Southern R. Co. v. St. Louis Hay & Grain Co., 214 U.S. 297 (1909)
Content
214 U.S. 297
29 S.Ct. 678
53 L.Ed. 1004
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,
v.
ST. LOUIS HAY & GRAIN COMPANY.
No. 104.
Argued March 8, 9, 1909.
Decided June 1, 1909.
This was an action brought by the defendant in error on an award of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. In a general way, the facts are as
follows: The St. Louis Hay & Grain Company is a corporation organized
under the laws of the state of Illinois, with its principal office at St. Louis,
Missouri, a dealer in hay, in the course of which business it operates two
warehouses in East St. Louis, Illinois. The railway company is the owner
and operating a line of railway extending from East St. Louis through the
eastern district of Illinois to points in Southern states, to which the hay an
grain company is engaged in shipping hay. The company buys some hay
at its warehouses, brought in from the adjacent country, but a large portion
of it is bought at points to the north and west. Some of the hay thus
purchased is sent directly through East St. Louis in the cars in which it
was originally loaded, but much of it is taken to its warehouses, there
unloaded, inspected, and reloaded for the Southern markets. This is called
a reconsignment. Taking these cars which are to be reconsigned to the hay
and grain company's warehouses, and taking the reloaded cars therefrom,
involves the use of the cars for a longer time, and there is some expense in
hauling the cars. For this the railway company had been in the habit of
charging $4 or $5 a car, equivalent on the average loading to 2 cents per
hundred pounds. On an application by the company to the Interstate
Commerce Commission it was held, on May 15, 1905 (11 Inters. Com.
Rep. 90), that such charge was an excessive and unreasonable charge, and
that one half thereof was sufficient. Upon that basis it awarded to the hay
and grain company the sum of $1,572.08, one half the sum paid
theretofore by it to the railway company. This sum not being paid, the hay
and grain company, on January 23, 1906, filed its petition in the United
States circuit court for the eastern district of Illinois to recover the amount
thus awarded, with interest, and also for an attorney's fee. A trial resulted
on June 25, 1906, in a judgment in favor of the hay and grain company for
the amount awarded by the Commission, with interest thereon, and also
for $350 as an attorney's fee. 149 Fed. 609. On error to the United States
circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit the judgment of the circuit
court was, on April 16, 1907, affirmed (82 C. C. A. 614, 153 Fed. 728),
whereupon the case was brought here on error.
Messrs. Claudian B. Northrop and Edward C. Kramer for plaintiff in
error.
Messrs. P. J. Farrell and L. O. Whitnel for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:
1
This case rests on the findings and conclusion of the Interstate Commerce
Commission; for while, on the trial in the circuit court, testimony in addition to
that which was produced before the Commission was received, yet the finding
of the court was that, 'from all the evidence heard and adduced on the trial of
this cause in this court, the court finds that the said findings of fact by the said
Interstate Commerce Commission are supported and justified by the said
evidence, and it is ordered that the said findings of fact, as above recited and set
out, be and the same are adopted as the special findings of fact of the court, and
that the same be set out in the records of this court accordingly.'
2
Nothing was, of course, added in the circuit court of appeals, which merely
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. We turn, therefore, to the
proceedings before the Commission, and there is this finding of fact:
3
'While the question is perplexing, and while we may not have apprehended all
the material points involved, we are strongly of the opinion and find that,
taking everything into account, the average additional expense to southern lines
in case of reconsigned hay will not exceed that of direct through shipments by
more than from $2 to $2.50 per car, which is equivalent upon the average
loading of hay to about 1 cent per hundred pounds.'
4
The conclusions, so far as material to this controversy, are thus stated:
5
'The stopping of a commodity in transit for the purpose of treatment or
reconsignment is in the nature of special privilege which the carrier may
concede, but which the shipper cannot, in the present state of the law, demand
as a matter of lawful right. Diamond Mills v. Boston & M. R. Co. 9 Inters.
Com. Rep. 311. Carriers may not, however, discriminate between markets nor
between individuals in the granting of such privileges. If this right is given to
the markets which compete with East St. Louis in this business by these
defendants, it should, prima facie, also be granted to that market. If these
defendants allow this privilege to the competitors of the complainant at East St.
Louis, they should accord it the same privilege.
6
'The case shows, although not very clearly, that the defendants concede this
privilege at other competing markets, and that a track buyer in East St. Louis
itself can send along a car load, which he purchases, but does not unload,
without the payment of this charge. It further shows, however, that the right to
unload this hay and handle it at its warehouse is of value to the complainant,
and that it costs these defendants something to accord that privilege.
7
'Under these circumstances, we think it is not an undue preference against this
complainant if the railroads charge for the privilege what it actually costs them,
but we do not think that they should charge more than the actual cost. The case
finds that the fair average cost when the complainant handles its hay through its
warehouse, over and above the cost of a through shipment, is from $2 to $2.50
per car, or approximately 1 cent per hundred pounds. We think, therefore, that
this reconsignment charge ought not to exceed the proportional rate by more
than one cent, and that the complainant is entitled to recover whatever it has
paid in addition to that sum.'
8
It thus appears that the Commission was of the opinion that the shipper could
not demand, as a matter of right, the stopping of the hay for the purposes of
treatment or reconsignment unless the same privilege was given to other
shippers; and that, in granting this privilege, the railway company could only
charge the shipper the actual cost. But this privilege involved to the railway
company the cost of hauling to and from the warehouses and the use of the car
for some hours, perhaps days. The Commission found that $2 or $2.50 per car,
or approximately 1 cent per hundred pounds, was the actual cost to the railway
company.
9
We are unable to concur with the Commission. If the stopping for inspection
and reloading is of some benefit to the shipper and involves some service by
and expense to the railway company, we do not think that the latter is limited to
the actual cost of that privilege. It is justified in receiving some compensation
in addition thereto. A carrier may be under no obligations to furnish sleeping or
other accommodations to its passengers, but, if it does so, it is not limited in its
charges to the mere cost, but may rightfully make a reasonable profit out of that
which it does furnish. Especially is this true when, as here, the privilege is in no
sense a part of the transportation, but outside thereof. Whether the conclusion
of the Commission that the carrier is under no obligations to permit the
interruption of the transit is right, and whether it is or is not under such
obligation, it is entitled to receive some compensation beyond the mere cost for
that which it does.
10
We have been particular to copy the exact language used by the Commission,
for, in another case between the same plaintiff and other railroad companies,
involving the charges in a case of reconsignment of hay, decided on December
20 of the same year (St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 11 Inters.
Com. Rep. 486), the Commission made an order dismissing the complaint. It is
true that the facts are not precisely like those in this case, but, at the same time,
the difference in the conclusions of the Commission is such as seem to suggest
that perhaps, on further examination, the Commission had come to a different
conclusion.
11
The testimony taken before the Commission is not preserved in the record,
hence it would be impossible, even if proper, with all the testimony before us,
to fix the amount which would be a fair and reasonable charge. All we can do is
to reverse the judgments of the Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, and
remand the case to the former court with instructions to send the matter back to
the Commerce Commission for further investigation and report.
12
Reversed.
29 S.Ct. 678
53 L.Ed. 1004
SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,
v.
ST. LOUIS HAY & GRAIN COMPANY.
No. 104.
Argued March 8, 9, 1909.
Decided June 1, 1909.
This was an action brought by the defendant in error on an award of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. In a general way, the facts are as
follows: The St. Louis Hay & Grain Company is a corporation organized
under the laws of the state of Illinois, with its principal office at St. Louis,
Missouri, a dealer in hay, in the course of which business it operates two
warehouses in East St. Louis, Illinois. The railway company is the owner
and operating a line of railway extending from East St. Louis through the
eastern district of Illinois to points in Southern states, to which the hay an
grain company is engaged in shipping hay. The company buys some hay
at its warehouses, brought in from the adjacent country, but a large portion
of it is bought at points to the north and west. Some of the hay thus
purchased is sent directly through East St. Louis in the cars in which it
was originally loaded, but much of it is taken to its warehouses, there
unloaded, inspected, and reloaded for the Southern markets. This is called
a reconsignment. Taking these cars which are to be reconsigned to the hay
and grain company's warehouses, and taking the reloaded cars therefrom,
involves the use of the cars for a longer time, and there is some expense in
hauling the cars. For this the railway company had been in the habit of
charging $4 or $5 a car, equivalent on the average loading to 2 cents per
hundred pounds. On an application by the company to the Interstate
Commerce Commission it was held, on May 15, 1905 (11 Inters. Com.
Rep. 90), that such charge was an excessive and unreasonable charge, and
that one half thereof was sufficient. Upon that basis it awarded to the hay
and grain company the sum of $1,572.08, one half the sum paid
theretofore by it to the railway company. This sum not being paid, the hay
and grain company, on January 23, 1906, filed its petition in the United
States circuit court for the eastern district of Illinois to recover the amount
thus awarded, with interest, and also for an attorney's fee. A trial resulted
on June 25, 1906, in a judgment in favor of the hay and grain company for
the amount awarded by the Commission, with interest thereon, and also
for $350 as an attorney's fee. 149 Fed. 609. On error to the United States
circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit the judgment of the circuit
court was, on April 16, 1907, affirmed (82 C. C. A. 614, 153 Fed. 728),
whereupon the case was brought here on error.
Messrs. Claudian B. Northrop and Edward C. Kramer for plaintiff in
error.
Messrs. P. J. Farrell and L. O. Whitnel for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:
1
This case rests on the findings and conclusion of the Interstate Commerce
Commission; for while, on the trial in the circuit court, testimony in addition to
that which was produced before the Commission was received, yet the finding
of the court was that, 'from all the evidence heard and adduced on the trial of
this cause in this court, the court finds that the said findings of fact by the said
Interstate Commerce Commission are supported and justified by the said
evidence, and it is ordered that the said findings of fact, as above recited and set
out, be and the same are adopted as the special findings of fact of the court, and
that the same be set out in the records of this court accordingly.'
2
Nothing was, of course, added in the circuit court of appeals, which merely
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. We turn, therefore, to the
proceedings before the Commission, and there is this finding of fact:
3
'While the question is perplexing, and while we may not have apprehended all
the material points involved, we are strongly of the opinion and find that,
taking everything into account, the average additional expense to southern lines
in case of reconsigned hay will not exceed that of direct through shipments by
more than from $2 to $2.50 per car, which is equivalent upon the average
loading of hay to about 1 cent per hundred pounds.'
4
The conclusions, so far as material to this controversy, are thus stated:
5
'The stopping of a commodity in transit for the purpose of treatment or
reconsignment is in the nature of special privilege which the carrier may
concede, but which the shipper cannot, in the present state of the law, demand
as a matter of lawful right. Diamond Mills v. Boston & M. R. Co. 9 Inters.
Com. Rep. 311. Carriers may not, however, discriminate between markets nor
between individuals in the granting of such privileges. If this right is given to
the markets which compete with East St. Louis in this business by these
defendants, it should, prima facie, also be granted to that market. If these
defendants allow this privilege to the competitors of the complainant at East St.
Louis, they should accord it the same privilege.
6
'The case shows, although not very clearly, that the defendants concede this
privilege at other competing markets, and that a track buyer in East St. Louis
itself can send along a car load, which he purchases, but does not unload,
without the payment of this charge. It further shows, however, that the right to
unload this hay and handle it at its warehouse is of value to the complainant,
and that it costs these defendants something to accord that privilege.
7
'Under these circumstances, we think it is not an undue preference against this
complainant if the railroads charge for the privilege what it actually costs them,
but we do not think that they should charge more than the actual cost. The case
finds that the fair average cost when the complainant handles its hay through its
warehouse, over and above the cost of a through shipment, is from $2 to $2.50
per car, or approximately 1 cent per hundred pounds. We think, therefore, that
this reconsignment charge ought not to exceed the proportional rate by more
than one cent, and that the complainant is entitled to recover whatever it has
paid in addition to that sum.'
8
It thus appears that the Commission was of the opinion that the shipper could
not demand, as a matter of right, the stopping of the hay for the purposes of
treatment or reconsignment unless the same privilege was given to other
shippers; and that, in granting this privilege, the railway company could only
charge the shipper the actual cost. But this privilege involved to the railway
company the cost of hauling to and from the warehouses and the use of the car
for some hours, perhaps days. The Commission found that $2 or $2.50 per car,
or approximately 1 cent per hundred pounds, was the actual cost to the railway
company.
9
We are unable to concur with the Commission. If the stopping for inspection
and reloading is of some benefit to the shipper and involves some service by
and expense to the railway company, we do not think that the latter is limited to
the actual cost of that privilege. It is justified in receiving some compensation
in addition thereto. A carrier may be under no obligations to furnish sleeping or
other accommodations to its passengers, but, if it does so, it is not limited in its
charges to the mere cost, but may rightfully make a reasonable profit out of that
which it does furnish. Especially is this true when, as here, the privilege is in no
sense a part of the transportation, but outside thereof. Whether the conclusion
of the Commission that the carrier is under no obligations to permit the
interruption of the transit is right, and whether it is or is not under such
obligation, it is entitled to receive some compensation beyond the mere cost for
that which it does.
10
We have been particular to copy the exact language used by the Commission,
for, in another case between the same plaintiff and other railroad companies,
involving the charges in a case of reconsignment of hay, decided on December
20 of the same year (St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 11 Inters.
Com. Rep. 486), the Commission made an order dismissing the complaint. It is
true that the facts are not precisely like those in this case, but, at the same time,
the difference in the conclusions of the Commission is such as seem to suggest
that perhaps, on further examination, the Commission had come to a different
conclusion.
11
The testimony taken before the Commission is not preserved in the record,
hence it would be impossible, even if proper, with all the testimony before us,
to fix the amount which would be a fair and reasonable charge. All we can do is
to reverse the judgments of the Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, and
remand the case to the former court with instructions to send the matter back to
the Commerce Commission for further investigation and report.
12
Reversed.
