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Subprime mortgage crisis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing real estate and ﬁnancial crisis triggered by a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures in the United States, with major adverse consequences for banks and ﬁnancial markets around the globe. The crisis, which has its roots in the closing years of the 20th century, became apparent in 2007 and has exposed pervasive weaknesses in ﬁnancial industry regulation and the global ﬁnancial system.[1] Approximately 80% of U.S. mortgages issued in recent years to subprime borrowers were adjustable-rate mortgages.[2] When U.S. house prices began to decline in 2006-07, reﬁnancing became more diﬃcult and as adjustable-rate mortgages began to reset at higher rates, mortgage delinquencies soared. Securities backed with subprime mortgages, widely held by ﬁnancial ﬁrms, lost most of their value. The result has been a large decline in the capital of many banks and U.S. government sponsored enterprises, tightening credit around the world.

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2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis
Major dimensions 2000s energy crisis Late-2000s recession Automotive industry crisis of 2008–2009 Subprime crisis impact timeline Subprime mortgage crisis United States housing bubble By country Belgium Iceland Ireland Latvia Russia Spain Summits 34th G8 summit (July 2008) 2008 G-20 Washington summit (November 2008) APEC Peru 2008 (November 2008) 2009 G-20 London Summit (April 2009) Legislation

1 Background and timeline of events 1.1 Mortgage market 2 Causes 2.1 Boom and bust in the housing market 2.2 Speculation 2.3 High-risk mortgage loans and lending/borrowing practices 2.4 Securitization practices 2.5 Inaccurate credit ratings 2.6 Government policies 2.7 Policies of central banks 2.8 Financial institution debt levels and incentives 2.9 Credit default swaps 2.10 Investment in U.S. by foreigners of their proceeds from Americaʹs net imports

Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 2008 European Union stimulus plan 2008 United Kingdom bank rescue package China economic stimulus program China – Japan – South Korea trilateral meeting, 2008 Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Bill 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Green New Deal Company bailouts American International Group (AIG) (US$150B) Bank of America Citigroup Chrysler (US$4B)

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2.11 Boom and collapse of the shadow banking system 3 Impacts 3.1 Impact in the U.S. 3.2 Financial market impacts, 2007 3.3 Financial market impacts, 2008 4 Responses 4.1 Federal Reserve and central banks 4.2 Economic stimulus 4.3 Bank solvency and capital replenishment 4.4 Bailouts and failures of ﬁnancial ﬁrms 4.5 Homeowner assistance 4.5.1 Homeowners Aﬀordability and Stability Plan 5 Regulatory proposals and long-term solutions 5.1 Other responses 6 Implications 7 See also 7.1 Other housing bubbles 8 References 9 Further reading 10 External links

General Motors Bailout Company failures New Century Financial Corporation American Freedom Mortgage American Home Mortgage Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC Charter Communications Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Linens ʹn Things Mervyns NetBank Terra Securities Terra Securities scandal Sentinel Management Group Washington Mutual Icesave Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Yamato Life Circuit City Banco Privado Português Allco Finance Group Waterford Wedgwood Saab Automobile BearingPoint Tweeter Chrysler Chrysler Chapter 11 reorganization General Motors General Motors Chapter 11 reorganization Causes Causes of the financial crisis of 2007–2009 Solutions

Main articles: Subprime crisis background information, Subprime crisis impact timeline, United States housing bubble, and United States housing market correction

Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate Regulatory responses to the subprime crisis

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The immediate cause or trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the United States housing bubble which peaked in approximately 2005–2006.[3][4] High default rates on ʺsubprimeʺ and adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), began to increase quickly therea er. An increase in loan incentives such as easy initial terms and a long-term trend of rising housing prices had encouraged borrowers to assume diﬃcult mortgages in the belief they would be able to quickly reﬁnance at more favorable terms. However, once interest rates began to rise and housing prices started to drop moderately in 2006–2007 in many parts of the U.S., reﬁnancing became more diﬃcult. Defaults and foreclosure activity increased dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices failed to go up as anticipated, and ARM interest rates reset higher. Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a ﬁnancial incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to be a key factor in the global economic crisis, because it drains wealth from consumers and erodes the ﬁnancial strength of banking institutions.

Factors Contributing to Housing Bubble – Diagram 1 of 2

In the years leading up to the crisis, signiﬁcant amounts of foreign money ﬂowed into the U.S. from fast-growing economies in Asia and Domino Effect As Housing oil-producing countries. This inﬂow of funds combined with low U.S. Prices Declined – Diagram 2 interest rates from 2002-2004 contributed to easy credit conditions, of 2 which fueled both housing and credit bubbles. Loans of various types (e.g., mortgage, credit card, and auto) were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt load.[5][6] As part of the housing and credit booms, the amount of ﬁnancial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which derive their value from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such ﬁnancial innovation enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major global ﬁnancial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported signiﬁcant losses. Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased signiﬁcantly as the crisis expanded from the housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S. dollars globally.[7] While the housing and credit bubbles built, a series of factors caused the ﬁnancial system to become increasingly fragile. Policymakers did not recognize the increasingly important role played by ﬁnancial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations.[8] These institutions as well as certain regulated banks had also assumed signiﬁcant debt burdens while providing the loans described above and did not have a ﬁnancial cushion suﬃcient to absorb large loan defaults or MBS losses.[9] These losses impacted the ability of ﬁnancial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key ﬁnancial institutions drove central banks to take action to provide funds to encourage lending and to restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key ﬁnancial institutions, assuming signiﬁcant additional ﬁnancial commitments. The risks to the broader economy created by the housing market downturn and subsequent ﬁnancial market crisis were primary factors in several decisions by central banks around the world to cut interest rates and governments to implement economic stimulus packages. Eﬀects on global stock markets due to the crisis have been dramatic. Between 1 January and 11 October 2008, owners of stocks in U.S. corporations had suﬀered about $8 trillion in losses, as their holdings declined in value from $20 trillion to $12 trillion. Losses in other countries have averaged about 40%.[10] Losses in the stock markets and housing value declines place further downward pressure on consumer spending, a key economic engine.[11] Leaders of the larger developed and emerging nations met in November 2008 and March 2009 to formulate strategies for addressing the crisis.[12] As of April 2009, many of the root causes of the crisis had yet to be addressed. A variety of solutions have been proposed by
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government oﬃcials, central bankers, economists, and business executives.[13][14][15]

Mortgage market
Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit histories and reduced repayment capacity. Subprime loans have a higher risk of default than loans to prime borrowers.[16] If a borrower is delinquent in making timely mortgage payments to the loan servicer (a bank or other ﬁnancial ﬁrm), the lender may take possession of the property, in a process called foreclosure. The value of USA subprime mortgages was estimated at $1.3 trillion as of March 2007, [17] with over 7.5 million ﬁrst-lien subprime mortgages Number of U.S. residential outstanding.[18] Between 2004-2006 the share of subprime mortgages properties subject to relative to total originations ranged from 18%-21%, versus less than foreclosure actions by 10% in 2001-2003 and during 2007.[19][20] In the third quarter of 2007, quarter (2007-2009). subprime ARMs making up only 6.8% of USA mortgages outstanding also accounted for 43% of the foreclosures which began during that quarter.[21] By October 2007, approximately 16% of subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) were either 90-days delinquent or the lender had begun foreclosure proceedings, roughly triple the rate of 2005.[22] By January 2008, the delinquency rate had risen to 21%[23] and by May 2008 it was 25%.[24] The value of all outstanding residential mortgages, owed by USA households to purchase residences housing at most four families, was US$9.9 trillion as of year-end 2006, and US$10.6 trillion as of midyear 2008.[25] During 2007, lenders had begun foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006.[26] This increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007.[27] As of August 2008, 9.2% of all mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure.[28] Between August 2007 and October 2008, 936,439 USA residences completed foreclosure.[29] Foreclosures are concentrated in particular states both in terms of the number and rate of foreclosure ﬁlings.[30] Ten states accounted for 74% of the foreclosure ﬁlings during 2008; the top two (California and Florida) represented 41%. Nine states were above the national foreclosure rate average of 1.84% of households.[31]

The crisis can be a ributed to a number of factors pervasive in both housing and credit markets, factors which emerged over a number of years. Causes proposed include the inability of homeowners to make their mortgage payments, due primarily to adjustable rate mortgages rese ing, borrowers overextending, predatory lending, speculation and overbuilding during the boom period, risky mortgage products, high personal and corporate debt levels, ﬁnancial products that distributed and perhaps concealed the risk of mortgage default, monetary policy, international trade imbalances, and government regulation (or the lack thereof).[32][33][34] Two important catalysts of the subprime crisis were the inﬂux of moneys from the private sector and banks entering into the mortgage bond market and the predatory lending practices of mortgage brokers, speciﬁcally the adjustable rate mortgage, 2-28 loan.[35][36] Ultimately, though, speciﬁc to the bailout of Wall Street and the ﬁnancial industry moral hazard lay at the core of many of the causes.[37] In its ʺDeclaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy,ʺ dated 15 November 2008, leaders of the Group of 20 cited the following causes:
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital ﬂows, and prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque ﬁnancial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and

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supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in ﬁnancial markets, keep pace with ﬁnancial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramiﬁcations of domestic regulatory actions.[38]

Boom and bust in the housing market
Main articles: United States housing bubble and United States housing market correction Low interest rates and large inﬂows of foreign funds created easy credit conditions for a number of years prior to the crisis, fueling a housing market boom and encouraging debt-ﬁnanced consumption.[39] The USA home ownership rate increased from 64% in 1994 (about where it had been since 1980) to an all-time high of 69.2% in 2004.[40] Subprime lending was a major contributor to this increase in home ownership rates and in the overall demand for housing, which drove prices higher. Between 1997 and 2006, the price of the typical American house increased by 124%.[41] During the two decades ending in 2001, the national median home price ranged from 2.9 to 3.1 times median household income. This ratio rose to 4.0 in 2004, and 4.6 in 2006.[42] This housing bubble resulted in quite a few homeowners reﬁnancing their homes at lower interest rates, or ﬁnancing consumer spending by taking out second mortgages secured by the price appreciation. USA household debt as a percentage of annual disposable personal income was 127% at the end of 2007, versus 77% in 1990.[43]
Existing homes sales, inventory, and months supply, by quarter.

While housing prices were increasing, consumers were saving less[44] and both borrowing and spending more. A culture of consumerism is Vicious Cycles in the a factor ʺin an economy based on immediate gratiﬁcation.ʺ[45] Housing & Financial Markets Household debt grew from $705 billion at yearend 1974, 60% of disposable personal income, to $7.4 trillion at yearend 2000, and ﬁnally to $14.5 trillion in midyear 2008, 134% of disposable personal income.[46] During 2008, the typical USA household owned 13 credit cards, with 40% of households carrying a balance, up from 6% in 1970.[47] Free cash used by consumers from home equity extraction doubled from $627 billion in 2001 to $1,428 billion in 2005 as the housing bubble built, a total of nearly $5 trillion dollars over the period.[48][49][50] U.S. home mortgage debt relative to GDP increased from an average of 46% during the 1990ʹs to 73% during 2008, reaching $10.5 trillion.[51] This credit and house price explosion led to a building boom and eventually to a surplus of unsold homes, which caused U.S. housing prices to peak and begin declining in mid-2006.[52] Easy credit, and a belief that house prices would continue to appreciate, had encouraged many subprime borrowers to obtain adjustable-rate mortgages. These mortgages enticed borrowers with a below market interest rate for some predetermined period, followed by market interest rates for the remainder of the mortgageʹs term. Borrowers who could not make the higher payments once the initial grace period ended would try to reﬁnance their mortgages. Reﬁnancing became more diﬃcult, once house prices began to decline in many parts of the USA. Borrowers who found themselves unable to escape higher monthly payments by reﬁnancing began to default. As more borrowers stop paying their mortgage payments (this is an on-going crisis), foreclosures and the supply of homes for sale increases. This places downward pressure on housing prices, which further lowers homeownersʹ equity. The decline in mortgage payments also reduces the value of mortgage-backed securities, which erodes the net worth and ﬁnancial health of banks. This vicious cycle is at the heart of the crisis.[53] By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006

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peak.[54][55] This major and unexpected decline in house prices means that many borrowers have zero or negative equity in their homes, meaning their homes were worth less than their mortgages. As of March 2008, an estimated 8.8 million borrowers — 10.8% of all homeowners — had negative equity in their homes, a number that is believed to have risen to 12 million by November 2008. Borrowers in this situation have an incentive to default on their mortgages as a mortgage is typically nonrecourse debt secured against the property.[56] Economist Stan Leibowitz argued in the Wall Street Journal that although only 12% of homes had negative equity, they comprised 47% of foreclosures during the second half of 2008. He concluded that the extent of equity in the home was the key factor in foreclosure, rather than the type of loan, credit worthiness of the borrower, or ability to pay.[57] Increasing foreclosure rates increases the inventory of houses oﬀered for sale. The number of new homes sold in 2007 was 26.4% less than in the preceding year. By January 2008, the inventory of unsold new homes was 9.8 times the December 2007 sales volume, the highest value of this ratio since 1981.[58] Furthermore, nearly four million existing homes were for sale,[59] of which almost 2.9 million were vacant.[60] This overhang of unsold homes lowered house prices. As prices declined, more homeowners were at risk of default or foreclosure. House prices are expected to continue declining until this inventory of unsold homes (an instance of excess supply) declines to normal levels.[61]

Speculation
Speculative borrowing in residential real estate has been cited as a contributing factor to the subprime mortgage crisis.[62] During 2006, 22% of homes purchased (1.65 million units) were for investment purposes, with an additional 14% (1.07 million units) purchased as vacation homes. During 2005, these ﬁgures were 28% and 12%, respectively. In other words, a record level of nearly 40% of homes purchases were not intended as primary residences. David Lereah, NARʹs chief economist at the time, stated that the 2006 decline in investment buying was expected: ʺSpeculators le the market in 2006, which caused investment sales to fall much faster than the primary market.ʺ[63] Housing prices nearly doubled between 2000 and 2006, a vastly diﬀerent trend from the historical appreciation at roughly the rate of inﬂation. While homes had not traditionally been treated as investments subject to speculation, this behavior changed during the housing boom. Media widely reported condominiums being purchased while under construction, then being ʺﬂippedʺ (sold) for a proﬁt without the seller ever having lived in them.[64] Some mortgage companies identiﬁed risks inherent in this activity as early as 2005, a er identifying investors assuming highly leveraged positions in multiple properties.[65] Nicole Gelinas of the Manha an Institute described the negative consequences of not adjusting tax and mortgage policies to the shi ing treatment of a home from conservative inﬂation hedge to speculative investment.[66] Economist Robert Shiller argued that speculative bubbles are fueled by ʺcontagious optimism, seemingly impervious to facts, that o en takes hold when prices are rising. Bubbles are primarily social phenomena; until we understand and address the psychology that fuels them, theyʹre going to keep forming.ʺ[67] Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky described how speculative borrowing contributed to rising debt and an eventual collapse of asset values.[68][69]

High-risk mortgage loans and lending/borrowing practices
In the years before the crisis, the behavior of lenders changed dramatically. Lenders oﬀered more and more loans to higher-risk borrowers.[70][71] Subprime mortgages amounted to $35 billion (5% of total originations) in 1994,[72] 9% in 1996,[73] $160 billion (13%) in 1999,[72] and $600 billion (20%) in 2006.[73][74][75] A study by the Federal Reserve found that the average diﬀerence between subprime and prime mortgage interest rates (the ʺsubprime markupʺ) declined signiﬁcantly between 2001 and 2007. The combination of declining risk premia and credit standards is common to boom and bust credit cycles.[76] In addition to considering higher-risk borrowers, lenders have oﬀered increasingly risky loan options

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and borrowing incentives. In 2005, the median down payment for ﬁrst-time home buyers was 2%, with 43% of those buyers making no down payment whatsoever.[77] By comparison, China has down payment requirements that exceed 20%, with higher amounts for non-primary residences.[78] One high-risk option was the ʺNo Income, No Job and no Assetsʺ loans, sometimes referred to as Ninja loans. Another example is the interest-only adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), which allows the homeowner to pay just the interest (not principal) during an initial period. Still another is a ʺpayment optionʺ loan, in which the homeowner can pay a variable amount, but any interest not paid is added to the principal. An estimated one-third of ARMs originated between 2004 and 2006 had ʺteaserʺ rates below 4%, which then increased signiﬁcantly a er some initial period, as much as doubling the monthly payment.[79]

The proportion of subprime ARM loans made to people with credit scores high enough to qualify for conventional mortgages with be er terms increased from 41% in 2000 to 61% by 2006. However, there are many factors other than credit score that aﬀect lending. In addition, mortgage brokers in some cases received incentives from lenders to oﬀer subprime ARMʹs even to those with credit ratings that merited a conforming (i.e., non-subprime) loan.[80] Mortgage underwriting standards declined precipitously during the boom period. The use of automated loan approvals allowed loans to be made without appropriate review and documentation.[81] In 2007, 40% of all subprime loans resulted from automated underwriting.[82][83] The chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association claimed that mortgage brokers, while proﬁting from the home loan boom, did not do enough to examine whether borrowers could repay.[84] Mortgage fraud by lenders and borrowers increased enormously. [85] In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned of an ʺepidemicʺ in mortgage fraud, an important credit risk of nonprime mortgage lending, which, they said, could lead to ʺa problem that could have as much impact as the S&L crisisʺ.[86] [87][88][89] So why did lending standards decline? In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a ʺGiant Pool of Moneyʺ (represented by $70 trillion in worldwide ﬁxed income investments) sought higher yields than those oﬀered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. Further, this pool of money had roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with ﬁnancial innovation such as the mortgage-backed security (MBS) and collateralized debt obligation (CDO), which were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. In eﬀect, Wall Street connected this pool of money to the mortgage market in the U.S., with enormous fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the mortgage broker selling the loans, to small banks that funded the brokers, to the giant investment banks behind them. By approximately 2003, the supply of mortgages originated at traditional lending standards had been exhausted. However, continued strong demand for MBS and CDO began to drive down lending standards, as long as mortgages could still be sold along the supply chain. Eventually, this speculative bubble proved unsustainable. NPR described it this way:[90]
The problem was that even though housing prices were going through the roof, people werenʹt making any more money. From 2000 to 2007, the median household income stayed ﬂat. And so the more prices rose, the more tenuous the whole thing became. No ma er how lax lending standards got, no ma er how many exotic mortgage products were created to shoehorn people into homes they couldnʹt possibly aﬀord, no ma er what the mortgage machine tried, the people just couldnʹt swing it. By late 2006, the average home cost nearly four times what the average family made. Historically it was between two and three times. And mortgage lenders noticed something that theyʹd almost never seen before. People would close on a house, sign all the mortgage papers, and then default on their very ﬁrst payment. No loss of a job, no medical emergency, they were underwater before they even started. And although no one could really hear it, that was probably the moment when one of the

Growth in mortgage loan fraud based upon US Department of the Treasury Suspicious Activity Report Analysis.

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biggest speculative bubbles in American history popped.

Securitization practices
Further information: Securitization and Mortgage-backed security The traditional mortgage model involved a bank originating a loan to the borrower/homeowner and retaining the credit (default) risk. With the advent of securitization, the traditional model has given way to the ʺoriginate to distributeʺ model, in which banks essentially sell the mortgages and distribute credit risk to investors through mortgagebacked securities. Securitization meant that those issuing mortgages were no longer required to hold them to maturity. By selling the mortgages to investors, the originating banks replenished their funds, enabling them to issue more loans and generating transaction fees. This may have created moral hazard and increased focus on processing mortgage transactions rather than ensuring their credit

Borrowing under a securitization structure.

quality.[91][92] Securitization accelerated in the mid-1990s. The total amount of mortgage-backed securities issued almost tripled between 1996 and 2007, to $7.3 trillion. The securitized share of subprime mortgages (i.e., those passed to third-party investors via MBS) increased from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006.[76] American homeowners, consumers, and corporations owed roughly $25 trillion during 2008. American banks retained about $8 trillion of that total directly as traditional mortgage loans. Bondholders and other traditional lenders provided another $7 trillion. The remaining $10 trillion came from the securitization markets. The securitization markets started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds.[93][94] In February 2009, Ben Bernanke stated that securitization markets remained eﬀectively shut, with the exception of conforming mortgages, which could be sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.[95] A more direct connection between securitization and the subprime crisis relates to a fundamental fault in the way that underwriters, rating agencies and investors modeled the correlation of risks among loans in securitization pools. Correlation modeling--determining how the default risk of one loan in a pool is statistically related to the default risk for other loans--was based on a ʺGaussian copulaʺ technique developed by statistician David X. Li. This technique, widely adopted as a means of evaluating the risk associated with securitization transactions, used what turned out to be an overly simplistic approach to correlation. Unfortunately, the ﬂaws in this technique did not become apparent to market participants until a er many hundreds of billions of dollars of ABS and CDOs backed by subprime loans had been rated and sold. By the time investors stopped buying subprimebacked securities--which halted the ability of mortgage originators to extend subprime loans--the eﬀects of the crisis were already beginning to emerge.[96] Nobel laureate Dr. A. Michael Spence wrote: ʺFinancial innovation, intended to redistribute and reduce risk, appears mainly to have hidden it from view. An important challenge going forward is to be er understand these dynamics as the analytical underpinning of an early warning system with respect to ﬁnancial instability.ʺ [97]

Inaccurate credit ratings
Main article: Credit rating agencies and the subprime crisis

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Credit rating agencies are now under scrutiny for having given investment-grade ratings to MBSs based on risky subprime mortgage loans. These high ratings enabled these MBS to be sold to investors, thereby ﬁnancing the housing boom. These ratings were believed justiﬁed because of risk reducing practices, such as credit default insurance and equity investors willing to bear the ﬁrst losses. However, there are also indications that some involved in rating subprimerelated securities knew at the time that the rating process was faulty.[98]

Critics allege that the rating agencies suﬀered from conﬂicts of interest, as they were paid by investment banks and other ﬁrms that organize and sell structured securities to investors.[99] On 11 June 2008, the SEC proposed rules designed to mitigate perceived conﬂicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers of structured securities.[100] On 3 December 2008, the SEC approved measures to strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies, following a ten-month investigation that found ʺsigniﬁcant weaknesses in ratings practices,ʺ including conﬂicts of interest.[101] Between Q3 2007 and Q2 2008, rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on $1.9 trillion in mortgage backed securities. Financial institutions felt they had to lower the value of their MBS and acquire additional capital so as to maintain capital ratios. If this involved the sale of new shares of stock, the value of the existing shares was reduced. Thus ratings downgrades lowered the stock prices of many ﬁnancial ﬁrms.[102]

MBS credit rating downgrades, by quarter.

Government policies
Main article: Government policies and the subprime mortgage crisis Both government failed regulation and deregulation contributed to the crisis. In testimony before Congress both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Alan Greenspan conceded failure in allowing the self-regulation of investment banks.[103][104] Increasing home ownership has been the goal of several presidents including Roosevelt, Reagan, Clinton and G.W.Bush. In 1982, Congress passed the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA), which allowed non-federally chartered housing creditors to U.S. Subprime lending write adjustable-rate mortgages. Among the new mortgage loan types expanded dramatically created and gaining in popularity in the early 1980s were 2004-2006 adjustable-rate, option adjustable-rate, balloon-payment and interest-only mortgages. These new loan types are credited with replacing the long standing practice of banks making conventional ﬁxed-rate, amortizing mortgages. Among the criticisms of banking industry deregulation that contributed to the savings and loan crisis was that Congress failed to enact regulations that would have prevented exploitations by these loan types. Subsequent widespread abuses of predatory lending occurred with the use of adjustable-rate mortgages.[105][106][107] Approximately 80% of subprime mortgages are adjustable-rate mortgages.[108] In 1995, the GSEs like Fannie Mae began receiving government tax incentives for purchasing mortgage backed securities which included loans to low income borrowers. Thus began the involvement of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the subprime market.[109] In 1996, HUD set a goal for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that at least 42% of the mortgages they purchase be issued to borrowers whose household income was below the median in their area. This target was increased to 50% in 2000 and 52% in 2005.[110] From 2002 to 2006, as the U.S. subprime market grew 292% over previous years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac combined purchases of subprime securities rose from $38 billion to around $175 billion per year before dropping to $90 billion per year, which included $350 billion of Alt-A securities. Fannie Mae had stopped buying Alt-A products in the early 1990s
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because of the high risk of default. By 2008, the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned, either directly or through mortgage pools they sponsored, $5.1 trillion in residential mortgages, about half the total U.S. mortgage market.[111] The GSE have always been highly leveraged, their net worth as of 30 June 2008 being a mere US$114 billion.[112] When concerns arose in September 2008 regarding the ability of the GSE to make good on their guarantees, the Federal government was forced to place the companies into a conservatorship, eﬀectively nationalizing them at the taxpayersʹ expense.[113][114] The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted a er the Great Depression. It separated commercial banks and investment banks, in part to avoid potential conﬂicts of interest between the lending activities of the former and rating activities of the la er. Economist Joseph Stiglitz criticized the repeal of the Act. He called its repeal the ʺculmination of a $300 million lobbying eﬀort by the banking and ﬁnancial services industries...spearheaded in Congress by Senator Phil Gramm.ʺ He believes it contributed to this crisis because the risk-taking culture of investment banking dominated the more conservative commercial banking culture, leading to increased levels of risk-taking and leverage during the boom period.[115] The Federal government bailout of thri s during the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s may have encouraged other lenders to make risky loans, and thus given rise to moral hazard.
[116][37]

Conservatives and Libertarians have also debated the possible eﬀects of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), with detractors claiming that the Act encouraged lending to uncreditworthy borrowers,[117][118][119][120] and defenders claiming a thirty year history of lending without increased risk.[121][122][123][124] Detractors also claim that amendments to the CRA in the mid-1990s, raised the amount of mortgages issued to otherwise unqualiﬁed low-income borrowers, and allowed the securitization of CRA-regulated mortgages, even though a fair number of them were subprime.[125][126] Both Federal Reserve Governor Randall Kroszner and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair have stated their belief that the CRA was not to blame for the crisis.[127]
[128]

Policies of central banks
Central banks manage monetary policy and may target the rate of inﬂation. They have some authority over commercial banks and possibly other ﬁnancial institutions. They are less concerned with avoiding asset price bubbles, such as the housing bubble and dot-com bubble. Central banks have generally chosen to react a er such bubbles burst so as to minimize collateral damage to the economy, rather than trying to prevent or stop the bubble itself. This is because identifying an asset bubble and determining the proper monetary policy to deﬂate it are ma ers of debate among economists.[129][130]

Some market observers have been concerned that Federal Reserve actions could give rise to moral hazard.[37] A Government Accountability Oﬃce critic said that the Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkʹs rescue of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 would encourage large ﬁnancial institutions to believe that the Federal Reserve would intervene on their behalf if risky loans went sour because they were “too big to fail.”[131] A contributing factor to the rise in house prices was the Federal Reserveʹs lowering of interest rates early in the decade. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%.[132] This was done to so en the eﬀects of the collapse of the dot-com bubble and of the September 2001 terrorist a acks, and to combat the perceived risk of deﬂation.[129] The Fed believed that interest rates could be lowered safely primarily because the rate of inﬂation was low; it disregarded other important factors. Richard W. Fisher, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, said that the Fedʹs interest rate policy during the early 2000s was misguided, because

Federal Funds Rate and Various Mortgage Rates

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measured inﬂation in those years was below true inﬂation, which led to a monetary policy that contributed to the housing bubble.[133] According to Ben Bernanke, now chairman of the Federal Reserve, it was capital or savings pushing into the United States, due to a world wide ʺsaving glutʺ, which kept long term interest rates low independently of Central Bank action.[134] The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate signiﬁcantly between July 2004 and July 2006.[135] This contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year ARM rates, making ARM interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners.[136] This may have also contributed to the deﬂating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates and it became riskier to speculate in housing.[137][138]

Financial institution debt levels and incentives
Many ﬁnancial institutions, investment banks in particular, issued large amounts of debt during 2004–2007, and invested the proceeds in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), essentially be ing that house prices would continue to rise, and that households would continue to make their mortgage payments. Borrowing at a lower interest rate and investing the proceeds at a higher interest rate is a form of ﬁnancial leverage. This is analogous to an individual taking out a second mortgage on his residence to invest in the stock market. This strategy proved proﬁtable during the housing boom, but resulted in large losses when house prices began to decline and mortgages began to default. Beginning in 2007, ﬁnancial institutions and individual investors holding MBS also suﬀered signiﬁcant losses from mortgage payment defaults and the resulting decline in the value of MBS.[139]

Leverage Ratios of Investment Banks Increased Significantly 2003–2007

A 2004 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decision related to the net capital rule allowed USA investment banks to issue substantially more debt, which was then used to purchase MBS. Over 2004-07, the top ﬁve US investment banks each signiﬁcantly increased their ﬁnancial leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to the declining value of MBSs. These ﬁve institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for ﬁscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007. Further, the percentage of subprime mortgages originated to total originations increased from below 10% in 2001-2003 to between 18-20% from 2004-2006, due in-part to ﬁnancing from investment banks.[19][20] During 2008, three of the largest U.S. investment banks either went bankrupt (Lehman Brothers) or were sold at ﬁre sale prices to other banks (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch). These failures augmented the instability in the global ﬁnancial system. The remaining two investment banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, opted to become commercial banks, thereby subjecting themselves to more stringent regulation.[140] In the years leading up to the crisis, the top four U.S. depository banks moved an estimated $5.2 trillion in assets and liabilities oﬀ-balance sheet into special purpose vehicles or other entities in the shadow banking system. This enabled them to essentially bypass existing regulations regarding minimum capital ratios, thereby increasing leverage and proﬁts during the boom but increasing losses during the crisis. New accounting guidance will require them to put some of these assets back onto their books during 2009, which will signiﬁcantly reduce their capital ratios. One news agency estimated this amount to be between $500 billion and $1 trillion. This eﬀect was considered as part of the stress tests performed by the government during 2009.[141] Martin Wolf wrote in June 2009: ʺ...an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this decade – the oﬀ-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the ʹshadow banking systemʹ itself – was to ﬁnd a way round regulation.ʺ[142] The New York State Comptrollerʹs Oﬃce has said that in 2006, Wall Street executives took home bonuses totaling $23.9 billion. ʺWall Street traders were thinking of the bonus at the end of the year,

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not the long-term health of their ﬁrm. The whole system—from mortgage brokers to Wall Street risk managers—seemed tilted toward taking short-term risks while ignoring long-term obligations. The most damning evidence is that most of the people at the top of the banks didnʹt really understand how those [investments] worked.ʺ[42][143] Investment banker incentive compensation was focused on fees generated from assembling ﬁnancial products, rather than the performance of those products and proﬁts generated over time. Their bonuses were heavily skewed towards cash rather than stock and not subject to ʺclaw-backʺ (recovery of the bonus from the employee by the ﬁrm) in the event the MBS or CDO created did not perform. In addition, the increased risk (in the form of ﬁnancial leverage) taken by the major investment banks was not adequately factored into the compensation of senior executives.[144]

Credit default swaps
Credit defaults swaps (CDS) are ﬁnancial instruments used as a hedge and protection for debtholders, in particular MBS investors, from the risk of default. As the net worth of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions deteriorated because of losses related to subprime mortgages, the likelihood increased that those providing the insurance would have to pay their counterparties. This created uncertainty across the system, as investors wondered which companies would be required to pay to cover mortgage defaults. Like all swaps and other ﬁnancial derivatives, CDS may either be used to hedge risks (speciﬁcally, to insure creditors against default) or to proﬁt from speculation. The volume of CDS outstanding increased 100-fold from 1998 to 2008, with estimates of the debt covered by CDS contracts, as of November 2008, ranging from US$33 to $47 trillion. CDS are lightly regulated. As of 2008, there was no central clearing house to honor CDS in the event a party to a CDS proved unable to perform his obligations under the CDS contract. Required disclosure of CDS-related obligations has been criticized as inadequate. Insurance companies such as American International Group (AIG), MBIA, and Ambac faced ratings downgrades because widespread mortgage defaults increased their potential exposure to CDS losses. These ﬁrms had to obtain additional funds (capital) to oﬀset this exposure. AIGʹs having CDSs insuring $440 billion of MBS resulted in its seeking and obtaining a Federal government bailout.[145] Like all swaps and other pure wagers, what one party loses under a CDS, the other party gains; CDSs merely reallocate existing wealth [that is, provided that the paying party can perform]. Hence the question is which side of the CDS will have to pay and will it be able to do so. When investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008, there was much uncertainty as to which ﬁnancial ﬁrms would be required to honor the CDS contracts on its $600 billion of bonds outstanding.[146][147] Merrill Lynchʹs large losses in 2008 were a ributed in part to the drop in value of its unhedged portfolio of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) a er AIG ceased oﬀering CDS on Merrillʹs CDOs. The loss of conﬁdence of trading partners in Merrill Lynchʹs solvency and its ability to reﬁnance its short-term debt led to its acquisition by the Bank of America.[148][149] Economist Joseph Stiglitz summarized how credit default swaps contributed to the systemic meltdown: ʺWith this complicated intertwining of bets of great magnitude, no one could be sure of the ﬁnancial position of anyone else-or even of oneʹs own position. Not surprisingly, the credit markets froze.ʺ[150]

Investment in U.S. by foreigners of their proceeds from Americaʹs net imports

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In 2005, Ben Bernanke addressed the implications of the USAʹs high and rising current account (trade) deﬁcit, resulting from USA imports exceeding its exports.[151] Between 1996 and 2004, the USA current account deﬁcit increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deﬁcits required the USA to borrow large sums from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses, mainly the emerging economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country (such as the USA) running a current account deﬁcit also have a capital account (investment) U.S. Current Account or surplus of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of Trade Deficit foreign funds (capital) ﬂowed into the USA to ﬁnance its imports. Foreign investors had these funds to lend, either because they had very high personal savings rates (as high as 40% in China), or because of high oil prices. Bernanke referred to this as a ʺsaving glutʺ[134] that may have pushed capital into the USA, a view diﬀering from that of other economists, who view such capital as having been pulled into the USA by its high consumption levels. In other words, a nation cannot consume more than its income unless it sells assets to foreigners, or foreigners are willing to lend to it. Regardless of the push or pull view, a ʺﬂoodʺ of funds (capital or liquidity) reached the USA ﬁnancial markets. Foreign governments supplied funds by purchasing USA Treasury bonds and thus avoided much of the direct impact of the crisis. USA households, on the other hand, used funds borrowed from foreigners to ﬁnance consumption or to bid up the prices of housing and ﬁnancial assets. Financial institutions invested foreign funds in mortgage-backed securities. USA housing and ﬁnancial assets dramatically declined in value a er the housing bubble burst.[152][153]

Boom and collapse of the shadow banking system
In a June 2008 speech, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, then President of the NY Federal Reserve Bank, placed signiﬁcant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a ʺrunʺ on the entities in the ʺparallelʺ banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the ﬁnancial system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable because they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the signiﬁcance of these entities: ʺIn early 2007, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, in structured investment vehicles, in auction-rate preferred securities, tender option bonds and variable rate demand notes, had a combined asset size of roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets ﬁnanced overnight in triparty repo grew to $2.5 trillion. Assets held in hedge funds grew to roughly $1.8 trillion. The combined balance sheets of the then ﬁve major investment banks totaled $4 trillion. In comparison, the total assets of the top ﬁve bank holding companies in the United States at that point were just over $6 trillion, and total assets of the entire banking system were about $10 trillion.ʺ He stated that the ʺcombined eﬀect of these factors was a ﬁnancial system vulnerable to self-reinforcing asset price and credit cycles.ʺ[154] Nobel laureate Paul Krugman described the run on the shadow banking system as the ʺcore of what happenedʺ to cause the crisis. ʺAs the shadow banking system expanded to rival or even surpass conventional banking in importance, politicians and government oﬃcials should have realized that they were re-creating the kind of ﬁnancial vulnerability that made the Great Depression possible--and they should have responded by extending regulations and the ﬁnancial safety net to cover these new institutions. Inﬂuential ﬁgures should have proclaimed a simple rule: anything that does what a bank does, anything that has to be rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a bank.ʺ He referred to this lack of controls as ʺmalign neglect.ʺ[155] The securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds.[156] According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: ʺIt would
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take a number of years of strong proﬁts to generate suﬃcient capital to support that additional lending volume.ʺ The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are ʺlikely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions.ʺ[157]

Main articles: Financial crisis of 2007–2008 and Global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008

Impact in the U.S.
Between June 2007 and November 2008, Americans lost more than a quarter of their net worth. By early November 2008, a broad U.S. stock index, the S&P 500, was down 45 percent from its 2007 high. Housing prices had dropped 20% from their 2006 peak, with futures markets signaling a 30-35% potential drop. Total home equity in the United States, which was valued at $13 trillion at its peak in 2006, had dropped to $8.8 trillion by mid-2008 and was still falling in late 2008. Total retirement assets, Americansʹ second-largest household asset, dropped by 22 percent, from $10.3 trillion in 2006 to $8 trillion in Impacts from the Crisis on mid-2008. During the same period, savings and investment assets Key Wealth Measures (apart from retirement savings) lost $1.2 trillion and pension assets lost $1.3 trillion. Taken together, these losses total a staggering $8.3 trillion.[158] Members of USA minority groups received a disproportionate number of subprime mortgages, and so have experienced a disproportionate level of the resulting foreclosures.
[159][160][161]

Financial market impacts, 2007
Further information: List of writedowns due to subprime crisis The crisis began to aﬀect the ﬁnancial sector in February 2007, when HSBC, the worldʹs largest (2008) bank, wrote down its holdings of subprime-related MBS by $10.5 billion, the ﬁrst major subprime related loss to be reported.[162] During 2007, at least 100 mortgage companies either shut down, suspended operations or were sold.[163] Top management has not escaped unscathed, as the CEOs of Merrill Lynch and Citigroup resigned within a week of each other in late 2007.[164] As the crisis deepened, more and more ﬁnancial ﬁrms either merged, or announced that they were negotiating seeking merger partners.[165]

During 2007, the crisis caused panic in ﬁnancial markets and encouraged investors to take their money out of risky mortgage bonds and shaky equities and put it into commodities as ʺstores of valueʺ.[166] Financial speculation in commodity futures following the collapse of the ﬁnancial derivatives markets has contributed to the world food price crisis and oil price increases due to a ʺcommodities super-cycle.ʺ[167][168] Financial speculators seeking quick returns have removed trillions of dollars from equities and mortgage bonds, some of which has been invested into food and raw materials.[169] Mortgage defaults and provisions for future defaults caused proﬁts at the 8533 USA depository institutions insured by the FDIC to decline from $35.2 billion in 2006 Q4 billion to $646 million in the same quarter a year later, a decline of 98%. 2007 Q4 saw the worst bank and thri quarterly performance since 1990. In all of 2007, insured depository institutions earned approximately $100 billion, down 31% from a record proﬁt of $145 billion in 2006. Proﬁts declined from $35.6 billion in 2007 Q1 to $19.3 billion in 2008 Q1, a decline of 46%.[170][171]

FDIC Graph - U.S. Bank & Thrift Profitability By Quarter

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Financial market impacts, 2008
Further information: Indirect economic eﬀects of the subprime mortgage crisis As of August 2008, ﬁnancial ﬁrms around the globe have wri en down their holdings of subprime related securities by US$501 billion.[172] The IMF estimates that ﬁnancial institutions around the globe will eventually have to write oﬀ $1.5 trillion of their holdings of subprime MBSs. About $750 billion in such losses had been recognized as of November 2008. These losses have wiped out much of the capital of the world banking system. Banks headquartered in nations that have signed the Basel Accords must have so many cents of capital for every dollar of credit extended to consumers and businesses. Thus the massive reduction in bank capital just described has reduced the credit available to businesses and households.[173]

The TED spread – an indicator of credit risk – increased dramatically during September 2008.

When Lehman Brothers and other important ﬁnancial institutions failed in September 2008, the crisis hit a key point.[174] During a two day period in September 2008, $150 billion were withdrawn from USA money funds. The average two day outﬂow had been $5 billion. In eﬀect, the money market was subject to a bank run. The money market had been a key source of credit for banks (CDs) and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms (commercial paper). The TED spread (see graph above), a measure of the risk of interbank lending, quadrupled shortly a er the Lehman failure. This credit freeze brought the global ﬁnancial system to the brink of collapse. The response of the USA Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. The governments of European nations and the USA also raised the capital of their national banking systems by $1.5 trillion, by purchasing newly issued preferred stock in their major banks. [173] However, some economists state that Third-World economies, such as the Brazilian and Chinese ones, will not suﬀer as much as those from more developed countries.[175]

Further information: Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate Various actions have been taken since the crisis became apparent in August 2007. In September 2008, major instability in world ﬁnancial markets increased awareness and a ention to the crisis. Various agencies and regulators, as well as political oﬃcials, began to take additional, more comprehensive steps to handle the crisis. To date, various government agencies have commi ed or spent trillions of dollars in loans, asset purchases, guarantees, and direct spending. For a summary of U.S. government ﬁnancial commitments and investments related to the crisis, see CNN - Bailout Scorecard (h p://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bailout_scorecard/index.html) .

Federal Reserve and central banks
Main article: Federal Reserve responses to the subprime crisis The central bank of the USA, the Federal Reserve, in partnership with central banks around the world, has taken several steps to address the crisis. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke stated in early 2008: ʺBroadly, the Federal Reserveʹs response has followed two tracks: eﬀorts to support

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market liquidity and functioning and the pursuit of our macroeconomic objectives through monetary policy.ʺ[23] The Fed has: Lowered the target for the Federal funds rate from 5.25% to 2%, and the discount rate from 5.75% to 2.25%. This took place in six steps occurring between 18 September 2007 and 30 April 2008;[176][177] In December 2008, the Fed further lowered the federal funds rate target to a range of 0-0.25% (25 basis points).[178] Undertaken, along with other central banks, open market operations to ensure member banks remain liquid. These are eﬀectively short-term loans to member banks collateralized by government securities. Central banks have also lowered the interest rates (called the discount rate in the USA) they charge member banks for short-term loans;[179] Created a variety of lending facilities to enable the Fed to lend directly to banks and non-bank institutions, against speciﬁc types of collateral of varying credit quality. These include the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).[180] In November 2008, the Fed announced a $600 billion program to purchase the MBS of the GSE, to help lower mortgage rates.[181] In March 2009, the FOMC decided to increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency (GSE) mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Commi ee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities during 2009.[182] According to Ben Bernanke, expansion of the Fed balance sheet means the Fed is electronically creating money, necessary ʺ...because our economy is very weak and inﬂation is very low. When the economy begins to recover, that will be the time that we need to unwind those programs, raise interest rates, reduce the money supply, and make sure that we have a recovery that does not involve inﬂation.ʺ[183]

Economic stimulus
Main article: Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 Main article: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 On 13 February 2008, President Bush signed into law a $168 billion economic stimulus package, mainly taking the form of income tax rebate checks mailed directly to taxpayers.[184] Checks were mailed starting the week of 28 April 2008. However, this rebate coincided with an unexpected jump in gasoline and food prices. This coincidence led some to wonder whether the stimulus package would have the intended eﬀect, or whether consumers would simply spend their rebates to cover higher food and fuel prices. On 17 February 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, an $787 billion stimulus package with a broad spectrum of spending and tax cuts.[185]

Bank solvency and capital replenishment
Main article: Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

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Losses on mortgage-backed securities and other assets purchased with borrowed money have dramatically reduced the capital base of ﬁnancial institutions, rendering many either insolvent or less capable of lending. Governments have provided funds to banks. Some banks have taken signiﬁcant steps to acquire additional capital from private sources. The U.S. government passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA or TARP) during October 2008. This law included $700 billion in funding for the ʺTroubled Assets Relief Programʺ (TARP), which was used to lend funds to banks in exchange for dividend-paying preferred stock.[186][187]

Common Equity to Total Assets Ratios for Major USA Banks

Another method of recapitalizing banks is for government and private investors to provide cash in exchange for mortgage-related assets (i.e., ʺtoxicʺ or ʺlegacyʺ assets), improving the quality of bank capital while reducing uncertainty regarding the ﬁnancial position of banks. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced a plan during March 2009 to purchase ʺlegacyʺ or ʺtoxicʺ assets from banks. The Public-Private Partnership Investment Program involves government loans and guarantees to encourage private investors to provide funds to purchase toxic assets from banks.[188] For a summary of U.S. government ﬁnancial commitments and investments related to the crisis, see CNN - Bailout Scorecard (h p://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bailout_scorecard /index.html) . For a summary of TARP funds provided to U.S. banks as of December 2008, see Reuters-TARP Funds (h p://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN1752684920081216) .

Bailouts and failures of ﬁnancial ﬁrms
Further information: List of bankrupt or acquired banks during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008, Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Government intervention during the subprime mortgage crisis, and Bailout Several major ﬁnancial institutions either failed, were bailed-out by governments, or merged (voluntarily or otherwise) during the crisis. While the speciﬁc circumstances varied, in general the decline in the value of mortgage-backed securities held by these companies resulted in either their insolvency, the equivalent of bank runs as investors pulled funds from them, or inability to secure new funding in the credit markets. These ﬁrms had typically borrowed and invested large sums of money relative to their cash or equity capital, meaning they were highly leveraged and vulnerable to unanticipated credit market disruptions.[189]

The ﬁve largest U.S. investment banks, with combined liabilities or debts of $4 trillion, either went bankrupt (Lehman Brothers), were taken over by other companies (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch), or were bailed-out by the U.S. government (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) during 2008.[190] Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac either directly owed or guaranteed nearly $5 trillion in mortgage obligations, with a similarly weak capital base, when they were placed into receivership in September 2008.[191]For scale, this $9 trillion in obligations concentrated in seven highly leveraged institutions can be compared to the $14 trillion size of the U.S. economy (GDP)[192] or to the total national debt of $10 trillion in September 2008.[193] Major depository banks around the world had also used ﬁnancial innovations such as structured investment vehicles to circumvent capital ratio regulations.[194] Notable global failures included
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People queuing outside a Northern Rock bank branch in Birmingham, United Kingdom on September 15, 2007, to withdraw their savings because of the subprime crisis.

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Northern Rock, which was nationalized at an estimated cost of £87 billion ($150 billion).[195]In the U.S., Washington Mutual (WaMu) was seized in September 2008 by the USA Oﬃce of Thri Supervision (OTS).[196] Dozens of U.S. banks received funds as part of the TARP or $700 billion bailout.[197] As a result of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, twenty ﬁve U.S. banks became insolvent and were taken over by the FDIC.[198]. As of August 14, 2009, an additional 77 banks became insolvent.[199] This seven month tally surpasses the 50 banks that were seized in all of 1993, but is still much smaller than the number of failed banking institutions in 1992, 1991, and 1990.[200] The United States has lost over 6 million jobs since the recession began in December of 2007.[201] The FDIC deposit insurance fund, supported by fees on insured banks, fell to $13 billion in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009.[202] That is the lowest total since September, 1993.[203]

Homeowner assistance
Both lenders and borrowers may beneﬁt from avoiding foreclosure, which is a costly and lengthy process. Some lenders have oﬀered troubled borrowers more favorable mortgage terms (i.e., reﬁnancing, loan modiﬁcation or loss mitigation). Borrowers have also been encouraged to contact their lenders to discuss alternatives.[204] The Economist described the issue this way: ʺNo part of the ﬁnancial crisis has received so much a ention, with so li le to show for it, as the tidal wave of home foreclosures sweeping over America. Government programmes have been ineﬀectual, and private eﬀorts not much be er.ʺ Up to 9 million homes may enter foreclosure over the 2009-2011 period, versus one million in a typical year.[205]At roughly U.S. $50,000 per foreclosure according to a 2006 study by the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank, 9 million foreclosures represents $450 billion in losses.[206] A variety of voluntary private and government-administered or supported programs were implemented during 2007-2009 to assist homeowners with case-by-case mortgage assistance, to mitigate the foreclosure crisis engulﬁng the U.S. One example is the Hope Now Alliance, an ongoing collaborative eﬀort between the US Government and private industry to help certain subprime borrowers.[207] In February 2008, the Alliance reported that during the second half of 2007, it had helped 545,000 subprime borrowers with shaky credit, or 7.7% of 7.1 million subprime loans outstanding as of September 2007. A spokesperson for the Alliance acknowledged that much more must be done.[208] During late 2008, major banks and both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac established moratoriums (delays) on foreclosures, to give homeowners time to work towards reﬁnancing.[209][210][211] Critics have argued that the case-by-case loan modiﬁcation method is ineﬀective, with too few homeowners assisted relative to the number of foreclosures and with nearly 40% of those assisted homeowners again becoming delinquent within 8 months.[212][213][214] In December 2008, the U.S. FDIC reported that more than half of mortgages modiﬁed during the ﬁrst half of 2008 were delinquent again, in many cases because payments were not reduced or mortgage debt was not forgiven. This is further evidence that case-by-case loan modiﬁcation is not eﬀective as a policy tool.[215] In February 2009, economists Nouriel Roubini and Mark Zandi recommended an ʺacross the boardʺ (systemic) reduction of mortgage principal balances by as much as 20-30%. Lowering the mortgage balance would help lower monthly payments and also address an estimated 20 million homeowners that may have a ﬁnancial incentive to enter voluntary foreclosure because they are ʺunderwaterʺ (i.e., the mortgage balance is larger than the home value).[216][217] A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston indicated that banks were reluctant to modify loans. Only 3% of seriously delinquent homeowners had their mortgage payments reduced during 2008. In addition, investors who hold MBS and have a say in mortgage modiﬁcations have not been a

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signiﬁcant impediment; the study found no diﬀerence in the rate of assistance whether the loans were controlled by the bank or by investors. Commenting on the study, economists Dean Baker and Paul Willen both advocated providing funds directly to homeowners instead of banks.[218] Homeowners Aﬀordability and Stability Plan Main article: Homeowners Aﬀordability and Stability Plan On 18 February 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a $73 billion program to help up to nine million homeowners avoid foreclosure, which was supplemented by $200 billion in additional funding for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase and more easily reﬁnance mortgages. The plan is funded mostly from the EESAʹs $700 billion ﬁnancial bailout fund. It uses cost sharing and incentives to encourage lenders to reduce homeownerʹs monthly payments to 31 percent of their monthly income. Under the program, a lender would be responsible for reducing monthly payments to no more than 38 percent of a borrower’s income, with government sharing the cost to further cut the rate to 31 percent. The plan also involves forgiving a portion of the borrower’s mortgage balance. Companies that service mortgages will get incentives to modify loans and to help the homeowner stay current.[219][220][221]

Further information: Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate and Regulatory responses to the subprime crisis President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank ﬁnancial cushions or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among others.[222][223][224] A variety of regulatory changes have been proposed by economists, politicians, journalists, and business leaders to minimize the impact of the current crisis and prevent recurrence. However, as of June 2009, many of the proposed solutions have not yet been implemented. These include: Ben Bernanke: Establish resolution procedures for closing troubled ﬁnancial institutions in the shadow banking system, such as investment banks and hedge funds.[225] Joseph Stiglitz: Restrict the leverage that ﬁnancial institutions can assume. Require executive compensation to be more related to long-term performance.[226] Re-instate the separation of commercial (depository) and investment banking established by the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 and repealed in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.[227] Simon Johnson: Break-up institutions that are ʺtoo big to failʺ to limit systemic risk.[228] Paul Krugman: Regulate institutions that ʺact like banks ʺ similarly to banks.[229] Alan Greenspan: Banks should have a stronger capital cushion, with graduated regulatory capital requirements (i.e., capital ratios that increase with bank size), to ʺdiscourage them from becoming too big and to oﬀset their competitive advantage.ʺ[230] Warren Buﬀe : Require minimum down payments for home mortgages of at least 10% and income veriﬁcation.[231] Eric Dinallo: Ensure any ﬁnancial institution has the necessary capital to support its ﬁnancial commitments. Regulate credit derivatives and ensure they are traded on well-capitalized exchanges to limit counterparty risk.[232] Raghuram Rajan: Require ﬁnancial institutions to maintain suﬃcient ʺcontingent capitalʺ (i.e., pay insurance premiums to the government during boom periods, in exchange for payments during a downturn.)[233]
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A. Michael Spence and Gordon Brown: Establish an early-warning system to help detect systemic risk.[234] Niall Ferguson and Jeﬀrey Sachs: Impose haircuts on bondholders and counterparties prior to using taxpayer money in bailouts.[235][236] Nouriel Roubini: Nationalize insolvent banks.[237]Reduce debt levels across the ﬁnancial system through debt for equity swaps. Reduce mortgage balances to assist homeowners, giving the lender a share in any future home appreciation.[238] Paul McCulley advocated ʺcounter-cyclical regulatory policy to help modulate human nature.ʺ He cited the work of economist Hyman Minsky, who believed that human behavior is pro-cyclical, meaning it ampliﬁes the extent of booms and busts. In other words, humans are momentum investors rather than value investors. Counter-cyclical policies would include increasing capital requirements during boom periods and reducing them during busts.[239]

Other responses
Signiﬁcant law enforcement action and litigation is resulting from the crisis. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation was looking into the possibility of fraud by mortgage ﬁnancing companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and insurer American International Group, among others.[240] New York A orney General Andrew Cuomo is suing Long Island based Amerimod, one of the nationʹs largest loan modiﬁcation corporations for fraud, and has issued 14 subpoenas to other similar companies.[241] The FBI also assigned more agents to mortgage-related crimes and its caseload has dramatically increased.[242][243]The FBI began a probe of Countrywide in March 2008 for possible fraudulent lending practices and securities fraud.[244] Over 250 civil lawsuits were ﬁled in federal courts during 2007 related to the subprime crisis. The number of ﬁlings in state courts was not quantiﬁed but is also believed to be signiﬁcant.[245]

Estimates of impact have continued to climb. During April 2008, International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that global losses for ﬁnancial institutions would approach $1 trillion.[246]One year later, the IMF estimated cumulative losses of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions globally would exceed $4 trillion.[247] This is equal to U.S. $20,000 for each of 200,000,000 people. Francis Fukuyama has argued that the crisis represents the end of Reaganism in the ﬁnancial sector, which was characterized by lighter regulation, pared-back government, and lower taxes. Signiﬁcant ﬁnancial sector regulatory changes are expected as a result of the crisis.[248] Fareed Zakaria believes that the crisis may force Americans and their government to live within their means. Further, some of the best minds may be redeployed from ﬁnancial engineering to more valuable business activities, or to science and technology.[249] Roger Altman wrote that ʺthe crash of 2008 has inﬂicted profound damage on [the U.S.] ﬁnancial system, its economy, and its standing in the world; the crisis is an important geopolitical setback...the crisis has coincided with historical forces that were already shi ing the worldʹs focus away from the United States. Over the medium term, the United States will have to operate from a smaller global platform -- while others, especially China, will have a chance to rise faster.ʺ[173] GE CEO Jeﬀrey Immelt has argued that U.S. trade deﬁcits and budget deﬁcits are unsustainable. America must regain its competitiveness through innovative products, training of production workers, and business leadership. He advocates speciﬁc national goals related to energy security or independence, speciﬁc technologies, expansion of the manufacturing job base, and net exporter status.[250]ʺThe world has been reset. Now we must lead an aggressive American renewal to win in the future.ʺ Of critical importance, he said, is the need to focus on technology and manufacturing.

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“Many bought into the idea that America could go from a technology-based, export-oriented powerhouse to a services-led, consumption-based economy — and somehow still expect to prosper,” Jeﬀ said. “That idea was ﬂat wrong.”[251] Economist Paul Krugman wrote in 2009: ʺThe prosperity of a few years ago, such as it was — proﬁts were terriﬁc, wages not so much — depended on a huge bubble in housing, which replaced an earlier huge bubble in stocks. And since the housing bubble isn’t coming back, the spending that sustained the economy in the pre-crisis years isn’t coming back either.ʺ[252] Niall Ferguson stated that excluding the eﬀect of home equity extraction, the U.S. economy grew at a 1% rate during the Bush years.[253] Microso CEO Steve Ballmer has argued that this is an economic reset at a lower level, rather than a recession, meaning that no quick recovery to pre-recession levels can be expected.[254] The U.S. Federal governmentʹs eﬀorts to support the global ﬁnancial system have resulted in signiﬁcant new ﬁnancial commitments, totaling $7 trillion by November, 2008. These commitments can be characterized as investments, loans, and loan guarantees, rather than direct expenditures. In many cases, the government purchased ﬁnancial assets such as commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, or other types of asset-backed paper, to enhance liquidity in frozen markets.[255] As the crisis has progressed, the Fed has expanded the collateral against which it is willing to lend to include higher-risk assets.[256] The Economist wrote: ʺHaving spent a fortune bailing out their banks, Western governments will have to pay a price in terms of higher taxes to meet the interest on that debt. In the case of countries (like Britain and America) that have trade as well as budget deﬁcits, those higher taxes will be needed to meet the claims of foreign creditors. Given the political implications of such austerity, the temptation will be to default by stealth, by le ing their currencies depreciate. Investors are increasingly alive to this danger...ʺ[257] The crisis has cast doubt on the legacy of Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System from 1986 to January 2006. Senator Chris Dodd claimed that Greenspan created the ʺperfect stormʺ.[258]When asked to comment on the crisis, Greenspan spoke as follows:[129]
The current credit crisis will come to an end when the overhang of inventories of newly built homes is largely liquidated, and home price deﬂation comes to an end. That will stabilize the now-uncertain value of the home equity that acts as a buﬀer for all home mortgages, but most importantly for those held as collateral for residential mortgage-backed securities. Very large losses will, no doubt, be taken as a consequence of the crisis. But a er a period of protracted adjustment, the U.S. economy, and the world economy more generally, will be able to get back to business.

Avarice Other housing bubbles American Casino, documentary ﬁlm on the crisis Indian property bubble American International Group Irish property bubble Bear Stearns subprime mortgage hedge fund Japanese asset price bubble crisis Spanish property bubble Collateralized debt obligation subprime United Kingdom housing bubble meltdown Community Reinvestment Act Diamond-Dybvig model Foreclosure crisis Global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 Financial crisis of 2007–2009

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January 2008 stock market volatility Late 2000s recession List of entities involved in 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crises Long-term Capital Management Mortgage backed security Nationalisation of Northern Rock Real estate bubble Panic of 1837 Panic of 1907 Predatory lending Savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s. Securitization Shadow banking system Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate Toxic security Troubled Assets Relief Program United States housing bubble

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238. ^ Risks to Global Growth (h p://www.forbes.com/2009/05/27/recession-depression-global-economy-growthopinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.htmlRoubini-Ten) 239. ^ McCulley PIMCO-The Shadow Banking System and Hyman Minskyʹs Journey-May 2009 (h p://media.pimcoglobal.com/pdfs/pdf/GCB%20Focus%20May%2009.pdf?WT.cg_n=PIMCOUS&WT.ti=GCB%20Focus%20May%2009.pdf) 240. ^ FBI Investigating Potential Fraud by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman, AIG (h p://www.foxnews.com/story /0,2933,426783,00.html) , Associated Press, September 23, 2008. 241. ^ ʺCuomo: Iʹll Sue Foreclosure-Relief Scam Artists (h p://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives /2009/06/cuomo_ill_sue_f.php) ʺ. villagevoice.com. 2009-06-09. h p://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared /archives/2009/06/cuomo_ill_sue_f.php. Retrieved 2009-06-09. 242. ^ ʺFBI Cracks Down On Mortgage Fraud (h p://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/06/19/national /main4194649.shtml) ʺ. CBS news. 2008-06-19. h p://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/06/19/national /main4194649.shtml. 243. ^ ʺFBI — Mortgage Fraud Takedown - Press Room - Headline Archives 06-19-08 (h p://www. i.gov/page2 /june08/malicious_mortgage061908.html) ʺ. Fbi.gov. h p://www. i.gov/page2/june08 /malicious_mortgage061908.html. Retrieved 2008-10-26. 244. ^ ʺFBI probes Countrywide for possible fraud (h p://money.cnn.com/2008/03/08/news/companies /countrywide_FBI/?postversion=2008031003) ʺ. Money.cnn.com. h p://money.cnn.com/2008/03/08/news /companies/countrywide_FBI/?postversion=2008031003. Retrieved 2009-02-27. 245. ^ ʺSubprime lawsuits on pace to top S&L cases - The Boston Globe (h p://www.boston.com/business/articles /2008/02/15/subprime_lawsuits_on_pace_to_top_sl_cases/) ʺ. 2008. h p://www.boston.com/business/articles /2008/02/15/subprime_lawsuits_on_pace_to_top_sl_cases/. Retrieved 2008-05-19. 246. ^ ʺIMF says worldwide losses stemming from the US subprime mortgage crisis could run to $945 billion (h p://www.ﬁnfacts.com/irishﬁnancenews/article_1013133.shtml) ʺ. h p://www.ﬁnfacts.com/irishﬁnancenews /article_1013133.shtml. 247. ^ IMF Summary (h p://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2009/01/pdf/summary.pdf) 248. ^ ʺFukuyama: The End of America Inc | Newsweek Business | Newsweek.com (h p://www.newsweek.com /id/162401) ʺ. Newsweek.com. h p://www.newsweek.com/id/162401. Retrieved 2008-10-24. 249. ^ ʺZakaria: A More Disciplined America | Newsweek Business | Newsweek.com (h p://www.newsweek.com /id/163449/page/1) ʺ. Newsweek.com. h p://www.newsweek.com/id/163449/page/1. Retrieved 2008-10-24. 250. ^ Charlie Rose - Immelt Interview (h p://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10412) 251. ^ Immelt Comments at Detroit Econ Club (h p://www.gereports.com/american-renewal-immelt-addressesdetroit-econ-club/) 252. ^ Krugman-Life Without Bubbles (h p://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/opinion/22krugman.html) 253. ^ Ferguson - Interview (h p://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090223.wferguson0223 /BNStory/crashandrecovery/home?pageRequested=all&print=true) 254. ^ Ballmer-Reset, Not Recession (h p://www.realclearmarkets.com/video/2009/06 /30/ballmer_economy_has_reset.html) 255. ^ By David Goldman, CNNMoney.com staﬀ writer. ʺCNN-Bailout Summary (h p://money.cnn.com/2008/11 /26/news/economy/where_bailout_stands/index.htm?postversion=2008112813) ʺ. Money.cnn.com. h p://money.cnn.com/2008/11/26/news/economy/where_bailout_stands/index.htm?postversion=2008112813. Retrieved 2009-02-27. 256. ^ ʺBloomberg Article (h p://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=akZVTnBs66uY& refer=home) ʺ. h p://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=akZVTnBs66uY&refer=home. 257. ^ Economist-A New Global System is Coming Into Existence (h p://www.economist.com/ﬁnance /displayStory.cfm?story_id=13653915&source=hptextfeature) 258. ^ ʺFT.com / Companies / US & Canada - Fed rapped over subprime loans (h p://www. .com/cms/s/66d98aead8e4-11db-a759-000b5df10621,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=h p%3A%2F %2Fwww. .com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F66d98aea-d8e4-11db-a759-000b5df10621.html&_i_referer=h p%3A%2F %2F alphaville. .com%2Fblog%2F2007%2F03%2F23%2F3374%2Ffed-targe ed-in-political-backlashover-subprime-loans%2F) ʺ. 2008. h p://www. .com/cms/s/66d98aea-d8e4-11dba759-000b5df10621,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=h p%3A%2F %2Fwww. .com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F66d98aea-d8e4-11db-a759-000b5df10621.html&_i_referer=h p%3A%2F %2F alphaville. .com%2Fblog%2F2007%2F03%2F23%2F3374%2Ffed-targe ed-in-political-backlashover-subprime-loans%2F. Retrieved 2008-05-19.

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Subprime mortgage crisis - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Commi ee for a Responsible Federal Budget ʺStimulus Watch, (h p://www.usbudgetwatch.org /stimulus) ʺ (Updated Regularly). Blackburn, Robin (2008) ʺThe Subprime Mortgage Crisis, (h p://www.newle review.org /?view=2715) ʺ New Le Review 50 (March–April). Demyanyk, Yuliya (FRB St. Louis), and O o Van Hemert (NYU Stern School) (2008) ʺUnderstanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, (h p://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396) ʺ Working paper circulated by the Social Science Research Network. DiMartino, D., and Duca, J. V. (2007) ʺThe Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, (h p://dallasfed.org/research/ecle /2007/el0711.pdf) ʺ Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Le er 2(11). Ely, Bert (2009) “Bad Rules Produce Bad Outcomes: Underlying Public-Policy Causes of the U.S. Financial Crisis, (h p://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n1/cj29n1-8.pdf) ” Cato Journal 29(1). Gold, Gerry, and Feldman, Paul (2007) A House of Cards - From fantasy ﬁnance to global crash. London, Lupus Books. ISBN 9780952345435 Michael Lewis, ʺThe End, (h p://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio /2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom) ʺ Portfolio Magazine (November 11, 2008). Liebowitz, Stan (2009) ʺAnatomy of a Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage Meltdown (h p://www.independent.org/pdf/policy_reports/2008-10-03-trainwreck.pdf) ʺ in Randall Holcombe and B. W. Powell, eds., Housing America: Building out of a Crisis (h p://www.independent.org/store/book_detail.asp?bookID=76) . Oakland CA: The Independent Institute. Muolo, Paul, and Padilla, Ma hew (2008). Chain of Blame: How Wall Street Caused the Mortgage and Credit Crisis. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. ISBN 978-0-470-29277-8. Woods, Thomas E. (2009) Meltdown: A Free-Market Look at Why the Stock Market Collapsed, the Economy Tanked, and Government Bailouts Will Make Things Worse / Washington DC: Regnery Publishing ISBN 1596985879 Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoﬀ (2008) ʺIs the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Diﬀerent? An International Historical Comparison, (h p://www.economics.harvard.edu /faculty/rogoﬀ/ﬁles/Is_The_US_Subprime_Crisis_So_Diﬀerent.pdf) ʺ Harvard University working paper. Archaya and Richardson. Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System NYU Stern ProjectExecutive Summaries of 18 Crisis-Related Papers (h p://media.wiley.com/assets/1706/87 /NYU_Stern_Executive_Summaries.pdf) Dominique Doise, Subprime: Price of infringments/Subprime : le prix des transgressions, Revue de droit des aﬀaires internationales (RDAI) / International Business Law Journal (IBLJ), N° 4, 2008 [5] (h p://www.alerionavocats.com/fr/expertise/publications/subprime-le-prixdes-transgressions-price-of-infringements/)

PBS Frontline - Inside the Meltdown (h p://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/) ʺGovernment warned of mortgage meltdown Regulators ignored warnings about risky mortgages, delayed regulations on the industry (h p://money.cnn.com/2008/12/01/news /ignored_warnings.ap/index.htm) ʺ. CNN. December 1 2008. h p://money.cnn.com/2008/12 /01/news/ignored_warnings.ap/index.htm.

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ʺThe US sub-prime crisis in graphics (h p://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7073131.stm) ʺ. BBC. 21 November 2007. h p://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7073131.stm. CNN Scorecard of Bailout Funds at CNN Bailout Allocations & Payments (h p://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bailout_scorecard/index.html) Barth, Li, Lu, Phumiwasana and Yago. 2009. The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit Markets: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Market Meltdown. Amazon (h p://www.amazon.com/Rise-Fall-Mortgage-Credit-Markets/dp/0470477245 /ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244840648&sr=8-1) Financial Times - In depth: Subprime fall-out (h p://www. .com/indepth/subprime) The Crisis of Credit Visualized - Infographic by Jonathan Jarvis (h p://vimeo.com/3261363) Retrieved from ʺh p://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisisʺ Categories: Subprime mortgage crisis | Real estate crises Hidden categories: All articles with dead external links | Articles with dead external links from October 2008 | Portal:Business and economics/Total This page was last modiﬁed on 13 September 2009 at 12:29. Text is available under the Creative Commons A ribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. See Terms of Use for details. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-proﬁt organization.

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