improve understanding of new IED threats. Re^earch^ O e v e ^ o p m e ^ anB Englneeirlng C e n t e r ^AROEC^Oh^ect^ve A m ^ r l^rotect^on. AI^DEC objective armor protection seeks to provide developmental armor technologies for protection against large explosively formed penetrators and rocket propelled grenades at a reduced weight compared to currently available armor solutions.

^Il9^^^l^l^les^ B ^ t e n ^ l ^ a ^ a ^ a City ^ 1 ^ ^ R o l l e r . PC rollers mitigate the effects of VOIEDs by standoff pre-detonation, reducing causalities and vehicle damage. H a r B Im^pact^ Hard Impact is a device to deny the enemy the use of culverts for empIacinglEDs while still allowing water flow. Thesystem is adaptable to different culvert sizes. This program is also creating tools and criteria to assist operators in assessing road

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In response to the SECDEFs memo ofMarch 18, 2010, JlEDDO has dramatically increasedC-IED training support to ISAF troop contributing nation partners through support to U.S. European Command and in cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)Allied Command Transformation. JIEDDO'smajor training investments were in filling Afghanistan surge operations and increased emphasis on live, virtual, constructive gaming (LVCG), formerly modeling and simulation. JCOE launched several initiatives during this year; ^COEC-IEDTraining Support Mission. This initiative funded the development and propagation of newC IED training capabilities based on emerging threats. Major types of support include; training, tactics, and procedures development; publication and distribution; and support to the Afghan training fusion cell. Synthetic Environments Core Common Virtual E n v i r o n m e n t (SEC IED S u p p o r t E l e m e n t s andC-IEDTeam T r a i n i n g . T h i s Battle Staff Training Team provided training that supported units' C IED training for surge deployment to Afghanistan. C o r e ) . JlEDDO funded the acceleration ofaproven training program to meet C IED requirements JlEDDO funded the procurement of hardware and software for the SE Core program enabling LVCGTraining.To overcome the joint operational problem, JlEDDO partnered with the services to developLVCG initiatives. T i s s u e Stahili2^ation. This initiative will accelerate research in tissue repair and skin grafting. It accelerates (by three-to eight years) additional surgical procedures to reduce infection, rapidly grow skin, and reduceB remove scar tissue caused by IED injuries. ^COEComhined^oint Tasl^Porce(C^TP) PaiadinTraining Support T e a m . T h i s initiative provides forward-stationed instructors to conduct receipt, staging, onward movement, and integration training to incoming forces in Afghanistan such as, EOD, special forcesBCOIN,and search and site exploitation, Biometrics and Porensics Virtual T r a i n i n g . This initiative provides virtual gaming interactive multimedia instruction on comprehensive and persistent biometrics and forensics training. asignificant increase of visual graphic and computer generated entity quality within virtual training systems.
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A T T A C K

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT JlEDDO invests in S&T to mature technology and accelerate a capability to theater. Some projects explore unknown phenomenology to gain better understanding to develop a component technology required for a larger system, JlEDDO programs are often worked in partnership and collaboration with experts from across the DoD S&T community. Efforts in these areas span all three lines of operation. Sensor and Data Exploitation. JlEDDO continues to explore new sensors and exploitation methods to demonstrate the ability to detect command wires, disturbed earth, signs of emplacement activity, and other observables associated with emplaced lEDs, to include integration and demonstration ofthese capabilities on both aerial and ground platforms. PBIED Detection Technology. JlEDDO is exploring new techniques for detecting explosives to include neutron-based detection, millimeter wave imaging, ultrasonic, and multi-modal detection.
21

Neutralization. JIEDDO's technology development program is exploring technologies to neutralize the IED. The use of high-power microwave as a technique to pre-detonate an IED remains a challenge.
Information Technology.

JlEDDO is working with information technology experts across industry, academia, and the services to advance the state of the art in a number of information technology areas to include fusion, knowledge management, natural language processing, and human computer. Social Dynamic Analysis. The JlEDDO social dynamic analysis program includes several programs that look at network analysis, cultural understanding, and metrics to gauge success in security operations and other COIN activities. These efforts promise to provide a set of integrated solutions for JlEDDO, DoD, and other agencies to consider as part of their philosophy of using social and cultural aspects of a network.
Cognitive Analysis.

scientific evidence to understand why 60 percent of detected lEDs are discovered by the human eye. Understanding of critical skills is enabling the services to incorporate the cognitive, physical, and individual differences into live, virtual, and gaming systems to better train warfighters to detect lEDs. Medical. In cooperation with the Army Surgeon General's office, JlEDDO focused a number of medical research initiatives and treatment capabilities intended to defeat IED wounding effects.

JlEDDO successfully completed a cognitive analysis study providing

FISCAL YEAR2010TRANSITIONS, TRANSFERS,AND TERMINATIONS
Chartered by DoD to rapidly acquireCIED capabilities, JlEDDO seeks to transition or transfer prov enCIED initiatives to the services, COCOMS, or government agencies for lifecycle management and sustainment within two years, Similarly,JIEDDO seeks to terminate initiatives that have met an urgent requirement and are no longer needed or have failed to deliver anticipated results.Timely initiative transition,transfer,or termination avoids JlEDDO being saddled with longterm resource commitments and enables JlEDDO to apply limited resources to the most urgent emergingC-lED requirements. JlEDDO transitioned or transferred ^6CIED capabilities and terminated four initiatives in FY 2010 (see charts on pages 23 26). JlEDDO transitionsCIED initiatives when those initiatives are judged to be integral to an existing and enduring capability for the joint force and are expected to become part of an existing program of record funded in the president'sbudget. JlEDDO transfers C-IED initiatives when the solution is not judged to be part of an existing approved capability,but will continue to be used in the current conflict and sustained through OCO supplemental funding requests. Annually in the third quarter,JIEDDO formally briefsT3 recommendations to the Protection Func tional Capabilities Board Working Group, Joint Capabilities Board, and Joint Requirements Over sight Council (JROC). Based upon JROC'sendorsement,aJROC memorandum (JROCM) signed by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, informs the services and agencies of the JROC action.TheT3 list and JROCM are forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for T3 decision

MRAP pushes a mine roller through the route ensuring the path is clear of lEDs during a 5-day convoy to FOB Edinburgh, Afgtianistan. Photo: Lance Cpl. Bruno J. Bego

22

A T T A C K
CIED Initiative Name 1 Army FY 2010 Transfers

D E F E A T
Description

T R A I N
Source Document

After Action Review (AAR) Video FaodtMck System

Two video capture systems and supporting AAR for existing sites (supports existing COTS strategy)

Deputy Secretary of Defense memo (DSDM) 2010 DSCM Aug. 18,2009

.

Additional Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer (CVRJ) Jammers

Follow-on procurement of CVRJ systems to bridge current fielding requirements and next generation system Funding provides procurement of additional systems in support of active jammer JUONS MTT for weapons technical intelligence

Additional Mobile Multi-band Jammer Battlefield Foransica Mobiie Training Team (MTT) Biometrics MTT Biometrics Training Integration

DSDM Aug. 18. a m

FY 2010 Congress

MMT for b k m e t r k s Addition of biometrics exploitation into other C-IED training U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) mandated process-oriented data collection and correlation toot

FY 2010 Congress FY 2010 Congress

Comlilned Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Web-enabled Temporal Analysis System Oata Management Sustainment C-IED Live Fire Environment

DSDM June 13, 2008

A complex and durat>te facility capable of Integrating all critical C-IEO enablers in a live-fire exercise (LFX) scenario D^ection and traclcins of terrorists (program of record) Improves dissemination of theater-derived CIED information Provides instructors, computers, pattem, and link-node analysis software to develop and train company intelligence support teams at the comt»at W i n i n g centers (CTC) Classified CREW project: Navy non-concurred and intended to end funding in FY 2010. GSM risk mitigator (Jukebox) Surrogate device for training

FY 2010 Congress

Comt^at Tracking Dogs Combined Information Oata IMetworIt Exchange Comi^any Intelligence Suppori Teams

D S E ^ June 13.2006 DSDM June 13.2008

FY 2010 Congress

CREW - Global System for Mobile (GSM) Risk Mitigator

DSD acMon memo Jan. 14, 2010

CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training Devices DARWARS Ambush

DSDM 2010

Provide virtual representation and replication of CREW actions and effects in support of training for convoy defense operations as well as IED defeat mounted and dismounted maneuver training Enhanced home-station C-IED training Classilied C-IEO effort Classified C-IED effort infrastructure improvements, personnel, surrogate training vehicles, and IED training aids to enhance C4ED lane training Assist services to enable IED defeat training at home Stations and improve readiness prior to CTC rotations Congressional add GPR for detection and marking of i»uried lEDt

DSDM 2010

Mfst Army CTC Leveling Gallant Dart Groendart Home Station C-IED Lane Training

FY 2010 Congress DSDM Aug. 18, 2009 OSDMAu9.18,2C»9 D S m June 13, 2008

^ \

Home Station C IED Training Capabilities Home Station Training Lanes II Husky Mounted Detection System

OSDM June 13, 2008

FY 2010 Congress DSDM Aug. 18. 2009

23

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1

CIED Initiative Name 1 Army FY 2010 Transfers (continued) i n s u ^ e n t s on tfie Battlefield

Description

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| Provides AtN training t»y using role players to perform as key charactere In social, political, and religious OSDM Aug. 18,2009

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Integrated Capability Development Team Assists with rapid C-IED capabilities development, material solutions integration, training, and fielding using subject-matter experts (SMEs) Develops higher performing man-portable systems DSDM June 13.2008

Joint CREW 3.1 Dismounted System Joint Electronic Warf are Course

OSDM Jan. 14, 2010

Prepares EWOs from all services for electronic warfare duties at the electronic warfare control center Provides a means to track redA»lue activities, down to the individual level - congressional add Congressional add

OSDM 2010

Joint Total Entity Tracking for the Instrumented Battlefield Joint Readiness Training Center Simulated Radio Infrastructure Expansion Joint Theater EW Operations Course Multifunction, Agile, f^mote-control Robot-Experimental Robot

FY 2010 Congress

FY 2010 Congress

EW planning and coordination skills for employment at COCOM, Joint task force, or corps-level A small, man-transportable, remotely controlled robotic platform for stand-off visual inspection of suspected lEDs High-resolution ISR system at survivable Creation of cell phone and wireless local loop networks at four CTCs CREW Manportable version 1

OSCWI2010

OSDM June 13,2008

Night E a g l e l & H Opposing Forces Command and Control Network Quick Reaction Dismount (QRO) (Guardian) ORD Surrogate Devices Wire Neutralization System

OSDM June 13.2008 OSDM June 13, 2008

OSDM Jan. 14, 2010

Training devices for QRO (Guardian) Roller attachment to defeat command and tripwire IED initiators in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF

DSDM 2010 OSDM June 13, 2008

1 Navy FY 2010 Transfers CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training Devices CREW Legacy Support Surrogate device for training O S t m 2010

1

Funding to sustain legacy CREW systems in FY 2009 until replaced Congressional add

OSDM June 13,2008

Future Immersive Training Environment Home Station C-IED Lane Training

FY 2010 Congress

Infrastructure improvements, personnel, surrogate training vehicles, and IED training aids to enhance C-IEO lane training Assist services to enable IED defeat training at home stations and improve readiness prior to CTC rotations HME detection capability Third-generation C-IED Jammers Tfiird-^eneration C-IED Jammers Congressional add split with JlEDDO Training devices for QRO (GuanMan)

OSDM June 13. »)08

Home Station C-IED Training Capabilities

t » O M June 13,2008

HME Detection JCREW 3.1 Dismounted System JCREW 3.2 Mounted System Joint Training COIC QRD Surrogate Devices

OSDM June 13,2008 OSDM Jim. 14.2010 OaOM Jan. 14, 2010 FY 2010 Congress OSDM 2010

24

A T T A C K
CIED Initiative Name

D E F E A T
Description

:

R A I N
Source Document " 1

1 Navy FY 2010 Transfers (continued) TrIpleplay (Easy FarmerfEasy Actor/WOMP) 1 Marine Corps FY 2010 Transfers AAR Video Feedback System Two video capture systems and supporting AAR for existing sites (supports existing COTS strategy) A complex and durable facility capable of integrating all critical C-IED enablers In an LFX scenario Provides instructors, computers, pattem, and link-node analysis software In the all-source intelligence targeting toolkit to support the requested CLIC and equipment integration Surrogate device for training DSDM 2010 Classified C-iED effort OSDM Aug. 18, 200*

|

C-IED Live-fire Environment (Marine Corps) Company-Level intelligence Cell (CUC)

FY 2010 Congress

;

FY 2010 Congress

CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training Devices Home Station C-IEO Lane Training

OSDM 2010

Infrastructure improvements, personnel, surrogate training vehicles, and IED training aids to enhance C-IED lane training Assist services to enable IED defeat training at home stations and improve readiness prior to CTC rotations Small unit level Immersive IED defeat training capability replicates sights, sounds, smells, chaos of battle with home station availability Provides AtN training by using role players to perform as key characters in social, political and religious groups

OSDMAug,18,2009

Home Station C4ED Training Capabilities Infantry Immersion "Trainer

DSDM Aug. 18.2009

i
;

FY 2010 Congress

Insurgents on the BatlleMeld (Marines): Deputy Secretary of Defense Action Memo, dated Dec. 2,2008 Integrated Capability Development Team

OSDM Aug-18.2009

j|
Assists wiBi rapid C-IED capabilities development, material solutions integration, training and fielding using subject matter experts Third-generation C-IEO Jwnmers Electronic training aids for field exercises OSDM Aug. 18, 2009

JCREW 3.1 Dismounted ^ s l e m Joint Total Entity Tracking for the Instivmented Battlefield Opposing Force ( O P F ( ^ 0 C2 Network Quicd Reaction Dismount (QRD) Surrogate Devices QRO (Guaniian}

OSDM Jan. 14.2010 FY 2010 Congress

4
? 'i

Creation of cell i ^ o n e and wiretess local loop networks at four CTCs Training devices for W D (Guardian)

OSDMAug.18.2009

OSDM 2010

CREW Man-portal>le version 1 being replaced by CREW 3.1 C-IED scrapper blade for Afghanistan

OSDM Jan. 14.2010

Route Clearance Research, Development. Testing, and Evaluation USMC OEF VOIEO Roller 1 Air Force FY 2010 Transfers C-IED ISR Integration

DSDM 2010

C-IED mine roller for Afghanistan

DSDM 2010

{

Integration of command and control of airbome C-IED assets Detection and traekittg of t e r r o r t e (program of record) Surrogate device for training

FY 2010 Congress

Combat Tracking Dogs CREW 2.1 Surrogate Training Devices

DSDM June 13,2009 DSDM 2010

25

CIED Initiative Name

Description

1 Source Document

Air Force FY 2010 Transfers (continued) Home Station C-IEO Training Capabilities QRD Surrogate Devices U S, Air Force War#ire Center Joint IND Team USSOCOM FY M I O Transfers EGON THOR/AM-terrain Vehicle Classified C4ED effort THOR is a man portable and vehicular-mountalile CREW system "#MiLug.18,2009 DSDM Aug, 18, 2009 Assist services to enable IED defeat training at home stations and Improve readiness prior to CTC rotations Training devices for QRD (Guardian) Mobile C IED team DSDM June 13,2009

DSDM 2010 OSrat 2010

Agency FY 2010 Transfer* National Securi^ Agency (NSA): C-IEO Embeds NSA: CSS Cryptologic Services Group (COIC) NSA: Fusion Analysis Development Effect Classified C-IEO effort DSDM 2010

Classified C-IED effort

DSDM 2010

Classified C-IED effort

Memorandum of understanding signed by Lt. Gen, Metz Sept 13, 2009 Technology

NSA: Liquid Fire {Meta Data Denver)

Classilied C-IED effort - memo for record (MFR)

Requirements and Integration Division MFR W#AS#p.17,M0»

26

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AAR AMN ARDEC AtN C2 CAC CF CIDNE C IED CIEW CI2C CLIC CJTF COCOM COIC COIN COTS C R E W C-SIG CTC CVRJ DDOI DDOR DDRA&T DDT DoD DSDM DtD

after action review Afghanistan Mission Network Army Research, DevelopmentaL and Engineering Center Attack the Network command and control Capabilities Acquisition Center coalition forces combined information data network exchange counter improvised explosive device counter-IED electronic wartare counter-IED integration cell company level intelligence cell combined joint task force combatant command Counter-IED OperationsB Intelligence Integration Center counterintelligence commercial off the shelf counter radio controlled IED electronic wartare Counter lED Senior Integration
Group

E W EO EOD EWO F A R F Y GAO GMTI G P R G S M FIME IED I R ISAF ISR JATAC JCOE JIEDD JIEDDF JlEDDO
JOLLER

electronic wartare electrooptical explosive ordnance disposal electronic wartare officer Federal Acquisition Regulation fiscal year Government Accountability Office ground moving target indicator ground penetrating radar global system for mobile homemade explosive(s) improvised explosive device infrared International Security Assistance Force intelligence,surveillance,and reconnaissance Joint AsymmetricTreat Awareness C IED training Joint Center of Excellence Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund Joint IED Defeat Fund Joint IED Defeat Organization Joint IED Neutralize Roller Joint Requirements Oversight Council JROC memorandum JlEDDO Test Board JointTraining Center IED Operations Integration Center joint urgent operational need killed in action live-fire exercise line of operation live, virtual, constructive gaming memo for record MarineTrainingAdvisoryTeam

combat training center combined vehicle radio jammer Deputy Director of Operations Integration Deputy Director of Operations and Requirements Deputy Director ofRapid Acquisition andTechnoIogy Deputy Director ofTraining Department of Defense DeputySecretaryofDefense
memo

JROC JROCM JTB JTCOIC JUON I^IA LF)^ LOO LVCG
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NATO NSA OEF OCO OPFOR ORSA PBIED PC PGSS PTDS ORD RCP RMDS North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Security Agency Operation Enduring Freedom overseas contingency operations opposing forces operations research systems analysis Person borne IED Panama City persistent ground surveillance system persistent threat detection system quick reaction dismount route clearance patrols TtF USMC UTS VBIED VOIED TAC TEDAC S&T SE SECDEF T3 science and technology synthetic environment Secretary of Defense transitions, transfers, and terminations tripwire analytic capability Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center Train the Force U.S. MarineCorps universal test set VehiclebornelED victimoperatedlED weapons technical intelligence USCENTCOM U.S, Central Command

robotic mounted detection system WTI

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Defense Exhibits 101 pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record ofTrial

tary's Killing ol 2»Jounialists in Iraq Detailed in New Book - Washington Post

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Military's Killing of 2 Journalists in Iraq Detailed in New Book
3yAnn Scott Tyson, Septemiier 1.5, 20(;>9

\ new book by a Washington Post reporter provides a graphic, second-by-second description ]f the U.S. military's 2007 killing oftwo Reuters joumalists in Baghdad, an incident that the news organization says it cannot investigate fully because the Pentagon has withheld key records of the event. rhe Reuters photographer and driver were carrying cameras and walking with a group of Iraqi nen, some of whom appeared to be armed, when a U.S. helicopter crew mistook them for insurgents, according to an account by David Finkel in the book "The Good Soldiers," published Tuesday, Reuters has been pressing the U.S. military for more than two years to turn over all materials containing information about the shootings on July 12, 2007, of its staff photographer Namir ^Joor-Eldeen, 22, and driver Saeed Chmagh, 40, in the helicopter strike in a contested neighborhood of East Baghdad.
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"We continue to have questions whether or not the actions taken by the soldiers in the area ;hat led to the deaths of the two Reuters journalists were necessary and appropriate," Reuters ;hief counsel Thomas Kim said. "My goal is to understand the basis on which the military concluded that the shooting was justified."
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Sixteen journalists have been killed by U.S. military fire in Iraq, leading to calls by Reuters and groups such as the Committee to Protect Joumalists for the Pentagon to undertake timely and thorough investigations of each case and make them public. But the U.S, military has withheld key information on the 2007 shootings on the grounds that it is classified, and has not released to Reuters a video taken from the gunship that captures the complete sequence of radio communications and imagery that unfolded on the streets below. * * Google

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That recording appears to form the basis for a lescription of the incident in one chapter of the book, about a U.S. infantry unit in Baghdad.

According to FinkeTs account, Noor-Eldeen and Chmagh arrived in Baghdad's east Al-Amin neighborhood during a morning of clashes between insurgents and the U.S. military. Working independently and without the knowledge of the U.S. ground unit or Apache crews operating ! UU ., ^ in the area, Noor-Eldeen and Chmagh were walking along a street with seven other Iraqi i%%FRNSE F X H s B I T j f v C ' " M i ' : ^

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taiy's Killing of 2 Joumalists in Iraq Detailed in New Book - Washington Post

:wo oftwhom appeared to be holding a rifle and a grenade launcher. The photographer and Iriver initieflly were both carrying cameras, which the Apache crew mistook for weapons, \fte'r crew members gained permission to fire and circled a building that blocked their view, :hey flew the Apache in for the attack, Finkel wrote,
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'Incident in New Baghdad': What happened in Iraq?
Ffbt-uai-ii 21. 2012

'Light 'em all up." Due second before thefirst burst, Noor-Eldeen glanced up at the Apache. 'Come on — fire." The others followed the gaze and looked up, too. The gunner fired. Seven of the nine men in the group began to fall, but Noor-Eldeen and Chmagh managed to run away, according to Finkel. The gunner tracked Noor-Eldeen as he fled into a pile of trash md fired three more bursts with the cannon, killing him as he could be seen trying to stand in 1 cloud of dust, Chmagh was wounded and began trying to push himself up on his knees and crawl away, but could move only a few inches. The crew saw that Chmagh was alive, but initially did not shoot lim because he was unarmed. However, when a van drove up and two men tried to pick up Chmagh, the crew requested permission to fire and received it. The gunner opened fire, killing Chmagh and the two men, and injuring two children who were inside the van. soon after the shootings, Reuters submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act tor all documents and materials about the incident, Kim said. In April, the U.S. Central Command, which oversees the U.S, military in Iraq, said it had identified eight documents but /yas vyithholding two because they were classified and released six others in redacted form, Aith classified portions blacked out. Reuters appealed in June, saying the information the military released was incomplete, challenging the decision to classify it and asking for an expedited decision. In July, the Pentagon rejected the request to expedite the appeal, Kim said. He said one of the documents released contains grainy photographs that appear to be captured from a helicopter video, which Reuters is seeking to obtain. 'It's difficult to understand whether the investigation is coming to sound conclusions without actually seeing the evidence," he said. "It is hard to make heads or tails out of the screen grabs from the video, so we would like to see the video . . . the actual unedited version of what lappened on the scene," Frank Smyth, the journalist security coordinator for the CPJ, said the U,S, military has not Tiade public several other investigations involving the deaths of joumalists killed by U.S. forces, and said that more transparency is important both for accountability and for preventing such incidents in the future. 'This case is one of quite a few, more than lo at least, where joumalists have been killed by U.S. fire in Iraq and it has not been investigated in a public way," Smyth said. "Once we have information, judgments can be made on whether they were justified." Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said U.S military personnel have repeatedly met with news managers in recent years to discuss safety issues, and U.S. commanders also have taken neasures to remind troops of the presence of reporters on the battlefield. "We think the safest ivay to cover these operations is to be embedded vyith U.S. forces," he said.
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Table of Contents
Message from the Director Threats and Trends IED Overview for Afghanistan and Iraq Global U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) U.S. European Command (EUCOM) U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) JlEDDO Mission and Mission Areas Resources Funding Personnel and Staffing JlEDDO Enterprise Management System FY 2009 Major Accomplishments Attack the Network Defeat the Device Train the Force Competitive Strategies Group FY 2009 Transfers, Transitions, and Terminations JlEDDO Field Teams Science and Technology Acronyms 3 4 4 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 9 10 10 10 11 12 12 14 15 18 19 22 22 23

Message from the Director
The Depart:ment of Defense (DoD) established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JlEDDO) in February 2006 to meet an urgent and compelling need to counter improvised explosive devices (lEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since then, JlEDDO has provided significant capabilities to warfighters - enabling IED network attack, enabling IED detection and defeat, and providing leading-edge counter-IED training to our men and women in uniform. This Annual Report provides an accounting of JIEDDO's significant efforts in Fiscal Year 2009. Highlights include: e Orchestrating a $3.1 billion effort to develop and deliver counter-IED capabilities on abbreviated timelines. • Improving effectiveness in developing and fusing information to understand and enable attacks against IED networks - and pushing that information forward to troops in theater. e Posturing JlEDDO to meet long-term DoD needs to counter lEDs as weapons of strategic influence. At the end of 2009, JlEDDO continued to deliver urgently needed counter-IED capabilities to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, where IED use dramatically escalated in 2009. On a positive note, IED use continued to decline in Iraq. Elsewhere in the world, violent extremists employed, on average, more than 250 lEDs per month. Notably, IED networks continued to (Jemonstrate remarkably rapid IED innovation cycles. We are in an extended era of persistent conflict that spans the globe. lEDs figure prominently as the weak adversary's weapon of choice - continuing a several-century trend. To counter the persistent IED threat, our nation needs new and improved counter-IED capabilities with an eye toward leaping beyond the terrorists' next innovation. As we move forward in 2010 and beyond, the men and women of JlEDDO remain committed to putting improved counter-IED capabilities in the hands of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen wherever they serve.

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Michael L, Oates LTG, U.S. Army Director

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Threats and Trends
IED Overview for Afghanistan and Iraq
lEDs continued to be a significant threat in both Afghanistan and Iraq in FY 2009, with overall incidents against U.5. and Coalition Forces (CF) decreasing in Iraq, and increasing in Afghanistan. As reflected in Figure-1, while the number of casualties caused by lEDs in Iraq has followed FY 2008 trends, IED casualties in Afghanistan began to increase in May 2009, lEDs in Iraq accounted for more than 14,400 casualties in FY 2009, a 31 percent decline from nearly 19,000 such casualties in FY 2008. In contrast, the number of casualties caused in Afghanistan increased 39 percent to almost 6,200 casualties in FY 2009 from approximately 3,800 casualties in FY 2008.
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6,800 IED incidents in FY 2009, 52 percent were found and safely cleared; 26 percent detonated but failed to produce a casualty; and 22 percent detonated and caused a CF, NonCF, or Host Nation casualty. As measured by CF casualties per incident, lEDs were 14 percent more effective in FY 2009 over FY 2008. Coupled with the significant corresponding increase in IED incidents, this resulted in over twice the number of CF casualties that were suffered in FY 2008. lEDs in Afghanistan continued to present a significant threat to CF, Most lEDs encountered in Afghanistan continued to employ simple, yet effective, technologies and designs such as Victim Operated lEDs (VOIEDs) (e,g,, pressure plates) and Command Wire lEDs (CWIEDs) that often used large net explosive weight (NEW) charges. These basic devices circumvented many CF countermeasures due to their simplicity and difficulty of detection.

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Afghanistan
lEDs were the most serious threat to Coalition Forces (CF) in Afghanistan in FY 2009. The use of lEDs in Afghanistan dramatically increased in FY 2009, continuing its steady climb since 2005. Taliban, other insurgent groups, and al Qaeda-aligned foreign fighters use lEDs to cause casualties, restrict CF Freedom of Maneuver, create insecurity in the populace, and separate CF from the civilian population. The increase in CF troop levels in Regional Commands (RC) South (S) and East (E) during FY 2009 resulted in a significant increase in IED incidents as these units pushed into areas formerly controlled by the Taliban ancj other insurgent groups. The influx of CF Into areas has led to the highest rates of IED attacks on CF since the conflict began in 2001, In FY 2009, the number of IED incidents in Afghanistan nearly doubled from FY 2008 (Figure-2). Of the more than

The incorporation of homemade explosives (HME) and other bulk explosives into large lEDs continued to be the most significant IED threat to CF in Afghanistan. HME, and other bulk explosives were used in the majority of IED main charges in Afghanistan, In addition to targeting CF vehicles, insurgents also increased targeting of dismounted forces in FY 2009 due to the increase of dismounted operations by CF forces in support of Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The lEDs used in these attacks often employed the same types of simple victim operated and command wire initiation used in attacks against mounted forces. Afghanistan Outlook: Driven largely by the increased CF presence and expanded COIN operations in Afghanistan, IED activity and lED-related casualties will persist at elevated levels in the near term. IED activity will increase as CF push into areas previously controlled by the Taliban, especially in traditional insurgent strongholds in RC-South as well as traditional insurgent areas of RC-East.

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Most lEDs encountered by CF in Afghanistan will continue to employ simple, yet effective, technologies and designs. Insurgents will continue to target armored vehicles with large net explosive weight lEDs in an attempt to cause significant casualties. With increased COIN operations requiring dismounted tactics, insurgents will also increasingly focus on targeting dismounted troops. In addition, insurgents will focus on conducting high-profile suicide attacks similar to the multiple Suicide Vehicle-Borne IED (SVBIED) attacks against CF and Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (GIRoA) targets in Kabul during FY 2009.

in the cities to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in June 2009 was a major contributing factor to the decline in the IED threat. As a result, insurgents shifted some of their IED targeting efforts to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), government and sectarian targets in attempts to reverse recent gains in security and stability. Due to the reduced operational posture of U.S, Forces Iraq (USF-I), many threat groups in Iraq have shifted a significant portion of their IED targeting efforts to Iraqi Security Forces and symbolic government and sectarian targets. However, despite a significant reduction in IED incidents, lEDs continue to present a significant threat to USF-I and will continue to threaten USF-I forces remaining in Iraq after the completion of the drawdown. Iraq Outlook: The overall decline in IED attacks against USF-I will likely continue, although there is potential that insurgents may attempt to increase attacks against USF-I depending on the outcome of Iraqi elections in FY 2010

Iraq
The decline in IED activity in Iraq continued in FY 2009, with attacks at their lowest levels since May 2004; and IED incidents falling nearly 50 percent as compared to the previous fiscal year (Figure-3). The withdrawal of the majority of U,S. Forces Iraq (USF-I) from Combat Outposts
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and during USF withdrawal operations. AlQaeda in Iraq (A0I)9ndShiaextremistswill continuetopropagate sectarian violence while A^Iwill attack Iraqi government and security targets using large SVBIEDs and Person borne lEDs(PBIEDs), Periodic spikes in IED violence can be anticipated during post election government formation, religiousholidays,andassociated pilgrimages,

Global
lEDs continued to be the weapon of choice for global insurgents and terrorists, FY 2009 saw an average of over 250 IED incidents per month outside ofAfghanistan and Iraq as shown in ^ f B ^ ^ - ^ , Device effectiveness and lethality continued to improvein many areas outside of Afghanistanand Iraq, Improvedglobal communications and coordination among threat groups has enabled proliferation of IED technology world wide ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ - ^ . Many global terrorist and insurgent groups outside oflraq andAfghanistan increasinglyreliedonlEDsandincorporated successful indigenous tactics,techniques, and procedures (TTPs)as well as those demonstrated by insurgents in Iraq andAfghanistan, lEDs will continue to threaten security forces throughout theglobe, Whilesomethreatgroups will employ lEDs

thatgrowin sophistication, others will continueto rely on relatively simple, but effective TTPs until they are effectively countered, IED events will increase in frequency in many unstable areas of the globe as threat groups share information,capitalizeon rapidly evolving global wireless communicationstechnologies,homemadeexplosives(HME), and realize the potential psychological, social, and political impact ofthis weapon, Thesetrends arealready being seen in places such as Pakistan, North and East Africa, and South America(Colombia), No other widely available terror weapon garners suchpotential for mass mediaattention and strategic influence as does the IED.

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Threat groups in CENTCOM(outside Iraq andAfghanistan) employednearly every type of lEDin FY 2009, Suicide attacks in the form of SVBIEDs and PBIEDs were common and caused significant casualties in countries such as Pakistan, The proliferation of suicide IED tactics by alO^eda and their proxies inCENTCOM continued to bea growing global threat, Pakistan continued to be thefocus o f a significant IED campaign in FY 2009 by al ^aedaandTalibanaffiliated groupsthatsoughttodestabilizethe Pakistani government and counter ongoing Pakistani military operations targeting

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extremist groups in the tribal regions and border areas with Afghanistan, Numerous PBIED and VBIED attacks on civilian, government and security force targets in FY 2009 illustrated the ability of Pakistani Islamist groups to conduct high casualty IED strikes that had strategic political and social impact. In the beginning of 2009, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni al-Qaeda organizations merged to form al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); a group capable of carrying out coordinated attacks against fortified compounds as illustrated in the 17 September 2008 assault on the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen as well as attacking U.S. interests both inside and outside the region. The continued proliferation of IED technology and TTPs from Iraq and Afghanistan to the rest of the CENTCOM area of responsibility will be a continuing concern,

SVBIED attacks against African Union security forces and other political and military targets. We assess these trends will continue into FY 2010. In North Africa and the Sahel, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) maintained an ongoing IED campaign against Algerian security forces and government targets, as well as posing an increasing IED threat to western targets in the region. On the west coast of Africa, Nigeria witnessed multiple IED attacks on multinational oil company pipelines and facilities by a loose coalition of criminal extortion groups known collectively as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOIVI)
In FY 2009, threat groups in PACOM conducted significant IED attacks in Thailand, the Philippines, India, and Indonesia, In addition to insurgent and terrorist groups, rogue states such as North Korea are assessed to have the capability to implement state-sponsored IED campaigns in the event of hostilities in the region. In Thailand, southern Malay Muslim insurgents continued to employ significant numbers of lEDs; these attacks were usually confined to the three southernmost Thai provinces. Threat groups in the Philippines, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), continued to use lEDs against the Filipino government. Of note, on 29 September 2009, an IED emplaced by members of an Islamist group on the island of Jolo destroyed an up-armored High Mobility Multi-

US. African Command (AFRICOIVI)
In AFRICOM, IED attacks were prominent in North and East Africa due to a permissive security environment, integration offoreign fighters into local insurgent groups, and increased focus on the AOR by groups such as al Qaeda, These attacks employed multiple types of lEDs, With al Qaeda influence, funding, and training, IED attacks became more lethal and sophisticated, especially in the Horn of Africa (HOA) where the al Qaeda linked al Shabaab group in Somalia demonstrated success with multiple, coordinated

purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and killed two U,S, soldiers as well asaPhilippine Marine. The IED threat in India consists ofacombination of threats from indigenous leftist groups(e,g,,the Maoist ^^Naxalites"), Pakistan based Islamist groups, and domestic Indian Islamist groups. FY 2009 saw continued IED use by violent ethnic separatist groups and Indian Maoist groups (e.g,, Naxalites)that will continue to poseasignificant IED threat to India in FY 2010.

groups could also exploit the presence of Sunni supporters in Latin America to facilitate future IED attacks against U.S, interests,

O.^.Ei^ro^eanCommand(EUCOi^)
In the EUCOM area of responsibility, domestic leftist and anarchistgroupsin^reece,dissidentIrishrepublicangroups inNorthernlreland, Spain's separatist Basque Fatherland and Liberty(ETA),andTurkey'sKongra^el(K^K), continued significant use of lEDs in FY 2009. Islamic terrorists associated with, or inspired by al Qaeda, may also attempt direct targeting of Western interests in the EUCOM area of responsibility with IED attacksthat may involve suicide operatives, ThelmiratKavkaz(IK), an Islamic extremist group in the Russian North Caucuses, will continue using sophisticated suicide IED attacks against Russian security forces,

U.^.^oi^^l^ernCommand(^OOTI^COi^)
In FY 2009, the mostsignificant IED threats in SOUTHCOM emanated from the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia, These groups conducted sophisticated and effective IED attacks on civilian, government, military,and infrastructure targets, Elsewhereinthe SOUTHCOM AOR, leftist and criminal groups conducted IED attacks against security forces, government targets, and large corporations. These attacks tended to use smaller,lesssophisticated devices. In Chile, small leftistandanarchistgroupscontinuedtocarry outsmall scalelEDattackson multinational corporations, banksand embassies in Santiago, In Peru, the Maoist influenced Shining Path, aka SenderoLuminoso(SL),has continued IED attacks against Peruvian security forces. Several Islamicextremistgroups maintain a presence in multipleareasof Latin America, This presence may provideincreased potential forfuturelEDeffortsacross the SOUTHCOM area of operational responsibility (AOR) as demonstrated bythe 19^2and 1994 Hezbollah IED attacks againstJewish targets in Argentina, Sunni Islamists

US.^or^l^ernCommand(i^ORT^COi^)
Historically,IEDs in NORTHCOM are limited to small devices related to criminal activity. Most lEDs in the U,S. and Canada during FY 2009 consisted of simple devices such as pipe bombs. However,thereremainsagrowing threat that U.S, based Islamic extremists will carry out IED attacks againsttheU,S,homelandusingtrainingandTTPsobtained overseas. In Mexico, drugcartelsbegan t o u s e l E D s o n a limited scale, Mexican cartels may increase the use of IED TT^Ps to respond to increased law enforcement pressure.

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JlEDDO Mission and Mission Areas
JIEDDO's mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DoD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders and their respective joint task forces' efforts to defeat lEDs as weapons of strategic influence. To accomplish this mission, JlEDDO has four specified mission areas: strategic planning, rapid acquisition, information fusion, and operations and training support.

Organizational Structure
JlEDDO continued to implement the organizational structure adopted in FY 2008. JIEDDO's organization (Figure-6) reflects two significant changes in FY 2009, First, JlEDDO realigned the Technology Requirements and Integration Division (TRID) and Acquisition Oversight Division (AOD) under the Capabilities Acquisition Center (CAC), Second, the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Center (JTCOIC) achieved initial operational capability in Newport News, Virginia,

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Funding
TheJointIEDDefeatFund(JIEDDF),establishedbyCongress in FY 2007 asanew appropriation, provides JlEDDO with the flexibility and agility necessary to counterlEDs and the highly adaptive networks which employ them against U,S, and Coalition forces. Providing funds with a three-year lifespan, the JIEDDF allows JlEDDO to respond rapidly to changing IED threats andinvestinpromisingemergingtechnologies. During FY 2006^FY2008,JIEDDOfundedmorethan^l2B for theCIED effort ^^^r^^-,B^, During this threeyear period, JIEDDO's main effort was to counter the IED threat in Iraq, In FY 2009, JIEDDO's funding levels decreased ^ reflecting the transfer of very expensive established programs to the Services (e,g,Counter Radiocontrolled Electronic Wartare(CREW) systems). In FY 2009, the focus of theCIED effort transitioned from Iraq to Afghanistan due t o a s h i f t in national priorities and the troop surge in Afghanistan; the grey and red lines show the historic allocation of funds to Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. In FY 2009, JlEDDO requested and received ^I.IB in funding originally planned for FY 2010 in anticipation of significant expenditures tosupport theforcesurgeto Afghanistan, The final bar depicts JIEDDO's requested FY 2010 funding. The Overseas Contingency Operations(OCO)supplemental provided 100 percent of JIEDDO's FY 2009 budgetauthority through the JIEDDF and was used to fund its four Lines of Operation (LOOs) by supporting warfighter needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, ^ ^ r ^ - ^ o n the next page shows the funding breakout of ^3,1B by LOO and the initiatives funded within these LOOs, These initiatives are described in more detail later in this report, Notably,as the focus of theCIED effort transitioned from Iraq to Afghanistan, the

Defeat the Device line of operation received 45 percent of total obligations.

Personnel and Staffing
In FY 2009, JlEDDO filled 90 percent of its Joint Manning Document (JMD) personnel authorizations. While making great strides filling its permanent government civilian billets approved in FY 2007, JIEDDOhad challenges fillingits military personnel billets, RecognizingthemilitaryServices'difficultyinprovidingactive duty military personnel, JlEDDO initiated an aggressive effort to develop and gain approval for reserve component augmentation from each of the Services, When approved, these personnel resources will enhance JIEDDO's ability to meet warfighters'C IED needs, Aninstitutionalreview,reassessment,andrevalidationofthe organization's mission andfunctions, supported by repeated government Accountability Office(^AO) recommendations, highlighted the urgent need to increase government oversight and direction. To this end, JlEDDO sought authorizations for additional government civilian billets to provide an experienced, mid-level leadership team. To reinforcegovernmentoversightand direction ofits heavily contractor based workforce, JlEDDO sought to convert the 192 contracted manpower equivalent authorizations to governmentcivilianpositionsapprovedattheorganization's inception in 2006, JlEDDO continued to rely heavily on service contracts to quickly acquirethevariety of engineering, scientific, and subjectmatterexpertisenot easily foundin the Services or through government civilian recruiting. To thisend, JlEDDO implemented a comprehensive services support contract which providesaflexible and enduring contracting vehicle, enabling JlEDDO to respond quickly to the needs of warfighters.

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JlEDDO Enterprise i^anagement System
Tl^e JlEDDO Enterprise Management System (JEMS) increases execution efficiency of JlEDDO activities by providingastreamlined, webbased, and enterprisewide set of business tools to automate organizational processes. In FY 2009, JEMS achieved initial operating capability as an integrated tracking, staffing, and decision making tool.

enabling rapid acquisition by serving as the repository for information about JIEDDO's initiatives. Residing on the SIPR network, JEMS provides internal and external transparency to JIEDDO's decision making process, JEMS access is available to external users witha^^need to know" ^instructions for obtaining access are on JIEDDO's SIPR website. Full JEMS operational capability is expected in FY 2010, with possible capabilities expansion in future years,

^^.^8
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Attack the Network: C-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC): • COIC Analytical Support Team (JCAST): $128.2M • Social Dynamics: $39.5M • Network Dynamic Analysis Comprehensive Look Team: $1.5M • Etjge User: $5.4M • Other COIC Programs: $139.3M Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI): $12SM Special Programs: •Wolfhound: $14.7M
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Detect Air: • Other DA Initives: $138.04 • Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VAOER): $2m Predict and Prevent: •Keyhole: $21 .IM • Route Clearance Optics Suite (RCOS): $17.8M Other R&D Investments: $158.1M Remaining 69 Programs: $280.2M*

the Device $1.4B

Defeat the Device: Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare (CREW): • Dismounted Man-Portable CREW 3.1: $181M • Vehicle Mounted CREW 3,2: $37.IM • CREW Vehicle Radio Jammer for Legacy Vehicles: $19M • CREW Vehicle Radio Jammer for Fixed Locations: $27 2M Detect Ground: • Counter Bomber: $17.4M • Beach Comber: S16M • Vehicle Opttcs Sensor System (VOSS): $51.3M • PBIED/VBIED Defeat: $89.3M

Neutralize: • Technology Upgrades for EOD Robots: $23.7IVI • Devil Pup; $4,8M Mitigate: • Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit (SPARK): $236M Joint IED Defeat Test Board: $111,IM Other R&D Investments: $184.2M Remaining 24 Programs: $260.8M*

Training $0.58

Train the Force: Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE): • JointTraining COIC: $19.3M • IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams: $17.7M • Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer: $10.4M • Home Made Explosives: $3.9M • Tactical Site Exploitation: $3.8M • Other JCOE Programs: $71.3M Staff and Infrastructure: Headquarters: $100.9M

Systems Integration and Modeling and Simulation: • Home Station Training Lanes: $128.4M •JointTraining COIC Database: $5.2M lEOD Integration Cell (I2C): $16.5M Technical Collection: $11,5M 1" Army CTC Leveling: $9.4M Remaining 23 Programs: $78.3M'

FY09
Flgure-8: FY09 JlEDDO Funding Highlights

11

FY 2009 Major Accompiisliments Attack the Network (AtN)
JIEDDO's AtN Line of Operation enables offensive operations against complex networks of financiers, IED makers, trainers, and their supporting infrastructure by providing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information operations, counter-bomber targeting, biometrics, and weapons technical intelligence capabilities. JIEDDO's significant FY 2009 AtN accomplishments include the following new and improved C-IED capabilities.

and Afghanistan. In FY 2009, JlEDDO procured and fielded the Edge User system to Afghanistan to support brigade combat teams whose tactical communications capabilities were unable to effectively communicate with the COIC.

Additional COIC Programs
Modeling and Simulation. From its FY 2007 inception through the end of FY 2009, the COIC produced 130 3-D virtual terrain models that enabled warfighters to move virtually through, over, and around their operational areas. In FY 2009, tactical units conducted more than 70 rehearsals or war games using these computer models to refine their tactical planning.

C-/ED Operations Integration Center (COIC)
In FY 2009, the COIC continued to provide fused analysis products to warfighters that enabled effective attacks against enemy IED networks. Continuously seeking new, innovative information fusion tools and methods, the COIC provided value to warfighters by connecting stove-piped information sources, accessing national-level intelligence data, and conducting timely analysis to meet requesting unit operational timelines. COIC analysts, working alongside interagency partners, responded to 2,154 requests for support (RFS) during FY 2009, compared to 1,780 requests in FY 2008 - a 21 percent increase. Since its FY 2007 inception, JlEDDO COIC has answered 4,716 warfighter requests for information - and in the process has simultaneously built and improved the body of IED network analytical knowledge. JlEDDO COIC Analytical Support Team (JCAST). The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the JCAST initiative which enables JlEDDO to provide embedded COIC AtN operations and analytical and technical support to warfighters in Afghanistan and Iraq. The COIC planned and coordinated JCAST as a single initiative to streamline forward support initiated earlier under three separate initiatives. In FY 2009, the three initiatives provided up to 117 personnel to support deployed warfighters. Forward support under JCAST is also more flexible to evolving requirements than had previously been possible. Social Dynamics, JIEDDO'sSocial DynamicAnalysis(SDA) program employed experts from multiple social science disciplines to build tools, techniques, and procedures to understand current and future C-IED environments. The resulting knowledge enabled wartighters to understand cultural context of their operating environment, to understand insurgent behaviors, and to target enemy networks. Edge User, Edge User is a communications capability specifically intended to enable COIC collaboration with brigade combat team C-IED planning/operations cells in Iraq 12

Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI)
w n is an intelligence category focused on the collection and forensic and technical exploitation of lEDs, associated components, and improvised weapons, WTI uniquely combines Service, intelligence community, Federal law enforcement, and national laboratory capabilities to produce actionable intelligence that enables the identification and disruption of low-signature networks that employ lEDs.

Cache of lED-maklng materials. Photo 1st Lt.Kurt Stahl

In FY 2009, JlEDDO invested almost $125M in WTI initiatives to improve and refine the exploitation capabilities and processes for overseas contingencies. While the main effort continued to be rapid response to immediate theater WTI requirements, JlEDDO played a critical role supporting WTI institutionalization in the DoD, The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) serves as the primary national facility for the processing, exploiting, and storing of wn-related material for the DoD. In FY 2009, JlEDDO and the FBI concluded that the TEDAC was substantially under-resourced to meet expected nearterm exploitation requirements and timelines on the high volume of material being recovered from the battlefield. In

response, JlEDDO provided an additional ^64M to expand analytical capabilities and triple material exploitation capacity in future years. In Afghanistan in F Y 2009, U.S, Forces Afghanistan (USFOR A) recovered thousands latent fingerprints of value from lEDs, This enabled biometric matches to people associated with lEDs, Ahigh priority USFORAeffort is collecting fingerprint data from the population to compare against latent fingerprints recovered from lED related materiaL In Iraq in F Y 2009, Multi National Force lraq (MNF I) recovered over 5,000 latent prints of value from lEDs, Todate,WTI efforts have enabled the identifications and detention of hundreds of suspects and of IED suspects. In 2009, JlEDDO, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), published and distributed more than 10,000 w n handbooks, Thesehandbooks provide detailed information on a wide range of WTI functions to assist commanders, staffs, and other warfighters in understanding and applying WTI concepts and capabilities. In September 2009,andincollaboration with theArmy,DIA, Department of Justice, and other government agencies, JlEDDO coordinated comprehensive, full-spectrum C-IED w n tactical training foradeploying Stryker BrigadeCombat Team's Soldiers ^ a significant shift from the historical practice of training individual augmentees to pertormwn tasks. The ^^nDALSUN^'initiative wasaproofofconcept for standing up and providing holistic w n pre deployment unit training. In 2009, JlEDDO facilitated C IED information sharing enhancements from the strategic to the tactical levels. Working in concert with theCIED community of interest, JlEDDO focused on facilitating the creation o f a CIED database federation,in which individual database owners make their data searchable and accessible usingacommon lexicon and an information exchange model. In November 2009,JIEDDOsuccessfullydemonstratedthatdata could be discovered and extracted from threedistinctlEDdatabases. The demonstration leveraged the Net Centric Enterprise Services information sharing infrastructure as prescribed by the DoD Net Centric Data Strategy, DoD Directive 8320.2, and other policy and guidance.

devices in Afghanistan. Wolfhound is the first system of its kind designed for use in dismounted operations, JlEDDO funded the Research Development Testing and Evaluation (RDT^E), procurement, and sustainment of 69 systems,

detect Air
DetectAirsystemsenablethewarfightertodetectinsurgent IED emplacement activityandall observables associated with lEDs and their emplacement from airborne platforms, CommandWireandDisturi^anceDetection Command Wire (CW) detection isa priority capability becausethe command wireinitiatedlEDs often have larger,more lethal charges. During IED emplacement, insurgents frequently cause detectable ground disturbances that can enable IED detection. In FY 2009 JlEDDO funded four command wire andchange detection technology solutions. These initiatives were eitheroperationally tested or funded for development as proofs of concept and all strive to achieve as effective combination of sensortechnology to detect IED observables, The Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation leadar ^VADEI^^,Vaderisacollaborative JlEDDO andDefense Advanceti Research Project Agency (DARPA) project to develop an airborne ground moving target indicator system that identifies both vehicular movement and insurgents on foot. Specifically designed forCIED AtN operations, VADER^s real time processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities alert warfighters to insurgent locations. TwoVADER prototype systems have flown more than 127 flighttests.

^peciaiPro^ran^s
Special Programs initiatives enable the warfighter to better predict where and how the enemy is employing lEDs, understand the nature and location of enemy IED networks, and preventtheenemyfrom achieving successandstrategic influence with lEDs. Wolfhound. Wolfhound is a direction-finding system used by ground forces to locate personal communications

Vehecll and Dismount Exploltlon leader, B^^OOO^^o^o

Predict an(^Pret^ent
Predict-and-Prevent systems enable the warfighter to gain collection, exploitation, and analytic advantages Signals Intelligence (SIOINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Communications Intelligence(COMIl^)^in support of AtN efforts. 13

I^oyhoie, This enhanced optics system consists of man portable equipment items that provide increased capability tosnipersaniJunitdesignatedmarksmen, Keyholedelivers an allweather,dayornight targeting capability to defeat and deter IED emplacers. In FY 2009, JlEDDO provided 158 systems to units in theater, l^outeCiearanceOpticsSystem^l^COS) RCOSprovides the same enhanced Keyhole optics reconfigured specifically tosupportRouteClearanceTeams, RouteClearanceTeams use RCOS to identify lEDs and emplacement activity along routes. JlEDDO procured 48 systems for route clearance operations in Afghanistan,

BeachComher. Reacting to an immediatewarfighter need to find buried lEDs, JlEDDO tested multiple commercial off the shelf handheld metal detectors to select one for rapid acquisition and deployment, JlEDDO funded 3,000 dectors for dismounted operations in Afghanistan, Vehicle Optics Sensor System ^VOSS) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and route clearance teams usethisdaynight, thermal imagingcamera mounted onatelescoping mast to detect lEDs and IED emplacement activities. In FY 2009, JlEDDO continued the funding of 538 VOSSs and transferred this initiative to the Army, Entry Control l^oint^ECI^) Solutions i n a B o ^ JlEDDO funded 234 ECP inaBoxkits,tailored to meet specific ECP operationalneedsinOEF. Each ECP inaBox consisted of up to 15C-IED components that detect lEDs, protect personnel, and mitigate IED blasts at ECPs, Kit composition was based upon site surveys of vehicle and pedestrian traffic,

Defeat the Device (DtD)
JIEDDO's DtD Line of Operation enhances freedom of maneuver and safe operations for Coalition Forces, Defeat the Device focuses on providing defensive technologies to detect lEDs, neutralize them before they can be detonated, or mitigate the effects of detonations, JIEDDO's FY 2009 investment included the following new and improvedCIED capabilities,

i^et^traii^e
Neutralize systems seek to denylED actuation a t a time and place of the enemy's choosing, l^oi^t Technology t^pgrades JlEDDO funded 3,140 upgrade kits forTALON and PACBOTrobots to improve system capabilities, the man machine intertace, and logistics supportability. Upgrades includedlightweightcameras, improved batteries, and handheld video screens to provide the EOD and engineer forcesamore versatile robot. Devil l^up EOD l^oi^ot Devil Pup is a man packable robot specifically designed fordismounted EOD operators. Devil Pup provides the capability to remotely disarm lEDs during long range foot patrols, JlEDDO funded the procurement and delivery of 55 Devil Pup robots.

Oot^nterPa^io^^ontroiie^iEOEiectronio ^ar^areC^PE^
The CREW family of systems prevents radio controlled IED (RCIED)switches from functioning. As cell phone and radio technologies advance, the RCIED threat rapidly evolves, which in turn drives rapid countermeasure investments to keep peace. In partnership with DoD CREW Single Manager (PMS 408), JIEDDOfunded the research, development, and procurementof thefollowing man-portable, vehiclemounted, and fixed-site jamming technologies in FY 2009: TI^OI^ Dismounted Man l^ortahie CI^EW ^CI^EW^.l),THORIIIbuiltuponpreviousdismounted CREWcapabilitiestoincreaseperformanceagainstRC IED threats, THOR III also reduced the dismounted warfighteBs load from three to two boxes, JlEDDO guided and funded the research,development, and procurement ofTHOR III systems.

detect ^rot^n^
Detect Cround systems seek to both detect person borne, vehicle borne, and buried lEDs and suspicious activity associated with IED emplacement, Coun^erBomher. Stand-off detection is critical to preventing person borne suicide IED attacks, CounterBomberisaradar and video system employed at entry control points to detect suicide bombers, JlEDDO funded 20 CounterBomber systems for OEF.
Devil Pup EOD Robot. JlEDDO Photo

14

Mitigate
Mitigate systems seek to minimize the effects of IED blasts on personnel, equipment, and facilities. Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit I I (SPARK I I ) , JlEDDO funded the development and procurement of the SPARK II in response to CENTCOM's urgent requirement for a more maneuverable roller for Afghanistan's rugged terrain. JlEDDO will field 1,679 SPARK II rollers to OEF in 2010.

academia in support of the JIEDDOC-IEDefforts, These working groups created tools for data management, standardized test protocols, coordinated electronic warfare techniques, and prioritized threat lists.

Train the Force (TtF)
JIEDDO's TtF Line of Operation assesses Joint and Service C-IED training requirements and supports the development and improvement of training initiatives to enable warfighters to organize, plan, and conduct C-IED operations; properly employ C-IED equipment; and improve understanding of emerging IED threats. In FY 2009, JlEDDO funded $509M in a broad array of C-IED training initiatives to support urgent Service and COCOM requirements. JlEDDO refined its unit pre-deployment training with emphasis on training synchronization, Battle Staff C-IED training, and information sharing. Home Station Training Lanes. FY 2009 was JIEDDO's last year funding the Home Station Training Lanes (HSTLs) initiative due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense's June 2008 decision to transfer the lanes to the Services. Over the course of 16 months, JlEDDO provided nearly $500 million dollars to the Services for constructing, equipping, and manning HSTLs. The HSTL initiative created or upgraded 57 home station training lanes at 55 locations and encompassed more than 150 C-IED training initiatives. Joint Center of Excellence. The JlEDDO Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) focused on facilitating individual, collective, and unit C-IED training - enabling joint forces to proactively defend against and defeat IED threats they will face in combat. The JCOE also addressed IED training gaps arising from the rapid fielding of C-IED capabilities directly to combat theaters.

Route Clearance Team with RHINO and SPARKS, JlEDDO Photo

JIEDD Test Board (JTB)
JTB validates that JIEDDO-funded C-IED initiatives are proven capabilities and allows DoD leadership to confidently field new technologies. In FY 2009, JlEDDO funded over 500 JTB test events. The JTB conducted tests to evaluate JlEDDO C-IED efforts across the JlEDDO capabilities portfolio, including handheld metal detectors, robots, counterPIR systems, airborne IED detection systems, and support equipment. JTB conducted over 200 COCOM-requested test events to validate CREW systems' performance and document their compatibility with other U.S. and Coalition electronic systems. The Joint led Defeat Test Board invested in Joint Experimental Range Complexex and the istallation of advanced communications systems. The Joint IED Defeat Test Board funded upgrades to electronic warfare text benches and ranges. The Joint IED Defeat Test Board coordinated working groups drawn from the Services, industry, and

JlEDDO JCOE instructor at Ft. Inwin. JlEDDO Photo

15

Located at Fort Irwin, California, and operational since 2006, the JCOE leadsfour subordinate, Serviceoriented centers of excellence(COE): the Army COE at Fort Irwin; the Navy COE at Indian Head, Maryland; the Air Force COE at Lackland Air Force Base,Texas; and the Marine Corps COE atTwentynine Palms, California,

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Intenmedlate Search (Tactical Site Exploitation). JlEDDO Photo

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JCOE construction of an Iraqi village, JlEDDO Photo

In FY 2009, the JCOE funded $290M in materiel training initiatives and $123M on technical, non-materiel C-IED training solutions. Through FY 2009, the JCOE has supported C-IED training for more than 65 Army brigade combat teams and 60 Marine Corps battalions constituting more than 200,000 individual service members, FY 2009 C-IED training innovations developed and funded through JCOE included: Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE). In a span of 90 days, the JCOE produced an initial TSE capability at the Army's National Training Center (NTC), TSE trains warfighters on search techniques, collection methods, and tactical questioning to ensure that documents, material, and personnel are identified, collected, protected, and evaluated. This enables rapid exploitation of information gained, facilitating further investigation and action against IED networks. The TSE initiative included constructing a small village complex modeled on Iraqi villages, where certified TSE instructors conducted search training. Capitalizing on the initial success, the JCOE expanded the TSE training to the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and seven other sites, including Camp Shelby, Camp Atterbury, Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, and Marine Corps Base in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, In the aggregate, the JCOE invested more than $7M in TSE and other search training initiatives during FY 2009. Home Made Explosives (HME). In early FY 2009, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Paladin, Afghanistan, identified an urgent need for warfighters to detect HME and unknown bulk explosives (UBE) being used in lEDs. Within five days of receiving

the requirement, the JCOE began training a joint, interagency, and coalition team to assist in HME/UBE training. In collaboration with Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives chemists, the JCOE developed a course to provide warfighters specialized knowledge of the chemistry involved in producing HME - enabling them to recognize HME production signatures, C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams (C-MATT). In FY 2009, the JCOE created C-MATT to provide focused C-IED training for units not having a pre-deployment training opportunity at a combat training center (CTC), The C-MATTs coached, mentored, and trained unit leaders and battle staffs to implement USCENTCOM's Counter-IED Training and Capabilities Guidance. C-MATT leveraged C-IED home station training lanes for units requiring this training, as identified by the Army's force generation process. During FY 2009, C-MATTs trained more than 6,000 Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen.

Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer. JlEDDO Photo

Joint Asymmetric Threat Awareness and C-IED Training Program (JATAC). In FY 2009, the JATAC training program, started in FY 2007, continued to address critical C-IED pre-deployment training gaps, such as: embedding C-IED trainers and

16

enablers in deploying units, training opposing force role players to provide relevant and realistic training to deploying units, training tactical site exploitation skills, and preparing EOD forces for theater-specific threats. Through FY 2009, the JATAC program has trained 8,500 service members at 27 locations for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, MohileCIED Interactive Trainer (MCIT), The MCITinitiative provided Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marineswithself paced, interactive, adaptable, field configurable IED threat training specific to each unit's anticipated area of operation. The MClTconsists of four 40foot trailers equipped with interactive multi media equipment that can rapidly be adapted to evolving threats. The MCIT increases warfighterC-IED awareness with information about IED components, IED employment strategies, and IED network organization and functioning. In FY 2009,warfighters at Fort Bragg and Camp Pendelton provided enthusiastic support for the MCITsystem, JlEDDO anticipates delivering future systemsto CONUS and combat zone locations to meet warfighter training requirements.

and Joint Forces forlED network attack, JlEDDO plans to fund the JTCOIC asaproofofconcept initiative for two yearsbeforetransferringthecapability. During FY 2009, the JTCOIC supported active and reserve Army,Navy,Air Force, and Marine Corps components. The JTCOIC established training support cells at the Army's CTCs in the U,S, and Germany, TheJTCOICinauguratedsupporttoJointForcesCommand (JFCOM)forthe United Endeavor exerciseseries, which trains Division, Corps, Marine Expeditionary Force, and Joint Task Force headquarters deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, JTCOIC's support included developing IED network scenarios and storylines to create appropriate, robust IED problem sets drawn from Iran and Afghanistan for these headquarters. The JTCOIC alsomentored the JFCOM exerciseC IEDobservertrainerstofacilitate realistic, productive staff training, C IED training innovations developed and funded through theJTCOIC during FY 2009 included: Systems Integration and Modeling and Simulation (SIMS). In FY 2009, theJTCOIC continued the development of training, modeling, and simulations capabilities through their SIMS team. The SIMS team employed innovative technologies andmethods to recreate IED events as interactive, three-dimensional visualizations, JTCOICisableto producearealisticvisualizationasquickly as four days - a uniqueDoD capability. During the year, more than 150 organizations downloaded these unclassified training products for deployment preparation, JTCOIC Central Training Datai^ase TheJTCOIC collected information from more than 50 data sources andarchivedthem in its central training databaseamassingmorethanonemillioncombatzonemessages and reports,TheJTCOIC, JCOE, and other units draw upon this database to develop richCIED exercises for units at the operational and tactical levels. The information drawn from the central training database profoundlyimpactedtrainingenvironmentsbyenabling realistic detail that was previously unattainable.

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JointTraining Counter lED Operations Integrations Center(JTCOIC). In FY2009,theJTCOICachieved initial operating capability in Newport News, Virginia, as the single sourcefortraining COIC tools and processes to the Services

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The Competitive Strategies Group (CSG) extends the JlEDDO Director's strategic and critical thinking process by challenging JIEDDO's strategy and decisions with independent, critical, and alternative perspectives that are technologically, culturally, and politically aware. These efforts enable JlEDDO to gain and maintainacompetitive advantage across the global operational environment, CSG is functionally aligned withaStrategic Influence Cell (SIC),aCultural and Political Perspectives Ceil(CPC), anda Technology Exploitation Cell, Strategic Influence and Cultural Political Cell (SIC^ CPC), The SIC^CPC provides an independent capability to fully explorealternatives in plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities in the context of the operational environment and from the perspectives of partners, adversaries, and others. Over the past 12 months, theSIC^CPC has published more than 70^^red teaming" information papers designed to provoke thought and generate discussion to help shape an understanding of how the adversary may view actions taken by Blue Forces, Topics included: ^^Coalition Force buildup in Afghanistan: What will be the response7"^^Whatwillhappen when CF draws down in Iraq7" and ^^How does North Korea plan to useIEDs7" In response to the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act,theSIC^CPC collaborated with various organizations and agencies to identify potential IED threats facing the COCOMs in 2012 2018, JIEDDO's response highlighted the portability of knowledge and skills needed to construct and uselEDs, The report concluded that each COCOM faces divergent and decentralized hostile actors with increasing capability and lethality. Technology Exploitation Cell (TEC) The TEC provided an independent capability to create and exploit technical C IED defeat alternatives. The cell

considered ^^what'snext7" in thelED fight, reached out tothe commercial sector to identify newand emerging technologies, and leveraged relationships with other government agencies, industry, and academia to discover and mitigate vulnerabilities andpotential uses of current and emerging technologies as lEDs, TheTEC is organized into three groups: Technical l^e^^^lue Team Assessment Croup During F Y 2009, competing Technical Red^Blue Teams completed more than 65 ^^QuickLook" and detailed assessments. These teams from Johns Hopkins University^Applied Physics Lab,GeorgiaTech Research Institute, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology^Lincoln Labs theorized Red Force counter countermeasures (CCMs)to defeat Blue ForceCIED systems. In response, BlueTeams documented the expected effectiveness of likely Red Force CCMs, identified system limitations and vulnerabilities, and offered recommendations to improve the system's capabilities. These efforts shaped the development of Service and JlEDDO initiatives, such as MANPOWER, C0UNTERB0MBER2, Shield, Laser Vibrometry IED Detection, and theJointLightTactical Vehicle, Device Coordination Croup (DCC) The D C G reverse engineered and reproduced lEDs found in Iraq andAfghanistan, These IED surrogate devices were used for Joint Counter lED system testing and training. In 2009, DCG supported 15 test events and provided more than 1,100 individual devices for DoD test ranges and laboratories. Device Innovation Croup (DIC) The DIG provided research in and production of emerging threats not yet seen, but likely to be used. During 2009, the DIG traveled to international technology tradeshows and conferences andselectedconsumerelectronics to be evaluated as possible future lEDs,

IS

FY 2009 Transitions, Transfers, and Terminations
C-IED Initiative Transitions, Transfers, and Terminations (T3), Chartered by the DoD to rapidly acquire C-IED capabilities, JlEDDO seeks to transition or transfer proven C-IED initiatives to the Services, COCOMS, or government agencies for lifecycle management and sustainment within two years. Similarly, JlEDDO seeks to terminate initiatives that have met an urgent requirement and are no longer needed or have failed to deliver anticipated results. Timely initiative transition, transfer, or termination avoids JlEDDO being saddled with long-term resource commitments and enables JlEDDO to apply limited resources to the most urgent emerging C-IED requirements. JlEDDO transitioned or transferred 48 C-IED capabilities and terminated 14 initiatives in FY 2009 (see Appendix below). JlEDDO transitions C-IED initiatives when those initiatives are expected to provide an enduring capability for the joint force and are expected to become a program of

record funded in the President's budget, JlEDDO transfers CIED initiativeswhenthesolution isnot expectedtoprovide an enduring capability, but will continue to be sustained and used in the current conflict; transferred initiatives are expected tobe sustained through Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental funding requests, JlEDDO hosts monthly Transition andTransfer Working Group meetings with Service, COCOM, and agency representativesfor processtransparency and to provide Services, COCOMs, and agencies time to program and otherwise plan for transitions and transfers. Annually in the 3rd Quarter,JIEDDOformally briefs its T3 recommendations to the Protection Functional Capabilities Board (P FCB) WorkingGroup, Joint CapabilitiesBoard(JCB),and Joint RequirementsOversightCouncil(JR0C),BaseduponJR0C's endorsement,aJROC Memorandum (JROCM) is prepared for the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,informing the Services and agencies of the JROC action, TheT3list along with the JROCM is forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) for T3 decision.

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WtKKKKB (U) (U) H^daWiedCIEDsmoit Safe, non-inlrusive screening system that rapidly and accurately images metallic and non-metallic objects concealed on a person s body COTS EMI sensors and magnetometers to detect and locate deeply buried weapons caches Sofiware designed to assist EWOs in the employment of Counter Radto-Controlted IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) systems (jammers) in support of tactical operations. Mobile integrated sun/eiltance for force protection providing Full Motion Video from EO/IR sensor, with radar cueing & PSDS2. Family of commercial systems to non-intrusively inspect vehicles and cargo for explosives and other contraband associated with lEDs. A stand-off capability to RG-31 and Husky thai is similar to the arm on a Buffalo vehicle. Joint database for collection, analysis, and sharing of information related lo effectiveness of personal protective equipment and vehicle equipment designed to protect against blast injury. Expert criminal enterprise analysts who can enhance commander's ability to identify, monitor, penetrate, interdict, and suppress criminal networks. Fleld-deployable, trailer-mounted mobile inspection systems using gamma and X-ray technologies to inspect vehicle mtenors and engine compartments. Rapidly deployable surveillance system for quick set-up of Combat Outposts. * DSD 8/17/07 DSD 8/17/07 DSD 8/17/07

(U) Backscatter X-rays of Personnel (U) Bloodhound (U) CREW - Coalition Joint Spectrum Management Planning Tool (U) Eagle Eye (U) Explosive Detection Equipment (U) IED Detection and Interrogation Arm (U) Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat (U) Law Enforcement Program (LEP) (U) Next Generation Mobile Non-Intrusive Inspection System (U) RDISS (Rapid Deployable Integrated Surveillance System

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20

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Repair services and spares at the lowest replaceable unit The rapid introduction of improved CREW systems soon limited the sustainability of this initiative, as newer CREW variants could not be serviced by the old spares components. Telescopic, man-portable, lightweight robotic manipulator Vehicle-mounted RCIED neutralization system Reachback provided to Information Operations support to JlEDDO UHF radar system on a C-12 aircraft to provide airborne tactical surveillance Highly classified C-IED project Remote Control HMMWV to lead convoys in urban terrain X-Ray apparatus used to identify hazards internal to suspect devices LOO IPT recommended Termination. 7/14/09

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^^^^^O^^^^d^^^^^
JlEDDO FieldTeams are deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to ensurethat all CIED efforts translate effectively into each theater. They serve as JIEDDO's primary operational link,supportingthesuccessfulintegrationofCIEDtraining, materiel programs, and networkattacksolutionsintocurrent operations, JlEDDO FieldTeams supported thedelivery and distribution, ongoing development, and operational training ofawide array ofCIED capabilities throughout FY 2009,including mine rollers,CREWsystems,pre detonation systems, and route clearance equipment, Non materielsupportincludedintegrationofCorps, Division, and Marine Expeditionary Force support team elements intocoordinatedCIEDcells; observation of individual unit CIED TTPs;and facilitation of intheater and reachback COIC support for operations planning and execution. Inlraq,the JlEDDO FieldTeam Commander also serves asthe intheaterCOIC Director, leveraging COIC tools to enable commanders on the ground to effectively attack the IED networks within their respective areas of responsibility, Inaddition,theJIEDDOFieldTeamAfghanistanCommander also serves as the CJTF Paladin Commander and the International Security Assistance Force C IED Branch Chief,

Through sensor fusion research investment, JlEDDO developed the fusion exploitation framework (FEF), an open standard, software interface layer which serves as a foundation for implementing advanced fusion within multi sensor and multi intelligence systems. The FEF was transitioned from S^T to the Distributed Common Ground Station^Army (DCGS-A) V3,l. This capability willbe delivered to theater in 4th quarter FY2010 and will enable bothinteractiveandautomated fusion withintbe Army's battlefield intelligence system. In FY 2009, JlEDDO establishedaSocial Dynamic Analysis (SDA)S^Tportfolio inthe Attack the Network Line of Operation to examinetheuse of social science, cultural understanding, and analytic methodologies to counter networks employing lEDs, Under the hypothesis that an insurgency has access to unlimited human capital and thus cannot be defeated by attrition, SDA examines stx^ial dynamics, counterinsurgency dt^rine, and non kinetic methodstodeter,mitigate,and^orreduceinsurgency. Within the COIC, JlEDDO developed innovative new technologies and methodologies to assist all source intelligence analysts in scoping, assessing, and fusing information about insurgent networks. The JlEDDO S^T portfolio extends beyond technology developmentand lookstodevelopunderstandingofphysical phenomena associated with lEDs and the environments in which they are placed. This understanding guides both new detection technology investment and warfighter training, JlEDDO S^T supported medical research to understand IED blast effects on warfighters^informing personal protection technology investments. In 2009, JlEDDO continued to expandand leverage the resources of its solutions network to develop an increased understanding of the threat and to continuously search for new capabilities for the warfighter. JlEDDO participated as amember of the Defense Science andTechnoIogy Advisory Group tocoordinateitsS^TinvestmentsacrosstheServices. JlEDDO leveraged National Research Council and Defense Science Board expertise to advise JIEDDOIeadership on S^T program execution, JlEDDO hosted semi annual Technology Outreach Conferences to publicizeCIED gaps and seek solution proposals from industry partners.

^^^^^^^^^d^^^^^^^^^^
JlEDDO continued to evolve its C IED Science and Technology (S^T) program withaportfolio of more than 200 projects. The preponderance of JIEDDO's ^500M S^T investment focused on immediate warfighter needs; however, JlEDDO also madekey investments to provide longer termC-IED solutions. In coordination with Director, Defense Research^Engineering, JlEDDO published its first S^T Investment Strategy for Countering lEDs^identifying counterlED capability gaps; outlining S^Tprograms to address these gaps; and describing efforts to coordinate counter lED S^Tinvestments across the DoD, In2009,JIEDDOdeployedmultiplecommandwiredetection systems to combat theaters for operational assessments, including Desert Owl, Copperhead, and Sand Dog, Through focusedS^T investments, JlEDDO continuedto advance stateoftheartcommand wire and buried IED detection systems.

22

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
3G ACGU AFRICOM ABIED ANSF AOR AOD AQI ATEC AtN CAC CCMS CDMA CENTCOM CF CIED CTFP CTTF CMATT COCOMs COE COIC COIN COMINT CONUS CREW CSG CTC CVRJ CW CWIED DARPA DCG DFFC DHS DIA DoD DoJ DSTAG DtD DTMF ECP EFP ELINT ELN EO EOD EUCOM FARC FEF FOB FVEY third generation Australia, Canada, Great Britain, United States U.S, Africa Command Air borne IED Afghan National Security Forces area of responsibility Acquisition Oversight Division alQaeda in Iraq Army Test and Evaluation Command JlEDDO LOO: Attack the Network Capabilities Acquisition Center countercountermeasures Code Division Multiple Access U.S, Central Command Coalition Forces Counter Improvised Explosive Device Counter-IEDTargeting Program Combined JointTask Force CIED Mobile Assistance TrainingTeams Combatant Commands Center of Excellence Counter^IEDOperations Integration Center Counterinsurgency Communications Intelligence Continental United States Counter Radio Controlled IED Electronic Warfare Competitive Strategies Group CombatTraining Center Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer command wire Command Wire IED Defense Advanced Research Project Agency Device Coordination Group DirectionallyFocused Fragmentation Charge Department of Homeland Security Defense Intelligence Agency Department of Defense Department of Justice Defense Science andTechnoIogy Advisory Group JlEDDO LOO: Defeat the Device DualToneMultiFrequency Entry Control Point Explosively Formed Projectile Electronic Intelligence National Liberation Army electrooptical Explosive Ordnance Disposal U,S, European Command Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia Fusion Exploitation Framework fon/^ard operating base Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand Government Accountability Office Global CounterTerrorism Force Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan GWOT Global War onTerrorism HME homemade explosive HMDS Husky Mounted Detection System HMMWV Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HOA Horn of Africa HSTLs Home StationTraining Lanes HUMINT Human Intelligence 12C lEDD Integration Cell IED Improvised Explosive Device lEDD IED Defeat ImiratKaukaz IK Infra Red IR IRAM Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISF Iraqi Security Forces JAM Jayshal Mahdi JATAC Joint AsymmetricThreat Awareness and CIED JCAAMP Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process JCAST JlEDDO COIC Analytical SupportTeam JCB Joint Capabilities Board JCOE JlEDDO: Joint Center of Excellence JlEDDO Enterprise Management System JEMS JFCOM U,S, Joint Forces Command JIEDDF Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund JlEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization JMRC Joint Multinational Readiness Center JOLLER Joint IED Neutralize Roller JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council JROCM JROC Memorandum JTB JIEDDOTest Board JTCOIC JointTraining Center IED Operations Center TTF JointTask Force LVBIED Large Vehicle Borne IED LOO Line of Operation MCFI Multinational Coalition Forces lraq MCTF MobileC-IEDInteractiveTrainer MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MNFI Multi National Forces Iraq MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) NDACLT Network Dynamic Analysis Comprehensive Look Team NORTHCOM U,S, Northern Command NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NTC NationalTraining Center OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OCO Overseas Contingency Operations OPFOR Opposing Forces PACOM U.S. Pacific Command GAO GCTF GIRoA

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PBIED PFCB PIR RC RC RCEast RC South RCIED RCOS RF RFI RFS RDT8tE S^T SDA Services SIC/^CPC SIED SIGINT SIMS SIPR SOCOM SPARK SVBIED SVIED T3 TEDAC TRIO TSE TtF T^Ps UBE UBIED UHF ULFA USFI USFORA UVIED VBIED VOIED VOSS WBIED WIT YPG

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PersonBornelED Protection Functional Capabilities Board passive infrared (type of switch) regional command remote control Regional Command East, Afghanistan Regional Command South Afghanistan Radio controlled IED Route Clearance Optics Suite radio frequency request for information request for support Research DevelopmentTesting and Evaluation Science andTechnoIogy Social Dynamic Analysis U.S, Military Services Strategic Influence and Cultural Political Cell Suicide IED Signals Intelligence Systems Integration and Modeling and Simulation Secret Internet Protocol Router U.S, Special Operations Command Self Protection Adaptive Roller Kit Suicide Vehicle Borne IED Suicide Vest IED Transitions, transfers, and terminations Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center Technology Requirements and Integration Division Tactical Site Exploitation JlEDDO LOO:Train the Force tactics, techniques, and procedures unknown bulk explosive Underbelly IED ultra high frequency United Liberation Front of Assam U,S. Forces Iraq U,S, Forces Afghanistan UnderVehiclelED Vehicle Borne IED VictimOperatedlED(switch) Vehicle Optics Sensor System WaterBornelED Weapons Intelligence Teams Weapons Technical Intelligence Yuma Proving Ground

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HELMAND KANDAHAR NIMROZ

A t t a c k t h e Net wo rk — D e f e a t t h e D e v i c e - Train t h e

Force

05-EC-M-0005

Issuance date: 01 S E P 2005

Deployment Planning for Information Systems
V e r s i o n 1.0 1. Overview:

Information systems (ISs) are an integral part of the Army's operational warfighting support, and our reliance on ISs requires that they be treatetj similarly as another weapons system. Commanders shall include ISs in their deployment and redeployment plans in order to protect the information, the IS, and the networks to which they connect. Commanders must ensure that ISs are properly prepared, and the individuals responsible for the management and security of these ISs are properly resourced and trained. When deployed, information systems must arrive in theater prepared to support the Combatant Commander and quickly integrate into an existing infrastructure. Redeploying ISs returning from theater must be sanitized and reconfigured to support the installation's base architecture as required. No system will connect to a garrison environment until these security actions are completed and verified. ISs must be maintained in a proactive state of readiness, whether deployed or in garrison. Updated security baselines, lAVM compliance, host-based security protections, and full accreditation are the minimal requirements. References: A, AR 25-2, Information Assurance (PARAs: 1-4c(1); 5-4) (URL LINK) B, DoDI 8500.2, Information Assurance Implementation (URL LINK) C, Army C10/G6 Memorandum; SUB: Interim Policy for Information Systems Deployment and Redeployment Vulnerability Management, DTD 10 MAR 04, 2. Point(s) of Contact (POC): NETC-EST-IA, Office of Information Assurance and Compliance (OIA&C) greg.weaver(gus.army.mil 703-602-7421 (DSN 332) Greg A. Weaver CECOM POC for the Universal Purge Tool Edward Baidy edward.baidy@us,army.mil 732-427-5540 (301) 688-5861

NSA Customer Service Desk, Protective Technologies

ACERTCNO website: https://www.acert.1stiocmd,army,mil/tools/. 3. Description of Former State: No requirement to identify or configure computer systems as part of a deployment or redeployment operation, 4. Description of Changes Instituted: Minimum acceptable procedures for identifying and securing ISs as part of operational deployment and warfighting, A, These BBP measures shall be considered for ISs in the following scenarios:

(1) Any IS that is/was connected to any Joint, Interagency, or Multinational environment. (2) Any IS that is/was identified for deployment into an operational theater external to the generating force (sustaining base) Area of Responsibility (AOR) for any length oftime. (3) Any IS that is/was used in any exercise or deployment to support Army organizations or agencies external to the generating force (sustaining base) architecture. (4) Any IS that departs/departed installation support or is/was connected to a nontrusted/unverified network as part ofan operation, exercise, or travel, B, Local evaluations ofthe vulnerabilities and risks and reconnection approval processes are required before reconnecting systems.

DEFENSE EXHIBIT H for identification PAGE OFFERED: PAGE ADMITTED: PAGE of PAGES

05^EC^^ 0005

Issuance date: 01 S E P 2005

OeploymentPlanningforlnformation Systems
Vefsionl.O
C, Commanders,DAAs and DOIMs ^or DOIM equivalents),must establishaquarantine and re introduction policy and implement procedures that addresses the risks of reintroducing ISs retuming from deployments to reconnect to their supporting networks. 5. Desct^i^tiot^ of ^ n ^ State: Deployment and redeployment plans shall include the requirements identified inAR 25-2,Information Assurance and this BBP as part ofthe operational mission to protect ISs and networks. These requirements should be stated in unit operations orders and other directives with command emphasis ^. Description of Required Resoui^ces: Assessment and scanning, patch and configuration management, and anti virus sofiware packagesaretheminimal required tools in ordertomanage deploying and redeploying ISs effectively. Training of individuals in the skills necessary to accomplish security managementactionsiscriticalforsuccess 7. Description of Derived benefits Resulting front In^plementation: Minimum acceptable lA requirements and standards established to safeguard information and IS. ^. Adt^iriistrativeRe^uit^ements: A Deploymentplanning shall include the requirements identified i n A R 2 5 2,Information Assurance Every IS or device shall have the latest authorized and acceptable security configurationsappliedbeforestorageortransiL Asaminimum,thisconfiguration shall include: system identification, newestauthorizedoperatingsystemandapplicationsservice packs and updates: identified lAVM fixes: updated anti-virus products and signature files: and updated managementsoftwat^eusedinthetheaterifknownThe ISwill be labeledwith this information beforestorageforeaseofidentification upon arrival in theaterDeployment planning shall includeamanagement plan for ensuring security and management updates are accomplished as necessary during deploymenf B. Redeployment planning shall incorporate the requirements identified inAR 25-2, InformationAssuranceEvery IS ordevice returning mustbesafeguarded tothe levelof information contained on the system. Implement data consolidation and preservation procedures for lessons leamed,after action reports,or analysis as required,Asasecurity consideration, purge or re baseline ISs before storing for transif C, Before connection to the installation environment fromadeployment,all ISs must be either: purgedand rebuilt, orprocessedthroughanassessmentandcertificationstationor quarantine procedure that will certify the integrity of the IS as updated to the latest security baseline, with lAVMcompliance, anti-virus and management configurations as minimums. Evaluate the presence of unauthorized software or applications on returning systems and rebuild those systems containing unauthorized, illegal, or highly vulnerable applications or services. Ideally, identify or remove all non upgradeable or non-supportable ISs from the inventory at this point and purge and appropriately label ISs for final disposal. D SAs/NAs shall be trained on the tools used to maintain security compliance. Deployment planning shall include successfully masteringthoseskillsnecessarytoenforce security configurations, vulnerability assessment scanning, remediation, and reporting, and network managementoroperations capabilities E. ^. Definitions and acronyms can be found in the AR 25-2 Glossary.

Related 8 8 P s :

05-EC-M-0005

Issuance date: 01 S E P 2005

Deployment Planning for Information Systems
V e r s i o n 1.0

04-PE-O-0001:

03-VI-O-0001:
04- EC-O-0004: 10. Products:

Reuse of Army Computer Hard Drives (URL LINK) Classified Data Spillage Procedures (URL LINK) Network Assessment Scanning (URL LINK)

A. Norton Ghost, Enterprise License: Enterprise license will be made available. Refer to the Army Small Computing Website for details on status and availability. https://ascp.monmouth, army, mil/scp/index.jsp B. Approved scanning and assessment applications. C. Universal Purge Tool (CECOM developed: see POC). D. Tamper Evident Security Tape: NSA POC. 11. Description: Ideally, the following steps should be addressed based upon requirements of the Commander and the DAA. Exceptions and approvals should be documented as part of the deployment planning, A, Pre-deployment procedures should be performed at a centralized location to ensure all IS are inventoried, documented, and prepared for deployment, (1) (a) SA/NA and IA personnel preparations: System and Network administrators should enroll and complete any required or appropriate training as is available on the lA Custom Learning path on Smartforce/Skillsoft. Suggested training includes: i. Intrusion Detection and Response in Networked Environments. ii. Operating Systems and File Security Issues (Appropriate OS module), iii. Introduction to Security in a Networked Environment. iv. Access control and Physical Security. Obtain all required system, program, approved vulnerability assessment, and lA tools required to support ISs, Identify requirements and train users on acceptable use, anti-virus, physical security and incident handling/response procedures, Create and provide boot, purging, sanitization, and management software for deploying systems and units, Obtain war-dialing software to be used to identify rogue modem connections. Obtain copies of forensic applications (i.e. Log Collector) from the Computer Crimes Investigative Unit (CCIU) for applicable IS from the ACERTCNO website, Plan and practice emergency recovery operations for IS. Plan and practice purge and rebuild operations for IS. SA/NA and lA training links: i. https://ia.gordon.army,mil ii. http://my.smartforce.com iii. https://iatraining,us.army.mil/ IS preparation: Create a pre-deployment asset database/spreadsheet for inventory of IS, external media, portable and other devices. Verify that current IS hardware can support any new OS/updates.

(b)

(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)

(2) (a) (b)

0 5 E C I ^ 0005

l s s u a n c e d a t e : 0 1 S E P 2005

DeploymentPlanningforlnformation Systems
Vetsionl.O
(c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (3) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (4) Purge old drive(s) if never performed Replace/destroy outdated/unsupportable IS or hardware, Determine asset value (i,e,MA(^ level), Revision levels, Maintenance agreements. Lease details. Establish baseline OS for workstations and servers: Install latest Army baselined OS. (Consideration must be given to impact of the newest OS on that of the theater approved and supported OS.) Install latest service pack (SP) and all OS security/hotfix patches for the approved baseline, Remove unnecessary services or disable embedded unauthorized hardware (i e, wireless capabilities). Ensure wireless and IR capability cannot be re-initiated by the user when prohibited Remove or disable sample, test configurations, and default accounts from OS installation(eg guest, administrator) Configure default security parameters (passwords: accounts: etc), Configure system and OS defaults for theater operations (e g. time zone, account format, audit logging). Document any program managed (PM),legacy,unpatchable,noncompliant, or nonupgradeable systems required for deployment and devisearisk management plan to protect these systems, Create and secure system specific boot disks for emergency recovery operations. Install/update necessary applications:

(a) Office applications. (b) Anti-virus application with most recent update, (c) Security applications if used(eglPSec,Tripwire) (d) Management/remote management applications used in theater/exercise. (e) Flost based firewall or IDS/IPS (f) Patch Management agenL (g) Backup-recovery software. (h) Authorized/licensed applications (Winzip, Adobe Acrobat, etc). (i) CAC/PKl Reader Applications (if not included in baseline) (j) Functional applications and data as required. (5) (6) (7) Perform vulnerability assessment on OS image. Remediate identified vulnerabilities. Load imaged OS onto workstations/servers.

(8) For systems that are preloaded with data before deployment, incorporated tamper identification measurestorevealevidenceoftampering,priortostorageortransiL Tamper-evident measures should be unique and non-replicable by end users or unauthorized personnel Backup copies of information shall be prepared and shipped or managed separately for COOP measures in the event of catastrophic loss of the IS

05-EC-M-0005

Issuance date: 01 S E P 2005

Deployment Planning for Information Systems
V e r s i o n 1.0 (9) Place pre-deployment certification label on external case IAW local policy or as shown in the sample below. (10) (a) (b) (c) (d) Create and provide baseline back-up images/software for deploying systems. Original Original License License media inventory verification. media labeled and stored (SW). restrictions (SW). conformance verification.

(11) Update Asset and Vulnerability Tracking Repository (A&VTR) with deploying assets and theater reporting requirements. B. In-theater IA requirements: (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (2) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (I) (3) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Asset Management: Verify pre-deployment inventory database/spreadsheet and tamper evidence verification measures. Physical identification of each asset, Physical location map (HW). IP and Ethernet address (HW). Weekly asset verification. Network probes (scanning). Process for adding/moving/decommissioning HW and SW. Data and process to determine asset value (i.e. MAC level). Update A&VTR as required. Facilities Management: Power supply capacity and distribution. UPS. Air conditioning. Fire control and protection measures. Environmental failure monitoring and alerting. Physical security. Appropriate maintenance contracts for core equipment. Appropriate console (privilege) management. Data center layout and network topology maps, Host responsibility assignments. IP allocations register. Critical support documents. Network Management: Network management console implemented. Proactive monitoring of network health. Network management provides alerts of network outages or failures. Network devices use common protocol to report failures (SNMP). Procedure for addition, removal and movement of network devices. Procedure for allocation and recovery of network addresses. Accurate network register maintained.

05-EC-M-0005

I s s u a n c e d a t e : 01 S E P 2 0 0 5

Deployment Planning for Information Systems Version 1.0
(h) (i) (j) (k) (I) Tool to scan for network exceptions: duplicate addresses, illegal addresses. Tools for identifying and isolating network faults. Policy and requirements for network gateway implementation, Policy for remote access (i.e. modem) facilities. Procedures for severing/restricting gateway and modem connections in the event of a security incident, (m) Procedures and tools in place to protect network from exterior networks (e.g. firewalls). (n) Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect illegal traffic on internal network, (o) Procedures and tools for monitoring for illegally connected gateways/modems, (p) Weekly network security audits performed. (q) Reporting procedures for network outages, incidents, or intrusions IAW AR 25-2. (r) Share notification, administrative, and technical contact information with the Regional/Theater RCERT/TNOSC/RCIOs, Server Management: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (6) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (7) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Account management standards. Product installation and configuration standards, Host configuration baseline, Centralized audit server where all system logs are maintained and reviewed, Weekly, well defined house cleaning (rolling and archiving logs). System backups, Centralized administration - tools direct results and errors to central monitoring. Key aliases defined. Software Management: Policy for software location, distribution, replication and currency. Mechanism to inventory installed software, Mechanism/tools to remove unauthorized software. Procedures for license management. Data Management: Well-defined data archiving policy and procedure, Random restores to verify backup media and procedure. Tools to scan for data integrity (e.g, Anti-Virus products), Availability management addresses Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID), High Assurance (HA) systems implemented where approved. Data Security: Well-defined and communicated information security policy, User responsibilities acceptance form and acceptable usage statements. Formal security procedures implemented and routinely evaluated. Defined information security coordination (e.g, intra-inter theater, cross services, cross-domain, multi-national, coalition, etc), Allocation of information security responsibilities. Process for receiving and evaluating vendor and CERT advisories. Process for reporting and investigating suspected security breaches.

(4)

0 5 E C I ^ 0005

lssuancedate:01SEP 2005

Deployment Planning for Information Systems
Versionl.O
(h) (i) (j) (k) (1) (m) (n) (o) (p) (q) Security logs reviewed onadaily/weekly basis, ^ Automated alerts defined, Audit trails enabled and reviewed Regularly used security methodologies and tools. Virus control systems in place, enforced and updated Security methodologiesand tools reviewedweeklyforcurrency and applicability Independent review of information security architecture, controls and mechanisms. Audits of physical, network, host and data security Incident investigation reports, assessments and action plans, Riskassessmentand contingency planning standards in place

C,Re-deployment/staging area: When possible,these procedures should be performed a t a centralized location to ensure all IS are inventoried, documented, and prepared fot^ redeploymenLThe recommended acceptable procedures for redeploying systems shall be data consolidation, IS purging, and label overprint before transit while any remaining activities can be conducted at home-station. As an absolute minimum, no system shall be connected toagarrison or home-station network until the system(s) has been certified as free from malicious logic, made compliant lo current Army standards,andacompliance verification scan has been completed and vulnerabilities remediated Rebuild any IS that can be, before reintroduction to the network, lASOsat^e primarily responsible for this action, (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) IS preparation: Inventory current ISs hardware/software, Compare to pre deployment reference and resolve discrepancies, Identify centralized server/system for data/file consolidation efforts. Identify file formats to be consolidated/moved to server(e,g,ppt, .pps, doc, .txt, etc). Executable files will be excluded unless specifically designed or implemented while deployed. Executable code will be maintained separately from all data repositories. IdentifyclassificationandsecurityrequirementsoffilesoraggregateddataTreat unknown or unmarked data as potentially classified until excluded, Establish defined data archiving policy and procedures Virus scan and compress (e,g.zip)all data files transferred to the server. Identify and label all outdated/unsupportable/unserviceable IS or hardware.

(e) (f) (g) (h)

(2) Purge all workstations and servers for transit when operationally permitted. For systemsthatare identified inthe managementplanasexemptfrom being purged or rebuilt, incorporate tamper identification measures to reveal evidence of tampering, prior to storage or transit of ISs, Backup copies of information shall be prepared and shipped or managed separately for COOP measures in the event of catastrophic loss of the ISs. (3) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Rebuild IS workstations and servers if operationally permitted. Install latest available Army baseline OS or approved Gold Standard Install latest service pack and OS security/hotfixes or patches, Remove un-necessary services, Remove sample, test configurations, and default accounts from OS installation. Configuredefaultsecurityparameters(e.g,passwords,accounts), Configure system and OS defaults for garrison operations(eg time zone, account format, audit logging).

05 E C ^ 0005

Issuance date: 01 SEP 2005

DeploymentPlanningforlnformation Systems Versionl.O
(4) Install necessary applications:

(a) Office applications. (b) Anti-virus application with recent update, (c) Security applications if used(e.g,IPSec,Tripwire), (d) Management application used in garrison (if returned to installation network). (e) Host based firewall or IDS/IPS (f) Patch Management agent (if used), (g) Backup-recovery software (if used). (h) Authorized/licensed applications (Winzip, Adobe, etc). (i) CAC/PKl Reader Applications (if not included in baseline), (5) (6) (7) Perform vulnerability assessment on OS image vulnerabilities. Remediate identified vulnerabilities, Load imaged OS onto workstations/servers,

(8) Place re-deployment certification label on external case lAWIocal procedures or as shown in the sample below (9) IS and IT hardware obtained for mission support: IT/IS systems, devices or peripherals obtained while deployed or inadeployment status are prohibited from being installed on installation networks until appropriate certification and accreditation documentation is updated or CCB/CCM approval and signature by the DAA, While operationally functional and locally required during an exercise or deployment, these items present an undue and undocumented risk to any garrison environmenL

05-EC-M-0005

Issuance date: 01 SEP 2005

Deployment Planning for Information Systems
Version 1.0 Sample Pre-deployment/Transit label: XX Command; S-6 Computer Name: MAC address: Serial Number: Server Y N Purpose Make: Model: OS: XP 2K Baseline: Y N Version: Classification: S U lAVA Compliance through lAVA: PKI: Y N A/V Version and signature Date: Assigned Section: Verified by: Sample Re-deploymentH-ransit label with Purge Overprint: XX Command; S-6 Computer Name: MAC address:

^ s j j f f l
^

^

A/V Version and signat Section: Verified by:

05-EC-M-0005

Issuance date: 01 SEP 2005

Deployment Planning f o r Information Systems Version 1.0 Sample Re-deployment/Transit label with Rebuilt Overprint:
XXCommand; S-6 Computer Name: MACaddress: Serial Number: Server Make: OS: XP 2K Classification:™ IJ lAVA Compliance PKI: Y N A/V Version and signattjri Section: Verified by:

^^^^^^^

urpose

10

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 107 ARMY PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20310-0107

Office. Chief Infommtion OfTieer / G-6

NETC-EST-I MEMORANDUM FOR All Army Activities

SEP 0 1 2005

SUBJECT: Implementation of Information Assurance Best Business Practice (IA BBP) As the Army Office of Information Assurance and Compliance Director the undersigned approves the listed OIA&C BBP to support the Army Information Assurance Program (AIAP). The BBP will be implemented throughout all information systems and networks as applicable, as the Army standard for IA implementation for the identified purpose. 05-EC-M-0001: Deployment Planning for Information Systems; Version 1.0

Stephen Jr COL, GS Director, CI0/G6 Office of Information Assurance and Compliance

(video) Pentagon targets Wiki Whistblowers for exposing its dirty secrets

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(video) Pentagon targets Wiki Whistblowers for exposing its dirty secrets

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Related articles by this Examiner US-hacked armed forces assassinating Indonesian TIs signals Global Phoenix Program State-sponsored attacks on Human Rights journalist TIs requires NGOs including UN help tvidcol Why would U.S. forces in Afghanistan smear a journalist? Human Rights journalist Nairn sees on TV criminal charges against him FAA DHS blind eve to 60vr druy running out of FL. airport 'ultimate hcdac' (video) Let Sibel Edmonds sav what Everybody Knows whistleblower TIs plead FAA and TSA whistleblower suppression and stonewalling breaches human rights and national security An urgent call went out today to the public for protection from U.S. State Department/CIA aggressive treatment of targeted individuals, WkiLeaks staff of the whistleblower Internet site. Julian Assange of WikiLcal<s' felt so threatened, he tweeted that "if anything happened to them," it would be due to their plan to leak a decrypted video depicting an air-strike on civilians andjoumalists. Australia's Special Broadcasting Service (SBS. reported that Assange said Thursday that he was followed by two CIA men who boarded his 2.15pm flight out of Reykjavik to Copenhagen and one WkiLeaks volunteer "was detained without explanation by Icelandic police for approximately 21 hours," Assange Tweeted, Assange was traveling to speak at an investigative joumalism conference in Norway and told SBS that "US sources told Icelandic state media that the US State Department was aggressively investigating a leak from the US Embassy in Reykjavik." "The next day, during the course of interrogation, the volunteer was shown covert photos of Assange outside a Reykjavik restaurant, Assange said. A production meeting for a video WikiLeaks was working on - allegedly documenting civilian kills by US pilots - had been held in the back room of that restaurant that week," reported SBS, providing the fiill text of Julian Assange's email explanation. ( click here.) A few hours later, SBS reported. "US Army spokesman Gary Tallman confirmed to AFP that the Department of Defence had compiled a report on WikiLeaks, after concems were raised that the website posed a security threat to troops."

Following that, Norway's ABC s "confirmed WikiLeaks spying story" as Assange reported on Twitter (See: http://hil.lv/cD 1ZE3) anJRussia Today (RT) then reported on WikiLeak's recent events (See /fT"report below). WikiLeaks vs Pentagon The bold message from WikiLeaks was, "We have airline records of the State Dep/CIAtails.Don't think you can get away with i t Vou cannot This is WikiLeaks." Wikileaks' mission is bringing hidden information to light when it's in the public interest, the way mainstream news used to be. Wikipedia outlines their grealesi hits including Gauntanamo Bay procedure documents, Scientology secrets, and net censorship lists.Whistleblowers with WikiLeaks have contributed some compelling information to some fractious global arguments. Earlier. WikiLeaks Twiner feed had worrying conlcnl thai is being circulated globally: "WikiLeaks to reveal Pentagon murder-covenip at US National Press Club, Apr 5,9am; contact press-club(gsunshinepres$.org" • • • • • • • WikiLeaks is currently under an aggressive US and Icelandic surveillance operation. Following/photographing/filming/detaining If anything happens to us, you know why: it is our Apr 5 film. And you know who is responsible. Two under State Dep diplomatic cover followed our editor from Iceland to lillp://skup.iio on Thursday. One related person was detained for 22 hours. Computer's seized.That's http://www.skiip.no We know our possession of the decrypted airstrike video is now being discussed at the highest levels of US command. We have been shown secret photos ofour production meetings and been asked specific questions during detention related to the airstrike. We have airline records ofthe State Dep/CIA tails. Don't think you can get away with it. You cannot. This is WikiLeaks.

All ofthose Tweets came out in a rush. Then the following Tweets hours later show intemet interference as typically reported by targeted individuals: UPDATE: "j"o those worrying aboul us-wc're line, and will issue a suitable riposte shortly." 8.22am NZ time. Then, another "UPDATE: Just noticed that the first tweet quoted, "WikiLeaks to reveal Pentagon murder-coverup" is gone from the feed. Now I wish I'd linked to all of them individually. Anyway, it was definitely there, and I think Linda is right that it is this previousiy-rel'erred-lo video:" and then, "UPDATE: commenter eru found the missing twee I. It isn't visible in the ordinary feed for some reason." At 8:44, March 26, WikiLeaks issued ihe following Editorial: (emphases added) Over the last few years. WikiLeaks has been the subject of hostile acts by security organizations. In the developing world, these range from the appalling assassination oftwo related human rights lawyers in Nairobi last March (an armed attack on my compound there in 2007 is stilt unattributed) to an unsuccessful mass attack by Chinese computers on our servers in Stockholm, after we published photos of murders in Tibet. In the West this has rangedfrom the overt, the head of Germany's foreign intelligence service, the BND. threatening to prosecute us unless we removed a report on CIA activity in Kosovo, to the covert, to an ambush by a "James Bond" character in a Luxembourg car park, an event that ended with a mere "we think it would be in your interest to...",

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Developing world violente aside, we've become used to the level of security service interest in us and have established procedures to ignore that interest. But the increase in surveillance activities this last month, in a time when we are barely publishing due to fundraising, are excessive. Some of the new interest is related to a film exposing a U.S. massacre we will release at the U.S. National Press Club on April 5. ne spying includes attempted covert following, photographing, Jilming and the overt detention & questioning of a WikiLeaks' volunteer in Iceland on Monday night. I, and others were in Iceland to advise Icelandic parliamentarians on the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative, a new package of laws designed to protect investigative journalists and internet services from spying and censorship. As such, the spying has an extra poignancy. The possible triggers: • our ongoing work on a classifiedfilm revealing civilian casualties occurring under the command of the U.S. general. David Petraeus. • our release of a classilied 32 pase US inielligence rcporl on how to fatally marginalize WikiLeaks (expose our sources, destroy our reputation for integrity, hack us). • our release of a classilied cable from ihc U,S. Embassy in Reykiavik reporting on contact between the U.S. and the U.K. over billions of euros in claimed loan guarantees. ' pending releases related to the collapse of the Icelandic banks emd Icelandic "oligarchs". We have discovered half a dozen attempts at covert surveillance in Reykjavik both by native English speakers and Icelanders. On the occasions where these individuals were approached, they ran away. One had marked police equipment and the license plates for another suspicious vehicle track back to the Icelandic private VIP bodyguard jirm 'leir. What does that mean? We don't know. But as you will see, other events are clear. U.S. sources told Icelandic state media's deputy head of news, that the State Department was aggressively investigating a leak from the U.S. Embassy in Reykjavik I was seen at aprivate U.S Embassy party at the Ambassador's residence, late last year and it is known I had contact with Embassy staff, after. On Thursday March 18. 2010.1 took the 2.15 PMflight out of Reykjavik to Copenhagen-on the way lo speak at the SKUP investigative joumalism conference in Norway. After receiving a tip. we obtained airline records for the jlight concemed. Two individuals, recorded as brandishing diplomatic credentials checked in for my flight at 12:03 and 12:06 under the name of "US State Department". The two are not recorded as having any luggage. Iceland doesn't have a separate security service. It folds its intelligence function into its police forces, leading to an uneasy overlap ofpolicing and intelligence junctions and values. ....Only a few years ago, Icelandic airspace was used for CIA renditionflights.Why did the CIA think that ihis was acceptable? In a classified U.S profile on the former Icelandic Ambassador to the United States, obtained by WikiLeaks, the Ambassador is praisedfor helping to quell publicity ofthe CLi's activities. Often when a bold new government arises, bureaucratic institutions remain loyal to the old regime and it can take time to change the guard. Former regime loyalists must be discovered, dissuaded and removed. But for the security services, thatfirstvital step, discovery, is awry. Congenitally scared of the light, such services hide their activities; ifit is not known what security services are doing, then it is surely impossible to know who they are doing it for. Our plans to release the yideo on April 5 proceed. We have asked relevant authorities in the Unites States and Iceland to explain. If these countries are to be treated as legitimate states, they need to start obeying the rule of law. Now. — Julian Assange ([email protected])

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eborah Dupre, B.S. M.S. and Post-Grad DipCont.ED. has been a human and civil rights advocate for over 25 years in the U.S.. Vanuatu and Australia, Feel free to support her at ii\\uJ)ehrprJiPitp_re,m^ and by subscrihiiiff lo Dupre's reports. She respectfully requests posting the link to this site (rather than entire article) unless republishing permission is granted, and welcomes emails: In fo(tv,i;)el)orah Dupie.com. Dupre's recently released book. Operation HINI: Vaccine Liberty or Death, with a comprehensive timeline of U.S. non-consensual human experimentation, is available at Deborah Dupre, com.

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Pentagon Still Playing Catch-Up With Bomb Makers

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National nmh DEFENSE
M; ctvAi(*f •.".na'Agy Msgm-is National Defense > Archive > 2011 > July Explosive T h r e a t s

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Pentagon Still Playing Catch-Up With Bomb Makers
July 2011
By Stew Magnuson

Explosive o r d n a n c e disposal t e a m leaders say t h e i r t e c h n o l o g y is b e h i n d t h e curve The U.S. military's cadre of bomb disposal technicians needs lighter equipment, the ability to detect explosives at stand-off distances and their sensors consolidated Into one handheld device. But most of all, they want to feel that their technology Is putting them one step ahead of the Insurgents who are planting the improvised explosive devices that are wounding and killing U,S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, Instead — when it comes to tools that can defeat lEDs — the Defense Department has been playing a game of catch-up for the past 10 years. : "Our acquisition process Inside the Department of Defense does not have the agility to keep up with our enemy's threat," i said Capt. Dan Coleman of the Navy expeditionary warfare division and a former officer at the Joint Improvised Explosive j Device Defeat Organization, I Requirements for defeating, detecting or protecting troops from lEDs must go through a bureaucratic approval process, the joint capability Integration development system, fight for funding and then — after a long wait — the explosive ordnance disposal teams finally receive what they asked for, he said. By that time, "our enemy is going to be three or four more ... cycles ahead of that solution that we have just fielded to the war fighter," Coleman said at a National Defense Industrial Association-Explosive Ordnance Disposal Memorial Foundation conference In Fort Walton Beach, Fla, The number of EOD technicians Is relatively small — about 5,500 spread out across the four services. Most of them "selfselect" to join the units. Their deeds have been celebrated in the Academy Award-winning film, The Hurt Locker. While they are few In number, their impact on the battlefield is crucial, said Army Col. Marue "MO" Quick, chief of the EOD and humanitarian mine action at the office of the secretary of defense's special operations/low intensity conflict division. lEDs were the weapon of choice In Iraq, and the tactic has made its way to Afghanistan. In both wars, the majority of combat deaths and Injuries are a result of these bombs, she said. Meanwhile, In the 12-month period from May 2010 to this year's conference, 20 bomb technicians lost their lives in combat, and 94 were wounded. Quick said. EOD technicians have responded to some 112,000 calls for their services in Iraq and 45,000 In Afghanistan, she added. While Quick, Coleman and other speakers said the long wars have resulted In EOD forces being the best equipped and most experienced since the specialty emerged during World War I I , there Is still a constant need to keep pace with new tactics being employed by the bomb makers. "While we have made tremendous progress and significant Improvements In equipment and training over the last 10 years, we must remain vigilant and focused In staying in front of the dynamic and evolving nature of our enemy's

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Pentagon Still Playing Catch-Up With Bomb Makers

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threat," Quick said, Coleman put it in more blunt terms: "We can't go back to shooting behind the duck in terms of technology to defeat this IED threat." The research and development community needs to get ahead of the curve and look at the potential ways enemies will use bombs in the future. As a Navy officer, for example, Coleman said he worries about submersible lEDs, a threat that has not emerged, but could someday, "In the last 10 years we have come from being underfunded, under-resourced, and under-equipped to catching up to the fight," said Coleman, But that Is what it Is; a game of catch-up, he added. Col. Dick Larry, chief of the adaptive Counter-IED/EOD solutions division at the Department of the Army headquarters, said, "Our adversary changes quicker than we do." An Insurgent "has no bureaucracy. He can do things much quicker than I can do. Whenever I come up with a new jammer, I've got to look three moves ahead. What have I forced him to do now that I have this new jammer?" said Larry. The services' bomb technicians have several tools to help them with their inherently dangerous work. The radiofrequency jammers to which Larry referred prevent Insurgents from detonating bombs through the airwaves. Bomb suits provide some protection in the event that an IED explodes. Robots can provide a view of a bomb from a safe distance, and their manipulators can sometimes be used to render them safe without the specialists needing to put on the cumbersome suits. Metal detectors have been around since World War I I . Recently, ground penetrating radar, which can see nonmetallic shapes, have been integrated onto the metal detectors. Explosives used to detonate lEDs In a controlled manner are also employed. EOD specialists also gather evidence that is turned over to units such as Joint Task Force Paladin, which goes after the networks of bomb makers and those who fund the operations. The Afghanistan surge is an example of how the Defense Department is yet again playing catch-up with insurgents who use improvised explosives. In Iraq, there was a nonstop, deadly game between the bombers, who constantly changed the types of detonation triggers, and organizations such as JlEDDO, which was stood up in 2006 to respond to the rapidly rising casualty toll. The triggers and bombs became more and more sophisticated. Simple command wires evolved to remotely controlled devices. When jammers were fielded. Insurgents switched to commercially available technologies such as garage door openers which did not rely on radio frequencies. At one point, U,S, military officials counted 90 methods to trigger a roadside bomb. Eventually, the explosives themselves became more potent. Explosively formed projectiles, designed to penetrate uparmored vehicles, arrived in theater. As operations in Iraq drew down, and the Afghan surge picked up, the Defense Department's counter-IED enterprise was again behind the curve, several speakers at the conference said. Afghan insurgents turned the clock back and began employing "pressure plate explosives," or victim-activated bombs, an improvised landmine that relies on a person or vehicle stepping or driving on it to trigger the device. Jammers and command-wire detectors do nothing to defeat them. Tragically, Afghan civilians step on the mines as well. "The threat Is very complex in a rudimentary way. I'm not trying to be facetious when I say that," said Col. Leo Bradley, commander of the Army's 71st Ordnance Group at Fort Carson, Colo. Afghan lEDs have a low metallic signature, often employing wood as a casing. They are not technologically sophisticated and use materials that are readily available, he said. They are difficult to find using standard mine detectors that seek out ferrous metals. "While it looks crude. It's actually quite sophisticated and matched asymmetrically to what our detection capabilities are," Bradley said. The explosives being used include a variety of ordnance, or homemade explosives with a variety of chemical signatures. The triggers "could be electronic or non-electronic. The list goes on and on and on," he added. To develop sensors that can identify the key components is a tough technological challenge. "An Improvised explosive device is just that. It's improvised. It doesn't have a standardized form. You iiave to be able to identify something that could look like anything ... It is a wicked problem." The explosives are sometimes made from ammonium nitrate, a common fertilizer found throughout the region. It was most famously employed in the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Today, the chemical is banned In Afghanistan In an effort to reduce the amount of material on hand. How effective that ban Is in a country where smuggling is rampant is unknown. Sensors that can pick up nitrate-based explosives are relatively inexpensive and a mature technology. But a field covered

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Pentagon Still Playing Catch Up With Bomb Makers

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in fertilizer createsalot of clutter.Navy Cmdr.ToddSlddall,deputy commander of Coalition JointTask Force Paladin,the organization In charge of defeating bomb-making networks In Afghanistan, acknowledged that farmers still use it. "Are they bad guys7 No they are just out there trying to e a r n a l l v i n g , " h e said, EOD teams have not only had to contend with changes In enemy tactics, but those being ordered by U.S. Central Command, Navy Capt, Frederick E,Caghan, chief of the technology requirements division at JlEDDO, said new counter insurgency strategies that require troops to leave their vehicles and go on foot patrols, also caught the organization off guard,Dismounted operations have resulted I n a h i g h e r casualty rate,he said. "We are trying to respond to that,"he added, '^Oneofthe Issues we have had is trying to identify in advance what the warfighters requirements are,"he said. SIddall said there are n o w l 4 d i f f e r e n t handheld devices fielded In Afghanistan used to detect improvised explosive devices,Most of them work well,but Imagineadismounted operation where an EOD team comprising three personnel must carry sensors,asmall robot, plastic explosives used to detonate bombs they dlscover,aradio frequency jammer, not to mention food,water,weapons and ammunition,he said. Sensors carried into the field include the metal detectors,ground penetrating radar andadevice designed to find hidden tripwires. With all that loading down EOD personnel, the 90 pound protective bomb suits are being left behind, said SIddall, Units have been given lighter robots, but they are not as capable as the larger models, he added, Coleman said:"We have got to do everything we can to drive down that weight," "We are backing into the future. We are meeting today's needs and today's gaps as best we can, but we're not looking over our shoulder to find out what tomorrow's fight is going to be,"he said. The EOD community will have to do this i n a t i m e of constrained resources,he added.JIEDDQ,when he served there, could s p e n d a l o t of money to bring forth new counter IED technology.It didn't matter how much it cost.Schedule was the primary driver.As long a s a v e n d o r could deliverasolution to solveaproblem quickly,the funding was there.Now, with fiscal pressures, JlEDDO will be saying, "we need it now, but we won't be able to pay more,"Coleman said. (shagan said JlEDDO will adapt accordingly as its fiscal situation changes. But he believed the organization will continue to exist as long as the improvised explosive threat Is around, Clobally, the scourge continues unabated, he noted. Putting Iraq and Afghanistan aside, there were about 400 IED Incidents every month In 2010 with Pakistan, India, Somalia and Thailand topping the list. Put Iraq and Afghanistan back into the equation, then there were more than 11,500 incidents last year,Chagan said. As for responsiveness, JlEDDO does have special working groups that look at future and emerging threats such as the use of lasers as triggering devices,various maritime lEDs "and other things we can't discuss,"he said. He pointed to statistics that indicated that JIEDDO's efforts in Afghanistan are having an impact.While the number of bomb emplacements from October to May held steady,the number o f " e f f e c t i v e " a t t a c k s ^ o n e s that c a u s e d h a r m ^ dropped from 21 percent to 16 percent.While that may not seem likealarge decrease,"The drop inasingle percentage point means someone Is coming home safe,"he added. Meanwhile,JIEDOO has put o u t a r e q u e s t for information for robots that can move ahead of dismounted troops and trigger pressure plate explosives before they can do harm. The organization is trying to leverage work done by several Defense Department labs that have developed leader follower drones designed to carry equipment. It wants to know if this work could be adapted for robots that would move ahead of foot patrols Instead of following them. But he acknowledged that fielding suchacapability would take many months, Avendor who asked not to be named because his organization Is responding to the RFI,said it will b e a h a r d p r o b l e m s especially If these robots are intended to be expendable and therefore,Inexpensive.Atypical ground robot also would either have to be heavy enough to set off an Improvised landmine or have some kind of attachment, likeamallet, that would pound the ground, T o g e t ahead of Insurgents'changing tactics,Edwin Bundy,program manager for EOD programs at the office of the secretary of defense's combating terrorism technical support office, said he is looking at an Australian program that organizes "fly-away" t e a m s , W h e n a n e w IED threat emerges,agroup of experts is assembled that can travel quickly to investigate and determine what possible solutions can be applied to neutralize the problem. They can bring back technical requirements based on the operational context that the bombs are in. For example, soil conditions a r e a f a c t o r when it comes to rendering roadside bombs safe,Asoil expert could be part of the team. They may know ofatechnology that could provide an 80 percent solution In the short term.They also would know what existing technologies are out of reach, "We would all love to haveTricorder but that I s a l o n g ways off,"Bundy said.

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Defense ExhihitJ LOpages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record ofTrial

Wikileaks Claims Facebook Deleted Their Fan Page Because They "Promote Illegal Acts"

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Wikileaks Claims Facebook Deleted Their Fan Page Because They "Promote Illegal Acts" (http://gawker.com/5520933/wikil —-claims-facebook-deleted-their-fanADRIAN CHEN (H TTP://ADRIANCH EN.KINJA.COM)
4/20/10 11:53pm (htlp://ga wker.com/5520933/wikileaks -claims-facebook-deletedtheir-fan-page-because-they WIKILEAKS (/T.. (http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks

c i a m ,s f a c e b o o k d = i e e ,d t h e r , f a n page-because-they-promote-illegalacts) L 20
page-because-they-promote-illegal- J (http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks -claims-facebook-deleted-their-fan- Secret-sharing website Wikileaks page-because-they-promole-illegalactsHreplies) (http://Wikileaks,org) is at it again, tweeting allegations against people who have pissed them off. Previously, it was Robert Gates, (http://gawker.com/5514665/wikileakssays-robert-gates-is-lying-in-his-defenseof-iraq-slaying-video) whom they called a "liar". Tonight, it's Facebook, which Wikileaks claims deleted its 30,000 member-strong fan club. Wikileaks—which was, of course, the outfit which leaked that infamous helicopter video (http://collateralmurder.org/)—tweeted (http://twitter.com/wikileaks) this a few moments ago. WikiLfiiks lai-i'lxKik piij'f deified toKi'tbur will) xo.ooo fans... boili'i plate ri'spiiiise iiK-ludcs "..prcmiolcs illegal arts..." f ' wikileaks RELATED Wikileaks Says Robert Gates Is (http://gawker.qcijij^|5i\^^|/wikileaks -says-robert- Defense of gates-is-lying Iraq Slaying Video -in-his(http://gawker.com/55146l defense-of-says-robert iraq-slaying-gates-islying-in-hisvideo) defense-ofiraq-slayingvideo) Earlier today, on ABC's This Week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates defended the troops shown killing Iraqis in a video aired by leaks site,,. Read,,, (http://gawker,com/55i4665/wikileaks -says-robert-gates-is-lying-in-hisdefense-of-iraq-slaying-video)

DEFENSE E X H I B T T ^ f o r identification PAGE OFFERED; ___PAOE / . D M l T T E D x — ^ PAGE of PAGES http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks-claims-facebook-deleted-their-fan-page-because-the.,. 7/18/201

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Wikileaks Claims Facebook Deleted TheirFan Page EecauseThey "Promote Illegal Acts"

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However, a visit to Facebook.com/wikileaks (http://Facebook.com/wikileak^ shows that the "Official Facebook Page" of Wikileaks is up. So what's the big deal? It appears the page that v?as" deleted was a user-run fan page, which Wikileaks tweeted atiout earlier this month: 871 reading; Search Engine Creator's... .loin otl I l'':u'i'l)(>ok I'':\iU'kil> at liMp: Im.K V.I l,i!iclui.i! (owner of taiu-lub please contact wl-sniip()rt>'rs(o siinshinepri'ss.orK)

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Visiting the link there leads nowhere now. Wikileaks and Facebook have clashed in the past. When they released their helicopter video earlier this month, Wikileaks accused Facebook of "censoring" links to it. (Facebook denied this (http://blog.dogsounds,com/20io/04/o6/facebook-censoring-wikileaks-not-so/),) But the most interesting Facebook-Wikileaks episode occurred in 2008, when Wikileaks was sued by Swiss bank Julius Baer (http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/bank-asks-judgeto-dismiss-its-suit-against-wikileaks-site/) over posting stolen documents relating to one of its clients. In the course of the trial, Julius Baer subpoenaed an officer of a Wikileaks Facebook page, mistaking him for an officer ofWikileaks itself. According to Network World (http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/25540), Julius Baer's lawyer sent the following to the guy—a Stanford student named Daniel Matthews:

Wikileaks lists you as an officer ofthe company on its Facebookpage. As an officer ofa defendant in this action, my client is entitled to serve you a copy ofthe summons and complaint pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Since Julius Baer wasn't able to get hold of a real Wikileaks employee—scattered worldwide as they are—some random Stanford student had to go to trial on their behalf in a high profile lawsuit. (He was listed as the "Stanford representative" of Wikileaks (http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/03/wikileaks-restraining-order-a-failurejudge-says.ars) on the page.) He was not pleased. And the possibility of Facebook users being sued simply for belonging to groups probably gave Facebook headaches, too. (The suit resulted in Wikileaks being shut down for a bit by a judge, before the bank ultimately withdrew their case.) It's possible that, having been burned by this previous episode, Facebook is looking to head off any other possible legal complications for its users. That, or Facebook is WORKING FOR THE CIA. Update: Facebook spokesman Andrew Noyes responds:

The disabled Wikileaks page was flagged as an inauthentic Facebook page and its fans will be migrated to the authentic page soon. The administrator ofthe inauthentic page violated our Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, particularly Section 12.2. which states: "You may only administer a Facebook page ifyou are an authorized representative of the subject of the page."

t Discuss 7 discussions displayed because an author is participating or following a participant.

I participant GoalieLax (http://goali...

11 participants W SeAor Flandangles (htt...

http://gawker.com/5520933/wikileaks-claims-facebook-deleted-their-fan-page-because-the...

7/18/2013

EXCLUSIVE: Taliban makes lEDs deadlier - Washington Times

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EXCLUSIVE: Taliban maltes lEDs deadlier
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By Rowan Scarborough

The Washinglon Times

Tuesday .'jeplemtiei 15. 3009

The Taliban has been building simpler, cheaper anii-personnel bombs made ol hard-lo-delecl nonmetal components, increasing Ihe number of lethal attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan, according to a confidential military report. The shift in the use ol improvised explosive devices (lEDs) away from larger anti-armor bombs has allowed the Taliban lo produce more weapons and hide Ihem in more places as they strive to kill larger numbers ot American forces in southern Afghanistan's Helmand province and other contested regions. The change in production Irom metal-dominated explosives to devices made of plastic is making it more difficult for ground troops lo detect the buried lEDs wilh portable mine-detectors, creating an "urgent need" inside Ihe Pentagon for belter detection devices, the report said. The new Taliban tactics are disclosed In a confidential report from Ihe Pentagon's Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, portions of which were obtained by The Washington Times. The area around Now Zad. northwest of Kandahar, has experienced some of the most lerocious fighting lor control ol southem Alghanistan since the surge of 21,000 U.S. troops began last spring. News reports and military bloggers say Marines on patrol lace a constant threat from hidden lEDs "Although the Taliban still fights with small-arms, rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices, they have increasingly focused the role of lEDs as antipersonnel devices," Ihe report said. "Smaller, lighter, more quickly constructed and quite often triggered by a victim-operated switch (booby trap], these antipersonnel lEDs have been a significant laclor in labeling Now Zad Ihe most dangerous location with the highest U S casualty rale in either Ihe Afghan or Iraq theaters." The Aug. 11 report, titled, "The Taliban's Emerging IED TTPs in the Proving Grounds of Now Zad, Helmand Province," was written by an analyst at U.S. Central Command, which oversees troops in the Middle East and Afghanistan. TTPs is short for tactics, techniques and procedures. The shift in tactics comes at a particularly sensitive time for President Obama. Sentiments inside the Pentagon lean toward sending more troops to Afghanistan, while key Democrats oppose such an expansion as Ihe number of casualties grows in the theater The research Web site icasualties org reports 328 NATO fatalities so far this year, already making il the most deadly since Ihe war began in October 2001. The U.S. has lost 190 service members this year, after reporting 166 deaths last year In the past two months, more than half ot the battlefield deaths suffered by NATO troops were caused by lEDs. This month, ol 31 falalilies, 15 came from lEDs; in August. 46 of the 77 coalition deaths resulted from these devices, according to teasualties.org. The Pentagon report said the Taliban IED research-and-development program used Ihe Now Zad region to show that smaller, more numerous lEDs kill more people. The rate lor dead and wounded for the 2nd Battalion, 7lh Marine Regiment stood at one-third ol the unit In August, Ihe report said. A typical Marine battalion has 800 to 1,000 troops A military official, who monitors Afghanistan and asked not lo be named because he was not authorized lo speak to Ihe media, said the Taliban is shitting lo small lEDs for a number of reasons. "You've got the fear factor," the source said. "It's also less costly. It's easier for them to build those things and use them as opposed to running the risk ol getting inflrefightsand losing people. The cost Is

http;//www,washingtontimes,com/news/2009/sep/15/taliban-makes-ieds-deadlier/print/

8/9/2013

EXCLUSIVE: Taliban makes lEOs deadlier Washington Times
relativelylowWe'r^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^i^^^^^^^^^l^r^^^^ figure out howto beat them." The Pentagon report said the Taliban has become adept at miningaroad called the "Pakistani Alley"-so-named because Taliban militants use Itto terrain newfightersfrom the neighboring country. "U.S. troop movements are split between foot and mounted patrols,"lhe repori said"The terrain and deplorable road conditions often necessitate that foot patrols be conducted on uneven terrain The Taliban have taken advantage ol this by littering Ihe area north of'Pakistani Alley'with numerous antipersonnel lEDs to maintain control over Iheir northern buffer.zone." Robert Maginnls.amllitary analyst and Army adviser,saidlEDs are tailor-made for Afghanistan. "lEDs are effective in Afghanistan in part because of the lerrain."MrMaglnnissaid."There are few paved roads.which means plantingadevice in or neararoad is easier and harder to detect by visual inspection The Increase inTalibanuse of lEDsIs due to the increased coalition forces In country, which forced Ihe relatively smallTallbanlorce loadiustitstaclics.lt stretches Ihe force's impact" 1^1. Col. Edward Sholtis, a spokesman lor Cen. Stanley McChrystral, the top commander in Afghanistan, told TheTimes the general has stepped up efforts to disn^pt networks before they can plant bombs, and get better intelligence on where they are embedded In lightol"the weapons' increasing use against coalition lorces and becauseofthe impact ofalarger number of indiscriminate, victim-operated lEDs on Ihe Afghan people." "I.ike most everything in Afghanistan, Ihe IED threat here is complex, and we go about addressing il In anumber of ways,"Col. Sholtis said "Broadly speaking,there's an offensive component that involves intelligence collection tied to Afghan and coalition operations designed to identify and disrupt Ihe cells that manufacture, place and operate lEDs. 'There'salsoa robustdefenslvecomponenlthat involves a comprehensivereporllng systemthat tracks IED events, disseminates threat Intelligence to all levels, identifies emerging threats and lessons learned, and trains the force in Ihe latest threats and countermeasures." Two nonmetallic ingredlents.salt solution and carbon.are being considered by theTaliban aslED trigger mechanisms, Ihe Pentagon report said. The Taliban can harvest carbon Irom everyday batteries This reduces the amount of metal, making detection difficult 'The use of lEDs as antipersonnel mines offers several distinct advantages,"lhe report said. They are small andeaslly transported and emplaced They are easily camoufiagedand donot need lobe remotely controlled In addition, antipersonnel lEDs are almost always lethal to their victims and are extremely difficult to detect with currenlUS minesweepers" OneTaliban tactic involves waiting until NATO forces enter an IED field. Onceabombexpkx^es, the militants open firewith mortars and rocket grenades. The military source said theTaliban is also thwarting detection by using long pull-cords rather than an electronic signal to ignite lEDs.Thisway,the bomb cannot be defeated by electronic countermeasures on vehicles and alrcratt that iam the signal. The source, whocompleted several tours inAfghanistan, said theTaliban strategy has been to abandon some villages rather than fight the Marines head-on They then watch the Marines'routines and place lEDs along those routes. The Pentagon report said Ihe current mine detector, Ihe AN^PSS-12. is not sufficiently sensitive to pick up the scarce metal In anIi.personnellEDs "There isan urgent need to identify new man-portable detection platlorms to expand the ability otU.S.troops to detect anti-personnel lED-mines,"the report concludes. One system now readily available commercially consists of electric field sensors.which can pick up electricity from nonmetallic conductors, the report said.

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THE GOOD SOLDIERS. Copyright © 2009 by David Finkel. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. For information, address Picador, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010. www.picadorusa.com Picador'* is a U.S. registered trademark and is used by Farrar, Straus and Giroux under license from Pan Books Limited. For information on Picador Reading Group Guides, please contact Picador. E-mail: [email protected] Portions of this book originally appeared, in different form, in Tlie Wasliington Post. Top photograph on page 118 courtesy of the U.S. Army. All other photographs courtesy of the author. Designed bj Ahby Kagan The Library of Congress has cataloged the Farrar, Straus and Giroux edition as follows:

«
Finkel, David, 1955The good soldiers / by David Finkel. ISBN 978-0-374-16573-4 (hardcover) 1. Iraq War, 2003- —Campaigns—Iraq—Baghdad. History—21st century, Army—Military life—History—21st century. Baghdad—History—21st century. DS79.764.U6 FS6 2009 956.7044'3420973—dc22 2009019391 Picador ISBN 978-0-312-43002-3 First published in the United States by Sarah Crichton Books, an imprint of Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1. Title. 2. Battles—Baghdad4. United States. 3. Soldiers—United States—Biography.

5. Counterinsurgency—Iraq—

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JULY 12, 2007 . which was eerily along a small girl, 1 burst into tears as

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I told the officer in id then laughed and e mosque. Without ir. went past a wideclimbed the steps to thev heard gunfire, Iv lower roof of the ninutes later with a 7. ammunition, and, bled lED. been brought down ng his own order to lisgusted. he needed to undersanction it, because desk, which was getmust understand the iiings. So did good e of those, too. "For jsj." he had read the not ignore the cries ? thev helpless? Yes. le explanation some•w davs before by an

Iraqi religious leader, which said, in part: "Yes, O Bush, we are the ones who kidnap your soldiers and kill them and burn them. We will continue, God willing, so long as you only know the language of blood and the scattering of remains. Our soldiers love the blood of your soldiers. They compete to chop off their heads. They like the game of burning down their vehicles." What a freak show this place was. And maybe that was the explanation for the pile of weapons Kauzlarich was looking at, that it deserved no understanding whatsoever. Weapons in a mosque, including an lED to burn vehicles and kill soldiers. Unbelievable. Shadi ghahees. Cooloh kbara. Allah je sheelack. "S/iuiran," Kauzlarich said out loud to the general, keeping his other thoughts to himself. He made his way to his Humvee to figure out where to go next and was just settling into his seat when he was startled by a loud burst of gunfire. "Machine gun fire," he said, wondering who was shooting. But it wasn't machine gun fire. It was bigger. More thundering. It was coming from above, just to the east, where the*AH-64 Apache helicopters were circling, and it was so loud the entire sky seemed to jerk. Now came a second burst. "Yeah! We killed more motherfuckers," Kauzlarich said. Now came more bursts. "Holy shit," Kauzlarich said. It was the morning's third version of war.

One minute and fifty-five seconds before the first burst, the two crew members in one of the circling Apaches had noticed some men on a street on Al-Amin's eastern edge.

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"See all those people standing down there?"one asked. "Confirmed," said the other crew member. "That open courtyard?" "P,oger,"said the first. Everything the crew members in both Apaches were saying wasbeing recorded. Soweretheircommunications w i t h t h e 2-16.Toavoid confusion,anyone talking identified himself with acode word.The crew members in the lead apache,lor example,were Crazy H o r s e I ^ . T h e 2 1 6 p e r s o n they were commu nicating with most frequently was Hotel2 6. There wasavisual recording of what they were seeing as well, and what they were seeing now—one minute and forty seconds belore they fired their first burst—were some men walking along the middle ofastreet,several of whom appeared to be carrying weapons. Allmorninglong, this part of A l A m i n had beenthe most hostile. WhileTyler Andersen hadbeenunderashadetreein west Al Amin, and Kauzlarich had dealt with occasional gunfire in the center part, east Al Amin had been filled with gunfire and some explosions. There had been reports of sniper fire, rodftop chases, and rocket propelled grenades being fired at Bravo Com pany, and as the fighting continued, it attracted the attention of NamirNoorEldeen,atwentytwoyear old photographer tor the P^euters news agency who lived in Baghdad, and SaeedChmagh, Iorty,his driver and assistant. Some journalists covering the war did so by embedding with theU.S. military. Othersworked independently. Noor Eldeen and Chmagh were among those who worked independently, which meant that the military didn'tknow they were in A I A m i n . The2 16didn'tknow,and neither did the crews of the Apaches, which were flying high above A l Amin in a slow, counter clockwise circle. Prom that height, the crews could see all of east A l A m i n , but theopticsinthelead Apache werenowlocused

tightly o shoulder thirty-m "Oh looked a "Hot, crew m( weapons They walked a leading h On the It guided h tioned fo with a lo one of w appearec crosshair of those "Yup. six, Cra; AK-47S. It w a burst. "Rog( of our pc "All r Thev cling hac structed " I can Sever curve an

^LILY12,2007

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^'one asked, ^^ber. "That open

tightlyonNoor-Eldeen,who hadacamera strung over his right shoulder and was centered in the crosshairs o f t h e Apache's thirty millimeter automatic cannon. "Oh yeah,"one of the crew members said to the other as he looked at the hanging camera."That'saweapon." "Hotel T w o s i x , t h i s is Crazy Horse One-eight,"the other crewmember radioed in to the ^16. "Have individuals with weapons." They continued to keep the crosshairs on Noor Eldeen as he walked along the street next to another man, who seemed to be leading him. On the right side of the street were some trash piles. On the left side were buildings. Now the man with Noor PIdeen guided him by the elbow toward one of the buildings and motioned tor him to get down.Chmagh Ibllowed,carryingacamera withalong telephotolens.Behind Chmagh were lour other men, one of whom appeared to be holding an AK 47 and one of whom appeared to be holdingarocket-propelled grenade launcher.The crosshairs swung now away from Noor Eldeen and toward one ofthose men. "Yup,he'sgot one,too,"the crew member said."HotelTwo six. Crazy Horse One eight. Have five to six individuals with AK-4-7s.l^equest permission to engage." It was now one minute and four seconds belore the first burst. "Pogerthat,"HoteI^6repIied."We have no personnel east of our position, so you are free to engage. Over." "All right,we'll be engaging,"the other crew member said. Theycouldn'tengageyet, however, because the Apache'scir cling had brought it t o a p o i n t where some buildings nowobstructed the view ofthe men. "Ican'tget them now,"acrew member said. Several seconds passed as the lead Apache continued its slow curve around. Now it was almost directly behindthebuilding

laches were saying ^ications w i t h t h e tified himself with B^pache,Iorexamhevwerecommu^ ere seeing as well, and lorty seconds men walking along ,red to be carrying ^adbeenthemost ler ashadetreein occasional gunfire d w i t h gunfire and niper fire, rooftop ired at Bravo Com ed the attention of ^otographerlbrthe ndSaeed Chmagh, wembeddingwith ^ntlv. ^oor Eldeen ed independently, ^wereinAl-Amin. w^of the Apaches, I a ^low, countercould see all of east werenowlocused

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that Noor-Eldeen had been guided toward, and the crew members could see someonepeering around the corner,looking in their direction andliftingsomethinglonganddark. This was NoorEldeen,raisingacamerawithatelephoto lens to his eyes. "He'sgotanl^PC." "Okay,IgotaguywithanI^PC" "I'mgonnafire." But the building was still in the way. "Coddamnit." The Apache needed to circle all the way around, back to an unobstructed view of the street, before the gunner would havea clean shot. Ten seconds passed as the helicopter continued to curve. "Once you get on it, just open—" Almost around now, the crew could see three ofthe men.lust alittlemoretogo. Now they could see five of them. "You're clear." Not quite. One last tree was in the way. "Allright" There.Now all ofthe men could be seen.There were nine of them, including Noor Eldeen. He was in the middle, and the others were clustered around him,except lor Chmagh,who was on his cell phonealew steps away. "Eight'emallup" One second before the first burst, Noor-Eldeen glanced up at the Apache. "Come on—fire." The others followed his gaze and looked up, too. The gunner fired. It wasatwentyround burst that lasted for two seconds. "Machinegun fire,"Kauzlarichsaidquizzically, a h a l f m i l e away,as the sky seemed to jerk, and meanwhile,here in east

AlAmin, street blew dead or ne Noor-Elde The gu and fired ; haps tw el\ "Keep ; There \ The trash . A cloud ot "Keep 5 There i burst. In t l and then h< All o f t i been fired. lot was silt down on w ibie as somt who was ta It was C He stoo now he din and minglec tinued circl "All righ "All righ "We hav "All righ "Yeah, w "Yeah, Ic "Good sl

j L I L Y l 2,2007

^d the crew memcorner,lookingin ^ddark. This was nolens to his eyes.

A l A m i n , n i n e men were suddenly grabbing their bodiesa street blewuparound them,seven were now fallingto the ground dead or nearly dead, and two were running away—Chmagh and Noor Eldeen. The gunner saw Noor Eldeen, tracked him in the crosshairs, and firedasecondtwentyround burst, and after running per hapstwelvesteps,Noor Eldeen dove intoapile of trash. "Keep shooting,"the other crew member said.

ground, back to an mner would havea nued to curve. ee ofthe men.^ust

There wasatwosecond pause, and then came the third burst. The trash all around where Noor-Eldeen lay facedown erupted. Acloud of dirt and dust rose into the air. "Keep shooting." There wasaonesecondpause, a n d t h e n c a m e t h e l b u r t h burst. In the cloud, Noor Eldeen could be seen trying to stand, and then he simply seemed to explode. All of this took twelve seconds. Atotal of eighty rounds had beenfired. The thirty millimeter cannon was now silent. The pi lot was silent. The gunner was silent. The scene they looked down on was one of swirling and rising dirt,and now,barely vis ible as some of the swirling dirt began to thin,they sawaperson who was taking cover by crouching againstawall. It was Chmagh. He stood and began to r u n . " I got him,"someone said,and now he disappeared insideafresh explosion of dirt,which rose and mingled with what was already in the air as the Apaches continued circling and the crew members continued to talk. "Allright,you're clear,"one said. " A l l r i g h t , f m j u s t trying to find targets again,"another said. "We haveabunchofbodies laying there." "All right, we got about eight individuals." "Yeah, we definitely got some." "Yeah, look at those dead bastards." "Good shooting."

There were nine of :^iddle,andtheothimagh,whowason

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"Thank you." The smoke was gone now and they could see everything clearly: the main pile ofbodies,some prone,one on haunches,one folded intoimpossible angles^ NoorEIdeenontopofthetrash^ Chmagh lying motionless on his left side. "BushmasterSeven,Crazy Horse One-eight,"they radioed to Bravo Company, whose soldiers were on their way to the site. "Eocation ofbodies Mike Bravo Pive-fbur-fiveeighteightsixone seven.They're onastreet in front of an open courtyard w i t h a bunch ofbluetrucks,abunch of vehicles inacourtyard." "There's oneguy movingdownthere, but he's wounded," someone now said, looking down, scanning the bodies, focusing on Chmagh. "This is Oneeight,"the crew member continued on the ra dio."We also have one individualwho appears to bewounded. Trying to crawl away." "P^oger. We'regonnamovedownthere,"Bravo Company replied. "Poger. We'll cease fire," the Apache crew responded and continuedtowatchChmagh,still alive somehow, w h o i n slow motion seemed to be trying to push himselfup. He got partway and collapsed. He tried again, raising himself slightly, but again he went down. He rolled onto his stomach and tried to get up on his knees, but his left leg stayed extended behind him, and when he tried t o l i f t his head,he could get it o n l y a f e w inches offthe ground. "Do you seeashot?"one of the crew members said. "Does he haveaweapon in his hands?" the other said,aware ofthe rules governing an engagement. "No,lhaven'tseenoneyet." They continued to watch and to circle as Chmagh sank back to the ground. "Come on,buddy,"one of them urged.

"All you gotta Now, as had behind some bui and when they w glimpsed runninj ond man was run approaching. "Bushmaster, have individuals g up bodies and w e, The van stopp around to the pas; "Crazy Horse ( Ready to fire, Bravo Companv as who was facedow 1 the legs. The seco back. Were thev i

help?
"Come orj! Let Now the seconi "Bushmaster, C But there was ; seat and the two m front of the van to\ "They're taking "Bushmaster, Cra. They had Chma "This is Bushmi They were pulli "Roger, we hav, Request permissior They were push

JULY 12, 2007

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everything lunches, one )t the trash; •\ radioed to to the site, ight-six-onetvard with a

"All you gotta do is pick up a weapon," another said. Now, as had happened earlier, their circling brought them behind some buildings that obstructed their view of the street, and when they were next able to see Chmagh, someone they had glimpsed running up the street was crouching over him, a second man was running toward them, and a Kia passenger van was approaching. "Bushmaster, Crazy Horse," they radioed in urgently. "We have individuals going to the scene. Looks like possibly picking up bodies and weapons. Break—" The van stopped next to Chmagh. The driver got out, ran around to the passenger side, and slid open the cargo door. "Crazy Horse One-eight. Request permission to engage." Ready to fire, they waited for the required response from Bravo Company as two of the passersby tried to pick up Chmagh, who was facedown on the sidewalk. One man had Chmagh by the legs. The second man was trying to turn him over onto his back. Were they insurgents? Were they people only trying to

• ard."
5 wounded," lies, focusing ?d on the rase wounded. vo Company •sponded and w ho in slow ? got partway t h , but again ied to get up ind him, and a few inches said. rr said, aware

help?
"Come on! Let us shoot." Now the second man had hold of Chmagh under his arms. "Bushmaster, Crazy Horse One-eight," the Apache said again. But there was still no response as the driver got back in his seat and the two men lifted Chmagh and carried him around the front of the van toward the open door. "They're taking him." "Bushmaster, Crazy Horse One-eight." They had Chmagh at the door now. "This is Bushmaster Seven. Go ahead." They were pulling Chmagh to his feet. "Roger, we have a black bongo truck picking up the bodies. Request permission to engage." They were pushing Chmagh into the van.

igh sank back

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"This is Bushmaster Seven. Roger. Engage." He was in the van now,the two men were closing the door, and the van was beginning to move forward. "One eight, clear." "Come on!" Afirst burst. "Clear" Asecond burst. "Clear" A t h i r d burst. "Clear" Ten seconds. Sixty rounds. The two men outside of the van ran, dove, androlledagainstawallassomeoftheroundsex ploded around them. The van continued forward a f e w yards, abruptly jerked backward, crashed into the wall near the men, and was now enveloped in smoke. " I t h i n k the van'sdisabled,"acrewmember said,but to be sure,now c a m e a f o u r t h b u r ^ t , a f i f t h , a n d a s i x t h — t e n more seconds, sixty morerounds—andthat, at last, was t h e e n d o f the shooting. Now it wasamatter of waiting for Bravo Company'ssoldiers to arrive onthe scene,and here they came,in Humvees and on loot, swarming acrossathoroughly ruined landscape.The battlefield was theirs now, f r o m t h e main pile of bodies,to the trash pile with Noor-Eldeen, to the shot up houses and buildings, to thevan—inside of which,among the bodies, they discovered someone alive. "Bushmaster Six, Bravo Seven," a Bravo Company soldier called over the radio."l've got eleven Iraqi KlAs, one small child wounded.Over." The Apache crews were listening. "Ah,damn,"oneofthemsaid. "We need to evac this child,"Bravo Seven continued."She's

gotawoundtotheb togetevac'd.OverB ^Well,it'stheirl crew member said "That'sright,"the continued to circle ar They saw more 1 ^ onto the trash pile, ri ofNoorEldeensbod "That guy just dro "Didhe?" "Yeah" ^^^ell,they'redea^ They watchedasi: wounded girl and run that was going to evaci They watched ano minutes later cradling boy who had been di^4 father's, which was dr, because that was how a And then they flew andmore Bravo Compa ^arch, the soldier w hc hadclimbedaguardtc ^aid quietly and nervou anIEDinallthisshitB Since then, Marchh ciallyon^une^^,wher ^r.Craig'smemorialserv later, as March saw all open,insides exposed,^ he would later explain-

jULYl2,2007

113

Idling the door,

gotawoundtothebelly. Doc can'tdo anything here.She needs togetevac'd.Over." "Well, it'stheir fault for bringing their k i d s t o a b a t t l e , " a crew member said. "That'sright,"the other said, and forafew more minutes they continued to circle and watch. They sawmore Humvees arriving, one of whichdrove up onto the trash pile, right over the part containing what was left ofNoor Eldeen'sbody. "That guy just drove overabody." "Didhe?"

t^ideofthevan theroundsexrd a few yards, ^ar the men, and ^^aid.buttobe ixfh—ten more w a^ the end of mpanv'ssoldiers f^umveesandon cape. The battlehe^.to the trash ^ d buildings, to thevdiscovered company soldier ^. one small child

"Yeah" "Well,they'redead,so—" They watched asoldier emerge from the vancradlingthe wounded girl and r u n w i t h her in his arms to the army vehicle that was going to evacuate her toahospital. They watched another soldier emerge from the van a few minutes later cradlingasecond wounded child,this onealittle boy who had been discovered underabody presumed to be his father's, whichwasdrapedovertheboy,eitherprotectivelyor^ because that was howadead man happened to falL A n d t h e n t h e y f l e w o n t o a n o t h e r p a r t o f A l A m i n as more and more Bravo Company soldiers arrived, one of whom was ^ay March,the soldier who on the battalion'svery first day in Iraq hadclimbedaguardtower, p e e k e d o u t a t a l l o f t h e t r a s h , a n d said quietly and nervously,"Weain'tever gonna be able to find an IED in all this shit." Since then, March had learned how prophetic he was, espe cially o n j u n e ^5, when an EPP killed his friend Andre Craig, ^r.Craig'smemorial service had been on july7,andnow,five days later, asMarchsawallofthebodiesscatteredaround, blown open, insides exposed, so gruesome, so grotesque, he felt—as he would later explain—"happy. It was weird. Iwas just really

continued."She's

^ ^
114 Tlr^COO0^OL0ILR5

very happy. Iremember feelingsohappy. W h e n l h e a r d t h e y wereengaging,whenlheard there'sthirteen K I A , I w a s just ^0 happy,because Craig had just died,and it felt like,you know,we got'em." As the Apaches peeled off,he and another soldier went through agate in the wall that the van had crashed into and against which Chmagh had tried to take cover. There,in the courtyard ofahouse,hidden from street view, they found two more injured Iraqis,one on top ofthe other. As March lookedclo^er at t h e t w o , w h o m i g h t h a v e b e e n t h e t w o who had been lifting Chmagh into the van, who as far as March knew had spent the morning trying to kill American soldiers, he realizedthat the one onthebottom was dead. But the one on top was still alive, and as March locked eyes with him, the man raised his hands and rubbed his two forefingers together,which March had learned was what Iraqis did when they wanted to signal the word^f^r^^^. So March looked at the man and rubbed his two forefingers together, too. And then dropped his left hand and extended the middle fin^ ger ofhis right hand. And then said to the other soldier,"Craig'sprobably just sit ting up there drinking beer, going, ^HahlThat'salllneeded.'" And that was the day'sthird version of war.

They had g Apaches and ha They had lo^ AK47sandari Iraqis. They had r prefaced the ki dierswerebeir there,that thej ons, that the .^^ when it fired at the van with th onehadacteda Hadthejou That would Asfbrthe r insurgents or ju They would Whatthevi soldiers, and th "Crow.Pavr walk to the Dl ^Those guys die! Inside t h e f ference, which before. "Ourtoppr tion,"Bushwa^ aroundBaghda^ Iraqi forces toe takerootincc country.

As for the fourth version, it occurred late in the day, back on the EOB, after Kauzlarich and the soldiers had finished their work in AlAmin. They knew by now about Chmagh and Noor Eldeen. They had brought back Noor-Eldeen'scameras and examined the images to see i f h e wasajournalist or an insurgent.

jULYl2,2007

115

^ n 1 heard they ^lA. Iwas just ^o :e.vouknow,we ierwent through nd against which rom street view, ofthe other. As vebeenthetwo :^a^ far as March ^can soldiers, he But the one on d^ him, the man together,which thev wantedto twoforefingers Ithe middle fin probably just sitalllneeded.'"

They hadgotten the videoand audio recordings f r o m t h e Apaches and had reviewed them several times. They had looked at photographs taken by soldiers that showed AK47sandarocketpropelled grenade launcher next to the dead Iraqis. They hadreviewed everything they could about what had prefaced the killings in east Al Amin, in other words—that soldiers were being shot at,that they didn'tknow journalists were there,that the journalists were inagroup of men carrying weap ons, that the Apache crew had followed the rules of engagement when it fired at the men with weapons, at the journalists, and at the van with the children inside—and had concluded that every one had acted appropriately. Had the journalists? That would be for others to decide. A s f o r t h e m e n w h o h a d t r i e d t o h e l p Chmagh, werethey insurgents or just people trying to helpawounded man? They would probably never know. What theydid know: thegood soldiers were stillthegood soldiers, and the time had come for dinner. ^ "Crow.Payne.Craig.Gajdos.Cajimat,"Kauzlarichsaidonthe w a l k t o the DEAC. "Rightnow? Our guys? They're thinking, ^Those guys didn'tdie in vain.Not after what we did today." Inside the DEAC,theTVs were tuned to Bush'spress conference, which had begunin Washington just a fewminutes before.

dav, back on the edtheirworkin Eldeen. ^and examined .urgent.

"Our top priority is to help the Iraqis protect their population,"Bushwas saying,"sowe'velaunchedanoffensivein and aroundBaghdadtogo after extremists, tobuy m o r e t i m e f b r Iraqi forces to develop, and to help normal life and civil society takerootincommunitiesandneighborhoodsthroughoutthe country.

11^

Tlr^COOO^^LOI^R^

"We're helping enhance the size, capabilities, and eflectiveness of the Iraqi security forces so the Iraqis can take over the defense oftheir own country,"he continued."We're helping the Iraqis take back their neighborhoods from the extremists. . ." This was the fourth version of war. Kauzlarich watched as he ate. " I like this president,"he said.

leven tackle ^ Eo sitting i n a d located ona butheshool^ himanddov hisback.Thi soldiershad d r i n k o f chc called Boom quickly over^ toon,Iiftedh for the slaps and yelled ar Open-hande, until he was entire midse they stop an^

7/7/2013

li^lnU Wl N w r EkjiTii, s%li(j hj<! a i'lmcra strung OVIT his right sliuuMcr and WOK i-cnlcrftl in lho crtisshair.s of tlu- .\|iJch« V lliirtv-niillimvlcr autonulic canixm. "Oh vojh," oni- o l thf t r c w mi'mhoni said ti> l k ^ithiT In-, okcit at Ih.- hanging *-jincr.a. "That s .1 «..ip<m," "1 lot* I Tv.o six, this is Cra/v Hursc One i-ij^ht." d i r nlfnT i n 11 mrmhr-r radio, d In to t l i , ? Ift "Havi- indi\irlo,ils widt f l 11, n m i iiiu, ll 1(1 let |> l l h i-ri»cih.itr^ nii Ni^ir-Hlilivn as iuu'jilUil a)nn^ OH- *lri'i l \ l I " JIIMIIKT man. who t miMl m Kk'jdiiigliiiii O n lliv r;v;lit siik <ij ilk- vircct mir.i- irj^Ji pi ' i ,

"Oil vcah," ism- lA l\ic LTCLX menibors K.ii(1 t i , 1 lit otVic r ;t.-. iio li>i>k«t .It tho li.rnglng t Jincr.v "Th.il s ,i nv.ijnm." ' 1 lord Two six, thi.t Is <.'r.i/\ Hn-n (>iii- i i ^ L c t i n nilu r < ri'irv iiu-iiihnr r.-itM<u'il in t<i llu ' Ih "H.ur imli\ iilu<ils u iili
\Vf.1j10l1S "
ll iKiw oiir in ill 1 1 1 r and Inur Mioml^ 1^ lore ihc hrst

'It,.git (h.«."HoUl 2-6 r< t>)iL-d. "Wl- Ito^c no piTMiniivl i-.ist ..four iHj.silio... sn you .iru iWv to Ovx-r.'" "All riglil. wv'H IK- LU^^gn,^." Uii oth.r cri-tv iix-rtiUr scid. J I K V tuuklii'l MigJiK- \ v i , ln>"r\cr, tivau-c tin- .A[).ii.hi-'s ttri Jiiig Iwd bruughl it i n n yoim " IKTC soint- liuililini;s now t>h"ilrwUvd tho vii;iv o f t h e nii-n. "1 iMn't gvl llii-ni inHv," il cri-w mcn hcr Siid. Si-vcni) Mt^jniN p^Mcd a: the lead .Apache continued its slow t ill VI- ^roun.1. Nnw it w.k aliiK-.M iliroaiy hclun,! the l.udding

DEFENSE EXHiBIT^[^Ibi idAntitic&tion PAGE OFFERED: PAGBVIDMITTED: fAGE of PAGES

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"Yup, hc'.i, j2nt oiic, t<H>." thi-1 n w nu t>ili<-r sjid. "Hotel T wo six, C.TX/.\ Hor.sc- On, right It burs!. "Rtjger thai," Hotel 2 6 replie<l. "We haw no ptTsunncI cast of our position, sn you are free to cngjge. Over." "Ail right, we'll Iw eiiL'dg'iig,*" tlie other erew member sjid.
a p p e a r e d I n he h o l i h i i ^ j n u k e i p r t i p , l k *l ^ n n.ule I . I U I K I I I I iTosrihairs K w u n g now ^ ( i l Ihosi- m i n. "Yup. he'm i f . t(H>," t h e i r i - « n i t n i l i e r w i d , " H ^ r t i t T w o ' , ighi Hatt- l i i t - t o *ix i i u l i * i d u a l * with I In

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.'\ K 47s, Request pcrmissitin to fugjge." now OIK- miiuito and four seionds bil'ore ihu first

awav f r n i n N i K i r 1 h h i n a n d t o w a i d o i x

Hix, C r a / v l l t j r M - O n *

,-\K 47)1, K n | u c \ f p i T m i i t i i o n t n < i i g a ^ e . " ll was iKiu nm- minute and four s t K i n t U txli»M- i h i ' hrol

" R t i ^ r t ) u ( , ~ H o t e l ? 6 n-plii-fl

" W * liave I K I | * r ^ m n e l c a i t

l i t ' o u r [ M i x i l i i N i . Wl v o u a r e f r e e l o e n i j a g i - . O i r r . " " A l l r i g h t , w e ' l l he e n g a g i n g . " t h e o t h e r e r e w m i - n t t x r M K I . I V > l u u k l n l e , i g . p - v e t . h i - w e x c r , I^-eaUM- t k - A [ » a e U - V e t r L l i n p h a d I * r o u g h t it t n a p o i n t w h o r e « i m c b u i l d i n g , n o w i l r m te*! the % iew o f t h e m e n . " I eati'l p t tlveiii m m . " a i r t - « n w i i i b c r said, St-vera! seco m l : p a x w d a» t h e load .A pat he c o n t i n u e d I t ; Klow .sir»e arourvl. N . m it w a s a l m o s t d i r e c t l v f x l u m t t h e budding

:i.«

It:,. i ; i ) O T ) v l t l t ) I E H <

t h a t N o o r l-hleen had heen g u i d e d t o w a r d , a m i the i r e w i n e m b e r s l o u k l M-« w m i e o n e j X T r i n g a r o u n d lh<- t u r n e r , l o o k i n g i n t h e i r d i r e c t i o n a n d l i l l i n i ^ iw m i r t h i n g l u n g a n d d ^ r k Thi*

S « x * F.ldt i n , r a i s i i l j i a i . i i n e r a w i t h a t r k ^ i l l o t n lens t n h i \ eve* ^He\g,manK|X; - O k a > . I g i 4 a g u y w i t h a^TIS^U T m ^Hinna l i r r . " B u t t h e b u i l d i n g » as s t i l l i n t h e "Goddamnil." T h o . \ p a t ho n o o d o d ii> t i r i le all l h o w a v arouru u n o b m r m tod view ol the s t r e e t , holore the g u n n e r v t loan * h o l . T o n set o t i t i s [uvM-d as t h e ht-lk t ^ t e r i u n t i n i n ' i t t o l u r v v . " O n o e v o u g e l o n i t . ju?-t o p e n

"He's g i i l j n R P G . " " O k a y , 1 got a guy w i t h an K P G . " " I ' m gonna lire." Bul the building w as still i n lho wav. "Goddamnil."
"Come on hre. T h e o t h e r s f o l l o w e d his The gunner bred. I l w a s a i w e n t v r o u m l b u r s t t h a t lasletl t o r t w o soconds. " . M a e h i n e g u n h r e , " K a u / l a r k - h said q u i y / i t a l h , a h a l f m i l e a w a i , as t h e skv s o r m o d t o j e r k , a m i m e a n w h i l e , h o r o i n oast

liT.t: ami looked un,

7/7/2013

"()tir«' yoii get <ni it, just opi-n .Mniost around now, the crew cinM ><.v three of the men. |ust A little more to go, Now thev eowlrl see five o f t h e i n . "You're clcir." N<it quite. One last tree "^llriglil."
setiHitIs "Onto .\lmo*t a littk |)asM'c! as the liolitoptei ' rould , M O thtt t- ol the moii just vou get <ni il, jtist open arourxl now, th, crew

in llie way. ' '

mi ltr to ff l

N o w l h e \ K H i I t t si-e lise o l i h o i i i " Y o u ' r e clear," N<it i j u i t e . (>iK- I asi ( r o e was i n the w a \

"\llrigln.~
Ihcre N o w all o l I I K - n K i i o x i k l U- s « - n . T h e r e wen,* n i n i - <jf I h e m . t i K l u d i n g ' \ l i x * r H i k - e n . H e w a - i n the m u k l k , a n d l h o o l h o n w o r e i l u s i o r o d arouiwl i i i t n , o x i o p i l o r O i n i a g h , w h o was o n his f o U p h o n o a l o w steps awav. " I i g h l e m all u p . " O n e set o n d l>elore the h r v I n i r s t , N o o r - f l t l o o n glaneoH u p a l l h o .Apache-. "Com*- on hre."

T h e 44 hers l o t t o w e d his g a / e a m i I r x i k o d u p , t r m . T h e g u n n e r It r o d . l l svas a t w c n t v r o u t u ! b u r s t t h a t lasted l o r t w o i c e o n c k . " M a t h i n r g u n H r e , " K a u / l a r i t h said q u i z / l t a l h . a h a l f m i k a w a v . as i h c skv s e e m e d t o ( c r k , a n d m e a n w h i l e , h e r o m cast

IIS

TK.- i ; i n m < i i i D i E K S rrHin

that N'oor-I:lileen had h o r n g u i d e d t i r w a r d , and the i r e w

b r r s c o u l d set s o m , i w i r p t n T i n g a r o u n d t h o l o r n r r , l o o k i n g i n their d i r e c t i o n and l i t l i t i i ; s o m e t h i n g long and dark fins w,is

"Come on- hre." The others Ibllowetl his gizc and looked up, too. The gunner hred. It was I twi-ntv-round burst tiijt lisu-d lor two seconds.
T e n se, "OrKt ti as t h e h o U o p i VIlU gel (til i t . just o | x n o f ihe iiHti I

.Almost a r o u n d n o w . t h e < r e w i m i k l ssi- t h i t a l i t t l e Miore t o go N o w t h e \ i i H i l t l st-<- list "You're clear" N o l q u i t e . O n e last t r e e w a * i n d i e * " M l right." ol'them

l i i e r o , Ntiss all <it t i n n n n c o u k i U - K I T . T h e r e w * i * F i i i t K * o f them, imludin^ Noor thk-en H e was i n the m u k U i ^ n d t h e o t h -

e r * w o r e c l u s t e r e d a m u m i h i m . e x i ^ i > l tor C l ( m a i ; h . w h o was o n his t r i l phom- a lew- s t e p s , " I i^hl e m all up."

O n e S O I O I K I Ix-li*re l h o t i r s ^ f A s i , \ o o r 1 ' k l o r n g l a n c e d u p at

C o n u - iT>

hre."

T h o <ilhors loUow'od his gaze and h x ) k o d u p , t i x i . The gunner hred. l l w a s a t w e n t y r o u n d b u r s t t h a t lasted f o r t w o s o c o n d * . "Maehine gun fire." K a u z l a r i c h said q u i w k a l h , a h a l f m i k

a w a v . as t h e skv s e e m e d t o | e r k . a n d m e a n w h i l e , h e r e i n cast

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.41 .4min, nine nn n w, re suildenlv grabbing tii. it U-tn . , slreetWew upartiuml them, seven w^Tt now tailing lotht gr ,un. dead or iiearls ikml. and two wen running au as C'hina^h and N.Kir Hileni i'W- gunner saw Nonr-I:kleen. Iiaeki^l him in the crosshair-, anil l i n i l a stvond twonts rouiul liursi, and alter running perhaps twohr steps, N<»o|- Fklit ii iio»e into a pile of trash. "Keep shooting," ihe othtf < rew meml>c-r sau r rh* rt w asa two M cond }Mkis^ . ami then came i h ^ h i r d buisl The Trash all ariHtixl where Noor Fidet-n la\ tat oilosti^w-iipi, il A clouil ot dirt .ind dusi rose into the air. "keep sIxKrtilig." 1 hi ft was a one seniml pause, ami then t aim llie loiirtli hurst. In the dooil. Nimr [kleon could ht seon t n ing li> sl ami, ami then IM- sinijih seemed to expl>Hli,MI ol this t'Hik twohr xexonds, A total ol e i c s rotimls had )<t'on Iin d 1 ht- thirlv millimetor cannon was now sjkfil. I he pi lot was sikiil, I he gunner was *ih nl The sct-m' thev liKiktij tlitwn on was one ol sw irling and rising d i n . and i>ow, ban-lv vis iTiie nl the- swirling tlirt hegan In thin, ihov sjw a tx-Aoii

"Keep .*i^h<w>tincf, ihi nllirr * row inimlHT saul. Thvvv Wis A iwtj M rntui ptxu>t^. JIKI then lamc the thini hui si. The trish all anmnti uhrn- N<«>r-Fldfrn facoclcmn *TU]>t< ti A cloud of dirt and dust rose in(o the air. *KK rp •ihiuiTiii^."
"Yeah. l,Mik at thu\e ih ad bastanis."

"All right, vou'n^ rli-ar,""oin- saki. "All right, ['m just trvinjj tn iiiui urguts agam/ another said. "Wc have a Kunrh o( h<^dk'> laving there.** "All right, \\<- got alKnit t ight individuals.** "Yeah, we <U^tmiteK gut MUIK- " "Yeah, look at chosv dt arl bastards.** "Ckifiul slnHffii)^ "
\ i l ol lti,st,,,,K iwebe -et'.nd' \ t.-lai ol eiijhu roiimls l i * l btentirril I IH- thirls millim.irr lann.xi wa\ o,,w sjl, „l. I h pi |i« was siknt. The gunner was nk nl The sctm- I Ins VKJcetl tVmn on was ont ol sw irling and rising dirt, ami noss. Iiarelv v(s ible as some ot the swirling dirt began In thin, ttn-s saw a [x-Aon sslio svas taking tos'cr In t nmihing againsi a wall It was Chmagh. He sUxxl ami began In run. " I got him," s'lmeonwAd. ami now he ilisappeared insiile a fresh <^|iliision ol iWfTwhith and mmgloil w ith w hat w a* alreads in llie a i ^ ^ h e Apac ho aiiKtl tire ling and tht t ri-w memliers^mtmueil lo talk "•Ml right, nm n cleai." oni saiti "All right, I'm just i r u n g tohml targets agam." another said. "We hase a bunch i*l hotlie, U\ ing there.' "Mi right, we got aliout eiglil imlivtiluals.'' "Yeah, we ik-tmitoU got sunn " "Yeah, look at ihos<- ih ad bastard*." "Good shtMJting,"

7/7/2013

1 III

I h r ( i O d U S O I n i l HS

"Thank s"ou." The smoke was gone now ami ihty ..HiUl tseryihing ckarlv the main pik nl boilii-s, some prone, on* on haiirx bt s, one lokkd into impossihk angk s; NiKir Klcken nn ti>|> of I I K trash; I h m a ^ K ing imiTlonk ss mi his k it s(<k , "Kdslimastft Vseti. C'ra/v Horss t )nt eight," IIK-\ radHHtl In l^sti (. nmpaiii. wlwise- sotiIters ssore on their was lo IIK- site. *Location of hmtirs Mike- Kra* i Use four liso oighl eight tXKrhov'ro on a street in front of an o|x n counvard wilh a bunch ol Uuo trucks, a hunch ol vehicles in a courtsard." - There s one guv moving tlown there, hut he's wounded." snmeiMie nciw saul, h^Jcmg .k.wn. scannmg the btxlies, locusmg on Chmagh. "This is One-eight," the crew member toniinut-t) on tho radio. "We also have tme indiviilual who a{>|X'ars to be wnundtxl. Trving lo <Taw I awav," "Ktiger Wore gonna ii.ov. tlown tht ie," Bravo Companv n-plit-d.

"Hu'sltin,)\lt*r Sc'u-n. ( _ uwv Ht>r>t O I K figKt," IIK'\ r*i<ln>ftl tn Br4\o Companv. whosu wUficrs wcrt- on i h f i r wav to the site. *'L»M.alifin tjf IKXIKX Mike Hraui Fivf liwr five fighl-cighl six-one seven. iTicy're 4»n a street in front of j n t>|H'n tourtvanl » i t h a bunch of blue truck:^. d bunch ol vehicley m a courlvard." -T heru's one guy moving down ihere, ijut he's w<mrHled," someone now saki, looking tlown, scanning the bodies, tocusing on t'hmagh.
. b,i,lil\.",.oeol lh,it

(Kii> SOI i m Hs

"1 hi.* is One-right.' thi- i rrw ininibrr tiinlinurd on thr radio. "Wc also have one individual who appears to IM- woundcd. Trving to crawl away." "kogcr. WV"r<- gonna movo down thoiv," Flra\i> Companv ri-plii-d. r Wc II i'f.is< lilt , rhf \pai hi- i icu r< sp<iiHK'<l jml

"This is One-eight," the , rew member tonlinued on the ra dio "Wo alsti have one indivitiual who appears to U ' wtiuiKlrd. I rv ing to crav%I awav," "Knger We're gonna move down ihi-ie." Hravo Ciini|>any rqtliecl. "Rogf-r We'll it-aso hr,-," the Apache crew rotfMNitkcl ami Iimiinuetl lo wauh ( limagli, still alive somehow, wlm in slow million stimeti in K trving to push himselfup Ht goi jurtwav ami eollapstil H . i r k i l again, raising himself slight Is. Intt again IH' wen) tkiwii Me 114k11 onto his stomach am) Hied In get up on his knees, hut his lefl log slavrti exleiitlod tvhiiwl him. atitl when in- tried lo lift his hea>l. ht- eon Id gi-t it onU a less inches off tin- ground "Dit vim si-o a siiotr"tme ol the crow nienil>ers said. " I )in-s he hau I vie.i|Min in hii. hands?" ths- otJier said, aware iA the rules governing an engaiymotit. "No, I haven't seen one vet " I hov iontimiiil lo waldi aoti lo > irt k- as C hmagh sank liac k lo ihc- ground "ItMHO no. liuiklv." iwie of thoni urged

7/7/2013

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TW t Icjrlv

-mikv

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I n l i k ' d i n t o i m p i s ^ l h l , ,int^li'.; N i ^ i r f-.ltlri'n n n t n ) , , i l i l k I h i i i j ^ h l\ .iiji i n n r i o i i l , 1 , 1 1 h i . I, l l si,I,

"Du vou sft' < i diotf" 'nif ol the Ltvv, iiK'itihers wiid. "Does he han' a wea|>on in his hands?" the other said, aware of ihe rules governing an engage ment, "No, I hav en't seen one vet ." Thev koiilinui d to vvateh and to lirtle as Chmagh sank l>aek to the gKniml "Cmiif I in, budilv." one ol I hem urged
"""S"onlinuetl to v l i as, l i r e , the A p a i N - > n w U S[MIOIW'<I a m i

h ( h m a g l i . si i l l alive sonit h o w . w l m in slow Ht- got p a r t wav

m i l l i o n s, o m o i l t o ho t r v i n g t o p u s h h i m s e l f u p and t o l U p s e d . I h IH- w e n t t k i w n

t r i e d a g a i n , r a i s i n g h i m s e l f s l i g h l l y . I m l again

Me m l k i l o n t o his s t t m i a c h a n i l t r i e d t o got u p

o n h i * I noes, l i u l his loft l o g stavetl e x t e i K l o d b e h i t x l h i m . a m i II he t r i e d l o l i f t h i s h o - h i , h e c o u k I get it I H I K a It w i n c h y * I lie g r o u n d D o v o u see a s h o t ? " t m e o f i h e c row m e m l v r s s a i t l . * " D i M s ho have a w e a p t w i i n his harwls?" t h o o t h e r s a i t l . a w a r e o f the r u l e s g o v e m i n g a n engage-mont. " N o . I haven't soon o n e v o l . " I hov t o i i l i n t i , l l l o w . i t t h a m i t o t Ire k as C h m a g h s^nk l o the g n n i m l "(_''imo n n , U i d t K , " oiH- o f t h o i n u i g e i l kuk

l u n i ; , ion/
• ^ A l l v o u g o t t a d o is p i c k u p a w e a p o n , " a n o t h e r s a i d . N o w . as h a d h a p p e n e d e a r l i e r , t h e i r c i r c l i n g h n * u g h l 1 I v h i l w l s o m e h u i k l i n g s t h a t o b s l r i K l e i l i h c i r v iovs t*f t l x • a t u i w h e n thev w e r e n e x t able t o see C h m a g h , s o m e o n e t h t v h a t l A glimpsed running up iht .strort w a s c r o u c h i n g o v e r h i m . a set

o n t l m a n w a s r u n n i n g t o w a r d t h r m . a n d a K i a )>as«.-iigtT v a n w a s api^rtiaching. "Du-shmasier. Crazv H o r s e . " I hoy r a d i r x d i n u r g e n t l y . "WV

havp i n d i v i t l u a U g o i n g t o t h o s < r n o . I o o k s l i k e possiWs up bodies and weapons. Break T h r van stopped n o x l t o C h m a g h .

pickmg

f h e d r i v e r got o u t .

ran

a n t i n t I I n lh« passenger s i i l e , a n d sliti o p e n t h e t a r g o t l i w i r

''.All vou gotta d o is pick up a weapon," another said. N o w , as had happened earlier, l l i i ' i r c i r t l i n j ^ hxDUght t h e m l>ehin<l some buildings that obstructed their view o f thi* street, atKl when they were next able t o sec Chrnagh, someone they ha<l l?limpM.'d r u n n i n g up the street was c r o u c h i n g over h i m , a sec ond m a n was r u n n i n g t o w a r d t h e m , and a K i a passenger van was approaching.
T h e v h a i l C h m a i i h .it t h e t k m r n o w " T h i s is B u s h m a s t e r St-von. ( i n a h e a d . " T h o v w e r e p u l l i n g C h m a g h t o his loot. " R o g e r , w e have a M a t k k f i g t , t r u c k p i c k i n g u p t h e h o t l i o : , Rocfuest p e r m IS) Kin t o e n g a g e , " Tl«--^.rt,p„li,n).ehnuel,im,..l..v4n

7/7/2013

l U l l I ! . }t>0'i "All vou gotta do IS pick up a weapon." annther said.

II I

Ntiw. as had happened earlier, tlwir eire ting brought them iK-hiiitl some l>uiktinjis lhal obstrucU-il ihetr view of tlit street, and wlion thev were m-xt able to see Chmagh. some,me they had glimpsed running up lho street was crouching over h i m , a w onti man vvas running toward them, and a K u passvngor van was apprtiaching. •"Bushmaster, Cra/v Horse." thev radioed in urgently "Wo t a v r iiKlividuals going to llie up bodies and weapons. Break Th, van stopped next to Chmagh, The driver got out. ran ariHim) lo th« j>assonger side, ami sUl open tho c argo th>t>r. "Cra/v Morce One-eight. Re<(uesl permissitHi tn engage." Roads to Jire, thov waited tor tiK rccjuircd ivs(>nn.so Irom Bravo Companv as two of tho paswrsliv Irietl to pit k up Chmagh, who was laceilow n <wi tho sidewalk. One man had Chmagh by the- legs rho st-Kiml man was trving to turn him over iMito his back. Were ihev insurgents.' Wore ihev |xi*pk onlv trving to , no. 1 ooks like posidbly picking

"lJu.shmaster, Craz\ Horse." thev radioed in urgently. "We have individuals going to the scene. Looks like possibly picking up bodies and weapons. Break The van stopped next to Chmagh. The driver got out, ran anuind to the passenger side, and slid open the cargo door. "Cra/v Horse One-eight. Request permission to engage."
Thov were pusliiiig Chmagh into tho van.

"All vou gotta do IS pak up a weajxin." annthrr said. Now. as had happened earlier, tlwir circling brnught ihrm

"Come <in' Let us ^iiotnT Now the second man had hold ol Chmagh under his arms. "Bushmaster, Cra/v Horse Orc-cight,"* the .Apache said again. But there was still no ivs|>*mse ai the driver got hack in his seat and the two men lifted Chmagh and earned him around the front of the \an toward the open door. "Thev're taking him "
the logs. Tho set ond man was trving to turn liini nvei onto his hack. Wore thov insurgents/ Were thev pocyk i>nl\.

Jtelpr
^'Cotne on' Let us tim}!.'' Nim- lho S S i-nnil man had hold ot Chmagh muter his arms. "BushmaslcT, Cra/v MiWTo One eight," the \|MCIK- said again But there vs js still no ri'S|>on!ie a.v tho clnver got Iwck in his scat and the two tm-n lilti-d Chmagh and earned him around tho front of the van low art! the ••»pen dot>r. "Tlvov're taking him " "JJuJimd-iicr. Od/i fA'rw tiffin " Thov had Chmagh at the tkxir nov*. "This is Bushmaster St vtn, l i o ahead." Thov wore pulling Chnv.»gh lo his k f t . "Rtigor, we have a Wa* k bongo truck pkking up tho U d l k i . Retjuest permission Ui engage," Thov were puslnng Chmagh inio the- van

7/7/2013

" M l vou gotta do IS pick up a weaptm," anothpr u k l . Now. as hati happened earlier, tlioir circling hrougbl them Ix-hiitd scnm- buildings lhal tibstriKted iheir view ol tin siroot, and VVIKII thev were next able lo see Chmagh, stimcoiie th, v had glimpsoil running up tlx street was crouching over him. a soc

-p*

•MMMHMIIIM

'Bu.thma.tter, Cru/j- fhric i h r ny'.'i ' They had Chmagh at the door now. "This Is Bushmaster Seven. Un ahead." They were pulling Cliliiagh to his lect. "Roger, wc have a Ula< k bongo truck picking up the lioslies. Request permission to eng.lgr," Thev were pushing Chmagh into the van.

"fi

Now the second man had hold nl Chmagh uniler his arms Bul there vs as still no response as the driver got Iwck in I

"Bushmaster. Cra/v Horse One eight." the .Apaclio said again seat and the two men l i f u ^ l Chmagh and earned him a front of the van inward lho ojien door. "Thev re taking him " ^'Bifv/ujkitffr, C>ii7i H.mr fW eiffhi ' Thc\ had Chmagh at the door now. "This is Bushmaster Seven t i n ahead." Thov wore pulling Chmagh to his k-oi. "Roger, we have a hiatk bongo truck pkking up the IUKIM-S. Rixfiiost perm ISS Kin to eiigagi." Thov were puvlnng Chmagh inln the van

11,. i . - . t M .

sotDMKs

Thi^ is Hushnuslor Seven. Roger. Lngage."y / / y / y / ^ Hi was in the van now, the two men were t ^ ^ n g the ilorir, ^k ^k ^ k ^k ^k ^ k ^k "One eight, i k a r " "Cmie on!" A lirst Imrst "Clear." A secximi liurst. -Clear." A thirtl burst. / a n d tin van was beginning to move lorvvanl.

/
/

"Ckar."
1,1, M'tomU Sixty roun,ls l l i , Iwo nu n iHit.nl,- nl ilu- u n

\

-This is Bushmaster Seven. Roger, tngage." He ».js in ihe Mn now, the i w o men were elosing the door. and the van was h, ginning u» move lorvvard. "()rie eight, i k . i r , " "Coine on!" .\ lirst 1 Ml rsi -Clear." A second hurst. -Clear." A ihii d hursi. ••Cle.ll."

"We need to ovac this < lii)d," Rravo Seven conimut il 'Shi *

7/7/2013

" I his is Bushmaster Seven Roger, tnyage-."

"Bushmaster Six, Brjv<, Seven," a Hr.rvo Companv soldier called over the radio. "I've got eleven Iraqi Kl,\s. one small i hild wounded. Over." The .\j)ache crews w ere listening, ".\h, damn," one <il iheni said. "We need to evac this cliiiil,' linivo Sevin fontinued. "She's

ahr j p i h jo t keil Ivii kw ard. cTashc-sl into the > II nojr the tiKii.. ivt lo|M'tl in smoke. I ihiiiL the sec I wills, sixlv tlx shotiting. mall01 ol waiting for Bravo Companv s soldiers ami lit re thev came, in llumvee-s and on to arrivx on tin- siene. s,e liKit. swarming dtn , a tlxiioiighlv ruim-tt lamlscapt- The- lulllo hold was theirs nov. from the m.iin pile of htxlios. to the trash pile with Noor Lkken, lo ihc shot up houses and buiklings. to the van inside of which, among lho bottles, thev disetivered ;me<ine alive Bushmaster Six. Bravo Seven," a Bravo Companv snkhef alkd over lho radio "I'vogol oh von Iratji KIAs. one small t hiW voundotl. Over," I he Apac-ho erew s were lisiening "Ah, damn." one n | them saiil. "We need lo ovac this thild." Bravo Seven mnlinuoil "She's n's disabk-d," a trevv mom hor saitl. IMII lo Ix hmrih hurst, a Kllh, ami a sixth ton mure* re rmiiHh - and that, at last, vvas the end ol

/ g o t a v*oumI to the IHUV. DCK .an t <k. anvihing hi-,. to got evac ' , I . Over."

She in .

-Well. (IS thi-ir lauh Inr Uiivgmg i h t i . kids lo a batlU." a crew nu mlicr s.ild. "Thai's righL^ihemhoi said, ami lor a kw more minutes ili, v eiMitinueil lo circh and waii h. Thov saw more Humvcs arriving, one nl w hit b .liove up onto the trash|pile. right mer the [wrl containing wlut was loll irf \ o o r - I Ith-en s UHIV "That guy just drove .iver .»I«.dv,"

\
She i i , . d .

got .1 xvoun.i ;,. the l>elly. Doc v-in't do anvthing he,,

to get evae'd. Over." "Well, it's their fault lor bringing their kids to ,r battle," .1 crew member sjid.
•I U u l \\3f n A r a l t l » n t h f v tk " , m I n a n n t l . r p a r t ,4 VI A m i n as m n r , ,

, n d m n r , K r a v o C n m p a n . ».UIi<T. a . . i > . J , n n . n l » I K " > ' » a > 1 - ' .Vljrih, t h , « , l d i » " h n nn t k l v n u l i , i « ' « >••,> l i r » ' k ) l"'l

l i « l . - h m U n l a g u a n i l n » c r . p f r k . ' l " U t at a l l n l th.- , i . i - h , a m i »,KI IU„-IU ami W I V I ^ H I V . " V V V a i n ' l . v , r p . n n a h., al.U- t n l i n ' l

an i r . O i n all t h i s .1,11." S i m c i h f n . . V l a r i h h i d lvarm-,1 l i n » | i c n i i h . - i i , h,- » a . , .-.p.i-.alK n n | u i i , 2 > . " h . n a n M P k i l l , ' l I " . I n " " ! ^ " ' I " ' ' Jr. C r a i g ' , i m n i o r u l « r v i c » l,a,l I x i n ,«> l " l y later, a , M a l . h o(xn, k all n l t l . " " I ,"">, "'S' <'"'

h . » l i , - «alt<-re.l arnun.1. I J n » n I' l l " a.

m , i . k . r x p , ~ - , l . » • j r . K M . m . . M> g m l c y , . I f k'M" I' '

, . n u l d Ial. r .'xplain

7/7/2013

gut 3 w o u m ! l o t h e I K - I I V . D O C c a n t d o a n y t h i n g h e , , - She m etis t o get r v a c M . < ) v e r . " " W e l l . It's t h e i r l a u h f o r k i n g i n g t h e n kitts l o a i M t t h . " a c r e w n k m i t o r saki " T h a t ' s r i g h t . ' l b e o t h e r s a k i . a m i Uir a lew m o r e m i n u l e s i h o v c o n l i n u e i l t o c i r t h a n d w a n h. _ f T h o v saw m o r e H u m v t t s a r r i v i n g , o n e n l w h i c h d r o v e un

/ m t o t h e i r a s h j p i l e . r i g h t over the p a r i t . s t a i n i n g w l u t was l o I l X ol \ , K , r I hloen slKwIy ' T h a t guv just d r o v e t r - D i d he?" -^,ah." - W e l l , i h e v ' r i d e a t l . so T h e v w a t c l k - d a soUlter e m e r g e I r o m l h o van c r a d l i n g t h e w - o u m l ^ l g i r l a n d r u n w i t h h e r i n his a r m s i n t h e a r m s l h a l w a s g o i n g l o ev j c u a l . h e r t o a h o s p i t a l Thev vvati-hod a n n t l n i snhlw r t m e r g e f i o m the v a n a f e w l u n t k t l t h i l d . t h i s out- a l i t t k vehkk abndt."

Thev s.»w more I l u m v . . s arriv i n g . one of w h i c h iliirt e up onto the trash|pile, right over the p j r t c o n t a i n i n g w l w l was left ol' N o o r - t l d e e n ' s body. " T h a t guv just drov e over a bodv." " D i d he?" "Yeah." " W e l l , thev're dead, so

could later expla i

v t - r v happv

I r e m e m b e r t o o l i n g so h a p p v . W h e n I h e a n l thov

w o r e e n g a g i n g , w h i n I h e a n l t h , rt \ t h i i t c t n K I A , I w a s |U!it t o h a p p v , h o i aust C r a i g had just d i e d , . i n d it f o i l l i k e , v o u k n o w , w e

As l l i e A f i a r h o s pet k y | n i l . IK- a m i a n o t h e r s o l d i e r w e n t t h r o u g h a g a l e III i l l , w a l l i t i a l l h o v a n h a d c r a s h o i l i n t o a n d a g a i n s t w h k h C h m a g h had t r i e d l o lake cover. There, ihrv Marxh who knt-w rrali/i In[i liounc) m the ctnirlvard two mnro ck>ser injured at the Chmagh morning td a tumso, Iraqis, Iwti, inin trving tvntinm who hitklon from street view, As two h

one on lop might

ol tho other. tht-

ln<iketl

h.»ve ken whn \ merit

had Iv, en li fling hat I sp, nl ih, tl lhal was still ilk alivi

the van, to kill

as far as Mars an soklit Bul llie

rs. ho one tin man whkh to

nm- <m thr

was di-atl. eves with

. and as Marv-li aiwl tuWh was jnmds.

ht krd

him, Ingolhor. thov

lho

raised March signal

his hamls hati

d his twn what Iratjis

hweliiigors did when

leariH-il

wanted

I tie- wiml

So M a r c h Intikott al t i n - m a n a m i r u N x - d his t w o logelhc-r, l o o .

hfrhngers

A n d t h e n i)ri>pjx-el his l e t l h a m l a n t I e x t o n c k - d t h e m ick I l e h i t - * ger o f his right hand. A n d t h e n said t o t h e o t h e r s o k i i e r . " C r a i g ' s prot*ablv |ust s n tint; up there d r t n k i n i ; brer, going. H a h ! Thai's a l l 1 m - e d o i l . ' "

A n d t h a i was t h e ilav's t h i r d v e r s i o n o l w a r .

As t o r l h o l o u r t h v e r s i t m . it tK C u r r t - d late i n t h e d a v . l u c k twi t h * ' r O B . a f t e r K a u / l a r u h a m i t h e s^vklierv h a d h n i s h e d t h e i r w o r k i n

The V k m w hv i m w a k t u i t h m a g h a m i N o i «

fUk rn.

T h o v h a d b r o u g h t bat k N n o r l lelren's c a m e r a s a n d o v a n i i n t - d t h e i m a g e s t o si-i i t lit w a s a j o u r n a l i s t or a n i n s u r g e n t

10

Prosecution Exhibit 15 Transcript of Video 00:03 Okay I got it. 00:05 Last conversation Hotel Two-Six. 00:09 Roger Hotel Two-Six, uh, Victor Charlie Alpha. Look, do you want your Hotel Two-Two two element. 00:14 I got a black vehicle under target. It's arriving right to the north of the mosque. 00:17 Yeah, I would like that. Over. 00:21 Moving south by the mosque dome. Down that road. 00:27 Okay we got a target fifteen coming at you. It's a guy with a weapon. 00:32 Roger. 00:39 There's a... 00:42 There's about, ah, four or five... 00:44 Bushmaster Six copy One-Six. 00:48 ...this location and there's more that keep walking by and one of them has a weapon. 00:52 Roger received target fifteen. 00:55 Okay. 00:57 See all those people standing down there. 01:06 Affirmed. And open the courtyard. 01:09 Yeah roger. I just estimate there's probably about twenty of them. 01:13 There's one, yeah. 01:15 Oh yeah. 01:181 don't know if that's a... 01:19 Hey Bushmaster element, copy on the one-six. 01:21 Thats a weapon. 01:22 Yeah. 01:23 Hotel Two-Six; Crazy Horse One-Eight. 01:29 Copy on the one-six, Bushmaster Six-Romeo. Roger. 01:32 Fucking prick. 01:33 Hotel Two-Six this is Crazy Horse One-Eight. Have individuals with weapons. 01:41 Yup. He's got a weapon too. 01:43 Hotel Two-Six; Crazy Horse One-Eight. Have five to six individuals with AK47s. Request permission to engage. 01:51 Roger that. Uh, we have no personnel east of our position. So, uh, you are free to engage. Over. 02:00 All right, we'll be engaging. 02:02 Roger, go ahead. 02:03 I'm gorma... I can't get 'em now because they're behind that building. 02:09 Um, hey Bushmaster element... 02:10 He's got an RPG. 02:11 All right, we got a guy with an RPG. 02:13 I'm gonna fire. 02:14 Okay.

02:151^0 hold on. Let's come around. Behind buildings right now fi'om our point of view....Okay,we're gonna come around. 02:19HotelTwoSix; have eyes on individual with RPG. Getting ready to fire.^ewon't... 02:23 Yeah,wehadaguy shoot—and now he's behind the building. 02:2^ God damn it. 02:28 Uh, negative, he was, uh, right in fiont of the Brad. Uh,'bout, there, one o'clock. 02:34 Haven't seen anything since then. 02:3^.Iustfi.ickin',onceyougeton'emjustopen'emup. 02:38 Roger,Iam 02:40Isee your element, uh, got about four Humvees, uh, out along... 02:43 You'reclear 02:44 Allright, firing 02:47 Let me know when you've got them. 02:49 Lets shoot. 02:50 Light'em all up. 02:52 Come on, firel 02:57 Roger, ^eep shooting, keep shooting. 02:59 keep shooting. 03:02 keep shooting. 03:05 Hotel..BushmasterTwoSix,BushmasterTwo-Six,we need to move, time now^ 03:I0AlIright,we just engaged all eight individuals. 03:12Yeah,we see two birds and we're still firing. 03:14Roger 03:I5Igot'em 03:l^Two-six, this isTwo-Six,we're mobile. 03:I9Oops, I'm sorry what was going on7 03:20Goddamnit,I^yle 03:23 All right, hahaha,Ihit'em... 03:28 Uh, you're clear. 03:30 All right, I'mjust trying to find targets again. 03:38 Bushmaster Six, this is BushmasterTwoSix. 03:40 Gotabunchofbodieslayin'there. 03:42 All right,we got about, uh, eight individuals. 03:4^Yeah, we got one guy crav^ling around down there, but, uh, you know, we got, definitely got something. 03:5I^e're shooting some more. 03:52 Roger 03:5^ Hey,youshoot, I'll talk 03:57 HotelTwo-Six;Crazyhorse One-Eight. 04:01 Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is HotelTwo-Six.Over. 04:03 Roger. Currently engaging approximately eight individuals, uh^IA,tth RPGs, and AI^ 47s

04:12 HotelTwo-Six,you need to move to that location once Crazyhorse is done and get pictures. Over. 04:20 Six beacon gaia. 04:24 SergeantTwenty is the location. 04:28 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 04:31Oh, yeah, look at those dead bastards. 04:3^^ice 04:37Two-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 04:44 ^ice 04:47 Good shoot. 04:48 Thank you 04:53 HotelTwo Six 04:55 HotelTwo Six; Crazyhorse One Eight. 05:03 Crazyhorse One-Eight; Bushmaster Seven. Go ahead. 05:0^ Bushmaster Seven; Crazyhorse OneEight.Uh, location ofbodies, Mike Bravo fivefour five-eight eight-sixone-seven. 05:15 Hey,good on the uh... 05:I7Eive-four-five-eight eight-six-one-seven. Over. 05:2IThis is Crazyhorse OneEight,that'sagood copy. They're onastreet infi^ontof an open, uh, courtyard withabunchofblueuh trucks, bunch ofvehicles in the courtyard. 05:30 There's one guy moving down there but he's uh, he's wounded. 05:35 All right,we'll let'em know^ so they can hurry up and get over here. 05:40 OneEight,we also have one individual, uh, appears to be wounded trying to crawl away. 05:49 Roger,we're gonna move down there. 05:51 Roger,we'll cease fire. 05:54 Yeah,we won't shoot anymore. 0^:01 He's getting up. 0^:02 Maybe he hasaweapon down in his hand7 0^:04 l^o,Ihaven't seen one yet. 0^:07Isee you guys got that guy crawling right now on that curb. 0^:08Yeah,Igot him.Iput two rounds near him, and you guys were shooting over there too, so uh we'll see. 0^:I4Yeah,rogerthat 0^:I^BushmasterThirty-Six Element; this is uhHotelTwo-Seven over. 0^:21 HotelTwo-Seven; Bushmaster Seven go ahead. 0^:24 Roger I'm just trying to make sure you guys have my turf, over. 0^:3IRoger we got your turf 0^:33 Come on, buddy. 0^:38 All you gofta do is pick upaweapon. 0^:44 Crazyhorse this is Bushmaster Eive, Bushmaster Pour break.^eare right below you right time now can you walk us onto that location over. 0^:54 This isTwoSix roger. I'll pop fiares.^ealso have one individual moving.^e're looking

for weapons. If we seeaweapon,we're gonna engage. 07:07YeahBushmaster,wehaveavan that's approaching and picking up the bodies. 07:14^here's that van at7 07:15Right down there by the bodies. 07:l^Okay,yeah 07:18Bushmaster; Crazyhorse.behave individuals going to the scene, looks like possibly uh picking up bodies and weapons. 07:25 Let me engage. 07:28 Canlshoot7 07:3IRoger. Break. Uh Crazyhorse One-Eight request permission to uh engage 07:3^ Picking up the wounded^ 07:38 Yeah,we're trying toget permission to engage. 07:4ICome on, let us shoots 07:44 Bushmaster; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 07:49 They're taking him. 07:51 Bushmaster; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 07:5^ This is Bushmaster Seven, go ahead. 07:59 Roger.^ehaveablackSUV-uh Bongo truck picking up the bodies. Request permission to engage. 08:02 Puck 08:0^ This is Bushmaster Seven, roger.This is Bushmaster Seven, roger.Engage. 08:12 One-Eight, engage. 08:12 Clear 08:13 Come onl 08:17Clear. 08:20Clear 08:21^e're engaging. 08:2^ Coming around. Clear. 08:27 Roger.Trying to uh... 08:32 Clear 08:35 Ihear'emco..Ilost'eminthedust. 08:3^Igot'em 08:41Pmfiring 08:42 This is Bushmaster forty got any BOA on that truck. Over. 08:44You're clear. 08:47 This is ah Crazyhorse. Stand by. 08:47 Ican't shoot for some reason. 08:49Goahead 08:50 Ithinkthevan'sdisabled. 08:53 Go ahead and shoot it. 08:54Igot an azimuth limitft^rsome reason 09:00Goleft

09:03 Clearleft 09:15 All right, Bushmaster Crazyhorse One-Eight. 09:20Avehicle appears to be disabled. 09:22 There were approximately four to five individuals in vehicle moving bodies. 09:28 Your lead Bradley should take the next right. 09:31 That's cruising east down the road. 09:341'^^o more shooting. 09:38 Crazyhorse; this is Bushmaster Pour.^e'removingadismounted element straight south through the Bradleys. 09:44Ihave your Elemuh, Bradley element turning south down the road where the engagements were. 09:53 Last call on station's uh Bradley element say again. 09:5^ Roger this is Crazyhorse. 09:58 Your lead Bradley just tumed south down the road where all the engagements happened. 10:03 Should haveavan in the middle of the road with about twelve to fifteen bodies. 10:11Oh yeah, look at that. Right through the windshields 10:14Hahal 10:l^Allright.There were uh approximately four to five individuals in that truck, so I'm counting about twelve to fifteen. 10:24Iwould say that'safairly accurate assessment so far. 10:27 Rogerthat 10:29Iwant to just be advised Six, Bushmaster Six are getting mounted up right now. 10:35 Okay,roger. Hey,we can't fiex down that road towards that, uh,where Crazyhorse engaged. 10:43 So, uh,Idon't know if you want us to do so or stay put. Over. 10:4^ ^ h y can't they go down there7 10:5^Ithink we whacked'em all. 10:58 That's right, good 10:59 This is HotelTwoSix 11:03 Hey you got my dismounted element right there over to your left. ll:O^Roger,Isee'em. ll:11Hey yeah, roger, be advised, there were some guys popping out with A^s behind that dirt pile break. l l : I 9 ^ e a l s o took some RPGs off, uh, earlier, so just uh make sure your men keep your eyes open. 11 2^ Roger. 11 27And,uh, Bushmaster ahead are, uh,Hote1Two-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 11 33 Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is HotelTwo-Six. 11 35YeahTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 11 37Uh,1ocationIhave about twelve to fifteen dead bodies. 11 42 Uh,where else are we takingfirefrom'^ 11 48 Ctirrently we're not being engaged, ah, butjust south ofthat location. Break.

11:55You should see dismounted elements with Humvees moving to the cast, over. 12:01This is Crazyhorse One-Eight; we have elements in sight. 12:05 BushmasterThree-Six. 12:07 I'm gonna get downaliftle lower. 12:09 Allright 12:10I'm gonna come downaliftle lower and takeaquick gander. 12:13 Rogerthat. 12:14Six; this is ft^ur.^e're headed to the area where Crazyhorse engaged. 12:2^ Bushmaster Six; this is HotelTwoSix. 12:28 Request to go to the south to our original BP so ifyoufiushedthem to the south we will be there to uh intercept over. 12:39 Hey this is Bushmaster Seven; we're coming up on B...on the ass end ofthe Brads. 12:54 Hey uh, Bushmaster Element; this is Copperhead One-Six break. 13:00 ^e're moving in the vicinity ofthe engagement area and looks like we've got some slight movement ftom ah, the ah van that was engaged. 13:0^ Looks likeakid. Over. 13:11This is Bushmaster Seven, roger. Uh,we'reaboutahundred meters behind you. 13:1^Got that big pile, to the right7 13:18Roger, you gonna pull inhered Oo you want me to push stuff so you can, uh, get clearof it7 13:21 Right on the comer7 13:22 ^hat'sthat7 13:23 Got that big pile ofbodies to the right, on the comer7 13:24Yeah, right here. 13:25^egotadismounted infantry and vehicles, over. 13:30 Again, roger. 13:31 And clear. 13:48 There's the Bradley right there. 13:51 Got'em 14:00 Hotel two-six; are you uh at this grid over7 14:05YeahIwanted to get you around so didn't you just get that one dude to scare them all away.It worked out prefty good. 14:llldidn't want those flickers to run away and scafter. 14:12Yeah 14:15Bushmaster Six; HotelTwo-Six.Roger,we lilted up with our two element they are all mounted up in our trucks break. 14:23 removed south so that we could ah possibly intercept personnel beingfiushedsouth. So we are vicinity fifth Street. 14:30 And ah phase line Gadins. Over. 14:37 Bring the trucks in, cordon this area off 14:39 Can we move the Bradleyft^rwardso we can bring trucks in and cordon off this area. 14:44 If the Bradleys could take the south cordon, that could help outalot.

14:53 Bushmaster or element.^hich Element called in Crazyhorse to engage the eightelem eightmenteamontopofaroof7 15:02 Bushmaster Six; this is HotelTwo-Six.Uh,Ibelieve that was me. 15:07 They uh had A^-47sand were to our cast, so,where we were taking small arms fire. Over. 15:20 Hotel Crazyhorse One-Eight. 15:2^ Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is HotelTwo-Six. 15:28YeahTwo-Six.One-EightIjust also wanted to make sure you knew that we hadaguy with an RPG cropping round the comer getting ready to fire on your location. 15:3^ That's why we ah, requested permission to engage. 15:40 Ok, roger that.Tango mike. 15:4^ HotelTwo-Six; do you understand me, over7 15:51Idid not copy last, uh, you got stepped on. Say again please7 1^:00 They cordoned offthe building that the helicopters killed the personnel on. 1^:04 Don't go anywhere else we need to cordon offthat building so we can get on top ofthe roofand SSC the building. Over. 1^:13 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. l^:l^ThisisHotelTwo-Six. l^:19Hey,whoever was talking about rooftops, know that all the personnel we engaged were ground level.Isay again ground level. 1^:27 Rogerlcopy ground level.Over. 1^:30 One-Eight roger. 1^:33 Canlgetagrid to that one more time please7 l^:3^Target twenty. 1^:3^ Roger l^:40You want me to take over talking to them7 1^:42 S'alright 1^:4^ Seven-Six Romeo Over. 1^:49 Roger, I've got uh eleven Iraqi I^IAs. One small child wounded. Over. 1^:57 Roger.Ah damn. Oh well. 17:04 Roger,weneed,weneedauh to evac this child. Ah, she's gotauh, she's gotawound to the belly. 17:10Ican't do anything here.She needs to get evaced. Over. 17:18Bushmaster Seven, Bushmaster Seven; this is Bushmaster Six Romeo. 17:20 fenced your location over. 17:25 Roger,we're at the location where Crazyhorse engaged the RPG tire break. 17:37 Grid five four five-eight. 17:4^^ell it's their fault for bringing their kids intoabattle. 17:48 That'sright 17:5^ Got uh, eleven. 18:01Yeahuh,roger.^e're monitoring. 18:02 Sorry

18:04^0 problem 18:07 Correction eight six one six. 18:l^Lookingft^rmoreindividua1ssouth. 18:18BushmasterSix-Bushmaster Seven. 18:29 That guyjust drove overabody. 18:31Ha,ha,didhe7 18:32Yeah 18:37 Maybe it was justavisual illusion, but it looked like it. 18:41 ^ell,they'redead, so 18:44 Bushmaster Six; HotelTwoSix over. 18:5^ Six; this is Pour.Igot one individual looks like he's got an RPG round laying underneath him. Break. 19:05 I^robably like to get.. 19:10Lookatthat 19:12Bushmaster Six; HotelTwo-Six over. 19:29 Bushmaster Six; Romeo HotelTwo-Six over. 19:44 Bushmaster Six; HotelTwo-Six over. 19:5^ HotelTwoSix; Bushmaster Seven co-located with Six. 20:08 HotelTwoSix; Bushmaster Seven. 20:10Bushmaster Seven; HotelTwo-Six over. 20:I4Roger,wegotalittle girl who needs to be evaced.^hat's your location over7 20:22 On route Gadins,Iam all the way to the south. Solam Gadins and f i f t h Street. 20:28 Isay again Gadins and fifth Street, over. 20:40 Bushmaster Seven; HotelTwo-Six.Do you want us to push to your location7 20:55 Hey,uh,Ineed to get the Brads to drop radslgotawounded girl we need to take her to Rustamyan. 21:04 Bushmaster Seven; HotelTwoSix.Do you want us to move to your location over7 21:30 Bushmaster Six; HotelTwo-Six over. 21:34 HotelTwo-Six; this is Bushmaster Seven. Roger, come to our location. 21:390kay,roger,we're moving up north on Gadins and then we will push east to your location. 22:0^ Bushmaster elements be advised we have friendlies coming fiom the south to your location.Over. 22:13 All right, got'em moving up ftom the south. 22:35 Bushmaster elements be advised we are coming up ftom the east over. 23:49 Hey One-Two; follow me over. I'm going to try and get out ofhere as quickly as possible. 24:10You guys all right back there7 24:13Yeah,we're with you. 24:35 Lotta guys down there. 24:37 Oh yeah 24:37 Came out ofthe woodwork. 24:38 This is Operation, ah. Operation Secure. 25:l^Yeah we have fifty rounds left.
^

25:17Yep 25:19TwoSix; Six Romeo over. 25:21Two-Six; Romeo over. 25:23 Hey roger,what's your current location over7 25:47 Six; speak it's Romeo. 25:50 Three-Six Romeo; Six Romeo over. 25:52 Roger, at the six once it's back on this guy. 25:5^ Lost him. 2^:00 that's he gotforus7 2^:01 Standby 2^:0^ HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 2^:21 Hey,did you got action on that target yet over7 2^:25 Speak to Charlie roger. 2^:32 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse OneEight. 2^:55 Bushmaster Six; Crazyhorse One Eight. 2^:59 Roger, you have traftic over. 27:02 Roger. Uh, just wondering ifyou had anything else you wanted us to drive on7 27:08Yeah roger keep on, ah, for the time being over. 27:11Six calls Six Romeo. Can you tell battalion that two civilian children casualties are coming back to Rustamyan in the Bradley over. 27:2^ Six calls Six Romeo. 27:29 Bushmaster Six Copper ^hite Six. 27:32 Copperhead ^hite Six; this is Bushmaster Six Romeo over. 27:3^ Roger, that'sanegative on the evac ofthe two, ah, civilian, ah, kids to,ah, rusty they're going to have the IPs l i t ^ up with us over here.Break. IPs will take them up toalocal hospital over. 27:50 That^sagood copy over. 27:54 One six over. 28:08 ^herethey'reallgoingto. 28:10Sayagain7 28:12^here all those dismounts are going to7 28:18Going into this hous-.Sorry 29:29 Three Six,Three Six; Bushmaster Six Romeo over. 29:37 Six Romeo, Six Romeo. 29:39 Roger, Bushmaster Seven wants an up on all personnel in your platoon over. 29:44 Roger 30:08 ...ftiendlies on the roof. 30:10CrazyhorseOneEight; this is Bushmaster four over. 30:12Bushmaster Pour; this is Crazyhorse One-Eight. 30:15 Roger,Ican ah hear small arms fire ftom your engagement area at two zero zero zero ah about three hundred meters ftom that objective over.

30:27 Crazyhorse; ftom whatlunderstand small arms fire at two zero zero zero degrees about two hundred meters. 30:39 .lust to the southwest. 30:41 Yup 30:49 Right about where we engaged. 30:51Yeah, One ofthem with that RPG or whatever. 30:55 He'sgotaweapon.GotanRI^ AI^47. 30:58 HotelTwoSix; Crazyhorse OneEight. 31:02 Gonna lose him. 31:03 Crazyhorse One-Eight this is HotelTwo-Six over. 31:08 Roger, have another individual withaweapon. 31:10Dammit, they're in the same building. 31:12Hey roger that, just make sure that ah, you're firing ftom west to cast over. 31:l^.Iust went in the building. 31:18CrazyhorseThree and four will be on their way. 31:21The individual walked into the building previously past grid. So there's at least six individuals in that building with weapons. 31:30^ecanputamissileinit. 31:31If you'd like, ah, Crazyhorse One-Eight could putamissile in that building. 31:4^ It'satriangle building. Appears to be ah, abandoned. 31:51 Yeah, looks like it's under construction, abandoned. 31:52 Appears to be abandoned, under construction. 31:5^ Uh,likelsaid, six individuals walked in there ftom our previous engagement. 32:01Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is Bushmaster Six Romeo. If you've PIDed the individuals in the building with weapons, go ahead and engage the building over. 32:08 Crazyhorse One Eight; will be coming up north to south engaging with Hellfire. 32:13 All right, I'm going to do manual. 32:17Allright,we've been cleared to engage with... 32:18This is Bushmaster Six Romeo.Crazyhorse One Eight is going to be engaging north to south with Hellfire missiles over. 32:24 This is HotelTwoSix. Roger. 32:2^ All right, you ready7 32:271'^o, I'm trying to get over to the IS^ovember.Trying to find the fucking... 32:33 This is Bushmaster Six. Has that RPG round been extended already or is it still live, over. 32:38 Looks live to me. 32:40 Let me know when you're going to fire. 32:44 All right, I'm flicking havingabrainfart.^here's the man advancement7 32:48 You got one on the clutch on the bottom left on your left door. 32:54 Roger let me stand by. 32:57 Gotit7 32:59^0 33:03 Allright 10

33:09 Let me just putakilo in there. 33:12 0k 33:15Gotit7 33:21 Putakilo in7 33:22 All right, let me get back. 33:2^ I'm gonna come around, get some more distance. 33:27 Roger that, you're clear. 33:33 Got more individuals in there. 33:3^You wanna hit ftom north to south or you wanna go ftom west to east7Idon^twanna fire with theftiendliesright there, you know. 33:41 Yeah, go north to south. 33:53 Right, come around, right. 33:5^ I'mjust gonna put one or two in, ifthey want any more. 34:09 Right 34:12 found the missile. 34:15Roger, f l l get you in this straight. 34:1^You're clear. 34:17I'm tiring. 34:2^Targethit 34:28 It wasamissile. 34:29 Left 34:32 You're clear. I'm above you. 34:3^ Crazyhorse One-Eight; was that explosion you engaging over7 34:38 Crazyhorse One Eight, roger. Engaging building with one hellfire. 34:4^ Let's come around and we'll clear the smoke, ^e'll fire one more. 34:50 Hey uh,we're going to wait for the smoke to clear. 34:52Yes Crazyhorse One Eight now.'^e're going to put one more missile into the building. 34:57Yeah,diditah,gointhebui1ding7Iseethewallknockedoutoftheway. 34:59Yeah,itwentin. 35:01 Bushmaster Six Romeo; this is HotelTwo-Six.Yeah roger, that was Crazyhorse engaging with one Hellfire over. 35:10Yeahroger,Igota^ovemberifyouwant. 35:12fireaway. 35:I3Youwantustofire7 35:18Youready7 35:19Yep 35:20 Bushmaster Six Romeo. They are going to engage ah, with one more Hellfire in that building. 35:24 Uh shit, whyldoIhaveAPfiashing on there7 35:47 W^e're not even going to watch this fucking shit7 35:49 Till next one. It won't come around,Ineedalittle more distance. 35:53 Still wantmeto shoot7 II

35:57 You guys,ft^IIowinghot. 35:59 Roger 3^:13You are clear. 3^:14Roger. 3^:1^You going to bring up the missile7 3^:18Roger 3^:19And firing. 3^:20 Come down7There you go. 3^:23 fire 3^:24 Allright 3^:28 I've got, ah backscafter. 3^:30 All right, come around. 3^:32 Roger. 3^:34 Coming around left, backscatter. 3^:53 There it goesl Look at that bitch gol 3^:5^Patooshl 37:03 Ah, sweet 37:07iSleedaliftle more room. 37:091'',^ice missile. 37:11Doesitlookgood7 37:12Sweef 37:l^Uh,youready7 37:18Roger 37:30 There'salotofdust 37:3^ Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is HoteITwo-Six.^asthereaBDA7 37:40 This is Crazyhorse One-Eight. Stand by,engaging with another Hellfire. 37:43 Allright 37:45 You're clear 37:47 Lemme know when I'm clear. 37:50 Rogerthat 37:59 Alright, he wasn't 38:02 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 38:07 Go ahead, Crazyhorse One Eight. 38:09 Roger, building destroyed. Engaged with three hellfire missiles.

12

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For use ol this form see AR 190-45 Ihe proponent agency iS PMG PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT Title 10 USC Section 301 Title 5. USC Section 2951: E O 9397 Social Secunty Number ISSN) To document potential cnminsi activity involving the U S Army, and la allow Army officials to maintain discipline law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents Information provided maybe further disclosed to lederal slate, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Oepartment of Veterans Affairs, and ihe Office ol Personnel Management Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment other administrative disciplmaiy acliorts. secunty clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions Disclosure of your SSN and other inlormation is voluntary 2 DATE 6 (YYYYNMDD) SSN I TIMF = I'.E NUMBFR 7 GRADE/STATUS

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HQ. 2d BCT. 10th MTN DIV (Ll). Ft. Dram, W
5 LAST NAME. FIRSTNAME, MIDDLE NAME

201 I ' d 20

1000 06/RA

Miller, David M.
8 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HQ. 2d BCT. 10th MTN DIV (LI). 10200 North Riva Ridge Loop. Ft. Drum. W 13602
9

I David M. Miller

. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

I have been the Commander of 2d BCT. 10th MTN for approximately 40 month.s. I do not know my next assignment yet: SLD i.< telling me to stand by as they consider some nominative possibilities. I expect to find something out soon, I was not originally informed about the issues with PFC Manning s outbursts or his behavior. Once I was made aware of what wa.< occunnng, my .itaff and I conducted an After Action Review to look at ourselves and our processes. I wanted to look ac Information Assurance, training, and all aspects of OPSEC and security. We also looked at BH and mental health. We implemented some changes based upon that internal look. It would have been helpful if I or other leaders had data from basic training and AIT upon which to make decisions, but that infomiation docs not come forward with Soldiers. There is a wall that keeps us from that infoimation. Approximately 60 days prior to deployment I had the unit look hard at the SRC Scrub, Another unit, 3BCT. 10th MTN barely made deployment strength. After IhaL FORSCOM guidance wa.s that BCTs would take a hard look at their numbers. We didn't want to take the wrong personnel forward, nor did wc want to leave a large rear D behind fora small staff to manage and lead. During this scrub. 1 was tracking 500 or f>00 Soldiers that may have had deployment issues but I was not tracking PFC Manning personally: I wa,s tracking the BCT as a whole. Wc reduced our numbers down to around 300 mostly medical or chapters. In Iraq, we assumed responsibility for 17 Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts in eastern Baghdad. We had a BCT TAC at JSS LOYALTY in East Baghdad and the BCT TOC outside the city at FOB HAMMER. We generally were responsible for eastern Baghdad and partnered with an Iraqi Corps equivalent HQ and two separate Iraqi Divisions (Ist Federal Police and the 9th Iraqi Army). We were helping the units to build their sta IT capacity and providing security for upcoming elections. After the elections our focus shifted to responsible drawdown and transition of security as well as JSS's and COP's to IA control. It was during this time that a problem wilh my S2, M.AJ Clausen, was coming to the forefront. MAJ Clausen's performance was not up to the standard that I expected. He could not provide a valuable intelligence picture or analysis in a manner that was useable to the unit as a whole or me as the Commander and our ability to assist the IA • IP. I discussed the issue with the BSTB Commander, then LTC Paul Walter. LTC Walter was also branched M i and understood what was necessary from an intelligence standpoint. Based upon discussions with LTC Walter and LTC Kerns (XO), I decided it was best to remove MAJ Clausen from his position as the S2 and place CPT Lim into that job. CPT Lim was the MICO Commander and he had served as a battalion S2 for 2/14 on a prior deployment. He wa.s capable and understood the unit. He is the type of officer who should be a Battalion Commander. I placed him in the job and looked to LTC Walter to help provide some oversight, I did not get involved in the inner workings of the S2 department under CPT Lim's leadership. Based on our pannership requirements and our split TAC and TOC locations, all of my .staff was relatively thin but rather than place inexperienced Intel personnel at the battalions,! chose to accept risk at the Brigade level instead of at more remote locations - particularly in a bottom up Intel driven fighL
10 EXHIBIT

I 11 INITIAL S ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ j & ^ ^ l N G STATEMENT
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STATEMENT OF

David M Wilier

TAKENAT

Fl D f u m . N Y

DATED 201 I 01-20

! 3 good 'hcther the

As the BCT Commander. I had a noimal battle rhythm that had me circulating the battlefield all day and retuming to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer at night. During the elections and a few other critical times I C2'd the BCT From our TAC at JSS LOYALTY in order to be in the city 24 ' 7, I don't recall the .spec! lie OPSEC training pieces conducted during the AAR after the Manning arrest, but from what I understand, almost noihirig would ha\e stopped PFC Manning from doing what be did I WHK made a'j.are, alter the fact ofthe unauthorized electronic ntedia in the SCIF. He may .\till have gotten the information out ofthe SCIF even if every proper control measure was ill place and executed properly because most checks are designed to control people who do not ncuwaliy have access and not people who belong in the ,section. As an Army we may need to look ai modifying control measures to look as much inicmally as wc do at external threats. With respect to ihe information side ofthe house, ourcurrent SIGO and our AS6 tell me that there is not enough training. The S(> 1 1 1 theater was average, bu! was noi computer savvy. He worked hard but struggled. Until I goi the AS2, CPT Cherepkn, there was no: enough knowledge aboul computer systems within my Sfi shop. CPT Chcrcpko was competent and conducied other functions. He is the sort of officer who will put lough issues on the lable. My observation is that there ha, to be more trammg inil experience in this area to give more depth and expertise in ihe fonnaiutn. '["here is even less knowledge at the BN level and below. Given that we were dispersed o'.cr 17 area.'*, it seem,s lhi,s could hate occurred at any one ofthem. A problem area that came to tight was tha! one of my chaplains had to be separated from the Army for conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. CPT Cberepko was the only person in the unit who was able to look at the computer assigned lo the Chaplain and perform die analysis that provided the information. I also was having connectivity problems with ilie weekly updates to MG Wolff and had the statT come up wiih a solution for this problem. It was during this timeframe on the io-ss of connectivity l i s t ! was made aware there was unauthorized data on ihe system. 1 understood this was an issue hampering connectivity but not a security threat The system was not working properly but afier the removal of users and excess data, the system began lo function better There was only one person in the BCT who had the skills necessary to fix the computer systems-CPT Cherepko I do not have special knowledge ofthe coniputers or the syslems and the way Ihey work The Army provides units with a skilled person who understands this area but in (his case, the S6 1 was provided with simply did nol have all the required experience. There was not training or training oversighi provided to my S6 section from ihe division because the G6 of ihc division already deployed wivh tlic Division HQ's. The only training provided was insiifutianal. Wlicn 1 served as the Deputy COG for /RTC, I iearucd that one of the choke points ue as an Aimy liy to caich up on "importam" or "required" spcciaity training is al CTCs during the first few days of MREs. The problem with ihis is thai there is so much of il that it is impossible to fit il all in during the available lime. I did not know all of what was happening with PFC Manning. There was a fit for duty determination during the deployment and I found out about ii after the fact, 1 am not sure what the interplay was between the company chain of command and mental health. I undcpitand bcticr the facts of the case today, but I caniioi .say what the issue was that forced MSG Adkins lo raise ibe red flag on PFC Manning. When looking al who lo take forward on deployment or who we sent back from iraq. I looked at two set of criteria to delennme wheiher to send some back. First, could the Soldier receive the type of cait: they needed in a deployed environment ' Second, was the Soldier a threat to themselves or others? If the answers '*ere no lo the former and yes to the latter (ifwe could not safe guard him or her), we sent them home. I'll have lo check the exact numbers, but we sent quite a few Soldiers home for BH issues and treatmem, I was the approving authority for all release from theater including BH issues - the BCT surgeon and BCT CSM brought each recommendation lo me. Manning was never brought to me.

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STATEMENT OF



TAKEN AT

F l Pnim. NY

DATEO



I 20

9. STATEMENT

•Continued)

From my perspective, the issues surrounding PFC Manning would have been something tbat the Sl' personnel would have been more involved in than the company. One issue that could have impacted what occurixzd during that time period is that the former company commander, MAJ Drcher was relieved over property accountability and ethics issues and wtis not making good decisions. The new company commander was working through the property book issues, but either would have provided support if necessary. As far as PFC Manning is concemed, we were the GRF prior to deployment and he was sharp as a briefer. He was not experienced at analysis but he wasfinein making presentations. He might have been a little animated in his posture and military bearing but it never crossed my mind that there were any underlying issues. As time passed the presentations stopped and the unit focus changed to other things. My next visibility of PFC .Manning occurred when we received guidance to detain him, ! broke out responsibility among ihe relevant staff in the following way; The XO had staff os-crsight, the S6 controlled all of Ihe networks, and the S2 controlled anything dealing with the SCIF. I used the DCO to oversee the non-lethal arena and specific special projects. I controlled the lethal effects of the BCT and gave overall guidance forboth lethal, non-lethal and all aspects of our partnerships with Iraqi forces, I had contact and interaction wilh the staff at my nightly updates and every other Friday wax a more in depth staff update. I held twice a week breeze sessions with my battalion commanders and met with them all face to face at one ofthe BN HQ's cxcry two weeks. Upon returning to Ft, Oram from my trip to Lcasenworth and my interview with LTG Casiea, ( had my XO and staff pmvide me additional information based on questions he asked tiiat I felt my response; were inadequate or not specific enough. The information provided below is from that cfTort: BEHAVIORAL HEALTH 1. Number of behavioral health cases during Brigade's deployment: 300 (sleep, tobacco cessation, anger management, post -incident trauma) " Total number command refeired; 24 2. Number of BH ctises that resulted in either early redep'o^^nent or delayed return from EML: Approximately 16 1. Most command referred BH issues were briefed to tne by BN CDRs as a matter of routine reporting. All release from theater were approved by me, 4. We also conducted a "State of the BCT' 100 Day review during the January time frame in theater. The purpose was to pulse the entire BCT for command climate, BH issues / trends. Soldier sense of purpose and understanding of the mission and its mportance. This was done by teams of EO reps. Chaplains, PA's and a few others across the entire BCT at the platoon level. LTC Johnson has a hard copy of the results briefed lo me. INTELLIGENCE SECTION 1 Manning Command Referred? • Manning was command referred by both MAJ Dreher (Dec) and by CPT Freeburg (late May, prior to CID arrest). Both doctom' assessments did not recommend redeploy. They recommend removing the bolt from his weapon and continue treatment. 2. MSG Adkins' performance as an NCO • Marginal, but not bad enough lo either relieve or replace. Technically competent, lacked leader skills expected ofa MSG (this info from the current BCT CSM with knowledge ofthe NCO). 3. What was the S2 section's supervisory structure in the SCIF? Was there anyone between PFC Manning and MSG Atkins? • Manning was a Shia analyst in the SCIF, and was supen ised by SSG Balonek and CW2 Ehresman, However, within the 24 hour staffing of the SCIF, Manning worked the night shift, which consisted of four total analysis and 5 SIGINT personnel On the night shift, SPC Padgett was the NCOIC ofthe nigbi shift for the Intel fusion section. Manning was placed on night shil\ because he was a good analyst and could be relied on to produce staff products on his own with little or no supervision—not to keep him out of the "main effort" on the day shift.

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STATEMENTOF

t)avid M. Miller

TAKEN AT

Ft. D r u m , N Y

D A T E D 2011/01 20

9 STATEMENT fConOnu** i . At what point (by regulation) should a DF.ROG he initialed'.' • Commanders (in conjunction with their unit security manager) are allotted 30 days to submit an mitial D.A 524H-R. following the discoveiy of credible derogatory inj'orinanon on a Soldier. • Alter the initial DEROC is submitted and processed by SID CCF. the unit has 90 days to submit a follow-up 524S-R. if there is a pending investigation or adverse action taken (e.g.. summary court martial). • Once the investigation/proceedings are completed and the Soldier has been cleared/charged of olTcnse, the unit must .submit a FINAL derog. 5. When was one initiated on Manning? • The 2BCT security manager sent 2 x initial DEROGs to SID/Dl V while in Iraq. The first was following his assault on SPC H May: the second initial DERCX) was after CID arrested and charged him with the unauthorized use and disclosure of Showman O U.S. classilied information. The follow up (final) DEROG v,as never submiited for eitheroffense by 2BCT within the 90 day period (July-August). The final DEROGs were never submitted in the required timeframe because we believed that oversight of Manning's DEROGs were taken "out ofour hands" due to the severity of his offense. (INFORMATION ASSURANCE'SA SECTION Bandwidth network pmblems wilh BCT HQ - when did they star? Method to fi.t? • 3,fi2set the network to meet their needs, as a tcmporaiy outgoing unit. Upon RIP TOA. we inherited their network and began reconfiguring it to meet our needs; part ofthis reconfiguration is establishing network priorities and optimizing data flow ' Minus random hardware failures, the internal 2BCT LAN-WAN was wortting acceptably. Connectivity outside of the Iraq theater was slow, • To ensure connectivity during CUBs, BUAs. and the Friday CG bnef, wc instituted measures including re-routing traffic and minimizing streaming video usage dunng sessions ' Were we in compliance wiih published difwlive.-! and DIV CDR guidance? • Yes, ' Who certified the certifiers? Was our lA Staff trained/accredited appropriately .' • The IAM was fully certified and accredited, as was the lASO. The S.A/T\IA was in compliance, but not certified. What, if any BCT directives did we cmplaee'/ • Disabled all computers that were nol in compliance • Disabled all cumpuieix that had not been connecied to the neiworii for over .30 days; • Disabled all user acco'jnts that had nol been active for over 30 days • Scanned for unauthonzed media (music, movies and games), removed all media, and notified supervisors about unauthorized media found • Enforced limited domain admin rights on the network " After the incident wai identified; • Disabled ali SIPR CD'DVD write capabilities in the BCT (months ahead of CYBERCOM directive) • Coiiducted a review of need for SIFR Accounts • Eliminated role based accounts' (e.g,, 2bci.chops) ability to login to a computer LTG Caslen asked about TRO training for our 53, I asked CPT Cherepko aboutthis. According lo him. there are 153 existing documents that describe S3 series related requirements - no one coherent document. He said he had no training in school with respect to knowing specific TRO requirements.

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Prosecution Exhibit 15 Transcript of Video 00:03 Okay I got it. 00:05 Last conversation Hotel Two-Six. 00:09 Roger Hotel Two-Six, uh, Victor Charlie Alpha. Look, do you want your Hotel Two-Two two element. 00:141 got a black vehicle under target. It's arriving right to the north of the mosque. 00:17 Yeah, I would like that. Over. 00:21 Moving south by the mosque dome. Down that road. 00:27 Okay we got a target fifteen coming at you. It's a guy with a weapon. 00:32 Roger. 00:39 There's a... 00:42 There's about, ah, four or five... 00:44 Bushmaster Six copy One-Six. 00:48 ...this location and there's more that keep walking by and one of them has a weapon. 00:52 Roger received target fifteen. 00:55 Okay. 00:57 See all those people standing down there. 01:06 Affirmed. And open the courtyard. 01:09 Yeah roger. I just estimate there's probably about twenty of them. 01:13 There's one, yeah. 01:15 Oh yeah. 01:181 don't know if that's a... 01:19 Hey Bushmaster element, copy on the one-six. 01:21 Thats a weapon. 01:22 Yeah. 01:23 Hotel Two-Six; Crazy Horse One-Eight. 01:29 Copy on the one-six, Bushmaster Six-Romeo. Roger. 01:32 Fucking prick. 01:33 Hotel Two-Six this is Crazy Horse One-Eight. Have individuals with weapons. 01:41 Yup. He's got a weapon too. 01:43 Hotel Two-Six; Crazy Horse One-Eight. Have five to six individuals with AK47s. Request permission to engage. 01:51 Roger that. Uh, we have no persormel east of our position. So, uh, you are free to engage. Over. 02:00 All right, we'll be engaging. 02:02 Roger, go ahead. 02:03 I'm gonna... I can't get 'em now because they're behind that building. 02:09 Um, hey Bushmaster element... 02:10 He's got an RPG. 02:11 All right, we got a guy with an RPG. 02:13 I'm gonna fire. 02:14 Okay.
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02:151^0 hold on. Let's come around. Behind buildings right now ftom our point of view....Okay,we're gonna come around. 02:19HotelTwo-Six; have eyes on individual with RPG. Gefting ready to fire.^ewon't... 02:23 Yeah,we hadaguy shoot—and now he's behind the building. 02:2^ God damn it. 02:28 Uh, negative, he was, uh, right in ftont ofthe Brad. Uh,'bout, there, one o'clock. 02:34 Haven't seen anything since then. 02:3^.Iustfuckin',onceyougeton'emjustopen'emup. 02:38 Roger,Iam 02:40Isee your element, uh, got about four Humvees, uh, out along... 02:43 You'reclear 02:44 Allright, firing. 02:47 Let me know when you've got them. 02:49 Lets shoot 02:50 Light'em all up 02:52 Come on, firel 02:57 Roger. I^eep shooting, keep shooting. 02:59 keep shooting. 03:02 keep shooting. 03:05 Hotel..BushmasterTwo-Six,BushmasterTwo-Six,we need to move, time nowl 03:10Allright,we just engaged all eight individuals. 03:12Yeah,we see two birds and we're still firing. 03:14Roger. 03:15Igot'em 03:l^Two-six, this isTwo-Six,we're mobile. 03:19Oops, I'm sorry what was going on7 03:20Goddamnit,I^yle 03:23 All right, hahaha,Ihit'em... 03:28 Uh,you'reclear 03:30 All right, I'mjust trying to find targets again. 03:38 Bushmaster Six, this is BushmasterTwo-Six. 03:40 Gotabunchofbodieslayin'there. 03:42 All right,we got about, uh, eight individuals. 03:4^Yeah,we got one guy crawling around down there, but, uh, you know,we got, definitely got something. 03:51^e're shooting some more. 03:52 Roger 03:5^ Hey,youshoot, I'll talk. 03:57 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 04:01Crazyhorse OneEight; this is HotelTwoSix.Over. 04:03 Roger. Currently engaging approximately eight individuals, uh^IA,uh RPGs, and AIs^47s

04:12HotelTwo-Six, you need to move to that location once Crazyhorse is done and get pictures. Over. 04:20 Six beacon gaia. 04:24SergeantTwenty is the location. 04:28 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse OneEight. 04:31Oh, yeah, look at those dead bastards. 04:3^^ice 04:37Two-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 04:44 ^ice 04:47 Good shoot. 04:48 Thank you 04:53 HotelTwo Six 04:55 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 05:03 Crazyhorse One Eight; Bushmaster Seven. Go ahead. 05:0^ Bushmaster Seven; Crazyhorse One-Eight. Uh, location ofbodies, Mike Bravo five-four five-eight eight-six-one-seven. 05:15 Hey,good on the uh... 05:17Five-four-five-eighteightsix-one-seven.Over. 05:21This is Crazyhorse One-Eight, that'sagood copy. They're onastreet in ftont of an open, uh, courtyard withabunchofblueuhtmcks, bunch of vehicles in the courtyard. 05:30 There's one guy moving down there but he's uh, he's wounded. 05:35 All right,we'll let'em know so they can hurry up and get over here. 05:40 OneEight,we also have one individual, uh, appears to be wounded trying to crawl away. 05:49 Roger,we're gonna move down there. 05:51 Roger,we'll cease fire. 05:54Yeah,we won't shoot anymore. 0^:01 He's getting up. 0^:02 Maybe he hasaweapondov^ in his hand7 0^:04 ^o,Ihaven't seen one yet. 0^:07Isee you guys got that guy crawling right now on that curb. 0^:08Yeah,Igothim.Iput two rounds near him, and you guys were shooting over there too, so uh we'll see. 0^:14Yeah, rogerthat. 0^:l^BushmasterThirtySix Element; this is uhHotelTwo-Seven over. 0^:21 HotelTwo-Seven; Bushmaster Seven go ahead. 0^:24 Roger I'mjust trying to make sure you guys have my turf, over. 0^:31Roger we got your turf 0^:33 Come on, buddy. 0^:38 All you gofta do is pick upaweapon. 0^:44 Crazyhorse this is Bushmaster Five, Bushmaster Four break.^eare right below you right time now can you walk us onto that location over. 0^:54 This isTwoSix roger. I'll pop fiares.^ealso have one individual moving.^e're looking

for weapons. Ifweseeaweapon,we're gonna engage. 07:07YeahBushmaster,wehaveavan that's approaching and picking up the bodies. 07:14^here'sthatvanat7 07:15Right down there by the bodies. 07:l^Okay,yeah 07:18Bushmaster; Crazyhorse.behave individuals going to the scene, looks like possibly uh picking up bodies and weapons. 07:25 Let me engage. 07:28 Canlshoot7 07:31Roger. Break. Uh Crazyhorse One-Eight request permission to uh engage 07:3^ Picking up the wounded7 07:38 Yeah,we're trying to get permission to engage. 07:41 Come on, let us shootl 07:44 Bushmaster; Crazyhorse One Eight. 07:49 They're taking him. 07:51 Bushmaster; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 07:5^ This is Bushmaster Seven, go ahead. 07:59 Roger.^ehaveablackSUV-uh Bongo truck picking up the bodies.Request permission to engage. 08:02 Fuck 08:0^ This is Bushmaster Seven, roger.This is Bushmaster Seven, roger. Engage. 08:12One-Eight, engage. 08:12Clear 08:13 Comeonl 08:17Clear 08:20Clear 08:21^e're engaging. 08:2^ Coming around. Clear. 08:27 Roger.Trying to uh... 08:32 Clear 08:35 1hear'emco..llost'eminthedust. 08:3^1got'em. 08:41fmfiring 08:42 This is Bushmaster Forty got any BDA on that truck. Over. 08:44 You'reclear 08:47 This is ah Crazyhorse. Stand by. 08:47 Ican't shoot for some reason. 08:49Goahead 08:50 Ithink the van's disabled. 08:53 Go ahead and shoot it. 08:54 1got an azimuth limit for some reason 09:00Goleft

09:03 Clearleft 09:15 All right, Bushmaster Crazyhorse One Eighf 09:20Avehicle appears to be disabled. 09:22 There were approximatelyft^urto five individuals in vehicle moving bodies. 09:28 Your lead Bradley should take the next right. 09:31That's cruising east down the road. 09:34 ISlo more shooting. 09:38 Crazyhorse; this is Bushmaster Four.^e'removingadismounted element straight south through the Bradleys. 09:441have your Elem-uh, Bradley element turning south down the road where the engagements were. 09:53 Last call on station's uh Bradley element say again. 09:5^ Roger this is Crazyhorse. 09:58 Your lead Bradley just tumed south down the road where all the engagements happened. 10:03 Should haveavan in the middle of the road with about twelve to fifteen bodies. 10:llOh yeah, look at that. Right through the windshieldl 10:14Hahal 10:1^Allright.There were uh approximately four to five individuals in that truck, so I'm counting about twelve to fifteen. 10:24Iwould say that'safairly accurate assessment so far. 10:27 Rogerthat 10:29Iwant to just be advised Six, Bushmaster Six are gefting mounted up right now. 10:35Okay,roger. Hey,we can't fiex down that road towards that, uh,where Crazyhorse engaged. 10:43 So, uh,Idon't know if you want us to do so or stay put. Over. 10:4^ ^ h y can't they go down there7 10:5^1think we whacked'em aft. 10:58That'sright,good 10:59 This is HotelTwoSix. 11:03 Hey you got my dismounted element right there over to your left. ll:O^Roger,lsee'em. I L I l H e y yeah, roger, be advised, there were some guys popping out with A^s behind that dirt pile break. ll:19^ealso took some RPGs off, uh, earlier, so just uh make sure your men keep your eyes open. 11:2^ Roger 11:27And,uh, Bushmaster ahead are, uh,HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 11:33 Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is HotelTwoSix. ll:35YeahTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 11:37 Uh,locationIhave about twelve to fifteen dead bodies. 11:42 Uh,where else are we takingfireftom7 11:48 Currently we're not being engaged, ah, butjust south ofthat location. Break.

11:55You should see dismounted elements with Humvees moving to the cast, over. 12:01This is Crazyhorse One Eight; we have elements in sight. 12:05 BushmasterThree-Six. 12:07 I'm gonna get downaliftle lower. 12:09 Aftright 12:10I'm gonna come downaliftle lower and takeaquick gander. 12:13 Rogerthat. 12:14Six; this is four.^e're headed to the area where Crazyhorse engaged. 12:2^ BushmasterSix; this is HotelTwo-Six. 12:28 Request to go to the south to our original BP so ifyoufiushedthem to the south we will be there to uh intercept over. 12:39 Hey this is Bushmaster Seven; we're coming up on B... on the ass end of the Brads. 12:54 Hey uh, Bushmaster Element; this is Copperhead One-Six break. 13:00 ^e're moving in the vicinity ofthe engagement area and looks like we've got some slight movement ftom ah, the ah van that was engaged. 13:0^ Looks likeakid. Over. 13:llThis is Bushmaster Seven, roger. Uh,we'reaboutahundred meters behind you. 13:l^Gotthatbigpile,totheright7 13:18Roger, you gonna puft in here7 Do you want me to push stuff so you can, uh, get clear of it7 13:21 Right on the comer7 13:22W^hat'sthat7 13:23 Got that big pile ofbodies to the right, on the comer7 13:24Yeah, right here. 13:25^egotadismounted infantry and vehicles, over. 13:30 Again, roger. 13:31And clear. 13:48 There's the Bradley right there. 13:51 Got'em 14:00 Hotel two six; are you uh at this grid over7 14:05Yeahlwanted to get you around so didn't you just get that one dude to scare them aft away. It worked out pretty good. 14:llldidn't want those fuckers to run away and scafter. 14:12Yeah 14:15Bushmaster Six; HotelTwoSix.Roger,we linked up with our two element they are aft mounted up in our trucks break. 14:23 removed south so that we could ah possibly intercept personnel beingfiushedsouth. So we are vicinity Fifth Street. 14:30 And ah phase line Gadins. Over. 14:37 Bring the trucks in, cordon this area off. 14:39 Can we move the Bradley forward so we can bring trucks in and cordon off this area. 14:44 If the Bradleys could take the south cordon, that could help outalot.

14:53 Bushmaster or element.^i^ich Element called in Crazyhorse to engage the eight-elem eightmenteamontopofaroof7 15:02 Bushmaster Six; this is HotelTwo-Six.Uh,Ibelieve that was me. 15:07 They uh had AIs^47sand were to our cast, so,where we were taking small arms fire. Over. 15:20 Hotel Crazyhorse One-Eight. 15:2^ Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is HotelTwo-Six. 15:28YeahTwo-Six.One-EightIjust also wanted to make sure you knew that we hadaguy with an RPG cropping round the comer gefting ready to fire on your location. 15:3^ That's why we ah, requested permission to engage. 15:40 Ok, roger that.Tango mike. 15:4^ HotelTwo-Six; do you understand me, over7 15:51Idid not copy last, uh, you got stepped on. Say again please7 1^:00 They cordoned offthe building that the helicopters killed the personnel on. 1^:04 Don't go anywhere else we need to cordon offthat building so we can get on top ofthe roofand SSC the building. Over. 1^:13 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. l^:l^ThisisHotelTwo-Six. l^:19Hey,whoever was talking about rooftops, know that aft the personnel we engaged were ground levef Isay again ground levef 1^:27 Rogerlcopy ground levef Over. 1^:30 One-Eight roger. 1^:33 Canlgetagrid to that one more time please7 l^:3^Target twenty. 1^:3^ Roger. 1^:40You want me to take over talking to them7 1^:42 S'alright 1^:4^ Seven-Six Romeo Over. 1^:49 Roger, I've got uh eleven Iraqi Is^IAs. One smaft child wounded. Over. 1^:57 Roger. Ah damn. Oh welf 17:04 Roger,weneed,weneedauh to evac this child. Ah, she's gotauh, she's gotawound to the belly. 17:10Ican't do anything here. She needs to get evaced. Over. 17:18Bushmaster Seven, Bushmaster Seven; this is Bushmaster Six Romeo. 17:20 fenced your location over. 17:25 Roger,we're at the location where Crazyhorse engaged the RPG tire break. 17:37 Gridfivefour-five-eight. 17:4^^eft it's their I^ult for bringing their kids intoabaftle. 17:48That'sright 17:5^ Got uh, eleven. 18:01Yeahuh,roger.^e're monitoring. 18:02 Sorry

18:04^0 problem 18:07 Correction eight-six-one-six. 18:l^Looking for more individuals-south. 18:18BushmasterSix-Bushmaster Seven. 18:29 That guyjust drove overabody. 18:31 Ha,ha,didhe7 18:32Yeah 18:37Maybe it was justavisual illusion, but it looked like it. 18:41 ^ e l l , they're dead, so. 18:44 Bushmaster Six; HotelTwo-Six over. 18:5^ Six; this is Four.Igot one individual looks like he's got an RPG round laying underneath him. Break. 19:05 Probably like to get... 19:10Lookatthat 19:12 Bushmaster Six; HotelTwo-Six over. 19:29 Bushmaster Six; Romeo HotelTwo-Six over. 19:44 Bushmaster Six; HotelTwo-Six over. 19:5^ HotelTwo-Six; Bushmaster Seven co-located with Six. 20:08 HotelTwo-Six; Bushmaster Seven. 20:10Bushmaster Seven; HotelTwoSix over. 20:14Roger,wegotalittle girl who needs to be evaced.^hat's your location over7 20:22 On route Gadins,lam all the way to the south. Solam Gadins and Fifth Street. 20:28 Isay again Gadins and Fifth Street, over. 20:40 Bushmaster Seven; HotelTwo-Six. Do you want us to push to your location7 20:55 Hey,uh,Ineed to get the Brads to drop radslgotawounded girl we need to take her to Rustamyan. 21:04 Bushmaster Seven; HotelTwo-Six. Do you want us to move to your location over7 21:30 Bushmaster Six; HotelTwoSix over. 21:34 HotelTwo-Six; this is Bushmaster Seven. Roger, come to our location. 21:39 Okay,roger,we're moving up north on Gadins and then we wift push east to your location. 22:0^ Bushmaster elements be advised we haveftiendliescoming ftom the south to your location. Over. 22:13 All right, got'em moving up ftom the south. 22:35 Bushmaster elements be advised we are coming up ftom the east over. 23:49 Hey One-Two; follow me over. I'm going to try and get out ofhere as quickly as possible. 24:10You guys aft right back there7 24:13Yeah,we're with you. 24:35 Lotta guys down there. 24:37 Oh yeah 24:37 Came out ofthe woodwork. 24:38 This is Operation, ah. Operation Secure. 25:l^Yeah we have fifty rounds left.
^

25:17Yep 25:19TwoSix; Six Romeo over. 25:21Two-Six; Romeo over. 25:23 Hey roger,whafs your current location over7 25:47 Six; speak it's Romeo. 25:50 Three-Six Romeo; Six Romeo over. 25:52 Roger, at the six once it's back on this guy. 25:5^ Lost him. 2^:00 that's he gotforus7 2^:01 Standby 2^:0^ HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 2^:21 Hey,did you got action on that target yet over7 2^:25 Speak to Charlie roger. 2^:32 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 2^:55 Bushmaster Six; Crazyhorse One Eight. 2^:59 Roger, you have traffic over. 27:02 Roger. Uh, just wondering if you had anything else you wanted us to drive on7 27:08 Yeah roger keep on, ah, for the time being over. 27:llSix calls Six Romeo.Can you teft battalion that fwo civilian children casualties are coming back to Rustamyan in the Bradley over. 27:2^ Six calls Six Romeo. 27:29 Bushmaster Six Copper ^^ite Six. 27:32 Copperhead ^^ite Six; this is Bushmaster Six Romeo over. 27:3^ Roger, that'sanegative on the evac of the two, ah, civilian, ah, kids to, ah, rusty they're going to have the IPs link up with us over here.Break. IPs will take them up toalocal hospital over. 27:50 That^sagood copy over. 27:54 One six over. 28:08 ^here they're all goingto 28:10Sayagain7 28:12^here all those dismounts are going to7 28:18Going into this hous-.Sorry 29:29 Three Six,Three Six; Bushmaster Six Romeo over. 29:37 Six Romeo, Six Romeo. 29:39 Roger, Bushmaster Seven wants an up on aft personnel in your platoon over. 29:44 Roger 30:08 ...ftiendlies on the roof 30:10Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is Bushmaster Four over. 30:12Bushmaster Four; this is Crazyhorse One-Eight. 30:15Roger,Ican ah hear smaft arms fire ftom your engagement area at two zero zero zero ah about three hundred meters ftom that objective over.

30:27 Crazyhorse; ftom whatlunderstand small arms fire at fwo zero zero zero degrees about two hundred meters. 30:39 .lust to the southwest. 30:41 Yup 30:49 Right about where we engaged. 30:51 Yeah, One ofthem with that RPG or whatever. 30:55 He's gotaweapon. GotanRI^AI^ 47. 30:58 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 31:02 Gonna lose him. 31:03 Crazyhorse One-Eight this is HotelTwo-Six over. 31:08 Roger, have another individual withaweapon. 31:10Dammit, they're in the same building. 31:12 Hey roger that,just make sure that ah, you're firing ftom west to cast over. 31:l^.Iust went in the building. 31:18CrazyhorseThree and Four will be on their way. 31:21 The individual walked into the building previously past grid. So there's at least six individuals in that building with weapons. 31:30 ^ecan putamissile in it. 31:31Ifyou'dlike, ah, Crazyhorse One-Eight could putamissile in that building. 31:4^ It'satriangle building. Appears to be ah, abandoned. 31:51 Yeah, looks like it's under constmction, abandoned. 31:52 Appears to be abandoned, under constmction. 31:5^ Uh,likelsaid, six individuals walked in there ftom our previous engagement. 32:01Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is Bushmaster Six Romeo. If you've PIDed the individuals in the building with weapons, go ahead and engage the building over. 32:08 Crazyhorse One-Eight; will be coming up north to south engaging with Hellfire. 32:13 Aft right, I'm going to do manual. 32:17Aftright,we've been cleared to engage with... 32:18This is Bushmaster Six Romeo.Crazyhorse One Eight is going to be engaging north to south with Hellfire missiles over. 32:24 This is HotelTwo-Six. Roger. 32:2^ Aft right, you ready7 32:271^0, I'm trying to get over to the l^ovember.Trying to find the fucking... 32:33 This is Bushmaster Six. Has that RPG round been extended already or is it stift live, over. 32:38 Looks live to me. 32:40 Let me know when you're going to fire. 32:44 Aft right, I'm fucking havingabrainf^rt.^here's the man advancement7 32:48 You got one on the clutch on the bottom left on your left door. 32:54 Roger let me stand by. 32:57 Gotit7 32:591^0 33:03 Aftright 10

33:09 Let me just putakilo in there. 33:120k 33:15Gotit7 33:21 Putakilo in7 33:22 All right, let me get back. 33:2^ I'm gonna come around, get some more distance. 33:27 Roger that, you're clear. 33:33 Got more individuals in there. 33:3^You wanna hit ftom north to south or you wanna go ftom west to east7Idon^twanna fire with the friendliesrightthere, you know. 33:41Yeah, go north to south. 33:53 Right, come around, right. 33:5^ I'mjust gonna put one or two in, ifthey want any more. 34:09 Right 34:12 Found the missile. 34:15Roger,fft get you in this straight. 34:l^You're clear. 34:17I'm tiring. 34:2^Targethit 34:28 It wasamissile. 34:29 Left 34:32 You're clear. I'm above you. 34:3^ Crazyhorse One-Eight; was that explosion you engaging over7 34:38 Crazyhorse One Eight, roger. Engaging building with one hellfire. 34:4^ Let's come around and we'll clear the smoke, ^e'ft fire one more. 34:50 Hey uh,we're going to wait for the smoke to clear. 34:52 Yes Crazyhorse One Eight now.^e're going to put one more missile into the building. 34:57Yeah, did it ah, go in the building7Isee the wall knocked out ofthe way. 34:59Yeah,ftwentin. 35:01BushmasterSix Romeo; this is HotelTwo-Six.Yeah roger, that was Crazyhorse engaging with one Hellfire over. 35:10Yeahroger,Igotal^ovemberifyouwant. 35:12 Fire away. 35:13Youwantustofire7 35:18Youready7 35:19Yep 35:20 Bushmaster Six Romeo.They are going to engage ah,with one more Hellfire in that building. 35:24 Uhshit,whyIdoIhaveAPfiashing on there7 35:47 ^e're not even going to watch this fucking shit7 35:49 Tift next one.It won't come around,Ineedalittle more distance. 35:53 Still want me to shoot7 II

35:57 You guys, following hot. 35:59 Roger 3^:13You are clear. 3^:14Roger. 3^:1^You going to bring up the missile7 3^:18Roger 3^:19And firing. 3^:20 Come down7There you go. 3^:23 Fire 3^:24 All righf 3^:28 I've got, ah backscatter. 3^:30 All right, come around. 3^:32 Roger. 3^:34 Coming around left, backscafter. 3^:53 There it goes^ Look at that bitch gol 3^:5^Patooshl 37:03 Ah, sweet. 37:07 ^eedaliftle more room. 37:09 l^ice missile. 37:llDoesitlookgood7 37:12Sweet 37:l^Uh,youready7 37:18Roger. 37:30 There'salotof dust 37:3^ Crazyhorse One-Eight; this is HotelTwo-Six.^asthereaBDA7 37:40 This is Crazyhorse One-Eight. Stand by,engaging with another Hellfire. 37:43 Allright 37:45 You'reclear. 37:47 Lemme know when I'm clear. 37:50 Rogerthat. 37:59 Alright, he wasn't. 38:02 HotelTwo-Six; Crazyhorse One-Eight. 38:07 Go ahead, Crazyhorse One-Eight. 38:09 Roger, building destroyed. Engaged with three hellfire missiles.

12

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REUTERS
Writer's Direct Dial +1 (646) 223 4212 Writer's Email ;,-iiii",:ir, !:ii'^,;ui;'.i;>;i> w-r

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July 25, 2007

Via Email Bryan Whitman Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Department of Defense The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000

Re:

FOIA Request relating t o the killing of Reuters journalists Mr. Namir NoorEldeen a n d Mr. Saeed Chmagh

Dear Deputy Assistant Secretary Whitman: This is a request under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) for: All documents, reports, information, video and audio recordings and any other evidence or materials (whether in hard copy or electronic form) in the possession of the Department of Defense relating to the killing of Reuters staffers Namir Noor-Eldenn and Saeed Chmagh in Baghdad, Iraq on July 12, 2007 during the operations overseen that day by 2nd Battalion, 16th Infrantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Combat Brigade, 1st Infantry Division ("2nd Battalion"). This request includes, but is not limited to, any video recordings taken by Apache helicopters, other air support craft, humvees and any armored ground vehicles in the area, whether under the command of 2nd Battalion or other units operating in support of 2nd Battalion. This request also includes, but is not limited to, evidence and materials obtained in the course of the investigation into the killings of Mssrs. NoorEldeen and Chmagh being conducted by Brigadier General Vincent Brooks. Reuters is willing to pay reasonable fees incurred in the course of produce the materials requested herein.
Reuters America '.nc. TSK716 The Retitrry. [iijilrlinrj .3 TliTie.? Square Now York NY 10036
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July 25, 2007 Bryan Whitman Page 2

As this information concerns a matter of urgency, please provide an expedited review of this request and contact me directly by telephone or email if you have any questions or need additional information Sincerely yours, '
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Thomas S. Kim Senior Vice President Global Head of Compliance Assurance Principal Legal Counsel cc: Rear Admiral I Mark Fox (via email)

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24 April 2(X)9 Mr. Thomas S Kim Reuters America Inc. The Reuters Building . 3 Times Squiue New York. NY 10036 Dear Mi. Kim. I am willing in response lo your Freedom of Infonnahon Act (FOIA) request for all documents, reports, information, video and audio recordings relating lo the deaths of Mr. Namir Noor-lildeen and Mr. Saeed Chmagh. Reuters joumalists. USCENTCOM conducted a through search and located eight responsive documents. After reviewing the infornjaiion, i h^ve cieterniined diat three {.Atlack Mission Request, Mission Journal, and Slory Board) documents are currently and property classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, as amended, sections 1.4(a), military plans, operations, or weapon systems; and 1.4(c), intelligence activities. Therefore, the national security information is withheld pursuant 5 U.S.C. .552(b)(1). classified information. Additional infonnation identified in ail eight documents is protected piuvsuani to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(2)liigii, information regarding internal mies or practices; (b)(3), as it relates to 10 U.S.C. i3{)b, personnel in overseas, sensitive or routinely deployable units; (b)(5). inter-agency records; and (b)(6), protection of personal privacy. As such. I'm enclosing six partially released documents. Tlie Mission Journal and Story Board documents arc withheld in their entirety.

Accordingly, in my capacity as the Initial Denial Autiiority. by withholding this information I am panially denying your request. The cost for processing your request is S352. Please make payment lo U.S. Treasury' Department and remit to USCENTCOM for processing. If you arc not satisfied with tins action, you may appeal to the appellate authority, the Director of Adntinislration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense. To submit your appeal, you should write directly to the Defense Freedom of Information Policy Office. Attn: Mr. James Hogan, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-1155. Your appeal should be postmarked within 60 calendar days of the date of this teller, should cite case number 07-0240, and should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

ManningB_00412536

It you have any questions regarding this FOIA request, please contact my FOIA Requester Service Center at (813) 827-1810 and refer to USCENTCOM FOIA 07-0240 when inquiring. Sincei'clv,

J^Y W. HOOD lajor General, U.S. Army Enclosures: Action By Appointing Authority Sworn Statements Attack Mission Request Photographs Isl Air Cavalry Brigade AR 15-6 Investigation 2nd Brigade Com'nat Team 15-6 Investigation DD Form 2086. Record of FOIA Processing Cost

ManningB_00412537

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hypocrisy v\*iich eadsfced dtring the Bush era oontinues tothrrwe inthe UStocfev [ B W ]

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Ev«y S O ofteti, a ooTTveigenoe occurs betv^eeri afew o pdertics and prcp^^nda, spin and advertisiiig that makeup the rnediaqiTeretcxlay. like the nccrds^ sun, they pienoe a hcie throu^ the 1D^ behind the larger pcJitical-eocnorric systenis smooth fincticning.

swiri of news stales,

But unlike the sun shining thnou^ the stonndouds, this opening is net irrmediabdy obvious, and can easily be missed ifcne does rxlkncwvshene and howto lock, hi fact, itis niorelikeathree-dirnensiarial wcrrnhciethrou^ political space, viev\alieifcrel<idsspediicooGDclinales ova-each Lithis case;, thecooninatesooniespctidtothtiBelevds o f p c i i t i ^ discourse - rrilitary, media and cultural - whose harnxrncus iriteracticn is crudal tothe larger firicticr^^ The brief mcment of darity leninds us of the crudal nole pla^«iby one of the most subtle yet darrrdng of human vices-l^pccrisy- in sustaining the problerrsaxifiontir^te and rrcst other ^obd powers fix that rnatter. E^pocrisy laid bare • |B1 Has ttie us
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F^'pocrisyhas al\\s^ beenan inportant denomination cf political cunency, but todsy ithas seenin^y become the coin ofthe realm Che oould easily asoibe it to the ieascendingofri^--wirg politics in the a l w ^ aooompaniedbyapolitics of hypocrisy, since asaniesudi politics inv^x^ theuse of popuUst rfietcnctoconoetTtnateaooLiTtiysvi^althandrescxincesinth^

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L l the IJS. the vitriolic Rqxbhcari-oorporate attacks oil liealti [AFP] name of protecting the ri^ts ofindividual dtL2Ens, reflect an incnsasiri^y toxic political culture and the power ofthe ri^ to nmipulate deep-seatedfearsand prguidce fcr its own erids. Fijwever, the ocntinuities in US loteigri pdicy between the Obama and Bush adrrirdstrationsreflecta more systerric l^pccrisy whose iieg^tiveocrisequerices have ^obal irrplicaticns. The IJS-like great pcA\osbeftre it-has Icrgdedaned its interticn to support fii^^ democracy and prcgress whUepursuirgpoHaes that encourage, or demand, their opposite. Not surprisingly, it has also tumed a blind eye to its allied or dients' t^pocrisies: Isaddedaring its desirefcrpeace while intensifyirig occupation, Ftrrid Karzai, the president of Aflianistan, prarisirigto fi^ corruption while ri^jrig decticns and pladng fanily merrbers in crudal positions. Then you have this or that Arab leader plec^iiig derixxxatic re&rmwh^ tlic ciistxnncct between wtntis ciixi doods tlnxiitais ocfc Anxaiciin intonjsts. Wthenenies, sudi as liaq(urider Saddam Fijssein)cr Iran tod^, l^pocrisy is assumed, even when evidence suggests that at crucial rrrxrerits they n i ^ actuaUy be telling the tnjth But wiw's loddng? Whetherfriendor Ibe, it is the people who sufferfraiiagBopohticsgn^undedin l ^ p ^ The haniships ofthe present eocnorric downturn in the IJSonly hint at of the devdrping worid, who bear the brutjt of the full power of the eoonctric and political interests lyiqg beneath the hypocrisy of the global powers and their leaders ahke. j)^-^
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And these consequences are often not just painfld, but deadly. Two geneiBtioris ^ 3 in Southeast Asia the death t d l readied into the rrilhcns^ is in the huridrsds of thousands of dead and it^uted But the sufferirigrardy makes headlines, unless it can produce irnages that are too pos\erful to ignore The AtxiQii-aibscarKMproduced one such rnorneriL althou^its quick dissipation (perh^K owing to an innate sense anxrg nsr^ Anericans that the l^pocrisy theyrepealedwas u i t i n i ^ tut the ccuntry as a whole) ensured that the Rish adniristration and Rqxblican-oonlraUed Congress paid no price for the activities they revealed Themost recent opening in the haze of media and political l^pocrisyb^piwiththeriearsinijltaneousrevelatiorisQf dvilian deaths at the hands oftJB forces in Iraq and Af^iardstan. The now ubiquitous Wikileaks video fbntqgetf sddiers firiiig cn Feutet's photqgr^iier >«fenir Noor-Hdeer^ his colleague Saeed Chma^ and several other dvilians in Ba^idadin July 3007 was equalled in g r ^ j i c power by the aocusationsthat in February 2010, US specialftxx^espeisonndhadnot crdyldUed two pregnaitworrmalcrig with a teen^egiri and two local offidalsinKhataba, Afghanistan, Ixt carved the buUets cut ofthe bodies to rernove eviderce of their resporisibility fbr the deaths. The hypocrisy ofthe official responses has been ^arin^y on diqjsy. When asked whether the Wflflleaks video would hurt Anxrica'sirrage;, Robert Gates, the UB defence secretary, said it wouldnot, predsdy because what the video really showed was the fog of war. "These people were operating in split-second situations .... And, you know, wdve investi^rted it very thoroughly.... It should not have any lastuig consequences." 'DeadbastaiTis' I^pocrisy is often aooonpaniedtyarrq^noe H m Gates assumes that scenes of US sddiers Hithdy calling the vicdms "dead bastards," lai^iing, lockingfcran ^ ^ " ^ ^ excuse to finish off an unarrnedvictirr^ and hianing other victin^ rdeEsed "not have any lasting consequences". tv
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F W i ^ Gates understands that most hacps and Afghans have long ^ o stopped bdievirigUB rhetoric about ^ supportirig democracy and protecting civilian lives. bastard[AFP]

Whether consdously or not, it seens Gales wasoorTsideririgpuiiicopiriionintheUS, ret inhaq Indeed, ifwe lock behind his, and the sddiers', words we are reminded that it is extremdy diGScult to shoot people who do not present an immediate and clear threat unless you havefirstbeen desensitised by intense idedqgical prqHration that ddTurranises the occupied people AsinMetnan% this ddiunnanisation rrearrs that Iracps and Al^iandvilian deaths are easUyaoce^^ dam^p;, since Aniericans have riocoraiecticn to or synpatl^ fbr the pecp^ last decade The latest polls show that'"voters are very responsive where Etenxcrats tal^ tothetenorists". Andsoevmas fburrraedvihanswereldUedbyXJSlbroes firingcnacriow^
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Americans g i B W W i ^ ^ of diar^ir^ tte "seoorriary sia&gM@Ht Iraq and A#anistarPg*§@«yaaaM%m- pditical discourse That would denrandreccgiificncf the l^pocrisy that enaded their r d ^ d o n t o sudi a low status in the first place, even at the cost of upward of a trilficn ddlars emd the loss of thousands of American sddiers. Wfcrse, it wodddennand a reev^uaticn of the larger pienises upon which the unend^ and ccrifioriting the f k l that in so rrary areas, CbanH is eritienching rath^ predecessor. Of course, Al^iaris are fk-less tderart of the disconnect between UB rhetoric and r The latest deaths caused a new rourri of bitter protests gainst the UB oocupati incieasiri^y treat UBprotrises to proted and resped dvilians as rneaniri^ess and, like Karza, even threaten to j d n theTaliban Tariq Ramadan's return Gates' rerrarks and the rrcre unscripted red-firreconrrents of the sddeis he was defend^ that hasfelledrrrserady to educate the American pddic about the riitivatio^ Iraq and Aiyian invasions and occupaticns. in a media sphere is being fcxi^

Uhderiyingthis c^nanic is a shared ano^nce and hypocrisy t y leading American commentators, e^»cially those often portrayed as pditicaUy Uberd or rnoderate, that was crudd to layirig the groundworic contradictions the rafiorWefcrgoing to war arri ccntinuirg the occupations despite the r between them and the realities on the ground The process by which this d^iianicprooeedswasrevededlast week in the coverage of the retum of Swiss Mjslim thedcgianTariqRanradantotheUBfbraq^eakingtour, six years after he was banned fiom erteririg the couitry by the Bush adninistraticrL Debating WthBmdiBr S^^edficaUy, Rannadarisfirste\ent in the UB wasa fbrirn on''secdarMamandden^ York, where he dd^atedAfevvl&^^BT writer George F^doa*. l\ickei-dicTHC m l to u^ige l-innidiin, Wx) Ixis spent CTVU- a ckxiKlc wnkir^ to i i i ^ n ccnsaisLisCUTXX"^ European IVWinns on the needfcrrrorr-viderroe and to produce identifies that can be Wfetern, on the issues rdated to the fcrurris title Rather, whUededarirg that he was'"net asldrig you to ngxriiate your gra fburder of the MjslimEh3therfiooc5,''he denBndedthat Raniada^ madety d-Banna wdl over half a century aga AtafirrewhentheoorterrporarylVldimaotherixxxiisen^pdinanurprB and attitudes, F^d<Er honedinliscritidsmof RarnadanfirrefiisirTgtoadaxjwiedgetto MjslimEkotherhood in its origins were diaraderised by anti-Senitic or totalitarian views". g Tanq
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Althcu^ he has hdd prestigious ^pointrrents at Odbrd as well as Notre Etae andtheUtdversity of Geneva, lacker argues that Ran:Bdan'"is net a pbilosoplier, or an origind thirikEr''.
I

F t provides no criteria fbr this jui^ement, but that is Hkdy because he assumes that most readers will accqt at face vdue that leadirig thirikers fiom the N l d i m worid are rardy origind or philosc^ rational, presumady Uke Americans and Europeans.
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For his partfma«m<B51d seemtofitratter characteriggHglf&e term, r^ver nind i d 8 a ( # W # i # M m A i s n i ' he accusedd-Banna of harbouririg was net even in use when the Brotherhood was fi^^ 'Ddtfeen foundatkxK' FWoer ccndudes that hovvever wdl-meaning his bridgp-buUding, Rannadaris hope ofreoonciling Manic and Wfestem cdture is budlt on "rottenfixrriations,"rrarrdy the history and idedci^ of the Ekotherhood l i ^ w does he knew tds? Qeariy riot by readirg Ran^daris riunierxxis b c d ^ basic tenets of the Botherhoeri duririg his grandfather's day. Instead, in good Qiertalist fashion, I^dser refers to seoorxi-hand accusations agdristRarradanrrade byjournalist I^BJI Berrran, who is about to puidish a book accusing Rarradan of being a p i ^ ^ extnarism Bermaris last fbrsy intotiiesuited cf Islam was TenrjrcindLibemlisn% which was cdebrated in the mainstream rredia fbr, arncng odier t h i r i ^ arguirigthat Sayyid Q t b was the idedcgicd godfather of d-C^eda- which schdars had been discussingfcryears befcre his "discovery" - and that pditicd Manist movements are dtimatdy "irrationd" and therdbrecannd be reasoned with. Nfcst schdariy reviews hytiiosewho actually knewtiier%ion and its larigua^ were largdy criticd of BemHris arguments. UBviewof lyifiliiiK ,

Ranradan coddharveresporrded to F^d<er'sceristart pressure fbr h ^ F^d<erreroJioe his supportfcrthe US invasion of Iraq, or his inaocurate and journalistically irresponside disnissd of those who opposedtiiewar - whidi induded Ramadan - as fiin^ knee-j eric and' 'dodrindre'' leftists who lacked any "understandirig" of the region. Ftrh^hewasbeirigpdite, orwastoojd-l^gedtorespcrriinl<indtoattad<sthathadnethii;gtodowithhiso^ tiiinkirig (irideed Ran:Bdan has coriderriiedarTti-Serritismso riBny ti newspaper/ijansfe). Otimatdy, however, it is mt Ramadaris reflisd to eri^ge Fucker at a lower levd of discourse that is important; it is tiie assurrption by F^d<er, riodcibt borne out by long experierioe, that his arguments as to the rottenfcxrriationand dtinBtdy irnatiorid basis dfRarradaris thirildrig wiU be accepted in the r r e ^ the generd view cf Mjslimintdlectud equabilities and motives. Tiger Wxxls
I

WrileIW<ErandRarnadanddiatedinlSbw%rkaty, TrgerWtods was prq^aring fir his retum to oerrpedtivegelf at tiie N^ster'stournanient that woddb%in later in tiie wedc

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Ofall the sins Wbods has been accused o( perh^K the most ubiqdtous was his hypocrisy - creadriga tfie persona based on stedycaln% control, integrity, arid deteriririation while in reality ds private life was based oom^sive on deodt and viclatirig the trust cf his fenily and fans. ^(thei^
today

THs is r o doubt a vaUdcritidsni, but by the tiire tile first round b^^n on Thursday rrtxe interested in what Tiger wodd do critiiegolf course than what he had dene off tte Cf course no one oeiid say tills opedy. And so BiUy F ^ n ^ tiie diair cf tiie IVfesters t c ^ Wbods, stating that he "dis^pdntedall of us" with his numerous maritd infidelities.

[AFP]

Cfcour9e,rrdtiierherioranycf the journalists preserttiiou^t it worth r r ^ of the fcwgdf dubs thd refiises to adrrit women as players. Apparently no one considered it the least bit typocriticd
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for a dub tmRBd^#K%onsider women wortly c f m a f B W a # to critidse a nenber aS*»?ffiEP?i«g'flfeats women as uriwcrtl^ c f consideration be^orri their sex. Withsorruchrnan^ridirigonWtiods' return to the spotii^t, his main endorser, Mke, also dedded it had to makea b d d statement critidsing Wbods, while at tiie sane tirrereaffirrrirTg bodi his icoriic status arxl the possibility o f redenption. Soitairadaconrnendd that saw Wfoods stariiig danldy into the carnera while his late father, Eari, asked d m fiom the grave about w h d he was thinkirig arri what he had learnt. That aconpary suchasNike, whose alleged record o f systematic rristreatment o f workers and use o f chUdlabour has been heavily critidsedaround the worid, detenrinedthatthe^iostcf Wbods' father coddhdp deanse drn, andthe company, o f their sins, is one o f themoreegp^ious examples c f corporate hypocrisy i n sometime I^pocrisfy's victwy But the reality is they are probadyri^iL Everyone is deariyarrxiouB to get bade to the wcy it was, and by the tirre Wtods walked toward the 18th green on Sunday he was snntUng and shaldrg hands witii d s c o u ^ K J . Chd, while receiving a standing ovation fiom the crowd No doibtnicst ofthose in atterriance and watdiirrg on tdevision wift be h q ^ ^ prowess. AfteraU, rxjpui^c figure better synixJised the power, purpose and deteniination^^ H s feU fiom grace inmanyweys ninored America's - tire l e a n i n g sted surfece and sunry ^ z e tumed out tobe, i f not qdte rotten, then in need o f rrqor repair. Thedcw-badcof Wfeds' behavicxjr is being played out i n fiont c f the worid So is that o f UB pdicy. W i t h e n o u ^ reflection and detenririation, one can hope tiiat Wixxls wiU rise abcjve the l ^ p e c r i ^ ofhis professiond and persond Ufei But itisrrudiharderfbroouritriestodothis, as it demands not one, but rrillicns c f people^ fiom pditicd leaders and corrrreritatcrs to ordinary dtizens, to refled deeply and hcnestiy on what brou^^ situation. I t r h ^ i f t h e fog reniairis lilted fcr long e n o u ^ one rrey be ade to grasp the b e g i n n i r ^ c f the process o f riToving away from pditicd and media cdtures based on hypocrisy, greed and power and toward cdtures that actually support peace, freedom and dgdty. ]Vta^kIJe^4neisam^enlfy^isUingpn]f^^ Hs books inch4de Hsa%y Nttcd Matt Bzaoe: Ismd/Rdestine Snce1989. &teden fiir tJw Soul ( f f Islcon coicl InrpoNfiUe

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UNCLASSIFIED (U)
""''U.S. Departnient of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 1 Organization and Functions

1 FAM 2 7 0 BUREAU OF I N F O R M A T I O N RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ( I R M )
(CT:ORG-306; 04-02-2013) (Office of Origin: IRM/BMP/GRP)

1 FAM 271 CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (CIO)
1 FAM 2 7 1 . 1 Policy
(CT:0RC-225; 03-05-2010) The Chief Information Officer: (1) Establishes effective information resource management planning and policies; (2) Ensures availability of information technology systems and operations, including Information technology (IT) contingency planning, to capably support the Department's diplomatic, consular, and management operations; (3) Exercises management responsibility for ensuring that the Department's information resources meet the business requirements of the Department's business practitioners and provide an effective basis for knowledge sharing and collaboration within the Department and with other foreign affairs agencies and partners; and (4) Exercises designated approving authority (DAA) for development and administration of the Department's computer and information security programs and policies. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is the designated approving authority (DAA) for State systems that fall under the requirements of the DCI Directive for Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Within Information Systems (DCI Directive dated 6/3).

1 FAM 271.2 Responsibilities
(CT:0RG-198; 10-15-2008) a. The Chief Information Officer (CIO) holds a rank equivalent to that of an Assistant Secretary. D' ':-r,.-7 ry:^-N " - ^"*"r.t^on . • PAG'.-, Oc'i^Ek:.!.:.. _ . - - - — V i i i . EU:_.,^ FAM 270 Page 1 of 78 PAGE oi

UNCLASSIFIED ^U^
U.S.Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volimne^ Organisation and Functions

b. The CIO fulfills the responsibilities of the Chief Information Officer pursuanttosection5^2SoftheCllnger Cohen Act(40 0.S.C.^425), Chapter 35 of 44 O.S.C.,thee^overnment Act of 2002 (Public l^aw^O^ 34^), and other applicable law, regulations, and directives. c. The CIO serves as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, the undersecretary for l^anagement(l^),and other senior officials on matters pertaining to developing, implementing, and as necessary, revising policies, plans, and programs to facilitate and strengthen the cost effective, efficient, and timely application of information systems, knowledge management, and technology resources to comply with applicable requirements and achieve strategic Department missions. d. The CIO, in performing his or her responsibilities, exercises functional authority on behalf of the lender Secretary for l^anagement(l^). Pursuant to 44 O.S.C. 3506(a)(2)(A), in carrying out his or her statutory responsibilities, the CIO reports directly to the Secretary of State. e. With respect to the subject matter described In subparagraph e(6) of this section, and taking Into account applicable statutes, executive branch instructions, and Department policies, the CIO: (^) l^anages and coordinates the Department's information resources and technology infrastructure and provides core information, knowledge management, and technology (IT) services; (2) Co^chairstheDepartment'se^overnment Program Board with the Chlef^inancialOfficerand coordinates on ITcapital planning matters regarding enterprise^wide information resource management and establishes ITprogram priorities; (3) Ensures that user requirements and business practices, as well as knowledge management objectives, are reflected in information resource management decisions; (4) represents the Department in the l^ederal CIO Council and other organisations; (5) Assures that Department information resource policies and programs fulfill federal Enterprise Architecture and e^Covernment objectives; (6) Establishes policies, plans, and programs and oversees specific operations to ensure that the Department's information resource management, information systems, and Information technology is designed, acquired, operated, maintained, monitored, and evaluated so as to comply with all applicable requirements and support the efficient, cost-effective, and timely achievement of strategic Department missions to include, but not be limited to: (a) Security,in coordination with DS;

^F^M270

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UNCLASSIFIED ^U^
U.S.Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volumes Organisation and Functions

(b) Configuration management, in coordination with DS; (c) Workforce planning; (d) l^nowledge management; (e) l^oderni^ation of the Department's information systems; (f) Development, implementation,and maintenance ofasound and integrated information technology architecture for the Department; (g) Establishmentand promulgation oftechnical and operating standards for application to Department Information systems; and (h) Analysis, prior to significant information technology investments, of the Department's mission^related and administrative processes, with due consideration to restructuring and outsourcing, as appropriate; (^) Is the designated approving authority (DAA) for development and administration of the Department's computer and information security programs and policies. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is the DAA for State systems that fall under the requirements of the DCI Directive for Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Within Information Systems (DCI Directive dated 6B3); (^) Provides advice, guidance, and direction to Department elements responsible for preparing Information resource management plans required by statutes, executive branch instructions, and Department policies; (^) I^ecommends funding priorities with respect to the acquisition, operation, maintenance, and improvement of Department information resource, programs, and projects. Including the discontinuance or termination of such programs and projects; (^O)Initlates the development. Implementation, and evaluation of training plans, in coordination with affected bureaus, to ensure that Department personnel acquire skills needed to manage and use existing and planned information resources; (^^)Establishes, or otherwise ensures, thataprocess Is in place to evaluate fairly whether proposed collections of information should be approved, and to certify such proposed collections of information to OI^B for review and approval; (^2)l^alntains liaison. In coordination with affected Department elements, with members and staffs of Congressional committees having oversight responsibilities for the Department's information resources
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and information resources management; (13) Exercises substantive responsibility for following the Department's regulatory publications: Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 5, Information Management, and its related Foreign Affairs Handbooks in their entirety; and (14) Performs such other functions as may be delegated by the Secretary of State or Under Secretary for Management (M).

1 FAM 271.3 Organization
(CT:0RG-225; 03-05-2010) See 1 FAM Exhibit 271.3 for an organization chart of the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM).

1 FAM 271.4 Definitions
(CT: ORG-237; 03-30-2011) Access Cootrol Fgcility, Versioo 2 (ACF2): A National Security Agency (NSA)-approved, C-2 rated software product. It provides security for data stored on computer systems using the IBM Multiple Virtual System/Enhanced Services Architecture (MVS/ESA) operating system. Altero9te comoiooic9tioos site: Established by the Department of State's Critical Infrastructure Committee, this site serves as the alternate communications and command and control center in the event of a major interruption of service, due to such things as a terrorist attack, fire, natural disaster, or catastrophic failure of the Department's primary facilities in Washington, DC and Beltsville, Maryland. These services include networking for all ClassNet, OpenNet, and Telegraphic Communications. C9ll gccoootiog: The process by which call detail records for specific or groups of telephone extensions are collected and recorded for billing and traffic-monitoring purposes. C9pit9l pigooiog: An integrated management process that provides for the continuous identification, selection, control, life-cycle management, and evaluation of an information technology investment program designed to achieve a desired business outcome. CeotrgI office of record (COR): The office of a Federal department or agency that keeps records of accountable communications security (COMSEC) material held by elements subject to its oversight. Combioed borego processiog ceoters: The combined bureau processing centers (CBPCs) are classified network centers that provide a centralized

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infrastructure to support bureau foreign affairs information systems (FAIS) requirements. These systems provide electronic telegram capabilities and classified electronic e-mail capabilities for the bureaus^ The AF,PM,EAP,EB, NEA, and EOR bureaus have information-processing equipment located in the CBPC. Coo^o^ooic9tioossecorit^(CO^SEC)9CCOoot: An administrative entity, identified by an account number,used to maintain accountability, custody,and control of COMSEC material. Coo^potertecbooiogies: The technology employed in developing and using computers, computer peripherals, operating systems, software, and communications systems. C o o f i 9 o r 9 t i o o o ^ 9 0 9 9 e o ^ e o t ( C ^ ) : The process of identifying and definingtheconfiguration items inasystem; controlling the release and change of these items throughout the system life cycle; recording and reporting the status of configuration Items and change requests; and verifying the completeness and correctness of configuration items^ D9t9 9doiiioistr9tioo: The organization responsible for the definition, management, organization, and supervision of data within an enterprise or organization. Abusiness function responsible for identifying, documenting, and modeling business Information requirements and for maintaining the business's set of data definitions and standards^ D 9 t 9 b 9 s e 9 d o ^ i o i s t r 9 t i o o ( D 6 A ) : Technical support and configuration management o f a d a t a base management system. DBA functions include system maintenance, user access control, review of new data base designs, data base change control, data base replication, and security Issues and procedures. D9t9repiiC9tioo: The process of,or facilities for,maintaining multiple copies, subsets, or versions of data(copy management). This process is normally managed by the data base administrator and can be primarysite(singlelocation)ormultl-site(multiple locations) In nature. D e p 9 r t o ^ e o t o f S t 9 t e p o b i i c 9 t i o o s ( D O S ^ U 6 ) : Alist of routing indicators and security levels for every post. Desi^top browser: Asuite of programs located inadesktop PC that allows both viewing and navigation from one node on the Internet orOpenNet, to another. Desi^tops^steons: Typically,personal computer hardware,software, and other peripheral devices, that users have on their desks. e^^o^eroo^eot: The use by the U.S. government of Web based Internet applications and other information technologies, combined with processes that implement these technologies.

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E o t e r p r i s e 9 r c b i t e c t o r e ( E A ) : Enterprise architecture is defined by three unique groups: (1) The Department level business function and information flow; (2) The supporting technologies; and (3) The crosscutting security architecture. The business is defined through the functions performed and supporting information flows; the technology by the data, application, and technical infrastructure layers; and the security architecture that affects all layers. In the architecture, the existing state is the ^^as is" or current architecture, whereas anticipated changes to meet the Department's future needs are represented in the ^^to be" or target architecture. Atransitionplanis included In the enterprise architecture to Identify how the gap between the ^^as is" and the ^^to be" states will be closed. Finally,atechnicai reference model and standards profile is included to provide the supporting technology with appropriate technical standards. F i e i d s o r e t ^ : Afull lifecycle approach to verification of the integrity of post classified information-processing equipment. ^ r 9 p b i c 9 ^ o s e r i o t e r f 9 c e ( ^ U I ) : An interactive screen display by which the user can moveamouse to point the screen cursor at symbols representing data or instructions to the machine, reducing the need for keyboard typing. ^ 9 r d ^ 9 r e 9 s s o r 9 0 c e : Hardware assurance is provided through investigatory procedures that review the technology safeguards applied to classified informationprocessing equipment forslgnsoftampering. Ioforo^9tiooresoorces: Information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and Information technology (IT). I o f o r o ^ 9 t i o o s e c o r i t ^ : Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in orderto provide: Integrity,which means guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity; confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; and availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. Ioforo^9tioos^steo^secorit^ officer pro9r9o^(corpor9te): Designed to plan, implement, and coordinate the Department's information system security program for corporate applications and networks and to provide support for the worldwide information system security officer's activities' I o f o r o ^ 9 t i o o t e c b o o i o 9 ^ 9 r c b i t e c t o r e : An integrated framework for

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evolving or maintaining existing, and acquiring new, information technology to achieve the Department's strategic and information resource management goals. Iofr9Stroctore: (Also reference network infrastructure, telecommunications infrastructure, telecommunications systems.) Infrastructure is hardware, software, and cabling that provides high speed data and voice services to all users within the Department, connectivity among the Department's domestic locations and access to the DiplomaticTelecommunications Service Program Office (DTS PO) international gateway or other communications connectivity. ^ e ^ o^9099eo^eot: l^ey management Is the supervision and control of the process whereby encryption keying material, to include fortezza type certificate, is generated, stored, protected, transferred, loaded, used, and destroyed. Life^c^cieo^9099eo^eot: l^ife-cycle management is the ordered sequential process of planning, applying, and controlling the use of funds, human resources and physical resources from the Inception ofaproject throughout the operational life of the program. This includes defining user requirements, concepts, and systems specifications; acquisition planning, source selection, system implementation, deployment, operations and maintenance, and deactivation. L o c 9 i 9 r e 9 o e t ^ o r i ^ s ( L A N s ) : A user owned and operated data transmission facility connectinganumber of communicating devices such as computers, terminals, printers, and storage devices withinasingle building oracampus of buildings to provldeacapability to share files and other resources among several users. ^ess99e broiler: Amiddleware product to support programto program communication between existing heterogeneous (i.e., not designed to work together) applications. Message brokers are based on three principles: (1) Program-to-program connections are more manageable, effective, and durable than database-sharing strategies; (2) Many applications must exchange data every few seconds, minutes, or hours, rather than waiting foranightly batch run; and (3) Connections cost less If arranged onamany-to-many basis, so messages and the development effort required to fit interfaces into application programs can be reused. ^ e s s 9 9 i o 9 : The electronic transfer of official and unofficial correspondence including telegrams and e-mail. ^ e t 9 d 9 t 9 : l^lterally,^^data about data." Information relating to business processes, data sources, and ownership, helping users to navigate ^FAM270 Page7of78

UNCLASSIFIED (U) tl.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume I^ Organization and Functions through the data. ^ i d d i e ^ 9 r e : The set of software facilities that resides betweenaclient's application software and the server. Middleware enables the application software to communicate with the server software. Middleware Includes remote procedure calls, message queuing, object request brokers. Interprocess communications, remote file access, remote database access, message routing services, directory services, conversational services, time service, terminal services, and security services. ^ i s s i o o e s s e o t i 9 i i o f r 9 S t r o c t o r e ( ^ E I ) : This infrastructure consists of the Department's core network communication array designed to share data with posts and annexes around the world. This array or backbone includes the networking and telecommunication systems within Main State, the Beltsville Communications Center,and all other facilities, annexes, and posts that relay or bridge communications directly between two or more facilities. The MEI within the Department serves to support the Department's mission-essential business processes that consist of telecommunications (i.e., OpenNet, ClassNet, and voice systems), mainframe operations and access controls, and official and unofficial messaging. OpeoNet: OpenNet isaphysical and logical Internet Protocol (IP)-based global network that links the Department of Staters l^ocal Area Networks (i^Ns)domestically and abroad. The physical aspect of the network uses DTS circuits for posts abroad, FTS 2001-provided circuits, leased lines, and dial-up public switch networks. This includes interconnected hubs, routers, bridges, switches, and cables. The logical aspect of the network uses Integrated Enterprise Management System (NMS) and TCP/IP software, and other operational network applications. OpenNet isa Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) network, which supports e-mail and data applications' P 6 ^ : Abbreviation for private branch exchange. Aprivate telephone exchange that provides on-premises dial service and may provide connections to local and trunked communications networks. Preo^isedistribotioos^steo^: Cabling and associated equipment installed inafacillty,lncluding the main distribution frame (MDF),intermediate distribution frames (IDFs), and telecommunications closets (TCs). Protectors and grounding systems are included. Repository: Aspecialized type ofdatabase containing metadata. St9od9rds: An established basis of performance used to determine quality and acceptability. As applied to information technology,standards characteristically address the implementation of technical and operating functions, and Interfaces between equipment, between software packages, and between equipment and software packages. Standards
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become rules when an appropriate authority S O determines. S^steo^s9ssor9oce: Ensuring avallability,currency,and responsiveness over the system life cycle, it incorporates the disciplines of: (1) Change management; (2) duality assurance; (3) Configuration management; and (4) Disaster recovery and contingency planning. S^steonsiotegrit^: Systems integrity applies and provides resources and procedures to prevent unauthorized access to Department information and to ensure data integrity. ^ecbooio9^s9fe909rds: Technology safeguards include the defensive counterintelligence methods and techniques that are applied to equipment to counter potential hostile threats. ^ e b t e c b o o i o 9 ^ ^ ^ h e software and services including Telnet, file Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Web servers used to build applications, other thanemail,that work on the Internet or OpenNet. ^ i d e 9 r e 9 o e t ^ o r i ^ ( ^ A N ) : Adata transmission facility that connects geographically dispersed sites using long haul networking facilities. ^ireiesscoo^o^ooic9tioos: Radio, cellular telephone, and satellite communications, includingTactlcal Satellite (TACSAT), and International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT).

1 F A M 2 7 1 . ^ AL^tborities
(^T^.'^^^^^(^^' (^^^^2^(^^^ Authorities include: (1) Annual authorization and appropriation acts, including the Budget Enforcement Act; (2) Freedom of Information Act of 1^66, Public l^aw ^^ 554 (5 U.S.C. 552); (3) Privacy Act of 1^74, Public l^aw ^3 57^ (5 U.S.C. 552a); (4) Federal Managers'Financial Integrity Act of 1^82, Public l^aw ^7-255; (5) Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1^86, Public I^aw^^3^^; (6) Computer Security Act of 1^87,Publicl^aw 100 235; (7) Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1^88, Public Eaw 100503;

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(8) Chief Financial Officers(CFO)Act of l^^O, Public l^aw 101576; (^) government Performance and Results Act of 1^^3, Public i^aw 103 62; (10) Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1^^4(FASA), Public l^aw 103 355; (11) ^overnment Management Reform Act of 1^^4, Public Eaw 103 356; (12) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1^^5, Public l^aw 1 0 4 1 3 ; (13) InformationTechnology Management Reform Act of 1^^6 Division E, (ITMRA)(Clinger Cohen Act of 1^^6), Public l^aw 104 106; (14) Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1^^6, Public l^aw 104 208; (15) Electronlc Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1^^6, Public l^aw 104 231; (16) Workforce Investment Partnership Act of 1^^8, Public l^aw 105 220; (17) Title^VII, government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1^^8, Public l^aw 105 277; (18) e-^overnment Act of 2002, including the Federal Information Systems Management Act of 2002 (Public l^aw 107-347, amending 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35); (l^)Declasslflcation of State Department Records, 22 U.S.C. 4354; (20) Fees and Charges for (government Services and Things of Value, 31 U.S.C.^701; (21) ArchitecturalandTransportation Barriers Compliance Board, ElectronicandlnformationTechnology Accessibility Standards, 36 CFR Part 11^4; (22) Federal Property Management Regulatlons,41 CFR Chapter 101; (23) Federal Management Regulation System, 41 CFR Chapter 102; (24) Federal Acquisition Regulations,48 CFR Chapter 1,Subpart 3^.2, Electronic and InformationTechnology; (25) Department of State Acquisition Regulation (DOSAR), 48 CFR Chapter6; (26) Executlve Order (E.O.) 10346, Preparation by Federal Agencies of Civil Defense Emergency Plans; (27) E.O. 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency PreparednessTelecommunication Functions; (28) E.O.12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities,

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E.O. 12656; (2^)E.O.12862, Setting Customer Service Standards; (30) E.O.12^31, Federal Procurement Reform; (31) E.0.12^58, Classified National Security Information(as amended by E.O. 132^2); (32) E.O.12^^^, EducatlonalTechnology: Ensuring Opportunity for all Children in the Next Century; (33) E.O.13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection; (34) E.O.13011, Federal InformationTechnology; (35) E.O.13048, Improving Administrative Management in the Executive Branch; (36) E.O.13101, greening the government Through l^eadership In Environmental Management; (37) E.O. 13103, Computer Software Piracy; (38) Capital Programming ^uide,Verslon 1.0,Supplement to OMB Circular A l l , P a r t 3 : Planning Budgeting,Acquisition,and Management of Capital Assets; (3^)0MB Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities; (40) OMB Circular A-10^, Acquisition of Major Systems; (41) 0MB Circular A-11^, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards; (42) OMBCircularA123,Management Accountability and Control; (43) OMBCircularA-127, Financial Management Systems; (44) 0MB Circular A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources; (45) 0MB Circular A-131, Value Engineering; (46) OMB Memorandum ^6-22, Implementation of the government Performance and Results Act of 1^^3; (47) National Security Decision Directivel45; (48) PDD 62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas; (4^)PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection; (50) PDD67,Enduring Constitutional government and Continuity of government Operations; (51) Federal Preparedness Circular 60, Continuity of the Executive Branch of the Federal government at the Headquarters l^evel During National

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Security Emergencies; (52) Federal Preparedness Circular 65, Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations; (53) SEC^ 00 0088, National Plan for Information Systems Protection; and (54) Other guidance and authorities, as appropriate.

1 F A M 272 OFFICE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCEBCHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER ( I R M B I A ) ( C I S O )
^^2^2^^^^ The Office of Information Assurance/Chief Information Security Officer (IRM/IA)(CISO): (1) Serves as Chief Information Security Officer(CISO) for the Department; (2) Serves as the Chief Information Officer's(CIO)primary adviser concerning Department information security Issues. ThelRM/IA CISO serves as the CIO's representative on intra-and inter agency issues regarding information security; (3) Serves as designated senior agency information security official as specified in the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 2002 (44 U.S.C. 35) or other applicable law; (4) Serves under the supervision of the CIO, carrying out the CIO's responsibilities under 44 U.S.C. 3544; (5) Heads the Office of Information Assurance (IRM/IA) with the mission and resources to assist in ensuring agency compliance with FISMA 2002 and other applicable national requirements and mandates; (6) Develops and maintains an agency-wide information security program as required by 44 U.S.C. 3544(b); (7) Coordinates the design and implementation of processes and practices that assess and quantify risk with respect to information resources; (8) Develops and maintains Information security policies, procedures, and control techniques to address all applicable information security requirements, including those issued under 44 U.S.C. 3543 and 40 U.S.C.11331; (^) Trains and oversees personnel with significant responsibilities for
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Information security with respect to those responsibilities and provides liaison with Information systems security officers domestically and abroad; (10) Advisesand assists Departmentsenlormanagementwith their Information security responsibilities; (11) Reports Department compliance status with program-related Federal mandates to Department leadership, OMB, and Congress; and (12) Serves as co chair of the Department's Information Security Steering Committee.

1 F A M 2 7 3 STATE MESSAGING ANO ARCHIVE RETRIE^A^TOOI^SET PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (IRMBSMART)
(^CT.(^^(^22^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The State Messaging and Archive RetrievalToolset Program Management Office (IRM/SMART): (1) Re engineers, consolidates, and modernizes Department corporate messaging, collaboration and archiving processes and systems to satisfy business needs and legal requirements; (2) Provides ability to search, manage, archive, and retrieve the information and knowledge contained in Working and Archival messages; (3) Plans and manages critical special programs related to IRM wide missions; (4) Manages SMARTstrategicprojectactivities including planning, budget, and coordination with Department long-range vision priorities, and legal requirements; (5) Manages SMART tactical program including finance, schedule, personnel, acquisition, risk, and quality; (6) Determines requirements for Command and Control Messaging and designs solutions to meet Department business and legal requirements. IRM/SMARTdevelops and integrates SMARTcore messaging solutions with other Department and external systems and ensures that solutions meet configuration,security,and statutory requirements; (7) DefinesSMARTarchitectureand ensures performance, integration and interoperability with related IT Investments;

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(8) Managestestand quality control forthe SMARTsystem; (^) DevelopsandoperatestheSMARTsystem laboratories; and (10) Deploys SMARTworldwIde and provides technical support and training.

1 F A M 2 7 4 OEPUT^ CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER FOR BUSINESS MANAGEMENT ANO P^ANNINGBCHIEF^NO^^EOGE OFFICER (IRMB8MP)
(^(^T'^^(^2^^^' ^2^^2^^^^ The Deputy Chief Information Officer for Business Management and Planning/Chief l^nowledge Officer (IRM/BMP): (1) The DCIO/CI^O assists and advises the Chief Information Officer (ClO)in the execution of his or her responsibilities; (2) Ensures that the Department's Information resource management decisions reflect the needs of the Department's business practitioners. IRM/BMP anticipates changes in both technology and the business practices of the Department to ensure that the Department's information resource programs fully meet information, e-^overnment, and knowledge management objectives; (3) Manages overall liaison, interface, and outreach functions within the bureau and Department to provide Information resource management policies and programs that best support the Department's business practitioners and business practices; (4) Exercises strategic responsibility to ensure that State ITprojects are developed and delivered on time, within budget, and in accordance with customer business needs; (5) Exercises leadership and provides management guidance to ensure that IRM products and services delivered are accessible to Internal and external customers around the globe are an efficient and cost effective use of ITresources; (6) Exercises leadership on ITarchitecture, engineering and planning, ande-^overnment. IRM/BMP ensures that ITarchltectures and plans provided by IRM are effective and consistent with Federal IT architecture programs and requirements; (7) Exercises strategic responsibility in the Department for developing and implementing improvements in information technology infrastructure, systems, and programs to Improve communication
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and collaboration among U.S. foreign affairs agencies domestically and at posts and missions abroad; (8) Exercises leadership regarding the development and communication oflTprocedural and IRM Bureau functional policies to ensure clear, conclsecommunicationoflTprocesses, roles, and responsibilities; (^) As Chief l^nowledgeOfficer,provides strategic direction and advocacy to manage knowledge assets and programs throughout the Department; ensures the availability of collaborative technologies that support knowledge leadership goals and objectives; and guides and supports knowledge management initiatives within State and between State and other agencies and foreign affairs partners; (10) Provides liaison and fosters cooperation with other Federal agencies, educational institutions, nongovernmental, not-for profit, and private-sector organizations regarding knowledge management and workforce planning initiatives, practices, and standards; (11) Provides overall leadership ofthe Department'se^overnment initiatives and programs; and (12) Represents the Business Practices and Programs office in the e^overnment Program Board.

I F A M 2 7 4 . 1 Project ^er^ices Office ^^RMB8MPBP^O^
(^CT.(^^^2^^^^ ^2^^2^^^^ The Project Services Office (IRM/BMP/PSO): (1) Acts asasingle entity within IRM to coordinate project management (PM) functions for supported ITprojects to enable consistency, standardization, and the ultimate success of the projects; (2) Is accountable to the PSO Executive Sponsor^the Deputy CIO for Business Management and Planning (BMP)^to ensure that IT projects assigned to PSO are being delivered on time, within budget and in accordance with customer business needs and the Department's target enterprise and segment architectures; (3) Provides guidance and support in project management processes and methodologies inamanner that is efficient, consistent, and standardized; (4) Acts as point of coordination for IRM'sPM processes that includes highlighting current PM excellence that can be applied to other IRM offices; (5) Coordinates with IRM/BMP/SPO's Portfolio Management Division to
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ensure all new projects go through the pre-select process and comply with IT investment reporting requirements such as, their strategic value in support of the customer's business needs, and their impact on resources, costs, schedule, performance and workload; (6) Manages sponsored ITprojects to include project planning,reporting, and coordination of PM activities; (7) In support of customer business requirements, works with the customer and senior management to determine the appropriate service level foreach ITproject. Project management support is provided at two levels(depending on customers'requirements)^ (a) ManagingtheProject^Acts as the Project Manager overseeing all aspectsofthelTprojectfrom start to finish including responsibility and accountability for managing the project^s scope, schedule, and budget to meet the customer's business needs; (b) Project Management Coordination^Provides project management templates, examples, and methodologies that are readily available for teams to use to accomplish project goals. (8) In addition to the three PM service levels, PSO provides ongoing services that are not tied to specific projects but rather support the Project Community asawhole.Coordinates project managementrelated events to promote, knowledge of project management discipline within the Department. PSO also provides mentoring on Project Management to include maintenance of other project management support/resources and ensures these are aligned with and complementary to official project management guidance and governance from IRM/BMP/SPO; (^) For PSO assigned projects, PSO collaborates with its customers and senior managers to define the scope and business requirements of IT projects. Tailors project management activities to the size and scope of each project and ensures that each project is reviewed by IRM/BMP/SPOfromastrategy,portfolio management, and enterprise architecture perspective; (10) Manages and maintains appropriate control of project management resources, including but not limited to physical resources such PM toolkits and methodologies, and ensures these are aligned with and complementary to official project management guidance and governance from IRM/BMP/SPO, as well as human resources and project personnel; (11) l^eeps the PSO Executive Sponsor and individual project stakeholders abreastofthestatusand relevant ITproject issues, asappropriate;

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(12) Fulfills ITproject management reporting requirements, and ifaMajor investment, complieswithOMBA 11 reporting requirements as necessary; and (13) Provides mentoring and coaching in an effort to raise the PM maturity level of IRM and improve the quality of ITproject management services delivered.

^FAI^2^4^^^^ ^^tl^^^^l^^i^^^^^Pr^^^^^^^Oi^i^i^^ (^RI^B8I^PBPSOBI^AP^
(^CT.0^^2^^^' ^2^^2(^^^^ The Methodologies and Processes Division (IRM/BMP/PSO/MAP): (1) Acts as point of coordination for IRM'sPM processes highlighting current PM excellence that can be applied to other IRM offices; (2) Establishes ITproject management processes, tools, andacommon reporting framework; (3) Communicates and advises on project management standards, best practices, news, and methodologies; and (4) Serves asaproject management knowledge center which includes developmentand maintenance ofacentralized knowledge repository containing templates, toolkits, and other project management resources, and ensures these are aligned with any project management guidance and governance from IRM/BMP/SPO.

^ F A ^ 2 ^ 4 . ^ 2 S^li^ti^^O^li^^ry^i^i^i^^ (^I^I^B8I^PBPSOBSO)
(^(^T.'0^^2^^^ ^2^^2(^^^^ The Solution Delivery Division (IRM/BMP/PSO/SD): (1) Provides day-to day project management support to sponsored projects for services including, but not limited to: (a) Scope management; (b) Schedule management; (c) Cost management; (d) Communications management; (e) Risk management; (f) duality management; (g) Procurement management

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(h) Requirements management; and (I) Integration management. (2) Manages sponsored ITprojects to include project planning,reporting, and coordination of PM activities; (3) Organizes and manages ITproject resources and ensures that projects are completed within the defined scope, quality,time and cost constraints; (4) Collaborates with other ITproject managers to coordinate project management activities; (5) Collaborates and coordinates with IRM/BMP/SPO on capital planning, portfolio management, enterprise architecture and project management related policies, mandates and compliance requirements to ensure consistency across IRM ITproject initiatives; and (6) Collaborates with other IRM offices to effectively transition postproject activities from the project team to operations and maintenance groups, as needed.

I F A M 274.2 s t r a t e g i c Planning Office ^^RMB8MPB^PO^
(^CT.0^(^2^^^' ^2^^2(^^^^ The Strategic Planning Office (IRM/BMP/SPO): (1) Serves the State Department asacentral decision support service for effective business, management and planning decisions for the efficient use of technology in the execution of our foreign affairs mission. SPO manages the activities of the Enterprise Architecture, Financial Management, Portfolio Management and Strategic Planning DivisionsandensuresthatthelTarchitectures, budget, plans and strategies they produce are fully,effectively,and successfully integrated to meet the Department's business needs; (2) Acts as the State Department's senior authority on Enterprise Architecture. Ensures IT investments and initiatives are aligned with IT strategies and the State Department's strategic objectives In accordancewith regulations, ITdirectlves, industry best practices and providesaline-ofsite view of IT investments for effective decisionmaking; (3) Performs the IRM Bureau's financial planning and management function, including budgetformulation and funds control functions. The office provides senior bureau management withaclear.

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transparent, and current financial reporting that reflects Departmental and IRM budget decisions; (4) Manages the State Department's Information Technology (IT) Portfolio Management function, and IT Capital Planning processes (Pre-Select, Select, Control and Evaluation)and maintains the capital planning tools. Serves as the executive secretariat of the e-^ov Program Board(e-^ovPB),which functions as the Department's senior management's governance board for IT investments and serves as the secretariat to the e-^ovPB's associated organizations, the e-^ov Advisory ^ r o u p ( e - ^ o v A ^ ) ; (5) l^eads the formulation of the State Department's Information Technology (IT) Strategic Plan, providingastrategicframeworkfor IRM, functional, management and regional bureaus to align IT investments to the mission of the State Department. The IT Strategic Plan establishesthe Department's ITmission, vision and goals and associated performance indicators, in direct alignment with the Department's Strategic Plan; (6) l^eads the formulation of the State Department's Information Technology (IT)Tactical Plan,which specifies the activities, milestones, deliverables, roles and responsibilities to implement the IT Strategic Plan; and (7) Represents the State Department to the CIO Council, OMB, and Congress and other regulatory bodies regarding IT initiatives, investment and various regulatory issues. Prepares reports, presentations and other responses to internal and external inquiries regarding the State Department's enterprise-wide ITportfollo.

^ F A ^ 2 ^ 4 2 ^ ^ ^l^^^^t^rpri^^A^^l^it^^ti^r^Oi^i^i^^ (^I^I^B8I^PBSPOB5AO)
(^CT.'(^^(^2^^^^ ^2^^2^^^^ The Enterprise Architecture Division (IRM/BMP/SPO/EAD): (1) Develops the Department's Enterprise Architecture and related products and services and ensures enterprise IT initiatives are in conformance. Develops and applies architectural principles to guide pre select and selection processes for current and new technology initiatives. Promotes integration, interoperability and standardization and facilitates the effective and efficient use of IT to eliminate redundancy and stove pipe ITsolutions; (2) Develops and maintains the State Department's Enterprise Architecture (EA) and related products and services, leveraging the Federal Enterprise Architecture, the State Department's IT Strategic
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andTactical Plans, the Department's ITportfollo and Service lines, and targeted CIO initiatives, including baselines, transitions, and targets, with inamultidisciplinary approach,in partnership with PMD, SPD and FMD divisions; (3) Facilitatesthe effective and efficient use of InformationTechnology across the Department through the promotion of sound EA principles and analysis(e.g.Business driven IT investments, interoperability, information resource and system sharing across Bureau and Agency boundaries, etc.)ln order to eliminate redundant data collection efforts and stove-pipe ITsolutions. EAD develops light, agile, relevant and verifiable architectural products and analytical services that provide current and out-year guidance to critical program and service areas within IRM and across the Department; (4) DrivestheDepartmentscoremanagementsystems toward greater integration, interoperability and data standardization to enhance their effectiveness in meeting business and mission information and processing requirements; (5) Develop and apply architectural principles to guide pre-select and selection processes for current and new technology initiatlves(e.g. Virtualization, network optimization, data center consolidation, cloud computing, mobile computing, social technologies, green computing, and cyber security,etc.); (6) Maintains technology standards and product standardization for critical technology programs and service areas across the Department, in the form of target architectures; dependency analysis, EARoadMaps(e.g.HSPD-12,Identity Credential and Access Management (ICAM), Cloud Computing, Data center and Network Services, Messaging, etc.), to ensure IT investments are aligned with the State Department's mission and IT Strategic and Tactical Plans; and (7) For IRM and other Bureaus and offices throughout the State Department: (a) Reviews information technology plans and programs, including applications, data, networks, and platforms, for conformance with the State Department's ITstrategic and tactical plans and target EA and respective EA Road Maps; (b) Supports business process reengineering initiatives; (c) Develop and maintain the IT Cyber Security Architecture Plan and the State Department's ICAM Road Map; (d) Investigates the implications of emerging technologies for supporting business requirements and analyzes the possible

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effects of such technologies on target architectures; and (e) Ensures that all applications, data, network, platform solutions, and all other IT investments maximize the shared use of services and platforms across the Department, eliminates duplications, and identifies cross-department and cross-government efficiency gains.

^FAI^2^4.22Fi^^^^i^ll^^^^^^^^^tOi^i^i^^ (^RI^B^I^PBSPOBF^O)
(^CT.0^(^2^^^^ ^2^^2^^^^ The Financial Management Division (IRM/BMP/SPO/FMD): FMD is responsible for the control of bureau funds, financial planning, budget formulation, budget execution, the IT Working Capital Fund (WCF) Business Management Center,and IRM Emergency Management Planning and Coordination.

^FAI^2^4^22(A) ^l^l^8^^g^tF^r^i^l^ti^^^^^8^^g^t ^^^^^ti^^8r^^^l^(^^^B8I^PBSPOBFI^OB8^^)
(^CT.'(^^^^(^6^^ ^^^22^^^^ The IRM Budget Formulation and Budget Execution Branch (IRM/BMP/SPO/FMD/B^T): (1) Decision Support and Analysis (a) Collects and reviews all bureau budget requests for CIO review; (b) Does all IRM budget related data entry and validation in application systems (BSS,BFEM); (c) Provides Financial Plan preparation and oversight for all IRM Bureau appropriations; (d) Works with SPO's Enterprise Architecture Division (EAD), Strategic Planning Division (SPD), Portfolio Management Division (PMD)andi^^ to provide input and oversight for the State Department's IT Capital Investment Fund Financial Plan; (e) Provides responses to ii^^ on OMB inquiries; (f) Acts as the central Point of Contact (POC) for IRM Financial Management policies. Ensures compliance with the Department of State CFO Act and Regulatory agency requirements;

(g) Oversees all IRM's Financial Management practices, processes and associated systems; and

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(h) Acts as the central authority on all Staff access to IRM Budget systems and the State Department's COR accounting system, ^FMS; (2) IRM Funds Control; (a) Reconciles and validates all allotments from ^ ^ ; (b) Manages, reconciles and validates all reimbursements and transfers, both internal and external; and (c) Provides reporting to IRM management on the status and use of all bureau funding; (3) Monitoring, Oversight and Reporting; (a) Manages all reports to RM/BMP for Spend Plans, reimbursements, transfers and funds control related to all IRM IT WCF and IRM IT fee-for service activities; (b) Oversees all financial, business, and contractual aspects of the IT WCF for all services to Bureaus across the State Department; (c) Monitors and assesses all IT StA's relating to WCF charges and services provided to ctistomer Bureaus to ensure that the charges track with services rendered; (d) Provides transparent reporting of cost and services to Bureau's receiving services from IRM; (e) Monitor funds of all IRM Program Offices, ensuring allocations are not exceeded, preventing anti-deficiency; and (f) Oversees all IRM UI^O's for validation. (4) Emergency Management planning and coordination for IRM Bureau; (a) Serves as the liaison with other Bureaus and Department of State emergency planning and response programs. Coordinates and develops information and responses to special or unique inquiries and requirements from the CIO, Deputy CIO for Operations and Deputy CIO for BMP; (b) Responsible for the annual Bureau Emergency Action Plan; (c) Responsible for the Federal Emergency Action Plan for State; and (d) A n n e x ^ ^ , w h i c h is also the American Red Cross building. (5) Oversees contract administration of all SPO's contracts and task orders and manages SPO Program Budget Formulation and Execution; manages IRM's Representation Fund.

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^FAI^ 2 ^ 4 ^ 2 2 ( 8 ) ^^rl^i^gC^pit^lF^^^8r^^^l^ (^^^B^I^PBSPOBFI^OB^CF)
(^(^T.0^(^2^^^ ^2^^20^^^ The Working Capital Fund Branch (IRM/BMP/SPO/FMD/WCF): (1) Provides financial governance and guidance, gathers customer requirements, develops overall IRM WCF business plans, reviews and reports on Service I^evel Agreements (StA's), provides Customer Advocacy and continuous improvement, and serves as the central POC/liaisonwithA/E^/WCF; (2) WCF develops and maintains the IRM WCF budget, serves as the central POC for all interaction with A/E^/WCF as financial liaison for WCF Operational Service Centers(OSCs),ensures appropriate spending against spend plans, ensures adherence to the objectives of the OSC Plans, and provides cost impact analysis of requirements and change requests; (3) WCF reconciles issues regarding bills and invoices, resolves disputes, prepares revenue and expense reports, and provides financial management support to each IRM WCF OSC; and (4) WCF provides financial reporting transparency and consistency, develops and manages streamlined service ordering processes, and develops and malntalnsaconsolidated and scalable WCF billing system and calendar that supports each IRM WCF OSC.

^FAI^ 2^4^23 P^rtf^li^l^^^^g^^^^tOi^i^i^^ (^I^I^BOI^PBSPOBPI^O)
(^CT.'C^^(^2^^^ ^2^^2^^^^ The Portfolio Management Division (IRM/BMP/SPO/PMD): (1) PMD provides an enterprise view, assessment, and governance for theStateDepartment'sITportfolios, investments, programs, and projects. This oversight service provides financial transparency and alignment of IT initiatives with the Department's IT Strategic Plan. PM also serves as the e-^overnment Program Management Office(e^ov PMO), established under the State Department's e-^overnment Program Board(e-^ovPB)charter,providlng enterprise-wide governance for the State Department's decentralized IT Portfolio; (2) Implements the pre-select, select, control and evaluation functions of the State Department's IT Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) process for managing risks and IT investment returns associated with State Department's IT initiatives;

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(a) Pre-Select: screens proposed ITsolutions for unmet Department business requirements before funding is provided; (b) Select: reviews, scores and selects well-founded business cases; and (c) Control/Evaluation: (i) Ensuresthe State Department's major ITportfolios, investments, programs, and projects are performing as expected to meet the State Department's business and strategic goals; Regularly monitors and analyzes IT business case performance measures, costs and schedules, to identify at risk ITprojects/investmentsforTechStat review. Assists project managers to develop remediation plans to mitigate identified investment risks; Conducts Control Phase Portfolio Reviews and recommends the realignment ofthe IT portfolio based on any changes in mission,statutory or business requirements.Thee ^ovPB makes final decisions on changes to the composition of funding levels within the portfolio; Manages all phases of the State Department's Internal Verification and Validation (IV^V) processes; Conducts performance reviews of major projects in the State Department's currentfiscal year ITcapital asset plan; Ensures IT business case information posted on the OMB's web site (IT Dashboard) is current and accurate; and Conducts State DepartmentTechStat reviews on underperforming ITprojects and reports its findings to the CIO and the e-^ov Boards.

(ii)

(iii)

(iv) (v)

(vi) (vii)

(3) Supports the e-^ovPB by coordinating the State Department's IT Capital Planning activities: (a) Manages the formulation, preparation, guidance, and dissemination of the State Department's IT Capital Asset Plans, in accordance with OMB's Circular A-11 regarding IT budget reporting requirements for the Department's IT investments; (b) Provides guidance to project managers on OMB-Circular A-11 project manager training requirements for certifications, and manages the State Department's PM certification program; (c) Manages the operation, maintenance, enhancement, and training

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of the capital planning tools and participates in the inter-agency working group, which updates the tool (i.e., electronic Capital Planning Investment Control eCPIC and IT Asset InventoryITAB);and (d) Develops procedures for selecting, monitoring, and evaluating IT investments and provides reports to senior management on the State Department's ITportfolio; (4) Provides staff and administrative support for the meetings of the e^ovPB and associated organizations: (a) Develops and coordinates the State Department'se^ov/IT Project Management Support Program by establishinga comprehensive project management curriculum; and (b) Provides recommendations to E-^ovPB on State Department IT proposals; and (5) Serves as the State Department's point of contact (POC) for coordinating State Department representation at inter agency meetings, working groups, conferences, and other forums.

^ F A ^ 2^4.2 4 S ^ r ^ t ^ g i ^ P l ^ ^ ^ i ^ g O i ^ i ^ i ^ ^ (^RI^B8I^PBSPOB9PO^
(^(^T.'(^^^2^^^' ^2^^2^^^^ The Strategic Planning Division (IRM/BMP/SPO/SPD): (1) Formulatesthe Department's IT Strategic andTactical Plans and IRM's Bureau Strategic Resource Plan to align IT investments to State's mission. In addition, it analyzes emerging technologies to determine their applicability to the Department's ITstrategic direction and coordinates Department-wide responses to OMB, Federal CIO Council and interagency IT Initiatives. Finally,SPD serves as IRM POC with the Office of the Inspector general and the Office of the l^egal Advisor and for Freedom of Information, Privacy Act andeDiscovery requests; (2) Develops the State Department's InformationTechnology ande government Strategic andTactical Plans and coordinates them with the State Department's strategic planning activities; (3) FormulatesthelTportionoftheState Department's overall Strategic Plan; (4) Formulates the annual Bureau Strategic and Resource Plan for the IRM bureau which contributes to the State Department's overall annual performance report;

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(5) Ensures that the Department of State's interests are represented on CIO Council products (i.e. Federal Strategic Plan); (6) Employs the State Department's quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review(^DDR) in IRM Bureau and also IT Strategic Planning efforts; (7) For the IRM Bureau, and other bureaus and offices throughout the State Department: (a) Reviews Information technology plans and programs, including applications, data, networks, architectures, and platforms, for conformance with the IT Strategic Plan; (b) Investigates the implications of emerging technologies to determine how they affect the strategic direction of the State Department; and (c) Assists in ensuring compatibility of proposed applications, data, networks, and platforms with the IT Strategic Plan. (d) Coordinates Department-wide IT Symposiums outreach program in partnership with the private sector and small business community to introduce emerging technologies and solutions that align with the ITstrategy,misslon and vision. (8) Serves as the State Department's point of contact (POC) for Implementing interagency initiatives such as e-^overnment(e-^ov) and the e-^overnment act of 2002, the Federal Information Security Management Act, the government Paperwork Elimination Act, and other related statutes. Represents the State Department at interagency meetings, working groups and conferences, regarding these issues; (^) Serves as the State Department's POC for Coordinating State Department-wide responses to OMB, Federal CIO Council, and other interagency IT issues, directives, and guidance. Coordinates State Department representation at inter agency meetings, working groups, conferences, and other forums on inter-agency initiatives s u c h a s C l i n g e r C o h e n ^ e ^ o v A c t , Open government, and Data.^ov initiatives; (10) Acts as IRM Bureau's POC for the Office of the Inspector general, and coordinates official responses to inspection and audit reports and other requests for information; (11) Manages the bureau's program for processing requests for Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) documents under the Freedom of Information (FOIA) and Privacy Acts; and (12) Acts as IRM Bureau^s POC with the Office of the l^egal Advisor and

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Department of Justice, and coordinates official responses to eDiscovery requests, litigation holds, and other requests for information.

1 FAM 2 7 4 . 3 e D i p l o m a c y O f f i c e ( I R M / B M P / E D I P )
(CT:0RG-298; 02-14-2013) Reserved pending IRM action.

1 FAM 2 7 4 . 4 G o v e r n a n c e , Resource a n d Performance Management Office ( I R M / B M P / G R P )
(CT:0RG-298; 02-14-2013) The Governance, Resource and Performance Management Office (IRM/BMP/GRP): (1) Provides innovative, high quality information technology (IT) tools, services and resources in support of transparency and empowering diplomacy around the globe; and (2) is comprised of four divisions: Governance and Policy (GP); Performance Management (PFM); Process Management (PMD); and Sourcing Management (SM).

1 FAM 274.4-1 Governance and Policy Division (IRM/BMP/GRP/GP)
(CT:ORG-306; 04-02-2013) The Governance and Policy Division (IRM/BMP/GRP/GP): (1) Is the office responsible for the content of Volume 5 of the Foreign Affairs Manual (5 FAM) and its' associated Foreign Affairs Handbooks (FAHs). (a) Ensures that 5 FAM/FAH policies and procedures are accurate, complete, and timely; (b) Addresses cross-cutting Department policies, regulations, and procedures concerning Department-wide 5 FAM information resource management issues; and (c) Initiates and coordinates publication of 5 FAM subjects and includes all relevant stakeholders In the clearance process. (2) Is a repository for Department-wide information resource management documents, including: (a) Statutes;
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(b) Executive orders; (c) OMB and other legal mandates; (d) Regulations; (e) Procedures; and (f) Guidelines. (3) Reviews proposed new Federal information resource and information technology (IT) management statutes and regulations. Provides comments and interpretations, as appropriate, to IRM and other Department Bureau managers and ensures Department-wide dissemination of these materials. (4) Serves on senior management directed interagency committees and working groups. (5) Assesses the effectiveness of5FAM policies through Department information resource management reviews and analyses. The Division recommends policy changes and works with operational offices to identify any relevant operational issues. (6) Serves as the Department's liaison to the U^S^ Government Accountability Office(GAO) regarding ITengagements In coordination with the ^^^e^^o^^^eCo^^^^o^^^^^^^^^Oi^^^^^^^^c^^^ ^^^^c^^(^C(^^^^. (a) Initiates, coordinates, reviews, negotiates, and consensus builds the Department-wide input; (b) Prepares the official response for CIO approval and final clearance; and (c) Prepares or comments on Department letters to various congressional committees and subcommittees responding to GAOIT-related recommendations. (7) Serves as the Department's IT-related governance office to ensure that rules and procedures that define how Department managers mustworkto accomplish related goals of accountability,performance measurement, and transparency are actually implemented and correctly followed, measured and reported, and that identified issues are addressed appropriately. (a) Assists the Department's business and management organizations in developing disciplined IT process governance; (b) Facilitatesthecoordination of ITmatters across the Department to mitigate risks and ensure that IT investments generate business value; (c) Reviews the effectiveness, efficiency,and economy of
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Department actions to implement5FAM/FAH and Other information resource management policies and procedures; (d) Ensures that input is obtained from IRM and other Bureau stakeholders to accomplish process governance; and (e) Monitors and reports to IRM senior managers on process governance activities. (8) Coordinates the initiation,update, revision of IRMIFAM organizational statements: (a) Drafts, reviews, revises and provides recommendations regarding new or proposed changes to IRMIFAM organizational roles and responsibilities; (b) Evaluates organizational structures and functions as well as strategies for organizational change to ensure that they support the global organizational mission, encompass sound management practices, and meet relevant regulatory policies and criteria requirements; (c) Facilitates the necessary external clearance processes and, subsequent, codification of the documented material; (d) Facilitates information resource management organizational development to align structures and functions with the mission, as necessary; and (e) Coordinates with internal and external officials, as appropriate.

l F A M 2 7 4 . 4 2 P e r f o r n ^ a n c e M a n a g e n ^ e n t Division (^RM/BMP/GRP/PFM)
(^(^T'(^^^2^^^ ^2^^2^^^^ The Performance Management Division (IRM/BMP/GRP/PFM): (1) Develops performance management/measurement policies and procedures in accordance with Federal statutes and the Office of ManagementandBudget(OMB) Performance Reference Model (PRM); (2) Coordinates with other IRM divisions to ensure effective collaboration and communication essential to meeting Department and IRM strategic goals; (3) Negotiates and coordinates with customer bureau representatives and documents IRM service level targets for InformationTechnology (IT) desktop support; Serves as partner with customers to ensure that customer needs are met and that measurable results are achieved; establishesacommunication channel betweenthe
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customers and the IRM service providers to improve customer service; (4) Coordinates with IRM/BMP Strategic Programs Office (SPO)to incorporate Department enterprise architecture performance initiatives for compliance with the Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) framework outlined in the PRM; (5) Manages the Master StA between IRM and its customers, ensuring that appropriate performance management measurement techniques are applied to IRM products and services to ensure that accurate metrics produce tangible results in IRM products and services; responsibilities include chairing the Service Eevel Agreement Working Group (SI^WG) and the IT Service l^evel Agreement Working Group (ITStAWG) groups; monitors and conducts reporting on IRM^s ability to deliver agreed upon levels of service; (6) Provides reports for senior management, individual IRM offices, and external customers to address overall, organizational, and customer specific needs emphasizing transparency,quallty management and improved customerservice; coordinates, as necessary,to identify specific performance gaps and conduct root cause analyses; (7) Performs business analyses and technical evaluations for selecting appropriate reporting tools that effectively assess IRM performance against S l ^ s ; and (8) Represents IRM/BMP/GRP on the Customer Service Advisory Forum (CSAF) where stakeholders develop and approve master service level agreements (Sl^s) and provide guidance forservice improvement and increased customer satisfaction.

I F A M 274.4-3 Process Mana^en^ent Division (IRM/BMP/GRPBPMD)
(^CT.'(^^(^2^^^^ 02^^2^^^^ The Process Management Division (IRM/BMP/GRP/PMD): (1) Provides bureau-wide, process-related guidelines and procedures to ensure IRM's delivery of products and services meets or exceeds customer expectations; (2) Recommends process-related policies and standards which support the goals and vision ofIRM; (3) Continually aligns IRM's services with customer needs by evaluating performance and proposing improvements; (4) Adopts the InformationTechnology Infrastructure l^ibrary(ITII^) Framework through the recommendation of best practices that meet
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the needs of IRM and Its customers; (5) Supports IT knowledge management (I^M) solutions that facilitate rapid problem resolution for self-service end users and support analysts; (6) Supports the InformationTechnology Infrastructure l^lbrary(ITII^) framework within the IRM bureau through the operation ofa continual service improvement function. Identifies opportunities for continual service improvement; and (7) Ensures that the implementation of IRM service delivery functions, (e.g., incident management, problem management, change management, service request management, configuration management, asset management, etc.), are customer-oriented and driven by service standards and established performance metrics. lFAM274.44Soi^rcingMana^en^ent (IRM/BMPBGRP/SM) (^(^T.'(^^(^2^^^ ^2^^2^^^^ The Sourcing Management Division (IRM/BMP/GRP/SM): (1) The primary functions of IRM/BMP/GRP/SM fall within four discrete categories: InformationTechnologyChangeControl Board (IT CCB) Management; Enterprise l^icensing and Strategic Sourcing; Strategic Workforce Analysis and Recruitment; and IRM Program for Accessible Computer/CommunicationTechnology (IMPACT); (2) IT CCB Management-Collaborates with the IT CCB Chairperson and IT CCB Membership to oversee and manage changes to the Department'sgloballTenvironment, including unclassified and classified infrastructures; (a) Manages the overall IT CCB process, including documentation, voting,and local CCB oversight. IT CCB Change Requests(CRs) and local CCB approvals encompass all hardware and software applications put on OpenNet and ClassNet; (b) Maintains the IT CCB SharePoint site content; (c) Conducts testing of hardware and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software and submission of CRs to reduce the workload of local CCBs. The IRM/OPS/ENM/NI^M office continues to provide enterprise patch management support; and (d) Provides training and advice on the process for clearing changes tothegloballTenvironmentand pending IT CCB approval requests.

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(3) Enterprise l^icensing and Strategic Sourcing Manages the Department's Microsoft and Oracle Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs)and Enterprise l^icense Agreements (EEAs); and establishes and manages other enterprise hardware and software agreements as designated by the Department. (a) Monitors the Department's Microsoft and Oracle contracts; tracks license assignments and counts for the specific products identified in the each of the contract El^s to ensure overall license compliance; and reviews and certifies payment for purchase orders under the individual ordering capability of the Microsoft BPA; and (b) Coordinates with bureaus and posts to identify requirements for establishing new BPAs,El^s, and other procurement vehicles offering cost savings/avoidance; prepares required budget estimates and acquisition strategy supporting funding requests for future enterprise agreements and re-competes; (i) Collaborates with A/t^M/A^M to develop new acquisition vehicles supporting software and hardware procurements; and prepares required documentation to include the Acquisition Plan, Justification and Approval for Other Than Full and Open Competition ( J ^ ) when applicable, and Statement of Work (SOW). Maintainsacentralized software license information repository for the enterprise software agreements that it manages for the Department. Provides customer service/support regarding entitlements and use of the hardware and software agreements that it manages for the Department.

(ii)

(iii)

(4) Strategic Workforce Analysis and Recruitment-Strategic Information Technology Workforce Recruitment (SITWR) is responsible for collaborating with Human Resources (HR) to provide guidance and aggressive outreach to maximize the Department's IRM Workforce competency and ensure workforce loads effectively serve the Department and IRM Bureau needs. (a) Plans and analyzes the Department's strategic ITworkforce requirements, demographics, diversity reports, labor market pressures, skill gap analysis, workload assessments and trend analysis to ensure that ITprofessionals are equipped to meet the Department's mission and ever changing information technology challenges; (b) StudlesandanalyzesITworkforcecompetencles, skills, and

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developmental needs in accordance with CIO Council, Office of ManagementandBudget(OMB) and Office of Personnel Management(OPM) guidelines and other organizations as needed to assist in the planning of career development for both InformationTechnology (IT) managers and employees both overseas and domestic; (c) Coordinates with external agencies and internal organizations, concerning various related issues of concern and as deemed appropriate; and (d) Manages the IRM outreach program to recruit worldwide for InformationTechnologySpecialistsforForeign Service and Civil Service careers. Actively participates in recruiting, hiring and training initiatives, which Impact IRM Bureau professionals. (5) IMPACT-Serves as the Department's resource for achieving electronic and information technology (EIT) accessibility for all employees and customers, providing assistance to all Department bureaus in their implementation of Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act; (a) Participates in Change Control Board approval processes such as the IT CCB which includes conducting technical reviews of Voluntary Product AccessibilityTemplates(VPATs)and Government Product AccessibilityTemplates(GPATs),working with vendors and DOS developers, respectively,to Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their VPATandGPAT documentation; (b) Provides training and technical presentations at the IMPACT Outreach Center and customer sites about Section 508 accessibility requirements, and use of ITaccessibillty products relative to Section 508; and (c) Conducts analyses, tests, and provides recommendations for software, web based applications and hardware developed, used, maintained, or procured by bureaus in accordance with Section 508 requirements.

1 F A M 2 7 S OEPUT^ CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER FOR OPERATIONS/CHIEF TECHNO^OG^ OFFICER ( I R M / O P S )

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(^^^.'(^^^2^^^

^^^^2(^^^^

The Deputy Chief Information Officer for Operations/ChiefTechnology Officer (IRM/OPS): (1) Provides overall liaison, interface, and outreach functions within the Department to supply the information resources management operations that best support the Department's mission and functions; (2) Provides direction and policy guidance on substantive operational activities In the IRM Bureau to ensure that the Department and other foreign affairs agencies receive the full range of worldwide rapid, reliable, responsive, secure, classified, and unclassified voice and data information management operating systems, networks, programs, and support services inacost-effective,customer serviceoriented manner. IRM/OPS ensures that people with disabilities have access to information technology; (3) Provides enterprise wide business systems, system integration, mainframes, and client/server operations, consistent with the principles embodied in the InformationTechnology Management Reform Act of 1^^6(ClingerCohen Act); (4) Implements U.S. Government information management directives and directs IRM's providing of operational products and support services to the Department and to other foreign affairs agencies as information resource management operating programs are implemented under Department inter-bureau and U.S. Government interagency agreements, as appropriate; (5) Provides leadership and technical experts for the U.S.-Russian Federation and Newly Independent States Direct Communications l^ink(DCI^), the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), and the GovernmenttoGovernment Communications l^lnk(GGCI^),and such other similar systems, as may be established; (6) Provides technical guidance, consistent with the ^^Department of State Enterprise Architecture and InformationTechnology Strategic and Performance Measurement Plan" to bureaus and offices so that they can implement appropriate information technology operations; (7) Accounts for the management and overall security of the classified and unclassified mainframe systems; and (8) Oversees the Defense l^iaison Office reporting to the IRM Bureau.

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I F A M 2 7 ^ . 1 Enterprise l^et^orl^ Management Office ( I R M / O P ^ / E I ^ M )
(^CT'(^^^^^^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Enterprise Network Management Office (IRM/OPS/ENM), in conjunction with other IRM offices and DTS/PO, the ENM directorate is responsible for managing and overseeing the design, operation, and life cycle management of the Department's worldwide networks^ The office is comprised of three divisions and one staff office.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 1 - 1 i^et^orl^ Engineering and Design Division (^RM/DPS/EI^M/i^ED)
(^(^T.'O^^^^^^^^^^2^^^^ The Network Engineering and Design Division (IRM/OPS/ENM/NED): (1) Provides technical guidance and support for the design, development, and engineering of the Department's enterprise network; (2) Providestechnicalguidanceandsupportforthe design, development, and engineering of the Department's server and client operating systems; (3) Validates applications to run on the Department's network, as appropriate; (4) Performs capacity planning and ensures optimum performance of the Department's networks; (5) Supports the IRM Customer Center in consolidating wide area network and operating system requirements; and (6) Oversees the development, implementation, and maintenance of the Integrated Enterprise Management System (lEMS), which includes proactive network monitoring, problem resolutions, escalation, troubleshooting, and trouble ticketing. l F A M 2 7 S . l - 2 D p e r a t i o n s Division ( I R M / D P S / E i ^ M / D P S ) (^(^T.'(^^G^^^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Operations Division (IRM/OPS/ENM/OPS): (1) Oversees and provides 24-hour management and administrative support for the Department's networks; (2) Ensures the reliable operations and performance of classified/unclassified Internet working systems and network services;

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(3) Provides operational, administrative, and management support for the worldwide internet protocol (IP) network through the Department's Enterprise Network Management Operations Center (ENMOC); (4) Provides operational support for the Department's server and client operating systems; and (5) Provides technical support and coordination for detecting and correcting ITsecurity vulnerabilities. 1F^M^7S.1-^ (^CT.-^^^^^^^ i^et^or^sL^fe-C^c^eManagen^entO^v^sion

(IRM/DPS/E^M/i^LM)
^^^^2^^^^ The Networks Ofe Cycle Management Division (IRM/OPS/ENM/NI^M): (1) Provides oversight and management responsibility for developing and maintaining technical baselines for the network infrastructure; (2) Provides technical assistance in the form of testing, evaluating, and reviewing the enterprise network equipment, systems, services, and technical support for the Department's Configuration Control Board (GCB); (3) Establishes and maintainsanetwork configuration management plan (CMP) to monitor,track, and approve engineering changes, upgrades, modifications, procedures, precepts, and criteria. IRM/OPS/ENM/NI^M maintains an accurate database of hardware, firmware, software, and documentation for the Department's networking assets; (4) Conducts integration testing and evaluation for new or modified hardware or software for the enterprise network; coordinates software distribution, new releases, updates, fixes, and version controls; (5) Provides enterprise patch management support. Provides patch support to mitigate vulnerabilities or provide alternate patch solutions for the DOS environment; (6) Provides asset management services (i.e., life cycle replacement schedules)for Department IT Infrastructure; and (7) Provides acquisition and procurement support for products, labor, and services required for enterprise-wide ITmanagement, operations, and maintenance responsibilities.

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InformationTechnology
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Infrastructure Office ( I R M / O P ^ / I ^ I )
(^CT0^(^22^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The InformationTechnology Infrastructure Office (IRM/OPS/ITI): (1) Advises the Deputy Chief Information Officer for Information Resource Management Operations and other high-level officials in the Department regarding infrastructure issues; (2) Directs and manages the development, maintenance, installation, and operations of the Department's telephone, radio, and wireless communications programs. IRM/OPS/ITI provides for systems integrity and technology safeguards in conformance with established Bureau of Diplomatic Security standards and policies; (3) Implements policies, standards, and procedures to conform with established Department of State architecture standards and policies to ensure effective and efficient infrastructure; and (4) Evaluates the utilization of new technology as it applies to the Department's infrastructures 1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 1 LA^ and ^ A l ^ Service Division (IRM/DPS/I^I/L^S) (^CT'(^^G^^^,' ^^^^2(^(^^^ The EAN and WAN Service Division (IRM/OPS/ITI/I^WS): (1) Advises the Director for InformationTechnology Infrastructure on all matters concerning the installation and maintenance of local and wide-area network (tAN/WAN) infrastructure; (2) Administers pollcy,standards, and procedures to conform with established Department enterprise architecture, and in regards to maintaining and installing tAN/WAN infrastructure; (3) Maintains the Department's I^N/WAN infrastructure and associated supporting technologies; (4) Provides tAN/WAN infrastructure security to conform with Department security standards; (5) Develops acquisition plans for new requirements; serves as contracting officer representative; and performs contract administration for all existing contacts for labor,equipment, maintenance, and spare parts in support of tAN/WAN services; and (6) Provides oversight and management for the Department's Radio Program, Foreign PostsTelephone Program, and the l^iaison Office to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations(OBO).

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UNCLASSIFIED (U) U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume I^ Organization and Functions 1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 1 ( A ) Liaison Brancl^/DBD (IRM/DPS/I^I/L^S/L^-DBD) (^(^T'(^^^^^^^' ^^^^2^^^^ TheOaisonBranch/OBO(IRM/OPS/ITI/I^WS/I^TOBO): (1) Provides OBO with IRM^sITrequirements for space, environmental systems, cabling, and information security systems at new office buildings, (NECs), interim office buildings (lOBs), and temporary office buildings (TOBs)at posts abroad; (2) Continuously reviews architectural, mechanical, and electrical drawings for NECs to ensure that IT facilities and environmental systems are adequate to accommodate IRM^s information, communications systems, and personnel; and (3) Tracks the progress of all NEC, IOB, and TOB projects and coordinates all of IRM^s technical plans for acquisitions and installations and informs the appropriate program office of all project changes, schedule delays, and engineering changes. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 1 ( B ) Installation Brands (IRM/DPS/I^I/L^S/I^L) (^CT.'(^^^^^^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Installation Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/l^WS/ITI^): (1) Implements policy standards and procedures regarding the installation of tAN/WAN infrastructure; (2) Plans, designs, installs, and documents installation of tAN/WAN infrastructure and related technologies; (3) Provides enterprise integrity and remediation for the Department's installed information technology infrastructure; and (4) Provides technical training and oversight for information management technical specialist to developacore base of communications specialists(COMPSPECS).

1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 1 ( ^ ) Maintenance Brands (IRM/DPS/I^I/L^S/Mi^^)
(^(^T.'(^^^^^^^^ ^0^^2^^^^ The Maintenance Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/I^WS/MNT): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures as they apply to maintaining the classified tAN/MAN/WAN infrastructure abroad;

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(2) Provides onsite preventative and remedial services for the continued operations or restoration ofclassified ITsystems at posts abroad; (3) Establishes and administers service contracts for repairing and returning failed IT hardware, firmware, or software, including INMARSATS, and for procuring new requirements; (4) Manages the Department's International Maritime Satellite communications contingency program (INMARSATS); (5) Conducts regular visits to posts abroad to troubleshoot and repair defectiveequipmentand software for unclassified ITsystems; (6) Conducts regular visits to posts abroad to provide operations and maintenance support for unclassified ITsystems in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations, IRM, and DS guidance and policies; and (7) Performs depot level maintenance and testing on failed ITequipment for posts abroad.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 1 ( D ) Foreign Posts ^elepl^one Brands (IRM/DP^/I^I/L^S/FP^)
(^CT.(^^(^^^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Foreign Posts Telephone Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/I^WS/FPT): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures for maintaining and operating PB^ telecommunications systems at all foreign posts; (2) Plans, installs, and maintains PB^ systems at foreign posts; and (3) Establishes and administers service contracts for repairing and returning failed telephone hardware, firmware, or software and for procuring telephone systems.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 1 ( E ) Radio Progran^s Brands (IRM/DP9/I^I/I^^^/RPB)
(^(^T.'(^^^^^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Radio Programs Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/I^WS/RPB): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures for maintaining and installing HF,UHF,and VHF radio systems, IncludingTACSATS; (2) Engineers, designs, plans, installs, and maintains radio systems; (3) Provides emergency communications systems to posts in crisis situations and communications support for special operations; (4) ManagestheDepartment'sTactical Satellite Communications

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contingency program (TACSATS); and (5) Supports the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (S/CT) in deploying, operating, and maintaining the Foreign Emergency SupportTeam^s (FEST) deployment packages for exercises and missions abroad.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 2 ^elecon^n^i^nications^ t i r e l e s s and Data Services Division ( I R M / D P S / I ^ I / ^ ^ D )
(^CT.^^^^^^^,^^^^2^^^^ TheTelecommunications, Wireless and Data Services Division (IRM/OPS/ITI/TWD): (1) Advises the Director of InformationTechnology Infrastructure regarding all matters concerning voice, video-conferencing, voice/data, wireless services, and telecommunications Infrastructure; (2) Develops and administers policy,standards,and procedures to conform with established Department architecture regarding voice, video-conferencing, voice/data, wireless services, and telecommunications Infrastructure; (3) Maintains the Department's voice,video-conferencing,voice/data, wireless services, and telecommunication services infrastructure, and associated support telecommunications systems; (4) Provides voice,videoconferencing,voice/data,wireless, data,and telecommunications services support to the Office of the Secretary for special infrastructure requirements; and (5) Serves as program manager for the Department's Enterprise Network Program (E Net), which is modernizing Staters data networking in the metropolitan area. Program management includes responsibility for designing, developing, operating, and network managing premise networks (tANs), and for the metropolitan area network interconnecting the main State Department building and the annexes (MAN).

1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 2(A) Bi^siness Operations Managen^ent Brancb(IRM/DPS/I^I/^^D/BOM)
(^CT.'^^^^^^^' ^^^^2(^^^^ The Business Operations Management Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/TWD/BOM): (1) Develops and implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding domestic telecommunications service to include call accounting, private branch exchanges (PB^s), domestic circuit acquisitions, and charge back programs;

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1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 2 ( B ) Don^estic^elepl^oneand Data Services Brands ( I R M / D P S B I ^ I / ^ ^ D / D ^ D )
(^CT.'O^G^^^^^^^^2^(^^^ The DomesticTelephone and Data Services Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/TWD/DTD): (1) Develops and implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding domestic circuits, PB^ operations, enterprise network (ENet) operations, and telecommunications infrastructure; and (2) Plans, installs, and maintains the Department's domestic circuits, PB^s, telecommunications infrastructure, and associated supporting telecommunications systems. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 2 ( C ) Don^estic^ecl^nical Services Brands (IRM/DPS/I^I/^^D/D^S) (^CT.O^G^^^^^^^^-2^^^^ The Domestic Technical Services Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/TWD/DTS): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures for maintaining Domestic tAN/WAN infrastructure; (2) Provides technical services support for the Department's command and control systems, which includes the fifth floor Communications Center,the Operations Center,the Secure Voice Center,and classified data networks; (3) Provides 7x24 hour operations and maintenance services for the Secure Voice Center and the red switch telephones systems; (4) ProvidesTierlll engineering and maintenance support for the continuous operations and rapid restoration of classified networks in the fifth floor Communications Center; (5) Provides installation, configuration, and maintenance support for the Department's classified networks cryptographic systems/equipment; and (6) Provides installation and maintenance support for the activation and mobilization of the Department's contingency operations at alternate sites.

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1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 3 Systen^s I n t e g r i t y Division (IRM/DPS/I^I/SI)
(^(^T.'(^^^-^^^^ ^^^:^2^^^^ The Systems Integrity Division (IRM/OPS/ITI/SI): (1) AdvisestheDirectoroflnformationTechnology Infrastructure on all key management infrastructure (I^MI) matters; secure voice; Pi^I/biometric; and anti-virus programs used to implement and maintain information assurance and systems integrity; (2) Administers I^MIpolicy,standards, and procedures regarding cryptography,information assurance, and systems integrity to conform with national and Department policy and regulations; (3) Provides comment(s)concerning the development of related national policy; (4) Provides technical security oversight and management for mainframe security,cryptographic services, and Information Integrity for the Department's Pl^I/biometric and anti-virus programs; and (5) Coordinates IRM integration, verification, and interoperability (IV^V) testing for the Department's ITassets using or supported by antivirus, cryptographic, mainframe, PI^I, and biometric security systems.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 3 ( A ) ^ryptograpl^ic Services Brands (IRM/DPS/I^IBSI/CSB)
(^CT.O^G^^^^^^^^2^^^^ The Cryptographic Services Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/CSB): (1) Advises all Department bureaus of encryption devices and technology necessary to comply with national and Department information assurance (IA) practices; (2) Implements key management Infrastructure (I^MI) policies, standards, and procedures as they apply toType I, I I , I I I encryption devices to Include symmetrical and asymmetrical algorithms; (3) Manages the Department's communications security(COMSEC) programs (i.e., COMSEC material control system (CMOS) and central office of record(COR))to meet national cryptographic management and audit policy requirements; (4) Manages the Department's cryptographic clearance(access)offlce and procedures and associated services to include maintaining5 FAH-6, Communications Security Handbook; and

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(5) Manages the Department's secure voice program. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 3 ( B ) Infornnation Integrity Brands (IRM/OPS/I^I/SI/IIB) (^C^T.'(^^G22^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Information Integrity Branch (IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding information systems security to conform with Department regulations; (2) Manages the Department's Mainframe Security Program to ensure compliance with Department security policies and industry best practices. IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB develops, implements, and administers, policies, standards, and procedures regarding mainframe security,with specific emphasis on amplifying and correlating workstation and network centric Department policies to the mainframe environment. IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB installs, tailors, configures, and operates all software packages designed to establish, facilitate, augment, and/or control: (a) User identification and authorization; (b) Data and resource access control; (c) Security event monitoring and auditing; and (d) Cryptographic services support on mainframe hardware platforms regardless of the operating system; (3) ServesasCOMSECcustodianformainframe based cryptographic service systems. IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB monitors and advises on, as appropriate, the installation and operation of mainframe interfaces with the OpenNet, Internet, or dedicated interagency communication links to ensure compliance with Department security guidelines; provides procedural safeguards for data transiting these boundaries; (4) Inacustodialcapacity,implements technical security controls on behalf of all mainframe system and application owners; advises on the secure design, installation, and operation of systems and applications; serves asavoting member on the SIO/EOC CCB on suitability of mainframe hardware and software selection and configuration; and monitors and advises on security matters for IT/CCB change records relevant to, or concerning interfaces with, the mainframes. The Information Integrity Branch conducts internal system security reviews and renders internal audit reports to all Department mainframe systems and applications owners; conducts real-time security event monitoring and mainframe network intrusion

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detection; and serves asafirst-levelCIRT for security incidents originating on any mainframe platform or at its boundary interfaces; (5) Manages and coordinates the mainframe application ISSO program, in cooperation with CIO/IA and DS; advises on all mainframe security relevant policies; coordinates intra-and inter-agency computer security issues; and supports certification and accreditation of mainframe resident applications or general support systems. IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB works with the PI^I program and IRM/OPS/ENM to facilitate and integrate PI^I with the mainframe asasingle signon methodology; (6) Implements anti virus policies, standards, and procedures to conform with established DOS architecture to ensure effective and efficient operations that protect critical automated information systems (AIS) against the threat of virus infection. Through these safeguards, computer and communications resources, including the data they store, are available and free of malicious code virus infection. The Information Integrity Branch managesaVirus Incident Response Team (VIRT) capable of responding to virus alerts Department-wide and provides 7^24 on-call assistance and an 8-hour,5-day Help Desk in support of anti virus software products. It maintains an anti-virus intranet Web site(accessible via the OpenNet) where the user community may obtain the latest versions of anti-virus software, virussignaturefiles,virusalertinformation,and policy guidance 7^24. Also, IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB develops policy that mandates reporting virus discoveries to this office; (7) Administers and implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding public key infrastructure (PI^I), including digital signature and asymmetric public key encryption technology,to conform with Department regulations. IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB manages the Department's PI^I program, including establishing and operating the PI^I Root Certificate Authority(CA) and all subordinate certificate authorities on all Department classified and unclassified networks, domestic and abroad; (8) Coordinates and manages the Department's cross-certification with the Federal PI^I Steering Committee Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) for classified and unclassified automated information systems digital signature and public key encryption interfaces to other Federal agencies. State and local governments, foreign governments, and the public, domestic and abroad. IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB represents the IRM Bureau in all departmentlevel and the Department of State In all Federal-level forums, working groups, standing committees, and boards relative to using public key technology and infrastructure, and acts as the Pi^I

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technical advisor to all such groups within the Department. IRM/OPS/ITI/SI/IIB coordinates IRM integration, verification, and interoperability testing for the Department; and (^) Manages the Department's Biometric l^ogical Access program, including the integration with the Department and Federal PI^I programs, for all Department classified and unclassified networks, domestic and abroad. IRM/OPS/I^I/SI/IIB represents IRM Bureau in all department level and the Department of State in all Federal level forums, working groups, standing committees, and boards relative to using biometrics for logical access control, and acts as the technical advisor to all such groups within the Department.

l F A M 2 7 S . 2 4 ^ e c l ^ n i c a l Security and Safeguards Division (IRM/OPS/I^I/^SS)
(^(^T.(^^(^^^^^' ^^-^^2^^^^ The Technical Security and Standards Division (IRM/OPS/ITI/TSS): (1) Advises the Director of InformationTechnology Infrastructure about all matters concerning hardware assurance and field surety program operations; and (2) Administers policy,standards, and procedures regarding hardware assurance and field surety programs to conform with Department regulations. 1FAM27S.2-4(A) ^ard^areAss^rance^ean^ (IRM/OPS/I^I/^SS/I^A^) (^(^T.0^(^^^^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Hardware Assurance Team (IRM/OPS/ITI/TSS/HAT): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding hardware assurance to conform with Department regulations; (2) Investigates new hardware assurance technologies; and (3) Performs assurance procedures on newly acquired equipment. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 2 - 4 ( B ) Field S i ^ r e t y ^ e a n ^ (IRM/DPS/I^I/^SS/FS^) (^(^T.(^^(^^^^^' ^(^^^2^^^^ The Field Surety Team (IRM/OPS/ITI/TSS/FST): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding field surety programs to conform with Department regulations;
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UNCLASSIFIED (U) U.S.Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volumel Organization and Functions (2) Performs technical counterintelligence processes for foreign posts; and (3) Provides hardware safeguard services for foreign posts.

IFAM27S.24(C)Systen^sSafegi^ards^ean^ (IRM/OPS/I^I/^SS/SS^)
(^CT'(^^(^^^^,' ^^^^2(^^^^ The Systems Safeguards Team (IRM/OPS/ITI/TSS/SST): (1) Implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding hardware issues to deploy and use analog and digital nonsecure telephone systems to conform with national and Departmental regulations; (2) Implements policies, standards, and procedures regarding the hardware integrity of cryptographic systems and their peripherals; and (3) Performs assurance procedures, certification, and/or validation of the Department's systems. l F A M 2 7 S . 2 S G I o b a l Infornnation ^ed^nology Modernisation Division ( I R M / D P S / I ^ I / G I ^ M ) (^(^T.0^^22^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Global InformationTechnology Modernization Division (IRM/OPS/ITI/GITM): (1) Manages the Department's information technology approved programs by utilizing industry standard project management methodologies. Acorestaff,trained in program management practices, effectively executes and implements information technology (IT) programs globally,domestically,and abroad; (2) Manages either an entire program^s life cycle or specific program lifecycle segments. When managing the entire program life-cycle process, GITMconductsacomplete program management review and acquisition strategy review and executes the actual program operations that include survey,design,building,delivery,lnstallation, and transition to operations, maintenance, and customer service; (3) When managing only specific segments ofaprogram^s life cycle, GITM coordinates and interfaces with multiple Department organizational elements to ensure that the program management methodologies are applied effectively; (4) Ensures that industry standard program management methodologies are being effectively executed for all IRM information technology
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programs conducted outside the GITM office and provides guidance and direction to all other IRM elements for adhering to the concepts of program management, project scope planning, project time activities, financial accounting, project quality assurance and tracking, production control planning, project resource requirements determination, project risk management, configuration management requirements, and procurement strategies; (5) Provides management oversight; directs and implements major IRM information technology programs(domestically and abroad); and advises the Deputy CIO for Operations, as required; (6) Ensures that GITM-managed programs comply with Federal legislation guiding agencies such as the Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF), the e-Government Act of 2001, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), NSA guidance, OMB Circular A-130, and National Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (NIACAP), as well as other legislation directing Federal ITprograms; (7) Establishesatechnical operations function for baseline configuration, site-specific requirements, and systems design and provides technical coordination with all customers; (8) Establishesadeployment function to coordinate installation schedules, logistical deployment of material and personnel to customer sites, site preparation, install team preparation, and customer training; (^) Establishesaproduction control function to effectively manage multidisclplinary processes, control gates, quality audits, internal reviews, and production goals to ensureareliable and timely workflow so that the deployment schedule is met within cost constraints and technical and quality criteria; (10) Establishesaquality-control function to define and execute system performance measures, contract performance, and configuration managementand baselines and ensures that process documentation standards are developed during the program^s life and adhered to; and (11) Establishesaprogram management function to ensure that life-cycle phases ofaprogram are documented and coordinated in the following areas: requirements definition, cost analysis, planning, financial management, reporting, automated management information system, and customer Web site development.

1 FAM 2 7 ^ . 3 Messaging s y s t e m s Office
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(IRM/OP^/M^O)
(^(^T^^^(^^^^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Messaging Systems Office (IRM/OPS/MSO): (1) Advises the Deputy Chief Information Officer for Information Resources Management Operations and other high-level officials about messaging; (2) Hasfullresponsibilityfordeveloping, implementing, and operating all Department-wide messaging; (3) Manages the integration of emerging technologies with existing and planned messaging programs; (4) Ensures messaging services are accessible to all offices of the Department and to other agencies; and (5) Provides technical experts for the U.S.-Russian Federation and Newly Independent States direct communications link (DCI^), the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), the government to-government communications llnk(GGCI^),the foreign affairs link (FAI^),and other such initiatives.

I F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 1 Managen^ent Analysis Staff (IRM/DPS/MSO/MAS)
(^(^T.'^^G22^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Management Analysis Staff (IRM/OPS/MSO/MAS): (1) Advises the director regarding all resource issues affecting the managing and administrating of the messaging systems office; coordinates resource requirements among all program elements within an office; and prepares and recommends resource proposals to be submitted to IRM/E^; (2) Manages the messaging systems office professional development program, ensuring that its employees are appropriately trained for their responsibilities; (3) Manages, coordinates, and performs building and environmental maintenance in conjunction with IRM/E^ and A/OPR offices; (4) Acts as the messaging systems office's contracting officer representative for its mission-critical contracts; (5) Coordinates program resources and is liaison to IRM/E^ for all office administrative and management issues such as budget, planning, staffing, training, equipment, space, desktop systems, inventory, procurement, etc.;

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(6) Prepares and monitors office performance measures and tracks the accomplishment of goals and objectives; keeps the office director informed of progress toward achieving the program's mission; and (7) Manages the communications security(COMSEC) account for the Communications Center and Secure Voice Center (i.e., COMSEC), cryptographic Clearance (Access) procedures, and associated services according to5FAH-6,Communications Security Handbook. IRM/OPS/MSO/MAS manages the STU III/STE's program for distribution, operations, and control for the IRM Bureau.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 2 Messaging Systen^s Products Division (IRM/OPS/MSD/MSP)
(^CT.'^^(^^^^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Messaging Systems Products Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP): (1) Oversees the Department's new messaging programs and identifies enhancements for existing systems, providing project management and quality assurance expertise; (2) Explores new messaging technologies of potential value to the Department, in conjunction with IRM/BPC/EAP,and departmental foreign affairs messaging consolidation initiatives; (3) Formulates, coordinates, and recommends messaging policies concerning new messaging technologies for Internet initiatives and their applications to existing and planned systems, in coordination with the other IRM Bureau directorates; and (4) Provides central management and operational support for electronic mail and the combined bureau processing centers(CBPCs)core messaging applications. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 2 ( A ) D e s i g n a n d Bi^ild B r a n d s (IRM/DPS/MSO/MSP/DB) (^CT.^O^(^^^^,' ^(^^^2^^^^ The Design and Build Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP/DB): (1) Participates in the finalization of messaging system requirements; (2) Develops, presents design concepts, and participates in the selection process; (3) Builds prototype systems for the customer and provides security and operational reviews; and (4) Finalizes prototype and builds beta systems.

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1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 2 ( B ) Operational Progran^ Brands (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP/OP) (^(^T.'(^^^-^^^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Operational Program Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP/OP): (1) Manages and directs programs supporting worldwide classified and unclassified messaging systems, as appropriate; (2) Provides expert guidance for formulating tactical plans,policy,goals, and objectives for messaging systems; (3) Plans, implements, budgets, contracts, procures, and arranges training for full-systems deployment following operational acceptance of new messaging systems; (4) Provides application support, including guidance, troubleshooting and program resolution, concerning matters pertaining to support messaging systems, in cooperation with the Customer Service Center (IRM/BPC/CST);and (5) Evaluates program operations and develops proposals for deactivation or modernization of messaging systems. I F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 2 ( C ) Prodi^ct Assurance Brands (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP/PA) (^CT.'O^G^^^^^^^^2^^^^ The Product Assurance Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP/PA): (1) Develops configuration methods, procedures, and standards to supportthedevelopmentand implementation of messaging systems products; (2) Ensures quality and consistency of software and documentation; (3) Conducts internal configuration control board meetings, document reviews, and platform audits to define product content, predict user comprehension, and ensure delivery of product; (4) Ensures compliance with established validation and verification procedures; and (5) Manages the SA 34 computer network in support of development, test, and operation activities. Responsibilities include providing user support and conducting software and hardware inventory.

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UNCLASSIFIED (U) U.S.Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volumel Organization and Functions 1 F ^ M ^ 7 S . ^ - ^ ( D ) Project Managen^entB^and^ (IRM/OPSBMSO/MSPBPM) (^(^T.'0^(^^^^^^ ^(^-^^2^^^^ The Project Management Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP/PM): (1) Is the responsible authorityfor defining and coordinating lifecycle activities for Department-wide messaging projects, from validation of user requirements through operational and customer acceptance; and (2) Organizes, plans, and aligns measurable project objectives in accordance with established project management methodologies. 1 F ^ M ^ 7 S . 3 - 2 ( E ) ^ e s t a n d Deploy B^and^ (IRM/OPS/MSOBMSP/^D) (^CT.'O^^^^^^^^^^2^(^^^ The Test and Deploy Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP/TD): (1) Is responsible fortesting, accepting, and deploying messaging projects and system enhancements; (2) Prepares messaging systems for installation at beta sites, including the installation, operational training, and final system validation; and (3) Performs user product acceptance review and reports on product readiness for production deployment.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 3 Spedal Messaging Operations Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/SMO)
(^(^T.'0^G2^7^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Special Messaging Operations Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/SMO): (1) Manages and oversees the operations of the Intelligence and Special Communications (ISC) Center Branch and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) Branch. This includes: (a) Maintaining program management responsibilities and technical/operational liaison with the Department's Executive Secretariat Operations Center (S/ES-0), Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), White House Communications Agency (WHCA),Central IntelligenceAgency(CIA),National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Information System Agency (DISA), Department of Defense (DOD)and other DOS bureaus and offices to coordinate operation, maintenance and installation of voice, data and emergency messaging systems;

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(b) Maintaining special, direct communications channels between the Department and foreign governments via secure voice programs (ForeignAffairsl.^inks^FAI^),anddatalinks(GovernmenttoGovernment Communications l^inks(GGCI^),betweenthe Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and foreign governments; and (c) Providing direct support to the Department of State's Chief Information Officer(CIO)including negotiating interagency agreements, memoranda of understandings (MOUs), bilateral agreements and protocols; (2) Provides daily operational and technical support to the Executive Secretariat's Operations Center (S/ES-0)for specialized communications and requirements. This includes: (a) In the arena of the ISC, directly supporting the Secretary of State (the Secretary) and other Department principals with secure voice and video requirements both domestically and abroad; (b) Being responsible for the operation of the Department's interface to the Defense Red Switch Network; and operation of the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) and satellite communications used to support the Secretary while traveling; and (c) ProvidingTierlservice, defined as daily operational and technical support, to the Staff Secretariat's Operations Center (S/S-0)forspeciallzed communications and requirements; (3) Manages the operation of the NRRC communications facility and related bilateral GGCI^. This includes providing coordination with foreign governments regarding maintenance and upgrades to equipment and telecommunications links, and maintaining currency of and updates to required international agreements; and (4) Provides technical counsel to the Department's head of delegation, the Chief Information Officer(CIO)for U.S.^Russian technical expert. IRM/OPS/MSO/SMO negotiates international agreements or treaties with foreign governments in support of the NRRC, Foreign Affairs l^ink(FAI^), Direct Communications l^ink(DCI^), Direct Voice Onk(DVI^),andDirectTelephoneOnk(DTI^). IRM/OPS/MSO/SMO provides program management and negotiates with host country regarding the Department's FAE and NRRC programs, including drafting/reviewing talking points and bilateral protocols.

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1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 3 ( A ) Intelligence and Special ^on^n^i^nications c e n t e r Brands (IRM/OPS/MSO/SMO/ISC)
(^CT.'^^^2^B^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Intelligence and Special Communications Center Branch (INR/OPS/MSO/SMO/ISC): (1) Manages and operates the ISC,a24x7 operation. This includes providing secure voice and data communications support to the Secretary and other principal officers; (2) Serves as the Department's liaison and interface with the special intelligence community for data,voice, and message traffic.This includes; (a) Providing operations and maintenance support for sensitive compartmented information (SCI);and (b) Being responsible for receiving and transmitting Critical Communication (CRITIC-COM) and SCI sensitive record traffic; (3) Through the Secure Voice Center(SVC),providesthe Secretary and other Department principals with accurate, reliable, and secure communications'support when traveling worldwide^ This Includes installing, operating, and troubleshooting an array of secure data, video,voice, and facsimile communications terminal equipment and transmission links for the Secretary and the traveling party between site locations and the Department; (4) Operates and maintainsasecure video conference facility for all Department principals; (5) Manages the CRITIC Network operations for the Department, which is the sole access and exit point for the Department's CRITIC traffic; and (6) Performs other critical-sensitive classified communications activities. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 3 ( B ) i^RRC^ M e s s a g i n g C e n t e r B r a n d s (^RM/OPS/MSO/SMO/I^RRC) (^(^T.'(^^^22^^ (^^^^2^^(^^ The NRRC Messaging Center Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/SMO/NRRC): (1) Manages and operates the NRRC,a24x7 operation; (2) Maintains liaison and conducts communications facility and related bilateral technical negotiations with foreign counterparts to maintain GGCI^ and continuous communications links(CCI^);
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(3) Serves as technical expert representative for the NRRC Communications on various inter agency working groups (IWG), the Configuration Control Board(CCB), Engineering Working group (EWG) and the Standing Subcommittee on Upgrade(SSU); and (4) Performs other critical-sensitive classified communications activities. 1FAM27S.3-4 (^CT.(^^G2^^^ E-Mail Division ( I R M / O P S / M S O / E M L )

^^2^2^^^^

TheE Mail Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/EMI^): (1) Provides program management and direction for classified and unclassified electronic messaging(email) processing systems, internet, OpenNet, Network Control Center (NCC), and Combined Bureau Processing Center(CBPC) operations; (2) Serves asasenior Department representative at inter-agency working group meetings on e-mail, firewalls, electronic directories, and associated technologies; (3) Coordinates, reviews, and monitors the operational life cycle of email,Internet, SIPRNET,Open Source Information System (OSIS), OpenNet, NCC, and CBPC activities and recommends enhancements; (4) Provides information systems security support for the Department's global classified,unclassified,and SBUemail systems and networks; (5) Provides management oversight and direction to on-site Microsoft Corporation support to the Department; and (6) Serves as the day-to-day manager of the worldwide Department mobile computing programs that support the Foreign Affairs community remote access requirements. Mobile computing is defined as any program that includes technologies or applications designed to provide classified or unclassified access to Department networks by devices that are not continuously connected to one of the networks. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 4 ( A ) l^et^orl^ control Center Brands (IRM/OP9/MSO/EML/l^^^) (^CT.'(^^G2^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ The Network Control Center Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/EMtBNCC): (1) Manages and operates the Department's 24x7 Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) and unclassified enterprise e-mail network central infrastructures,aworldwideinterconnectionoflocaltAN based systems that connect the Department to all U.S. embassies,
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consulates, and missions abroad; (2) Manages and operates the Department's 24x7 unclassified internet support services; (3) Manages and operates the Department's 24x7 Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) remote access system platforms and firewall systems platforms; and (4) Manages and operates information systems security infrastructure, including Data Encryption Standard (DES) andTypelencryption devices.

l F A M 2 7 S . 3 4 ( B ) C o n ^ b i n e d B ^ r e a ^ Processing c e n t e r Brands ( I R M / O P ^ / M S O / E M L / C B P C )
(^CT.0^G2(^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ Combined Bureau Processing Center Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/EME/CBPC): (1) Manages and operates the Department's 24x7 Secret classified enterprise e-mail network central infrastructure, connecting the Department to all U.S. embassies, consulates, and missions abroad; (2) Manages and operates the central infrastructure for the Department's 24x7 domestic Secret classified CABI^E^PRESS telegraphic distribution systems; (3) Manages and operates information systems security infrastructure for classified e-mail and telegraphic delivery systems w i t h T y p e l encryption devices; and (4) Manages and operates the Department's 24x7 Secret classified firewall systems platforms.

l F A M 2 7 S . 3 - 4 ( ^ ) Mobile ^on^p^ting Brands (IRM/OPS/MSO/EML/MC)
(^(^T^(^^(^2^^,' ^^2^2^^^^ The Mobile Computing Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/EMi^MC): (1) Manages and operates worldwide Department mobile computing programs that support Foreign Affairs community remote access requirements; (2) Provides technical network, operational, and administrative support to the Department of State and numerous Federal Agencies for OpenNetEverywhere(ONE),Blackberry,SecureDial In(SDI),and other mobile computing programs; and (3) Serves as the Department of State's primary mobile computing site
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responding t o a w i d e array of customer queries via the IT Service Center's UniversalTroubleTicket(UTT) system and direct contact^

I F A M 2 7 S . 3 - S Main State Messaging Center Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC^)
(^(^TO^G-2^7^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Main State Messaging Center Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC): (1) Manages and operates the Main State messaging center (MSMC), the remote messaging center in State Annex 44, and maintains technical and operational liaison with the Department's Executive Secretariat's Operations Center(S/ESO),INR, other bureaus, offices, and agencies, to coordinate ongoing and emergency messaging; (2) Responsible for 7x24 hourtelegraphic processing, message analysis and distribution, traffic research, and network managementfor Department enterprise messaging systems; (3) Serves as the primary technical and operational liaison between IRM andtheWhite House Communications agency,the Executive Secretariat's Operations Center (S/ES O), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), and other government entities for routine emergency messaging and telecommunications operational support; and (4) Provides operational life-cycle management for the Department's Main State messaging center and satellite bureau message centers, supporting core messaging applications in accordance with prevailing Federal statutes, regulations, and applicable legislation.

I F A M 2 7 S . 3 - S ( A ) Messaging Operations Brancb (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSM^/MOB)
(^CT.'C^^G2^7^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Messaging Operations Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/MOB): (1) Maintains 7x24-hour messaging liaison with bureaus, S/ES-0, posts, and other Federal agencies; (2) Performs high-level coordination of critical-sensitive telegraphic support functions with the Executive Secretariat (S/ES)Staff,White House, Pentagon, and other offices, bureaus, and Federal agencies; (3) Provides telecommunications guidance to MSMC shift chiefs and communications personnel at posts; (4) Serves on telecommunication procedural, development, and operations planning groups within the IRM Bureau;

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(5) Manages the worldwide telegraphic collective address and CRITIC test programs; (6) Performs message handling, processing and analysis, and distribution functions,7x24 hours; (7) Operates the MSMC Help Desk; (8) Manages the Department of State publications (DOSPUB) telegraphic routing indicator program; (^) Operates core messaging and peripheral equipment to retrieve, correct, re-enter,and research telegraphic messages and continuity journals; (10) Operates the Defense Messaging System (DMS) Help Desk; and (11) Performs world-wide management of various State Messaging Archive RetrievalToolset (SMART) message validation and management queues for Department and other agency customers both domestically and abroad. 1FAM27S.3-S(B) ^on^n^^nicationsSysten^sBrancb (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSM^/CSB) (^(^T.'(^^G^^^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Communications Systems Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/CSB): (1) Operates mainframe and ancillary message-processing systems, 7x24 hours; (2) Performs telecommunications technical and network control, trouble analysis, and circuit management functions; and (3) Performs trouble analysis and circuit management functions to maintain cryptographic operations. 1FAM27S.3-S(C) P^ogran^n^ingB^ancb (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSM^/PRG) (^CT'(^^(^2^7^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Programming Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC/PRG): (1) Performs automated terminal system (ATS), State terminal automated relay system (STARS), and PC hardware and software maintenance for Main State and Beltsville, Maryland 7x24 hours; (2) Oversees, manages, and performs the contracting officer's representative function for the contract that provides programming and system maintenance for IRM/OPS/MSO/MSMC and some of

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IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC system computers and peripheral equipment; (3) Performs EAN administration and hardware/software configuration management for PC and mainframe telegraphic processing systems; and (4) Serves on the system development, technical, and operations planning group within the IRM Bureau. l F A M 2 7 S . 3 ^ B e l t s v i l l e Messaging Center Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/BM^) (^CT.'^^(^22^^ ^^^^2(^^^^ The Beltsville Messaging Center Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC): (1) Manages and operates the Beltsville Messaging Center and the alternate Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) messaging system. Maintains technical and operational liaison with the Department's Executive Secretariat's Operations Center (S/ES-0), White House CommunicationsAgency (WHCA), DiplomaticTelecommunications Service Programs Office (DTS-PO), CIA, NSA, and other agencies, bureaus, and offices to coordinate ongoing and emergency messaging7daysx24 hours; (2) Provides program oversightforthe Department's messaging systems worldwide; (3) Manages the Department's primary global telecommunications network center and regional messaging relay facility; (4) Serves as designated alternate site facility for emergency messaging operations and the State Archiving System (SAS); (5) Provides management oversight of the entire State Annex 26 facility to include building operations and maintenance support for the tenant organizations; and (6) In accordance with policies and procedures established by A/OEM/PPD and the Domestic Emergency Action Committee, is solely responsible for all emergency operations and relocation facilities within the complex. IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC is responsible for classified operations, support, and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) related to the forwarded activities.

I F A M 2 7 S . 3 - ^ ( A ) ^on^n^^nications Operations Brands (IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS)
(^CT.0^G22^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Communications Operations Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS):
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(1) Manages and operates the State telegraphic automated relay system (STARS) red message switching computers and ancillary systems; (2) Performs telecommunications network management of the domestic communications links that support the diplomatic telecommunications service (DTS) network; (3) Serves as the Department's on-site facilitator for interagency and inter-office network service requests; (4) Plans, develops, and implements the telecommunications operational methods and procedures used by the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies; and (5) Directs and coordinates the development of system and data circuit requirements between the Department and other U.S. Government agencies. IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/OPS maintains liaison with officials of other U.S. Government agencies concerning common telecommunications programs.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 3 - ^ ( B ) ^ecbnical Services Brancb (IRM/OPS/MSO/BM^/^S)
(^CT.(^^^2^7^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Technical Services Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/TS): (1) Provides primary technical control and maintenance support for BMC primaryoperations, including circuit, multiplexer,and cryptographic analysis and troubleshooting; (2) l^iaises with IRM/ENM/GTS on circuit troubleshooting and installations for all overseas and domestic circuits that terminate into the STARS; (3) Provides COMSEC control for the BMC COMSEC accounts; (4) Provides site security support for managing and controlling physical access to the Beltsville locations to include: (a) Usage; (b) Handling; (c) Disposition; and (d) Control of classified equipment and materials; and (5) Provides guidance and assistance for the security programs and coordinates with SA 26 tenant organizations'unit security officers, facilities management services. Diplomatic Security,and otherU.S. Government security agencies to ensure physical security, communications, personnel, information systems, and TEMPEST security are maintained in accordance with National Institute of

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StandardsandTechnology(NIST), Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), and Diplomatic Security's Office of Computer Security Guidance.

1FAM27S.3-^(C) Interagency Con^n^i^nications^^pport Activity Brancb(IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/ICSA)
(^CT0^(^22^^ ^^^:^2(^^^^ The Interagency Communications Support Activity Branch (IRM/OPS/MSO/BMC/ICSA): (1) Provides central program management, operational, application, and diagnostic services for all Interagency communications activities supported out of SA-26 and other selected DOS annexes; (2) Responsibleforlogisticalservices(warehousing and shipping) for worldwide interagency communications activities supported by the Department; and (3) Performs high-level coordination related to the support of criticalsensitive interagency communications.

I F A M 2 7 ^ . 4 Gustomer service Office (IRM/OP^/G^O)
(^CT.(^^^2^^^' ^^^^2^^^^ The Customer Service Office (IRM/OPS/CSO): (1) Provides rapid, reliable delivery of quality products and services to all IRM customers and serves as the primary interface and facilitator for all IRM products and services; (2) Implements long-range policies and plans inahighly dynamic and ever-changing environment; (3) Provides coordination and direction for desktop support services and helpdesk operations for facilities at domestic and overseas posts; (4) Oversees the operations and management ofacentralized ITcenter (the ^^IT Mart"), governed by the principle of ^^one-stop shopping" to provide rapid, reliable services to IRM's customers. IRM/OPS/CSO receives, logs, tracks, and manages all incoming trouble tickets, service requests, or queries received via e-mail, fax, and/or telephone and distributes incoming calls to the appropriate action office. IRM/OPS/CSO expedites trouble calls when deemed necessary,toachievespeedy resolution and ensures that timely, coordinated responses/solutions are provided to all of IRM's customers; and
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(5) Oversees and coordinates the rapid, reliabie delivery of Specialized operations and technical services for secure and nonsecure communications and information systems to the Office of the Secretary of State and senior Department officials during travel/visits both overseas and domestically.

1 F A M 2 7 S . 4 - 1 Infornnation ^ecbnology Service Center (IRM/OPS/CSO/I^SC)
(^CT.0^G2^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Information Technology Service Center (IRM/OPS/CSO/ITSC): (1) Providesasingle point of contact for Department of State information technology (IT) products and services worldwide; (2) Manages the centralized IRM IT Service Center for the Department, providing daily 24 hour IT helpdesk support. IRM/OPS/CSO/ITSC provides domestic and overseas employees withasingle point of contact for information or assistance on IRM bureau products, services, and standard commercial off-the-shelf(COTS) products, as well as specialized support for applications and services typically provided by other Department of State organizations when required; (3) Provides IRM management and other Department bureaus with reports relating to incident management, from preparing initial requests forservices and records managementto performing, monitoring, and closure; (4) Operates and manages specialized IT hardware, software, and peripherals for the bureau, division, and Department, supporting customers worldwide; (5) Provides incident recording, tracking, and follow-up for all requests received at the IRM IT Service Center from Department employees; (6) Provides firstlevel support (Tier-l)to Department employees, and when required, transfers and monitors completion of-service requeststootherIRM service providers (Tier-2andTier-3) and Department technical support functions for resolution; (7) Provides ^^early warning" and other notifications of core outages and other events when necessary; and (8) Provides remote domestic ITsupport services for consolidated offices and/or bureaus requesting assistance.

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I F A M 2 7 S . 4 - 2 Desl^topSi^pport Division (IRM/OPS/^SOBDSD) (^CT.(^^G2^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ The Desktop Support Division (IRM/OPS/CSO/DSD): (1) Provides operations and technical support to domestic workstations; (2) Provides all systems integration, account administration, and network administration for IRM, as well as for customers from various other Department bureaus and offices. IRM/OPS/CSO/DSD coordinates installation and administration of computer systems to other foreign affairs agencies as determined by Department management; (3) Coordinates imaging, deployment, and continuing maintenance and technical support of the IRM desktop computer systems; (4) ConductsTier2support from ^^desktop to wall plate" for all operation and maintenance(O^M) measures concerned with or directly related to user workstations for supported domestic bureaus. IRM/OPS/CSO/DSD provides OpenNet Everywhere(ONE) fob support for certain overseas posts and OtherU.S.Government agencies; (5) Coordinates within IRM and consolidated bureaus user requirements and schedules for desktop-related projects such as workstation refresh, local area network (tAN) integration, software upgrades, and office moves; (6) Ensures customer workstations are functioning under,and compliant with, the guidelines set forth by the Department of State Standard Operating Environment (SOE-D); (7) Reviews, approves, and distributes approved procurement requests for in-scope hardware and software for purchase through Department bulk purchasing vehicles; (8) Installs, updates, and configures bureau-specific government, custom,and otherlTchange control board (IT CCB)-approved desktop applications and hardware for supported domestic bureaus; (^) Supplies and maintains active directory (AD)accounts for supported customers; (10) Supplles classified and unclassified e-mail accounts to supported domestic customers and conducts maintenance for desktop e-mail applications; (11) Supports mobile devices such as ONE fobs and BlackBerrys for Department supported users; (12) Coordinates with other domestic Department offices and bureaus to resolve any in-scope desktop support-related issues;
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UNCLASSIFIED (U) U.S.Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volumes Organization and Functions (13) Identifies and recommends to customers appropriate training materials pertaining tothe use of Department ITresources in coordination with the School of Applied InformationTechnology (SAIT) of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and bureau specific IT training programs; and (14) Issues and responds to relevant change-management actions within the Department of State to resolve desktop-support issues. 1 F A M 2 7 S . 4 - 3 Operational Si^pport Division (IRM/OPS/CSO/OSD) (^CT.(^^G2^^^ 0^^^2^^^^ The Operational Support Division (IRM/OPS/CSO/OSD): (1) Provides quality control and oversight for IRM's desktop-support effortsvia the InformationTechnology Infrastructure l^ibrary(ITIE) model; (2) Restores normal service operations as defined in the StA through the Incident Management Branch (IRM/OPS/CSO/OSD/IM). Theincident Management Branch also monitors the system for related incidents and initiates problem reports or requests for change and prepares reports for process improvement purposes; (3) Is responsible for all activities required to diagnose the root cause of incidents and to determine the resolution of problems; (4) Controls and coordinates change, and ensures that standardized methods and procedures are used for the efficient handling of all changes; (5) Identifies, controls, maintains, and verifies the attributes and versions of all desktop-related configuration items(CIs)and develops and maintainsaConfiguration Management Database,recording all CIS and their relationships; (6) Is responsible for design and implementation procedures, management of customer expectations, and quality control of the distribution and installation of changes to the desktop; (7) Establishes policies, processes, and procedures to ensure that the Desktop Support Division (IRM/OPS/CSO/DSD)service environment is in compliance with Department of State security guidelines. IRM/OPS/CSO/OSD monitors IRM/OPS/CSO/DSD systems for security risks and re-evaluates the effectiveness of measures currently in place onaregular basis, as well as monitors all changes to the environment to determine risk; and (8) Provides information security for network resources and fulfills
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information systems security officer (ISSO)responsibilities with regard to maintaining requirements for all workstations on the network and all users as defined by the service-level agreement (StA) for fully consolidated bureaus and ISSO appointment memos.

1 F A M 2 7 ^ . ^ s y s t e m s and I n t e g r a t i o n Office (IRM/OP^/^IO)
(^(^T.^(^^(^2^^,' (^^2^2^^^^ The Systems and Integration Office (IRM/OPS/SIO): (1) In conjunction with other IRM offices, the SIO Office is responsible for: (a) Providing enterprise technology-based solutions and services in the areas of managerial, collaboration, compensation, post specific administration, Web sites, and Web-based applications; (b) Developing and implementing Department wide systems integration and data management standards, policies, and procedures; and (c) Managing and operating the Department's Enterprise Server Operations Centers (ESOCs); and (2) The office is comprised of four divisions: (a) Business Engagement Center (BEC); (b) Collaboration and Compensation Services(CCS); (c) Enterprise Programming and Integration (EPI); and (d) Enterprise Server Operations Center (ESOC).

I F A M 2 7 S . S I Bi^sinessEngagen^ent center Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/BEC)
(^CT.'0^G2^^^^ ^^2^2^^^^ The Business Engagement Center Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/BEC): (1) Provides customer support for existing StAs, MOUs and ESOC services and also management of SIO budget, acquisition, and procurement planning; and (2) Is composed ofthree sections and one unique team: (a) Planning, Analysis and Budget (PAB); (b) ESOC Customer Management (ECM); (c) Information Management Support (IMS);and
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(d) ComplianceTeam(CT).

I F A M 2 7 S . S - 1 ( A ) Planning, Analysis and Bi^dget Section (IRM/OPS/SIO/BE^/PAB)
(^CT(^^(^2^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ The Planning, Analysis and Budget Section (IRM/OPS/SIO/BEC/PAB): (1) Coordinates SIO resources for all office administrative and management issues such as budget, planning, staffing, training, equipment, inventory, space, and procurement; (2) Develops acquisition plans for new computer systems, utilities, and services; (3) Serves as contracting officer's representative(COR) for existing contracts for labor,service, and materials. CORs will coordinate with task managers at the branch or division level, as appropriate; and (4) Creates, implements, tracks, and ensures the adherence to SIO's management plans and processes.

I F A M 2 7 S . S I ( B ) ESO^^^ston^erManagen^entSection (IRM/OPS/SIO/BEC/ECM)
(^(^T'0^(^2^^^ ^^2^2^^^^ The ESOC Customer Management Section (IRM/OPS/SIO/BEC/ECM): (1) Represents the interests of SIO, in general, and the ESOC, in particular,to other Department of State organizations; (2) Manages relations with SIO customers who utilize ESOC resources; (3) Conducts initial planning with customers regarding insta^iations of their system into the ESOC; (4) Negotiates service-level agreements (Sl^s)with ESOC customers; (5) Maintains open and positive communications with customers whose systems will be affected by ongoing ESOC activities such as outages, upgrades, moves, and expansion; and (6) Monitors resolution of customer issues with responsible action teams within the ESOC.

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I F A M 2 7 S . S - I ( ^ ) Infornnation Managen^entSi^pport section ( I R M / O P ^ / ^ I O / B E ^ / I M S )
(^(^T.(^^^2^^^ ^^2^2^^^^ The Information Management Support Section (IRM/OPS/SIO/BEC/IMS): (1) Promotes SIO services, products, and applications through marketing, multimedia, presentations, and demonstrations; (2) ProvidesTier2customer support and assistance for SIO applications and products to customers; (3) Manages and directs negotiation, coordination, and monitoring of agreements between SIO and other Department bureaus, including StAs and MOUs; (4) Coordinates the preparation of all service-level agreements between SIO and its internal and external customers and ensures agreements are consistent with Department information resource management policies, goals, and objectives; and (5) Performs strategic planning for SIO management to identify life-cycle management, control and selection of pertinent information technology to meet SIO's customer's goals. This includes but is not limited to gathering user requirements and systems specifications. I F A M 2 7 S . S - I ( D ) ^on^pliance^ean^ (IRM/OPS/SIO/BEC/^^) (^(^T(^^(^2^^^ ^^2^2^^^^ The Compliance Team (IRM/OPS/SIO/CT): (1) Provides and coordinates delivery of systems assurance services for SIO, including changeand configuration management(e.g., patches andITCCBsubmissions)andcompliance(e.g.,IMPACT,PrivacyAct, data management, etc.)toachleveand maintain positive stakeholder relations while providing customer-oriented, cost-effective and secure services from computer systems, applications, and programs; (2) Coordinates the SIO disaster recovery and contingency planning program to reduce risk by developing effective plans and procedures to anticipate and guard against major system problems; (3) Enforces security compliance by SIO, in accordance with Departmental security requirements, as guided by the Office of Information Assurance and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security; (4) Coordinates technical and physical security programs to control access to sensitive information, computer hardware, and software

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and serves as communications security custodian(COMSEC); and (5) Coordinates with SIO/BEC/PAB regarding activities related to budget, environmental systems, contract administration, acquisitions, customer support services, and project reporting.

I F A M 2 7 S . S - 2 Collaboration and Con^pensation Services Division ( I R M / O P S / S I O / C ^ S )
(^CT.0^^2^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ The Collaboration and Compensation Services Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/CCS): (1) Provides policy,program direction,and standards regarding collaboration services and provides the guiding structure and standards for bureau use of Department of State collaboration tools and services; (2) Provides requirements analysis, design, development, maintenance, enhancement, and technical support for the payroll and retirement application mainframe information systems; (3) Provides the full range of support for the development and testing networks to ensure that both the SIO/CCS and SIO/EPI development teams have the necessary environment to carry out their development activities; (4) Manages projects based on Departmental customer requests related to the development and enhancement of Department information management systems applicable to retirement, payroll, and other nonmessaging initiatives; and (5) Coordinates within SIO regarding activities related to configuration management, change control, quality assurance, disaster recovery and contingency planning, security controls and compliance, overall financial management activities, environmental systems, contract administration, acquisitions, customer support services, and project reporting.

1 F A M 2 7 S . S - 2 ( A ) Enterprise collaboration Services Brancb(IRM/OPS/SIO/CCS/ECS)
(^CT'(^^G-2^^^^ ^^2^2(^^^^ The Enterprise Collaboration Services Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/CCS/ECS): (1) Provides policy,program direction,and standards regarding enterprise SharePoint services, and provides the guiding structure and standards for bureau use of Department of State SharePoint services. Policies and standards will conform to established

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Department Standards and policies; (2) Provides SharePoint sites on Department SharePoint Services environments in the Department's major network; (3) Manages the Enterprise SharePoint Configuration Control Board; (4) Identifies and maintains guidelines for MOSS (Microsoft Office SharePoint Server) implementation and assists other bureaus, posts, and offices, which have approval to runalocal MOSS environment with implementation documentation and best practices; (5) Provides application development for MOSS Web parts and custom requirements to meet the user requirements in the MOSS environment; and (6) Provides Web and portal development services in response to customer requirements from throughout the Department and the foreign affairs community.

1 F A M 2 7 S . S - 2 ( A ) ( 1 ) Operations and I n v e n t o r y Managen^ent^ean^(IRM/0P9/^I0/^^^/E^S/0IM)
(^CT.(^^^2^^^' ^:^2^2^^^^ The Operations and Inventory ManagementTeam (IRM/OPS/SIO/CCS/ECS/OIM): (1) Provides the full range of support for the development and testing networks to ensure that both the SIO/CCS and SIO/EPI development teams have the necessary environment to carry out their development activities; (2) Synchronizes changes/enhancements to the development and testing networks with the Department's operational networks to ensure that developed systems function properly when released to the operational networks; (3) Provides advice to development teams on most efficient use of network capabilities; and (4) In consultation with development staffs, implements new technologies and software tools for use in application development. lFAM27S.S-2(^) (^CT.'(^^G2^^,^ Con^^ensation Applications Brands

(IRM/OPS/SIO/CCS/CAB)
^^2^2^^^^ The Compensation Applications Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/CCS/CAB): (1) Provides requirements analysis, design, development, maintenance,
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enhancement, and technical support for the payroll and retirement application mainframe information systems. Work priorities are defined by the customer for each application; (2) Evaluates new technologies and software tools for use in enhancing existing or planned software engineering activities, which includes conducting feasibility studies to define alternative means of achieving this function; (3) Provides consultation services in various mainframe systems technological disciplines; and (4) Defines and manages projects that cross all applications supported in the branch. These include software modernization to bring information systems up to current release of operating software, etc.

I F A M 2 7 S . S - 3 Enterprise Progran^n^ing and I n t e g r a t i o n Division ( I R M / O P S / S I O / E P I )
(^CT0^(^2^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ The Enterprise Programming and Integration Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI): (1) Manages projects based on Departmental customer requests related tothedevelopmentand enhancement ofvarious nonmessaging Department information management systems; (2) Providesdesktop,client/server,and Web-based applications development and support activity based on Departmental customer requests; (3) Provides consultation services in various software engineering technological disciplines; (4) Manages projects that cross all applications supported in the division. These include software modernization to bring information systems up to the current release level of operating software, etc; (5) Provides policy direction regarding programs that integrate Department-wide applications. Such policies will be developed in coordination with the Chief Information Officer,the Customer Service Center (IRM/BPC/CST), and the Enterprise Architecture and Planning Office (IRM/BPC/EAP), to ensure conformance with established Department architecture standards and policies; (6) Directs the Department-wide data management program, including data administration and database management systems administration; (7) Designs and administers centrally coordinated Department wide data and system interfaces employing specialized enterprise applications

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integration (EAI) middleware software technology; and (8) Coordinates within SIO regarding activities related to configuration management, change control, quality assurance, disaster recovery and contingency planning, budget, environmental systems, contract administration, acquisitions, SIO customer support services, and project reporting^

1 F A M 2 7 S . S - 3 ( A ) Progran^Managen^ent Office Staff (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/PMO)
(^CT'0^^2^^^' ^^2:^2(^^^^ The Program Management Office Staff (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/PMO): (1) Evaluates new technologies and software tools for use in enhancing existing or planned software engineering activities that will impact Post Administrative Software Suite (PASS). This includes preparation of feasibility studies to define alternative means of achieving necessary functionality within PASS to meet the needs of Department of State posts abroad; (2) Provides consultation services and coordination with numerous bureaus for various technological disciplines to ensure that PASS satisfies the field's software needs as they pertain to the administrative functions performed at the Department's posts abroad; and (3) Defines and executes all PASSrelated projects that impactapost's ability abroad to accomplish its administrative tasks using PASS. These include software modernization to bring information systems up to the current release level of operating software, etc.

I F A M 2 7 S . S - 3 ( B ) Applications Developn^entBrancb (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/ADB)
(^(^T.0^(^2^^^^ ^^2:^2^^^^ The Applications Development Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/ADB): (1) Develops software for Department-wide use; (2) Plans, develops, tests, deploys, and supports custom software solutions for the Department; consults with functional bureau customers to assist them in defining technology solutions to meet their business needs and then developing and implementing their custom software solutions; and will provide services to those bureaus that do not have the capability to implement the required software solutions;

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(3) Plans, develops, tests, deploys, and supports Department-wide custom software solutions for legacy client server applications; and (4) Plans, develops, tests, deploys, and supports the Department's custom Web software applications for Department-wide use. 1FAM27S.S-3(C) DataManagen^entBrancb (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/DM) (^CT0^(^2^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ The Data Management Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/DM): (1) Provides policy,program direction,and standards regarding Department-wide data and provides the guiding structure and standards for bureau data modeling and development efforts. This office's methodologies conform to established Department architecture standards and policies; (2) Identifies and maintains centralized descriptions of Department standard data elements and assists bureaus in defining new,or capturing existing local data models to identify and remediate inconsistencies with the enterprise data model; (3) Assists bureaus in their collaborative efforts by providing data governance guidance. This support improves data quality,and facilitates data sharing between internal and external agencies; (4) Collects, catalogues, and consolidates current Department-wide enterprise data descriptions inacommon automated metadata repository (MDR); (5) Supports bureaus in acquiring database management systems and defining local databases consistent with enterprise data management standards; (6) Maintainsacentral repository of vocabularies as an Enterprise Taxonomy. This repository is used Department-wide to support enhanced search functionality in various information systems such as search engines,Web sites, and database applications; (7) Maintainsasingle authoritative source of standard reference tables (SRT) to be used Department-wide. This improves the quality of code reference data in Department systems by eliminating inaccuracies. The SRTalso facilitates data sharing and data reusability; and (8) Develops and extends the Enterprise Extensible Markup language (^Ml^) Registry. Thiscentrally managed repository providesa common location where all ^Ml^ artifacts are captured, inventoried, and stored. Items such as namespace, schemas, tags, elements,
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attributes, and ^Ml^ vocabularies are discovered Department-wide, and made available for reuse. 1 F A M 2 7 S . S - 3 ( D ) Integrated Projects Brancb (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/IP) (^(^T'(^^^2^^^^ ^^2^2^^^^ The Integrated Projects Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/EPI/IP): (1) Designs, implements, and administers centrally coordinated Department-wide data and system interfaces employing specialized Enterprise applications integration (EAI) middleware-software technology; (2) Develops and providesaset of Department of State Enterprise-level, service oriented architecture (SOA) compliant standards used for systems/data integration, which include guidelines and training materials for using industry-established integration processes and best practices; (3) Providesafullysupported (24x7) production integration infrastructure solution to serve as the Department's Enterprise nervous system for sharing data and information seamlessly among disparate business processes; (4) Provldesacollaborative state-of-the-art integration facility where EPI, as well as the Department's ITenablers, can prototype, develop, and testthe integration ofbusiness processes, applications, and data without affecting the production environment; (5) Establishes and maintains project plans, including formulation of the overall project schedule, assessment of vulnerabilities and impacts, conversion cost estimates and guidance, and technical evaluations of project integration; and (6) Establishesand maintains the ITasset baseline (ITAB), and provides management of its integration with other systems, in accordance with the Department's information architecture and security standards.

IFAM27S.S-4 Enterprise Server Operations Centers Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESO^)
(^CT.'(^^G2^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ The Enterprise Server Operations Centers Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC): (1) Manages and operates the Department's Enterprise Server Operations Centers and is comprised of four branches:

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(a) The Management Service Branch (ESOC/MSB) provides overall project management and process improvement direction; (b) The l^egacy Systems Support Branch (ESOC/l^EG) provides operational support for the mainframe legacy applications; (c) The Open Systems Operations Branch (ESOC/OPS) provides operational support for the open systems servers used for the majority of Department's applications; and (d) TheTechnologyServices Branch (ESOC/TSB) provides the overall technical direction for the Department's open systems configuration; (2) Provides the full range of activities related to the management of an enterprise operations center including configuration management, change control, quality assurance, disaster recovery and contingency planning, security controls and compliance, budget preparation and control, establishing environmental systems, contract administration, acquisitions, SIO customer support services, and project reporting; and (3) Supports the Department's need for managed server services by providing 24x7 server monitoring, problem escalation, enterprise backup and restore, data mirroring, virtual infrastructure, storage area network/network attached storage (SAN/NAS)storage(data base or file/print), patch application, and compliance reporting. lF^M^7S.S-^(^) (^CT.'0^(^2^^^^ Managen^ent Services ^ r a n d ^

(IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC/MSB)
^^2^2^^^^ The Management Services Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC/MSB): (1) Provides overall project management direction for all ESOC projects; (2) Provides direction for process improvement throughout the entire ESOC division; (3) Gathers requirements, designs and develops software to support the internal procedures of the ESOC division; and (4) Provides internal data collection and reporting to ensure that ESOC meets service-level agreements (StAs).

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I F A M 2 7 S . S - 4 ( B ) Legacy Systen^s S u p p o r t Brancb (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC^/LEG) (^(^T't^^^2^^^' (^^2^2^^^^ The l^egacy Systems Support Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC/I^EG): (1) Ensures that mainframe operations centers at ESOC sites are fully supported with appropriate and sufficient enterprise mainframe computer processors, and that environmental systems are monitored, controlled, and maintained onanormal operating schedule; (2) Manages, maintains, and controls the SIO's mainframe backup solution at all ESOC sites; (3) Manages and directs the activities required to generate, reproduce, store, control, and distribute computer-generated information; (4) Analyzes and plans the most efficient workload for the mainframe computers, including developing job schedules, task assignments, timetables, priorities, and modifying job schedules to meet urgent demands or changing requirements; (5) Maintains and tracks any documents produced by the Department's enterprise mainframe computers and maintains accurate up-to-date records of deliveries, pickups, and authorized Department customer offices; (6) Operates, maintains, and troubleshoots mainframe communications by recording events, detecting problems, and restoring services to communication equipment; (7) Manages operating systems, utility software development, installation, and maintenance for the Department's mainframe computers; and (8) Provides the required analyses, design, development, maintenance, and deployment of mainframe communications control programs in order to facilitate open exchange of information between the enterprise mainframe computers and the Department's customer systems, in conformance with established Department security architecture standards and policies. l F A M 2 7 S . S - 4 ( ^ ) Open Systen^s O p e r a t i o n s Brancb (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC/OPS) (^(^T.0^^2^^^' ^^2^2^^^^ The Open Systems Operations Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC/OPS):

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UNCLASSIFIED (U) U.S.Department of state Foreign Affairs Manual Volumel Organization and Functions (1) Ensures that the open systems operations centers at ESOC Sites are fully supported with appropriate and sufficient server capabilities and that all environmental systems are monitored, controlled, and maintained o n a 2 4 x 7 basis; (2) Ensures that all open systems are backed up in accordance with Department standards and conducts periodic tests to verify that all backup and restore procedures are working as designed; (3) Monitors all servers and the various connectivity points and interfaces to ensure systems are operating. When outages occur, escalates the problem to the appropriate system owner; (4) Manages the configuration elements of all systems owned by SIO that are within the ESOC; (5) Manages placement and inventory of all systems owned by bureaus that are placed within the ESOC; (6) Analyzes and plans the most efficient workload for the various ESOC servers, including monitoring production systems to identify trouble spots or bottle necks before actual failures occur and responding to urgent demands to make configuration modifications; (7) Operates, maintains, and troubleshoots communications equipment by recording events, detecting problems, and restoring services to communication equipment; (8) Manages operating systems, utility software, installation, and maintenance for the Department's ESOC-based servers; and (^) Coordinates the facilities management activities for all ESOC server locations.

1 F A M 2 7 S . S - 4 ( D ) ^ecbnology services Brancb (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC/^SB)
(^CT.0^G2^^^ ^^2^2^^^^ The Technology Services Branch (IRM/OPS/SIO/ESOC/TSB): (1) Provides the overall technical recommendations for the open systems direction, selects hardware/software/firmware products, evaluates virtual processing capabilities, and provides management with the blueprint for future enhancements; (2) Provides the technical guidance for selecting, evaluating, implementing, and monitoring the standard operating systems used on all ESOC open systems; (3) Identifies technical solutions for the Department's storage solutions, evaluates software, makes selections, oversees the implementation,
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and monitors the ongoing Storage processes for accuracy and efficiency; (4) Plans the most efficient server configuration, server virtualization strategies, and utilization of computer-room space, backup configuration, and continuity of operations plans; and (5) Provides managed services support to ESOC customers including patch management, system upgrades, security compliance reporting, information assurance support, and product production testing and rollout.

1 F A M 2 7 G REGIONAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CENTERS (RIMCS)
(^CT.'(^^G22^^^ ^^^^2^^^^ IRM/OPS manages four regional information management centers (RIMCs) worldwide. They perform the following duties: (1) Provide technical and operational assistance on all information management programs to the posts within their geographic region; (2) Formulate information management programs in the field, develop supporting budget and financial reports, and submit required administrative, technical, and analytical reports; (3) Provide direction to the information management technical specialists (IMTS) under their supervision and monitor technical program performance; (4) Examine and assess the effectiveness of ongoing communications and information systems programs and provide expertise necessary for enhancing area diplomatic missions^ overall information management posture. RIMCs recommend improvements to achieve maximum efficiency and security on information management projects and programs; (5) Conducttechnicalsitesurveysand develop plans for constructing or upgrading communications and data processing facilities. RIMCs assist other foreign affairs agencies with their communications requirements; (6) Coordinate DiplomaticTelecommunication Service (DTS) operations and policies with the area telecommunications office (ATO); and (7) IRM RIMCs are located in: (a) U.S. Embassy Bangkok, RIMC/EAP/SA with satellite offices in Beijing, Canberra, Manila, New Delhi, andTokyo;

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(b) U.S. Embassy Pretoria, RIMC/AF with satellite offices in l^ome and Harare; (c) Fort l^auderdale Regional Center,RIMC/WHA; and (d) U.S. Consulate General Frankfurt, RIMC/EUR/NEA/AFW witha satellite office in Cairo.

1 FAM 277 THROUGH 2 7 ^ UNASSIGNEO

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1 FAM EXHIBIT 271.3 BUREAU OF INFORMATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT(IRM)
(CT:ORG-198;
OFFICE OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER (IRM/IA)

10-15-2008)
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (IRM/EX)

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (IRM)

DEPUTY CIO FOR BUSINESS, PLANNING, AND CUSTOMER SERVICE CHIEF KNOWLEDGE OFFICER (IRM/BPC)

DEPUTY CIO FOR OPERATIONS CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER (IRM/OPS)

T
Customer Seivice Office (IRM/BPC/CST) Enterpnse Ardiltecturfl and Planning Office (IRM/BPC/EAPl e-Dlplomacy Office (IRM/BPCfEDIP) Information Resources Policy and Regulations Office (IRM/BPC/PRG) Enterprise Network Management Otfice (IRM/0PS€NM) Information Technology Infrastructure Office (IRM/OPS/ITI) Messaging Systems (IRM/OPS/MSO) Ptoflram Management and Analysis Office ( I R M / O P S / P M A ) Systems and Integration Office (IRM/OPS/SIO)

BuMTMW Cwilar DiviHon (fmiBPcicsTiec)

EntBTpriM Architactura and Enginsahng Oivwon (IRM/BPC/EAP/AE)

Network EnginMring ond OocfonOhmnn (IRM'OPS/ENM/NED)

LAN and WAN SarvicM (IRM/OPS/m/LWS)

Management Analyais (IRM/OPS/MSO/MAS)

Syriema Service* (IRM/OPS/SIO/SYS)

LiliMn Divmion (IRWBPOCSTAD)

Planning DtviWDn (IRM/BPC/EAP/PL)

OpBHiiona (IRM/OPS^NM/OPS|

Telecommitfilcationt, Mreleu. and Data Sen/ice* Divition (IHM/OPS/lTITO/Dl

Macaaging Syalemc Products Divition (IRM/OPS/MSO/MSP)

Application Integration Divwion (IRM/OPS/SIO/API)

Suppoft Sarvicas Diviwon (IRM/6PCrt;sWPS)

Networks Lifecycle Managemenl Divition (IRM/OPS/ENM/NLM)

Syatema Integnty DIviaion (IRM/OPSmVSI)

Special Massaging Operationa Divition (IRM/OPS/MSO/SMO)

Applications FYogramming Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/APD)

Technical Security and Safeguards Division (iRM/oPs/m/rss)

E-Mail Division (IRM/OPS/MSO/EML)

Enterprise Operations Centers Division (IRM/OPS/SIO/EOC)

Main State Messaging Canlar Diviaion (IRMfOPS/MSO/MSMC)

Regional Information Management Centers

Belsvile Messaging Center Division (IRM/OPS/NSOmMC)

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1. I am the Office Manager at the Internet Archive, located in San Francisco, California. I make this declaration ofmy own personal knowledge. 2. The internet Archive is a website that provides access to a digital library of Internet sltcs and other cultural artifacts in digital form. Like a paper library, we provide free access to researchers, historians, scholars, and the general public. The internet Archive has partnered with and receives support from various institutions, including the Library of Congress. 3. The Internet Archive has created a service known as the Way back Machine. The Way back Machine makes it possible to surf more than 240 billion pages stored in the Internet Archive's web archive. Visitors to the Way back Machine can search archives by URL (i.e., a website address). If archived records for a URL are available, the visitor will be presented with a list of available dates. The visitor may select one ofthose dates, and then begin surfing on an archived version of the Web. The links on the archived files, when served by the Wayback Machine, point to other archived files (whether HTML pages or images). If a visitor clicks on a link on an archived page, the Wayback Machine will serve the archived file with the closest available date to the page upon which the link appeared and was clicked. 4. The archived data made viewable and browseable by the Wayback Machine is compiled using software programs known as craw lers, which surf the Web and automatically store copies of web files, preserving thesefilesas they exist at the point of time of capture. 5. The Intemet Archive assigns a URL on its site to the archived files in the format http://web.archive.org/web/fYear in yyyy][Month in mm][Day in dd][Time code in hh:mm:ss]/[Archived URL]. Thus, the Intemet Archive URL http://web.archive.Org/web/19970126045828/http://www.archive.org/ would be the URL for the record of the Internet Archive home page HTML file (http://www.archive.org/) archived on January 26, 1997 at 4:58 a.m. and 28 seconds (1997/01 /26 al 04:58:28). A web browser may be set such that a printout from il will display the URL of a web page in the printout's footer. The date assigned by the Internet Archive applies to the HTML file but not to image files linked therein. Thus images that appear on a page may not have been archived on the same date as the HTML file. Likewise, if a website is designed with "frames." the date assigned by the Intemet Archive applies to the frameset as a whole, and not the individual pages within each frame. 6. Regarding archivedfilesstored in and made available via the Wayback Machine, 1 further declare that: A. to the best that the electronic systems involved can accurately record and reflect, such files were captured at or near the time of the date refiected in the URL assigned to each file by virtue of an automated transfer of electronic data;

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13. such records were captured by Internet Archive or received from third party donors in the course ofreguiarly conducted activity by the Internet Archive: and C. the Internet Archive captures, stores, and receives from third party donors web data asaregular practice. 7. The web archives for the year 2009 in the Wayback Machine at web.archive.org were largely obtained from third-party organisations, which donated the archived data, captured by automated electronic systems, to the Internet Archive. Ido not affirm that these web archives were set forth by, or from information transmitted by, people with knowledge ofthe information recorded therein. 8. This document is the Internet Archive'sstandard affidavit, the affidavit Intemet Archive normally provides to parties seeking to useWayback Machine records as evidence in legal proceedings, with additional language provided in paragraphs ^-8. 9. Attached hereto as ^:i^hibitAare true and accurate copies of printouts of the Internet Archive^s records of the HTML files for theURLs and the dates specified in the footer ofthe printout. 10.Ideclare under penalty of perjurythat the foregoing is true and correct.

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Exhibit A

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D raftrThe Most Wanted Leaks of 2009
From Wikileaks
2009's Most Wanted Leaks—the concealed documents or recordings most sought after by a country's joumalists, activists, historians, lawyers, police, or human rights investigators.

Help us clarify and background the nominations so we can discover which are significant and which are not. You may securely and anonymously add information to this page for each entry (click "edit" next to each country). WikiLeaks will prioritize the list based on the available information and seek to obtain the leading candidates directly, through the legal system, or indirectly through ours network of joumalists, intelligence sources, volunteers and readers. If you email us ([email protected]) we will alert you when the record has been obtained. The current order reflects the order of submission and is unlikely to be related to the final order. Winners for each country will receive a cash prize upto 1000 EUR, depending on how many countries submit. Documents or other materials added nominated must: • Be likely to have political, diplomatic, ethical or historical impact on release. • Be known to exist or have existed. • Be plausibly obtainable to a well motivated insider or outsider. For instance the entire collection of documents held by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security { ^ ^ X K # % S ^ ^ a P ) is not plausibly obtainable, but a specific document or group of documents may be. • Be well defined, and if possible, specific. Three examples of well defined and specific: • Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody, 20 Nov 2008. • East Timor Presidential assassination intelligence intercept map 2008. • Camp Delta Standard Operating Procedure (2004). An acceptable example, which is known to exist and well defined, but not specific: • The current list of websites or URLS filtered by the Chinese Public Security Bureau's "Great Firewall of China" censorship system. • Be described in enough detail so that a court, dissident insider or visiting outsider not already familiar with the material or its subject matter may be able to quickly locate it, and will be motivated to do so.

Contents
1 International organizations 2 Austria 3 Australia 4 Bahrain 5 Canada 6 China 7 Colombia 8 Egypt 9 Finland 10 France 11 Germany 12 Greece 13 Guatemala 14 Italy 15 Kenya 16 Libya 17 Madagascar 18 Mali 19 Mexico 20 Niger 21 Norway 22 Puerto Rico 23 Rwanda 24 Russia 25 Slovenia 26 Sudan 27 Syria 28 Switzerland 29 Swaziland 30 Trinidad and Tobago 31 Uganda 32 United Kingdom 33 United States • 33.1 Bulk databases • 33.2 Federal politics • 33.3 Military and Intelligence . 33.4 Banking • 33.5 Environment • 33.6 Media • 33.7 Religion

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Should, where possible, list all organizations, locations and/or websites suspected of holding the material or having information about how to access it.

34 Vatican

Be attentive to the content of your nomination. Do not worry about making formatting mistakes. All copies of this page are kept and reviewed. In the rare cases were a document might be destroyed or vaulted if it appeared on this list, send your nomination privately to [email protected] or securely via Chat.

International organizations
• Bilderberg Group meeting minutes, papers and annual reports of since 1954. WikiLeaks has some years already. Bilderberg is an annual off-the record conference of transatlantic political, economic and ideological agenda setters. As an historically important confidential document collection it is probably only equaled by Cabinet minutes and high level intelligence and diplomatic assessments. Leads: There are some older, previously unnoticed records in boxes at Uni of Illinois http://www.library.illinois.edu/archives/uasfa/1535051.pdf (1956-1970) the George Bush library, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/finding_aids/pdfs/08-0379-F.pdf and the Eisenhower Library in Kansas http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/Research/Finding_Aids/PDFs/Jackson_CD_Records.pdf • Requests to the Security Council in 2003 that the Security Council look at what was happening in Darfur, and any notes of discussions leading to the decision not to look at the situation • Documents regarding the founding and operation of Alliance Base, cover name for a secret Westem Counterterrorist Intelligence Center in Paris.

Austria
• E-Mail traffic between minister offinanceProell and Christian Konrad, who is advocate general of Raiffeisen bank. • E-Mail traffic of FPO delegate Anton Mahdalik with Viennese mayor Michael Haupl and/or deputy mayor Michael Ludwig containing threats when renting municipal ground to the Viennese trailor park ("Wagenplatz Wien"). • Source-code as well as certifications for the Austrian e-Voting system used in students elections.

Australia
• Federal cabinet minutes from the special session held on 18 March 2003. Context (/web/20091104212937/http: //en.wikisource.org/wiki/John_Howard's_speech_to_the_Australian_Parliament_-_18_March_2003) • The report of the national broadband network expert working group. • Versions of the ACMA URL blacklist newer than 19 March 2009. • Full details of filtering hardware/software vendors participating in government-sponsored ISP-level censorship technology trials, including (but not limited to): • Any and all commimications between filter vendors and govemment departments prior to, during, and after the trials • Any and all transactions, contracts, and otherfinancialarrangements involving filter vendors • URL blacklist(s) used during above trials. Alleged (by govemment) to be ACMA URL blacklist. • Full statistical breakdown of results of above trials, since Enex TestLab will not make them publicly available, and the public report will be compiled by the same govemment department which is spearheading the censorship proposal (see here (/web/20091104212937/http://www.cm.com.au/News/151876,conroy-promises-to-release-isp-level-filteringreport.aspx) and here (/web/20091104212937/http://www.amnet.com.au/article/314195 /enex_testlabs_isp_filtering_trial_up_scratch). • URL blacklist as used by Watchdog NZ during private censorship technology trial by ISP Exetel in May 2009. Alleged (by Watchdog) to have been IWF list (see United Kingdom). • Written exam NSW police officers must take annually before they can be issued with Tasers. • Volume 1 of the New South Wales-Commonwealth Joint Task Force Report on Dmg Trafficking. It was suppressed at time of publication and has not yet been released. Possibly contains information on Nugan Hand Bank, CIA and drug trafficking and/or connections of Peter Abeles and Bela Csidei to dmgs. But we wont know until it is no longer suppressed.

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^al^rain
^ Documents disclosing the number of citizenships that have been granted in the last few years, in an effort to change the country's demography.See Political naturalisationlll(/web/20091l04212937/http://www.ihrc.org.uk /show.php7id^2860)

Canada
^ Documents disclosing the number of Authorization to Carry permits the provinces have issued for the purposes of preservation oflife.Provincial ChiefFirearms Officers have refused to release this information citing that it could potentially compromise the identities of those that hold licenses.

Cl^ina
^ Alist of URLs and keywords censored filtered by the Great Firewall of China.WikiLeaks has previously released related information, for example, watch lists, policies and several thousand URLs for CCTV and Baidu, but not for general http filtering. ^ Policy options on Darfur formulated in response to the so-called Genocide Olympics campaign led byAmerican actress,Mia Farrow,and notes of meetings in 2007 between Stephen Spielberg and Chinese Foreign Ministry officials prior to Spielberg's resignation as Artistic Director of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

CoIon^I^ia
^The DAS (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad) is reported to have surveilledawide array of public officials, private citizens, and organizations. Documents wanted: contracts to supply software for intemet surveillance to Colombian policy agencies and details of the software supplied. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^The complete list of current political prisoners and the charges against them.

Finland
DThe so called Tiitisen Lista, the list ofl8persons claimed to have been in active contact with East German security services (Stasi). The list was received from the West German intelligence services (BND) in 1990 and since classified by the order ofPresident Koivisto as adviced by the head of the Finnish Security Police (Suojelupoliisi),Seppo Tiitinen.It is mmoured that several curtent or formertop Finnish politicians appear on the list. ^The Bilderberg 2009 raport,Finnish President Tarja Halonen secured the papers.The request comes Finnish ex-President Martti Ahtisaari,aformer Bilderberg participant.

France
^The list of people with an office at the Elys^e and their function (to expose resident lobbyists,etc.) ^ Documents regarding the founding and operation of Alliance Base,cover name forasecret Westem Counterterrorist Intelligence Center in Paris. ^ The Monthly Health Report ofPresident Nicolas Sarkozy.as promised by himself during the last presidential elections.

C^em(an^
^TheStasi(/web/2009ll04212937/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stasi)filesofFederal Chancellor AngelaDorothea Merkel (maiden name Kasner) and other leading politicians, which are known to exist, but withheld from public. ^The Stasi files relating to operation Gladio/stay behind organisations in relation to right-wing terrorism in Germany (/web/20091l042l2937/http://wwwheisede/tp/r4/artikel/30/30390/lhnnl),asperaparliamentaryrequestbythe Green party. ^The complete Toll-Collect contracts.

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^Cross-Border Leasing contracts of the Berlin Transport Corporation (BVG). ^The so called'Atlas der Wut",adocument about the risk of riots in different german regions.The list is said to be updated regulary and was first written in 2005. ^ -The list ofNPD party members. ^The censorship filter list for the proposed national,mandatory censorship system. The list will be compiled by German federal criminal police BKA and distributed to intemet service providers. ^The contents of the contract between the BKA and some ISPs that has already been signed,but is kept secret due to "public safety" and copyright concems(seehttp://blog.fefe.de/7ts^b4fa8af8). ^The List ofMedia Harmful toYoungPeople(the censorship system already in place).The "virtual media" part of this list is distributed to search engine providers and is illegal to publish. It probably could be reverse engineered using the differences between googlecom andgoogle.de search results.Also,if you want to knowifaspecific medium is on the list,you can send an enquiry to [email protected](mailto:[email protected])("Bundesprufstelle" is the agency responsible for keeping the list). ^ Ursula von der Leyen's driver's logs (Fahrtenbuecher)that she refuses to make public.

C^reeee
^Documents related to the Athens affair that have yet to be released (including those from countries other than Greece.)

Cruaten^ala
^ All documents on Plan Victoria 82, Plan Sofia and Plan Firmeza 83. ^ Final report of United Nations'Historical Clarification Commission(CEH) into the killing of 200,000 Mayan people and the involvement of the US govemment and American corporations.The report official sources(militar interviews, campaign plans,etc)are kept secret by the UN in NYC. ^ Documents on Canadian corporation named Goldcorp withamining operation in Guatemala, especially information on where the Gold they extract is processed and who is buying the gold(wethittk it might beaSwiss company). Detail: PLANVICTORIAANDPLANSOFL^^ in the process of trying to bring military personal involved in human rights violations and massacres that happen during the civil war in Guatemala to justice,the military have been required to declassify many war documents.Inacase,that went all the way to the Supreme Court of Guatemala,the Court dictatedasentence that confirmed the obligation of the Ministry of Defense of Guatemala to hand over the official documentation of four specific military operations: Campana Sofia 82, Victoria 82, Firmeza 83 and Operacion Ixil. The Supreme Court sentence indicated that this achieves had to be declassified and made public yesterday. These military operations were carried out in the 80s. According to the CEH, Historical Clarification Commission of Guatemala final report contained in "Guatemala: Memory ofSilence",these military operations resulted in massacres and severe humanrightsviolations. The Minister ofDefense AbrahamValenzuela only delivered partial information about plansVictoria 82 and Firmeza 83,two of the four requested plans. He indicated that he had no knowledge of the other two plans before he became Minister of Defense and that he ignores where the documentation could be. He stated that he could not deliver the complete plans "Victoria 82"y"Firmeza 83" because certain information was considered state secret andaconcem of national security. ^ "'Plan Sofia"aderivative of ""PlanVictoria 82",was of special concern to human rights activists: this plan was conceived in Iulyl982,four months afterGeneral Efrain Rios Montt came into power.^ ^SOWEWILLREAULYLIKETOOBTAINTHECOMPLETEDOCUMENTSOFPLANVICTORIA 82,PLANS0FIAA1^DPLANFIRMEZA83^

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^CEHARCHIVES^ The United Nations'Historical Clarification Commission (CEH^ for Guatemala tssuedareport where the US govemment and several American corporations were accused ofcomplicity in the genocide of nearly 200,000 Mayan people during Guatemalans bloody 36-year civil war. Thefinal3,600-pageCEH report clearly places the blame for most of the 200,000 deaths on the 7racist7 policy of the Guatemalan govemment and holds the country7s military and paramilitary forces responsible forthe actual killings.tortures and disappearances. However,it accuses the US of directly and indirectly supportinga7fratricidalconfrontation7by providing sustained training, arms andfinancialaidThe report is based on the testimony of9,200 people from all sides ofthe conflict and other documents^,classified and Secret,protected in the UN headquarters in NYC.^The CEH investigated42,000 human rights violations, 29,000 of which resulted in deaths or disappearances and therefore, the documents under UN custody are fundamental for the prosecution ofthose responsible ofthe crimes. ^GUATEMALA,SWITZERLAND ANDCANADA^ ACanadian corporation named Goldcorp hasamining operation in Guatemala with poor environmental conditions and harming health of many workers andacommunity asawhole.We will like to know: -Where the Gold they extract is processed. -Who Is buying the gold (we think it might beaSwiss company)

^^^1^
^ ^//documents pertaining to Nazi Germany and theVatican,as well as those relating to the post-war rat line to Argentina. Refer to http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/26ll847.stm ^The^//Italian censorship,of which Wikileaks currently only hasasubset.

^en^a
^The international investigative firm Kroll associates produced at least four reports on high level Kenyan cormption after first term of the Kibaki govemment.Adraft version of one of the reports The looting ofKenya,was previously published by WikiLeaks.The reports were given to selected members ofPresident Kibaki's cabinet at the time and are likely still held by http://www.kroll.com.uk/, notably lead investigator Andrew Marshall.

Lil^^a
^ Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese government to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Libya (Civilians and adminisrators on the gruond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place).

^adagasear
Both sides of the political conflict in Madagascar are crying fouls about the deals made by their counterparts with foreign entities. The release of the official documents with respect to contract negotiations about: ^ Oil exploitation in the region ofBemolanga(SouthofMadagascar)byTotal^others ^ an obvious one but the proposed final contract before rejection of the land deal with Daewoo Logistics. ^-The recent agreement with Saudi investment group on staple products and proposed ^2 billion USD investment. DThe revised mining exploitation agreement with Sheritt in Ambatovy and RioTinto in Fort-Dauphin. ^ Least but not last, the complete list of current political prisoners and the charges against them.

^ali

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^ Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Mali (Civilians and adminisrators on the gruond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place)

^e^ieo
^Zapotec indigenous people demand transparency fromU.S.Scholar and full disclosure of all the agreements between U.S.Govemment and their agencies andU.S.geography scholar Peter IIerlihy,especially confidential agreements with Foreign Military Studies Office.Prof.Herlihy failed to mention that he received funding from the Foreign Military Studies Office of theU.S.Armed Forces on the research of "Mexico Indigena" project.Mexico Indigena Project forms part of the Bowman Expeditions,amore extensive geographic research project backed andfinancedby the FMSO, among other institutions.The FMSO inputs information intoaglobal database that forms an integral part of the Human Terrain System (HTS),aUnited States Army counterinsurgency strategy designed by Foreign Military Studies Office and applied within indigenous communities, among others. ^ Documents to unveil the real purpose of "Ruta Maya 2002 Isuzu Challenge". The convoy was commanded by Ben Nun Avihu,Israeli militar and Moshe Savir,geography expert and around 50 tourists in 40 Isuzu Jeep. Some communities linked the incursion with biopiracy. The terrain they explored is controled by the EZLN. ^ Documents related with the fraud and corruption around FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario de Proteccion alAhorto). ^ Documents offinancialoperations just before thefinancialcrisis ofl994(some say the govemment knew before that the crisis was coming and took advantage ofthe information protecting their interests). ^ Documents related with the World Bank credit and application of the budget to combat swine flu. ^ Documents related with the technology curtently used in cellphones in Mexico to implement the RENAUTprogram (/web/200911042l2937/http://www.renaut.gob.mx/RENAUT/) Information about the security technology used to protect data collected from users. ^ Documents related to the transparency ofPlan Merida (/web/20091l042l2937/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M ^C3^A9rida_Initiative)

^iger
^ Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese government to grant land in Darfurto Arab settlers from Niger (Civilians and adminisrators on the gruond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place).

^or^a^
^The secret verdict in the court case between the ISP LyseTele and the law firm Simonsen,decided the 5th ofMay 2009,where Simonsen demanded LyseTele disclose the identity information ofafile sharer suspected of uploadinga copy of the movie Max Manus to thefile-sharingcommunity.

Puerto Rieo
^TheFBlhas not yetfinisheddeclassifying all the secret files related to surveillance ofPuerto Rican individuals and organizations from the 1930 70 s http://www.prsecretfiles.net/index.html(not to mention,large sections of the files are blacked out by the FBI). In addition, there are thousands of secret files produced by Puerto Rican police that were only briefly made available to individuals themselves, and have now been closed off to the public. These documents provide evidence of quiteasignificant spying and intimidation operation by the United States and local police against leftists and independence movement leaders.

Rwanda
^ Documentation offinancialassistance given by the Rwandan govemment to General Laurant Nkunda for operations in the DRC

Russia

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^ Intemal Kremlin, FSB and SVRR documents and emails into the series of Moscow apparement building bombings shortly before Putin s Presidential election ^ Complete technical documentation ofthe "Perimetr" system (a.k.a. "Dead Hand""),along history of deployment and removal from deployment (ifdone). Political documents relating to the deployment of ""Perimetr". DMaps,floor plans,and blueprints ofMountYamantaw and Kosvinsky Mountain,and any otherfacilities similar to the conjectured facilities there, including names and locations. ^ Documents related to the VRYAN crisis, especially political documents, analyses of intelligence, and specific steps taken. Information on the mindset of the Politburo, as well as intelligence services, and what exactly they feared, and how credible they believed their fear to be. ^ Soviet psychological profiles and political analyses of American politicians. ^ Alist and description of the various agents prepared by the various Soviet and Russian bioweapons prograttts. Indications of whether they developed recombinant DNA based agents,and what those are specifically.Weaponization of agents, including re-entry vehicle mounting. Doctrine for use, including deniable use. Vaccines and treatments for affected personnel. ^Technical plans,manuals,and blueprints forthe SS-27 SickleB(Topol-M),along with the Bulava. ^ Documents relating to nuclear warplans of the Soviet Union and Russia. ^ Documents relating to orbital weapons systems,and whether the Soviets ever deployed them(or still deploy them) such as orbital HANE devices.

Slovenia
^Taped conversations between Slovenian opposition leader lanezlansa and Croatian prime minister Ivo Sanader in the summer of 2004, held by Slovenian intelligence service SOVA.The tapes supposedly show the two were arrangeing incidents on the coutry border that could help Slovenian opposition win the parliamentary elections in the falL

Sudan
^ Documents detailing discussions during 2005 meeting between Salah Gosh and the CIA (for which the CIA flew Gosh on privatejet from Khartoum to CIA HO). See: http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php37id_article^10205

S^ia
^ All the documents related to the assasination,in 1965,ofMehdi Ben Barka still held in France,USA,Israel and Morocco. In 1976, thanks to the Freedom of information Act, the US govemement recognized that the CIA had about 1800 classified documents about his assassination. Theses documents are still classified.

Switzerland
DThe full Comu Report.See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projekt-26^The_Comu Report

Swaziland
^ Expense accounts ofKing Mswati,the Ot^een Mother and the Kings wives. ^ Intelligence memos from the Ministry of Defence or Police about the pro-democracy organization, PUDEMO.

Trinidad and Tol^ago
^The Report on the Commission ofEnquiry into the constmction of the new Piarco Airport. This identified corrupt practices in the spending of public funds.The Commissions report was delivered in August 2003.Nearly6years later, itsfindingshave not been made public. ^The Report on the Caroni Bridge Collapse.Aman was killed whenabridgecollapsedafew years ago: again the public has not been made aware of the report s findings. ^ Documents in relation to payments of attomeys by state. Numbers of these payments are being kept secret from the public.

^ Acopy of the contract for the billion-dollar Waterfront Development Project. ttp://web.archive.org/web/200911042l2937/http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Draft:The Most Wanted Leaks of 2009

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^List of recipients and amounts of scholarships sponsored by Ministty of Culture for study abroad. ^ Report of thefindingsof the current C^^^^.^.^/^^^^^^^/B^/^^^^/^^/^^^^/i:^^.^r^^^^^ Detail: As far asTrinidad andTobago goes,our govemment tends to pay lip service to the principles of transparency and accountability.For instance,there isaFreedom of Information Act which,by law,allows the public to seek information from govemment departments.But quite often,when such attempts are made by the citizenry,the govemment bars full disclosure. Depending on how importantapiece of information is to Joe Public,he may actually have to tum to the courts to ""force" the govemment to reveal facts that should be disclosed voluntarily.Followingareafew examples of documents that should be made public, but have not been: ^The Report on the Commission ofEnquiry into the construction of the new Piarco Airport This identified cormpt practices in the spending of public funds.The Commissions report was delivered in August 2003.Nearly6years later, its findings have not been made public. DThe Report on the Caroni Bridge Collapse.Aman was killed whenabridgecollapsedafew years ago: again the public has not been made aware of the report s findings. ^The Opposition recently brought up in Parliament the issue of taxpayers" money being used to pay attomeys by state. Although the public hasaright to know how much of its funds were used in paying said attomeys,the Attomey General refused to disclose the sums, saying it would be an invasion of the lawyers'privacy. ^ The same goes forarecent request in Parliament,whereby ^the Minister of Planning and Development was asked to produceacopy of the contract for the billion-dollar Waterfront Development Projects.The Ministers response was that she could not produce said contract for public discussion because there wasaconfidentiality clause contained therein (foraproject being built with public funds). ^ The Ministry of Culture recently awarded scholarships for students to study abroad-when asked in Parliament to disclose the list of recipients and the dollar value of the scholarships, the response was that this was private information. As such,many citizens are concemed that thefindingsofthe current ^Commission ofEnquiry into the local constmction sectors, like many Commisions before it, will never see the light of day.

I^ganda
The government ofUganda has recently signedanumberofprofit-sharing agreements with several oil companies that are conducting explorations in southwestem Uganda.My friend was in Kampala in January and spoke withanumber of joumalists who believe that releasing these documents would beamajor step in increased transparency with respect to the country's emerging oil industry. ^ Ugandan profit-sharing agreements with oil companies in south-western Uganda

Ignited ^ngdon^
^ List of current and expired D-Notices 1 ^ 2 1 (/web/2009ll04212937/http://www.dnotice.org.uk/the_system.htm) ^Theletter-RRanditsDANotice ^The secret cabinetminutes(/web/20091l042l2937/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7752009.stm)and legal advice (/web/20091l04212937/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4381379.stm) pertainingto the allegedly illegal war and ongoing occupation oflraq. ^ Documents revealing why the trial ofWangYam,who was convicted ofkilling Allan Chappelow, was held in camera, the first UK murdertrial ever heard behind closed doors without access by press or public. ^ UK Govemment documentation into the investigation ofRoger Hollis,head ofMI5 between 1956 and 1965,including the report by LordTrend, into the serious but apparently unproven allegations ofbeingaRussian Spy. ^ Copies of govemment minutes of meetings between Gordon Brown and/or Alistair Darling and representatives of Lloyds Bank relating to the proposed takeover ofUBOS. ^ Acopy of the police intelligence handed to E.ON about climate change protestors.131 (/web/2009ll042l2937/http: //www.guardian.co.tik/uk/2009/apr/20/police-intelligence-e-onberr) ^Documents detailing the information stored and collected by the Wythenshawe intelligence centre.141

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(/web/200911042l2937/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/travel/news/article5683677.ece) ^ Censorship list for the United Kingdom's "voluntary" filter system.Known to be held byThe Intemet Watch Foundation (/web/2009ll04212937/http://www.iwf.org.uk/).Companies and their subsidiaries which are currently being supplied with the IWF list. Most ISP's in the UK haveacopy of the IP's on the list. ^ The proper reasons for nationalisation of Northem Rock and Bradford^Bingley,and the subsequent sale of the latter's savings buisiness to Santander. ^ Information regarding the valuation process to determine compensation for fromer shareholdersofNorthem Rock and Bradford^Bingley,that is,the information the independent valuer uses to determine the final value of the comapanies. ^Records of events during the twelve months leading up to the nationalisation ofBradford^Bingley. ^ Documents from Solicitors Regulation Authority's investigation into Davenport Lyons threatening letters related to filesharing. ^The full unredacted copy of receipts and documentation relating to MPs expenses as was partly released by the Daily Telegraph: in addition, any private communications regarding the leak of these expenses, especially if said communications are politically significant.

Ignited States
l^i^lk^a^al^as^s
^Amirror of the complete Intellipedia site as ofll/1/2008,including article history. ^ Amirror of the Common Core database as ofll/1/2008. DThe complete CIA Open Source Center analytical database.The database is extensive, unclassified,non-public,but relatively accessible to certain outsiders afterjumping through hoops https://www.opensource.gov/ ^The complete PACER database.The PACER database contains most US federal court records.They are legally public documents,currently behindapaywall and unsearchable.Were the documents to be public the behavior of many corporations would come to light. See http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/04/case-against-pacer.ars

F^^^^ali^oli^i^s
^ The missing five million White House emails-possibly no longer in existence. ^ Chenney and Rumsfeld Archives ^The White House visitors list ^Minutes or notes for VP Cheney's Energy Conference. ^The1141 pages of ACTA background documents not released to the EFF by the US Trade Representative(see 151 (/web/20091104212937/https://secure.eff.org/site/Advocacy7cmd^display^page^UserAction^id^420)) D Alist of all Whitehouse and senior federal govemment employees holding dual citizenship and the countries they represent.

^ili^ai^yand^n^^lli^enc^
^TheSIOP ^OPLAN/CONPLAN 8022,2003 revision ^OPLAN/CONPLAl^ 8044,2007 revision ^ CIA detainee interrogation videos. While the CIA claims to have destroyed 92 of the videos, others are known to remain. ^The US "'Black Budget",from inception to present,with line items,hopefully annotated and explained. ^ Detainee abuse photos withheld by the Obama administration. ^Ut^edacted Inquiry into theTreatmentofDetainees in US Custody,20 Nov 2008. ^ Memorandum between the CIA and the Department of State detailing any constraints on Darfur policy caused by actual or anticipated Sudanese govemment cooperation on counter-tertorism, including CIA request to USUN that Salah Gosh be removed from the UN Panel ofExperts list ofthose recontmended for sanction.See: http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php37id_article^l0205 ^ Department of State and CIA contributions to the Obama Administrations 2009 Sudan Policy Review,in particular with respect to: a) Whetherto support the ICC arrest warrant against Sudanese President Bashir:b)whether to takea confrontational or an appeasement approach to the Sudanese govemment on the issue ofDarfur.

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DCamp Delta (Guantanamo)Standard Operating Procedure 2005-2009. ^Camp Delta (Guantanamo) Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure 2003-2009. ^ Correspondence between the National Security Agency and American telecom companies such as AT^T, Verizon, and Owest, regarding the warrantless wiretapping program. Cortespondence involving telecoms who cooperated with the NSA(e.g.AT^T) may give dilTerent information than telecoms who refused(e.g.O^est),but both types would better shed light on the NSAsprogram.The existence ofthis correspondence is well documented in the media, for example that O^cst s lawyers refused to cooperate because the FISA Court had not signed off on it. ^h^aqandAfttanistan US Army Rules ofEngagement2007 2009 (SECRET) ^CIA/DL^GA/NSAanalysesofthe VRYAN crisisofl983. ^Technical specifications of the KH-lland follow-on satellites with similar capabilities. ^The contents of the Football,and how they changed over the years during the different Administrations. ^ What Pollard stole and gave to the Mossad, the full text. ^ US psychological profiles and political analyses of Soviet leaders. D Documents relating to orbital weapons systems,and whether the US ever deployed them(or still deploy them) such as orbital HANE devices. ^ Information about the PAN satellite and the agency responsible for it http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n0905 /26milspace/ ^Commander Directed Report oflnvestigation Conceming an UnauthorizedTransferofNuclear Warheads Between MinotAFB,NorthDakotaandBarksdale AFB,Louisiana 30 August2007(S//FRD//MR) ^ Investigation into the Shipment of Sensitive Missile Components toTaiwan (ADM Donald Report)-22May2008 (S//FRD//NOFOR^) ^AirForceComprehensiveAssessmentofNuclearSustainment(CA^S) July 2008 (S//FRD//NOFORN) ^ General Order Number One issued by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan ^ Reports about Colombian "falsos positives" ^ Unredacted copy ofDept of Justices Office of Inspector General"s"AReview of the FBI'sActions Connection With Allegations Raised By Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds" Julyl,2004 (redacted version here http://www.wbez.org /FILES/sibel.pdf) ^ All secret annexes for,attachments to,unredacted versions of,and documents implicitly or explicitly referenced in the following documents, which may be partially available in unclassified form: ^ National Security Presidential Directive5l,"National Continuity Policy",May9,2007,also known as l^omeland Security Presidential Directive 20 ^Federal Preparedness Circular 65,"Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations (COOP)",July 26, 1999 ^FederalResponse Plan 1FEMA9230.1-PL1,April 1999 ^ Presidential Decision Directive 67, ""Enduring Constitutional Govemment and Continuity of Govemment Operations",October21,1998 ^ Presidential Decision Directive 63,"Critical Infrastmcttu^eProtection(CIP)",May 22,1998 ^Presidential Decision Directive 62,"Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas", May 22,1998 ^^^Ci^,^ Federal Response Planning Guidance01-94,"Continuity of Operations(COOP)",December4, 1994 ^ ^^^^7National Security Directive 69, "Enduring Constitutional Govemment", June 2,1992 ^ ^^Ci^.^ Federal Preparedness Circu1ar61,"Emergency Succession to Key Positions of the Federal Departments and Agencies", August 2,1991 ^ Federal Preparedness Circular 62,"Delegation of Authorities for Emergency Situations",Augustl,1991 ^ Federal Preparedness Circular 60, " Continuity of the Executive Branch of the Federal Govemment at the Fleadquarters Level During National Security Emergencies", November 20,1990 ^ National Security Directive 37, ""Enduring Constitutional Govemment", April 18,1990 ^ Executive Order 12656,""Assignment ofEmergency Preparedness Responsibilities",November 18,1988 ^ Executive Order 12472,"Assignment ofNational Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions",April3,1984 ^/^^^i^^NSDD 55,""Enduring National Leadership" September 14,1982 ^ Executive Order 12148,"Federal Emergency Management",July20,1979 ^ Alist of the actual facilities in the Federal Relocation Arc,as of the present time,along with their locations. ^ Blueprints,maps,and floor plans ofMWEOC. ^ Blueprints,maps,and floor plans ofSiteR(Raven Rock).

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^ Blueprints and floor plans of all unmentioned facilities in the Federal Relocation Arc, including historical ones. ^a^^^^ ^The complete list of identities of the 52,000 wealthy American clients suspected ofhiding^l5 billion at UBS to avoid taxes, including the names of any elected or appointed govemment or former govemment officials. ^The complete details of Goldman,Sachs^Co.'s counterparty exposure to AIG prior to the Federal bailout of AIG in September,2008. ^^vi^i^^en^^ ^ Monsanto's intemal evaluations of GMO products including safety and pollen drift,

l^e^a
DThe Editorial Guidelines for Fox News ^Emails relating to suppressed GO Magazine article on Putins rise by Scott Anderson mentioned atl61 (/web/2009ll042l2937/http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php7storyld^ll2530364) Reli^io^ ^ Mormons Church records ^ With recent leak ofl999/2006 Church Handbook oflnstmctions,pertinent documents and covertly photographed artifacts in the vault at Church Office building or subsidy in Salt Lake City,Utah which expose and negate Mormon Churchs claim of divinity and its monopoly on "'tmth."I.e.the concealed remnants of diaries and letters written by formerearly Mormon apostle William McLellin 171 (/web/2009ll04212937/http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_E._M^27Lellin^Personal_writings).McLellin diary and documents was the main point of interest for convicted double murderer/bomber Mark Hofmann's planned forgery attempt to deceive Mormon leaders to obtain in fraud by deception monetary reward to suppress truth of early Mormon history unfavorable to current Mormon religion. For more info, 181 (/web/2009ll042l2937/http://www.utlm.org /onlinebooks/trackingch3.htm). ^Documents ofMormon Churchs billion-dollar investment in City Creek Mall and Condominium in SLC,which may put Mormon Church s IRS tax-exempt status in jeopardy if there is verification of the allegation the Church used tithe and offering monetary contributions by the members to fund the project under the umbrella of tax-exempted religious freedom. ^Mormon Church leaderships involvement in politics,such as correspondence to ecclesiastical subordinates (bishopric)on policy and attitude towards same-sex civil rights^other sensitive issues relevant and conceming to the leaders.As well as recorded cortespondences between Mormon members ofUtah legislation and Church leaders on sensitive political issuBr^/^^^^^^es for legislation purposes which may contravene the separation of church and state. ^ Uncovered film or audio recording featuring the play with the actor portraying Protestant minister encouraged by Satan/Lucifer (portrayed by actor) to spread false doctrines to attack all religions outside ofMormon religion as ""abominable" which was exhibited for qualified "'temple reconm^end" audiences in all of the existing temples priorto removal in 1990(almost like leaked Scientology orientation video) 191 (/web/200911042l2937/http: //www.exmormon.org/mormon/mormon288.htm). ^ Unearthed secret audio or video recording inside Mormon temple with the temple members swearing ""blood oath"before removal in 19901101 (/web/20091l042l2937/http://enwikipediaorg /wiki/Blood_oath_(Latter_Day_Saints)) ^ Documented Church leaders" and lay clergy"s cover-up of physical/sexual abuse and rape of minors by missionaries and members without reporting to law enforcement in some cases1lll(/web/2009ll04212937/http: //www.exmormon.org/mormon/mormon384.htm). voider editions ofChurchHandbooksoflnstt^uctions from the first edition up1121(/web/2009ll042l2937/http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_IIandbook_of_Instmctions^IIistory)for comparison to recent leaked 1968 (tmncated),1999 and 2006editions.

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Vatiean
^ The Index of the Vatican Secret Archive.At present prescrened scholars are allowed to see it but not copy it(under scholar rule^l6http://asv.vatican.va/en/fond/amm.htm) Retrieved from ""https://secure.wikileaks.Org/wiki/Draft:The_Most_Wanted_Leaks_of_2009" Categories: AnalyseslUnitedStateslBulgarialCzechRepubliclDenmarklEstonialFrancelGermanyllcelandlltalyl LatvialLithuanialNetherlandslNorwaylPolandlRomanialSlovenialSpainlTurkeylUnitedKingdomlSwitzerlandl SwedenlMaltalPortugallLuxembourglFinlandlBelgiumlCypruslCanadalSlovakia

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D raftrThe Most Wanted Leaks of 2009-sort
From Wikileaks
Somewhat sorted entries of the most-wanted list. Work in progress, TODO: Add brief, entity and date for each entry.

Contents
1 Austria 2 Australia 3 Bahrain 4 China 5 Colombia 6 Finland 7 France 8 Germany 9 Greece 10 Guatemala 11 Italy 12 Kenya 13 Libya 14 Madagascar 15MaU 16 Mexico 17 Niger 18 Norway 19 Puerto Rico 20 Rwanda 21 Russia 22 Slovenia 23 Sudan 24 Syria 25 Switzerland 26 Swaziland 27 Trinidad and Tobago 28 Uganda 29 United Kingdom 30 United Nations 31 United States 32 Vatican 33 Intemational organizations

Austria
Austrian e-Voting system used in students elections. • Date: 18 May 2009 • Brief: We seek for details about Austrian voting system used in students elections, which includes but is not limited to source code and certifications. • Entity: Scytl (/web/20091105061330/http://www.scytl .com/) (programming) • Entity: Austrian Federal Computation Center (/web/20091105061330/http://www.brz.gv.at/Portal.Node /brz/public 7gentics .am=PCP&p .contentid= 10007.17664) (hosting)

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^ Entity: Ministry ofScience(/web/2009110506l330/http://www.bmwf.gv.at/submenue/english/) (initiator) ^Entity: Robert Krimmer (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.e-voting.cc/topics/Team/)(consulting) D ^l^aiItra^cbetw^t^.^osefProKaut^ Christian konrad. ^Date:777 ^ Brief: E-Mail traffic between minister offinanceJosef Proll and Christian Konrad, who is advocate general of Raiffeisen bank. ^Entity: JosefProll()[email protected]) ^Entity: Christian Konrad ^ ^ - ^ a i l traffic of Alston Mahdalil^ with l^ichaeinauplaud/or Michael L^udwi^ ^Date:777 ^ Brief: E-Mail traffic ofFPO delegate Anton Mahdalik with Viennese mayor Michael Haupl and/or deputy mayor Michael Ludwig containing threats when renting municipal ground to the Viennese trailor park ( "Wagenplatz Wien") 1 ^ Entity: Anton Mahdalik ([email protected]) ^Entity: Michael Haupl ([email protected])

Australia
^ACMAU^^blacl^ist ^Date:l9March 2009 and later ^ BriefVersions of the ACMA URL blacklist newer than l9March 2009.1^^/^1^^,^ previously released three versions of the list, two of which included WikiLeaks or its subpages. ^Entity: Australian Communications and Media Authority (/web/2009ll05061330/http://www.acma.gov.au /WEB/UOMEPAGE/PC^HOME) ^ Censorship technolo^ in Australia ^Date:2009 ^Entity: Australian Communications and Media Authority (/web/2009ll05061330/http://www.acma.gov.au /WEB/HOMEPAGE/PC^HOME) ^Entity: Enex Testlabs (/web/20091105061330/http://www.testlabcom.au/) ^Entity: WatchdogNZ(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.watchdognetnz/) ^Entity: 1www.iwf.org.uk Intemet Watch Foundation! ^Entity: Exetel ISP (/web/20091105061330/http://exetel.com.au/news_main.php) ^Brief: Full details of filtering hardware/software vendors participating in govemment-sponsored ISP-level censorship technology trials, including (but not limited to): ^ Any and all communications between filter vendors and govemment departments priorto,during, and after the trials ^ Any and all transactions, contracts, and other financial arrangements involving filter vendors ^Details: ^ URL blacklist(s)used during above trials.Alleged (by govemment) to be ACMA URL blacklist. ^Full statistical breakdown of results of above trials (in the event that Enex Testlabs do not make them publicly available). ^ URL blacklist as used by Watchdog NZ during private censorship technology trial by ISP Exetel in May 2009.Alleged (by Watchdog) to have been IWF list(see United Kingdom). ^ Full statistical breakdown of results ofWatchdog/Exetel's censorship technology trial-Exetel's official response(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://forumexetel.com.au/viewtopicphp7f^^t^3l857^p244129) seems lacking. ^ A n m ^ l N S ^ Police test ^Brief: Written exam NSW police officers must take annually before they can be issued with Tasers. ^Entity: NSWPolice(/web/2009ll05061330/http://wwwpolicenswgovau/)

^aln^ain

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^Documents re^ardin^ changes to countrysdemo^raphy. ^ Brief: Documents disclosing the number of citizenships that have been granted in the last few years, in an effort to change the country's demography.See Political naturalisation1ll(/web/20091105061330/http: //www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php7id^2860).

China
^Golden Shield Project ^Brief:AlistofURLs and keywords censored filtered by the Golden Shield Project(Great Firewall of China). WikiLeaks has previously released related information, for example, watch lists, policies and several thousand URLs forCCTV and Baidu,but not for general http filtering. ^Entity: Ministry of public security (/web/20091l05061330/http://www.mps.gov.ctt/) ^Genocide Olympics campaign ^Date:28thMarch2007 ^Brief: Policy options on Darfur formulated in response to the so-called Genocide Olympics campaign led by American actress, Mia Farrow, and notes of meetings in 2007 between Stephen Spielberg and Chinese Foreign Ministry officials priorto Spielberg's resignation as Artistic Directorofthe 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Colon^hia
^Surveillance of citizens and organisations ^ Brief:The DAS (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad) is reported to have surveilledawide array of public officials, private citizens, and organizations. Documents wanted: contracts to supply software for intemet surveillance to Colombian policy agencies and details of the software supplied. ^Entity: DAS (/web/2009ll05061330/http://wwwdasgovco/)

Finland
Tiitisen ^ista ^ Brief: The so called Tiitisen Lista,the list ofl8persons claimed to have been in active contact with East German security services (Stasi).The list was received from the West German intelligence services (BND)in 1990 and since classified by the order ofPresident Koivisto as adviced by the head ofthe Finnish Security Police (Suojelupoliisi),SeppoTiitinen.lt is mmoured that several current or formertop Finnish politicians appear on the list. ^Entity: Stasi (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/Stasi) ^Entity: Koivisto (/web/20091l05061330/http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/hakemisto/ministerikortisto /ministeritiedot.asp7nro^167) ^Entity: Suojelupoliisi (/web/2009ll05061330/http://www.poliisi.fi/supo/)

Franee
NicholasSarl^o^yhealthreport ^Brief: The Monthly Health Report ofPresident Nicolas Sarkozy.aspronnsed by himself during the last presidential elections.

C^ern^an^
Ceusorshi^ittGeru^atty ^ Details: ^ The censorship filter list for the proposed national, mandatory censorship system. The list will be compiled by German federal criminal police BKA and distributed to intemet service providers. ^The contents of the contract between the BKA and some ISPs that has already been signed,but is kept secret due to ""public safety" and copyright concems(seehttp://blog.fefe.de/7ts^b4fa8af8). ^The List ofMedia Harmful toYoungPeople(the censorship system already in place).The "virtual media"

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part of this list is distributed to search engine providers and is illegal to publish. It probably could be reverse engineered using the differences between google.comandgoogle.de search results.Also,ifyou want to knowifaspecific medium is on the list,you can send an enquiry to [email protected] (mailto:[email protected])("Bundesprufstelle" is the agency responsible for keeping the list). ^Entity: Bundesprufstelle(/web/20091l0506l330/http://wwwbundespmefstelle.de/) ^Entity: BKA (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://wwwbkade/) ^PoliticiansStasililes ^The Stasi (/web/2009ll05061330/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stasi)filesofFederal Chancellor AngelaDorothea Merkel (maiden name Kasner) and other leading politicians, which are known to exist, but withheld from public ^ Operation Gladio ^Brief: The Stasi files relating to operation Gladio/stay behind organisations in relation to right-wing tertorism in Germany (/web/20091105061330/http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/30/30390/l.hnnl),as peraparliamentary request by the Green party. ^AtlasDer^ut ^Brief: The so called"Atlas der Wut",adocument about the risk of riots in different german regions.The list is said to be updated regulary and was first written in 2005. DThe list ofN^lO party members

Creeee
The Athens Affair ^Brief: Documents related to the Athens phone tapping affairthat have yet to be released (including those from countries otherthan Greece)Context(/web/2009ll05061330/http://www.spectmm.ieee.org/telecont/security /the-athens-affair/0)

Cuaten^ala
^PlanVictoria Plan Soda and PiauFerme^ ^3 ^ Brief: All documents on PlanVictoria 82,Plan Sofia and Plan Firmeza 83. ^Detail: Within the process of trying to bring military personal involved in human rights violations and massacres that happen during the civil war in Guatemala tojustice, the military have been required to declassify many war documents.Inacase,that went all the way to the Supreme Court of Guatemala, the Court dictatedasentence that confirmed the obligation ofthe Ministry ofDefenseofGuatemala to hand over the official documentation of four specific military operations: Campana Sofia 82, Victoria 82, Firmeza 83 and Operacion Ixil. The Supreme Court sentence indicated that the archives had to be declassified. These military operations were carried out in the 80s. According to the CEH, Historical Clarification Commission of Guatemala final report contained in "Guatemala: Memory of Silence", these military operations resulted in massacres and severe human rights violations. The Minister ofDefense AbrahamValenzuela only delivered partial information about plans Victoria 82 and Firmeza 83,two ofthe four requested plans.He indicated that he had no knowledge ofthe other two plans before he became MinisterofDefense and that he ignores where the documentation could be.He stated that he could not deliver the complete plans "Victoria 82"y "Firmeza 83" because certain information was considered state secret andaconcem of national security. ""Plan Sofia",aderivative of "PlanVictoria 82",was of special concern to human rights activists: this plan was conceived in Julyl982,four months after General Efrain Rios Montt came into power. ^ T h e C ^ ^ archives ^Brief: Final report ofUnited Nations" Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) into the killing of 200,000

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Mayan people and the involvement of the US govemment and American corporations. The report official sources(military interviews,campaign plans,etc)are kept secret by the UN in NYC. ^Detail: The United Nations" Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) for Guatemala issuedareport where the US govemment and several American corporations were accused of complicity in the genocide of nearly200,000 Mayan people during Guatemala7sbloody36-year civil war. Thefinal3,600-pageCEH report clearly places the blame for most ofthe 200,000 deaths on the "racist" policy ofthe Guatemalan govemment and holds the country7s military and paramilitary forces responsible for the actual killings, tortures and disappearances. However, it accuses the US of directly and indirectly supportinga"fratricidalconfrontation"by providing sustained training,arms andfinancialaidThe report is based on the testimony of9,200 people from all sides of the confiict and other documents^, classified and Secret, protected in the UN headquarters in NYC.-fhe CEH investigated 42,000 human rights violations, 2 9 , ( ^ of which resulted in deaths or disappearances and therefore, the documents under UN custody are fundamental for the prosecution ofthose responsible ofthe crimes. ^ Goldcorp affair ^Brief^Documents on Canadian corporation named Goldcorp withamining operation in Guatemala,especially information on where the Gold they extract is processed and who is buying the gold(we think it might bea Swiss company). ^DetaiLACanadian corporation named Goldcorp hasamining operation in Guatemala with poor environmental conditions and harming health of many workers andacommunity asawhole.Where the Gold they extract is processed7 Who is buying the gold (we think it ntight beaSwiss company)7

^tal^
Italian censorship list ^ Brief:The^//Italian censorship,of whichWikileaks currently only hasasubset.

^en^a
^Reports on hi^h level corruption in IKibal^i government ^ Brief:The intemational investigative firm Kroll associates produced at least four reports on high level Kenyan cormption after first term of the Kibaki govemmenLAdraft version of one of the reports The looting ofKenya, was previously published by WikiLeaks.The reports were given to selected members ofPresident Kibaki's cabinet at the time and are likely still held by http://www.kroll.com.uk/, notably lead investigator Andrew MarshalL ^Entity: President Kibaki ^Entity: Kroll (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://wwwkroll.com.uk/)

Lih^a
^Arrau^euteutswiththeSudanesegovernment ^ Brief: Documents indicating artangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Libya(Civilians and adminisrators on the gmond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place).

^adagasear
Both sides of the political confiict in Madagascar are crying fouls about the deals made by their counterparts with foreign entities.The release ofthe official documents with respect to contract negotiations about: ^ Oil exploitation in the region ofBemolanga(SouthofMadagascar)byTotal^others ^ Detail: Oil and Gas in Madagascar-Industry Overview (/web/2009ll05061330/http://www.mbendi.com /indy/oilg/af/md/p0005.htm),Infos on Total licensing (/web/20091l0506l330/http://www.scandoil.com/moxiebm2/news/total-farms-into-the-bemolanga-heavy-oil-license-i.shtml) ^ an obvious one but the proposed final contract before rejection of the land deal with Daewoo Logistics.

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^The recent agreement with Saudi investment group on staple products and proposed ^2 billion USD investment. ^The revised mining exploitation agreement with Sheritt in Ambatovy and RioTinto in Fort-Dauphin. ^ Least but not last, the complete list of curtent political prisoners and the charges against them.

^ali
Arrangements with the Sudanese government ^ Brief: Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Mali(Civilians and adminisrators on the gruond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place).

^e^ieo
Agreements between USA and Peter herlihy ^ Brief: Zapotec indigenous people demand transparency fromU.S.Scholar and full disclosure of all the agreements betweenU.S.Govemment and their agencies andU.S.geography scholar Peter Herlihy,especially confidential agreements with Foreign Military Studies Office.Prof.Herlihy failed to mention that he received funding from the Foreign Military Studies Office of theU.S.Armed Forces on the research of "Mexico Indigena" project. Mexico Indigena Project forms part of the Bowman Expeditions,amore extensive geographic research project backed and financed by the FMSO, among other institutions. The FMSO inputs information into aglobal database that forms an integral part of the Human Terrain System (HTS),aUnited States Army counterinsurgency strategy designed by Foreign Military Studies Office and applied within indigenous communities, among others. ^Entity: FMSO(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://fmsoleavenwortharmy.mil/) ^Entity: Peter Herlihy (/web/20091l0506l330/http://www2.ku.edu/-^geography/peoplepages/IIerlihy_P.shtml) Ruta Maya 2002 Hsu^ Challenge ^ Brief: Documents to unveil the real purpose of "Ruta Maya 2002 Isuzu Challenge". The convoy was commanded by Ben NunAvihu,Israeh militar and Moshe Savir, geography expert and around 50 tourists in 40 Isuzu Jeep. Some communities linked the incursion with biopiracy.The terrain they explored is controled by the EZLN. ^ Entity: Ben Nun Avihu ^ Entity: Moshe Savir ^Entity: EZLN (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.ezln.org.mx/) CorruptionaroundF08APROA ^ Brief: Documents related with the fraud and cormption around FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario de Proteccion al Ahorro). ^Entity: FOBAPROAl(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/cronica^7/contenido/cont2 /fobaprol.htm)2(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://enwikipediaorg/wiki/Fobaproa) Financial operations before crisis ^Documents offinancialoperations just before the financial crisis ofl994(/web/20091l05061330/http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/l994_economic_crisis_in_Mexico)(some say the govemment knew before that the crisis was coming and took advantage of the information protecting their interests). ^ o r l ^ ^ a n ^ credit ^Brief: Documents related with the World Bank credit and application of the budget to combat swine flu. ^Entity: WorldBank(/web/20091l0506l330/http://wwwworldbankorg/mx) Renault program ^ Brief: Documents related with the technology curtently used in cellphones in Mexico to implement the RENAUT program (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://wwwrenautgobmx/RENAUT/) Information aboutthe security technology used to protect data collected from users. Plan Merida ^ Brief: Documents related to the transparency ofPlan Merida (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/M^C3^A9rida_Initiative)

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Niger
. Arrangements with the Sudanese govemment • Brief: Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Niger (Civilians and adminisrators on the gmond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place).

Norway
. Court case between Lyse Tele and Simonsen • Brief: The secret verdict in the court case between the ISP Lyse Tele and the law firm Simonsen, decided the 5th of May 2009, where Simonsen demanded Lyse Tele disclose the identity information of a file sharer suspected of uploading a copy of the movie Max Manus to thefile-sharingcommunity. . Entity: Lyse Tele (/web/20091105061330/http://www.lyse.no/) • Entity: Simonsen (/web/20091105061330/http://www.simonsenlaw.no/)

Puerto Rico
• FBI surveillance of Puerto Rico citizens • Brief: The FBI has not yetfinisheddeclassifying all the secretfilesrelated to surveillance of Puerto Rican individuals and organizations from the 1930-70's http://www.pr-secretfiles.net/index.html (not to mention, large sections of the files are blacked out by the FBI). In addition, there are thousands of secretfilesproduced by Puerto Rican police that were only briefly made available to individuals themselves, and have now been closed off to the public. These documents provide evidence of quite a significant spying and intimidation operation by the United States and local police against leftists and independence movement leaders. . Entity: FBI (/web/2009110506l330/http://www.fl)i.gov/)

Rwanda
• Financial aid for Laurant Nktmda • Brief: Documentation offinancialassistance given by the Rwandan govemment to General Laurant Nkunda for operations in the DRC. • Entity: Laurent Nkunda (/web/20091105061330/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laurent_Nkunda)

Russia
• VRYAN crisis documentation • Brief: Documents related to the VRYAN crisis, especially political documents, analyses of intelligence, and specific steps taken. Information on the mindset of the Politburo, as well as intelligence services, and what exactly they feared, and how credible they believed their fear to be. . Maps for Kremlm and military hideouts • Brief: Maps, floor plans, and blueprints of Mount Yamantaw and Kosvinsky Mountain. . Technology analysis • Brief: Technical plans, manuals, and blueprints for the SS-27 Sickle B (Topol-M), along with the Bulava. • Brief: Documents relating to nuclear warplans of the Soviet Union and Russia. • Brief: Documents relating to orbital weapons systems, and whether the Soviets ever deployed them (or still deploy them) such as orbital HANE devices. • Brief: A list and description of the various agents prepared by the various Soviet and Russian bioweapons programs. Indications of whether they developed recombinant DNA based agents, and what those are specifically. Weaponization of agents, including re-entry vehicle mounting. Doctrine for use, including deniable use. Vaccines and treatments for affected personnel.

Slovenia

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^Taped conversations between Slovenian opposition leader and Croatian PM ^ Brief: Taped conversations between Slovenian opposition leader Janez Jansa and Croatian prime ntinister Ivo Sanader,recorded by Slovenian intelligence service SOVA. ^Date: Summer 2004 ^ Entity: JanezJansa ^Entity: Ivo Sanader ^Entity: SOVA

Sudan
^Salah Gosh and the CIA DDate: 2005 D Documents detailing discussions during 2005 meeting between Salah Gosh and the CIA (for which the CIA flew Gosh on private jet from Khartoum to CIA HO) See: http://www.sudantribune.com /article.php37id_article^l0205 DMaliease DBrief: Documents indicating artangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Mah (Civilians and adminisrators on the gmond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place). DLibyacase DBrief: Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfurto Arab settlers from Libya (Civilians and adminisrators on the gmond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place). DNigercase DBrief: Documents indicating arrangements with the Sudanese govemment to grant land in Darfur to Arab settlers from Niger(Civilians and adminisrators on the gmond in Darfur indicate this has been taking place).

Syria
D AssasinationofMehdiBenBarka DBrief: All the documents related to the assasination,in 1965,ofMehdi Ben Barka still held in France,USA, Israel and Morocco.Inl976,thanks to the Freedom of information Act,the US govemement recognized that the CIA had about 1800 classified documents about his assassination. Theses documents are still classified.

Switzerland
DCornu report D Brief: The full Comu Report. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projekt 26^The_Comu_Report

Swaziland
D F ^ ^ n ^ accounts ofKing Mswati, the Ot^een Mother and the IGngs wives. DMemos from Ministry off^efense or Police D Brief: Intelligence memos from the Ministry ofDefence or Police about the pro-democracy organization, PUDEMO DEntity:Pudemo(/web/20091105061330/http://www.pudemo.org/) DEntity:MinisfryofDefense(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.gov.sz/home.asp7pid^59)

Trinidad and Tohago
D Commissionofl^n^uiryreports DBrief: The Report on the Commission ofEnquiry into the constmction of the new Piarco Airport. This identified cormpt practices in the spending ofpublic funds. The Contmission's report was delivered in August 2003. Nearly6yearslater,its findings have not been made public.

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D Brief: Report of thefindingsof the curtent C^^^/,^,^^^^^^r^^^/^/^r^^/^^/^^^/^^^^^r^^^/^r^,^^^r^^ D Entity: Commission Enquiry (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.constmctionenquiry.gov.tt/) ^Entity: Piarco airport (/web/2009110506l330/http://www.piarcoairport.com/) DCaroni Bridge collapse DBrief: The Report on the Caroni Bridge Collapse.Aman was killed whenabridgecollapsedafew years ago: again the public has not been made aware ofthe report's findings. DDate: 2ndAugust2008 D Waterfront f^velopment Project DBriefAcopy of the contract for the billion-dollar Waterfront Development Project. DEntity:7udecott7(/web/2009ll05061330/http://www.udecottcom/) ^Scholarships sponsored by Ministry of Culture DBrief: List of recipients and amounts of scholarships sponsored by Ministry of Culture for study abroad. ^Entity: Ministry ofCulture (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://wwwgovtt/) DDetail: As far asTrinidad andTobago goes,our govemment tends to pay lip service to the principles of transparency and accountability.For instance,there isaFreedom ofinformation Act which,by law,allows the public to seek information from govemment departments.But quite often,when such attempts are made by the citizenry,the govemment bars full disclosure.Depending on how importantapiece of information is to Joe Public,he may actually have to tum to the courts to "force" the govemment to reveal facts that should be disclosed voluntarily. Following areafew examples of documents that should be made public,but have not been: DThe Report on the Commission ofEnquiry into the constmction of the new Piarco Airport This identified cormpt practices in the spending of public funds.The Commission's report was delivered in August 2003.Nearly6years later, itsfindingshave not been made public. DThe Report on the Caroni Bridge Collapse.Aman was killed whenabridgecollapsedafew years ago: again the public has not been made aware ofthe report's findings. DThe Opposition recently brought up in Parliament the issue of taxpayers'money being used to pay attomeys by state. Although the public hasaright to know how much of its funds were used in paying said attomeys,the Attomey General refused to disclose the sums, saying it would be an invasion of the lawyers'privacy. D The same goes forarecent request in Parliament,whereby ^the Minister ofPlanning and Development was asked to produceacopy of the contract for the billion-dollar Waterfront Development Projects.The Ministers response was that she could not produce said contract for public discussion because there wasaconfidentiality clause contained therein (foraproject being built with public funds). DThe Ministry of Culture recently awarded scholarships for students to study abroad when asked in Parliament to disclose the list of recipients and the dollar value of the scholarships, the response was that this was private information.

I^ganda
D^gandanproHtsharingagreementswithoilcompaniesinsouthwestern Uganda DBrief: The govemment ofUganda has recently signedanumberofprofit-sharing agreements with several oil companies that are conducting explorations in southwestem Uganda.Releasing these documents would bea major step in increased transparency with respect to the country s emerging oil industry.

Ignited I^ngdom
D Censorship in UI^ D Brief: List of current and expired D-Notices DEntity: dnotice (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.dnotice.org.uk/the_system.htm) D Brief: secret gag orders, injunctions and legal threats sent to UK newspapers DEntity: legal contact addresses at the Guardian,Daily Mail,Times,Independent,Evening Standard,etc. DBrief: Censorship list for the United Kingdom's "volunt^" filter system.Known to be held byThe Intemet

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Watch Foundation (/web/2009l105061330/http://www.iwf.org.uk/).Companies and their subsidiaries which are curtently being supplied with the IWF list. Most ISP's in the UK haveacopy of the IP's on the list. ^Entity: The Intemet Watch Foundation (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://wwwiwforguk/) Dlrat^ war planning DBrief: The secret cabinet minutes (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics /7752009.stm)andlegaladvice(/web/2009ll05061330/http://newsbbccouk/2/hi/uk_news/politics /4381379.stm) pertaining to the allegedly illegal war and ongoing occupation oflraq. D linger Hollis surveillance D Brief: UK Govemment documentation into the investigation ofRoger Hollis,head ofMI5 between 1956 and 1965,including the report by Lord Trend,into the serious but apparently unproven allegations ofbeingaRussian Spy DEntity:MI5(/web/2009l10506l330/http://wwwmi5govuk/) D Wythenshawe intelligence centre D Brief: Documents detailing the information stored and collected by the Wythenshawe intelligence centre.121 (/web/2009110506l330/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/travel/news/article5683677.ece) D Police surveillance on climate change protestors D Brief:Acopy of the police intelligence handed to EON about climate change protestors.131 (/web/2009ll05061330/http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/20/policeintelligenceeonberr) DEntity:EON(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.eonukcom/) D MP expenses D Brief: The full MP expenses data: how much theTelegraph paid for them. DEntity: Daily Telegraph (/web/20091l0506l330/http://www.telegraph.couk/) DEntity:UKParliament(/web/20091l05061330/http://www.parliamentuk/) D Allan Ca^^elow murder DBrief: Documents revealing why the trial ofWangYam,who was convicted ofkilling Allan Chappelow, was held in camera, the first UK murdertrial ever heard behind closed doors without access by press or public14] (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://enwikipediaorg/wiki/Allan_Chappelow) DNationalisationofNorthemRockandBradford^Bringley DBrief: The proper reasons for nationalisation ofNorthem Rock and Bradford^Bingley,and the subsequent sale of the latter's savings buisiness to Santander. DBrief: Records of events during the twelve months leading up to the nationalisation of Bradford^Bingley. D Brief: Information regarding the valuation process to determine compensation for fromer shareholders of Northem Rock and Bradford^Bingley,that is,the information the independent valuer uses to determine the final value ofthe comapanies. DEntity:B^B(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://wwwbbgcouk/) ^Entity: Northem Rock (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.northemrock.couk/) DnBOS takeover D Brief: Copies of govemment minutes of meetings between Gordon Brown and/or Alistair Darling and representatives ofLloyds Bank relating to the proposed takeover ofllBOS. D Investigation into Daveport Lyons D Brief: Documents from Solicitors Regulation Authority's investigation into Davenport Lyons threatening letters related to filesharing.

Ignited Nations
D Security Council and Darfur DBrief: Requests to the Security Council in 2003 that the Security Council look at what was happening in Darfur, and any notes of discussions leading to the decision not to look at the situation.

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DDate: 2003 DEntity: UN Security Council

Ignited States
Important bulk databases DIntellipedia DBrief: Classified intelligence community site as ofll/l/2008,including article history. Dopensot^cgov DBrief: The complete CIA Open Source Center analytical database.The database is extensive,unclassified, non public, but relatively accessible to certain outsiders after jumping through hoops. Despite its name, you need to be govemment official to gain access to it. DEntity: opensource.gov (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.opensource.gov/) DPacer database D Brief: The complete PACER database. The PACER database contains extensive US federal court records. They are public documents,curtently behindapaywalL See http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/04/caseagainst-pacer.ars DEntity: PACER (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://pacer.pscuscourtsgov/)

Federal i^olitics D The missing five million White House emails—possibly no longer in existence. D Chenney and Rumsfeld Archives DThe White House visitor's list D Minutes or notes for VP Cheney's Energy Conference. DThel141 pages of ACTA background documents not released to the EFF by the US Trade Representative(see 151 (/web/2009ll0506l330/https://secure.eff.org/site/Advocacy7cmd-display^page-UserAction^id^420)) D Alist of all Whitehouse and senior federal govemment employees holding dual citizenship and the countries they represent. Military and Intelligence DTheSIOP DOPLAN/CONPLAl^ 8022,2003 revision DOPLAN/CONPLAN 8044,2007 revision D CIA detainee interrogation videos. While the CIA claims to have destroyed 92 of the videos, others are known to remain. DThe US "Black Budget",from inception to present,with line items,hopefully annotated and explained. D Detainee abuse photos withheld by the Obama administration. D Wiretapping program led by NSA DBrief: Correspondence between the National Security Agency and American telecom companies such as AT^T, Verizon, and Owest, regarding the warrantless wiretapping program. Cortespondence involving telecoms who cooperated with the NSA(e.g.AT^T) may give different information than telecoms who refused(e.g.O^est), but both types would better shed light on the NSAsprogram.The existence ofthis cortespondence is well documented in the media, for example that O^est s lawyers refused to cooperate because the FISA Court had not signed off on it. DEntity:NSA(/web/20091l05061330/http://www.nsagov/) DEntity:0^est(/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.qwest.cont/) DEntity:AT^T(/web/20091l05061330/http://wwwattcom/) DEntity: Verizon (/web/2009ll0506l330/http://www.verizon.com/) D Uttredacted copy ofDept of Justices Office oflnspectorGeneral's'AReview of the FBI'sActions Connection With AllegationsRaisedByContt^actLinguistSibelEdmonds" July 1,2004(redactedversionhere http://wwwwbez.org /FILES/sibel.pdf) D Camp Delta(Guantanamo)Standard Operating Procedure 2005-2009.

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DfraqUSArt^yRulesofEngagement2007 2009(SECRET). D Unredacted Inquiry into theTreatmentofDetainees in US Custody,20 Nov 2008. D Memorandum between the CIA and the Department of State detailing any constraints on Darfur policy caused by actual or anticipated Sudanese govemment cooperation on counter-terrorism, including CIA request to USUN that Salah Gosh be removed from the UN Panel ofExperts list ofthose recottmtended for sanction.See: http://www.sudantribune.cont/article.php37id_articlei^l0205 ^Department of State and CIA contributions to the Obama Administration's 2009 Sudan Policy Review.in particular with respect to: a) Whether to support the ICC arrest warrant against Sudanese President Bashir:b)whether to takea confrontational or an appeasement approach to the Sudanese govemment on the issue of Darfur. D Camp Delta (Guantanamo)Standard Operating Procedure 2005-2009. D Camp Delta (Guantanamo)Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure 2003-2009. D Correspondence between the National Security Agency and American telecom companies such as AT^T,Verizon,and Owest, regarding the wartantless wiretapping program. Cortespondence involving telecoms who cooperated with the NSA(e.g.AT^T) may give different information than telecoms who refused(e.g.O^est),but both types would better shed light on the NSA's program. The existence of this correspondence is well documented in the media, for example that Owest's lawyers refused to cooperate because the FISA Court had not signed off on it. DfraqandAfhanistan US Army RulesofEngagement2007 2009 (SECRET). DCL^DL^GA/NSAanalysesofthe VRYAN crisisofl983 ^Technical specifications of the KH-lland follow-on satellites with similar capabilities. DThe contents of the Football,and how they changed over the years during the different Administrations. D What Pollard stole and gave to the Mossad, the full text. DUS psychological profiles and political analyses of Soviet leaders. DDocuments relating to orbital weapons systems,and whether the US ever deployed them(or still deploy them) such as orbital HANE devices. DInformation about the PAN satellite and the agency responsible for it http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n0905 /26milspace/ D Commander Directed Report oflnvestigation Conceming an UnauthorizedTransferofNuclear Warheads Between MinotAFB,NorthDakotaandBarksdale AFB,Louisiana 30 August2007(S//FRD//MR) D Investigation into the Shipment of Sensitive Missile Components toTaiwan (ADM Donald Report)-22May2008 (S//FRD//NOFORN) DAirForceComprehensiveAssessmentofNuclearSustainment(CANS) July 2008 (S//FRD//NOFORl^) D General Order Number One issued by commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan D Reports about Colombian falsos positives' D Unredacted copy ofDept of Justice's Office oflnspectorGeneral's'AReview of the FBI'sActions Connection With Allegations Raised By Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds" Julyl,2004 (redacted version here http://www.wbez.org /FILES/sibelpdf) D All secret annexes for,attachments to,unredacted versions of,and documents implicitly or explicitly referenced in the following documents, which may be partially available in unclassified form: D National Security Presidential Directive5l,"National Continuity Policy",May9,2007,also known as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 D Federal Preparedness Circular 65,"Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operations(COOP)",July 26, 1999 DFederal Response Plan 1FEMA9230 1 PL1,April 1999 D Presidential Decision Directive 67, "Enduring Constitutional Govemment and Continuity of Govemment Operations",October21,1998 D Presidential Decision Directive 63,"Critical Infrastructure Protection(CIP)",May 22,1998 DPresidential Decision Directive 62,"Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas",May22,1998 D/^^C^.^ Federal Response Planning Guidance01-94,"Continuity of Operations (COOP)",December4, 1994 D PD^l^7National Security Directive 69, "Enduring Constitutional Govemment",June 2,1992 D^^C^.^ Federal Preparedness Circular6l,"Emergency Succession to Key Positions of the Federal Departments and Agencies", August 2,1991 D Federal Preparedness Circular 62,"Delegation of Authorities for Emergency Situations",Augustl,1991 DFederal Preparedness Circular 60,"Continuity of the Executive Branch of the Federal Govemment at the Headquarters Level During National Security Emergencies", November 20,1990

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D National Security Directive 37,"'Enduring Constitutional Govemment",Aprill8,1990 D Executive Order 12656,"Assignment ofEmergency Preparedness Responsibilities",November 18,1988 D Executive Order 12472,""Assignment ofNational Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions",April3,1984 D / ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ NSDD 55,"Enduring National Leadership" September 14,1982 D Executive Order 12148, "Federal Emergency Management",July 20,1979 D Alist of the actual facilities in the Federal Relocation Arc,as of the present time,along with their locations. DBlueprints,maps,and floor plans ofMWEOC. D Blueprints,maps,and floor plans ofSiteR(Raven Rock). D Blueprints and fioor plans of all unmentioned facilities in the Federal Relocation Arc, including historical ones. Banking DThe complete list of identities of the 52,000 wealthy American clients suspected ofhiding^l5 billion at UBS to avoid taxes, including the names of any elected or appointed govemment or former govemment officials. DThe complete details of Goldman,Sachs^Co."s counterparty exposure to AIG prior to the Federal bailout of AIG in September,2008. environment D Monsanto s intemal evaluations of GMO products including safety and pollen drift. Media DThe Editorial Guidelines for Fox News DEmails relating to suppressed GO Magazine article on Putins rise by Scott Anderson mentioned at161 (/web/20091105061330/http://wwwnprorg/templates/story/storyphp7storyld-ll2530364) Religion Mormons Church records D With recent leak ofl999/2006 Church Handbook oflnstmctions,pertinent documents and covertly photographed artifacts in the vault at Church Office building or subsidy in Salt Lake City,Utah which expose and negate Mormon Churchs claim of divinity and its monopoly on ""tmth."I.e.the concealed remnants of diaries and letters written by formerearly Mormon apostle William McLellin 171 (/web/2009ll05061330/http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_E._M^27Lellin^Personal_writings).McLellin diary and documents was the main point of interest for convicted double murderer/bomber Mark Hofmann's planned forgery attempt to deceive Mormon leaders to obtain in fraud by deception monetary reward to suppress truth of early Mormon history unfavorable to current Mormon religion. For more info,181 (/web/2009110506l330/http://www.utlm.org /onlinebooks/trackingch3.htm). DDocuments ofMormon Church's billion-dollar investment in City Creek Mall and Condominium in SLC,which may put Mormon Church's IRS tax-exempt status in jeopardy if there is verification of the allegation the Church used tithe and offering monetary contributions by the members to fund the project under the umbrella of tax-exempted religious freedom. D Mormon Church leadership's involvement in politics, such as correspondence to ecclesiastical subordinates (bishopric)on policy and attitude towards same-sex civil rights^other sensitive issues relevant and conceming to the leaders. As well as recorded correspondences between Mormon members of Utah legislation and Church leaders on sensitive political issu7^^//^^^^.^^es for legislation purposes which may contravene the separation of church and state. D Uncovered film or audio recording featuring the play with the actor portraying Protestant minister encouraged by Satan/Lucifer (pomayed by actor) to spread false doctrines to attack all religions outside ofMormon religion as '"abominable" which was exhibited for qualified "temple recommend" audiences in all of the existing temples prior to removal in I990(almost like leaked Scientology orientation video) 191 (/web/20091l0506l330/http: //www.exmormon.org/mormon/mormon288.htm). D Unearthed secret audio or video recording inside Mormon temple with the temple members swearing "blood oath" beforeremoval in 19901101 (/web/2009110506l330/http://en wikipediaorg

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/wiki/Blood_oath_(Latter_Day_Saints)) D Documented Church leaders" and lay clergy"s cover-up of physical/sexual abuse and rape of minors by missionaries and members without reporting to law enforcement in some cases1111(/web/20091l05061330/http: //www.exmormon.org/mormon/mormon384.htm). DOlder editions of Church Handbooks oflnsttuctions from the first edition up1121(/web/2009ll05061330/http: //en.wtkipedia.org/wiki/Church Handbook of_Instmctions^History)for comparison to recent leakedl968 (tmncated),1999 and 2006editions.

Vatican
D Vatican secret archives D Brief:The Index of theVatican Secret Archive.At present pre-screned scholars are allowed to see it but not copy it(under scholar m1e^l6http://asv.vatican.va/en/fond/amm.htm) DVaticansdocumentsonnaziGermany D Brief: B^//documents pertaining to Nazi Germany and the Vatican,as well as those relating to the post-warrat line to Argentina. Refer to http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/26ll847.stm

International organizations
DBi^derberg Group D Brief: Bilderberg Group meeting minutes,papers and annual reports of sincel954.WikiLeaks has some years already.Bilderberg is an annual off-the record conference of transatlantic political,economic and ideological agenda setters. As an historically important confidential document collection it is probably only equaled by Cabinet minutes and high level intelligence and diplomatic assessments.Leads:There are some older,previously unnoticed records in boxes at Uni of Illinois http://www.library.illinois.edu/archives/uasfa/1535051.pdf (1956-1970) the George Bush library,http://bushlibrary.tamu.edtt/research/finding_aids/pdfs/08-0379-F.pdf and the Eisenhower Library in Kansas http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/Research/Finding_Aids /PDFs/JacksonCDRecordspdf DEntity: Bilderberg Group (/web/20091105061330/http://en.wtkipedia.org/wiki/Bi1derberg_Group) D Alliance Base D Brief: Documents regarding the founding and operation of Alliance Base (/web/2009ll05061330/http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alliance_Base). Retrieved from ""https://secure.wikileaks.Org/wiki/Draft:The_Most_Wanted_Leaks_of_2009-sort" Categories: BulgarialCzechRepubliclDenmarklEstonialFrancelGermanyllcelandlltalylLatvialLithuanial NetherlandslNorwaylPolandlRomanialSlovenialSpainlTurkeylUnitedKingdomlSwitzerlandlSwedenlMaltal PortugallLuxembourglFinlandlBelgiumlCypruslCanadalSlovakialUnited States

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Kerns, Brian 2BCT10MTN LTC BCT XO
From: Sent: To: SubJiKt: Attachments: Lim, Stefven J. CPT BDE S2 Friday. June 04, 2010 2:39 PM Kems, Brian 2BCT10MTNLTCBCTXO {UNCLASSIFIED) FW: My Probteru [UNCLASSIFIED] breanna.jpg

Titus Clastsiftcayon: UNCLASSIFIED Titus FullClassificatlorra: UNCLASSIFIED/#/#

UNCLASSIFIED//

—--Original Message From: Adkins, Paul 28CT10MTN M S G B C T S2 NCOIC Sent: Thursday, June 03, 2010 9:51 P M To: Lim, Steven 3. C P TB D E S2 Subject: F W : [UNCLASSIFIED] M y Problem [UNCLASSIFIED] Sir, Par conversation. V/r M S G Paul David Adkins Original Message From: Manning, Bradley S P CB D E 52 Sent: Saturday, April 24, 2010 7:40 P M To: Adkins, Paul 28CT10MTN M S G 8CT S2 NCOIC Subject: [^CLASSIFIED] My Problem [UNCLASSIFIED] UNCLASSIFIED// This is m y problem. I've had signs of i t for a very long time. Its caused problems within m y family, I thought a career in the military would get rid of i t . It's not something I seek out for attention, and I've been trying very, very hard to get rid of i t by placing myself in situations where i t would be impossible. But, it's not going away, its haunting m e more and more as I get older. Now, the consequences of i t are dire, at a time when i t s causing m e great pain in itself. As a result, I'm not sure what to do about i t . It's destroyed m y ties with m y family, caused m e to lose several jobs, and its currently affecting m y career and preventing m e from developing as a person. It^s the cause of m y pain and confusion, and turns even the most basic things in m y l i f e extremely difficult. I don't know what to do anymore, and the only "help" that seems to be available is severe punishment and/or getting rid of me. A l l I do know, is that fear of getting caught has caused m e to go to great lengths to consciously hide the problem. As a result, the problem and the constant cover-up has worn m e down to a point where i t ' s always on m y mind, making i t difficult to concentrate at work, difficult to pay attention to whatever is going on, difficult to sleep, impossible to have any meaningful conversations, and makes m y entire life feel like a bad dream that won't end.

DEFENSE EXHIBTTM^for uj^ntification PAGE OFFERED: „ PAGE ADMITTED:^ PAGE of PAGES

Like I said, I don't know what to do and I don't know whats going to happen, but at this point, i t feels like I'm not really *here* anymore, and everyone's concerned about m e and afraid of me. I'm sorry, v/r S P C Manning, Bradley Commando S E G Analyst (1000C-2200C) S2 Fusion Cell, 2BCT 1 0 M T N F O B Maimer, Iraq Primary SVOIP: 674-7935

Conversation with bradass87 at 2/21/2009 7:27:49 PM on ZJemptv (aim) (7:27:49 PM) bradass87: hi (7:27:55 PM) ZJ: Hi (7:28:20 PM) bradass87: you dont know my, i apologize, i got this from your youtube channel (7:28:22 PM) bradass87: *me (7:28:31 PM) ZJ: No problem, there's a reason I put it on there :P (7:29:37 PM) bradass87: i did a search on info theory, books, videos, etc... bought books on it, watched some of your videos... then i saw your more personal stuff and figured you were on the same page (7:29:40 PM) bradass87: *as me (7:29:58 PM) ZJ: Cool (7:30:10 PM) bradass87: oh, my name is brad manning, btw (7:30:23 PM) ZJ: I'm Zach Antolak, nice to meet you (7:30:34 PM) bradass87: :formal handshake: (7:30:39 PM) bradass87: =P (7:32:01 PM) bradass87: im 21, male, and i dont really know where im from xD... but my stuff is in potomac, maryland... outside DC... and i live and work at fort drum in upstate ny (7:32:28 PM) ZJ: I'm from the south suburbs of Chicago, pretty much generic suburbia around here (7:34:07 PM) bradass87: yessh, i spent some time out there in chi-town... i was there in '06... lived in a pickup truck, sleeping in the ohare parking lot, commuting downtown during the day... LONG story (7:34:21 PM) ZJ: that sure sounds fun :P (7:35:28 PM) bradass87: surprisingly it was, i actually had got a job at the guitar center on halsted by a home depot (7:36:01 PM) bradass87: my father kicked me out ofhis house in Oklahoma City in early 06 (7:36:12 PM) ZJ: I think I've been to that guitar center

o
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(7:38:19PM) bradass87:tguess ill tell you the basic life story since tm at it already...iwas bom in Oklahoma, lived in the small town of crescent, disproportionately evangelical town...iwas the science and computer nerd through school...not the most friendly of places, butidtd my best (7:38:59 PM)ZJ:^eah, I've heard Oklahoma isn't the most intellectually welcoming place (7:40:39 PM)bradass87:my father is from Chicago, my mother is from britain...they divorced in 2000, my mother gained custody,andthenimoved with her to southwest wales,whereiftnished school...however, she became ill and dependant on alcohol,andihadnt really assimiliated into british life, so atl7y/o in desperationtcalled my father andiwent back to Oklahoma to live, his new wife didnt exactly like me, so she forced him to kick me out (7:41:27 PM)ZJ:That'sawfLtl...lhaveafew step-parents and ex-stepparents floating arotmd, and they really suck (7:41:43 PM)bradass87:tlived in tulsaforalittle bit, then Chicago, thenisettled with my aunt and uncle in potomac maryland (7:42:51 PM)bradass87:iworked at Starbucks, and abercrombie and fitch...as fun as those jobs were they werent really getting me anywhere...twanted to go to college, butididnt have any family ties to push it (7:44:13 PM)bradass87:istarted looking lor an intemship,ihadaprogrammtng and design one at ^oto.com(even today's design elements are mostly my work) (7:44:58 PM)bradass87:seeing as it was DC,igave the Intel fteldashot...got few bites, however (7:45:51 PM)bradass87: somehow one ofmy resumes ended up in an army recruiters'hands... and came knocking at my door (7:46:40 PM)bradass87:and now after basic training and Intel school training,iltnd myself at Fort Drum as an intelligence analyst for 2BCT,10th Mountain Division (7:46:53 PM)ZJ:Awesome (7:47:26 PM)bradass87: its so-so... the army world drives me nuts (7:48:20 PM)bradass87:ido computations and analytical work, as well as preparing weekly Intel briefings for the commander (7:49:32 PM)bradass87:uhhm...im politically active, even more so af^er enlisting... living under Don't Ask Don'tTell will certainly do that (7:49:53 PM)ZJ:^eah,lcan't say I'd ever enlist, for that reason in particular

l^^ge2of39

(7:50:27 PM)bradass87:yes, but seeing as it will get me through college, andigetabit more ofastory...maybe its worth it ^L (7:50:54 PM)bradass87:anyway,sorry to bore ya with my story ^P (7:51:10PM) ZJ:No problem...my life story isn't nearly as interesting :P (7:52:01PM) ZJ: I've lived around here my whole life, dropped out ofhigh school whenlwas 14, nowlmake websites for people (7:52:56 PM)bradass87:ah,why did you drop out (7:53:58 PM)ZJ:High school was an intensely unpleasant experience, everyone was at least2 years older thanlwas and they were difficult to relate to, nobody there seemed to be interested in actually learning anything, and by the timelwas done with sophomore year my grades were so bad they put me in summer school (7:54:10PM) ZJ:ldidn't care to waste anothertwo years there (7:54:34 PM)bradass87:ah, yes, being gifted inapublic education system sucks ass (7:54:50 PM)ZJ:^oyeah,Ijust got my ged last year (7:56:06 PM)bradass87:iwas lucky enough to go through the private british curriculmfi^r secondary education, so my experience wasalittle better...finished that up atl6, but thenturmoil came once again (7:56:41PM) ZJ:^ometimesIwonderhowlwould've done inadifferent system (7:59:54 PM)bradass87: well, in the systemiwas in, the pupils were seperated in classes by their determined ability from the previous year...they called them sets...ifyou showed ability in aparticular subject, you would be placed inahigher "set" with other pupilsof similar ability and interest, the lower sets spent more time on teaching the basics to uninterested or unruly pupils, and the higher sets would teach more interesting, extra stuff, with the middle sets teaching bythe-book (8:01:25 PM)ZJ: Oh yeah, we had that, there were honors classes, academic classes, and basic classes (8:01:58 PM)ZJ: Initially they just put me in all the honors classes butldidn't really feel like doing the work because it was repetitive and uninteresting, so they moved me to the academic classes (8:02:05 PM)ZJ:needless to say that didn't really help anything l^^ge3of39

(8:03:12PM) bradass87:lol, dont worry,even in britainiflunked math in sell,and won second in the f^l^ mathematical challenge... my teacher HATED that, he routinely called me out for being sucha"yank" (8:04:37 PM)bradass87: oh well, stuffhappens...gotta get through it, and then try to fix it when you get in the position to (8:04:52 PM)ZJ:yeah (8:05:12PM) ZJ:l've always learnt better on my own,lwas always learning more afl^er school thanldidwhilelwas in school (8:05:35 PM)ZJ:kindawhylhaven'tsigned up forthecommunitycollegearoundhereyet,it's not likeacommunity college has courses on information theory (8:05:45 PM)ZJ:the highest class they have is "microsol^ office" (8:05:53 PM)bradass87: ick (8:06:08 PM)ZJ:solfigure it's not really worth wasting money on (8:07:20 PM)bradass87:same thing with me, imreadingalot more, delving deeper into philosophy,art, physics, btology,politicstheniever did in school...whats even better with my current position is thatican apply whatileam to provide more information to my officers and commanders, and hopefiilly save lives...ifigure that justifies my sudden choice to this (8:08:02 PM)ZJ:yeah,Ijust research whatever interests me (8:08:08 PM)bradass87::) (8:08:23 PM)ZJ:lmight end up taking some classes on math just to get up to speed,ldropped out beforelcould take precalc (8:10:25 PM)bradass87: community college sucks,ispentasemester at montgomery college in maryland...shuffling2and 1/2 jobs and covering old topics, and still not being able to afford it... it didnt pay off (8:11:09 PM)bradass87:ihopeican^OMEHO^ get intoanice university and study physics forabachelorsormasters(doctorateifim smart enoughs) (8:12:49 PM)bradass87:anyway,its nice meeting ya^P (8:13:00 PM)bradass87:isentyouafacebook request (8:13:llPM)ZJ:yeah,laddedyou

1^8ge^of39

(8:14:23 PM)bradass87:ah thank you...im not exactlyademocrat btw...ijust knowthe^...^ stonewall dems intimately well^-) (8:16:08 PM)ZJ:lol,niffy (8:17:14PM) bradass87:ihave long arms andawide footprint, despite my low profile near military installations (8:19:04 PM)bradass87: so where do you plan on going from where you are now7 (8:20:48 PM)ZJ:ldon'tknow,really (8:20:55 PM)ZJ:I've never been good with long-term planning (8:21:06 PM)ZJ:lmean,lcan make plans...it's the execution part that trips me up (8:21:17PM) bradass87:ah yes, of mice and men (8:25:13 PM)bradass87: my plan is pretty simple but vague... get credentials, nice ones... ones that make it difficult for really creepy conservative people to attack... then jtnnp into politics (8:25:35 PM)ZJ:ldon't know ifl'dget involved with politics...activism, maybe (8:26:53 PM)bradass87:activism is fun (8:27:13 PM)bradass87:itdoesnt do much unless you get heard, however... (8:30:52 PM)bradass87:worringly,"terrortsts"areaform of political activist, however, they recruit yoLtng people with troubled lives(asick family member, extremely poor upbringing, etc^ offer themamonetary solution, take them intoacamp, give them psychoactive drugs, ^syhologically drug them li^r many months, give them an explosivejacket or rigged vehicle, give them heavy doses ofuppers and send them on their way to try and kill themselves...ifthey go through with it(which is what the uppers are supposed to do) (8:32:22 PM)bradass87:most of the time though, they just getapoor person, and pay them money to place roadside bombs (8:32:54 PM)bradass87:its socio-economic, ratherthanreligous (8:33:27PM)ZJ:yeah (8:33:30 PM)ZJ:it'satragedy (8:35:53 PM)bradass87:we try our best to keep it from beingatragedy,thats what all the infrastructure, schools, elections, and military training out there is for

l^^geSof39

(8:37:09 PM)bradass87:aye...my headhunt (8:38:16PM) bradass87:blah,italkalot (8:38:29 PM)ZJ:ldon'tmind (8:38:48 PM)bradass87:thanks^) (8:40:32 PM)bradass87: so what are you doing now7^P (8:40:38 PM)ZJ: Making dinner:p (8:40:52 PM)bradass87: oh sorry,do you need time to eat7 (8:41:00 PM)ZJ:NahIjust bring itto my desk, lol (8:41:17PM)bradass87:efltcent (8:41:28 PM)bradass87:just dont get sticky or greasy keys, yuck (8:41:36 PM)ZJ:^eahl'm careful aboutthat (8:41:41PM) ZJ:lcan'tstandmoststickythings (8:41:54 PM)bradass87: cant blame ya (8:44:02 PM)bradass87:ilove taking any break from this life...ipromisedmyselfi'dgo to Chicago beforeideploy to afghanistan (november-januarytimefrime) (8:44:37 PM)bradass87:idoalakeshore drive run...from grant park to lincoln park (8:48:12 PM)ZJ:stay safe in afghanistan, dude :^ (8:55:58 PM)bradass87:ohiwill try (8:57:06 PM)bradass87:im more concemed about making sure that everyone, soldiers, marines, contractor, even the local nationals, get home to their families (8:57:26PM)ZJ:yeah (8:58:52 PM)bradass87:ifeelagreat responsibility and duty to people...its strange,iknow (8:59:03 PM)ZJ:nah,lunderstand (9:00:18PM) bradass87:iapprectatethat,igetalot of puzzled looks and c^uestions from people

l^age^of39

(9:01:10PM) bradass87: so, whats yourO^ of choice7 (9:01:20 PM)ZJ: I'm onXPrightnow (9:01:26PM)ZJ:butlused2000untillastyear (9:01:42 PM)bradass87: do you speak linux (9:01:56 PM)ZJ: my only experience with linux is when sshing into webservers (9:02:21 PM)bradass87: ah yes, ssh... the good'ol days... (9:02:45 PM)ZJ:whenIgetanewcomputerlmight install linux on this one (9:03:07 PM)bradass87:military is all f d up...contracts with closed source developers with incompatible sof^are... drives me Nf^T^ (9:03:29 PM)ZJ:that is ridiculous, it's hard to ensure security when the source is unavailable (9:03:53 PM)bradass87:y6S, even worse its o^en lowest bidder... (9:05:03 PM)bradass87:used to be the cream of the crop...now its outdated non-backward compatible suites ofbuggy software that were originally used l^r civilian purposes, then modified for military but not exactly thoroughly tested (9:05:36 PM)bradass87:then they get contractors who dont know anything about computers to teach it... (9:06:42 PM)bradass87:and its all OI^^,be69U96 we c^t exactly 6^^ because the sofl^ware which bugs out is ofl:en times onmachines which are staoiped with bigred SECRET stickers (9:06:57PM) ZJ:thafsprettylame (9:07:12 PM)bradass87:itis,itis (9:07:52 PM)bradass87: but, luckilyiuse my DC contacts fi^om Starbucks and get the word out to those higher up in the chain... (9:08:15PM) bradass87: its not what y'know,its who y'know^-) (9:08:56 PM)ZJ:Ican imagine two guys in sunglasses meeting atastarbucks to quickly hand over an envelope... just to get some minor bug repaired

^^ge^of39

(9:10:32 PM)bradass87: lol, glamorous, but no...its more likeiknewthis It colonel from the DIA at Starbucks beforeiwas in the military...slept with him once or twice, theniget in the military,inotice the problems, call him and say,hey,ftnd someone who can fix this (9:12:45 PM)bradass87:in public eye, I^S Intel services are mysterious^ in the real world, intelligence isagoofy,clunky,and annoying process, slowly adapting and getting streamlined (9:12:53 PM)bradass87:int6llipedi9:^D (9:14:26 PM)ZJ: oh yeah,Iheardaboutthat (9:14:29 PM)ZJ:do6sitworkwelI7 (9:16:11PM) bradass87: its sloooooow... they need more servers and bandwidth, and there needs to be more people that are actually interested in online collaboration to add stuff through that disemination channel, but yes, the concept works and is slowly becoming useful (9:17:32 PM)bradass87: so, got any fun clients7 (9:19:16PM) ZJ:notreally,just like minor artists who needasite to show their work (9:21:30 PM)bradass87: brings back so many memories...beingawebdev for some clients, its hilarious...alot of them show you what they want...you roll your eyes and tell them what they actually want, they say they really dont want to veer from that idea, do what you intended anyway,and then they are like:ididn't know that you could do that (9:22:05 PM)ZJ:mine want the worst color schemes, andltry to make it work well but you can only do so much with some colors, but they like it anyway (9:23:59 PM)bradass87:there are so many factors that laymen dont thit^abouL..readability fi:^r typeface si^es,availabltty of typefaces on certain machines, colorblindness,varying monitor sizes, and general aesthetic (9:29:59 PM)bradass87:ispent most of my free time working onasuite of tools: AJAX tools fordynamicpages,PHP/MySt^Eappsforserversidecontent,XMERPCframeworkfor communicating between the front end AJAX and the database, and thenasuiteoftools for Flash usingtheXMERPC (9:30:55 PM)ZJ:yeah,ldon'treally do flash^a^axstuff,mostofthetime it's juststatictemplates, mys^l for the more complicated stuff (9:31:44 PM)bradass87:ilike to joke was web 2.0 before web 2.0^Pwebl9beta7 (9:32:05 PM)ZJ: webNaN

^age^of39

(9:34:29 PM)bradass87: but it was company ftinding and lack ofmanpower that killed my job at zoto...flickr creamed us because my boss wasamarketing retard...and my video hosting project f:^rzoto,ahard sell for my boss being an intern...was just an untested theory.and an engine to convert uploaded videos and stream them through Flash... tumed out another company took that torch and ran with it (9:34:53 PM)ZJ:youtube^ (9:35:07PM) bradass87:ofcourse^^P (9:36:16PM) bradass87: not bad foral7y/otho,icame out withaconcept engine and framework...iguess an alpha version, to show to my boss about the same time as youtube went beta (9:36:37PM) ZJ:that'sprettyneat (9:38:30 PM)bradass87:yeah, but...its all history...inventions are something that one person does and its all them, they are about who discovers them first... tomedison takes credit for inventing the lightbulb^ but there were many people working on the idea ofincandecent electric lighting willing to take that claim for themselves (9:39:18PM) bradass87: but hereiam, four years later (9:39:59 PM)bradass87:alot ofthat creative energy has subsided...its still there, its just waiting...ihope (9:41:48 PM)bradass87:im surprised you havent asked the usual c^uestion: why isagay, libertarian, atheist, computer nerd in the army (9:42:02 PM)ZJ:well^l69t^S66whyyot^'dl^v6 your rea^ (9:42:15PM) ZJ: ifyou can use it to your advantage and help otherpeople, that's cool (9:42:28 PM)ZJ:it does seem like an interestingjob, army thing asid6 (9:42:32 PM)bradass87:iguess..^ (9:43:20 PM)bradass87: oh its fascinating, but it sucks on the count of recieving credit and^ niovingup (9:43:52 PM)bradass87:wesharealot:) (9:46:47 PM)bradass87:^^hmm,shouldiorderpizza7 (9:47:05 PM)ZJ:dependsifit'sfromagood pizza place

l^^ge9of39

(9:47:18PM) bradass87:dominoes pizza, fort drum...xD (9:47:28 PM)bradass87: its, often okay (9:48:11PM) bradass87:actually,ill try and orderasandwich...if only subway or ^uizznos delivered (9:48:18PM) bradass87:omg, if Starbucks delivered xD (9:48:22 PM)ZJ:^uiznos has good meatball subs (9:51:43 PM)bradass87:yay,dominos sandwich on its way,ihope it was worth it (9:52:21 PM)bradass87:what time do you normally go to bed7 (9:52:30 PM)ZJ:usually early in the moming and sleep all day (9:52:43 PM)ZJ: I've always been that way for some reason (9:52:55 PM)bradass87:im naturally noctemal (9:53:15 PM)ZJ:Ilove the night, it's dark and ^uietandlcan be alone (9:55:08 PM)bradass87:but,imust wake up for PTat 0650 every moming, do my few miles of running, cardio,or muscular strength and endurance training with the rest ofthe section for over an hour, go to my barracks room, shower, get in my uniform, and go to the office for the day, with an hour andabit for lunch, andinormally get into my room byl730 (9:55:29 PM)bradass87:weekdays tho...weekends, anything goes ^D (9:56:14PM) ZJ:yeah,Ihaven't had to be onaregular schedule forawhile (9:56:25 PM)ZJ:school was difficult becauselhad trouble getting to sleep early (9:56:45 PM)bradass87:the digital existence (9:56:57 PM)ZJ:the intemet is24/7 which is perfect for me (9:59:33 PM)bradass87:theam^y took me,awebdev,threw me intoarigid schedule, removed tne fi^om my digital self and threw me in the forests of missoLtriforlOweeks with an old M-16 i^agan era load bearing equipment, and 50 twanging people hailing from places likeTexas, Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi... joy (9:59:51 PM)ZJ:well that sounds...interesting (10:00:14PM) bradass87:ohi^ was...but frightening atthe same time l^^ge^0of39

(10:02:03 PM)bradass87:being around my platoon for 24hoursaday...it took them awhile, but they started figuring me out, making fitnofme, mocking me, harassing me, heating up with one ortwophysic9lattack9...whi6hif6ndedoffjustfio6^butitwasscary (10:03:02 PM)bradass87:damn,ijust read that...what the hell didiput myself through (10:03:19PM) ZJ:yeah,ldoubt I'd everjoin the military (10:03:40 PM)bradass87:firstthey'dcuturhurr (10:04:08 PM)bradass87: scream at ya, tell you what to do... correct your every eyetwitch (10:05:39 PM)bradass87:itservesasimple purpose tho:asense of Lmity,duty,andadisciplio6 ^oactcalmlyinstressft^lsituations (10:06:08 PM)bradass87:imsorry,ijust keep talking and talking (10:06:14PM)ZJ:oh,ldon'tmind (10:06:47PM) bradass87:im sure youc^relatesomewhattho (10:06:56PM)ZJ:yeah (10:10:15 PM)bradass87:iactuaIlybelievewhatthearmytriestornal^^^ diverse place fttll ofpeople defending the country...male, ^male, black, white, gay,straight, christian, jewish,asian, old oryoung, it doesnt matter to me^ we all wear the same green tinifi^rm...but its stillamale-dominated,christian-right, oppressive organization, withafew hidden jems of diversity (10:10:41PM) ZJ:yeah, that's kindawhatlthought, from reading about it (10:11:34 PM)bradass87:ithinkimightwriteabookwheniget older (10:11:50 PM)ZJ:writingisfun (10:12:01 PM)bradass87:itis^) (10:12:36 PM)bradass87:iused to haveablog and youtube vlog...butihad to delete for secLtrity reasons... (10:13:15PM) bradass87:thesedays,iwork through proxies, im the anecdotal evidence in many ofmy friends blogs^) (10:14:31PM) bradass87:ihope you getadecent pay from yotn^ design work (10:14:40 PM)ZJ:yeah,it'sdecent
1^8ge^^of39

(10:15:24 PM)bradass87:thats good (10:16:55 PM)bradass87:you should get into college and give it your best shot...just think about the fact that someone like me is spending 4 years in the military jtist to get the opportunity

(10:17:19PM) ZJ:yeah,it'sabig investment, I'd have to be sure to find the right one (10:19:23 PM)bradass87:im not scared of aiming high...iknow its all the same stuff you leam, ^ut those f^ncy sounding colleges can take your career fiirther if careftil...l^Cberkeley,camegie mellon,MIT,university of Chicago (10:19:42 PM)bradass87:caltech,et6 (10:19:50 PM)bradass87:comell^) (10:20:07 PM)ZJ:yeah,Iremember whenlwas 12 and just starting high school the counselors Were like "so what are yotn^ plans f:^r college" and it was like,Ididn't even know anything ABOl^T college (10:20:31PM) ZJ:soljust went along with what they said andlwas like "okay I'm going to graduate when I'ml6and go to MIT and beamathematician and workfortheNSA^" (10:20:41PM) ZJ: can you believelactuaiiy believed that forawhile :p (10:21:04 PM)bradass87:SIGfNT^soundsfun^butisterriblyboringintheend... (10:22:35 PM) bradass87:ithink fulfilling childhood dreams can be ftin, but imleaming that i f you dont aim high, you ftrstly,dont achieve them, and secondly,you find your more ^realistic^ dreams to be tmrewarding... (10:24:04 PM)bradass87:iwant to be like my idols: richardfeynman, carl sagan,harveymilk^ etc (10:24:24 PM)ZJ:thatwouldbenice (10:25:55 PM)bradass87:its not the strongest of people who survive, its the ones most responsive to change (10:26:10PM) ZJ:didn't clarence darrow say something like that (10:26:34 PM)bradass87: close, darwin,just replacing people with species (10:26:43 PM)bradass87:ortheotherwayaround

l^^ge^^of39

(10:28:59 PM)bradass87:c^uestion: guantanamo bay,the closure is good, but what do we do about the detainees (10:29:43 PM)ZJ:whatlwant to know is^ are these people literally so dangerot^t^^^^^ be kept inalocation outside the country (10:30:03 PM)ZJ:altemately,are our own prisons in this country so insecure that they can't be relied on to keep prisoners imprisoned (10:33:01 PM)bradass87:well, some ofthem are actually pretty dangerous indeed...some of them weren't dangerous before, but are now in fact dangerous because we imprisoned them fo^ ^olong(don't^uote me on that, l^rthe love of my career), and others might, withalittle more ^an an apology would easily fit back into society...who's who...worryingly,you cant really tell (10:33:38 PM)ZJ:well, one thing's for sure, you can't keep people imprisoned forever without some kind of trial or charges (10:35:45 PM)bradass87:the reason thats dif^cult: the things we have tried them on are classified information, connected with other pieces of classified information...so ifatrial is ^one, it might have to be done in some kind ofmodifted trial, where pieces ofevidence which 8ireclassifiedarepresentedoti^yit^acl^^^ (10:36:11PM) bradass87:its all very weird and complicated (10:36:41PM) ZJ:andaconviction on the basis ofevidence thatnobodycanknowabouthold^ practically no credibility (10:36:58 PM)bradass87:mhmni i^lO:37:10PM)bradass87:itsabizarre situation (10:38:59 PM)bradass87:some ofthem are indeeddangerous, and those that have lefl have, and iasaliberal and someone against gitmo will tell you...yes, many of those previously released, ^ven though innocent before^ are ^uicli^yrecrtiited as leading figti^es for new win ^oups (10:39:18PM) ZJ: yeah thereare no easy answers fo this one (10:40:49 PM)bradass87:sometimesiwish it were all black and white like the mediaand politicians present it... him, he's the badguy,oh and he, he's the good guy...its all shades of blurry grey (10:48:29 PM)bradass87:is it gray or grey ^7 (10:48:38 PM)ZJ:either,lprefergrey

l^age^3of39

10:49:01 PM)bradass87:tsee "gray" is an americanism 10:49:59 PM)bradass87:istill write harbour and travelled the british way ^P 10:54:15PM) bradass87:probably heading to bed soon, eastem time here andidont want to throw my body all out of whack :P 10:55:16PM) bradass87:keeping my boyfriend informed on my status, he's my neuroscience ma^oratbrandeis 10:55:50 PM)ZJ:awesome, neuroscience is fitn stuff 10:56:07 PM)bradass87:it is...he's so zany and cute 10:57:50 PM)bradass87:he bought meadozen roses, andibought us matching ec^uality bracelets to wear 10:58:02 PM)bradass87:forvday 10:58:12PM)ZJ:aww,that'ssweet 10:58:31PM) bradass87:lol,he didnt shave tho...drives me nuts when he doesnt shave xD 10:58:43 PM)bradass87:httt^://r^hotos-e.akfbcdnnet/photos-ak-sncl/v888/229/42/1370640054/ nl370640054 30195476 4564ip^ 10:58:56 PM)ZJ:he'sacutie 10:59:08 PM)bradass87:unshaved: http://photos-e.ll.facebook.com/photos-llsncl/v888/229/42/1370640054/nl370640054 30193980 8080it^^ 10:59:47 PM)bradass87:cute,butscruffy^P 11:00:01 PM)ZJ: lol 11:00:52 PM)bradass87:he wins the arguement tho, because his stubble isntabrasive,whereas my5o'clock shadow is razorsharp 11:02:05 PM)bradass87:rawr,he outsmarts me all to of^en:) 11:05:01 PM)bradass87:anyway,im going into semisleep mode, it was great talking to you,i hope we can chat again sometime, give meamessagewhenever,ilike to keep in contacts) 11:08:32 PM)ZJ:alright,later:)

l^8ge^^of39

(11:08:54 PM)bradass87:keep posting videos tho,you're onto something, b t w : ) (11:09:13 PM)bradass87:g'night Conversation with bradass87at2/22/2009 6:35:00 PMonZJemptv(aim) (6:35:00 PM)bradass87: hi (6:35:09 PM)ZJ:Hi (6:35:24 PM)bradass87:are you familiar with thunderfOOt (6:35:45 PM)ZJ: isn't he that really popular atheist on youtube (6:35:52 PM)bradass87:yes (6:36:38 PM)bradass87:tumsouthe'shavinganissue with youtubeoverthevotebots,and they suspended his account: http://^^^^vw.voutube.com/watch7v^r2EA^^l^^A (6:37:31PM) ZJ:wow,did they even bother to explain why (6:37:49 PM)bradass87: community violation (6:38:02 PM)ZJ: what the hell isa"community violation" that could be anything (6:38:16PM)bradass87:exactly,watch the video, it explains (6:47:39 PM)bradass87: conceming, huh7 (6:47:56 PM)ZJ:yeah (7:44:05 PM)bradass87:hey (7:44:09 PM)ZJ:sup (7:44:20 PM)bradass87:meh,weekend is ending (7:44:29 PM)bradass87:backto the grind... (7:45:34 PM)bradass87: gotta get up, stand around in formation for awhile, doalittle miming, takeashower, and then tomorrow,ihave been scheduled to rec^ualify with the M4 at the firing range ...ugggh (7:45:53 PM)ZJ:man, it's been years since I've usedagun

1^8ge^Sof39

(7:46:47PM) bradass87:itsarifled carbine, buthey,youdontgetyelledatifyou call itagun xD (7:47:03 PM)ZJ:yeahsee,Idon't know anything about them^:P (7:47:18PM) bradass87:which is good (7:47:27 PM)bradass87:you shouldn't, you don't really need to...^) (7:47:57 PM)ZJ:yeah,lfigureifldon'tneedagun, my life is going pretty well PlCl^f^P (7:48:06 PM)bradass87:^) (7:51:08 PM)bradass87:rattattat tattat rattattat.rattattat.tattat...rattattat..tattat...tattat...

(7:51:34 PM)bradass87: its going to drive me crazy ^z (7:53:06 PM)bradass87:whats the weather like in chi7 (7:53:15PM) ZJ: cold, it was snowing the other day (7:53:19PM) ZJ:now it's just freezing (7:53:41PM) bra gtdass87: its windy, withalight sleet (7:54:08 PM)bradass87:lake effect drop zone: oswego,pulsaki,watertown, and fort dmm (7:54:18PM) bradass87:180 inches this year :eyeroll: (8:24:30 PM)bradass87:whatyou up to now7 (8:26:40 PM)ZJ:ohnothingmuch (8:27:08 PM)bradass87:^) (8:45:25 PM)bradass87:igive up, imbored...^P (8:45:39 PM)ZJ:yeah I'm trying to getapython program to work (8:45:46 PM)bradass87:eek^E (8:46:21 PM)bradass87: never beenabig fan of python, had muchoproblemo with memory leaks l^age^^of39

(8:46:42 PM)bradass87: doesn't benchmark well f:^r production either (8:47:58 PM)bradass87:stackless python wasagood fork, imho (8:48:15PM) ZJ:yeahIdon't really know anything about any of that I'm just leaming it (8:48:50 PM)bradass87: gotchya...what you leaming it for7 nothing specificitakeit7 (8:48:59 PM)ZJ:yeah no real reason just lor the hell ofit (8:49:12PM) bradass87:any current direction7what you trying to do7 (8:49:34 PM)ZJ:I'mjustplayingaroundwithit,currentlyusingsomereally basic genetic algorithms (8:49:42 PM)bradass87:ishee (8:51:16PM) bradass87:ilast used python at zoto...zoto runs AJAX front-end, PHP mediator. Python organizer fi:^r the Database and its BLOB image data (8:51:31PM) bradass87:ImageMagick for manipulation of the images (8:52:49 PM)bradass87:26 17 (8:53:49 PM)ZJ:yeah, something like that (8:54:04 PM)bradass87:windowsbinary7 (8:54:13 PM)ZJ:yeah (8:54:38 PM)bradass87:k (8:55:04 PM)ZJ:lhavecygwin but it's kind of pointless since python on windows is like, the same thing (8:55:19PM) bradass87:cygwin kills memory (8:55:41PM) ZJ: open the python interpreter in cygwin, or in windows, it all seems to work the same (8:56:00 PM)bradass87:yes, but...cygwin mns it slower than the windows native (8:56:52 PM)bradass87: when writing production sofl^ware, speed and memory usage are the ultimate achilles heel

l^^ge^^of39

(9:02:47PM) bradass87:my computer just didaHARD crash, not even bluescreen, just went black and froze up(caps lock light didnt blink when key was pressed) (9:03:05 PM)ZJ:Iused to see that happen when it overheated (9:03:43 PM)bradass87:iwas installing the pyinterp (9:07:04 PM)bradass87: ok, went fine this time (9:08:44 PM)bradass87: Okies, im going to grab vim now (9:10:05 PM)bradass87:lol,ihaven't played around with programming fi:^rawhile^^^ (9:10:13 PM)ZJ:Itried figuring outvim (9:10:23 PM)ZJ: but there wasn't really much pointto it (9:10:25 PM)ZJ:sinceIhavescite (9:11:37 PM)bradass87: doesnt matter, some people will be emacs, some will be vim...imjusta native vimmer (9:11:55 PM)bradass87:inever have to touch the mouse with vim (9:12:54 PM)bradass87:ifeel like my inner child is coming out all ofasudden (9:15:48 PM)bradass87:can you throw me what you got ^o7 (9:16:38 PM)ZJ:what,scite7 (9:16:47 PM)bradass87:no,what you're working on^) (9:16:58 PM)ZJ:l'm only working on it because...it's not working right (9:17:10PM) ZJ:it's ridiculously bad, I'd be embarrassed for anyone else to see it (9:17:22 PM)bradass87:im not one to critique (9:18:01 PM)bradass87:imfascinated (9:18:17PM)ZJ:Ineedtogetitinorderftrst (9:26:13 PM)bradass87:whatsitdoing7 (9:26:33 PM)ZJ:lailing to evolve properly

l^^ge^^of39

(9:26:55 PM)ZJ:Imadeaclass for it when previously it was just an assortment offnnctions, but I've obviously messed something up in the process (9:27:40 PM)bradass87:ah yes, going fromarandom set ofloosely connected functions to an OOP method, not pretty (9:27:57 PM)bradass87:still got the assortment of functions7 (9:28:17PM) ZJ:somewhere around here (9:28:30 PM)bradass87: backup, dear, backups) (9:28:54 PM)bradass87:iusually try and move stuff over one fttnction atatime...tho you cant always do that (9:32:06 PM)bradass87::twiddles thumbs: (9:35:51PM) bradass87:print"rawr^" (9:36:52 PM)bradass87: ok, ill stop armoying you (9:37:00 PM)ZJ: lol (9:37:34 PM)bradass87:ijust want to help, you remind me of..well...me xD (9:38:01PM) ZJ:Ithink this program is beyond rescue, better to start from scratch literally sketching out every step ofit asaflowchart (9:38:08 PM)ZJ:right now it'sahelpless entanglement of confitsion (9:38:39 PM)bradass87:heehee, thats whatithoughtwhenireverseengineered my first content management system, php-nuke (9:39:07 PM)bradass87:how many lines is it7 (9:39:30 PM)ZJ: like 200,haha (9:39:34 PM)ZJ:I'mnewatthis (9:40:14PM) bradass87:^whistle^ phew...thatsawhole 2007 (9:40:31PM) ZJ:without braces like php and c, there are fewer wasted lines (9:40:41PM) bradass87:iknowzit:) (9:40:55 PM)bradass87:iremember when 200 lines of anything sounded likealot
^8ge^9of39

(9:41:15PM) bradass87:iwaslike,9...phasic (9:42:34 PM)bradass87:inever got the whole flowchart thing... (9:42:58 PM)bradass87:probablywhyineverreally got the whole using arithmetic to solve algebra either (9:45:04 PM)bradass87:im not trying to be fecicious,ijusthaveawildcuriousityandilove to help people (9:47:54 PM)bradass87:have you already started from scratch7 (9:48:22PM)ZJ:twice,lol (9:49:14PM) bradass87: is it built aroundalormula7 (9:49:36PM)ZJ:hardly (9:49:45 PM)ZJ:if you can call all ofthisaformula (9:49:50 PM)ZJ:formula makes me think of math (9:49:55 PM)ZJ:thereisn'tmuch math to this (9:50:19PM) bradass87:all programs are math^) (9:50:37PM) ZJ:in terms of shttnting symbols around, yeah (9:51:43 PM)bradass87: is itacontinuous loop (9:51:54 PM)ZJ: only until it finds the best answer (9:52:12PM) bradass87:20^uestions^P (9:52:51 PM)bradass87: is it built onaconcept by someone else7 (9:53:07 PM)ZJ:yeah, it's adapted from someone else's c^^ code forabasic genetic algorithm (9:53:37PM) bradass87:GAGS7 (9:53:48 PM)ZJ:dunnowhatthatmeans (9:54:53 PM)ZJ:the basic concept forthe one I've made is that you setatarget ofaspecific string ofbitsofacertain length, you generateapopulation of random bitstrings to begin with, each ofthem are evaluated withafitness function to see how well-adapted they are which is just how many points at which it matches the target string
I^^ge20of39

(9:55:04 PM)ZJ: i f i t matches all ofthem, it wins and the whole thing is over (9:55:21 PM)ZJ: but if none ofthem do, it uses crossover recombination and mutation to generateanew generation (9:55:22 PM)bradass87:aha (9:55:33 PM)bradass87:isee how that would work (9:55:42 PM)ZJ:so they just get closer and closer to the target, you can actually see it happening, until one ofthem finally gets it right (9:55:59 PM)bradass87:gui or cmdline7 (9:56:05 PM)bradass87:cmdiassume (9:56:13 PM)ZJ: command line,Idon't know enough python for guis yet (9:56:27PM)bradass87: dont (9:57:16PM) bradass87: but this isac,c^^ guy saying that, soihaveahuge bias ^D (9:58:09 PM)bradass87: so its justasimple genetic algorithm in python:-) (9:58:14PM) ZJ:yeah (9:58:32 PM)ZJ:not even really an algorithm, the bit string would supposedly beachromosome that codes forase^uence of operations (9:58:36PM)ZJ:analgorithm (9:58:42 PM)ZJ:butIhaven'tprogressedthatfaryet (9:58:52 PM)bradass87: base four7 (9:59:37 PM)ZJ:theprogramIcopied it from used sequences of4bits to indicate numbers or basic arithmetic operations (9:59:57PM) bradass87::) (10:00:06PM) bradass87:suchfiin^^^ (10:00:10PM) bradass87:^ crazy (10:00:15 PM)ZJ:yeah,whenitworks

^8ge2^of39

10:00:35 PM)bradass87:10000 failures are worth the success sometime 10:02:14PM) bradass87:y'know whats kind of silly,but practical, and potentially moneymaking, is finding prime ntnnber sequencing 10:06:13 PM)bradass87:thatwasaprojectidid back in...late 037 10:06:55 PM)bradass87:finding prime numbers with past so many digits, theresareward for finding one and confirming it 10:08:42 PM)bradass87:looks like someone actually won that last august, with 13 million digits, f^CLA 10:10:07 PM)ZJ: oh yeah, mersetme prime search 10:10:16PM) bradass87:mhmm 10:10:59 PM)bradass87:mine was written inc, it wasalotsimplerthan GIMPS, but clunkier andunveriliable 10:11:50 PM)bradass87:you dabble much in crypto7 10:11:57 PM)ZJ:notreally,no 10:12:07 PM)ZJ:Iftgure my information isn't important enough for anyone to steal 10:12:30 PM)bradass87:Rijndael (AES) kicksass^P 10:12:49 PM)bradass87:12years, not been broken 10:14:03 PM)bradass87:thats what we(thegovemment)use 10:14:14PM) ZJ:yeah, I've heardaboutthis 10:15:04 PM)bradass87:what really sucks tho, is the fact that since, we cant break it...because we use it, but its public... so everyone else uses it... 10:15:24 PM)bradass87:so, that causes issues 10:16:58 PM)bradass87 is offering to send file rijndael.cpp 10:17:09 PM)bradass87:this is my implementation ofit... 10:17:20 PM)ZJ: my file transfer doesn't work on pidgin, itjust locks up the entire system 10:17:32PM) bradass87:ah,ishee
1^8ge22of39

(10:17:34 PM)bradass87 canceled the transferofrijndael.cpp (10:18:09 PM)bradass87:its justasimple implementation of rijndaelimade,soicould try and figure outaway to break it (10:18:25PM) bradass87:^phailz (10:19:01 PM)bradass87:ishould probably go to bed and stop bombarding you with nonsense (10:19:08 PM)ZJ:oh,Idon'tmind (10:19:37 PM)bradass87:lol,iguess my nonsense is better than someone elses nonsense (10:22:13 PM)bradass87:4865781f^0626162791f^06865782e (10:48:06 PM)bradass87:goodnight (10:48:17PM)ZJ:gnight Conversation with bradass87 at 2/27/20095:23:18PM on ZJemptv(aim) (5:23:18PM) bradass87:hola (5:23:26 PM)ZJ: sup (5:23:42 PM)bradass87: its the weekend, yay (5:24:28 PM)bradass87:ftnished producing my brief fbr brigade staff meeting on monday,all settochillaxfortwodays^) (5:24:44 PM)ZJ: cool (5:25:17PM) bradass87: snow is finally melting here...ican see the ground again ^D (5:25:30 PM)ZJ:we're still gettingalittle snow here (5:25:58 PM)bradass87:we've had snow on the ground since thanksgiving weekend...icried whenisaw my first patch of mud (5:26:58 PM)bradass87:so hows life7 (5:27:05 PM)ZJ:pretty good (5:27:09 PM)ZJ:leamingtkinter (5:27:26 PM)bradass87: fun
l^^ge23of39

(5:27:48 PM)bradass87:ilostalot of money on the market today (5:27:58 PM)ZJ:ohdear (5:29:35 PM)bradass87:ibankedalot of money on the possibility citigroup's govemment deal was going to mean bailout money for the bank, but the govemment wasnt going to takea preferred stake...they tooka38^ preferred stake, and the already dying price dropped 40^ (5:30:27 PM)bradass87: looks like ill be holding my stake for several months, rather thanafew days (5:31:27 PM)bradass87:idid buy more citi shares while its still so low...its not going to go out ofbusiness, so the price will go up eventually (5:31:38 PM)ZJ:yeah,mighttakeawhile (5:32:10PM)bradass87: my advice: don't play the market (5:32:29 PM)bradass87:you can make money i^uickly...but you can lose it just as ^uick (5:32:55 PM)ZJ:Idon't have enough money to bother with that anyway :P (5:33:23 PM)bradass87:istartedwith^l500..ihaveabout ^850 now^^^ (5:33:45 PM)ZJ:lthinklhadlike^l3000 in stocks before this whole economything (5:33:50 PM)ZJ:now it's been cut in half (5:33:59 PM)bradass87:heh, hold on to what you got (5:34:34 PM)bradass87: if you're already playing the game, then go ahead and B1^^,B1^^, BI^^... it'll never be this easy and affordable to play the market (5:35:09 PM)bradass87: improbably going to dumpagood portion of my next paycheck into the market, too (5:38:32 PM)bradass87:im getting the vibe you're an introvert7 (5:38:56 PM)ZJ:Idon'tknow,is that likeahard-and-fast distinction that can be determined (5:39:21 PM)bradass87:itcan be (5:39:40 PM)bradass87:ipsychoanalyze too much tho (6:10:50 PM)bradass87:rawr^...whats going on in chi-town

1^8ge2^of39

(6:11:23 PM)ZJ:lol,notverymuch (6:11:44 PM)bradass87: big city,lots of suburbs...c'mon, something (6:11:59 PM)bradass87:closest thing to civilization for me is syracuse70 miles south ^P (6:12:53 PM)ZJ:yeah,Idon't go downtown much (6:12:58 PM)ZJ:just during Christmas (6:13:07 PM)bradass87:take the opportunity (6:13:16PM) bradass87:imean:TAI^ETHEOPPORTl^IT^ (6:14:00 PM)bradass87:the streets ofthe downtown ma^or cities are the most fantastic place in this country (8:35:53 PM)bradass87:^ou heard about this right http://w^vw.silencit^^chiistians.com/ (8:36:04 PM)ZJ:yeah,notthatI'vewatchedit (8:36:41PM) bradass87:im slowly watching pieces ofit,ican only takeafew minutes atatime (8:37:19PM) ZJ:fascistswithapersecutioncomplex,what else is new (8:38:17PM) bradass87:flashy graphics, btizzwords,andagreener "save the environment" ethic (8:38:47PM) bradass87:rick warren reference in there :P (8:39:31PM) bradass87:afuzzy warm and friendly fascist is stillafascist,right7 (8:39:47 PM)ZJ:fascismwithasmiley face (8:41:07 PM)bradass87: Love your family.Recycle.I^ill Jews. (7:39:00 PM)bradass87:have you seen Andromedas^ake's first few vids ofthe "welcome to the f^niverse" series yet7 (7:40:05 PM)ZJ:Ihaven't (7:40:19PM) bradass87: http:^/www.^outube.com/watch7v^M5McvNTdEAE^feature^channeI pa^e^--trailer (7:40:35 PM)bradass87:http://wwwyoutubecom/viewp^aylist7p^lBCD9A77E08118F8^-playlist(vidland2)

l^^ge25of39

(7:41:23 PM)ZJ:awesome (7:52:55 PM)bradass87: its gorgeous^) (2:35:53 AM) bradass87:ithinkim going to make my own videos) (2:36:57 AM)ZJ:cool (2:37:04 AM) ZJ:it'sdefinitelyworthit (2:37:11 AM) bradass87:im downloading adobe after effects (2:37:44 AM) bradass87:"Propensity^Intent" (2:38:10AM) bradass87: it'll beahistory,current status of^ and call for repeal ofDADT... (2:38:33 AM) bradass87:narrarative rather than vlog (2:39:08 AM) ZJ:sounds good Conversation with bradass87 at 3/2/2009 12:53:19AM onZJemptv(aim) (12:53:19AM) bradass87: sleep isacrutch:P (12:58:34 AM) ZJ:lstay awake too long and then crash (12:58:44 AM) bradass87:heehee (12:58:50 AM) bradass87: sounds like the life (12:59:07AM) bradass87: intelligent people just cant sleep these days (12:59:18AM) bradass87:when so much information is available all the time (12:59:27 AM)ZJ:yeah (12:59:57AM) bradass87: so what are we working on tonight7 (1:00:09 AM)ZJ:watching24:D (1:00:32 AM) bradass87:ithink jack bauer is going to save the day,afl^er 22 plot twists of course (1:00:42 AM)ZJ:we'll see :P (1:00:57AM) bradass87:istopped watching afier season4

^^ge28of39

(1:01:12 AM) ZJ: but that means you missed out on5:^ (1:01:13 AM) bradass87:and now that im living the Intel life, its even less likelyiwill do so (1:01:27AM) ZJ:Ilove their techno jargon (1:01:31AM) ZJ: open upasocket^ (1:01:57AM) bradass87:my favorite cliche in movies and television (1:02:08 AM) bradass87:the military command room (1:02:55 AM) bradass87: everything is so sleek and high tech, multiple screens, bright lights, and lots ofspace, huge amounts ofit (1:04:30 AM) bradass87:inreality,itsadimly lit room crowded to the point you cant move an inch without having to quietly say "excuse me sir" "pardon me sergeant ma^or"... cables trip you up everywhere, papers stacked everywhere... (1:04:58 AM) ZJ:daylisfi^om2001,ithasn'texactly aged well (1:05:05 AM) ZJ:Iforgot how big cell phones were back then (1:05:29 AM) bradass87:ijust think back to my father's motorola (l:05:50AM)bradass87:hegaveittomewhenheboughtanewonewheniwasakid (1:05:59 AM)ZJ:wasitthestartac7 (1:06:51 AM) bradass87:itwasa^5000, 21b brick...the biggest part wasabattery...ipretended it wasamachinegun, the antanna was its barrel, and the battery was its ammo clip xD (1:07:01 AM)ZJ:hahah (1:07:29 AM) bradass87: oh no, much older (1:07:53 AM) ZJ:Iremember my uncle hadastartac, we were like "that'saphone7but it's so tiny^" (1:08:17AM) bradass87:http://www.oaktreeent.con^web^hotos/Telephones/ Motorola Brick Cell Phone web.jpg it was this^^^ (1:08:58 AM) ZJ: it would be awesome ifeveryone had one ofthose nowadays and they were always jabbering away on it in public (1:09:18AM) bradass87:http:^/et^wikipedia.org/wikt/Motoro^aDynaTAC ^^ge^^of39

1:09:40 AM) bradass87:lol 1:10:38 AM) bradass87: brings back memories 1:12:17AM) bradass87:ihadafascination building stuff with lego, and with army stuff with ^reen and tan soldiers...ialso had handmedown dolls from my sister, barbie dolls... (1:12:36 AM) (1:12:52 AM) (1:13:53 AM) (1:14:20 AM) weird (1:14:48 AM) (1:14:59 AM) (1:15:02 AM) (1:15:04 AM) (1:15:07 AM) (1:15:16 AM) (1:15:25 AM) (1:15:35 AM) (1:15:42 AM) (1:15:46 AM) (1:16:14 AM) (1:16:37 AM) (1:16:48 AM) (1:17:01 AM) (1:17:36 AM)

l^^ge^8of39

l:17:41AM)ZJ:really7 1:17:47AM) bradass87: mhmm 1:18:42 AM) bradass87: we tooka^uiz together, one of those think of anyone in the woods things 1:19:28 AM) bradass87:well,when it came to who is most important to our lives,ianswered with his name 1:19:43 AM) bradass87: his response was god... 1:19:50 AM)ZJ: oh dear 1:20:09 AM) bradass87:awkward7 1:20:15 AM)ZJ:^uite l:20:33 AM)bradass87:ithasntbeenaproblemasofyet 1:21:06 AM) bradass87:butifigure down the line we might have to reconcile 1:21:31AM) ZJ:it usually comes up at some point 1:22:19AM) bradass87:he'saregularchurchgoer,adevout catholic, converted in his early teens, from jewish parents 1:22:45 AM) bradass87:iwas raised catholic, soiget the whole schpiel 1:23:40 AM) bradass87:butithink this isapointwhereitmly dont understand him... 1:24:14AM) bradass87:that tells me his faith obviously meansawhole lot to him 1:24:36 AM) ZJ:why would someone leave their religion, and then join another 1:24:50 AM) ZJ:ifyou've realized that one religion is false, how can you not extend that to every religion7 1:25:06 AM) bradass87:idontknow,idont have answers...ifidid,iwouldnt be fiizzled 1:27:04 AM) bradass87:this is the first time ive sensedaproblem...ijust hope itll be okay, becauseilovehim 1:27:36 AM) ZJ: I'm sure you two can work through it 1:27:51 AM) bradass87:mhmm, l^age29of39

1:28:15 AM) bradass87: it certainly caught me off guard tho 1:28:28 AM) bradass87:sinceiplace value on people first I:31:14AM)bradass87:my personal value to things in order: dirt/rocks/ice, single-celled organisms, plants, man-made objects,various animals, mammalian animals, people 1:31:29 AM) ZJ:that makes sense 1:31:35 AM) ZJ: gods wouldn't even enter the picture for me 1:31:42 AM) bradass87:me either 1:31:59 AM) ZJ: it's important only in the sense ofthe effects that the concept has on people 1:32:51 AM) bradass87: it just felt,weird...being his boyfriend, being in love with him, and feeling he is the most important person in the world to me, and then he places his faith above me 1:34:41AM) bradass87: as you can tell, it bothers mealittle...^^ 1:34:50 AM)ZJ:yeah 1:35:05 AM) ZJ:religion messes people up 1:35:14AM) ZJ: it corrupts their priorities in life 1:37:33 AM) bradass87:ive asked him about it before...he's nice about it, and he knows im far, far, from religous... but you're right, ive asked him about how he can reconcile his ways with his beliefs and he explains it in terms of'faith" and "feeling god"...ijust shrugged these off 1:52:14AM) bradass87: imsure jack bauer is doing some amazing stuff..teleporting across los angeles in minutes 1:52:40 AM) ZJ: someone actually madeasite to calculate that 1:52:51 AM) ZJ:where he was,where he was going, how long it took to get there 1:52:57AM) ZJ:and they would make realistic maps of this 1:53:06 AM) ZJ:at times he exceeded 600 mph 1:58:36 AM) bradass87:iknewaman who was withlstSFODD, commonly referred to as DeltaForce" 1:58:47AM)bradass87: scariestmanievermet

I^^ge30of39

(2:00:20 AM) bradass87: he would appear and disappear, hear and see stuff like where the hell did you find that out at, jump over fences withoutasound (2:00:23 AM) bradass87: just crazy stuff (2:01:03 AM) bradass87: he hadacombat knife with him at all times, he would throw it at wood and make it stick inside to scare you (2:01:26 AM) bradass87:iknow liars and fakes, but this guy was holy shit (2:02:59 AM) bradass87:would you call Ira^ and Afghanistan wars7 (2:03:20 AM)ZJ:notlike,a^^IIkindofwaroranything (2:03:29 AM) ZJ: depends on the criteria for war (2:03:39 AM) bradass87:iwas just thinking about howwe refer to them as wars, commonly (2:03:53 AM) bradass87:would say that there isa"war" in mexico7 (2:04:15 AM) bradass87: even though, more casualties from dmg cartel related violence are occuring there (2:04:32AM)ZJ:hmm (2:04:37 AM)ZJ:I'mnotsure,really (2:04:45 AM) ZJ: fbr either, you could use the more generic term conflict (2:04:45 AM) bradass87:iknow,its weird (2:05:12 AM) bradass87:iwas just thinking about that this moming.. (2:05:46 AM) bradass87:we've been watching carefttlly (2:06:09 AM) bradass87:since its in our back yard, of course (2:06:36 AM) bradass87:Sinaloa, Gulf, Eos Zetas, (2:07:39 AM) bradass87:6000killedlastyear,andthatsnottheACTl^AE total ^nudge^ (2:14:31AM) bradass87: oh fuck,ishouldsleep (2:14:35 AM) bradass87:gn'ight (2:14:38 AM) bradass87:g'night l^age3^of39

(2:14:43 AM)ZJ:gnight Conversation with bradass87 at 3/8/2009 6:05:59 PM on ZJemptv(aim) (6:05:59 PM)bradass87:doyouknowlatin7 (6:09:24 PM)ZJ:notreally,no (6:18:09 PM)bradass87:trying to leam...iam linguistically challenged (6:18:34 PM)ZJ:yeahItookacouple years ofit like...7years ago (6:18:37PM)ZJ:butIforgotit (6:19:05 PM)bradass87: conjugations... declinations or something like that... my head is about to explode (6:20:16PM) bradass87:puer,puella,vir,femina... (6:20:25 PM)bradass87:thats my knowledge inanutshell:-) (6:20:58 PM)bradass87:pueri,puellae,viri,feminae...just doubled my knowledge (2:36:56 AM) bradass87:hi (2:37:01AM)ZJ:sup (2:37:18AM) bradass87:heh,went to sleep early,andiwoke up in the middle of the night... yay7 (2:37:29 AM) ZJ:lollhate when thathappens (2:37:48 AM) bradass87: my head is spinning (2:38:18AM) bradass87:^sigh^ (2:38:40 AM) bradass87: ive got fi:^reign affairs on my mind constantly now... (2:39:31AM) bradass87:mexico's spiralling violence, Pakistan's instability,northkorea's rhetorical posturing... blah blah blah (2:40:20 AM) bradass87: one ofthe bad parts ofthejob, having to think about bad stu^ (2:40:48 AM) ZJ:I've just been catching up on24...Isuppose it's like foreign affairs for complete idiots

1^8ge32of39

(2:41:33 AM) bradass87:hehehe... well, thejason bourne club isnt as fttn as television and movies make it out to be (2:42:00 AM) bradass87: just readastate department release... (2:42:49 AM) bradass87:keepasmile on your face, andaknife behind your back (2:44:08 AM) bradass87:im going to boston this weekend, that might put my mind at ease for at leastamoment (2:45:07AM) ZJ:I've never been to boston, is it nice (2:46:28 AM) bradass87:its lovely...ispendalot of time in the college portions with my boyfriend...he goes to brandeisin^altham, Mass...we go to Cambridgealot when im there, where Harvard and MlTare Conversation with bradass87at3^22/2009 11:20:16PMonZJemptv(aim) (11:20:16PM) bradass87:heIlo (ll:22:37PM)ZJ:sup (11:22:49 PM)bradass87:latenight . (11:23:32 PM)ZJ: indeed (11:24:31PM) bradass87:im getting back into my programmer mode, albeit not deeply (11:26:35 PM)bradass87:im working on an htcidentTt^aekerformy unit, to update the c u r r ^ one we have^om the unit's last deployment (11:27:39 PM) bradass87: http://www.designerbrad.com/its/index.php (11:28:02 PM) bradass87: it gives me a chance tcrplay with php/mysql/ajax (11:30:20 PM) ZJ: nifty (11:31:19 PM) bradass87: its coming along nicely so far, i figure (11:31:34 PM) bradass87: heh, none of it is usable at all Conversation with bradass87 at 5/3/2009 8:29:34 PM on ZJemptv (aim) (8:29:34 PM) bradass87: in DC =D (8:29:59 PM) bradass87: hi, btw
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(8:34:47PM) ZJ:hi (8:36:36 PM)bradass87:taking classes in the day,playing politics in the evening (8:36:40 PM)bradass87:ilove this town (8:38:09 PM)bradass87:im attending two ma^or events...agavinnewsomgubematorial fiindraiser,thenastonewall democratscapitol championsthingie (8:38:33 PM)ZJ: sweet (8:39:11PM) bradass87: ive gotaphoto scheduled will gavinnewsom, and ill be hobnobbing with congressional folk at the other event (8:39:16PM) bradass87:^with (8:39:54 PM)bradass87: ill be sure to bring up issues regarding religion and homophobisa (8:40:07PM) bradass87: ^phobia Conversation with bradass87 at 8/1/2009 8:59:01 PMonZJemptv(aim) (8:59:01 PM)bradass87:howdiddly (8:59:30 PM)ZJ:sup (8:59:51 PM)bradass87: notmuch (9:00:12PM) bradass87:igot back from ft polk recently (9:00:29 PM)ZJ: cool (9:00:45 PM)bradass87:what have you been up to (9:01:08 PM)ZJ:right now I'm havingalive show on blogtv (9:01:26 PM)bradass87: oh wow (9:01:56 PM)bradass87:how long are you doing that for7 (9:02:05 PM)ZJ:forthenextllhoursorso (9:03:30PM)bradass87:ah,ishee...ifound the link, its connecting now (9:04:20 PM)bradass87:seem to be gettingalotofharassment^E

P8ge3^of39

(9:04:33 PM)ZJ: oh, they'realways like that (9:06:23 PM)bradass87:iused to doawebcamshowafew years ago...noone watched of course (9:09:01 PM)bradass87:where is everyone chattering to you from7 (9:09:14PM)ZJ: http://www.blogtv.eom/people/Z.lemptv (9:09:19PM) ZJ:thereisabox on the right side (9:09:56 PM)bradass87: had to refresh...iguess the page was broken (9:13:31PM) bradass87:ibriefedthe210BrigadeCombatTeam (BCT), Colonel Millerabout6 times during JRTC in Louisiana onaclassified webcam...of course it was buggy as all hell (9:13:39 PM)bradass87:my bad (9:13:42 PM)ZJ:noproblem (9:13:45 PM)ZJ:thislagslikehelltoo (9:13:51 PM)ZJ: because my system is slow (9:19:14PM) bradass87:sorry to AIM again: what do you plan on doingjobwise over the course ofthe next2years7 (9:19:29 PM)ZJ:probablygetajob at kmart or something (9:19:51 PM)bradass87:are you sure about that7 (9:20:36 PM)ZJ:no,Imight end up at walgreens... (9:21:47PM) bradass87:hmm...how about public relations7 (9:24:33 PM)bradass87:youhavetalent (9:24:41PM)ZJ:inpublicrelations7 (9:25:08 PM)bradass87:you're online with 66 viewers...you makealot of open and honest videos ^B^ (9:41:24 PM)bradass87:i'dlike to hire you/work with you in the fixture

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(9:41:47PM)ZJ:really7 (9:42:10PM) bradass87:yes (9:45:32 PM)bradass87:you probably think im crazy ^P (9:45:44 PM)ZJ:notnecessarily:P (9:46:22 PM)bradass87: indeed you are (9:47:53 PM)bradass87: how have you been supporting yourself, financially7 (9:50:19PM) ZJ: currently I'm living with my parents and doing odd jobs regarding technology (9:56:00 PM)bradass87:im not sure how my lifeis going to pan out overthe next 26 months..^ (9:57:11PM) bradass87:2months pre-deployment, 12monthsofiraq...and another 12month^ of recovery and garrison...all assumingidont get discharged underDADT...but the moment! leave the military,im planning on breaking out in all directions (9:57:46 PM)ZJ:man, stay safe iniraq (10:01:26 PM)bradass87:im an analyst,ishadowabrigadeconmiiander...also, the shia majority in the location we are going doesn't want to screw around with the l^S...theyre stockpiling fresh weapons...because the moment they leave, they plan on removing stmnis out of the region tothe southeast and northeast ofbaghdad (10:02:01 PM)bradass87:imtryin^to figure outawaytopreventacivilwarthe second v^e le^^e (10:02:47PM) ZJ:thatsoundsvery bad (10:03:22 PM)bradass87:if you're busy,ican leave you alone (10:03:47PM)ZJ:no,goahead (10:08:50 PM)bradass87:ican provide you with some training/support over the next few months for technical matters...if you would like... ^...^damnshilt tab wont let me finish (10:11:58 PM)bradass87:^shiflretum (10:16:28 PM)bradass87:ihopeim not creeping you out (10:16:34PM)ZJ: ofcoursenot Page36of39

10:49:40 PM)bradass87:have you been to the guitar center onNHalsted7 10:49:57 PM)ZJ: I've been toaguitar center butlsuck at directions so it may have been that one 10:50:48 PM)bradass87: haha, the only other one is in Gary someplace... so yes that was it... i worked there forabrief period of time during my travels inal992nissan pickup 10:51:02 PM)ZJ:Isee 10:52:01 PM)bradass87:any interest in an AJAX driven blog/content management system 10:52:19PM)ZJ:I'vedoneCMSesbutnotwitha)ax 10:53:26 PM)bradass87:ive built an XML RPC client/server engine,whichim currently using for the brigade event tracking system 10:54:20 PM)bradass87:itsamishmash of freetext data management, geospatial data management, and statistical data 10:55:37 PM)bradass87:iget this feeling like all ofit has business potential, but im stuck here ^sigh^ 11:04:07 PM)bradass87:im enjoying your debates^) 11:13:49 PM)bradass87:httt^://swisham^^.wordpress.com/boyfriend's blog 11:19:00 PM)bradass87:brian green-elegant universe —great resource 11:19:05 PM)bradass87:on string theory Conversation with bradass87 at 8/7/2009 10:30:22 PMonZJemptv(aim) 10:30:22 PM)bradass87:helloagain 10:30:31PM)ZJ:hi 10:30:37 PM)bradass87:whatyou up to7 10:32:04 PM)bradass87:^ahem^ 10:32:10PM) ZJ:probably gonna make some food,Ihaven't eaten all day 10:32:12 PM)bradass87:sorry,pressed wrong button somewhere 10:32:22 PM)ZJ:butIdid wake up onlyacouple hours ago
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(10:32:32 PM)bradass87:funfun (10:32:41PM) bradass87:itookanap earlier (10:33:11PM) bradass87:^sigh^ (10:34:59 PM)bradass87:idont mean to sound overdramatic,but im quite lonely (10:37:31PM)ZJ:aww (10:37:42 PM)bradass87:im okay Conversation with bradass87 at 8/8/2009 1:55:17AM on ZJemptv(aim) (1:55:17AM) bradass87: are you familiar with meyersbriggs7 (1:55:27AM) ZJ:the personality types7 vaguely yes (1:55:33 AM) bradass87: do you know yours7 (1:56:04 AM)ZJ:IthinkIwasISTJlasttimeIchecked (1:56:22 AM) bradass87:^ENTJ (2:01:12 AM) bradass87: blah —iwish there were something to do (2:03:23 AM) bradass87: everyone is asleep ^L Conversation with bradass87 at 8/10/2009 1:59:32 AM onZJemptv(aim) (1:59:31AM) bradass87:helloagain^D (1:59:43 AM)ZJ: sup (1:59:48 AM) bradass87: blah (1:59:56 AM) bradass87: another late night (2:00:03 AM)ZJ:yeah,same (2:00:27AM) bradass87:at least you're an hour behind me (2:01:39 AM) bradass87: do you know of"kalamazoo,michigan"7 (2:01:54 AM) ZJ: I've heard oftheplace

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(2:02:17AM) bradass87: lol,imight be going there in the next month or so... (2:02:40 AM) bradass87:its outthere

(2:02:51 AM) bradass87:butiguessim in the middle of nowhere as well (2:04:03 AM) bradass87: what do you thii^ ofthe olsen-boies lawsuit thing (2:04:19AM) ZJ:Idon'tknowifit's the best strategy (2:04:30 AM) ZJ: it seems like they could be riskingalot (2:04:35 AM) bradass87: mhmm (2:04:59 AM) bradass87:im thinking it hasawhole lot to do with ego (2:05:31AM) ZJ: it just seems weird olson would be involved with something like that (2:05:58 AM) bradass87: indeed... im very skeptical (2:06:27AM) bradass87:the good news is that the case would be withdrawn if prop8were to be repealed in 2010 (2:06:53 AM) ZJ:are they waiting until 2012, though (2:07:25 AM) bradass87:idont honestly know...its allabig grassroots mess (2:11:26 AM) bradass87:no leadership (2:11:33 AM)ZJ:yeah (2:12:04 AM) bradass87: id love to take the reins ^^D Conversation with bradass87 at 8/11/2009 12:58:07 AM onZJemptv(aim) (12:58:07 AM) bradass87:htto://video^oo^le com/videoplay7docid^-6217214475742003000 veryinteresting..."how to startacult" —very very similarto basic training

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FINAL REPORT GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE
January 22, 2010

Department of Justice Department ofDefense Department of State Department of Homeland Security Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence Joint Chiefs of Staff

DEFENSE EXHIBITS for »r icfentification iaentificati PAGE OFFERED: PAGEADMITTED: PAGE of PAGES

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^X^CUTIV^SU^l^AR^ On January22,2009,tbe President issued Executive Orderl3492, calling lora prompt and comprehensive interagency review ofthe status ofall individuals currently detained at the Guantanamo 13ay Naval 8ase and requiring tbe closure ofthe detention lacilities there. The Executive Order ^as based on tbe finding that the appropriate disposition ofall individuals detained at Guantanamo would further the national security and Ibreign pohcy interests ofthe United States and the interestsofjustice. One year after the issuance ofthe Fxecutive Order, the review ordered by the President is now complete. After evaluating ah ofthe detainees, the review participants have decided on the proper disposition—transfer, prosecution, or continued detention— of all240 detainees subject to the review. Each ofthese decisions was reached by the unanimous agreement ofthe agencies responsible fbr the review: the Department ofJustice, Department ofDefense, Department of^tate, Department ofHomeland^ecurity,Office ofthe Director of National Intelhgence, and Joint ChiefsofStaff Review Frncess Toimplement the President^sorder, the Attorney General,as the coordinator of the review,estabhshed the Guantanamo ReviewTask Force andaseniorlevel Review Panel. TheTask Force was responsible lor assembling and examining relevant information on the Guantanamo detainees and making recommendations on their proper dispositions. The Review Panel, consisting ofofficials with delegated authority from their respective agencies to decide the disposition of each detainee, reviewed theTask Force^srecommendations and made disposition decisions onarohing basis. Where tbe Review Panel did not reach consensus, or where higher-level review was appropriate, the agency heads (^^Principals^^) named in the Executive Order determined the proper disposition ofthe detainee. Key leatures ofthe review process included: ^ Comprehensive Interagency Review. TheTask Force consisted of more than 60 career prolessionals, including intelligence analysts, law enforcement agents, and attorneys, drawn from the Department ofJustice, Department of Defense, Department ofState, Department ofllomelandSecurity,Central Intelligence Agency,Federal bureau oflnvestigation, and other agencies within the intelligence community.
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Rigorous ^^amination ofinformation. TheTask Force assembled large volumes ofinformation Irom across the government relevant to determining the proper disposition ofeach detainee. Task Force members examined this information critically,giving careful consideration to the threat posed by the detainee, the reliability ofthe underlying inlormation, and the interestsof nationalsecurity.

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Unanimous l^eeision^al^ngbySeniorOflieials.8asedontheTask Force^sevaluations and recommendations, senior officials representing each agency responsible lor the review reached unanimous determinations on the appropriate disposition lor ah detainees. In the large majority of cases, the Review Panel was able to reachaconsensus. Where the Review Panel was not able to reachaunanimous decision—or when additional review was appropriate—the Principals met to determine the proper disposition.

Results of the Review The decisions reached on the240 detainees subject to the review are as follows: ^ 126 detainees were approved lor transfer. Todate,44 ofthese detainees have been transferred from Guantanamo to countries outside the United States. 44 detainees over the courseofthe review were relerred lor prosecution either in federal court oramilitary commission, and ^6 of these detainees remain the subject ofactive cases or investigations. The Attorney General has announced that the govemment will pursue prosecutions against six ofthese detainees in lederal court and will pursue prosecutions against six others in mihtary commissions. 4^ detainees were determined to be too dangerous to transler but not feasible lor prosecution. They will remain in detention pursuant to the government's authority underthe Authorization IbrUseofMilitary Force passed by Congress in response to the attacks of^eptemberll,2001. Detainees may challenge the legality oftheir detention in federal court and will periodically receive further review within the Executive 13ranch. ^0 detainees from^emen were designated lor ^^conditional^^ detention based on the current security environment in that country. They are not approved fbr repatriation to^emen at this time, but may be translerred to third countries, or repatriated to^emen in the ftiture ifthe current moratorium on transfers to^emen is lifted and other security conditions are meL

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Looking Ahead With the completion ofthe review,an essential component ofthe effort to close the Guantanamo detention facilities has been accomplished, beyond the review, additional work remains to be done to implement the review decisions and to resolve other issues relating to detainees. TheTask Force has ensured that its analysesofthe detainees and the information collected in the course ofthe review are properly preserved to assist in the resolution ofthese issues going forward.

T A 8 L ^ OF CONTENTS L II. III. IV. Introduction background The President^sExecutive Order Implementing the Executive Order: The Guantanamo ReviewTask Force A. Establishment of theTask Force 8. Task Force Structure C. Guantanamo Review Panel D. Task Force Information Collection E. Review Phases V. Detainee Review Guidelines A. Transfer Guidelines 13. Prosecution Guidelines C. Detention Guidelines D. Review ofinformation VL Results ofthe Review A. Overview ofDecisions 13. Overview ofthe Guantanamo Detainee Population VIL Transfer Decisions A. Background B. Decisions C. Yemeni Detainees VIII. Prosecution Decisions A. Background B. Decisions C. Detainees ^ho Cannot Be Prosecuted IX. Detention Decisions A. Background B. Decisions C Continued Reviews X. XL XIL Conditional Detention Decisions: Yemeni Detainees Diplomatic Efforts Conclusion iii 1 1 2 3 3 3 4 5 6 7 7 7 8 9 9 9 13 15 15 16 18 19 19 20 22 23 23 23 25 25 26 28

I.

Introduction

An essential component ofthe President^sorder calling lor the closure ofthe detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base was the initiation ofanew and rigorous interagency review ofall individuals detained there. The purpose ofthe review was to collect and examine information from across the government to determine which detainees the United States should transfer or release from custody,prosecute, or otherwise lawfully detain. This review is now complete. After carefully considering each case, the agencies responsible lor the review—the Department ofJustice, Department ofDefense, Department ofState, Department ofllomelandSecurity,Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of^taff—have unanimously agreed on the proper disposition of all240 detainees subject to the review. While there remain other steps outside the scope ofthe review that must be taken belore the detention facilities at Guantanamo can be closed, the completion ofthe review fullillsacentral element ofthe President^sorder. This report describes the process by which the review was conducted over the past year, the decisions resulting from the review,and the progress made toward implementing those decisions. II. Bael^groiind

Following the terrorist attacks of^eptemberll,2001,the United states was faced with the c^uestion ofwhat to do with individuals captured in connection with military operations in Afghanistan or in other counterterrorism operations overseas. Starting in January2002, the military began transferringanumberofthese individuals to the detention facilities at Guantanamo. 1 3 y the end of2002,632 detainees had been brought to Guantanamo. In 2003,117additional detainees were brought to the base,withlO more detainees added in 2004, 14detainees in 2006,five detainees in 2007,and one detainee in 2008. Since 2002,atotal of779 individuals have been detained at Guantanamo in connection with the war against al0^^da,theTaliban, and associated forces. From 2002 through 2008,most ofthe individuals detained at Guantanamo were transferred or released fromU.^.custody,with the vast majority being repatriated to their home countries and others reseftled in third countries willing to receive them. Ofthe779 individuals detained at Guantanamo, approximately 530—almost 70 percent—were translerred or released fromU.^.custody prior to 2009. The countries to which these detainees were transferred include Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh,Belgium,13osnia, Denmark, Fgypt, France, Germany,lran,lrai^,Jordan, Kazakhstan, l^uwait, Libya, l^aldives,Vlauritania,l^orocco, Pakistan, O^tar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia (somaliland),^pain,^udan,^weden,Tajikistan,Tunisia,Turkey, Uganda, the Ignited Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom,andYemen.

By January20,2009,the population of detainees at Guantanamo had been reduced to242. Of the242 remaining detainees, 59 had been approved lor transfer by the prior administration and were awaiting implementation oftheir translers. III. The President s I^:i^eeiitive Order

On January22,2009,the President issued an Fxecutive Order rei^uiring the closure ofthe detention facilities at Guantanamo within one year. Noting the length of the detentions and the significant concerns they had raised both within the United States and internationally, the President determined that the ^^prompt and appropriate disposition ofthe individuals currently detained at Guantanamo and closure ofthe facilities in which they are detained would further the national security and fbreign policy interests ofthe United States and the interestsofjustice.^^ Accordingly,the President ordered the Executive Branch to conductaprompt and comprehensive interagency review ofthe factual and legal bases for the continued detention ofall individuals remaining at Guantanamo. The President ordered that the review be coordinated by the Aftorney General and conducted with the full cooperation and participation ofthe Secretary ofDelense, secretary ofState, Secretary ofHomeland Security,DirectorofNational Intelligence, and Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff The first task given to the review participants under the Executive Order was to assemble, to the extent reasonably practicable, all inlormation in the possession ofthe federal govemment pertaining to any individual then detained at Guantanamo and relevant to determining his proper disposition. The Executive Order then set Ibrth the tbllowing framework lor the review participants to follow in determining the disposition ofeach detainee: ^ First, onarolling basis and as promptly as possible, determine whether it is possible to transler or release the detainee consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests ofthe United states and,if so,whether and how the Secretary ofDefense may effect the detainee^stransler or release: Second,with respect to any detainee not approved for transfer or release, determine whether the lederal government should seek to prosecute the detainee lor any offenses he may have committed, including whether it is leasible to prosecute such individual inacourt established pursuant to Article 111 ofthe United States Constitution(/.^.^ federal court): and Third, with respect to any detainee whose disposition is not achieved through transler,release, or prosecution, select other lawful means, consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests ofthe United States and the interests ofjustice, lor the disposition ofthe detainee.

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The Executive Order further directed that the Secretary ofDefense, the Secretary of^tate, and other review participants work to effect promptly the release or transfer of all individuals lor whom release or transfer is possible, and that the SecretaryofState expeditiously pursue and direct such negotiations and diplomatic efforts with foreign governments as are necessary and appropriate to implement the order. Finally,the Executive Order rei^uired that any individuals who remained in detention at Guantanamo at the timeofthe closure ofthe detention facilities be returned to their home country,released, transferred toathirdcountry,or transferred to another United States detention facility inamanner consistent with law and the national security and Ibreign policy interests ofthe United States. IV. Implementing the I^^ecntive Order: TheCnantanamoReviewTasl^Force A. establishment of theTasl^Force

Toimplement the Executive Order, the Attorney General established the Guantanamo ReviewTask Force and appointed an Fxecutive Director oftheTask Force onFebruary20,2009. TheTask Force was charged with assembling and reviewing relevant information on the Guantanamo detainees and making recommendations to senior level officials on the proper disposition of each detainee pursuant to the framework set forth in the Executive Order. Toensure that the expertise and perspectives of each participating agency were brought to bear on the review process, theTask Force was established as an interagency entity. Further, to maximize collaboration and exchangeofinfbrmationamongTaskForce members, allTaskForce staff were located together inasecurefacility,onasingle floor devoted toTask Force work, and connected electronically throughastandalone classified network. B. Tasl^ForeeStrttetnre

With the assistanceofthe participating agencies, theTask Force assembledastaff ofover 60 career professionals, drawn Irom the Department ofJustice, Department of Defense, DepartmentofState, Department ofHomeland^ecurity,Federal Bureau of Investigation,Central Intelligence Agency,and National Counterterrorism Center. Included in this wide range ofrepresentatives were senior military oflicers, lederal prosecutors, FBI agents, intelligence analysts and officers, military prosecutors and investigators, national security lawyers, civil litigators, paralegals, and administrative assistants. During their tenure at theTaskForce, these staff members worked fulltime on theTask Force review. TheTask Force staff was initially organized into two review teams. The transler team was responsible lor evaluating whether detainees could be transferred or released consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests ofthe United States.^
' The term "release" is used to mean release from confinement without the need for continuing security measures in the receiving country, while the term "transfer" is used to mean release from confinement subject to appropriate security measures.

The team primarily evaluated the degree ofthreat posed by the detainee toU.S.national security,whether the threat could be mitigated through appropriate security measures, and the potential destination countries where it appeared possible to salely transler the detainee. The transler team was composed ofrepresentatives from each agency listed in the Executive Order. The prosecution team was responsible lor recommending whether the government should seek to prosecute certain detainees in either lederal court or the military commission system. The prosecution team was staffed predominantly by experienced lederal prosecutors, investigative agents, and criminal appellate specialists from the Department ofJustice,^as well as military commission prosecutors and investigative agents from the Department ofDefense. The work ofthe transfer and prosecution teams often overlapped, and the two teams worked in close coordination over the course ofthe review. As described below, after an initial review ofall the detainees, the transler and prosecution teams merged to conductafurther review of detainees whose cases had been deferred during the initial review. The interagency makeup ofthe review teams was designed to ensure that all relevant agency viewpoints—including military,intelligence, homeland security, diplomatic, and law enforcement—were considered in the review process. Thus, proposed recommendations for transfer or continued detention were drafted, reviewed, and vigorously discussed in group deliberations by representatives ofeach ofthe participating agencies. After these extensive discussions on each detainee, any dissenting viewsofthe agency representatives were noted in the recommendations or otherwise made known to the Review PaneL C Guantanamo Review Panel

TheTask Force^srecommendations,which contained detailed classified assessments of each detainee,weresubmifted onarolling basis to the interagency Guantanamo Review PaneL The Review Panel was established in February2009 along with theTask Force and was composed of senior-level officialsftomeach ofthe agencies identified in the Executive Order. Review Panel members were delegated authority from their respective agency heads (^^Principals^^) to decide the disposition ofeach detainee. Review Panel members were also responsible fbr ensuring that their respective agencies made relevant inlormation in their possession available to theTask Force and

^ specifically,federal prosecutors on theTask l^orce were drawn from United states Attorneys^ t^ftices in the southern Oi^trictofNewVork,l^asternOistrictof^ewVork,WesternOi5trictofNew ^ork,district of^olumbia, eastern Oi^trictof^irginia, central district of^alifornia. Northern Oi^trict of California, and OistrictofMaine, and from the counterterrorism section ofthe National security division in the Oepartment of .lustice. ^ senior officials from the Central Intelligence Agency and l^ederall3ureau oflnvestigation also regularly attended the Ireview Panel meetings to further inform the decision-making process.

provided theTask Force with personnel and other resources necessary lor theTaskForce to complete its review within the one-year time frame mandated by the PresidenL Beginning in March 2009,the Review Panel met onaweekly basis to consider the recommendationsoftheTask Force. The Review Panel made disposition decisions only by unanimous agreement ofthe agencies identified in the Executive Order. Thus, each ofthe participating agencies had an ec^ual voice in disposition decisions, and no decisions were made by the Review Panel over the objection ofany agency. In the large majority of cases, the Review Panel wasabletoachieveconsensusand reach decisions regarding the detainees considered. When Review Panel members did not reach consensus, or when higher level review was appropriate, the cases were referred to the Principals Ibradecision. All ofthe cases referred to the Principals also ultimately garnered the unanimous agreement ofthe participating agencies. Onceafinal decision was made regarding the disposition ofaparticular detainee, the decision was passed to the appropriate agencies for implementation. Ifadetaineewas approved for transler toafbreign country asaresuh ofthe review,the Department of State and Department ofDelense worked together to make appropriate arrangements to effect the transfer inamanner consistent with the national security and Ibreign policy interests ofthe United States, includingU.^.policies concerning humane treatmenL I f a decision was made by the Review Panel lor prosecution, the case was referred to the Department ofJustice for further investigation and review underajoint protocol established by the Department ofjustice and Department ofDefense to determine whether to pursue prosecution ofthe case in lederal court oramilitary commission. The Review Panel was regularly updated on the implementation oftransler decisions and prosecution relerrals, as well as any issues arising out ofthe implementation ofthese decisions rec^uiring further interagency consideration. l^. Tasl^Foree Information Collection

In accordance with the Executive Order, theTask Force^sinitial responsibility was to collect all government information, to the extent reasonably practicable, relevant to determining the proper disposition ofeach detainee. The govemment did not havea preexisting, consolidated repository ofsuch information. Rather, each lederal agency stored information conceming Guantanamo detainees in its own systems, consistent with its particular mission and operating protocols. Accordingly,soon after it was formed,theTask Force initiated an eflbrt to collect detainee inlormation and make it available for review byTask Force members. Asa resuh ofthis complex effort, theTask Force consolidatedalarge volume ofinlbrmation from the Department ofDefense, Central Intelligence Agency,Federal bureau of Investigation, Department ofJustice, National ^ecurityAgency,National Counterterrorism Center,Departmentof^tate, and Department ofHomeland security. The documents assembled by theTask Force include summariesofbiographic and capture inlormation: interrogation reports from custodial interviews ofthe detainees:

records ofDepartment ofDefense administrative proceedings involving the detainees, /.^,Combatant status ReviewTribunals and Administrative Review Board proceedings: the results ofname traces run for detainees in certain intelligence databases maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency and National SecurityAgency: the resultsofname traces run for detainees in law enlbrcement databases maintained by the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation: investigative records maintained by the Office ofmilitary Commissions Prosecution (^^OMC^^) and Criminal InvestigativeTask Force within the Department ofDefense: records assembled by the Department ofJustice lor purposes of defending habeas litigation brought by detainees to challenge their detention: recidivism assessments concerning Ibrmer detainees: finished intelligence products on the detainee population and on general topics ofinterest to theTask Force^swork: and information concerning potential destination countries fbr detainees approved for transler or release. TheTask Force also accepted wriften submissions made on behalfOfindividual detainees by their counsel or other representatives. Additionally,theTask Force had accesstoavariety of external networks containing additional inlormation on the detainees, including documentary and physical evidence recovered through counterterrorism operations, and records conceming the behavior, disciplinary infractions, and physical and mental health ofthe detainees during detention. Over the course ofthe review,theTaskPorce also received briefings from the intelligence community onanumberoftopics relevant to the review. The review of all this information was conducted inaclassified environment using secure systems. ^. Review Phases

Following an initial period to stand up theTaskForce and collect detainee inlormation,theTask Force began to review detainees on March 5,2009. The review was conducted in two phases. During the lirst phase, theTask Force reviewed all240 detainees subject to the review.^ In accordance with the framework set Ibrth in the Executive Order, the purpose ofthe first phase ofthe review was to identify those detainees who could be transferred or released consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests ofthe United states, those detainees as to whom prosecution appeared feasible, and those detainees who rec^uiredliirther evaluation belbreadecision could be made on their appropriate disposition. The purpose ofthe second phase ofthe review was to reevaluate those detainees who had been deferred during the lirst phase. Each detainee reviewed in the second phasewasconsideredlbrtransler,prosecution,or—in the event that neitherofthese dispositions was deemed appropriate—continued detention pursuant to the government's

^Although there were2^2 detainees at Ouantanamo when the l^xecutive Order was issued,one detainee had already been convicted and sentenced to life in the military commission system in ^00^, and another detainee committed suicide in lune ^^0^. Thus,there were^^O detainees whose dispositions were reviewed under the l^xecutive Order,

authority under the Authorization lor Use ofMilitary Force (^^AUMF^^) passed by Congress in response to the attacks ofSeptemberll,2001. V. I^etainee Review Guidelines

In conducting its reviews, theTask Force Ibllowed detainee review guidelines (^^Guidelines^^) developed specifically for the Executive Order review and approved by the Review Panel. The Guidelines set Ibrth standards to apply in considering detainees Ibrtransler, prosecution,orcontinued detention pursuant to the government^sauthority under theAU^F. A. Transfer Guidelines

The Guidelines addressed three types ofevaluations relevant to determining whetheradetainee should be recommended lor transfer or release. The first evaluation rei^uired by the Guidelines wasathreat evaluation. The Guidelines provided thatadetainee should be deemed eligible for transler if any threat he poses could be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures.^ The Guidelines set forthanonexclusive list offactors to be considered in evaluating the threat posed byadetainee. In applying those factors, theTask Force was instructed to consider the totality ofavailable inlormation regarding the detainee, and to give careful consideration to the credibility and reliability ofthe available information. The second evaluation rec^uired by the Guidelines was an evaluation of potential destination(/.^.,receiving) countries. The Guidelines left theTask Force with discretion whether to recommendadetainee lor transler only to specified countries or under specified conditions. As with the threat evaluation, the Guidelines providedanon exclusive set offactors by which to evaluate potential receiving countries. The third evaluation rei^uired by the Guidelines wasalegal evaluation to ensure that any detainee falling outside the government^slawful detention authority under the AUMF was recommended for transler or release. B. Prosecution Guidelines

The Guidelines also rei^uired cases to be evaluated byTask Force prosecutors to determine whetherafederal court or military commission prosecution should be recommended for any oflenses the detainees may have commifted. For the evaluation of whetheradetainee should be prosecuted in lederal court, the Guidelines set Ibrth standards used by lederal prosecutors across the country to determine
^The guidelines further pi^ovided thatadetainee should be deemed eligible for release ifhe does not pose an identifiable threat to the national security ofthe United states. Other than thel^Chinese Uighur detainees,who were approved for "ti^an^fer or release,"no detainees were approved for "release" during the course ofthe review.

whetherto chargeacase, as set forth in the ^ ^ / / ^ ^ ^ / i ^ / ^ ^ B l / / ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ / . Consistent with these standards, the Guidelines provided thatacase should be recommended lor prosecution ifthe detainee^sconductconstitutesalederaloflense and the potentially available admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustaina conviction—unless prosecution should be declined because no substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution. Key lactors in making this determination include the nature and seriousness ofthe oflense: the detainee^sculpability in connection with the offense: the detainee^swillingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others: and the probable sentence or other consec^uences ifthe detainee is convicted. For the evaluation of whetheradetainee should be prosecuted inamilitary commission,Task Force prosecutors examined the potentially available admissible evidence and consulted closely with O^C to determine the feasibility ofprosecution. Recognizing the unii^ue nature ofthese cases, the Guidelines provided that other lactors were also significant in determining whether to recommend prosecution, including the need to protect classified information, such as intelligence sources and methods. C l^etention Guidelines

In accordance with the Executive Order, the Guidelines provided that every effort should be made to ensure that all detainees who could be recommended lor transfer, release, or prosecution consistent with national security and Ibreign policy interests and the interests ofjustice were recommended lor such dispositions. Thus, the Guidelines provided thatadetainee should be considered eligible for continued detention under the AU^F only i f ( l ) t h e detainee posesanational security threat that cannot be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures: (2) prosecution ofthe detainee by the lederal government is not feasible in any forum: and (3)continued detention without criminal charges is lawful. The Guidelines required theTaskForce to consuh with the Department ofJustice in conductingalegal evaluation lor each detainee considered for continued detention. This legal evaluation addressed both the legal basis lor holding the detainee under the AUMF and the government^scase fbr delending the detention in any habeas litigation.^ As the Supreme Court has held, inherent within the authorization oftheAUMF to ^^use all necessary and appropriate Ibrce^^ is the power to detain any individuals who fall within the scope ofthe statute.^ AstheCourtobserved,^^by universal agreement and
* The AUMF authorizes the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future attacks of intemational terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." AUMF § 2(a). ' See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 587 (Thomas, J.) (dissenting).

practice,^^ the power to wage war necessarily includes the authority to capture and detain combatants in order to prevent them from ^^returning to the field ofbattle and taking up arms once again.^^^ The scopeoftheAUMF^sdetention authority extends to those persons who ^^planned,authorized or commifted or aided^^ the Septemberllaftacks, ^^harbored those responsible for those aftacks,^^ or ^^were partof, or substantially supported, Taliban or alO^^da forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.^^^ Accordingly, only detainees who satisfied this standard could be designated for continued detention. I^. Review ofinformation

Consistent with the Guidelines^ rcL^uirement that theTask Force undertakeafresh and comprehensive evaluation of detainee information,theTask Porce sought to make independent evaluations ofthe facts. In many instances, theTask Force largely agreed with prior threat assessments ofthe detainees and sometimes Ibund additional inlormation that further substantiated such assessments. In other instances, theTask Force Ibund prior assessments to be overstated. Some assessments, for example, contained allegations that were not supported by the underlying source document upon which they relied. Other assessments contained conclusions that were stated categorically even though derived Irom uncorroborated statements or raw intelligence reporting ofundetermined or questionable reliability. Conversely,inafew cases, the TaskForce discovered reliable information indicating thatadetainee posedagreater threat in some respects than prior assessments suggested. Even after careliil examination ofthe intelligence, however, it was not always possible to draw delinitive conclusions regardingadetainee^spastconducL Many ofthe detainees were captured in active zonesof combat and were not previously the targets of investigation byU.^.law enforcement authorities or the intelligence community. Much ofwhat is known about such detainees comes from their own statements or statements made by other detainees during custodial debrielings. TheTask Force sought to ensure that the Review Panel and Principals were apprised in their decision-making ofany limitations ofthe available inlormation. VI. Results of the Review A. Overview ofl^ecisions

By the oneyear mark ofJanuary 22,2010, the review participants reached decisions on the appropriate disposition of all240 detainees subject to the Executive Order. In sum,126 detainees were approved for transfer: 36 detainees were referred lor

* Id, at 518; see also id. at 587 (Thomas, J.) (dissenting) (same). See Gov't Filing, in re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (D.D.C. March 13, 2009). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently affirmed that Guantanamo detainees who meet this standard are detainable. See also Al-Bihani v. Obama, — F.3d 2010 WL 10411 at *3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 5, 2010).

prosecution:^^ 48 detainees were approved for continued detention under the AUMF: and 30 detainees from Vemen were approved fbr ^^conditionaF^ detention based on present security conditions in Vemen. O^er^^e^ of 060^^00^

^^n^^^^ ^l^i^^^lo^ 13 C O ^ ^ O ^ I 0 9 ^ ^ 1 0 ^ ^O^^f^O^

After careful deliberation, all ofthese decisions were reached by unanimous agreement ofsenior officials Irom each agency responsible lor the review. Thus, each decisioncarriestheapprovaloftheDepartmentof Justice, Department ofDelense, Department ofState, Department ofHomeland Security, Ofhce ofthe Director of National Intelligence, and Joint Chiel^ of Staff. A more detailed breakdown ofthe decisions lollows. Detainees Approved lor Transler ^ 126 detainees were unanimously approved fbr transfer subject to appropriate security measures. o 63 ofthe 126 detainees either had been cleared lor transler by the prior administration, ordered released by a lederal district court, or both. 44 ofthe 126 detainees have been translerred to date—24 to their home countries, 18 to third countries Ibr resettlements and two to Italy for prosecution. 82 ofthe 126 detainees remain at Guantanamo. Ofthese detainees: ^ 16 may be repatriated to their home countries (other than Vemen) consistent with U.S. policies on humane treatmenL The State Department and Department ofDelense are working with these countries conceming the security conditions and timing ofthe

o

o

As explained below, 44 cases were initially relcrred tor prosecution; 3^ ofthose cases remain the subject ofactive referrals.

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transfers. Some ofthese detainees have obtained injunctions that presently bar their repatriation and cannot be repatriated until these injunctions are lifted: litigation over the injunctions is ongoing. 37 cannot be repatriated at this time due to humane treatment or related concemsassociated with their home countries(other than ^emen). The State Department is seeking to resettle these detainees in third countries. (Asmall number of these detainees may be transferred to third countries for prosecution rather than resettlement.) 29arefrom^emen. In light ofthe moratorium on translers of Guantanamo detainees toVemen announced by the President on January5,2010, these detainees cannot be translerred to^emen at this time. In the meantime, these detainees are eligible to be translerred to third countries capable ofimposing appropriate security measures.
Detainees Approved for Transfer

B Transferred • Repatriation Consistent with Humane Treatment Policy • Repatriation Raises Humane Treatment Concerns

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• Yemeni Detainees

Detainees Referred for Prosecution • Initially, 44 detainees were referred for prosecution. As a result of further evaluation of these cases (detailed below), there are now 36 detainees who remain the subject of active cases or investigations. o 1 detainee (Ahmed Ghailani) has been transferred to the Southern District of New York and will be tried for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. o 5 detainees will be tried in the Southern District of New York, for their alleged roles in the September 11 attacks, as announced by the Attorney General. o 6 detainees will be tried for offenses under the laws of war in a reformed military commission system, as announced by the Attorney General. o 24 detainees remain under review pursuant to the joint Department of JusticeDepartment ofDefense protocol. No final determination has yet been made as to whether or in what forum these 24 detainees will be charged.

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o 8other detainees were initially relerred lor prosecution but subsequently designated for other dispositions. D Idetainee was translerred pursuant toacourt order in his habeas case. ^ 7detainees were relerred back to the review participants after prosecution was deemed not leasible upon further evaluation(6were subsequently approved for continued detention under theAUMF,and Iwas approved for transfer).
Detainees l^eferred for P r o s e c u t i o n

^ T o h e t r i e d in federal court ^ T o h e t r i e d h y military commission OUnderrevieyir ^Redesignated for other dispositions

^
^4

Detainees Approved Ibr Detention ^ 48 detainees were unanimously approved for continued detention under theAUMF based onafinding that they poseanational security threat that could not be mitigated sufficiently at this time if they were to be transferred fromU.S.custody. o TheTask Force concluded as to all of these detainees that prosecution is not leasible at this time in either federal court or the military commission system. o At the same time, theTask Force concluded that there isalawfiil basis for continuing to detain these detainees under theAUMF. Detainees Approved lor Conditional Detention ^ 30 detainees fromYemen were unanimously approved lor ^^conditional^^ detention based on current security conditions inYemen. o After carefully considering the intelligence concerning the security situation inYemen,and reviewing each detainee onacase-by-case basis, the review participants selectedagroupof30Yemeni detainees who posealower threat than the 48 detainees designated for continued detention under theAUVIF,but who should not be among the first groups oftranslerstoYemen even ifthe current moratorium on such translers is lifted. o These 30 detainees were approved for ^^conditionaf^detention, meaning that they may be transferred ifone ofthe following conditions is satisfied: (l)the
12

security situation improves inYemen: (2)an appropriate rehabilitation program becomes available: or(3)an appropriate thirdcountry resettlement option becomes available. Should any ofthese conditions be satisfied, however, the 29Yemeni detainees approved for transler would receive priority fbr any transler options over the 30Yemeni detainees approved for conditional detention. B. Overview of the Guantanamo Oetainee Population

The tbllowing section provides an overview of the240 Guantanamo detainees reviewed under the Executive Order, including their threat characteristics and more general background information, including country oforigin, point ofcapture, and date of arrival at Guantanamo. ^^^^^^C^^B^^^^^^^,^^^^,^. As reflected in the decisions made in the review,there is asubstantial degree of variation among the Guantanamo detainees fromasecurity perspective. Although not all detainees can be neatly characterized, the following groupings providearough overview of the recurring threat profiles seen in the population.
^
.^^^^^^,^,^^^^^//v^.^,^^^^i:^////^/^^.^/^v^/v^^/^/^B^^^^,^/^/^^^

At the high end ofthe threat spectrum are leaders, planners, operatives, and lacilitators within al-Oaida or associated groups who are directly implicated in terrorist plots againstU.S.interests. Among the most notorious examples in this group are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,the alleged mastermind ofthe Septemberll attacks: Ramzi bin alShibh,the alleged principal coordinator ofthe Septemberll attacks: Abd alRahimalNashiri,the alleged mastermind ofthe attack on theU.S.S. C^/^: Abu Farajal-Libi, who allegedly succeeded Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as alOaida^schief planner ofterrorist operations: Hambali,the alleged leader of an alOaida affiliate in Indonesia who directed numerous attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia: and Ahmed Ghailani,an alleged key participant in thel998 bombings oftheU.S.embassies in Kenya andTanzania. RoughlylOpercent ofthe detainees subject to the review appear to have playedadirect role in plotting, executing, or facilitating such attacks.
^//^^^.^ii^///^.^/^^//^i:^^^/i^^^^^/^i^//^^^/^^/^,^^^///^/^^/-^^^^

^^^^^/^^//^^.^. Other detainees played significant organizational roles within alOaida or associated terrorist organizations, even ifthey may not have been directly involved in terrorist plots againstU.S.targets. This group includes, lor example, individuals responsible for overseeing or providing logistical support to al O^^da^s training operations in Afghanistan: facilitators who helped move money and personnel lor al0^^da:acadreofUsama bin Laden^sbodyguards,whoheldauni^ue position of trust within al O^^da: and well-trained operatives who were being groomed by al-Oaida leaders for future terrorist operations. Roughly20 percent of the detainees subject to the review fall within this category.

13



Taliban leaders and members of anti-Coalition militia groups. The detainee population also includes a small number of Afghan detainees who occupied significant positions within the Taliban regime, and a small number of other Afghan detainees who were involved in local insurgent networks in Afghanistan implicated in attacks on Coalition forces. Less than 10 percent of the detainees subject to the review fall within this category. Low-level foreign fighters. A majority of the detainees reviewed appear to have been foreign fighters with varying degrees of connection to al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated groups, but who lacked a significant leadership or other specialized role. These detainees were typically captured in combat zones during the early stages of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, often by Northern Alliance troops or other allied forces, without being specifically targeted for capture by (or even known to) the U.S. military in advance. Many were relatively recent recruits to training camps in Afghanistan run by al-Qaida or other groups, where they received limited weapons training, but do not appear to have been among those selected for more advanced training geared toward terrorist operations abroad. Miscellaneous others. The remaining detainees- -roughly 5 percent—do not fit into any of the above categories.





Country of Origin. The Guantanamo detainees reviewed included individuals from a number of different countries, including Yemen, Afghanistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, and Pakistan. Approximately 40 percent—97 detainees—were Yemeni, while over 10 percent were Afghan.
Yemen Afghan. . China S. Arabia Algeria Tunisia Syria _ Libya _ Kuwait Pakistan Uzbekistan Egypt Somalia Sudan Others

20

40

60

80

100

120

14

Point of Capture. The large majority of the detainees in the population reviewed—approximately 60 percent—were captured inside Afghanistan or in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Approximately 30 percent of the detainees were captured inside Pakistan. The remaining 10 percent were captured in countries other than Afghanistan or Pakistan.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
50
100
150

Arrival at Guantanamo. Most of the detainees reviewed—approximately 80 percent—arrived at Guantanamo in 2002, having been captured during the early months of operations in Afghanistan. The remaining detainees arrived in small numbers over succeeding years.
200
250

VII.

Transfer Decisions Background

As the first step in the review process, the Executive Order required the review participants to determine which Guantanamo detainees could be transferred or released consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. The Executive Orderftjrtherrequired the Secretary ofDefense, the Secretary of State, and other review participants as appropriate, to "work to effect promptly the release or transfer of all individuals for whom release or transfer is possible." Prior to the initiation of the review, 59 of the 240 detainees subject to review were approved for transfer or release by the prior administration but remained at Guantanamo by the time the Executive Order was issued. One reason for their continued detention was that more than half of the 59 detainees could not be returned to their home countries consistent with U.S. policy due to post-transfer treatment concerns.'' Thus, many of the 59 detainees required resettlement in a third country, a process that takes time and requires extensive diplomatic efforts. In addition, 29 of the detainees subject to review were ordered released by a federal district court as the result of habeas litigation. Of these 29 detainees, 18 were
" It is the longstanding policy of the United States not to transfer a person to a country if the United States determines that the person is more likely than not to be tortured upon return or, in appropriate cases, that the person has a well-founded fear of persecution and is entitled to persecution protection. This policy is consistent with the approach taken by the United States in implementing the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Accordingly, prior to any transfer, the Department of State works closely with relevant agencies to advise on the likelihood of persecution or torture in the given country and the adequacy and credibility of assurances obtained from the foreign government.

15

ordered released after the govemment conceded the case.Theremaininglldetainees were ordered released afteracourt reached the meritsofthe case and ruled, based ona preponderance ofthe evidence, that the detainee was not lawfully held because he was not part of or did not substantially support, alQaida, theTaliban, or associated forces.'^ Of the 29 detainees ordered released,18were among the 59 who had been approved by the prior administration lor transler or release. Thus,atotalof70 detainees subject to the review were either approved lor transler during the prior administration or ordered released byafederal court. B. Decisions

Based on interagency reviews and case-by-case threat evaluations, 126 ofthe240 detainees were approved lor transfer by agreement ofsenioroflicials from the agencies named in the Executive Order. Thel26 detainees unanimously approved fbr transler include 44 who have been translerred to date—24to their home countries,'^18to third countries lor resettlement,'^ and two to Italy for prosecution. Ofthe 82 detainees who remain at Guantanamo and who have been approved for transfer,16may be repatriated to their home countries (other thanYemen)consistent with U.S.policies concerning humane treatment, 38 cannot be repatriated due to humane treatment or related concerns in their home countries (other thanYemen)and thus need to be resettled inathird country,and 29 are ftom Yemen. Ualfofall detainees approved lor transler—63ofthel26—also had been approved for transler during the prior administration, ordered released byafederal court, orboth'^ There were considerable variations among the detainees approved for transfer. Forasmall handful ofthese detainees, there was scant evidenceof any involvement with terrorist groups or hostilities against Coalition forces in Alghanistan. However, lor most ofthe detainees approved lor transfer, there were varying degrees ofevidence indicating that they were low-level fbreign fighters affiliated with al Qaida or other groups operating in Afghanistan. Thousandsofsuch individuals are believed to have passed
^^DftheI8cases conceded by the government,I7were brought by the Uighur detainees and were conceded by the prior administration. 2^1even of theI8detainees have been transferred to date. ^^AtotalofI4detainees have won their habeas cases on the merits in district court The government transferred three ofthese detainees in December 2008; thus,they were not subject to the review. Of thellremaining detainees who were reviewed under the executive Order,seven have been transferred to date. Ofthe four who have not been transferred,the United States is appealing the district court'sruling in t^o ofthe cases,and is still within the time period to appeal the remaining two cases. ^^The24detainees transferred to their home countries were repatriated to Afghanistan(5), Algeria (2), Chad(I),Iraq(I),I^uwait (2), Saudi Arabia(3),Somalia(Somaliland) (2), the United Kingdom(l), andYemen (7). ^^Thel8detainees transferred to third countries for resettlement were transferred to 8elgium(l), Bermuda(4), France (2), Flungary(l),Ireland (2),Portugal (2),and Palau(^). The review participants reviewed the detainees who had been approved for transfer by the prior Administration and designated seven such detainees(allofwhom were fromVemen) for conditional detention instead of transfer.

16

through Afghanistan from the mid l990s through 2001, recruited through networks in various countries in the Middle East, North Aftica, and Europe. These individuals varied in their motivations, but they typically sought to obtain military training at one ofthe many camps operating in Afghanistan: many subsequently headed to the ftont lines to assist theTaliban in their fight against the Northern Alliance. For the most part, these individuals were uneducated and unskilled. Atthe camps, they typically received limited weapons training. While al-Qaida used its camps to vet individuals for more advanced training geared toward terrorist operations against civilian targets, onlyasmall percentage ofcamp attendees were deemed suitable lor such operations. Thelow level fighters approved for transler were typically assessed by the review participants not to have been selected lor such training. Many were relatively recent recruits to the camps, arriving in Afghanistan in the summerof2001. After the camps closed in anticipation of the arrival ofU.S.forces in October 2001,someofthese individuals were transported by camp personnel or otherwise made their way to theToral3ora mountain range,where they joined fighting units, but subsequently dispersed in the face ofU.S.air attacks. It is important to emphasize thatadecision to approveadetainee lor transler does not reflectadecision that the detainee poses no threat or no risk of recidivism. Rather, the decision reflects the best predictive judgmentof senior govemment officials, based on the available information, that any threat posed by the detainee can be sufficiently mitigated through feasible and appropriate security measures in the receiving country. Indeed, all transfer decisions were made subject to the implementation of appropriate security measures in the receiving country,and extensive discussions are conducted with the receiving country about such security measures belbre any transler is implemented. Some detainees were approved for transfer only to specific countries or under specific conditions, andalew were approved fbr transfer only to countries with pending prosecutions against the detainee(or an interest in pursuingafuture prosecution). Each decision was made onacase-by-case basis, taking into account all ofthe information about the detainee and the receiving country^sability to mitigate any threat posed by the detainee. For certain detainees, the review participants considered the availability of rehabilitation programs and mental health treatment in the receiving country. The review participants also were kept inlbrmed ofintelligence assessments concerning recidivism trends among former detainees. It is also important to emphasize thatadecision to approveadetainee lor transler does not equate toajudgment that the govemment lacked legal authority to hold the detainee. Tobe sure, in some cases the review participants had concems about the strength ofthe evidence againstadetainee and the government^sability to delend his detention in court, and considered those factors, among others, in deciding whether to approve the detainee for transfer. For many ofthe detainees approved lor transfer, however, the review participants found there to be reliable evidence that the detainee had engaged in conduct providingalawlul basis for his detention. The review participants nonetheless considered these detainees appropriate candidates for transler ftomathreat perspective, in light oftheir limited skills, minor organizational roles, or other factors.

17

C.

Yemeni Detainees

From the outsetofthereview,it was clear that theYemeni detainees poseda unique challenge: there were 97Yemenis subject to the review,by far the largest group in the Guantanamo population,and the security situation inYemen had deteriorated. AlQaida was gaining strongholds in certain regions of the country,and the government of Yemen was lacingarebellion in other regions. Potential options for rehabilitation programs and other security measures were carelully considered throughout the course of the review,but conditions inYemen remainedaprimary concern. Taking into account the current intelligence regarding conditions inYemen, and the individual backgrounds ofeach detainee, the review participants unanimously approved 36 of the 97Yemeni detainees lor transler subject to appropriate security measures. The decision to approve these detainees lor transfer,however, did not require immediate implementation. Rather, by making each transfer decision contingent on the implementation ofappropriate security measures, the review participants allowed lor necessary flexibility in the timing ofthese translers. Under these transler decisions, detainees would be returned toYemen only atatime, and only under conditions, deemed appropriate fromasecurity perspective. Todate, only seven ofthe 36Yemeni detainees approved fbr transfer have been transferred toYemen.'^ One was translerred in September 2009 pursuant toacourt order,and six were transferred in December 2009. The six who were repatriated in December 2009 were selected by the unanimous agreement ofhigh-leveloflicials in the agencies named in the Executive Order,after further individualized reviews ofthe detainees, including consideration ofthreat-related inlormation, the evidence against the detainees, and the government^sability to successfully delend the lawfulness oftheir detentions in court. This decision involved high level coordination within the government and reflectedadetermination that these six specific detainees should be returned toYemen at that time. There are 29Yemenis approved lor transfer who remain at Guantanamo. The involvement ofAl-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula—the branch ofal-Qaida based in Yemen—in the recent attempted bombing ofan airplane headed to Detroit underscored the continued need foradeliberate approach toward any further effort to repatriate Yemeni detainees. In the wake ofthe attempted plot, the President publicly announceda moratorium on the transler of detainees toYemen. Accordingly,noneofthe29Yemeni detainees remaining at Guantanamo who are approved lor transler will be repatriated to Yemen until the moratorium is lifted. These detainees may be considered for resettlement in third countries subject to appropriate security measures, if such options become available.

During the last administration,14detainees were returned toYemen,and an additional 15 Yemeni detainees were among the 59 approved for (but still awaiting) transfer as oflanuary 20, 2009.

18

VIII.

Prosecution Decisions A. Background

The Executive Order provides that "^iln accordance with United States law,the cases ofindividuals detained at Guantanamo not approved lor release or transfer shall be evaluated to determine whether the Federal Government should seek to prosecute the detained individuals fbr any oflenses they may have committed, including whether it is feasible to prosecute such individuals befbreacourt established pursuant to Article 1 1 1 of the United States Constitution^/.^.,federal courtl." Inaspeech at the National Archives on May2l,2009,the President reiterated that "when leasible, we wih try those who have violated American criminal laws in federal courts." As the President noted in his speech, federal prosecutors havealong history of successfully prosecuting all manner of terrorism oflenses in the lederal courts: Our courts and juries ofour citizens are tough enough to convict terrorists, and the record makes that clear. RamziYousef tried to blow up the World Trade Center—he was convicted in our courts, and is servingalile sentence in U.S. prison. ^acariasMoussaoui has been identified as the 20^'^9/llhijacker—he was convicted in our courts, and he too is servinga lile sentence in prison. Ifwe can try those terrorists in our courts and hold them in our prisons, then we can do the same with detainees from Guantanamo. The President also stressed that military commissions "haveahistory in the United States dating back to George Washington and the Revolutionary War" and remained "an appropriate venue for trying detainees for violations ofthe laws of war." Accordingly,the administration proposed, and Congress has since enacted, relbrms to the military commissions system to ensure that the commissions are lair, legitimate, and effective. In accordance with the President^sguidance, theTask Force evaluated detainees fbr possible prosecution wherever there was any basis to conclude that prosecution in either federal court oramilitary commission was appropriate and potentially leasible. TheTask Force prosecutors Ibcused their review at first on the 23 detainees who, as of the issuance ofthe Executive Order, were facing charges in the military commissions, as well as several other uncharged detainees whose cases were related to those of charged detainees.'^ TheTask Force then evaluated for possible prosecution the approximately 40 additional detainees whom OMC had designated for potential prosecution. Finally, theTaskForce reviewed every detainee for prosecution who was deemed ineligible lor transler.

^^Asoflanuary 22,2009,there were 12detainees whose cases had been referred toamilitary commission, including the defendants in the Septemberllprosecution. In compliance with the Lxecutive Order, their cases were halted.

19

In conducting its reviews, theTask Force worked closely with OMC. TaskForce members had access to OMC files, and OMC prosecutors briefed theTask Force on their cases. Upon request, Department ofDelense investigators and FBI agents who had worked on investigations met withTask Force members to answer their questions. The Task Force also reviewed original source inlormation pertaining to the detainees and was ableto identily previously unexploitedsourcesofevidence. As theTask Force completed its prosecution reviews, it identilied those cases that appeared leasible for prosecution in lederal court, or at least potentially leasible, if certain investigative steps were pursued with success. In this regard, theTask Force identifiedanumber of avenues for strengthening important cases and developing them fbr prosecution. For example, theTask Force determined that there were more thana thousand pieces ofpotentially relevant physical evidence (including electronic media) seized during raids in the aftermath ofthe Septemberllattacks that had not yet been systematically catalogued and required further evaluation for forensic testing. There were potential cooperating witnesses who could testify against others at trial, and key fact witnesses who needed to be interviewed. Finally,certain Ibreign governments,which had been reluctant to cooperate with the military commissions, could be approached to determinewhethertheywouldprovidecooperationinafederal prosecution. Given the limited resourcesoftheTask Force to pursue this additional work, the Review Panel referred cases that appeared potentially leasible for lederal prosecution to the Department ofJustice for further investigation and prosecutorial review. The Department ofJustice and Department ofDefense agreed uponajoint protocol to establishaprocess fbr determining whether prosecution ofareferred case should be pursued inafederal court or beforeamilitary commission. Underthe protocol—titled/^^/^^^/^i^/Z^^i^t^^^^/^^^^^C^,^^.^,/^^^^^^^^^^!^.^^^^^^^ —there is apresumptionthatprosecutionwill be pursued inafederal court wherever feasible, unless other compelling lactors make it more appropriate to pursue prosecution beforea military commission. The evaluations called for under the protocol are conducted by teamsofboth lederal and military prosecutors. Among the criteria they apply are: the nature ofthe offenses to be charged; the identity ofthe victims: the location ofthe crime: the context in which the delendant was apprehended: and the manner in which the case was investigated and by which investigative agency. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary ofDelense, makes the ultimate decision as to wherea prosecution will be pursued. B. Decisions

Asaresuh oftheTaskForce^sreview,the Review Panel referred 44 cases to the Department ofJustice for potential prosecution andadecision regarding the forum for any prosecution.^^ Decisions to seek prosecution have been announced in l2ofthese cases:24remain pending under the protocol: and eight ofthe detainees initially relerred were subsequently designated lor other dispositions.
The review participants did not determine that any additional detainees were potentially feasible for prosecution solely beforeamilitary commission at this time.

20

On May2l,2009,the Department ofJustice announced that Ahmed Ghailani, who had previously been indicted in the United States District Court for the Southem DistrictofNewYork for his alleged role in thel998 bombings oftheU.S.embassies in KenyaandTanzania, would be prosecuted in federal court.^^ OnJune9,2009,Ghailani was transferred ftom Guantanamo to the Southem District ofNewYork,where his case is pending. On November 13,2009,the Attorney General announced that the government would pursue prosecution in federal court in the Southern DistrictofNewYork against the five detainees who had previously been charged belbreamilitary commission lor their roles in the Septemberllattacks. They are: ^ Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind ofthe Septemberllplot: ^ Ramzi bin alShibh,the alleged coordinator of the Septemberllplot who acted as intermediary between Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the hijackers in the United States: ^ WalidMuhammed Salih Mubarak Bin Attash(a.k.a.Khallad Bin Attash), an alleged early member of the Septemberllplot who tested airline security on United Airlines flights between Bangkok and Hong Kong: ^ Mustafa Ahmed al-Uawsawi,an alleged lacilitatorofhijackers and money to the United States from his base in Dubai; and ^ Ah Abdul Aziz Ali(a.k.a.AmmarBaluchi),asecond alleged facilitator of hijackers and money to the United Statesftomhis base in Dubai. On the same day,the Attorney General also announced thatthe prosecution against Abd al-Rahimal-Nashiri,the alleged mastermind ofthe bombing oftheU.S.S. C^.i/^.would be purstied beforeamilitary commission. The Attorney General further decided that lour other detainees whose cases were pending before military commissions when the Executive Order was issued would remain belbre the commissions: Ahmed alDarbi,^oorUthman,Omar Khadr,and Ibrahim al-Qosi. In January 2010,the Department ofJustice announced that Obaidullah,whom OMC had charged but whose case had not yet been relerred toamilitarycommission,will remain in the military commission system. Twentyfourofthe referred cases remain pending with the Department ofJustice under the protocol, ^o final decision has been made regarding whether or in what forum these detainees will be prosecuted.

The decision to pursue prosecution against Ghailani in federal court was made before the joint prosecution protocol was in effect.

21

Eight ofthe relerred detainees are no longer under active consideration lor prosecution. One detainee who had been relerred fbr prosecution was translerred pursuant toacourt order in his habeas case. Seven additional detainees who had been referred for prosecution were ultimately relerred back to theTask Force, based ona determination that the cases were not leasible Ibr prosecution in either federal court or the military commission system at this time. Six ofthese detainees were subsequently approved for continued detention under theAUMF without criminal charges, and one was approved Ibr transfer. Asaresuh ofthese subsequent decisions, there are currently 36 cases with active prosecution referrals. C. Detainees ^ h o Cannot Be Prosecuted

TheTask Force concluded that lor many detainees at Guantanamo, prosecution is not feasible in either lederal court oramilitary commission. There are several reasons Ibr these conclusions. First, the vast majority ofthe detainees were captured in active zones ofcombat in Afghanistan or the Pakistani border regions. The locus at the time oftheir capture was the gathering ofintelligence and their removal from the fighL They were not the subjects offormal criminal investigations, and evidence was neither gathered nor preserved with an eye toward prosecuting them. While the intelligence about them may be accurate and reliable, that intelligence, for various reasons, may not be admissible evidence or sufficient to satislyacriminal burden of proofineitheramilitary commission or lederal court. One common problem is that, Ibr many ofthe detainees, there are no witnesses who are available to testily in any proceeding against them. Second,many ofthe detainees cannot be prosecuted because ofjurisdictional limitations. In many cases, even though theTask Force Ibund evidence thatadetainee was lawfully detainable as part of al-Qaida—based on information that he attendeda training camp, or played some role in the hierarchy ofthe organization—theTaskForce did not find evidence that the detainee participated inaspecific terrorist ploL The lack of such evidence can pose obstacles to pursuingaprosecution in either federal court ora military commission. While the federal material support statutes have been used to convict persons who have merely provided services toaterrorist organization,^.^.,by attendingaterrorist training camp, there are potential limitations to pursuing sucha charge against the detainees.^'
^^Amongtheselimitations^First,thetworelevantstatutes^l8USC^^ 2339Aand 2339B^ were not amended to expressly apply extraterritorially to non-U S. persons until October 2001and December 2004, respectively. Thus,material support may not be available asacharge in the federal system unless there is sufficient evidence to prove thatadetainee was supporting al-^aida after October 2001at the earliest. Second,the statute oflimitations for these offenses is typically eightyears (,^^^18 U.S.C,^ 328^),which may bar prosecution for offenses that occurred well before the detainee'scapture. Third, because the statutory maximum sentence for material support isl5years(where death does not result from the offense), sentencing considerations may weigh against pursuing prosecution in certain cases. Some ofthese considerations would not apply to material support charges brought in the military commissions; however, the legal viability of material support asacharge in the military commission system has been challenged on appeal in commission proceedings.

22

Notably,the principal obstacles to prosecution in the cases deemed inleasible by theTask force typically did not stem from concems over protecting sensitive sources or methods ftom disclosure, or concerns that the evidence against the detainee was tainted. While such concerns were present in some cases, most detainees were deemed infeasible Ibr prosecution based on more fundamental evidentiary and jurisdictional limitations tied to the demandsofacriminal forum,as described above. Significantly,theFxecutive Order does not preclude the govemment ftom prosecuting atalater date someone who is presently designated Ibr continued detention. Work on these cases continues. Further exploitation ofthe Ibrensic evidence could strengthen the prosecution against some detainees. Other detainees may cooperate with prosecutors. Ifeither the Department ofJustice or the Department ofDefense concludes in the future that prosecution ofadetainee held without charges has become leasible in federal court or inamilitary commission,the detention decisions made in the course of this review would permit the prosecution to go forward. IX. Detention Decisions A. Background

Under the Executive Order, the review participants were required first to consider whether it was possible to transfer,release, or prosecute each detainee. With respect to any detainees who were not deemed appropriate for transler,release, or prosecution,the review participants were required to "select lawful means, consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests ofthe United States and the interests ofjustice, fbr the disposition ofsuch individuals." In accordance with this framework, detainees were first reviewed to determine whether transler or release was consistent with the national security and fbreign policy interests ofthe United States and whether they could be prosecuted. Ifthose options did not appear leasible, the review participants then considered whether the detainee^s national security threat justified continued detention under theAUMF without criminal charges, and,ifso,whether the detainee met the legal requirements for detention. B. Decisions

As the resuh ofthis review,48 detainees were unanimously approved Ibr continued detention under theAUMF. Although each detainee presented unique issues, all ofthe detainees ultimately designated for continued detention satisfied three core criteria: First, the totality of available information—including credible inlormation that might not be admissible ina criminal prosecution—indicated that the detainee posesahigh level ofthreat that cannot be mitigated sufftciently except through continued detention: second, prosecutionofthe detainee inafederal criminal court oramilitary commission did not appear leasible: and third,notwithstanding the infeasibility of criminal prosecution, there isalawful basis for the detainee^sdetention under theAUMF.

23

Broadly speaking, the detainees designated for continued detention were characterized by one or more ofthe tbllowing lactors:
^

Signilieantorgani^ational role within al-Qaida,theTaliban,or associated forces. In contrast to the majority ofdetainees held at Guantanamo, many of the detainees approved for detention heldaleadership or other specialized role within al-Qaida, theTaliban, or associated forces. Some provided operational, logistical, financial, or fundraising support Ibr al Qaida. Others were al Qaida members who were selected to serve as bodyguards Ibr Usama bin Laden based on their loyalty to the organization. Others wereTaliban military commanders or seniorofftcials, or played significant roles in insurgent groups in Afghanistan ahied with theTaliban, such as Uezb-e lslamiGulbuddin. Advanced training or experience. The detainees approved for detention tended to have more extensive training or combat experience than those approved for transler. Some ofthese detainees were veteran^//^^^/,^/.^ with lengthy involvement in the training camps in Alghanistan. Several had expertise in explosives or other tactics geared toward terrorist operations. l^xpressed recidivist intent. Some detainees designated for detention have, while at Guantanamo, expressly stated or otherwise exhibited an intent to reengage in extremist activity upon release.

^

^

D Historyofassociationswithextremistactivity Someofthedetainees approved for detention haveahistory of engaging in extremist activities or particularly strong ties(either directly or through lamily members)to extremist organizations. ,^^n^//^^.^/,^^^^^i^/^^//^^. Under the FxecutiveOrder,everydetainee^s disposition must be lawfttl. Accordingly,theTask Force consulted closely with the Department ofJustice regarding every detainee approved Ibr continued detention to ensure that the detainee fell within the boundsofthcGovernment^sdetention authority under theAUMF,as described above. ^^i^.^^^^//i^^^^/c^^^^^^//^^^.^//^/^. Although dangerous and lawftilly held, the detainees designated for detention currently cannot be prosecuted in eitheralederal court oramilitary commission. While the reasons vary ftom detainee to detainee, generally these detainees cannot be prosecuted because either there is presently insufftcient admissible evidence to establish the detainee^sguihbeyondareasonable doubt in eithera federal court or military commission, or the detainee^sconduct does not constitutea chargeable offense in eitherafederal court or military commission. Though prosecution currently is not feasible for these detainees, designatingadetainee for detention does not preclude future prosecution in eitherafederal court oramilitary commission should new evidence or other developments makeaprosecution viable. Ti^^^.^^^^^^/^^,^^^^^/^^^^^^^//^^!^,^//^/^. Finally,none ofthe detainees approved for detention can be salely transferred toathird country at this time. This does

24

not mean that the detainee could never be safely translerred toathird country. Rather, designating the detainee Ibr continued detention at this time indicates only that given the detainee^scurrent threat and the current willingness or ability ofpotential destination countries to mitigate the threat, the detainee is not currently eligible for transfer or release. Should circumstances change(^^,should potential receiving countries implement appropriate security measures), transfer might be appropriate in the future. C Continued Reviews

Detainees approved Ibr continued detention under theAUMF wih be subject to further reviews. First, in accordance with the Supreme Court^sdecision in ^^^^^^/^^^v. Z^^,^/^,^^ each detainee has the opportunity to seekjudicial review oftheir detention by filingapetitionforawritofhabeascorpus in federal court. In such cases, the court reviews whether the detainee falls within the government^slawful detention authority. In cases where courts have concluded that the detainee is not lawfully held, the courts have issued orders requiring the government to take diplomatic steps to achieve the detainee^s release. Thus far, federal district courts have ruled on cases brought by four ofthe 48 detainees approved Ibr continued detention. In each ofthe lour cases, the district court denied the habeas petition and upheld the lawfulness ofthe detention. Many other cases are pending in district court, and some are pending on appeaf Second, as the President stated in his speech at the National Archives,"a thorough process ofperiodic review" is needed to ensure that "any prolonged detention is carefully evaluated and justified." Thus, in addition to thejudicial review afforded through habeas litigation, each detainee approved for continued detention will be subject to periodic Executive Branch review. X. Conditional Detention Decisions: Yemeni Detainees

As discussed above, the review ofthe 97Yemeni detainees posed particular challenges from the outset given the security situation inYemen. After conductinga case-by-case review oftheYemeni detainees, the review participants unanimously agreed that 36Yemenis (29 of whom remain at Guantanamo)are appropriate for transfer,subject to security measures, and that 26Yemenis should continue to be detained under the AUMF in light oftheir individual threaL In addition, there are currently fivcYemenis with active prosecution referrals, two ofwhom the Attorney General announced will be prosecuted in federal court for their roles in the Septemberllattacks (Ramzi bin alShibh and WalidMuhammed Salih MubarakBin Attash). The remaining 30Yemeni detainees were determined to posealower threat than the group of detainees designated for continued detention under theAUMF. Nonetheless, the review participants determined,based onanumber offactors, that these 30 detainees should not be transferred toYemen in the near Ititure and should not be among the ftrst groups oftransfers toYemen even if the current moratorium on such transfers is lifted.
^^122S.Ct 2229(2008)

2^

Thus, these 30 detainees were approved for "conditional" detention, meaning that they may be transferred ifone ofthe following conditions is satisHed: (l)the security situation improves inYemen; (2)an appropriate rehabilitation program becomes available; or(3) an appropriate thirdcountry resettlement option becomes available. Should any of these conditions be satisfied, however, the remaining 29Yemeni detainees approved for transler would receive priority for any transler options over the 30Ycmeni detainees approved for conditional detention.^^ At the timeofthe closure ofthe detention facilities at Guantanamo, the status of detainees approved Ibr conditional detention will be reconsidered Ibr possible transler to Yemen,athirdcountry,oradetention facility in the United States. XI. Diplomatic efforts

The President^sExecutive Order recognized that diplomatic eflorts would be essential to the review and appropriate disposition ofindividuals detained at Guantanamo. Toimplement the review decisions approving the transler of detainees, the order provides that the "Secretary ofDefense, the Secretary ofState, and,as appropriate, other Review participants shall work to effect promptly the release or transfer ofall individuals Ibr whom release or transfer is possible." The President emphasized this point during his speech at the National Archives, stating that for cases involving "detainees who we have determined can be translerred salely to another country...my Administration is in ongoing discussions withanumber of other countries about the transfer ofdetainees to their soil." Toft^lfill this mission,the Secretary ofState created an oflice to lead the diplomatic efforts to transfer detainees and appointed an experienced career diplomat to serve as the Special Envoy for the Closure ofthe Guantanamo Bay DetentionFacilities. The highest levels in the administration supported these efforts. ThePresident,^ice President, and Cabinet members—including the Secretary ofState, Attorney General,and Secretary for Homeland Security—have discussed the closure ofthe Guantanamo detention facilities and the transfer ofdetainees outside the United States with their Ibreign government counterparts. Toassist these diplomatic efforts, the National Counterterrorism Center facilitated the sharing ofinformation about the detainees with fbreign governments considering whether to accept them. In addition, the govemment arranged meetings between officials ftom interested countries and detainees at Guantanamo to facilitate resettlement and repatriation discussions. From the outset ofthe review,the State Department developedadiplomatic strategy Ibr Guantanamo, focusing on efforts to resettle detainees who could not be sent to their home countries because of posttransfer treatment concerns. lnJune2009,the United States and European Union concludedajoint statement in support ofthe
^^Ten ofthe detainees approved for conditional detention had initially been approved for transfer by the review participants, because the specific conditions placed on the transfer approvals of theselO detainees were the equivalent of those used for the conditional detention category,the lOdetainees were later redesignated for conditional detention.

26

resettlement ofanumber of detainees in Europe, expressing the readiness of certain member states to resettle former Guantanamo detainees onacase-by-case basis. Following this joint statement,anumberofLuropean governments—such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Ireland—announced that they were prepared to work out arrangements to accept some detainees. In addition, the Government ofPalau also announced its readiness to acceptanumberofUighur detainees. Following these initial successes, the State Department intensified efforts to implement resettlements. Thepublicoffersby some European governments to resettle detainees encouraged other govemments to make similaroffers. Todate, the diplomatic efforts taken under the Executive Order have led to the resettlement ofl8detainees in the following seven locations: Belgium,Bermuda, France, llungary,lreland,Palau,and Portugal.^^ Resettlement negotiations are ongoing withanumber ofcountries,^.^.,Spain, Switzerland,and Slovakia. In addition,Italy accepted two detainees Ibr criminal prosecution on charges stemming from pre-9/11 activities. All efforts to resettle detainees include discussions with receiving governments about post transfer security measures, as well as other issues such as the integration and humane treatment of resettled detainees. The process Ibr engagingacountry on resettlement issues can be lengthy and complicated. The State Department has engaged in discussions with dozens ofcountries across the globe to initiate or further resettlement negotiations oncehhas been determined thatagovernment is open to discussions. When this process is successftil, initial receptiveness leads to discussions regarding individual detainees, Ibreign government interagency review,fbreign government interviews of prospective resettlement candidates, the Ibreign government^sformal decision-making process, integration plans, and, ultimately,resettlemenL The length ofthe eflbrt often has been influenced by political and other issues in potential resettlement countries(^^,public perceptions of current and pastU.S.detention policies), third-country views(and sometimes pressure)with respect to detainee resettlement, and public views ofthe Guantanamo detention facility generally. Depending on how these factors affect individual cases, the process can be very lengthy. Oncearesettlement has occurred, the State Department and other agencies remain in contact with host governments tbllowing transler on these issues. The State Department is engaged in ongoing discussions Ibr the remaining detainees who cannot be repatriated due to post transfer treatment concems and is on track to lind resettlement countries for most ifnot all ofthe detainees in this category. The State Department also has worked to repatriate detainees to their home countries, in coordination with other agencies and with the National Security CounciL Thus far,24detainees have been repatriated since last January to nine different locations—Afghanistan, Algeria, Chad, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somaliland, the United Kingdom, andYemen. All decisions to repatriate detainees have been made in
From 2002-2008, atotal ofeight Guantanamo detainees were resettled, all in Albania.

27

light ofthe latest intelligence information and with the consent ofall relevant agencies. In light ofsuch inlormation,and following the attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 2009,the President announced that repatriations toYemen would be suspended for the foreseeable iLiture. In addition, the government has adopted enhanced procedures for the implementation of repatriation decisions, requiringacabinetlevel review prior to going fbrward with any repatriation. XII. Conclusion

The review process established pursuant to the Executive Order is now complete. The participating agencies have reviewed and unanimously agreed on dispositions for each ofthe240 detainees subject to the review. The agencies responsible Ibr the review will continue to handle operational issues involving detainees, including the implementation ofthe review determinations, and the National Security Council will coordinate the resolution ofpolicy issues pertaining to Guantanamo. TheTask Force has ensured that its analysesofthe detainees and the inlormation collected in the course of the review are properly preserved to assist in the resolutionofthese issues going fbrward.

28

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PAGE OFFrR^ C: r PAGE of I A( ADMH75D;._

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Defense Exhibit T 2 pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason 2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated 20 August 2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record of Trial

Defense Exhibit TT have been entered into the record as a CD/DVD and will be maintained with the original Record of Trial

.) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

,. • ;

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMYFORCES COMMAND 1777 HARDEE AVENUE, SW FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-1062
REPIVTO ATTENTION or

115APRU
AFCG

MEMORANDUM FOR Master Sergeant Paul D. Adkins. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d BCT, 10th Mtn Div, Fort Drum, NY SUBJECT: Reprimand

1. During the period from August 2008 to May 2010. you failed to report to your chain of command various acts of misconduct and inappropriate behavior of PFC Manning. This information was crucial to the commander's determination whether to deptoy this soldier and whether to maintain his security clearance. Your failure to keep the chain of command Informed impeded decision-making and created opportunities for further misconduct. Your failure to keep the chain ofcommand informed constitutes dereliction of duty in violation of Article 92, Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice. 2. You are reprimanded. Your actions are contrary to your duty to inform your commanders in order for them to make essential decisions. With regard to PFC Manning, your failure to report significant information about the soldier was an essential factor in PFC Manning's continued access to classified information, notwithstanding numerous acts on his part that raised questions as to his suitability for continued service and ability to maintain security of classified information. For a noncommissioned officer of your rank, experience and responsibility, these failures are unacceptable. You failed to display the sound judgment that your rank and position demanded. 3. This reprimand is imposed under the provisions of Army Regulation 600-37 and not as punishment under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, You are advised that in accordance with AR 600-37, paragraph 3-4b, I may file this reprimand in your Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). Prior to making a filing decision, however, I shall consider any matters you present to me. 4. Within ten (10) days of receipt of this memorandum, you may submit any matters for my consideration in making a filing determination. Submit any materials in rebuttal to me through the Staff Judge Advocate. US Amy Forces Command, 1777 Hardee Avenue SW, Fort McPherson. GA 30330-1062.

Enclosures

I yJAMESC General, USA Commanding

DEFENSE EXHIBIT ' " " ^ i r identification PAGE OFFERED: PAGE ADMXTTCD:
ManningB_00013083 PAGE of PAGES

.}
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, FORT ORtM FORT DRUM. NEW YORK 13602-5000

AFDR-ASC MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330-1062 SUBJECT: Memorandum of Reprimand - Master Sergeant Paxil D. Adkins, Headquarters and Headquartas Company, 2d Brigade Combat Team, Fort Drum, New York 13602 1. I have reviewed the case file, the memorandum of reprimand, and the rdjuttal documents, submitted by MSG Adkins. 2. I recommend the following action: [ ] The reprimand be withdrawn and destroyed. pfMSO Adkins' reprimand befiledin Ws([0M^^EOCALnLE]. 3. I make this recommendation for the following reasons: '

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ManningB_00013088

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM 10TH MOUNTAM DIVISION (LIGHT INFANTRY) FORT DRUM, NEW YORK 13602-5000

AFDR-BBA MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Fort Drum, Fort Dmm, New York 13602 SUBJECT: Memorandum of Reprimand - Master Sergeant Paul D. Adkins, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York 13602 1. I have reviewed the casefile,the memorandum of reprimand, and the rebuttal documents, submitted by MSG Adkins. 2. I recommend the following action: [ ] The reprimand be withdrawn and destroyed. nc^C^ ^^MSG Adkins'reprimandbefiledinhi^^OM^^[LOCALFILE].

3. Imakethis recommendationforthefollowingreasons:
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND 1777 HARDEE AVENUE, SW FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-1062
REPLY TO ATTENTION or

AFCG

"^^mi

MEMORANDUM FOR MSG Paul D. Adkins, Headquarters, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY 13602 SUBJECT: Disposition of Reprimand 1, I have reviewed and considered all information provided by you relating to the reprimand dated 15 April 11. 2. After considering the underlying events, surrounding circumstances, and information ytxi provided, I determine to file the reprimand in your a, b. Official Military Personnel File. Unit local file for a period of (up to 36) months.

3. POC is the Staff Judge Advocate at (404) 464-6200 (DSN = 367).

^y^L^^JXr^
/ydAMES D. THURMAN * ^ General, USA Commanding

ManningB_00013090

Defense Exhibit 1^ llpages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplen^ent to the original Record ofTrial

Defense Exhibit UU have been entered into the record as a CD/DVD and will be maintained with the original Record of Trial

Defense Exhibits ^pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record ofTrial

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Defense Exhibits 2pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record ofTrial

FBI — Myron Leon "Mike" Wallace

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Myron Leon "Mike" Wallace
Myron Leon "Mike" Wallace (1918-2012) was a well-known American journalist. This release consists ol two parts. The first concems a foreign counterintelligence file opened about Wallace's 1970 trip to Cuba (pp.1-5) and the second an investigation into a threatening letter sent to Wallace (pp.6-50). B M y r o n Leon "Mike" Wallace Part 01 of 01

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http://vault.fbi,gov/myron-leon-mike-wallace

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FBI — Ernest Hemingway

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Vaun Home* Ernesi Hemingway

Ernest Hemingway
Ernest Hemingway (1899-1961) was a noted American author and joumalist. This release consists of one FBI main file on Hemingway with documents ranging from 1942 to 1974. The bulk of it concems Hemingway's intelligence wori< on behalf of Ihe U.S. Embassy In Havana, Cuba between 1942 and 1944. mest Hemingway Part 01 of 01 BE,

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7/19/2013

FBI — Paul Harvey

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Paul Harvey Aurandl Paul Harvey Aurandt (1918-2009). popularly known as Paul Harvey, was a long-time radio broadcaster lor ABC Harvey conesponded with the Bureau on a range ol issues between 1956 and 1986. He was also the subject oftwo investigafions, a 1951 Atomic Energy Act investigation sparked when he entered s restricted area at a U.S. facility in pursuit of a slory and a 1983 background investigation.

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7/19/2013

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Defense.gov News Release: Statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell and Sp... Page 1 of 1

U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release
On the Web: httP://www,defense.oov/Releases/Release,aspx?Rele3seID= i4422 Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132 IMMEDIATE RELEASE Public contact: http://www.defense.Qov/landinq/cominent.aspx or-t-1 (703) 571-3343 No. 340-11 April 24, 2011

statement by Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell and Special Envoy for Closure ofthe Guantanamo Detention Facility Ambassador Daniel Fried "It is unfortunate that several news organizations have made the decision to publish numerous documents obtained illegally by Wikileai<s concerning the Guantanamo (GTIVIO) detention facility. These documents contain classified information about current and former GTMO detainees, and we strongly condemn the leaking ofthis sensitive infonnation, "The Wikileaks releases include Detainee Assessment Briefs (DABs) written by the Department of Defense between 2002 and early 2009. These DABs were written based on a range of information available then. "The Guantanamo Review Task Force, established in January 2009, considered the DABs during its review of detainee information. In some cases, the task force came to the same conclusions as the DABs. In-other instances the review task force came to different conclusions, based on updated or other available information. The assessments of the Guantanamo Review Task Force have not been compromised to Wikileaks. Thus, any given DAB illegally obtained and released by Wikileaks may or may not represent the current view of a given detainee. "Both the previous and the current administrations have made every effort to act with the utmost care and diligence in transferring detainees from Guantanamo. The previous administration transfen-ed 537 detainees; to date, the current administration has transferred 67. Both administrations have made the protection of American citizens the top priority and we are concemed that the disclosure of these documents could be damaging to those efforts. That said, we will continue to work with allies and partners around the world to mitigate threats to the United States and other countries and to work toward the ultimate closure of the Guantanamo detention facility, consistent with good security practices and our values as a nation."

http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem,aspx?print=http://www.defense,gov/releases/relea... 9/12/2012

Remarks by the President After Bipartisan Leadership Meeting | The White House

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T h i White HouM OfTice ol lha Press Secretary For Immediate Release July 27,2010

•WATCH THE VIDEO

Remarks by the President After Bipartisan Leadership Meeting
Rose O i n l t n 12:30 P.M. EDT
Jllly27,20IO J.2JPM

THE PRESIDENT: Good aftemoon, everybody. I Jusi concluded a productive discussion wilh ihe leaders of both panics In Congress. This was one of a series of regular meetings lhal 1 called lor in the Slaie of Ihe Union because 1 Ihink it's important lor us to come together and speak frankly aboul the challenges we lace and lo work through areas where we don't agree: hopefully find some areas where we do. Our conversation today recused on an issue that's being discussed every day at kitchen tables across Ihis country - and that's how do we create jobs that people need lo support their lamilies 1 believe that starts with doing everything we can to support small businesses. These are Ihe stores, the restaurants, Ihe start-ups and other companies thai create tvra out of every three new jobs In Ihis country - and that grow Into the big businesses that transform industries, here in Amerka and around Ihe world. Bul we know that many of these businesses still can't get the loans and the capital Ihey need to keep their doors open and hire new workers. That's why we've proposed steps to get them that help - eliminating capital gains taxes on investments, making it easier fbr smell lenders to support small businesses, expanding successful SBA programs to help these businesses access the capital that Ihey need. This is howwe create fobs - by investing In the innovators and entrepreneurs that have always driven our prosperity. These ere Ihe kind of common sense steps that folks from both parties have supported in the past •• steps to cut taxes and spur private sector growth and inveslmenl. And I hope that In the coming days, we'll once again find common ground and get this legislation passed. We shouKln't let America's small businesses be held hostage to partisan politics ~ and certainly not at this critical time. We also talked about the need to move forwaid on energy reform, -nte Senate Is now poised to act before Ihe August recess, advancing legislatnn to respond to the BP oil spill and create new clean energy jobs. That legisiatlon Is an Important step in the right direction. But 1 want to emphasize it's only the first step. And I intend to keep pushing for broader reform, including climale leglslatkm. because If we've leamed anything from the tragedy In Ihe Gulf, It's that our current energy polky is unsustainable. And we can't afford lo stand by as our dependence on foreign OH deepens, as we keep on pumping out the deadly pollutants thai threaten our air and our water and the lives and livelihoods of our people. And we can't stand by as we lei China race ahead lo create the clean energy jobs and industries of the future. We should be developing those renewable energy sources, and creating those high-wage, high-skil jobs nght here in the United States ol America. Thai's what comprehenshis energy and climale reform would do. And that's why I intend to keep pushing this issue fon«ard. I also urged the House leaders to pass Ihe necessary funding to support our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I know much has been wrinen about this in recent days as a result of the substantial leak of documents from Afghanistan covertng a period from 2004 lo 2009.

Prc<i(lent Obama on Bipartisan Leadership Mreting

EXTENDING MIDDLE-CLASS TAX CUTS
IT'S THE RIGHT THING TO DO

BLOO POSTS ON THIS ISSUE
SepU-illMir 12. 2012 I V M AM EOT

I'rcsklcnt Obama Discusses the Attack in Benghazi, Libya
President Obama condemns the attacks on an American diplomatic post in Benghazi, Lt>ya V_f and praises the service of those who lost their lives.

A) 1

© '

SBpmmbar 12. 2012 I2:M PM EDT

Annual Census Data on Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance l o r 2 0 u The Annual Census data report shows that we have made progress digging our way out ol Ihe worst economic crisis since the Great t)epresslon. bul lamilies are still slrugglng. Congress must act on the polkaes President Obama has pul forward Io strengthen Ihe middle class and those trying to get Into ll

• -

SeplonitlOf 11. 2012 12:18 PM EDT

The Health Care Law is Saving Americans Money
According to a new report, consumers saved more $2 billion in the past year, thanks to new rules that protect people from insurance Industry abuses

http://www,whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-after-bipartisan-leadership-,.. 9/12/2012

Remarks by the President After Bipartisan Leadership Meeting | The White House
While I'm concemed about the disclosure of sensitive Infonnation from the balUemeld lhal could potentially jeopardize individuals or operations, the fact is these documents don i reveal any issues lhat haven't already informed our publk debate on Alghanistan; indeed, they point lo Ihe same challenges lhal led nie to conduct an extensive review ol our policy last lall. So let me underscore what I've said many times; For seven years, we failed lo Implement a strategy adequate to Ihe challenge in this regton, Ihe region from which the 9/11 attacks were waged and other attacks against the United Stales and our Iriends and allies have been planned. That's why we've substantially increased our commllment there, insisted upon greater accountability from our partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan, developed a new strategy that can work, and put in place a leam, including one of our finest generals, lo execute thai plan. Now we have to see that strategy through. And as I told the leaders, I hope Ihe House wil act today to join the Senate, whkh voted unanimously in favor of Ihis funding, to ensure that our troops have the resources they need and that we're able to do what's necessary for our national security. Finally, dunng our meeting today, I urged Senator McConnell and others in the Senate to work virilh us to HI the vacancies that continue lo plague our judiciary. Right now, we've got nominees who've been waiting up to eight months to be confirmed as judges. Most of these loiks were voted out of conmiltee unanimously, or needy unanimously, by both Democrats and Republkans. Both Democrats and Republicans agreed that they were quaHlied to serve. Nevertheless, some in the minorily have used partlamenlaiy procedures time and again to deny Ihem a vote in the full Senate. If we want our judkaal system to wortt - If vre want to deliver justice in oui courts - then we need judges on our benches. And I hope thai In lha coming monlhs, we'll be able to work together lo ensure a timelier process In Ihe Senate. Now, we don't have many days left before Congress Is out for the year. And everyone understands thai we're less than 100 days from an election It's duriig this time lhal Ihe noise and the chatter about wlu's up In the polls and which party is ahead threatens to drovnn out just about everything else. But the folks we serve - who sent us here to serve, Ihey sent us here for a reason. They sent us here to listen lo Iheir voices. They sent us here lo represent Iheir interests ~ nol our own They sent us here to lead. And 1 hope that in the coming months, we'll do everything in our power to Uve up lo lhal responsibility. Thanks very much. END 12:37 P.M. EDT VIEW ALL RELATED BLOC POSTS

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l51o
SECRETARY OP DEFENSE tooo DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20901-1000

m 16
The Honorabki Carl Levin Chairman Committee on Armed Services United Stati» Senate Washington, DC 20510 Dear Mr. Chairman; Thank you for your July 2S, 2010, tetter regarding die unauthorized disclosure and publication of classified militMy dooummts by tbe WikiLeaks organWion. I share your concerns about the potential oompromiBe of classified information and its effect on the sa&ty of our troops, aUiea, and Aj^biatt partners. After consulting witii the Director of Ae Federal Bureau of Investigation, I have directed a ihorou^ invwtlgation to determine fhe scope of any unauthonzed release of classic B d information and identify tbe person or persons regwnsible. I have also established an interagency lofoitnation Review Task force, led by tbe Defense Intelligence Agency, to assess tbe contmt of any compromised iidbnnation and 6e impscts of such a oon^romise. Our initial review indicates most ofthe iitformatioQ contained in these documents relates to tactical mlUtaty operations, The initiai assessment in no way discounts tbe risk to national secui^; however, the review to date has not revealed any sensitive intelligence sources and methods compromised by this disclosure. The documents do contain the names of coop%ative Afghan nationals and the Departmenttekesvery seriously the Taliban threats recwrtly discussed in the press. We ' essess thisriskas likely to cause signiJBcant harm or damage to tbe national security interests ofthe United States and are examining mitigation options. We are wnking closely with our alUes to detennine whatrisksour mission partners may &ce as a result ofthe disclosure. There is a possibility lhat additional military documents may be published by WikiLeaks and the Department is developing courses of acticm to address this possibiUry. The scope ofthe assessment and nature ofthe iuvestigiL-dve process re<piife a great deal oftime and effort I am committed to investigating ^s matter and determining 31 s n Ad 31 siivo:

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appropriate action to reduce 4io risk of any such compromises in the fbture. We will ke^ you infosmed as ad^tiional InfbrmatioQ becomes available. Sincerely,

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cc: The Honorable John McCain Ranking Member

Defense Exhibits 3pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record ofTrial

Defense,gov News Transcript: DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm, Mulle,.. Page 1 of 8

U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Transcript
On the Web: http://www,defense.oov/Transalpts/TransaiDt,asDX?TranscriptID=4728 Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132 Public contact: http://www,defense,aov/landinQ/comment.a5Dx or +1 (703) 571-3343

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen

November 30, 2010

DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. This past February, I established a high-level working group to review the issues associated with implementing a repeal of the "don't ask, don't tell" law regarding homosexual men and women serving in the military, and based on those findings to develop recommendations for implementation should the law change. The working group has completed their work, and today tfie department is releasing their report to the Congress and to the American public. Admiral Mullen and I will briefly comment on the review's findings and our recommendations for the way ahead. We will take some questions. And then the working group's co-chairs, General Counsel Jeh Johnson and Army General Carter Ham, will provide more detail on the report, and answer any questions you might have on methodology, data and recommendations. When I first appointed Mr. Johnson and General Ham to assume this duty, I did so with the confidence that they would undertake this task with the thoroughness, the seriousness, professionalism and objectivity befitting a task ofthis magnitude and consequence. I believe that a close and serious reading of this report will demonstrate they've done just that. We are grateful for the service they have rendered in taking on such a complex and controversial subject. The findings of their report reflect nearly 10 months of research and analysis along several lines of study, and represent the most thorough and objective review ever of this difficult policy issue and its impact on the American military. First, the group reached out to the force to better understand their views and attitudes about a potential repeal of the "don't ask, don't tell" law. As was made dear at the time and is worth repeating today, this outreach was not a matter of taking a poll of the military to determine whether the law should be changed. The very idea of asking the force to in effect vote on such a matter is antithetical to our system of government, and would have been without precedent in the long history of our civilian-led military. The president of the United States, the commander in chief of the armed forces, made his position on this matter clear, a position I support. Our job as the civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense was to determine how best to prepare for such a change should the Congress change the law. Nonetheless, I thought it critically important to engage our troops and their families on this issue, as ultimately it will be they who will detennine whether or not such a transition is successful, I believe that we had to learn the attitudes, obstacles and concerns that would need to be addressed should the law be changed. We could do this only by reaching out and listening to our men and women in uniform and their families. The working group undertook this through a variety of means, from a mass survey answered by tens of thousands of troops and their spouses to meetings with small groups and individuals, including hearing from those discharged under the current law. Mr. Johnson and General Ham will provide more detail on the results of the survey of troops and their families.

Q

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^ut in summary,astrong majority of those who answered the sunBey-more than two-thirds-do not object to gays and lesbians serving openly in uniform.The findings suggest that for large segments of the military,repeal of'don't ask,don't tell,"though potentially disruptive in the short term, would not b^ the wrenching,traumatic change that many have feared and predicted. Thedata also shows thatwithin the combat arms specialties and units, there isahigherlevel of discontent, of discomfort and resistance to changing the current policy. Those findings and the potential implications for America's fighting forces remainasource of concern to the service chiefs and to me, I'll discuss this later. Second, the working group also examined thoroughly all the potential changes to the department's regulations and policies dealing with matters such as benefits, housing,relationships within the ranks,separations and discharges, Asthe co-chairs will explain inafew minutes, the majority of concems often raised in association with the repeal-dealing with sexual conduct, fraternisation,billeting arrangements, marital or survivor benefits-could be governed by existing laws and regulations. Existing policies can and should be applied equallyto homosexuals as well as heterosexuals, Whilearepeal would require some changes to regulations, the key to success, as with most things military,is training,education, and, above ail, strong and principled leadership up and down the chain of command. Third,the working group examined the potential inipactofachange in the law on military readiness, including the impact oh unit cohesion, recruiting andretention, and other issues critical to the performance ofthe force, in my view, getting this category right is the most Important thing we must do, TheU,S, armed forces are in the middle oftwo major military overseas campaigns-acomplex and difficult drawdown in lraq,awar in Afghanistan^both ofwhich are putting extraordinary stress on those serving on the ground and theirfamilies. It is the well-being ofthese brave young Americans, those doing the fighting and the dying since ^B11,that has guided every decisionlhave made in the Pentagon since taking this post neariyfouryears ago, Itwill be no different on this issue, lam determined to see that ifthe law is repealed, the changes are implemented in suchaway as to minimi^^e any negative impact on the morale, cohesion and effectiveness of combat units that are deployed, about to deploy to the front lines. With regards to readiness, theworking group report concludedthat overall andwith thorough preparation-andl emphasise thorough preparation-there isaiow risk from repealing "don't ask, don't tell." However,aslmentloned earlier, the survey data showed thatahigher proportion-between 40 (percent) and ^Opercent-of those troops serving in predominately all-male combat specialties-mostly Army and Marines, but including the Special Operations fonnations of the Navy and the Air Force-predictedanegative effective on unit cohesion from repealing the cunent law, Forthis reason, the uniform service chiefs are less sanguine about the worklng-than the working group aboutthe level of risk of repeal with regardto combat readiness. The views ofthe chiefs were sought out and taken seriously by me and by the authors ofthis report, The chiefs will also have the opportunityto explain their-to provide theirexpert military advice to the Congress,as they have to me and to the president.Their perspective desen/es serious attention and consideration, as it reflects the judgment of decades of experience andthe sentiment of many senior officers. In my view, the concerns of combattroops as expressed in the survey do not present an insurmountable barrierto successful repeal ofdon't ask,don't tell."This can be done and should be done without posingaserious risk to military readiness. However,these findings do lead me to conclude that an abundance of care and preparation is required ifwe are to avoidadisruptive and potentially dangerous impact on the performance ofthose serving atthe tip ofthe spear in America's wars. This brings me to myrecommendations on the way ahead. Earlierthis year, the House ofl^epresentatives passed legislation that would repeal "don't ask, don't tell" afteranumber of steps take place, the last being certification bythe president, the secretary of Defense and the chairman that the new policies and regulations were consistentwith tha U.S, military's standards of readiness, effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention. Now thatwe have completedthisreview,lstrongly urge the Senate to pass this legislation and send it to the presidentfor signature before the end ofthis year, ibelieve this isamatter of some urgency because, aswe have seen inthe pastyear,the federal courts are increasingly becoming involved in this issue, Justafewweeks ago, one lower court ruling forcedthe department intoan abrupt series of changes thatwere no doubt confusing and distracting to men and women in the ranks. Itisonlyamatterof

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time before the federal courts are drawn once more into the fray,with the very real possibilitythatthis change would be imposed immediately by judicial fiat-byfarthe most dlsn^ptive and damaging scenariolcan imagine, and one ofthe most ha^^ardous to military morale, readiness and battlefield perfom^ance. Therefore, it is important that this change come via legislative means^ that is, legislation informed by the review just completed,What is needed isaprocess that allows forawell-prepared and well-considered implementation-above all,aprocess that carries the imprimatur ofthe elected representatives ofthe people ofthe United States, Given the present circumstances, those that choose notto act legislatively are rolling the dice thatthis policywill not be abruptly overturned by the courts. The legislation presently before the Congress would authori^i^earepeal of the "don't ask, Idon't tell" pendingacertification by the president, secretary of Oefense and the chairman. It would not harm military readiness. Nonetheless,lbelieve that Itwould be unwise to push ahead with full implementation of repeal before more can be done to prepare the force-in particular,those ground combat specialties and units-forwhat could beadisruptive and disorienting change. The working group's plan,withastrong emphasis on education,training and leader development, providesasolid road map forasuccessfulft^llimplementation of repeal, assuming thatthe military isgivensufficienttime and preparation to getthejob done right. The department has already madeanumber of changes to regulations thatwithin existing law applied more exacting standart^s to procedures, investigating or separating troops for suspected homosexual condut^^t-changes that have addedameasure of common sense and decencytoalegally and morallyfraught process. Iwould close onapersonal note andapersonal appeal. This is the second time thatlhave dealt with this issue asaleader in public life, the priorcase being in CIA in t^^^whenldirected that openly gay applicants be treated like all other applicants^ that is, whether as individuals they met our competitive standards. Thatwas and isasituatlon significantly different in circumstance and consequence than confronting - than that confronting the United States armed forces today. ^ews toward gay and lesbian Americans have changed considerably during this period, and have grown more accepting since "don't ask, don'ttell" was first enacted, ^utfeelings on this matter can still mn deep and divide often starkly along demographic, cultural and generational lines, not only in society asawhole but in the uniformed ranks as well. Forthis reason,Iwould ask, as Congress takes on this debate, for all involved to resist the urge to lure ourtroops and theirfamilies intothe politics ofthis issue. What is called for isacareful and considered approach,an approach that to the extent possible welcomes all who are qualified and capable of serving their country in uniform, but one that does not undermine out ofhaste or dogmatism those attributes that make theUSmilitarythe finest fighting force in the world. The stakes are too high foranationunderthreat,foramilitaryatwar,to do any less. Admirals AOMMUI^I^EN:Thank you,Mr, Secretary, I,too, wish to thank Jeh Johnson and Carter Ham, as well as everyone involved in the working group,fortheir extraordinary efforts over much of the past year Ifully endorse their report, its findings and the implementation plan recommended by the working group. The working group was givenatall order-indeed,nothing less than producing the firsttruly comprehensive assessment of not only the impact of repeal ofthe law goveming "don't ask, don't tell,"but also about how bestto implement anew policy across the joint force. As the secretary indicated, the working group surveyed ourtroops and theirspouses, consulted proponents and opponents of repeal, and examine!^ military experience around the world, They also spoke with serving gays and lesbians, as well as former members ofthe miiitarywho are gay and lesbian. The result is one ofthe most expansive studiesever done on military personnel issues, andlapplaud the time thatwas taken to anive at solid, defensible conclusions. More criticaliy,lwas gratified to see thatthe working group focused theirfindingsandrecommendations, rightly, on those who would be most affected byachange in thelaw^our people, all of our people. And so forthe first time, the chiefs andlhave more than just anecdotal evidence and hearsay to inform the advice we give our civilian leaders. We've discussed this issue extensively amongst ourselves and with the secretary,andthechiefsandlmetwith the president as

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recently as yesterday. lonlywant to add three points to what the secretary's already laid out. First,lthink it's noteworthythattheworking group found strong leadership to be the single most important factor in implementing any repeal. That may sound fairly obvious, but It isakey,critical point. We all have our opinions, and those opinions matter. This is without questionacomplex social and cultural Issue, 8ut atthe end ofthe day, whateverthe decision ofour elected leaders may be, we in uniform have an obligation to follow orders. When those orders involve significant change such as thiswould,we need to findways to lead the way fonivard, Ourtroops and theirfamilies expectthat from us, andlthink the American people do as well. Second,we've heard loud and clearthat ourtroops also expect us to maintain high standards of conduct and professionalism, both as we move forward in this debate and should repeal occur. We treat people with dignity and respect in the armed forces,orwe don't last long.No special cases,no special treatment,ifwe're going to continue to comport ourselves with honor and hold ourselves accountable across the board to impeccably high standards, repeal or no repeal, Finally,the report shows that however low the overall risk of repeal may be with respect to readiness,cohesion and retention,it is not without its challenges. We can best address those challenges by having itwithin our power and our prerogative to manage the implementation process ourselves. Should repeal occur,lshare the secretary's desire that it come about through legislation-through the same process with which the lawwas enacted,ratherthan precipitously through the courts, Ifurther hope that such debate In the Congress will be as fully informed by the good work done in this report as my advice to the secretary and to the president is. Thank you. 0: Secretary Gates,you said it would be unwise to proceed with repeal until there is more groundwork, Howlong do you envision that process lasting^ And is thisaconcernandarecommendation that is shared by the White House i n as far as once Congress acts there still beingaperiod in which the policy is in place7 Admiral Mullen, do you also share that recommendation'^ SEC,GATES: Well, first of all,justto be clear, whatwe're talking about is that, should the Congress vote to repeal the law, what we are asking for is the time subsequent to that to prepare adequately before the change is implemented in the force. How long thatwould take, frankly,ldon't know. There is the-the report, as you will see in the implementation plan, lays out an ambitious agenda of things that need to be done,including not only leadership training but training ofamilitary force of over^million people. Iwould saythis. Ithink we all would expect that ifthis law is implemented, the presldentwouldbe-ls-ifrepeal is passed,the president would be watching very closely to ensure thatwe don't dawdle or try to slow-roll this. Soithinkhis expectation would be that we would prepare as quickly as we properly and comprehensively could, and then we would be in aposition to move toward the certification. 8ut how long thatwould takelthink-ldon't know. ADM.MU^I..EN: There will-there will be level-there isalevel of risk here,as is laid out in the report. Andl would hope you spend as much time on the implementation plan as the report, because the Implementation plan certainly from all the military leadership is strongly endorsed should this law change. And it is in that implementation plan that the risk levels are mitigated,and principally mitigated through leadership-certainly the training,the guidance,but the engagement ofthe leadership. And having enough time to do that is critically important as we wouiti look at implementation. That's what really mitigates any risk that's out there. 0: Mr Secretary,you said the chiefs are less sanguine than the working group. What specifically have they told you about their concerns'!^ And why inatimeofwar accept any increase in the level of risk7 SEC. GATES: Well, the chiefs will speak forthemselves on Friday. Andthe chainnan has spent much more time with them thanlhave on this. Ithink-lthink it's fairtosaythat their concerns revolve around stress onaforce after nearly lOyears of war, Andlthink they are concerned about the higher levels of negative response from the ground combat units and the Special Operations units thatlhave talked about in m y - i n my remarks.

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Ithink that-lwouldjust like to go back and underscore the chainnan's point, and that is the level of risk is tied Intimatelytothequaiityofpreparation Andtodothis-solguesslwouldputitthisway: Ifacourt ordered us to do this tomorrow,lbelieve the force-the risk to the forcewould be high, ifwe had no time to prepare, Ifwe have plenty oftime to prepare the force, to prepare the leadership,lthink the more effectivelywe do that preparation the lowerthe risk, Chairman7 ADM,MUI..t.EN: I've engaged,actually,many,many times with the chiefs overthe last-overthe last many months, and so we've had very,very extensive discussions about this. And from the standpoint ofachange in the l a w - l mean,my perspective is, as whatlwould call my-certainlywas my personal opinion, is now my professional view,thatthls isapolicy changethatwe can make And wecando it inarelatively low-risk fashion,given the time and given the abilityto mitigate whatever risk is out there through strong leadership. In fact, part ofthis is the fact thatwe have been atwarforso long. We have-one ofthe discussions about this is affecting combat effectiveness or combat readiness. I've never been associated withabettermilitarythan we are right now and better military leaders, Andlhave tremendous confidence that shouldthis change, thatthey'll be able to implement it, very specifically, 0:That's true, butwhat aboutthe otherchiefs7 AOM,MUI..I..EN: Well,again, the chiefs will speak forthemselves on Friday. O: Mr,Secretary,you raised the issue of combat arms, and the report shows that of those polled, 50 percent in Army combat arms are opposed,^0 percent in Marine combat anrts. And there's also the issue of chaplains, Thereport says that there's very strong opposition among the chaplains there as well, Whatwould you say to both groups'!^ Howwould you deal with this with both groups^ SEC,GATES: Well,the interesting-one ofthe other considerations in this that the-that the report revealed is even in combat arms units,those who-among those who believed they had served withagay person before,the level of comfortwith going fonfifard was something like ^0 percent. So part of this isaquestion of unfamiliarity. Part of it Is stereotypes. And part of it is just sort of inherent resistance to change when you don't knowwhat's on the other side. And solthink- Ithink that the contrast between the significant levels of concem for those who had -who said they had never served with someone who is gay as opposed to those who had is an important consideration, ^utwhatl would sayto them is, you know, frankly,ifthe Congress ofthe United States repeals this law, this is thewill ofthe American people, and you are the American military,andwe will do this, and we will do it right, and we will do everything in our power to mitigate the concerns that you have. O: Andonthechaplains7 SEC.GATES: SayingO: The report-(inaudibie)-avery large numberview homosexuality asasin or an abomination. SEC.GATES: And the report-the report identifies that the chaplains already serve inaforce many ofwhose members do not share theirvalues,whodo not share their beliefs. And there is an obligation to care for all. ^ut it also is clearthat the chaplains are not going to be asked to teach something they don't believe in. And solthink that the-lthink the report is pretty clear on that, O: Thank you, Non-'don't ask, don't tell" question quick7 SECGATES:Sure, 0: Wikil^eaks, Post Wikit.eaks reaction. What's your sense on vifhether the information-sharing climate and environment created after 9/11to encourage greater cooperation and transparency among the intelligence communities and

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the military led to these three massive data dumps7 And how concerned are you now there may be an overreaction to clamp down on information dispersal because of thedisclosures7 SEC.GATES: One of the common themes thatlheard from the timelwasasenior agency officialin the early 1880s in every military engagementwe were in wasthe complaint ofthe lack of adequate Intelligence support. That began to change witii the GulfWar in ig^t,but it really has changed dramatically after g^11. And clearlythe finding that the lack of sharing of information had prevented people from, quote/unquote, "connecting the dots" ledto much wider sharing ofinfonTtation,andlwould say especiallywider sharing ofinformation at the front, so that no one at the front was denied —in one of the theaters,Afghanistan or Iraq-was denied any information that might possibly be helpful to them. Now, obviously, that aperture went too wide. There'sno reason forayoung officer ata forward operating post in Afghanistan to get cables having to do with the STAI^Tnegotiations. And so we've takenanumber of mitigating steps in the department. Idirectedanumber ofthese things to be undertaken in August. First, t h e - a n automated capability to monitorworkstations for security purposes. We've got about^O percent of this done, mostly in-mostly stateside. And I've directed that we accelerate the completion ofit. Second,aslthink you know, we've taken steps in CENTCOM in September and now everywhere to directthat all CD and D^O write capability offthe network be disabled. We have-we have done some other things in terms of two-man policies-whereveryou can move information fromaclassified system to an unclassified system,to haveatwo-person policy there. And then we have some longer-term efforts under way in which we can —and, first of all. In which we can identify anomalies, sort oflike credit card companies do in the use of computer; and then finally,efforts to actuallytailor access depending on roles. Outlet me say-let me address the latter part ofyourquestion.This is obviouslyamassive dump ofinformation. First of all,lwould say unlike the Pentagon Papers, one ofthe things that is important,lthink, in all ofthese releases, whether it's Afghanistan,Iraq orthe releases this week, is the lack of any significant difference between what the U,S, governmentsays publicly andwhat these things show pnvately,whereas the Pentagon Papers showed that many in the governmentwere not only lying to the American people, theywere lying to themselves, ^ut let me —let me just offer some perspective as somebody who's been at thisalong time. Every other government in the world knows the United States govemment leaks likeasieve, and it has foralong time. Andldragged this up the other day whenlwas looking at some ofthese prospective releases. And this isaquote from John Adams: "Ht^canagovemment go on, publishing all oftheir negotiations with foreign nations,lknow not." Tome, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel," When we went to real congressional oversight ofintelligence in the mid-'70s, there wasabroad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again ifwe were going to share it all with the Congress, Those fears ail proved unfounded. Now, I've heard the impact ofthese releases on our^oreign policy described asameltdown, asagame-changer, and so on. Ithink-lthink those descriptions are fairly significantly oven^rought,The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets. Many governments-some govemments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us, Theywill continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with one another, Isthisembarrassing7 ^es, Isitawkward^ ^es. Consequences forUS.foreign policy^ Ithink fairly modest, 0: And on that same subject. On that same subject. Did eitherofyou reach out to any ofyour counterparts in advanceofthis leak and warn them, or even apologi2:e in advance forwhat might come out7 SECGATES:ldidn't.

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Defense.gov News Transcript: DOD News Briefing with Secretary Oates and Adm, Mulle,,, Page7of8

ADMMUt^l^EN:ldid. 0: Whowasit7 ADM. MUI^I^EN:ToGenerall^ayani in Pakistan. SEC, GATES: 'f^eah^ 0: Sir,you've said that-you know, on "don't ask, don't tell"-you've said that now is the time todo this, largely because ofthe threat of legal action, I'm just wondering,ifthat legal action wasn't looming,how much do you think thatthis would-this is the right thing to do now7 And I'mwondering just how hard you intend to lobby those on the Hill to get them to sway to the other side, SEC,GATES: Well,you know,ldon't spend much time thinking about the world aslwishitwere. The reality is the court issue is out there, and, in myview, does lend urgency to this, ^ouknow,the question was-hast:ieen raised, well,maybe the courts would give us time, to which my answeris, maybe, maybe not. We just don't know, butthe one path we know gives us the time and the fiexibility to do this is the legislative path, Andldon'tknow how fast the courts are going to move on this, but what we've seen seems to be more and more action in the courts in the last year ortwo. And that's what gives measense of urgency about. My greatest fear is what almost happened to us in Octoberand that is being told to implementachange of policy overnight, 0: ^eah, Mr,Secretary,Senator McCain is now arguing that this report is the wrong report, and that it won't get to the bottom of h t ^ this could -the repeal could affect unit cohesion or morale, I'm wondering ifyou or Admiral Mullen have any reaction to that response to the report, SEC, GATES: Well,lthink-lthink that, in this respect-andlobviouslyhavealot of admiration and respecter Senator McCain-butin this respect,lthink that he's mistaken, Ithink this report does provideasound basis for making decisions on this law. Now,people can draw different conclusions out ofthis report: the comments,for example,in t h e - l n the evaluation in the report ofthe higher levels of concern for-among the combat arms units and in the Marine Corps and so on. So people can read this and potentially come to different conclusions, but in terms ofthe data andin terms ofthe views ofthe force, it's hard for me to Imagine that you could come up withamore comprehensive approach. We h a d - w e had something on theorder of 145,000 people in uniform answerthe questionnaire, the survey. We had something on the order of 40(,000) to 42,000 spouses respond to t h e - t o that survey.Tens ofthousands of people reached in otherways. Solthink there is no comparable source of information or data on attitudes in the force than this report, and it's hard for me to imagine another efforttakingamuch different approach than this report did, ADM,MUt..l^EN: And its main thrustwas on combat effectiveness, mission effectiveness, readiness, unit cohesion,etcetera. Andthat data-again,lagree with the Secretary,you can certainly pick parts ofitthatread-you might wantto read differently. Sut the data's very t^mpelling, in parttcularwithrespectto those issues. Imean, thatwas the main reason forthe report. 0: Iwonder ifyou could talkalittle bit more about howyou would see this implemented and what you mean by giving time. For example,would you, say,nothave openly g a y - i f the lawis changed,would you not put openly gay servicemembers into units that units that are abouttodeployto Afghanistan in ^011orso7 Would you-would you takewould you integrate the non-combat-arms units firsts Imean,what-could you describealittle bit more ofwhat your implementation plan would be'i^ SEC.GATES: Well,first of all, the repeal ofthe lawwould not, aslunderstand i t - n o w I'm notalawyer-butasi understand i t - a n d maybe Jeh Johnson can address this question foryou more authoritativelywhen he comes up here. ^ut aslunderstand it,until we certify,until the president, the set^etary ofDefense and the chairman ofthe Joint Chiefscertit^thatwe-that the U.S. military is readytoimplementthe law, the repeal, theexisting-thecurrently existing rules would continue to apply. And so you would haveaperiod of preparation, ifyou will,that, aslindicatedearlier,ldon't know necessarily how long thatwould take.

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Defense.gov News Transcript: DOD News Briefing with Secretary Oates and Adm, Mulle... Page8of8

ADM,MUt^t.EN: And, Julian-and from my perspective, we are one military. We are one military, SEC,GATES:Two more questions, ^eah, 0: Mr,Secretary,you have spoken quite clearly about howyou supportthe president's position on this, and how you're urging the Senate to act, and howthis needs to be donein an orderly and measuredway, butyou haven't said so muchovertime about yourpersonal beliefs on "don't ask, don't tell,"Do you feel personally that it's been unjust orwrong for gays and lesbians notto be able to serve their country openly7 Or are you comfortable with the idea of openly integrating the military^ SEC,GATES: Ithink that-in my view-one of the things that is most important to me is personal integrity. And apolicyoralawthatin effect requires people to lie gives me-givesmeaproblem. And solthink it's-imean,we spenda lot oftime in the military talking about integrity and honor and values. Telling the truth isaprettyimportant value in that scale, It'savery important value. Andsoforme,andlthought the admiral was-that Admiral Mullen was eloquent on this last February-apolicy that requires people to lie about themselves somehow seems to me fundamentally flawed. I^ast question. 0: Earlier in the process. General Conway, when raising concerns aboutthis, floated the idea of separate banacks and said that, you know. Marines might not becomfortable sharing banacks with openly gay troops. Is that even on the table, or is that-would the idea of separate barracks, separate housing,separate showers just be offthe table'i^ SEC.GATES: We can get into the details ofthat-oryou can with Jeh and General Ham. butthe bottom line of the report is no separate facilities. Thank you.

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Remarks With l^a:2:akhPoreignMinisterSaudabayev After Their Meeting

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m ^ i l U.S. DEPARTMENT O F STATE
^ DIPLOMACY IN ACTION Home » Secretary of State Hillaiy Rodham Clinton » Secretary's Remarks » 2010 Secretary Clinton's Remarks » Remarks by Seer Kazakh Foreign Minister Saudabayev After Their Meeting

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Remarks With Kazakh Foreign Minister Saudabayev After Their Meeting
Remarks Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State Palace o f Independence Astana, Kazakhstan December 1, 2010 MODERATOR: (Via translator) Welcome to (inaudible) Chairman of the OSCE, State Secretary and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Saudabayev and U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. FOREIGN MINISTER SAUDABAYEV: (Via translator) (Inaudible), first ofall, to thank you for your great interest in the work of this Astana summit, and wish you fruitful work in the capital of Kazakhstan, A meeting of the head of our state, Nazarbayev, and the head of the U.S. delegation at this summit, Mrs. Hillary Clinton, has just finished. And, as President Nazarbayev stressed, the participation of State Secretary Clinton in this (inaudible) summit is one more testimony to the fact that our strategic partnership between our two countries has been further developed. At the meeting there was a deep and detailed exchange of opinions on the most topical issues of this Astana summit, which was (inaudible) important political results. The two sides have agreed that Kazakhstan's effective chairmanship, including this first summit, OSCE Summit in the 21st century, is giving an impetus to the further development of cooperation in the OSCE space. Another part ofthis summit is the response to transnational threats, especially from outside the OSCE area; above all, from Afghanistan, Situations in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asian countries has been discussed. It was stressed that, in order to achieve stability and sustainable development of the region's countries - thought through policies important and the rule of law, as well as implementation of humanrights.The two parties agreed that development is only achieved through the rule of law with strong democratic institutions. As far as the humanitarian dimension is concemed, it was noted that Kazakhstan chairmanship was trying to achieve interaction with civil society, and through the participation of NGOs in OSCE work, also at this summit.

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Remarks With Kazakh Foreign Minister Saudabayev After Their Meeting

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It was also stressed how important it was to normalize relations of the Islamic world with the West, and to achieve an effective dialogue between civilizations and to increase tolerance. These are issues that are always in the central focus of the Presidents Nazarbayev and Barack Obama, And Kazakhstan will continue to promote those issues. As the chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, we have paid a lot of attention to further development of the strategic partnership between our two countries, including in such areas like security, political independence, economic and trade relations, as well as promotion of democracy. We have reconfirmed our determination to continue our cooperation in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, including the celebration of a Nuclear Security Summit. At the meeting in Washington in April this year, at the meeting of the two presidents it was also stressed to take Kazakhstan in the economic area is contributing to the implementation of the joint initiative of the United Nations and the United States on global food security. And this connection of two countries has recently started to implement major projects for agriculture that would profit from the most up-to-date U.S. technologies. Nazarbayev also established a university that established good cooperation with the leading U.S. universities. And this opens up better prospects for technological cooperation. Kazakhstan has highly appreciated the support provided for security in Afghanistan in - the two sides also stressed an important contribution of Kazakhstan to assistance to Afghanistan. Our country also hosts 1,000 Afghani students to complete their university studies at a cost of 50 million U.S. dollars. Fiftyfive Afghanis have already started their studies. And Kazakhstan has now ~ has joined the security forces, international security forces, in Afghanistan. I am quite convinced that today's meeting between President Nazarbayev and State Secretary Clinton has given a new impetus to the entire development of the - in the entire area of our bilateral relations. Distinguished State Secretary, let me welcome you once again, from the bottom of my heart, in this capital of Astana. You, being an intemational personality and a great friend of Kazakhstan, we are very thankful to you for your consistent support and help that we have noticed in very specific ways during our chairmanship at the OSCE. And I would like to express my hope that we continue our fruitful and effective cooperation for the good of our peoples and countries. And I give you the floor. Thank you. (Applause.) This applause is a sign of your support of our cooperation. SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, let me begin by expressing what a pleasure it is for me to be here in Astana. And I want to thank the president, the foreign minister, and the people of Kazakhstan for their hospitality and warm welcome. I fondly remember my first visit here in the 1990s, when Kazakhs were just beginning to chart their new course as an Independent nation. I was proud that the United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan, and to welcome you into the community of nations. And today Kazakhs can be proud of all you have accomplished, and our two nations can be confident in the strength of our strategic partnership. The relationship between the United States and Kazakhstan is rooted in mutual respect and mutual interest. Kazakhstan may be a young nation, but it is home to an ancient and rich culture, which I saw for myself at the museum in Almaty 13 years ago. America is still a relatively young country, yet we deeply respect the hopes of the people of Kazakhstan, and your aspirations for a better future, and we seek to broaden our partnership and to wort< with you to continue making progress toward developing into a stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous nation that is a leader in the region and beyond.

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Remarks With Kazalch Foreign Minister Saudabayev After Their Meeting

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We alsolookforwardtocooperatingwith the Kazakh private sectorand NGOs that are worthing forfree markets, the rule oflaw, andavibrant civil society in which citizens can exercise theirfull range ofhuman rightsThese goals will take continued hard work, ButAmerica believes in Kazakhstan's promise, and we are committed to yourfuture. Today's OSCE Summit isatestamentto both Kazakhstan's valued role in the international community,and the strong ties between ourtwo countries. As the firstformerSovietRepublicto lead the OSCE asan independent nation, Kazakhstan has helped to focus attention on Central Asia's challenges, as well as its many opportunities. As the foreign minister said,we have discussed security,theeconomy,the environment, democracy,human rights, and tolerance.The United States is committed to the OSCE, and we and our partners are working to empower itto take an even more effective role, including the encouragement of more transparency and cooperation between and among militaries, helping resolve long-standing conflicts, and standing up against attacks on civil society and journalists. Our discussions here in Astana have been constructive and substantive. Last night,lmetwith many ofthe participants who took part in the independent conference of nongovernmental organizations that ran parallel with the summitlwas impressed by their effort and energy on cmcial challenges, including protecting fundamental freedoms,Theyknowwhat we all know,thatathriving civil society isavital building block of democracy,and that disparate, diverse voices must be heard and supported. In thediscussion thatlhad with both the president and the foreign minister,lthanked Kazakhstan foryour support ofthe international mission in Afghanistan, and for all you are doing to help the Afghan people, particularly the very kind invitation for1,000 students to continue their education here, in Kazakhstan. This will enable these young people to contribute to Afghanistan's developmentlalso thanked Kazakhstan forthe recently concluded airtransitagreement that will help ensure the delivery of critical resources to Afghanistan,andlwelcomed Kazakhstan as the newest member ofthe International Security Assistance Force, which now includes 49 countries. We discussed our shared interest In curbing nuclear proliferation, and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear material, Kazakhstan has long beenaleader on this issue, and the United States deeply valuesour partnership. Along with the United Kingdom,our nations recently secured more than tOmetric tons of highly-enriched uranium, and3metrictons of weapons-grade Plutonium here in Kazakhstan.That is enough material to have made 775 nuclearweapons.And now we areconfident itwill neverfall into the wrong hands.Thisisamilestone of our cooperation,andamajor step forward in meeting the goals set at this year's Nuclear Security Summit of securing all nuclear material within four years. lalso sharedwith the minister and the president the discussions thatlhave had with civil society leaders.lexpressed our continued interest in Kazakhstan's national human rights action plan,and reforms to electoral, political,and libel laws,l assured him that America's commitment to working with Kazakhstan and the other nations of Central Asia to advance democracy and human rights will not end when the summit is over. On all ofthese and otherfronts,Kazakhstan andthe United States are making progress together,The bonds we are forging between our governments and our peoples are making both of our countries-and, indeed, the region and the world-more secure and prosperous.And surrounded by the energy and optimism that one feels in this new dynamic city, Ilook fon^ard with confidence toapositive future for Kazakhstan and its people. So again,Minister,let me thank you foryour leadership and your hospitality.(Applause.) FOREIGN MINISTER SAUDABAYEV: (Via translator) Thank youvery much. Please ask questions,According to the law ofhospitality,firstlgive the floor to our guests, MODERATOR: (Via translator) Mr ^urns, please.

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Remarks With Kazakh Foreign Minister Saudabayev After Their Meeting

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OUESTION:Aquestion for Secretary ClintonThank you. On Iran,now thatthe date has been set for talks in Genevaalthough it's not clearthat the agenda itselfhas been agreed-can you saywhat exactly it is that the United States hopes and expects to achieved And also,given the ot^comeayear ago, when an apparent agreement unraveled rather quickly, is this really Iran's last chancer Thank you. SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Sob, first, we are encouraged that Iran hasagreed to meet in Geneva nextweek with representatives ofthe P-^-f^l.This is an opportunity for Iran to come to the table and discuss the matters that are of concern to the international community: first and foremost, their nuclear program. The agreementyou referred to that wasaresult ofthe negotiations oflast fall, the so-calledTehran Research Reactor agreement, will t::ertainly be discussed, but would have to be modified in order to take Into account what is known through the IAEA and other sources ofthe developments in Iran's nuclear program since that agreement was first reached and then not implemented. Theinternationalcommunityhasbeenveryclear.lranisentitledtotheuseofcivilnuclearpowerforpeacefulpurposes.lt is not, however,entitledtoanuclearweapons program. And the purpose ofthe negotiations will be to underscore the concern of the entire international community in Iran's actions and intentions. We hope that Iran will enter into these negotiations in the spirit that they are offered,We want to see Iran takeapositionasaresponsible member of the international community,But In order to do that, it must cease violating international obligations, cease any efforts it is making and has made in the past toward achieving nuclearweapons. So, that is whatwe will be focused on,And the agenda can be more comprehensive than that, but that is the principal purpose ofthe meeting in Geneva, QUESTION: (Via translator)lhaveaquestlon for Mr.Saudabayev,lt is knt^n that Kazakhstan is going to be succeeded as chairmanship, butwillremainamember ofthe troika, ofthe threesome ofthe OSCE, Could you please tell us in which areas are you going to work next year7 FOREIGN MINISTER SAUDABAYEV: (Via translator) Kazakhstan is going to continue being active asamember ofthe OSCE, and to contribute towards the search for solutions of problems, and the implementation of the decisions to be taken at this summit.For one yearwe will remainatroikamember,And the processes that we hope to have been given an impetus will be continued further by our successors, and we will continue to wori^ together in close contact with them. And as to theinternal life of our country,the processes have become (inaudible) as part of our further development of our country and the economic and social area, as well as the democratic development. As part of the implementation of the national program "The Way to Europe,''thisisalso going to be continued. MODERATOR: (Via translator) Mr.AndyOuinn is an American press member, OUESTION: Madam Secretary,this trip has given youyourfirst chance to meet personally with foreign leaders following the Wikileaks release overthe weekend,lam wondering ifyou could tell us how much ofatopic it's been in your discussions, what sort of responses you may have heard. And has anyone expressed any worry about U.S. trustworthiness,going fonivard^ And, forthe minister,your government saw some embarrassing details alsocome to light in the Wikileaks release. What is your reaction to this7 And do you feel that this type of release will change the way the U.S.is perceived asadiplomatic partner, going forwards

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Remarks With Kazakh Foreign Minister Saudabayev After Their Meeting

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SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Andy,lhave had the opportunity to meetwith many leaders here at the summit in Astana. We have talked about many important issues, and the work thatwe are doing togetherto solve global problems,lhave certainly raised the issue ofthe leaks in orderto assure our colleagues that it will not in anyway interfere with American diplomacy or our commitmentto continuing tmportantwori^ that is ongoing,lhave not had any concerns expressed about whether any nation will not continue to wort^ with and discuss matters of importance to us both, going forward, Aslhave said,lam proud ofthe work that American diplomats do,and the role that America plays in the world,Both President Obama andlare committed toarobust and comprehensive agenda of engagement, It's one of the reasons that lam here in Astana at the OSCE Summit Andlam confident that thework that our diplomats do every single daywiil go fonivard,Andlanticipate that there will bealot of questions that people have every right and reason to ask, and we stand ready to discuss them at any time with our counterparts around the worid, FOREIGN MINISTER SAUDABAYEV: (Via translator)lbelievethatwhat has happened is part ofanormal cost, ora nonrial price, that one has occasionallyto pay while we lead ourworkThat is why we will be able to live through this incident, as.we have through others. And, as head ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs in my country,now declare that this will have no effect for our strategic partnership between the United States and Kazakhstan Thank you. MODERATOR: (Via translator) One question from the Kazakhstan members ofthe press. OUESTION: (Via translator)lhaveaquestion to both the Secretary of State and Mr.Saudabayev, It has been mentioned that right after the meeting between the two presidents, Nazarbayev and Obama (inaudible),Istiil would like to knowwhat is going to happen next, apart from the operation on the Nazarbayev's university and the plans for agricultural cooperation. Are there any other agreements or projects to be implemented between ourtwo countries^ And what could prevent them from happenings A n y - i s there anything subjective that-orpersonal-that might affect those plans7 And one more question to State Secretary Clinton. It is known that some amendments to the act on cyber space have been adopted in the United States that would entitle the U.S. President to regulate the exchange of Information in the Internet.iwould like to know more about this concerning the amendments to the act on cyber space. Thank you. FOREIGN MINISTER SAt^DABAYEV: (Via translator) Atthis briefing, we dont have the opportunityto discuss prospects for general cooperation and specificareas of cooperation in our bilateral relations, because this isahuge area that has several dimensions.lcan only take note that we have, once again,reconfirmed that we both haveavery optimistic outlook,as far as our bilateral relations are concerned,and we havealot of potential in this area.Thank you SECRETARY CLINTON: Andlwould add we discuss not onlythe importance of our strategicpartnership between our two countries, but how the United States and Kazakhstan can work together in the region and beyond. We value Kazakhstan's role and influence in the region. Itwas critical,afterthe events oflast spring affecting Kyrgyzstan,to have Kazakhstan playaleadership role.The United States worked closelywithKazakhstan.The Minister andltalked several times aboutwhat Kazakhstan was doing to assist Kyrgyzstan,and we are continuing to wori^ together and supporting Kazakhstan's influential position in trying to help stabilizeKyrgyzstan. We discussed further what additional regional steps might be t^nsidered to better Integrate the Central Asian nations. I believe that this is an important area of the worid, Kazakhstan has done well, economically, and with its development. Now we need to see how to work together to assist the other nations in the region to develop more successfully and inclusively. With regard to cyber security and cyber space, the United States is, like many nations, addressing the opportunities and the challenges and the threats that are posed in cyber space. We wantthe Intemet to beavehicle forthe free exchange of information,yetwe are well aware ofthe dangers that can be posed to the misuse ofthe Internet to all kinds ofinstitutions

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Remarks With Kazakh Foreign Minister Saudabayev After Their Meeting

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and networi^s. And so this is not onlyamatter of concem forthe United states; we think this deserves attention at the highest international levels, and that is beginning tooccur, MODERATOR: (Via translator) Thank you very much,That will be it. We don't have any time left,Thank you.

PRN: 2010/T36-5

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Defense Exhibits ^pages classified "SECRET" ordered sealed for Reason2 Military Judge's Seal Order dated20August2013 stored in the classified supplement to the original Record ofTrial

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