“Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. forever.” General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower, 1947
Streamlining Defense for the 21st Century (Preparing for austere ‘interwar period’ levels of military funding)
Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel (ret) U.S. Army Executive VP Burke‐Macgregor Group LLC +1 703 975 6954 Doug.Macgregor@Burke‐Macgregor.com
Briefing Outline:
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1. Wha hatt you should take away from this presentation!
2. Wh Wher ere e do we go from here? 3. The ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver‐Sustainment Framework; 4. Too Many Chiefs, too few Indians; 5. Fast aster er,, Flatter C2 for More Teeth, Less Overhead; 6. Jo Joiint Rotational Readiness, the Path to Savings; 7. Key Recommendations, Primary and Secondary.
What you should take away from this presentation:
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This presentation outlines a Vision Vision for for a coherent, efficient national defense strategy; a vision for economy and effectiveness the National Leadership can present to the American people: Streamline: Eliminate wasteful and redundant C2
overhead, and support structures. Maximize ready, available combat power! Simplify: Simplify Operational C2 arrangements using
the ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver, Sustainment Framework . Unify: Integrate capabilities across service lines.
Wherever possible, reduce redundant single‐service warfighting structures and C2 along with single‐service thinking, culture, modernization, R&D/acquisition.
BOTTOM LINE: Keep the muscle, cut the fat!
The Fiscal Crisis and Defense:
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The subtle realization that the United States is in fiscal “free fall” is sinking in, an economic crisis that bailouts and “quantitative easing” cannot stop. In 2013, the President will have three obvious courses of action: 1. Do nothing. Let the Service bureaucracies and events drive outcomes ( few if any $ Savings Savings); ); 2. Tink Tinker er on the margins of the status quo (modest $ Savings); Savings ); 3. Le Leve vera rage ge the crisis to reduce overhead, streamline defense investment and increase capability (major $ Savings). Savings ).
Option 3 is the only course of action that promises real savings and constructive change!
Meanwhile, beyond America’s borders…
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China: Stability‐obsessed leaders are focused on maintaining rapid
economic growth to create enough jobs jobs for China’s 1.3 billion people and keep a lid on unrest. Chinese society is riddled with corruption and asphyxiated by the ever‐greater effort required to impose political control. China’s neighbors (Japan, Korea, Vietnam…) fear and loathe it. SWA A are in meltdown. The Muslim Societies in North Africa, ME and SW growing Islamist majorities will struggle among themselves for decades. Attempts to remove Assad from power in Syria are reinforcing Iran’s
perception that it needs a nuclear deterrent. Competition for regional dominance will pit Turkey and Iran against each other for decades. Mexico, presents an immediate and growing threat to the internal
stability and national security of the United States. Mexico is in the midst of a drug war, with rival cartels fighting for control of a $30 billion market for illegal drugs inside the United States.
Key Point: U.S. economy demands austere ‘interwar period’ level of military funding. Meanwhile, external conditions require a new approach to the exercise of military power.
So, where do we go from here?
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“A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be.” – – Wayne Gretzky;
The point is simple: Teams win by identifying patterns in the game’s evolution, patterns they can leverage.
However, patterns are not absolutes and adjustment to leverage the patterns is required on the way to victory.
The United States can likewise act now to influence the future of defense investment. Hindsight can be foresight if viewed through the right lens.
“You can duck under the wave, stand fast against the wave or, better yet, surf the wave.” Bill Gates, Chairman, CEO and founder, Microsoft, Inc.
Strategic Implications for National Defense:
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The fiscal crisis in defense spending creates the opportunity to both economize and expand the Nation’s range of strategic options.
The President and Congress can reduce costs by building a 21st ‐century scalable, “lego‐like” force design design,, a design structured and equipped for dispersed/distributed, mobile warfare inside an integrated ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver ‐Sustainment Framework.
The ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver‐Sustainment Framework:
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just about The Framework is not just
“things.” It’s about integrating existing and future capabilities within an agile operational framework guided by human understanding.
It’s an intellectual construct with
technological infrastructure infrastructure..
The Framework is the next logical step
in the evolution of warfare beyond the ad hoc coordination of Federal Agencies or combined arms, air‐ ground cooperation, air‐sea battle, amphibious and special operations.
Single‐service command structures are obsolete. U.S. capabilities must be integrated at the operational level to detect, deter, disrupt, neutralize or destroy opposing forces/threats decisively; Apply the ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver ‐Sustainment Framework as a methodology for investment planning and programming as constrained budgets compel force optimization; Build the framework inside a reduced number of regional unified commands.
The Problem: Too many chiefs, too few Indians!
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While Siemens CEO Peter Loescher cut $2 Billion from operating expenses since taking over and dismantled a bureaucracy that once contained 200 separate management boards, he isn’t scrimping on research and development (unchanged at 5.1% of revenue in 2010) or on engineers. “This is not overhead,” he says. “This is our competitive advantage.” Daniel Fisher, Forbes Magazine, 9 May 2011, page page 98.
From March 1942 to April 1945 when there were 11 million men in the Army
and Army Air Corps the US had only 4 four star generals to command them: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Arnold. How many four stars do we have to direct today's Active Army and Air Force? Answer: 23 Four Stars for 879,000 soldiers and airmen. From 7 December to 31 December 1946 when there were 4,183,466
million
men in the Navy the US had 4 four star admirals to command them: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King, and the Marine Corps of 800,000 was led by a three star, Vandegrift, until March 1945. How many four stars do we have to direct today’s Active Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer: 10 Four Star Admirals and 5 Four Star Marine Generals for a combined force of 402,000.
The Solution: Faster, Flatter C2 for the Post‐Industrial Era One Star Force Packages Exist Now!
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Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said efficiency measures might mean " flatter organization, fewer fewer headquarters, smaller staff, generally more efficiency " for the department… “You're not going to get savings like we're proposing proposing here with simply the easier moves.“ Nathan Hodge, “Pentagon Looks To Save $100 Billion Over Five Years,” Wall Years,” Wall Street Journal.Com, 4 Journal.Com, 4 June 2010.
What is to be done? Reduce Overhead! •
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Simplified organizational structures that emphasize responsibility and accountability are the keys to success in 21st Century crisis or conflict. There won’t be time for a “pick‐up game” in a future crisis or conflict. By the time the U.S. gets its operational construct and “C2” act in order, China (or other future great powers) will defeat U.S. forces and achieve its own strategic aims. Today’s C2 structure is a legacy of WW II and Industrial Age service‐ centric warfare. Joint Task Force Headquarters are single‐service headquarters with augmentation.
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21st Century Warfare demands force packages organized around maneuver (ground), strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint Force Headquarters Headquarters..
Single Service C2 inside the Regional Unified Commands: Example PACOM
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“Failure in war is most often the absence of one directing mind and commanding will.” Sir Winston Churchill
Flag Officer Totals: Four Stars: 4 Three Stars: 15 Two Stars: 35
Integration within a relatively flat, joint command structure is a vital step in the direction of combining ground maneuver forces with Strike, ISR and sustainment
Total: 54 Flag Officers
capabilities from all the Services.
More teeth, at the expense of Unneeded overhead and tail!
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After Conversion: Four Star: 1 Three Stars: 6 Two Stars: 30 Flag Officer Total: 36 Note 1: SOF JTF retained; Note 2: One Stars are excluded from this total More Efficient, Effective and Agile C2 at Lower Cost!
Five regionally focused Joint Force Commands (JFCs); Services provide one‐star commanded mission focused ISR, Strike, Maneuver or
Sustainment capability‐based force packages to JFCs on rotational basis; Deputy CDRs for ISR, Strike, Maneuver and Sustainment assist JFC CDR to employ mission focused capability force packages; Reduced multi‐Star headquarters improves “tooth to tail” ratio.
$ Savings will be substantial!
Notional PACOM Regional Joint Force Commands
SOUTH KOREA
THAILAND
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JAPAN
PHILLIPINES
AUSTRALIA
Joint Rotational Readiness: The Path to Unity of Effort and $Savings!
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Joint rotational readiness achieves several important goals: 1. Force orcess habitually train as a Joint Team; 2. Depl Deploy oyme ment ntss become predictable improving the quality of life for service members; 3. The National Command Authorities (NCA) know what forces are ready to fight; 4. Fun undi ding ng for O&M is managed more efficiently; 5. How many and what types of force packages/modules is a matter for decision by the NCA.
Recommended Actions:
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“You cannot win this war by sitting still!” Sir Winston Churchill, 1915 Compelling change in U.S. national defense is tantamount to war. Bold, new initiatives can succeed. Moving to the point of least resistance leads to failure and no change.
Primary Recommendations: Direct GAO or CRS to Model the ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver‐Sustainment Framework with Joint Force Command structure in simulation; Ensure the report contrasts the framework’s capabilities and capacities to execute operations with the status quo force structure in a representative
simulated planning scenario or conflict vignette; Direct GAO or CRS to provide a non‐classified, as well as, a classified report within 90 days on the framework and command structure to the Senate Armed Services’ Committee, the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Key Supporting Recommendations:
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1.
Advise the President to Revise Bush Executive Order 13223 dated Sep 14, 2001, Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Armed Forces to Active Active Duty and Delegating Certain Authorities Authorities to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, rescinding Section 2: a) Sec. 2. To allow for the orderly administration of personnel within the armed forces, the following authorities vested in the President are hereby invoked to the full extent provided by the terms thereof: section 527 of title 10, United States Code, to suspend the operation of sections 523, 525, and 526 of that title, regarding officer and warrant officer strength and distribution; and sections 123, 123a, and 12006 of title 10, United States Code, to suspend certain laws relating to promotion, involuntary retirement, and separation of commissioned officers; end strength limitations; and Reserve component officer strength limitations.
2. Free Freezze all flag rank promotions pending DoD wide Flag Officer review, identify Flag rank Billets for downgrade 1 or more stars and those for elimination; 3. Direct Unified Command Plan to consolidate COCOMs into five RCCs – – Pacific, Atlantic (formerly EUCOM and AFRICOM), Central, Northern and Southern Commands; 4. Est Estab abli lish sh initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters at Joint Base Lewis‐ McChord. Develop template for JFCs across regional unified commands.
The Benefits of Change in Defense:
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Reductions in defense spending provide the opportunity to implement the new construct: Prioritized Capability at Cost; Predictable Revenue Stream
and Job Creation; Joint Optimized Defense Investments; Requirements Stability; Clarity in Technology Forecasting ‐ Increased Industry R&D ROI; Industry Rapid Transition to Profitable Production; Technology transition
stimulating other domestic markets;
Implementing the Framework compels unity of effort and strengthens critical instruments of U.S. National Power: Military, Diplomatic and Economic
Backup Slides
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“The primary purpose of an army ‐ to be ready to fight effectively at all times ‐ seemed to have been forgotten…. The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking…” General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War , 1956
How do we alter defense investment to leverage change?
Post‐Industrial Age Structure
Old WW II/Cold War Industrial Age Structure
Land Warfare
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Sea Warfare
ISR – – STRIKE 60%
MNVR and SUST 40%
Air Warfare
Strategic Assumptions
New Operational Concept
New Force Missions
New Force Design & Capabilities
New Force Development / Management / Employment Paradigm
Critical Tasks for the Incoming Defense Team: Align defense investments with evolutionary trends in technology, organization and command structures; Align defense commitments and missions with a changed strategic environment;
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Optimize today’s forces within the trend lines to guide strategic investment/acquisition over time.
Changed defense investment promises greater operational ROI Old WW II/Cold Wa Warr Industrial Age Structure
Relative sizes indicate Return on Investment
Operational Impact
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Post‐Industrial Age Structure
Industrial Age inefficiencies and duplications reduce operational impact and perpetuate
unsustainable “cost exchange ratios” with opponents; Optimizing “capability at cost” inside the Post‐Industrial Age structure dramatically increases operational impact of each dollar spent – – maintaining / increasing security at reduced budgets.
The BCT versus the Combat Maneuver Group (CMG)
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The future Army must be survivable, effective and act as a Joint enabler across a range of alternative futures. The Combat Group is a self ‐ contained organization for combat; a specialized module of combat power organized around ISR, Strike, Maneuver and Sustainment. A combat group is designed
(CSA plans to restore the third maneuver battalion to Armored and Infantry BCTs increasing their strength to roughly 4,500 men.)
to ” with inside LTCs as “Stand primaryAlone staff officrs a Lego‐like Joint Joint Force Design.. Design •
There are CGs for maneuver, strike, ISR and sustainment.
Army Reform: Building Combat Groups (CG) versus BCTs inside Divisions
144,000 Troops (Assumes roughly 4,500 men per BCT) VS The BCTs are the reinforced brigades inside divisions with minor modifications at the battalion level or roughly 4,500 men. The BCTs are realigned with division and corps headquarters to restore the ten division force structure, a smaller version of the Cold War Army that emerged in
1992 after Desert Storm Storm..
Combat Group Types in Maneuver Echelon:
LRSG: Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (5,150) CMG: Combat Maneuver Group – (Armored) (5,500) ICG: Infantry Combat Group ‐ (Motorized) (5,000) AAG: Airborne‐Air Assault Group (5,000)
What the Framework means to U.S. National Security:
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The ISR‐Strike‐Maneuver Sustainment Framework (hereafter (hereafter referred to as the framework framework ) is designed to weld American military power inside the regional unified commands into a coherent whole organized to cope with a broad spectrum of missions at a time when the size of general purpose forces and the fiscal resources to support them is diminishing. It is a way to disengage from the economically expensive World War II, industrial age paradigm of land, air or sea warfare in favor of “integrated, all arms, all effects” operations based on maneuver, strike, intelligence, information, surveillance, and sustainment (logistics). The framework framework is is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare and interagency activities beyond the ad hoc coordination of individual Federal Agencies and Service‐based elements of integration: combined arms, air‐ground cooperation, air‐sea battle, and amphibious operations. Inside the framework framework operations are harmonized across service lines through integrated C2, common mission purposes or "effects” enabled by the rapid and wide dissemination of critical information. The transition to flatter, permanent Joint Force Command structures on the operational level, as well as the optimization of forces and capabilities to maximize their impact is enabled by long‐range precision effects – – kinetic and non‐ kinetic. These effects are achieved with a vast array of ISR and Strike (from SOF Direct Action to Cyber) assets from seabed to space. The main "selling point" for the framework framework – – change in the way conventional forces are employed and developed – – must be operational efficiencies. At present, the scramble to justify justify service equities and programs (many of which involve redundant capabilities), is leading to conceptual chaos, organizational turmoil and minimal savings. In response, the framework framework leverages leverages America’s technological and human advantage with the understanding that the U.S. Military is climbing the crest of a revolutionary bow wave; a wave that competing great powers have already identified and will surely surf in the decade that lies ahead.