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Oxford University Press
American Historical Association
Back to the League of Nations
Author(s): Susan Pedersen
Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 4 (Oct., 2007), pp. 1091-1117
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40008445
Accessed: 24-10-2015 20:04 UTC
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ReviewEssay

Back to theLeague of Nations
SUSAN PEDERSEN

For the two decades of its effectiveexistence,theLeague of Nationswas a faand political
voredsubjectof academicresearch.International
lawyers,historians,
and debatedeveryaspectofitsworking;
acrosstheglobescrutinized
leadscientists
them
scholars
of
the
James
American
Shotwell,QuincyWright,
period among
ing
and RaymondLeslie Buell- devotedmuchoftheirlivesto investigating
(and often
flowto a trickitsideals.1The League's demiseslowedthatscholarly
to supporting)
le.2 Althougha numberof its formerofficialswrotetemperateassessmentsof its
to theUnitedNations,3mostpostwaracin preparationforthetransition
activities
or analyticalpostmortems
countsof theLeague were "declineand fall"narratives
relations.4
"realist"analysesof international
intendedto reinforce
Earlystudiesof
thosechastheLeague had been based largelyon theinstitution's
records;
printed
werewrittenfromdiplomaticrecordsand out of
tenedlateraccounts,bycontrast,
nationalarchives.For thirty
years,the archivesof the League's own Geneva Secretariatwereverylittledisturbed.
That neglectbegan to liftin the late 1980s,and forobviousreasons.Withthe
collapse of the SovietUnion and the end of the bipolarsecuritysystem,interwar
withnewclaimsto sovereignty
debatesoverhowto reconcilestability
beganto sound
familiar.The breakupof Yugoslaviaalso unleasheda wave of ethnicconflictand
KenWeisbrode,andtheanonymous
I amgrateful
toTomErtman,MarkMazower,BernardWasserstein,
and to the Guggenheim
Foundation
reviewers
of theAmericanHistoricalReviewfortheircomments,
of thisessay.
zu Berlinforfellowship
and theWissenschaftskolleg
supportduringthewriting
1 The bibliography
ofworkson theLeague ofNationsmaintained
bytheLeague ofNationsArchives
CenterfortheStudyof Global Changelistsmorethanthreethousandworks,
and IndianaUniversity's
ofwhichwerepublishedbefore1950.See http://www.indiana.edu/Meague/bibliography.php.
a majority
2 Note, however,the usefulstudieswrittenby JamesC. Barros:TheAland Islands Question:Its
Settlement
bytheLeague ofNations(New Haven,Conn.,1968); The CorfuIncidentof 1921:Mussolini
and theLeague of Nations(Princeton,N.J.,1965); TheLeague ofNationsand theGreatPowers:The
Power:Secretary-General
Sir Eric DrumIncident,1925 (Oxford,1970); Officewithout
Greek-Bulgaria
mond,1919-1933(Oxford,1979);Betrayal
fromWithin:
JosephAvenol,Secretary-General
oftheLeague
ofNations,1933-1940(New Haven,Conn.,1969).
3 Significant
are citedbelow;thecomprehensive
accountis Francis
byex-Leagueofficials
writings
P. Walters,A History
of theLeague ofNations(1952; repr.,London,1960).
4 Two readable"declineand fall"accountsare ElmerBendiner,^4TimeforAngels:TheTragicomic
History
oftheLeague ofNations(New York,1975),and GeorgeScott,TheRiseand Fall oftheLeague
of Nations(1973; U.S. ed., New York, 1974). Perhapsthe best scholarlysurvey,one writtenfroma
TheLeagueofNations:ItsLifeand Times,1920-1946(Leicester,
is F. S. Northedge,
"realist"perspective,
has oftenreiteratedthatrealistview;see, forexample,"The False Promise
1986). JohnMearsheimer
International
of International
19, no. 3 (Winter1994/1995):5-49.
Institutions,"
Security

1091

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1092

Susan Pedersen

scholars
reminiscent
of the HabsburgEmpire'scollapse,prompting
claims-making
to askwhetherthe"minorities
system"establishedundertheLeague had
protection
and humanrightsanymoresucmanagedto reconcileideals of self-determination
The
administration
of
and
theSaar, as wellas themancessfully.5 League's
Danzig
dates systemfoundedto overseethe administration
of ex-Germanand Ottoman
areas, likewisecame back intofocus,as the UnitedNationsfacedthe problemof
"failedstates"in a worldnow constructed
aroundthepresumption
thatalmostall
historicalreterritorial
unitswouldbe "statelike"in form.6
the
new
mid-1990s,
By
searchwas underwayor in printon all theseaspectsof the League, and graduate
as
studentstillingthe newfieldof "transnational
history"discovereditsfootprints
well.International
forcombatingor managingepidemicdisease,drugtrafsystems
sex trafficking,
ficking,
refugees,and a hostof otherproblemswerefoundto have
hammeredout underthe auspices
originatedin or been furthered
by conventions
of the League of Nations.
The worksresulting
fromthisresearchhave enabledus to come to a betterunof thismuch-misunderstood
international
derstanding
organization.In contrastto
a postwarhistoriography
inclinedto viewthe League fromthe standpointof 1933
or 1939,therelevantquestionnowis not"whytheLeague failed"butratherthemore
exproperlyhistoricalquestionof whatit did and meantoverits twenty-five-year
istence.We are now able to sketchout threedifferent
but not mutuallyexclusive
oftheLeague, one stillfocusedlargely(ifless pessimistically)
on itsconnarratives
tribution
to peacekeeping,but the othertwoconcernedmorewithitsworkdelimboundariesbetweenstatepowerand
iting,and to a degreemanaging,the shifting
international
in thisperiod.If one considersitsworkin stabilizingnew
authority
statesand running
theminorities
theLeague approtectionand mandatessystems,
as
a
in
the
transition
from
a
world
of
formal
pears
keyagent
empiresto a worldof
ifone notesitsefforts
to regulatecross-border
formally
sovereignstates.Bycontrast,
traffics
or problemsof all kinds,it emergesratheras a harbingerof globalgovernance.
Archivalresearchhas deepenedour understanding
of theLeague's activitiesin
each of these threeareas. By examiningthatscholarshiptogether,however,and
and
to theless-studied
areas ofstate-building
especiallybypayingas muchattention
international
it
is
as
to
the
more
conventional
of
cooperation
subject security, possible to showhow profoundly
of the
some innovativeinstitutional
characteristics
most
relaofficialsand its symbiotic
League,
notablyits relianceon international
markedeveryaspectof itswork.Yettionshipwithinterestgroupsand publicity,
and thisis the crucialpoint thosecharacteristics
affecteddifferent
policyarenas
Put
while
extensive
consultation
and
wide
verydifferently. simply,
mayhave
publicity
the
to
those
same
hammer
out
on
helped League
agreements controlling
epidemics,
5 Perhapsunsurprisingly,
it was a historianof Greece and the Balkans,MarkMazower,whowas
insistent
abouttheneed to payattentionto theminorities
particularly
systemof theLeague. See Mazower,"Minoritiesand the League of Nationsin InterwarEurope,"Daedalus 126 (1997): 47-61, and
Dark Continent:
Century
Europe'sTwentieth
(London, 1998),chap. 2.
6 For suchpresent-minded
recoveryof League precedents,see, e.g., Gerald B. Helman,"Saving
Failed States,"ForeignPolicy89 (Winter1992-1993):3-20; RalphWilde,"FromDanzigto East Timor
and Beyond:The Role of International
Territorial
AmericanJournalofInternational
Administration,"
Law 95, no. 3 (2001): 583-606.
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October 2007

Back to theLeagueofNations

1093

factorscould seriouslyhamperdisarmament
negotiations.Structureand process
a finding
thatsuggeststheneedformoreattention
to theLeague's internal
mattered,
and its complexrelationship
withvarious"mobilizedpublics."Haparrangements
pily,thistopicis also now attracting
scholarlyinterest.
Securityis the area inwhicha revisionist
abouttheLeague seemshardargument
est to sustain.The League was, afterall, establishedto maintainworldpeace, and
failedto do so. Althoughthe League Councilmediatedsome minor
spectacularly
territorial
disputesin the early1920sand succeededin bringing
Germanyintothe
in 1926,whenitwasconfronted
withgreat-power
inManorganization
expansionism
andwordydeliberations
churiaandEthiopia,itstime-consuming
drovetheaggressor
statesoutoftheLeague,butnotoutoftheinvadedterritory.
and
True,inretrospect
some
commentators
attributed
that
outcome
less
at the time,
to the limitations
of
"collectivesecurity"thanto the reluctanceof the greatpowersto giveit theirfull
inhislandmark
butwhenFrankWaltersadvancedsuchan argument
History
support,
Gerhart
rebuked
him.
Great
the
Niemeyer
of League ofNations,
powers,likeother
iftheyfoundthattheycould not
states,understandably
pursuetheirowninterests;
- and not
offeredbytheLeague, thosemechanisms
do so throughthemechanisms
relationsis theartof makinggreatthegreatpowers wereat fault.7International
if
coincide:
the League made thatcoincidence
interests
and
global stability
power
it deservedthe opprobrium
moredifficult,
heaped upon it.
interestsand League processesdid appear to
And yet,fora time,great-power
coincide- or at least some astutepoliticiansof the 1920striedhardto makethem
and AustenChamberlainmaynothave
do so. AristideBriand,GustavStresemann,
and
at least,regardedtheeffort
to comeup
over
the
Covenant, Chamberlain,
pored
to Britain'sinterestsand a
withevermorebindingcollectivelanguageas contrary
foundthe League "a muchmoreuseful
waste of time,but all threenevertheless
at rapprochebody"thantheyhad anticipated,and made it centralto theirefforts
ment.8The agreementsand the euphoric"spiritof Locarno" thatresulteddid not
have been dismissedas havingbeen an "illusion"all along,9
last,and in retrospect
but recentstudiesof all threemainplayers,a new accountof diplomaticand ecoin the1920s,and Zara Steiner'smagisterial
efforts
international
nomicstabilization
that
That
Failed
The
statesmen
of
the
1920sare
The
temper judgment.
history Lights
in
the
the
process modestlylifting reputationof the
undergoingrehabilitation,
League as well.
Famous in theirown timebut eclipsedbythe cataclysms
thatfollowed,Briand
and Stresemann
merittheattentiontheyare nowreceiving.
The storyofhowthese
nationalism
towardconciliation
twomenmovedawayfromtheirearlierintransigent
and even a measureof fellowfeelingis a grippingone, and inAristideBrandand
GerardUngerand JonathanWrightdo theirrespectivesubjects
GustavStresemann,

7 GerhartNiemeyer,
"The Balance SheetoftheLeague Experiment,"
International
6,
Organization
no. 4 (1952): 537-558.
8 AustenChamberlainto F. S. Oliver,January17, 1927,in CharlesPetrie,TheLifeand Lettersof
2 vols. (London,1940),2:312.
theRightHon. SirAustenChamberlain,
9 For whichsee SallyMarks,TheIllusionof Peace: International
Relationsin Europe,1918-1933
2003).
(1976; 2nd ed., Basingstoke,

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October 2007

1094

Susan Pedersen

fulllives,treatingprewaractivitiesand the injustice.10These are, appropriately,
- Stresemann's
tricaciesofpartypolitics,butthestepstowardrapprochement
endGerman
resistance
to
the
Ruhr
to
the
the
moves
that
led
Locarno,
ing
occupation,
famoustete-a-tete
at Thoiry,and Briand'spremature
butprescientadvocacyofEu- are welltold.Theycan be complemented,
moreover,
ropeanfederation
byAusten
Chamberlain
and theCommitment
toEurope,RichardGrayson'smeticulousstudyof
Chamberlain'scriticalrole as Britishforeignsecretary
between1924and 1929;and
The Unfinished
Peace afterWorldWar/,PatrickCohrs'scomprehensive
accountof
and agreements
inthe1920s.11
overreparations
and security
diplomatic
negotiations
These studiesvaryin scope and emphasis(Cohrs'sand Wright'sare the mosthisaware and the most consciouslyrevisionist),but all treat the
toriographically
"Locarnospirit"not as a chimera,but as thecruxof a pragmaticand evolvingsettlement.
In doingso, moreover,theyprovidesome groundsfora reassessmentof the
League even in the realmof security.To a degreeat the time,and even morein
"Locarno"was seen as weakeningthesecurity
retrospect,
systemof the League. It
after
a
a
because
and
not
"collective"
was,
all, "greatpower"
agreement;moreover,
it coveredonlyGermany'swesternborders,it raisedawkwardquestionsabout the
statusof a League Covenantthatpresumablyalreadyguaranteednot onlythose
bordersbut the Polish and Czech frontiers
as well. Lord RobertCecil certainly
the
Locarno
a
forhis ownproposalsaimed at
thought
agreements poor substitute
theCovenant,and in hisautobiography
about
was markedly
strengthening
grudging
Chamberlain's
achievement.12
Yet Cecil,as PeterYearwoodnotes,was an ambitious
interestin theLeague and whatprovedto be an
politicianwitha strongproprietary
viewofmemberstates'commitment
to theCovenant;13
overlyoptimistic
bycontrast,
whileconsidering
the kindof guaranteeofferedbythe Covenantto
Chamberlain,
be "so wideand generalthatitcarriesno conviction
whatever"unlesssupplemented
foundtheLeague tobe an invaluable
bymorepragmatic
regionalpacts,nevertheless
for
the
face-to-face
contact
between
stagingground
foreignministerson neutral
that
a
of
reconciliation
And
territory
policy
required.14 Locarno,Cohrsinsists,was
and American-supported
effort
to moderateFrancoonlyone partof a British-led
Germanantagonism
and crafta stableframework
forEuropeanpeace and recovery
aftertheRuhrcrisisof 1923(theotherbeingtheAmerican-led
over
renegotiations
thatculminated
intheLondonAgreements
of1924).IfLocarnoexposed
reparations
thelimitsoftheCovenant,then,itdidnotnecessarily
theLeague,which
undermine
in
to
look
this
an
"Parliament
of
Man" and more
less
like
began
period
embryonic
10GerardUnger,Aristide
GustavStreseBriand:Lefermeconciliateur
Wright,
(Paris,2005);Jonathan
mann:Weimar'sGreatest
Statesman(Oxford,2002).
11RichardS. Grayson,
AustenChamberlain
and theCommitment
to Europe:BritishForeignPolicy,
1924-29(London,1997);PatrickO. Cohrs,TheUnfinished
Britainand
Peace afterWorldWarI: America,
theStabilisation
ofEurope,1919-1932(Cambridge,2006).
12ViscountCecil [Lord RobertCecil],A GreatExperiment
(London,1941), 166-169.
13PeterJ.Yearwood," 'Consistently
withHonour':GreatBritain,theLeague of Nations,and the
CorfuCrisisof 1923,"Journalof Contemporary
History21 (1986): 562.
14AustenChamberlain
to SirEyreCrowe,February16, 1925,in Petrie,Lifeand Letters,
2:259;and
forChamberlain's
see Grayson,
determination
to marginalize
Cecil anddeal withforeign
policyhimself,
AustenChamberlain,
24-26.

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1095

1928.Facingthecamera:Chamberlain,
Figure 1: Meetingon Franco-German
Stresemann,
understanding,
PhotobyErichSalomon.Reproduced
ofbpk/Berlinische
Briand(in profile).
Galerie.
bypermission

likea modifiedConcertofEurope- theformChamberlainwas convincedit had to
take (and thatCohrsshowsit fora timedid take) to do anyusefulwork.15
This is a viewwithwhichSteineragrees.Her massiveinternational
historyof
and
between
1918
1933
offers
no
to
those
Woodrow
Wilson,Cecil,
support
Europe
themassedranksoftheLeague ofNationsUnion- whosawtheLeague as a decisive
breakwiththediscreditedgreat-power
politicsof theprewarperiod.The "Geneva
she pointsout,"was nota substitute
forgreat-power
system,"
politics. . . butrather
an adjunctto it. It was onlya mechanismforconductingmultinational
diplomacy
whosesuccessor failuredependedon thewillingness
ofthestates,and particularly
the mostpowerfulstates,to use it."16Yet it is a signof the League's reach and
in theseyears,as well as of the growingscholarlyinterestin itswork,
significance
thatalmosteverychapterin thisverylongbook givesit somemention.Its handling
of international
disputesrangingfromthe Aland Islands to Manchuria,its work
and Hungarianeconomies,and its efforts
the
Austrian
to establishrustabilizing
mechanisms
to deal withproblemsof minority
dimentary
protectionand refugees,
And fromthisa morefavorableassessmentemerges.
all receivejudiciousattention.
15Grayson,
AustenChamberlain,
Peace, 351.
chap. 4; Cohrs,The Unfinished
16Zara Steiner,TheLightsThatFailed: EuropeanInternational
1919-1933(Oxford,2005),
History,
299.

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October 2007

1096

Susan Pedersen

Steinerdoes not overlookthe numerousdisadvantageshamperingthe Leagueamongthemtheformal(if not alwaysactual) absenceof the UnitedStates,a lack
ofcoercivepowers,and a linkto a treatyreviledbythedefeatedstates- butshedoes
notagreethatitwas impotent
fromthestart.Itsproceduresfordealingwithdisputes
flexible
to
resolve
proved
Germany's
enough
problemswithoutarousingresentment;
in
to
willingness join 1925was predicatedon the assumptionthatdoingso would
enhanceits statusand interests.17
In thisdecade, "moredoorswere opened than
shut"- and by shifting
from
Wilsonian
ideals towarda pragmatic"Concert"
away
Geneva
them
system,
helpedkeep
open.18
The relativerehabilitation
of thepoliticsof the 1920sthatwe findin all fiveof
thesebooks has obviousimplicationsforour understanding
of the 1930s as well.
for
the
the
of
Steiner
concludes,can1930s,
Responsibility
catastrophes
forthrightly
notbe laid at thefeetofthe1919settlement
butrestsrather
or theLocarnosystem,
- thedeathor sideliningofkeyfigures,
on a conjuncture
offactors
theManchurian
the
crisis,and above all theworldeconomiccollapse whichtogetherundermined
offinding
international
solutionsto commonproblemsand strengthened
possibility
the appeal of nationalism.Ungerlargelyagrees,absolvingBriandof responsibility
forworseningcontinentalrelations.19
Yet thereare also hintsin thesebooks,esthatthe heightened
peciallyin Cohrs'saccountand Wright'sstudyof Stresemann,
not to mentionthe expopularvalencegivenforeignpolicybythe League system,
pectationsand euphoriabroughton byLocarno,could compromisetheverystabilizationitwas intendedto promote.This is an intriguing
idea, one not analytically
workedthroughin anyof thesebooks,butwellworthexploring.
The League,as we know,fedoffandpromotedpopularmobilization.
Wilsonand
and
Cecil consideredpublicopinionthe ultimatesafeguardof collectivesecurity,
whenwe thinkoftheclamorforpeace in 1917and 1918,theirviewis understandable.
Anglo-Americansupportersmassed in popular associations agreed, and the
- indeed,its verystructure
- reflectedtheirassumptions.The
League's practices
PublicitySectionwas its largestsection,and providedcopies of the Covenant,accountsof League activities,and minutesof manyof its sessionsto the publicat
minimalcost. Such efforts
were supplementedby the assiduousworkof a sizable
Genevapresscorpsthatincludedcorrespondents
frommanyofthemajorEuropean
treated
then,
papers.Unsurprisingly, manypoliticians
League eventsas a chanceto
in
the
Briand'sreputation,
international
statesman
before
a
domestic
audience.
play
came
to
rest
at
on rousingspeechesmade the League assembly.
particular,
As Cohrs,Wright,
ofpublicopinand Ungerall show,however,themobilization
ionbroughtdangersas well.Wilson,Cecil,and thepeacemakersassumedthatpublic
ofFrenchopinopinionwouldbe pacificand hencepro-League,buta strongcurrent
ion alwaysheld thatpeace wouldbe best securedbyconstraining
and notrehabiland especiallyin thewakeoftheRuhroccupationand subsequent
itatingGermany,
17Ibid.,359, 420-422.
18Ibid.,630. Cohrs,writing
outofdiplomaticrecordsin nationalarchives,
claimsthatBritishstatesrelations
menandAmericanbankersplayedthemajorpartinresponding
tothecrisisinFranco-German
and constructing
newmechanisms
and agreements.
Thisis no doubtcorrect,
butbyoverlooking
League
roleplayedbytheLeague's officials
archives,Cohrshas missedthequietbutimportant
(and especially
byDrummond)in conciliating
Germanyand preparingforthisshift.
19Unger,Aristide
Briand,606.

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1097

theGermanmoodwashardlyconciliatory
either.Americanbankers,Cohrs
inflation,
Hans Luther,and EdouardHerriotpragmaticin pripointsout,foundStresemann,
vate (indeed,Americanwillingness
to aid in financialreconstruction
was predicated
on thatdiscovery)butworryingly
to
official
distrust
and
revanchism
prone voicing
inpublic.20
WhenLocarnofailedto producetheresultsthatthosemobilizedpublics
felttheyhad been promised,suspicionand hostility
quicklyresurfaced.By 1931,
whenBriandran forpresidentof the republicon a pro-Leagueplatform,
he faced
him
as
the
"German"
candidate.21
Stresemann
was
dead by
placardsdenouncing
of
but
his
room
for
maneuver
had
been
even
and in
then, course,
narrower,
always
hispoliciesto hisrightwing,he had tendedto holdoutthehope thatthey
justifying
wouldmakepossiblethe revisionof easternborders.As Wrightnotesin a careful
statuscould be
conclusion,Stresemann'ssincerebeliefthatrenewedgreat-power
based onlyon internaldemocracy
and international
reconciliation
meantthathe was
remotefuture,"but
willingto postponethoserevisionist
goals "to an increasingly
sharedhisgoalsbutnothismoderation.
manyofhiscompatriots
Bycourting
popular
in
this
Stresemann
stoked
resentments
that
he
could
not
control.
While
way,
support
he lived,Stresemann
was a bulwarkagainstHitler,butafterhe died,Hitlerwas his
beneficiary.22
A firstproblemraisedbythe League's umbilicaltie to publicopinionwas that
suchopinioncould proveto be neitherpacificnor particularly
easilyappeased. A
was thatstatesmenmightreactto mobilizedpublicopinsecondproblem,however,
ion byalteringnotwhattheydid butsimplywhattheysaid. Europeansecurity
continuedto depend,intheend,on thegreatpowers butwhenforcedto conducttheir
businessin public,thosepowerscould send representatives
to Geneva to profess
whilecalculatingtheirinterestsmuchmorenartheirloyaltyto collectivesecurity
had muchfaithin sanctions,themechanism
rowlyat home.No Britishgovernment
deterrent
to breachesoftheCovenant,Steinerremarks,
presumedto be an effective
no one quitesaid so.23Thatgulfbetweenpublicspeech
butgivenpublicsentiment,
andprivatecalculationwasjustwhatStresemann,
had held
Briand,and Chamberlain
their"Locarnotea parties"tobridge,butaftertheirpassing,itwideneddangerously.
It is surelyowingto thisperverseeffectofpublicopinionthat,as CarolynKitching
showsin Britainand theGenevaDisarmament
Britishstatesmenat the
Conference,
1932
World
Disarmament
Conference
intensely
publicized
soughtlessto cometo an
than
to
the
of
to
come
to
an agreement,
in hopes
give appearance trying
agreement
of therebyavoidingblamefortheconference'sfailure.24
The League's responseto
theAbyssiniacrisisbroughtout thatgulfbetweenpublicrhetoricand the careful
calculationof nationalinteresteven morestarkly.
If thesenewaccountsshowthatstatesmenwereable to use theLeague to ease
tensionsand win timein the 1920s,no such case appears possibleforthe 1930s.
characterand consensual,dilatory
Indeed,theLeague's porous,publicity-conscious
processesmayhaveplayeda role in thatdeterioration.
Diplomacyrequiresreliable
interlocutors
who can speakfortheirstates;it requiressecrecy;and it requiresthe
20Cohrs,The Unfinished
Peace, 239.
21Unger,AnstideBriand,582.
22Wright,
GustavStresemann,
338-347,359-364,508-509,521-523.
23Steiner,TheLightsThatFailed,358.
24CarolynJ.Kitching,
Britainand theGenevaDisarmament
Conference
(Basingstoke,
2003),esp. 106.

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1098

Susan Pedersen

w66n^V6
L6 TeSTHCDeOT
SeionDERSO ET KELEN
tdiU par LE EIRE

Figure2: AloisDersoandEmeryKelen'scartoonoftheLeagueas theGardenofEden,withworldstatesmen
as thedifferent
ofPrinceton
animals.
FromLeTestament
deGeneve(Geneva,1931).Reproduced
bypermission
ofRare Booksand SpecialCollections,
Princeton
Archives,
Library.
University
University
Department

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1099

metnoneof
abilityto makecrediblethreats.The Covenant'ssecurity
arrangements
thosecriteria.For a time,personaldiplomacybykeyforeignministers
was able to
- usefor
those
"collective
to
function
deficiencies,
allowing
compensate
security"
- mostlyas a legitimizing
rhetoricfora fragilebut functional"greatpower"
fully
concertsystem.That drifttowardrealpolitik
was muchresentedbythesmallstates,
fearedthattheirfateswouldbe decidedbyothers,
however,whichunderstandably
andwhichsuccessfully
forcedexpansionoftheCouncil.Theywererewardedbyfull
in a systemthathad become not onlyimpotentbut also, by its proparticipation
to
a forcefor
pensity generatewordypromisesnotbackedbybindingagreements,
destabilization.

A firsttask laid uponthe League was to keep thepeace; a second,however,was
to reconciletheideal of a worldto be composedofformally
equal sovereignstates,
and ethicalnorms,withthereality
all operatingaccordingto agreedadministrative
ofmemberstatesofverydifferent
typesand possessedofvastlyunequalgeopolitical
had provedto be a genie
reachand power.Wilson'spromiseof self-determination
let out of a bottle:to his dismay,not just Poles and Serbs,but equallyKoreans
underJapaneserule,Egyptians
undertheBritish,
andArmeniansunder
languishing
wordsappliedto them.25
thesestirring
Whichoftheseclaimswere
theTurksthought
metcouldbe a close-runthing:theBalticstates,forexample,madeit,butArmenia
revolution
and
the
United
States'
abstention
in
the
Turkish
the
end
did
not;
given
- were the disputedpledges of
nor- givenFrenchand Britishimperialinterests
Arabindependencehonored.26
Sometimes,too,thepeacemakersfoundsovereignty
theLeague withdirectadministration
hardto assign,and entrusted
ofa fewdisputed
somespecialhalfway
areas(theSaar,Danzig) andwithrunning
houses- a minorities
protectionsystemappliedto a swathof newor redrawnEast Europeanstatesand
a mandatessystemset up to overseeformerOttomanand Germancolonialterritories- establishedto attenuatethe independenceor limitthe subjectionof some
statesclosetoone ortheothersideoftheline.Fromtheoutset,then,andthroughout
theLeague founditselfin thebusinessof adjudicating,
itstwenty-five-year
history,
relationsofsovereignty.
Thisis a second"narrative"
and delimiting
ofthe
managing,
and
a
second
area
of
fruitful
research.
League,
Some of thatresearchconcernshowtheLeague handledthetricky
dual taskof
thepopulationsand legitimating
thebordersof thestatescreatedor reprotecting
createdin 1919.Those bordersreflectedsome mixof strategiccalculation,ethnic
and victors'bounties,butno demarcationlinecouldhaveunscramconsiderations,
livedin thenew
bled theethnicmixofEasternEurope. Some 25 millionminorities
about
two-thirds
of
the
of
reconstituted
Poland
werePoles.
states;only
population
25Erez Manela's The WilsonianMoment:Self-Determination
and theInternational
OriginsofAnticolonialNationalism(Oxford,2007) appearedtoo late forinclusionin thisreview,but fortwoearly
see Manela,"The WilsonianMomentand theRise ofAnticolonialNationalism:
The Case
installments,
ofEgypt,"Diplomacy& Statecraft
WoodrowWilson
12,no. 4 (December2001): 99-122,and "Imagining
in Asia: Dreamsof East-WestHarmonyand the RevoltagainstEmpirein 1919,"AmericanHistorical
Review111,no. 5 (December2006): 1327-1351.
26MargaretMacMillan'srecentParis1919: SixMonthsThatChangedtheWorld(New York,2001)
decisions.
providesa good accountof the reasoningbehindthe territorial
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1100

Susan Pedersen

Intensivelobbying(especiallyby Jewishorganizations)and some concernforthe
fatesof those minoritiesand those bordersalike thusdrovethe peacemakersto
some linguistic,
educational,and religiousauimposespecialtreatiesguaranteeing
to
for
tonomy particular
minority
groups.Responsibility monitoring
compliancewas
leftto the Council;in practice,however,and as ChristophGutermann'slandmark
1979studyDas Minderheitenschutzverfahren
des Volkerbundes
showed,itwas theSecretariat'sMinoritiesSectionthat,underthe forcefulleadershipof the Norwegian
Erik Colban, hammeredout a systemof supervision.27
Minoritiescoveredby the
treatieswere allowedto petitionthe Council about violations,but such petitions
weretreatedas informational
andnotjuridicaldocuments,
werejudged"receivable"
andwerehandledconfidentially
conditions,28
onlyunderquiterestrictive
byCouncil
"committees-of-three"
and bythe MinoritiesSection,whichwas usuallyleftto resolve the matterthroughdirectdiscussionwiththe state (but not usuallythe minorities)concerned.
Minoritiesand theirdefenders(notablyGermany)routinely
protestedthatthe
states."Yet, whilesome
systemwas too secretiveand biased towardthe "minority
minorreforms
wereintroducedin 1929,sensitivity
towardPolishopinionwithinthe
Councilmeantthatappeals forstronger
juridicalrightsand stricterenforcement
wentunanswered.29
In 1934,following
theNazi seizureofpower,Polandunilaterally
repudiateditsminorities
treaty;
petitionsfromothergroupsand areasstarteddrying
as
well.
a
few
up
Although
specialiststudiespublishedduringWorldWar II contestedthatview,bythelate 1930sthesystemwas widelyseen to have failed,and it
was not revivedafter1945.30Henceforth,
it was assumed,protectionof individual
humanrightswouldmake minority
rightsirrelevant.31
The Balkancrisesof the 1990sshowedhowwrongthatassumption
was,driving
researchersto take anotherlook at the interwar
minorities
protectionregimethat
was the "humanrights"regime'srejectedprogenitor.
All threeof the important
studiesreviewedhere concede thatthatminorities
regimewas indeedbiased and
secretive;wheretheydisagreeis on whetherthatbias and secrecywas a signof the
or- as Colban and his successorPablo de Azcarateinsistedin
system'sbankruptcy
accountswrittenduringthe 1940s- the conditionof its (albeit limited)effectiveness.32Carole Fink'sprize-winning
theRightsofOthersis probably
studyDefending
27ChristophGiitermann,
Das Minderheitenschutzverfahren
des Volkerbundes
(Berlin,1979).
28Conditionsincludedthatthepetitioncouldnotcall theterritorial
settlement
itselfintoquestion,
be anonymous,
or be expressedin "violentlanguage."For thelatter,see JaneCowan'sexcellentarticle
in the League of Na"Who's Afraidof ViolentLanguage?Honour,Sovereignty
and Claims-Making
tions,"Anthropological
Theory33, no. 3 (2003): 271-291.
29Germany'sinvolvement
in League minority
aspectof the
policiesis the singlebest-researched
system.See Carole Fink,"Defenderof Minorities:Germanyin the League of Nations,1926-1933,"
Central
M. Kimmich,
and theLeagueofNations
5 (1972): 330-357;Christoph
Germany
EuropeanHistory
(Chicago,1976), chap. 7; BastianSchot,NationoderStaat?Deutschlandund derMinderheitenschutz
(Marburg,1988).
30JacobRobinson,OscarKarbach,MaxM. Laserson,NehemiahRobinson,andMarcVichmak,Were
theMinorities
a Failure?(NewYork,1943);OscarJanowsky,
andNationalMinorities
Treaties
Nationalities
(New York,1945).
31Forthatgenealogy,
see MarkMazower,"The StrangeTriumphofHumanRights,1933-1950,"The
Historical
Journal47, no. 2 (2004): 379-389.
32ErikColban,"The Minorities
Problem,"TheNorseman2 (September-October
1944): 314; Pablo
de Azcarate,LeagueofNationsand NationalMinorities:
An Experiment
D.C., 1945),112(Washington,
121.

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1101

the mostdamning.Fink,who has publishedimportant
workon Stresemann'smiheretreatstheentirehistory
ofinternational
nority
policiesin the1970s,33
minority
protectionregimesin EasternEurope fromthe Congressof Berlinto 1938,while
to shape,and to the consequencesof
payingparticularattentionto Jewishefforts
Jewishpopulationsfor,thosesystems.34
The League systemformsonlyone partof
thatstory,and Finklargelyconfirms
interwar
criticisms
of itsinadequacy."Bound
shewrites,League officials
"notonlyguarded
bytheprincipleofstatesovereignty,"
theminority
states'interests
and dismissedall butthemostpolitically
explosivecomalso
blocked
outside
shrouded
theirworkin
plaints;they
improvement
proposals,
That
secrecy,and excludedpetitionersfromeverystage in the investigations."35
- a diasporicpopmode ofoperationhardlyservedminorities
well,and it leftJews
- particularly
defined"kinstate"to exertpressure
ulationwithoutan ethnically
at
and
American
Jewish
risk.British,
and
Lucien
Wolf
French,
organizations, especially
of the JewishBoard of Deputies,did petitionon behalfof (forexample)refugee
GalicianJewsdeniedcitizenship
byAustria,or HungarianJewssubjectto numerus
but accordingto Fink,the League
claususlaws limitingtheiraccess to university,
or
the
the
excuses
oftheminority
either
accepted
purelycosmetic"reforms"
usually
to
decline
to
stateor foundtechnicalgrounds
proceedaltogether.
ingeneral?InA Lesson
WereJewsa specialcase,or didthesystemfailminorities
in
his
of
the
German
Christian
Raitz von Frentz
Poland,
minority
Forgotten, study
conclusion.Some 950 petitionsfromall minorities
also comesto a pessimistic
were
between
1921
and
of
submittedto the League
1939, which550 werejudged "rebetween
ceivable";ofthese,fully112weresentbymembersofthisGermanminority
March 1922 and September1930 alone.36Intractablepoliticalconflictsunderlay
thesestatistics:the factthatsome Poles remainedwillingin the 1920sto vote for
Germanpartiesorsendtheirchildrento GermanschoolsdeepenedthePolishstate's
and Germany'sdecisionto chamto a policyof "de-Germanization,"
commitment
into
the
for
its
after
its
minorities
entry
League,
part,probablydidmoretostoke
pion
in
than
to
the
lot
ofethnicGermansinPoland.
revisionist
improve
opinion Germany
that
Colban
and
while
Raitz
von
Frentz
shows
his
teamtooktheminority
comYet,
he also insiststhatsome aspectsof
plaintsseriouslyand dealtwiththemskillfully,
the generalLeague system(if not thebilateralUpper Silesiansystemalso worked
outbyColban) worsenedtheproblem.Whenitcameto petitionsabouteviction,
for
the
time
for
the
enabled
Poland
to
ir"create
required
League process
example,
reversibleeconomicand demographicfacts"(new Polishowners,Germansettlers
- but not restitution
back in Germany),leavingsome monetarycompensation
of
land- the onlyrealisticsolution.If Raitz von Frentzconfirms
Fink'sview of the
system'sweakness,though,he disagreesthatsecrecywas one cause of thatinefhe concludes,the systemwas not secretiveenough,
To the contrary,
fectiveness.37
withthe decisionin 1929 to retaina generalCouncilrole in minority
protections
33See n. 29 above.
34Carole Fink,Defending
theRightsofOthers:TheGreatPowers,theJews,and International
Minority
1878-1938(Cambridge,2004).
Protection,
35Ibid.,282.
36ChristianRaitzvonFrentz,A LessonForgotten:
Protection
undertheLeagueofNations
Minority
in Poland,1920-1934(New York,1999), 100, 112, 130.
The Case of theGermanMinority
37Fink,Defending
theRightsof Others,316.

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1102

Susan Pedersen

to barborderorkinstatesfromtheprocess
(ratherthanto use thecommittee
system
Suchproceduresmade
creatingirresistible
pressurestowardpoliticization.
entirely)
the temptation
forGermanleadersto exploitthe minority
issue fordomesticpropagandistpurposesalmostirresistible.38
How could twoscholarspaintsucha similarportraitof thesystem'slimitations
butaccountforthemso differently?
MinderheitenMartinScheuermann's
impressive
worked
schutzcontraKonfliktverhiitung?
helpsto answerthisquestion.Scheuermann
to its
his way throughall petitionshandledby the systemfromits establishment
149
of
the
reviewin June1929,and he providesnotonlya comprehensive
register
of
the
section
admissible
and
the
306
short
judged
biographies
judgedinadmissible,
members,and a chartof the petitionprocess,but also an invaluablecountry-bycountryanalysisof the system'soperation.ScheuermannsustainsGutermannand
RaitzvonFrentz'shighopinionofthesection'sofficials,
showinghowseriouslythey
- suchas theUkrainiansin Poland- without
treatedpetitionsevenfromminorities
Councildefenders.
Yet Scheuermann
also confirms
powerful
(as Colbanand Azcarate laterclaimedin self-justification)39
thatthepreeminent
goalswerepoliticaland
and theprestige
nothumanitarian,
withthe taskof defendingthe 1919 settlement
Just
reliefforpetitioners.
of the League oftentakingprecedenceovermeaningful
keepingLithuaniain the system,giventhatsmallstate'sangerover the League's
to forcethePoles to withdraw
fromVilna,becamea majorgoal; thus,"the
inability
to
become
an
end
in
withargument
moreaboutprocedures
threatened
itself,
system
thansubstantive
led the sectionto concentrateon
issues."40Poland's sensitivities
ratherthanthe letterof thelaw; likewise,althoughbothYugodamagelimitation
and forcefully
slavia and Greece deniedthe existenceof a "Macedonian"identity
a
in
meant
thatthe
concern
to
the
this
it,
repressed
region
protect fragilepeace
Macedonia
"not
receivable."
somehow
found
most
League
petitionsinvolving
also acceptedthelandreforms
thatdispossessedGermansinPoland
League officials
andEstoniaand RussiansinLithuaniaas genuinesocialmeasuresandpragmatically
restricted
themselvesto trying
to securesome compensationforthoseexpropriated.41
Andyet,forall that,Scheuermann's
portraitofthesystemis morepositivethan
thatof Fink or Raitz von Frentz althoughadmittedly
thismaybe because he is
it
the
realistic
standard
of
what
was
judging by
possiblegiventhegreatpowers'reluctanceto get closelyinvolvedratherthanby the ideal standardsset out in the
treaties.Colban,in particular,
is shownto have had a cannysense ofhowto playa
veryweakhand,and Scheuermann
agreeswithRaitzvonFrentz(and disagreeswith
on
how
it
was
to
restrict
Fink)
important
(and henceto be able to threaten)public
if
he
was
to
If therewereplentyof barelytolit
to
best
exposure
play
advantage.42
erablecompromises,
ethnic
Colban
and
his
then,
colleaguesdidpreventsmoldering
38Raitz von Frentz,A LessonForgotten,
238-240.
39Colban, The MinoritiesProblem, 311; Azcarate,League ofNations,14-16.
40"Das SystemdrohtezumSelbstzweck
wurdeweitmehrumFormaliaals um
zu werden,gestritten
Die MinderheitenpoliMartinScheuermann,
Minderheitenschutz
contraKonfliktverhiitung?
Sachfragen."
tikdes Volkerbundes
in denzwanziger
Jahren(Marburg,2000), 87.
41Ibid.,68-69, 147-148,285-286,341-342.
42RaitzvonFrentz,
A LessonForgotten,
10,109,112.OnlyYugoslaviaandTurkeytreatedthethreat
ofpublicexposurewithindifference.
Minderheitenschutz
contraKonfliktverhiitung?,
261,
Scheuermann,
369.

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1103

conflicts
fromescalatingintowarand tempereda processofethnicconsolidationto
In Greece,forexample,League pressure
whichall of thesestateswerecommitted.
preventedtheexpulsionofsome oftheAlbanianpopulation,whilein Romaniathe
combinationof Colban's personaldiplomacy,threatsto bringcases to the Council
or the PermanentCourt,and fearof the hostility
of its Hungarianand Bulgarian
halted(ifitdidnotreverse)a waveofexpropriations.43
Scheuermann
also
neighbors
examinesJewishpetitionsand comes to a morepositiveassessmentof the effecand of Colban's willingness
tivenessof Wolf'sinterventions
to act thanwe findin
recordof minority
Fink.44This maynotbe an impressive
butgiventhat
protection,
League officialsarmedwithnothingbut persuasivepowerswere involvingthemselvesin theinternalaffairsofhighlysensitiveand nationaliststates,thesurprising
at all.
thingis thattheyaccomplishedanything
The minorities
treatieswere applied to fragileand oftennew statesthatwere
nevertheless
was applied
recognizedas sovereign;themandatessystem,
bycontrast,
toterritories
andoftenextensive
colonial
conqueredbystrongstateswithpreexisting
Set
to
reconcile
Wilson's
determination
to
avoid
an
annexationist
empires. up
peace
and his allies' equallypowerfuldesireto hang on to those capturedOttomanor
Germanpossessions,the mandatessystemgrantedadministrative
controlbut not
to thosevictors,on theunderstanding
formalsovereignty
that(as article22 of the
Covenantput it) "the well-beingand developmentof [thoseterritories']
peoples
forma sacredtrustof civilization."
Mandatorypowerswererequiredto reportanofthatcharge,and a "PermanentMandatesCommission"
nuallyon theirfulfillment
was setup in Genevato examinethosereportsand to alerttheCouncilto anyproblems.45Welcomedat its inceptionas a decisivebreakwiththe self-interested
imof
the
the
mandates
to
have
little
dispre-1914period,
perialism
systemproved
and once thelast mandatesfellunder
cernibleeffecton thetimetableto self-rule,
thesupervision
ofthesuccessorUnitedNationsTrusteeship
Councilandthenmoved
to independence,the systemfadedfromview.What,then,was its significance?
In Imperialism,
and theMakingofInternational
Law, AntonyAnghie
Sovereignty
that
approaches
questionby situatingthe systemwithina genealogyof the role
law in managingrelationsbetweentheThirdWorldand the
playedbyinternational
43Scheuermann,
Minderheitenschutz
contraKonfliktverhiltung?
\ 254-256,341.
44See especiallyScheuermann
s discussionof thepetitionsconcerning
Hungarys numerusclausus
to Wolf's
law,ibid.,213-220.It is notpossibleto reconcileFink'saccountofa Secretariat
unresponsive
accountofColban'spressing
pleasandwillingto acceptHungary'sliesandevasionswithScheuermann's
fora moreforceful
isthatFink'saccountofthisepisode
response,althoughsurelypartoftheexplanation
is basedlargelyon thearchivesoftheJointForeignCommittee
oftheBoardofDeputiesofBritishJews,
and Scheuermann's
on thearchivesoftheLeague,suggesting
thelimitations
ofbothofthose
exclusively
sources.Fink,Defending
theRightsof Others,291-292; Scheuermann,
Minderheitenschutz
contraKon215.
fliktverhutung?,
45The mandatedterritories
weredividedintothreegroups,ostensibly
on thebasisoftheir"levelof
civilization"
and hencecapacityforself-government.
The OttomanMiddleEast became"A" mandates,
withPalestine(includingTransjordan)and Iraq grantedto Britain,and Syriaand Lebanonto France.
Most of GermanAfricabecame "B" mandates,withbothTogo and Cameroonpartitioned
between
Britainand France,Rwandaand Burundihandedoverto Belgium,andTanganyika
givento theBritish,
to be administered
withregardto articulated
international
humanitarian
norms.More remoteGerman
areasweregrantedwithfewstipulations
to Japanand Britain'sdominionsas "C" mandates:thesewere
SouthWest Africa,awardedto SouthAfrica;GermanNew Guinea, awardedto Australia;Western
PacificislandsnorthoftheEquator,entrusted
toJapan;
Samoa,turnedovertoNewZealand; Germany's
and thephosphate-rich
islandof Nauru,handedoverto theBritishEmpirebut administered
byAustralia.

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1104

Susan Pedersen

Westoverfourcenturies.46
International
law's core conceptof sovereignty,
Anghie
and he traceshow loyalty
argues,was alwaysdeployedto serveWesterninterests,
to particularEuropean ideals ("Christianity,"
"civilization,""economicdevelopof terrorism")
times
was at different
ment,""good governance,""a renunciation
made theconditionforitsexercise.The mandatessysteminterests
because
Anghie
itwas, in hisview,a crucialstagein thisprocess,beingboththemomentat which
and themechanism
whichdirectimperialcontrolofThirdWorldareasgave
through
to
control
exercised
way
by international
organizationsand the WorldBank. The
institutions
ofglobalgovernance
thatnowlimitthesovereignty
ofThirdWorldstates
"derivein fundamental
from
the Mandate System,"Anghiewrites.
ways
ItisintheMandateSystem
thata centralised
isestablished
forthetaskofcollecting
authority
massiveamounts
ofinformation
fromtheperipheries,
andprocessing
thisinforanalysing
mation
suchas economics,
andconstructing
an ostensible
universal
bya universal
discipline
a sciencebywhichall societies
science,
maybe assessedandadvisedon howto achievethe
thatthis"science"
couldnothavecome
Indeed,itisarguable
goalofeconomic
development.
intobeingwithout
a central
institution
suchas theMandateSystem.47
in this.In publicizingand scrutinizing
theadNow,thereis certainly
something
ministrative
of
a
the
mandates
practices mandatory
powers,
systemplayed partin
and
then
norms
about
shaping
"internationalizing"
governancein dependentterritories.Yet Anghie'saccountis deeplyfrustrating,
forhis strongclaimsare based
and theproclamations
oftheMandates
literature
verylargelyon outdatedinterwar
Commissionitselfand have notbeen testedagainstthe archivesof themandatory
powers,theLeague's archivesin Geneva,or evena reasonablesliceoftheextensive
on thegovernanceofparticularmandates.48
FromAnghie'saccount,
historiography
one would imaginethatthe MandatesCommissionwas a kindof WorldBank in
theThirdWorldand establishing
embryo,infiltrating
agentsand fundsthroughout
conditionsforindependenceacrosstheglobe.It was not.The commission
was comand
posed ofnine(laterten) "experts,"mostofwhomwereex-colonialgovernors,
fewofwhomsoughtto exercisean independentrole.Whentheydid,theyfoundit
hard going:as Ania Peter has shownin WilliamE. Rappardund der Volkerbund,
SirEricDrummondsabotagedearlyefforts
to expandthe
League Secretary-General
commission'sfunctions,
afterwhich,as Michael Callahan'sMandatesand Empire
shows,the League Council and the mandatory
powerscolludedto limitits remit
further.49
does
not
cite
either
of
these
(Anghie
authors.)Even had thecommission

46AntonyAnghie,Imperialism,
Law (Cambridge,2004).
and theMakingofInternational
Sovereignty
47Ibid.,264.
48Anghiereliesheavilyon QuincyWright'slandmarkstudy,which,howeverimpressive,
was based
onlyon publishedrecordsand appearedin 1930.He has notconsultedeitherthe League archivesor
ofFirst
thekeygovernment
recordsexploitedbyMichaelD. Callahan,and hisrepeatedcondemnation
Worldinattention
inlightofhisownfailure
toThirdWorldculturesandhistories
isparticularly
irritating
to pay even themostrudimentary
attentionto thosehistories.It is impossibleto surveythe rangeof
excellenthistorical
workon themandateshere,butfora summary
of some of it,see Susan Pedersen,
"The Meaningof theMandatesSystem:An Argument,"
Geschichte
und Gesellschaft
32, no. 4 (2006):
560-582.
49Ania Peter,WilliamE. Rappardundder Volkerbund
(Bern,1973), esp. 84-121; a briefEnglishofPeter'sbook appearsas "WilliamE. Rappardand theLeague ofNations,"in The
languagesummary
LeagueofNationsinRetrospect:
oftheSymposium
Proceedings
(Berlin,1983),221-241;MichaelD. Callahan,Mandatesand Empire:TheLeague ofNationsandAfrica,1914-1931(Brighton,
1993),123-129.

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1105

wishedto enforcea newsystemofcolonialcontrol(as opposedto promulgating
new
idealsofadministration),
it had no agentswithwhichto carryout suchdeployment,
commissioners
missionsin themandates,
beingbarredfromconducting
fact-finding
themexceptin a privatecapacity.True,thecommission
or indeedevenfromvisiting
froma mandatory
couldrequestinformation
to
powerand subjectitsrepresentative
butwhetherthesemodestpowersconstituted
a yearlyinterview,
newand sweeping
ofruleis at bestdebatable.Anghiehas,importantly,
"technologies"
graspedtheway
themandatessystemhelpeddefinea "damaged"formofsovereignty
forthepoorer
nationsof theworld,butto understand
howthoseconceptsaffectedadministrative
practice(and theydid in factdo so), one mustlook beyondthe system'sownselfrhetoricto negotiationsand strugglesover governancethattook place
justifying
withinthe imperialcapitalsand the mandatory
territories
alike.
Callahan givesus partof thismorecompletestory.His Mandatesand Empire
(1993) was a studyof Frenchand BritishpolicyregardingAfricanmandatesuntil
to 1946.50Callahanhas
1931;inA SacredTrust(2004), he bringsthatstoryforward
buthe has a
delvedintothepublicationsof thePermanentMandatesCommission,
of
official
documents
and
has
historian's
tracked
healthyskepticism
polipolitical
confidential
ColonialOfficeandForeignOfficerecords,providing
through
cymaking
mind"
us withthebestaccountwe are likelyto getoftheFrenchand British"official
withcalaboutmandates.That "mind,"he shows,was pragmaticand instrumental,
culationsof nationalinterestparamount.The need to manageor placateGermany
policy,forexample,withBritainagreeingto
figuredlargelyin Britishmandatory
bringa Germanmemberonto the Commissionin 1927 and even periodicallyconto find(as the left-leaning
League supporterPhilipNoel-Baker
trying
templating
in
of
Africa
which
couldbe handedoversimultaneously
"two
pieces
suggested 1931)
Yet Callahaninsiststhatsuch
undermandateto Germanyand Italyrespectively."51
strategiccalculationwas neverthe whole story,and thatBritainand France rethat
bydevelopingpoliciesintheirmandatedterritories
spondedto League oversight
thanthosein therestof
were"morerestrainedand moreinternationally-oriented
theirempiresin tropicalAfrica."52
thispoint.Sensitivity
to international
Callahanmarshalsevidenceto corroborate
France
to
its
mandates
from
led
military
recruiting,
strengthened
exempt
opinion
Britain'sdesire to resistwhitesettlerpressuresto amalgamateTanganyikaand
belowthosein the
Kenya,and drovebothstatesto keep forcedlaborrequirements
recordtendedbothto
colonies.Yet it is worthnotingthatthismorepaternalistic
Africa'sfew
legitimize(and notshorten)Britishand Frenchruleand to undermine
humanitarians
and
black
states.
Some
liberals
thus
respondedto revindependent
elationsof forcedlaborin Liberiabycallingfora UnitedStatesmandateoverthat
country
(a painfulparadoxbetterexploredbyIbrahimSundiatathanbyCallahan);53
warbygranting
othershopedto averttheItalo-Abyssinian
Italya mandateoverparts
50Michael D. Callahan,A Sacred Trust:TheLeague of Nationsand Africa,1929-1946(Brighton,
2004).
51MinutebyNoel-Baker,February10, 1931,quoted in ibid.,57. Noel-Bakerhoped to use sucha
"colonialdeal" to ease disarmament
negotiations.
52Callahan,A SacredTrust,3.
53IbrahimSundiata,Brothers
and Strangers:
Black Zion,Black Slavery,
1914-1940(Durham,N.C.,
2003).

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1106

Susan Pedersen

of Ethiopia.The factthatpoliticianscould imagineusingmandatesso veryinstrumentally(NevilleChamberlain's"colonialoffer"to Hitlerbeinganotherextreme
example)54
suggeststhat,forall hisveryusefulwork,Callahanmaynothaveweighed
thebalancebetweenpaternalism
and geopoliticalcalculationquiteaccurately.
That
record
Bellook
less
had
Callahan
considered
would,moreover,
paternalistic
strong
of SouthWest
gianrulein Rwandaand Burundiand SouthAfricanadministration
Africa(as he shouldhave done in twobooks subtitledTheLeague ofNationsand
alizationofethnicdivisionin theformer
case and thewholeAfrica).The instrument
sale land seizures,laborcontrols,and physicalrepressionof thelatterwerehardly
reconcilablewiththe ideals of the "sacred trust,"but the Mandates Commission
could not deflecteitheradministration
fromits chosen course. The verdictthat
"mandatesmeant... a greateremphasison the interestsof Africans"is hard to
squarewiththatrecord.55
Those difficulties
ofgeneralization
whenwe considertheMidworsen,moreover,
dle East cases discussedin Nadine Meouchyand PeterSluglett'sinvaluableedited
collectionTheBritish
and FrenchMandatesin Comparative
The essays
Perspectives.56
thereinare varied,dealingwithsubjectsrangingfromadministrative
practices,to
economicprojects,to theuses made ofethnography
and medicine,to thecourseof
nationaland ethnicmovements;
takentogether,
however,theyunderscorethehazardsofgeneralizing
aboutthemandatessystemevenin a singleregion,and thefolly
ofdoingso on thebasisofthepublications
ofthePermanentMandatesCommission
alone. Certainly,
severalofthearchivally
based essaysconfirm
justhowstrategically
thegreatpowersacted:as GerardKhourypointsout,Robertde Caix couldscarcely
havebeen cleareraboutFrance'sreasonsto oppose thecreationof a unifiedArab
statewhenhe wroteon April11,1920,that"thepeace oftheworldwouldbe on the
wholebettersecurediftherewere a certainnumberof smallstatesin the Middle
couldbe controlledherebyFranceand therebyBritain,
East,whoseinter-relation
whowouldbe administered
withthegreatestinternalautonomy,
andwhowouldnot
have the aggressivetendenciesof large,unifiednationalstates."57
As Pierre-Jean
Luizardshows,Britainwas equallystrategic,
to
movingswiftly repressKurdishinmovements
and
construct
a
unified
dependence
Iraqi stateout of threeOttoman
Yet calculationdidnotalwayspointinthesamedirection:thus,as Slugprovinces.58
lett shows,while the Frenchremainedideologicallycommittedto Syriadespite
massivelocal oppositionand negligibleeconomicgains,the Britishpragmatically
nurtured
a class ofIraqi clientsable to safeguardBritishinterests
underconditions
54Callahan,y4
SacredTrust,
oftheGerman
naiveteaboutthecharacter
134-149,faultsChamberlain's
sees his"colonialoffer"as drivenbothbyEuropeanconcernsand (less plausibly)
regime,butotherwise
147.
internationalize
and reformEuropeanimperialism";
bya genuinedesireto "further
55Ibid.,4.
56NadineMeouchyand PeterSluglett,
TheBritish
andFrenchMandatesin Comparative
Perspectives/
Les mandatsfrangaiset anglaisdans uneperspective
comparative
(Leiden,2004).
57"La paixdu mondeseraiten sommemieuxassurees'ilyavaiten Orientuncertainnombrede petits
Etatsdontles relationsseraientcontroleesiciparla Franceet la parl'Angleterre,
qui s'administreraient
avecle maximum
d'autonomieinterieure,
et qui n'aurientpas les tendancesagressivesdes grandsEtats
nationauxunitaires."GerardD. Khoury,"Robertde Caix et Louis Massignon:Deux visionsde la poliau Levanten 1920,"in Meouchyand Sluglett,TheBritishand FrenchMandates,169.
tiquefranchise
58Pierre-Jean
en Irak:Une rencontre
entreplusieursprojetspoliLuizard,"Le mandatbritannique
tiques,"ibid.,361-384.

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1107

Norwas one nation'spolicynecessarily
ofnominalindependence.59
uniform
across
land reformin Transjordanwhile
mandates,forBritainput througha far-sighted
"refeudalizing"
essentially
Iraq.60The mandatessystem,
pace Anghieand Callahan,
had no consistentimpacton eithergovernanceor economicpolicy.
But does thismean thatthe systemwas unimportant,
or could we perhapsbe
askingthewrongquestion?Anghieand Callahanstraintoo hardto detectuniform
different
impactwhenwhatlocallygroundedstudiesshowis thatthesystemaffected
and
different
Too
little
effort
has
been
mandates,
mandatory
powers,
differently.
made- exceptin Sluglett'sessay- to explainthatvariation.Such an explanationis
possible,but it musttake into accountnot onlylocal factorsand the interestsof
mandatory
powers,but equallyhow the discursive(and not coercive)practicesof
and actionsalike.Therearerevealingglimpses
oversight
shapedinterests
mandatory
in thesebooksoflocal inhabitants
usingthepetitionprocessto garnerinternational
criticismby adjusting
governments
forestalling
support,and of opinion-sensitive
accountof thatprocessof local claims-making
course.But no comprehensive
and
and
of
the
variable
has
been
written.
metropolitan
response, yet
politicallearning,
and mandatessystems
thesestudiesof theminorities
Taken together,
bringout
nature
of
the
in
theparadoxicaland seemingly
conflicting
League's responsibilities
and sovereignty.
On the one hand,the League was to
the realmof state-building
andhumanrights;
normsrelatedtotrusteeship
on theotherhand,
promoteemerging
theprincipleofstatesovereignty.
Colban'squiet
itwas to do so withoutundermining
Mandates
Commission's
more
and
the
distant
but
publicscrutiny
personaldiplomacy
soughtto reconcilethosetwogoals- and, as we have seen,sometimesmanagedto
statesor mandatory
do so. Whenthathappened,however,itwas because minority
national
interests
or
international
that
their
wouldbe
concluded
reputations
powers
enhancedbytheir(sometimespurelyverbalor formal)compliance;whentheyconfewconsequences,because sanctionsforviolations
cludedotherwise,
theysuffered
treatieswere(as
of themandateor evenforoutright
repudiationof theminorities
if
nonexistent.
these
could
Polanddiscoveredin 1934)virtually
Yet,
League systems
did
contribute
to
the
arnotcoerce statesor overridesovereignty,
they
powerfully
ofinternational
ticulationand diffusion
norms,someofwhichprovedlasting.If the
did notsurvivethedemiseof
of
groups
byethnicity
designating
protected
principle
the
of
forcible
the minorities
system, delegitimation
conquestas a foundationfor
- based is now
which
the
mandates
was
however
on
system
reluctantly
sovereignty
Andwherenormsand nationalinterests
wereeasilyreconciled,
broadlyaccepted.61
of the League wouldbe moresubstantial.
the achievements
59PeterSluglett,"Les mandats/The
Mandates:Some Reflections
on theNatureoftheBritishPresence in Iraq (1914-1932) and theFrenchPresencein Syria(1918-1946),"ibid.,99-127; TobyDodge,
"International
Obligation,DomesticPressureand ColonialNationalism:The Birthof the Iraqi State
underthe MandateSystem,"ibid.,142-164.
60MichaelR. Fischbach,"The BritishLand Program,
State-Societal
Cooperation,andPopularImaginationin Transjordan,"ibid.,477-495; Luizard,"Le mandatbritannique,"
ibid.,383.
61Despite themandatory
powers clearwishto avoidthequestion,theLeague Councilfeltforced
to assertsovereignty
in SouthWestAfrica,
in 1929to stateclearly,in answerto SouthAfricanattempts
- a judgmentthat(together
thatthemandatory
powerwas "not sovereign"in themandatedterritory
intheManchurian
andAbyssinian
withitsrulings
cases) helpedto delegitimize
conquestas a foundation
Forthis,see SusanPedersen,"SettlerColonialismat theBar oftheLeague ofNations,"
forsovereignty.
in CarolineElkinsand Susan Pedersen,eds.,SettlerColonialismin theTwentieth
Century
(New York:
Routledge,2005), 121.
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1108

Susan Pedersen

In additionto peacekeepingand managingrelations of sovereignty,theLeague
had a thirdtask:fostering
international
cooperationto addresstransnational
problemsor traffics
thathad been thesubjectofhumanitarian
concernand rudimentary
collaborationbeforethe war. The League's foundersexpected
intergovernmental
thisto be a minoradjunctto itswork,butseriouspostwarhumanitarian
crisesand
thecontinuedabsenceof the UnitedStatescombinedto alterthatbalance. Overstretched
and besetnewlyestablishedstatescouldnotcope
voluntary
organizations
alone withthe waves of refugees,epidemics,and economiccrisessweepingtheir
to committhemselves
too deeply,gladlydropped
lands;thegreatpowers,unwilling
some of theseissuesat the League's door. Secretary-General
Drummondwatched
thisexpanding
involvement
withanxiety.
OnlytwoorthreeoftheCovenant'stwentyand technicalactivities,
Drumthetidy-minded
plusarticlesdealtwithhumanitarian
mondprotestedto a meetingof his directorsin May 1921.62But JeanMonnet,the
architectof European union,who (it is oftenforgotten)spentthe early1920s in
Genevaas Drummond'sdeputy,disagreed,and theambitiousand cleveryoungmen
(and one woman)appointedto head up thevariousLeague technicalbodieswere
notinclinedto siton thesidelineseither.AlbertThomaswas alreadybuildingup his
Labor Organization;theDutchjuristJoostVan Hamel
empireat theInternational
was workingout thecontoursofthePermanentCourtof International
Justice;and
RobertHaas, ArthurSalter,Rachel Crowdy,and LudwikRajchmanwerebusyaseconomic,social, and healthorganizationsof the
semblingthe communications,
Some
of
these
institutional
League.
entrepreneurs
provedto be moretalentedthan
and
some
of
theircreationsfalteredamid the heightenedpoliticalconflict
others,
and economicnationalism
ofthe1930s,buton thewhole,criticisms
oftheLeague's
lent
its
added
the
late
1930s,more
security
capacities
specializedorgans
prestige.By
than50 percentoftheLeague's budgetwentto thismisnamed"technical"work,with
withinan autonomousbodyincorporating
plans afootto relocatethosefunctions
memberstatesand nonmembers
alike.The warput an end to thoseplans,but the
institutions
themselves
intoUnitedNationsbodies after
survived,
metamorphosing
1945.
The history
of thisthird"League of Nations"is notwell known.Officials
wrote
inthe
accountsofparticular
at thebehestoftheCarnegieEndowment
organizations
butwiththeexceptionof the articlesof MartinDubin and thesymposium
1940s,63
on theLeague heldin Genevain 1980,no synthetic
A new
studyhas been written.64
of
"liberal
institutioninternational
sometimes
influenced
historians,
generation
by
alist"international
relationstheory(whichitselfhas a directgenealogicallinkto the
reassessments
ofvarious
well-researched
League),65has,however,
begunpublishing
62League ofNationsArchives[Microfilm
31/10/15,
May18,
Collection],Directors'Meetingminutes,
1921.
63This series includedAzcarate,League of Nationsand NationalMinorities;BertilA. Renborg
chiefofsectionintheLeague's DrugControlService),International
DrugControl(Washington,
(former
D.C., 1947); MartinHill (memberof sectionof theEconomicSectionof the League), TheEconomic
andFinancialOrganization
D.C., 1946); and severalotherworks.
oftheLeagueofNations(Washington,
64MartinDavid Dubin,"Transgovernmental
Processesin theLeague ofNations,"International
Organization37, no. 3 (1983): 469-493; Dubin, "Towardthe Bruce Report:The Economicand Social
42-72,
Programsof theLeague of Nationsin theAvenolEra," in TheLeague ofNationsin Retrospect,
and otheressaysin thatvolume.
65The crucialfigurehereis David Mitrany,
whoseinvolvement
withtheBritishLeague of Nations

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1109

branchesofthiswork.ClaudenaSkran'sRefugees
inInter-War
Europeis a particularly
fineexampleofthisgenre,66
andtheLeague's HealthOrganization
receivedsimilarly
in Paul Weindling'seditedcollectionInternational
treatment
HealthOrthoughtful
61
and
1918-1939.
Patricia
Clavin
and
Jens-Wilhelm
Wessels
Movements,
ganizations
have tracedthe developmentand functioning
of the League's Economicand FinancialOrganizationin "Transnationalism
and the League of Nations,"68
complementingAnthonyM. Endresand GrantA. Fleming'sstudyof the intellectualsigWilliamB. McAllister'sDrugDiplomacyin the
nificanceof theworkdone there.69
a
Twentieth
narrative
ofthedevelopment
oftheLeague's
Century
provides thorough
and organizations
conventions
thetraffic
in drugs,70
and whiletheSocial
regulating
Section'sefforts
to combatsexual trafficking
and promotechildwelfarehave receivedless attention,Carol Miller'sarticlein Weindling'scollectionand Barbara
and 2007 essayare important
Metzger's2001 Cambridgedissertation
beginnings.71
In 1999,the League's Paris-basedbodies set up to fosterintellectualcooperation
but a comparablestudyof its Rome-basedCinemafoundtheirhistorian,72
finally
Institute
remains
to
be
written.
TheworkoftheCommunications
andTrantography
sit Organizationlikewiseawaitsinvestigation.
These new studiesestablishthe importanceof those "technical"sections.The
effortat intellectualcooperation,whichengagedHenri Bergson,AlbertEinstein,
and MarieCurie,amongothers,was moresymbolically
thaneffective,
but
significant
whichhad a staffof sixtyby 1931,built
theEconomicand FinancialOrganization,
Its heroicearlydays,whenSalter,Monnet,and
up a solid recordof achievement.
theirallieshammeredouttheAustrianandHungarianrecovery
plans,couldnotlast;
but the sectionproducedpioneeringstatisticalseriesand analyses,and facilitated
muchcollectiveresearchand discussion(ifnot action)aboutlatereconomiccrises
Union and workforthe CarnegieEndowmentwas thebasis forhis "functionalist"
thatinargument
wouldbe betterenhancedthrough
ternational
stability
intergovernmental
cooperationon specifictech- an argument
thanitwouldbe through
"collectivesecurity"
nicalorpolicymatters
that,ifrecastinterms
of RobertKeohane and JosephNye,wouldnotbe light-years
of theliberalinstitutionalism
fromthat
Peace System:
AnArgument
Working
fortheFuncbyAnne-MarieSlaughter.See Mitrany,^4
putforward
A NewWorldOrder(PrincetionalDevelopment
ofInternational
Organization
(London,1943);Slaughter,
ton,N.J.,2004). MartinDubin drawsattentionto the genealogyof liberalinstitutionalist
theoryin
Processes,"469, 492-493.
"Transgovernmental
66Claudena M. Skran,Refugees
in Inter-War
Europe:TheEmergence
of a Regime(Oxford,1995).
67Paul Weindhng,ed., International
HealthOrganizations
and Movements,
1918-1939(Cambridge,
1995).
68PatriciaClavinand Jens-Wilhelm
and the League of Nations:UnWessels, Transnationalism
theWorkofItsEconomicandFinancialOrganization,"
14,
derstanding
Contemporary
EuropeanHistory
no. 4 (2005): 465-492.
69AnthonyM. Endresand GrantA. Fleming,International
and theAnalysisofEcoOrganizations
nomicPolicy,1919-1950(Cambridge,2002).
70WilliamB. McAllister,
An International
DrugDiplomacyintheTwentieth
Century:
History
(London,
2000).
71Carol Miller,"The Social Sectionand Advisory
Committeeon Social QuestionsoftheLeague of
International
HealthOrganizations
and Movements,
Nations,"in Weindling,
154-176;BarbaraMetzger,
"The League ofNationsand HumanRights:FromPracticeto Theory"(Ph.D. thesis,CambridgeUniHumanRightsRegimeduringtheInterWarYears:
versity,
2001); Metzger,"Towardsan International
in Womenand Children,"in KevinGrant,PhilippaLevine,
The League ofNations'CombatofTraffic
and FrankTrentmann,
c. 1880-1950
eds., BeyondSovereignty:
Britain,Empireand Transnationalism,
(Basingstoke,2007), 54-79.
72Jeanintellectuelle
JacquesRenohet,L UNESCO oubliee:La Societedes Nationset la cooperation
(1919-1946) (Paris,1999).
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1110

Susan Pedersen

- opium,refuand tradequestions.League bodiesdealingwithtransnational
traffics
effective.
All made seriouseffortsto
gees, prostitutes also provedsurprisingly
therightoftheLeague to interrogate
gatherdata on theirsubject,establishing
governments
and carryout on-sitevisits;all (conflicts
betweenregulationist
and liberal
stateson questionsof prostitution,
and betweenproducer,consumer,and manufacturer
stateson thedrugquestionnotwithstanding)
managedto hammeroutbasic
all attempted
to monitorcompliancewiththoseconventions;
and inthe
agreements;
cases ofopiumtrafficking
and refugees,
of
bodies
the
mechanisms
League
operated
controlas well.Before1914,refugeeshad no distinctive
statusor agreedrights;by
1939,however,theLeague and otheractorshad developeda setofstandards,
rules,
andpractices(including
thelandmark"Nansenpassport")that,Skrancontends,
provided"legalprotection
and durablesolutionsformorethanone millionrefugees."73
We need to ask,however,
whetherthewholewas morethanthesumoftheparts:
their
given
specializedmandates,did thesebodiessetin motiona different
dynamic
ofinternational
cooperation?Comparisonsuggeststhattheywereindeeddistinctive
in threeways.First,theLeague's technicalareas provedto be moreexpansive,and
moregenuinelyglobal,thanits securityor state-building
operations.The United
StatescooperatedwiththeworkoftheHealth,Opium,and Social sections;Germany
and even the SovietUnionworkedwiththeHealth Organizationlongbeforethey
joined the League; Japancontinuedto workwithmosttechnicalbodies afterits
withdrawal.
That widerparticipation
was not alwayseasy to manage:especiallyin
theearlydays,as McAllistershows,crusadingAmericanseagerto crackdownon the
Yet itis surely
as to fosterthem.74
supplyofdrugswereas likelytowreckagreements
thatwhilethe securityarrangements
deterredsome statesfromjoining
significant
the League and droveotherstatesout of it, the technicalorganizationsbrought
inandmitigated
nonmembers
Notthat
theorganization's
Eurocentrism.
transparent
the League's officialswere culturalrelativists
the
avantla lettre:to the contrary,
healthofficials
werestrongproponentsofa Westernbiomedical/public
healthepisteme.Theywere,however,determined
to spreadthebenefits
ofWesternknowledge
acrossthe globe,and througha seriesof pragmaticbut far-sighted
innovations
theestablishment
ofan epidemiological
stationinSingapore,theprovision
including
- theydid muchto
of technicalassistanceto China,and trainingformedicalstaff
expandthe reach and reputationof the League.75
The specializedbodies reconciledstateinterestsand the demandsof mobilized
thanthe securitybodies as well,oftenby incorporating
publicsmoresuccessfully
intotheirwork.Statesstillassertedtheirinterestsand
expertsand activistsdirectly
hadplentyofopportunities
buta desire
to exercisewhatSkranterms"vetopower,"76
to shareburdensand avoidpubliccriticism
states
and
League officials
predisposed
73Skran,Refugees
in Inter-War
Europe,292.
74See especiallyMcAllister'saccountof the counterproductive
Steeffectof U.S. Representative
andthe1924Geneva,,
stanceat the1923OpiumAdvisory
Committee
phenPorter'sintransigent
meetings
DrugDiplomacy,50-78.
opiumconferences;
75Dubin,"The League of NationsHealth Organization,"
in Weindhng,
HealthOrgaInternational
nizationsand Movements,
56-80; Lenore Manderson,"WirelessWarsin theEasternArena:EpidemiDisease Prevention
andtheWorkoftheEasternBureauoftheLeague ofNations
ologicalSurveillance,
HealthOrganization,
1925-1942,"ibid.,109-133;Paul Weindling,"Social Medicineat the League of
NationsHealth Organizationand the International
Labour OfficeCompared,"ibid.,134-153.
76Skran,Refugees
in Inter-War
Europe,279-281.

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1111

aliketo seekto involve(and sometimesthusto neutralize)experts,
and
campaigners,
withstrongrecordsofpracticalworkor strong
evencritics.Voluntary
organizations
claimsto expertise(the ancestorsof today'sNGOs) thushad easy access to key
and sometimesstatutory
on League bodies;League
representation
League officials
in
ties
to
used
their
to compensatefor
officials, turn,
wealthyprivatephilanthropies
memberstates'parsimony.
BothoftheLeague's verysubstantial
into
investigations
in womenand childrenwere fundedby theAmericanBureau of Social
the traffic
Hygiene,forexample,whilethe RockefellerFoundationunderwrote
manyof the
Health Organization'sprogramsforfifteenyears.77Finally,where goodwillwas
werenotcloselyinvolved,a singlecrusadingindividualor
presentbutstateinterests
couldhavea decisiveimpact.The roleplayedbythefounderoftheSave
organization
and securingLeague backingforthe
theChildrenFund,EglantyneJebb,in drafting
1924 Geneva Declarationon the Rightsof the Child is perhapsthe moststriking
butBritishanti-slavery
activists
entrepreneurialism,
exampleof suchhumanitarian
were also able to exploitpersonalcontactsin Geneva and the sensibilitiesof the
definitions
ofandprohibitions
Assemblytopromotemorestringent
againstslavery.78
was not the rule;on mostissues- and this
Yet thisdegreeof outsideinitiative
is thethirdpoint- officials
playedthekeyroles.Sometimestheywerekepton a tight
statesmen
leash: as AndrewWebsterpointsout,theLeague officials,
small-country
alive
the
across
entire
andexpertswhokeptdisarmament
negotiations
period,found
of nationalintheirworkundoneand theiropinionstrumpedby "the imperatives
Skraninsists,FridtjofNansenand theSecterest. . . timeand again."79Bycontrast,
and the tight-knit
retariatexercisedconsiderableinitiativeon refugeematters,80
groupofeconomistsunderArthurSalteralso chartedan ambitiouscourseshielded
Rachel Crowdy,thesole womanappointedto
bya rhetoricofimpartialexpertise.81
had a muchtoughertime:herwillingness
to bring
head a section,notcoincidentally
was a strategically
sensiblereactionto a lack of instituin voluntary
organizations
butitbrandedheras an "enthusiast"
and
tionalsupportand chronicunder-funding,
her
career.
while
Ludwik
shortened
ambitions
for
contrast,
By
Rajchman's
probably
theHealthOrganizationmade somepoliticiansand hisownsecretaries-general
unhishighreputation
comfortable,
amongexpertsandhisabilityto secureindependent
fundshelpedhimsurvivepoliticallymotivatedattacks(Rajchmanwas left-leaning
and Jewish)until1939.
The League's specializedagenciesproved,then,to be moreexpansive,flexible,

77On theABSH funding,
see Metzger,"The League ofNationsand HumanRights,"94, 124;on the
see Dubin,"The League ofNationsHealthOrganization,"
Rockefeller
72-73,and Weindling,
funding,
"Social Medicine,"137.
78On Jebb,see Metzger,"The League ofNationsand HumanRights,"165-176;on anti-slavery,
see
KevinGrant,A CivilisedSavagery:
Britainand theNew SlaveriesinAfrica,1884-1926(London,2005),
159-166,and Susan Pedersen,"The MaternalistMomentin BritishColonialPolicy:The Controversy
over'Child Slavery'in Hong Kong,1917-1941,"Past & Present,no. 171 (May 2001): 171-202.
79AndrewWebster, The Transnational
Dream: Politicians,Diplomatsand Soldiersin theLeague
ofNations'PursuitofInternational
1920-1938,"Contemporary
Disarmament,
14,no.
EuropeanHistory
4 (2005): 493-518,517. Note,however,David R. Stone'sclaimthatwhentheirownrightsto purchase
to see limitsplacedon theirfreedomsas were
armswereinvolved,thesmallstatesprovedas unwilling
and Sovereignty:
The League of Nations'Driveto Control
thegreatpowers.See Stone,"Imperialism
the Global ArmsTrade,"Journalof Contemporary
History35, no. 2 (2000): 213-230.
80Skran,Refugees
in Inter-War
Europe,279, 286, 287.
81Thispointis stressedbyClavinand Wessels,"Transnationalism
and theLeague ofNations,"480481.

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1112

Susan Pedersen

or state-building
creative,and successfulthanitssecurity
theywere
arrangements;
also morelasting.AlthoughDrummond'smediocresuccessor,JosephAvenol,disin 1940,
missedmuchoftheLeague's staffshortly
beforehisownforcedresignation
some of thetechnicalorganizations
weregivenrefugeabroad,and evenwherethe
wardisruptedLeague activity
health,and refugeework),the
(as withitstrafficking,
The WorldHealth OrganiUnitedNationsquicklyrebuilton League foundations.
zationsucceededthe League Health Organization;UNESCO took over fromthe
Committeeon IntellectualCooperation;theTrusteeshipCouncilinheritedtherefor
oftheMandatesCommission;the1949UnitedNationsConvention
sponsibilities
theSuppressionof theTraffic
in Personscodifiedlanguagedraftedbeforethewar;
even the 1989 Conventionon the Rightsof the Child cited the 1924 Geneva
Declarationas itsprecedent.82
Likewise,whiletheUnitedNations'refugeeregime
was fromits originsmuchmorecomprehensive
and ambitiousthanthe League's,
- its insistenceon politicalneutrality,
the
UNHCR's basic structure
and practices
in "a man and a staff" stillbear Nansen's imprint.83
concentration
of authority
ofpeoples,
and institutions
thattodayregulatemovements
Manyoftheagreements
services,and goods aroundthe globe took shape in Geneva betweenthewars.
Whichbringsus, of course, to the pointmadeat the outset, abouttheneed to
examinemoreintensively
and cultureof thatGenevathepersonnel,mechanisms,
centeredworld.Othercitiesbetweenthewarswere muchmorepolyglotand coswas enacted,institumopolitan:it was in Geneva,however,thatinternationalism
had itsholytext(the Covenant);
That internationalism
tionalized,and performed.
it had itshighpriestsand prophets(especiallyNansenand Briand);it had itsbenefactorsand fellowtravelers;in thecaricaturist
EmeryKelen and thephotographer
Erich Salomon,it foundits mostbrilliantchroniclers.84
There was an annual pilwhena polyglot
collectionofnationaldelegates,claimants,
grimageeach September,
and
on
this
descended
lobbyists, journalists
once-placidbourgeoistown.But forall
than
itsreligiousovertones,interwar
internationalism
dependedmoreon structure
even
stateson faith:a genuinelytransnational
or
and
not
visionaries
officialdom,
men,was itsbeatingheart.Secretariatmembersbriefedthe politicians,organized
themeetings,
wrotethepressreleases,and,meetingon thegolflinksor in thebars,
that
"back channel"of confidential
information
on whichall complex
keptopen
of course,butforthe
networks
The
Secretariat
had
its
and
time-servers,
rely.
spies
mostpartDrummondchosewell:nationalpoliticiansfulminating
againstitsbias or
and
Officialsled
ended
its
expenseusually
up impressedby efficiency impartiality.
statesmento recognizecommoninterestsand forgeagreements;againstthe odds,
82For thoseconventions,
see Metzger,"The League of Nationsand Human Rights,"163, 176.
83Skran,Refugees
in Inter-War
Europe,296.
84
EmeryKelen'sPeace in TheirTime:Men WhoLed Us In and Outof War,1914-1945(New York,
ofthatGenevanworld.
1963)containsmanyDerso/Kelencartoons,andremainsone ofthebestportraits
Originalsof manyof thecartoons,includingthosereproducedin thisissue,are in thePrincetonUniArchives,Departmentof Rare Books and Special Collections,PrincetonUniversity
Library;I
versity
am gratefulto the PrincetonUniversity
Libraryforpermissionto use theseimages.For an excellent
see JanosFrecot,
recentcompilationof Salomon'swork,includingmanyof the Geneva photographs,
1928-1938(Mued.,ErichSalomonlMitFrackundLinsedurchPolitikundGesellschaff:
Photographien,
nich,2004).

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Back to theLeagueofNations

1113

and hope thatbecame
theyfoughtto sustainthatparticularblend of pragmatism
knownas the "spiritof Geneva."
We stillknowtoo littleabouthowthoserelationships
worked.Much ofthehisof
the
has
been
written
fromthestandpoint
ofnationalinterests
toriography
League
and out ofnationalarchives;85
we havebeen slowto reversetheoptic.Studieshave
been written(includingthosementionedhere) on severalLeague sections,and biand a fewotherLeague officials
ographiesexistofthethreesecretaries-general
(alnot
of
Colban
or
but
the
full
account
of
the
unfortunately
though
only
Crowdy),86
and
Secretariat
is morethansixty
of
the
matters
discussed
there
the
yearsold,
many
thetouchyquestionofthenationaldistribution
ofpodegreeofsectionautonomy,
- have neverbeen
sitions,theendemicproblemsofinfiltration,
leaks,and "spying"
followedup.87Likewise,whilesomeworkhas been done on theriseof nongovernand of lobbyingefforts
in Geneva,88suchephemeralbut sigmentalorganizations
nificant
associationsas theCongressofEuropeanMinoritiesor theBrussels-based
FederationofLeague ofNationsSocietiesawaitinvestigation.
International
Andthe
intheAssemblyortheCouncil- Italianjournalists
greatdramaticmoments
shouting
downHaile Selassie,StefanLux killinghimselfto protestNazi treatment
ofJews
have been lost to view.
Here,as well,however,thereare encouraging
signs.Two recentstudies- one of
memberof the Secretariat,the otherof Geneva's Frenchcontina rank-and-file
worldto life.In 1928,an idealisticyoungCanadian
gent bringthatinternationalist
womanworkingfortheStudentChristianMovementtalkedherwayintoa job with
Section.MaryMcGeachy'scolorfullifeinspiredFrank
the League's Information
Moorhouse'svividhistoricalnovel GrandDays (surelythe onlyworkof fictionto
85Usefulnation-centered
studiesincludeKimmich,Germany
and theLeague ofNations; Richard
Veatch,Canada and theLeagueofNations(Toronto,1975); S. ShepardJones,TheScandinavianStates
and theLeague ofNations(1939; repr.,New York,1969); MichaelKennedy,Irelandand theLeagueof
Relationsbetween
Nations(Dublin,1996); Sara Pienaar,SouthAfricaand International
theTwo World
Wars:TheLeagueofNationsDimension(Johannesburg,
1987);andWarrenF. KuehlandLynneK. Dunn,
and theLeague of Nations,1920-1939(Kent,Ohio,
KeepingtheCovenant:AmericanInternationalists
1997).
86Biographiesof Drummondand Avenol are cited in n. 2 above. For Sean Lester,see Douglas
General:Sean Lesterand theLeague ofNations(Dublin,1999). Conflicting
Gageby,TheLast Secretary
accountsof Monnet'syearsat the League (bothbased on Monnet'sownwritings)are foundin Eric
Roussel,JeanMonnet(Paris,1996),and JeanMonnet,Memoires(Paris,1976).For Rappard,see Peter,
E. Rappard:Defenseur
E. Rappard,andVictorMonnier,William
deslibertes,
William
serviteur
de sonpays
Internationale
etde la communaute
(Geneva,1995); and forRajchman,see MartaAleksandraBalinska,
LudwikRajchman,1881-1965(Paris,1995),rev.Englished.,For theGood
UneviepourVhumanitaire:
LudwikRajchman,MedicalStatesman(Budapest,1998). Particularly
usefulmemoirsare
ofHumanity:
Noon (Hampshire,1973), and ArthurSalter,Personality
Salvadorde Madariaga,Morningwithout
in
Statesmen(London,1947).
Politics:Studiesof Contemporary
87Egon F. RanshofenTheInternational
A GreatExperiment
Secretariat:
inInternational
Wertheimer,
Administration
D.C., 1945). Withthe openingof the Secretariat'spersonnelfilesa few
(Washington,
newstudyis possible.
yearsago, a comprehensive
88For theriseofNGOs, see, e.g.,AkiraIriye,Cultural
Internationalism
and WorldOrder(Baltimore,
TheRole ofInternational
in theMakingofthe
Md., 1997),and Iriye,Global Community:
Organizations
World(Berkeley,Calif.,2002); and forinternational
women'sorganizations,
see Carol
Contemporary
Miller,"Lobbyingthe League: Women's InternationalOrganizationsand the League of Nations"
FeministsandtheLeague
(D.Phil.,Oxford,1992),and Miller,"Geneva- theKeyto Equality:Inter-war
Review3, no. 2 (1994): 219-245.
of Nations,"Women'sHistory

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1114

Susan Pedersen

Figure 3: AloisDersoandEmeryKelen'scartoonoftheLeagueSecretariat
backthewatersofthe
holding
de Geneve
crisesoftheearly1930s.AlbertThomasandEricDrummond
areinthecenter.FromLe Testament
ofRareBooksand
ofPrinceton
Archives,
(Geneva,1931).Reproduced
bypermission
University
Department
Princeton
SpecialCollections,
University
Library.

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Back to theLeagueofNations

1115

now MaryKinnearhas givenMcGeachya
explainthe League's filingsystem!);89
biographyof her own.90Like most of the Secretariat'sconsiderablenumbersof
- was neverprowomen,McGeachyheld a juniorpositionand- to herfrustration
motedto the covetedrankof "memberof section."91
She was givensignificant
reas
liaison
with
the
international
women's
however,acting
sponsibility,
organizations,
theLeague and theILO at conferences,
and givingpubliclecturesand
representing
briefing
politiciansduringseveralextendedCanadian tours.Whenthe Secretariat
fellapart,McGeachywenton to thewartimeMinistry
ofEconomicWarfarein London and theUnitedNationsReliefand Rehabilitation
and in later
Administration,
lifeworkedwiththe International
Councilof Women.
ThroughMcGeachy'slife,we see how individualsbothmade and wereremade
- but could that internationalism
by internationalism
tempernationalfeelingin
turn?Les Frangaisau servicede la Societedes Nations,ChristineManigand's2003
activein Geneva,addressesthisquesstudyofthoseFrenchpoliticiansand officials
In theearly1920s,mostFrenchpoliticians
viewedWilsonianidealswithskeption.92
ticism:to theirmind,the League was thereto upholdFrenchsecurityand enforce
thestringent
restraints
placed on GermanybytheTreatyofVersailles.In a crucial
de la France(1920-1924), Marie-Renee
La
des
Nations
et les interets
Societe
work,
- so
Moutonshowedhow hard the Quai d'Orsayworkedto promotethisvision93
hard,indeed,thatbythe mid-1920s,the Britishwouldno longergo along.Yet, as
likeMouton,largelyfromQuai d'Orsayarchives)shows,such
Manigand(working,
setbacksdid notlead to Frenchdisengagement;
instead,as tiesin Geneva became
andweblike,theycameto havea forceoftheirown.Geneva's
evermoremultifarious
inwithina network,
Frenchcontingent
was, as she shows,itselfa kindof network
members
of
the
Secretariat
and
the
and
the
not
the
French
ILO,
corporating only
politicianssecondedto France'smissionto theLeague or servingas Assemblydeland wealthypolitical
egates,but also a richcollectionofjournalists,intellectuals,
hostesses.Workingin Geneva did not makethesemen and womenless protective
butitdidchangehowtheydefinedthem- and itwasthischange,
ofFrenchinterests,
of the mid-1920s.Maniganddoes not
the rapprochement
in turn,thatunderwrote
but by followingher as she
analyzethatprocessof reorientation,
systematically
andwell-wishers,
we beginto see how- if
movesamongtheLeague's Frenchofficials
onlysometimes,and thenonlyfora while it became possible.
theLeague acrossthe
The booksand essays reviewedhere havenotrehabilitated
board.Theyhave,however,provideda morecomplexand variegatedportraitofits
operation.The League was an associationof sovereignstatesthatmanyof itssup89FrankMoorhouse,GrandDays(Sydney,
1993);see also hissequelDarkPalace (MilsonsPoint,New
SouthWales,2000),and AlbertCohen'snovelset at theLeague in the 1930s,Belledu Seigneur(Paris,
1986).
90MaryKinnear,Womanof the World:MaryMcGeachyand International
Cooperation(Toronto,
2004).
91The interesting
ofwomenin theSecretariat
and complexquestionoftheemployment
is discussed
byMiller,"Lobbyingthe League" and "Geneva- the Key to Equality,"but deservesa fullstudynow
thatthepersonnelfileshave been opened.
92ChristineManigand,Les Frangaisau servicede la Societedes Nations(Bern,2003).
93Marie-ReneeMouton,La SocietedesNationsetlesinterets
de la France(1920-1924)(Bern,1995).
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October 2007

1116

Susan Pedersen

- a genuineassociationof
muchgreater
portershopedwouldevolveintosomething
an
worldgovernment.
Those hopeswerealwaysUtopian,forthe
peoples, embryonic
League was foundedupon and remaineddevotedto the principleof statesoverindeed,insofaras theseidealsled politicianstoplayto thestandsor alienated
eignty;
the greatpowers,theymayhave been counterproductive.
Competingnationalin- security,
terestswerenoteasyto reconcile,and as we have seen,on somematters
andpressurefrommobilizedpublicsprobably
minority
rights theglareofpublicity
narrowedthe scope forpragmaticagreement.
Yet forall that,the League mattered.In some areas- epidemicmanagement,
- itmidwifed
drugcontrol,refugees
regimesthatexistto thisday,and inotherareas
itarticulated
normsthat,verypartially
observedat thetime,havegainedinauthority.
If thatis the case, however,it is due in largepartto the innovativestructure
and
of
the
institution
itself.
of
Continuities
of
but
the
continuities
processes
policyexist,
and
the
and
and
of
humanitarian
petitioning oversight, incorporation expert
opinion
are stillmoremarked.Onlybyexamining
theseprocessesand structures,
publicity,
tracingtheircapillariesthroughthe Secretariat'shalls and intovoluntary
organizationsand nationalbureaucraciesalike,do we come to appreciatejust how proandlastingly
butalso increasingly
foundly
theyhaveshapedourstill-state-structured,
globalized,world.
The discredited
ceased toexist
League helditsfinalassemblyin 1946andformally
one yearlater.Itsthreesecretaries-general,
role
no
its
sharing stigma,played further
in international
life.94But ifwe shineour spotlight
one
tier
down,pickingout
just
some of the Secretariatmembersmentionedhere,we findMonnetand SaltercoAlliedshippingduringWorldWarII (as theyhad inWorldWarI); Salter,
ordinating
AdRajchman,and McGeachyall at theUnitedNationsReliefand Rehabilitation
ministration
and
those
UNICEF
at
the
war's
end;
by1944;Rajchmanbusyfounding
"minorities"
expertsColban and Azcarateheadingoffon UnitedNationsmissions
to Kashmirand Palestinesoon thereafter.
ManyothermembersoftheSecretariat's
diminishedstaffalso made theirwayintothe officesof the UnitedNations.
The League was thetraining
groundforthesemenandwomen- theplace where
learned
skills,builtalliances,and beganto craftthatfragilenetworkof norms
they
and agreementsbywhichour worldis regulated,ifnot quite governed.Pragmatic
withlittlefanfare,
bynature,theyshiftedorganizations
shakingoffthe discredited
name
but
its
with
them.
But
League
taking practices
theyleftone treasurebehind.
In Geneva,stillunderused,sitsthe archiveof theworld'sfirstsustainedand conininternationalism.
The worksdiscussedherehavesenta few
sequentialexperiment
lines
into
its
but
remains
to be done to keep an armyof
plumb
depths,
enough
students
and
scholars
a
for
time.
We havemuchto learnbygoing
graduate
busy
long
back to the League of Nations.
94Drummond(laterLordPerth)playeda modestroleas a LiberalPartyelderstatesman
intheBritish
House of Lords,but JosephAvenolpassed an embittered
to rescuehis tarnished
retirement
trying
whileLestercontentedly
in Ireland.
returnedto troutfishing
and obscurity
reputation

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1117

andJamesP. ShentonProfessor
ofHistory
SusanPedersenis Professor
ofthe
at ColumbiaUniversity.
She is theauthorofFamily,
Core Curriculum
DepenState:Britain
andFrance,1914-1945(Camdence,andtheOrigins
oftheWelfare
and
Eleanor
Rathbone
and thePoliticsof ConPress,
bridgeUniversity
1993)
science(Yale University
Press,2004),and theeditor,withCarolineElkins,of
Colonialism
intheTwentieth
Settler
Century
(Routledge,
2005).She is currently
ofthemandatessystem
of theLeague ofNations.
a history
writing

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October 2007

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