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The Kurdish Nationalist Movement and External Influences

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The Kurdish Nationalist Movement and External Influences

by Donald Bruce Disney, Jr. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of


from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December, 1980

ABSTRACT The Kurdish National Movement and External Influences is a historic examination of the Kurds, the Kurdish national movement, and the effects of external actors on the movement. It discusses who the Kurds are, where they are located and how many of them there are. The primary topics covered are Kurdish revolts, leaders, Kurdish political evolution, and the roles which local and non-Middle-Eastern countries have played in Kurdish national development. The primary countries discussed, as actors, are: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Kurdish links to other groups, such as the Armenians, and the Palestine Liberation Organization are also described. Finally an assessment as to the effects of external actors on Kurdish Nationalism is made and a prognosis for further Kurdish prospects is included.


I. THE KURDS TO 1918 12 A. EARLY HISTORY 12 B. THE KURDS AND ISLAMIC EMPIRES TO 1880 13 C. THE RISE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM 17 D. CONCLUSIONS 24 FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION I 25 II. KURDISH REVOLTS: 1918-1944 28 A. TRIBAL-FEUDAL REVOLTS 29 1. Sheikh Mahmud of Barzinjah 29 2. Dilo Kurds in Iraq - 1920 30 3. Seyyid Abdullah, July 1925 4. Nisibin, Turkey - 1928 31 B. RELIGIO-POLITICAL REVOLTS 33 1. Sheikh Said of Palu (Genj) 33 2. Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan 36 C. TRIBAL-NATIONALIST REVOLTS 37 1. Simko in Persia 37 2. Sheikh Mahmud Revisited 38 3. Jelali and Haideranlu in Turkey 1927 40 4. Bazan of Zibar 41 D. NATIONALIST REVOLTS 42 1. Ishan Nuri in Turkey - 1930 42 2. Sayyid Riza in Turkey, 1937 44 5 31

3. Revolts in Iraq 1941-1943 45 4. Revolt in Iran 1941-1942 46 E. CONCLUSIONS 47 FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION II : 49 III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1918-1944 57

A. POLITICAL MANEUVERS PRECEDING THE TREATY OF SEVRES 57 B. THE TREATY OF SEVRES TO THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE 60 C. POST-LAUSANNE EUROPEAN ACTIONS TO 1944 66 1. The Mosul Question 67 2. The Tripartite Treaty: Iraq, Turkey, and United Kingdom - 5 June 1926 69 3. World War II Efforts 70 D. REGIONAL ACTORS: EFFORTS AT CONTROL 73 E. KURDISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 77 1. The Khoybun 77 2. The Pan-Iranian League 79 3. The Hewa Party 79 4. The Shursh Group 80 5. The Komala 81 F. CONCLUSIONS 82 FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION III 84 IV. THE KURDS FROM 1945-1958 92 A. THE MAHABAD REPUBLIC 92 1. Political Prelude 92 2. Mullah Mustafa's 1945 Revolt 96 3. Formation of the Republic 97 6

4. Demise of the Mahabad Republic 99 5. Assessment and Regional Shocks 103 B. COLD WAR PROPAGANDA EFFORTS 105 C. KURDISH POST-MAHABAD POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 107 1. Formation of the UDPK 107

2. Iranian and Turkish Kurds 108 3. Regional Power Actions 109 D. CONCLUSIONS 111 FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION IV 114 V. THE KURDS IN IRAQ 1958-1980 121 A. THE GATHERING STORM: 14 July 1958 September 1961 122 1. Initial Cooperation 122 2. The Barzanis Return to the North 125 3. The Road to Revolt 127 B. THE KURDISH REVOLT September 1961 April 1975 129 1. The First Phase - September 1961 29 June 1966 129 2. The Ceasefire 142 3. The Second Phase March 1969-March 1974 144 4. The Third Phase March 1974-April 1975 150 C. DEVELOPMENTS FROM APRIL 1975-1980 153 1. Kurdish Political Developments 153 2. Iraqi Ba'th Policies 156 D. CONCLUSIONS 159 FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION V 163

VI. CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS 181 A. CONCLUSIONS 181 1. Kurdish Nationalism 181 2. The Impact of External Influences 186 3. The Hypothesis 193 B. PROGNOSIS 194 FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION VI 199


INTRODUCTION The Kurds, as a tribally organized nation, have existed in the Middle East since ancient times. Centered predominantly in the area of modern Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, with smaller groups in Syria and the USSR, they have interacted with the various migratory flows and imperial regimes throughout the region's history. With the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century, the first Kurdish modern revolt occurred under the leadership of Sheikh Ubeidullah. This was followed by the development of early Kurdish political groups and other expressions of nationalism in the early 20th century. After World War I, Kurdish nationalist aspirations were encouraged by the Treaty of Sevres but were to be deflated by the actions of Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The 1920' s and 1930' s saw a multiplicity of Kurdish revolts and the growth of an urbanized political intelligentsia as the Kurds interacted with the new assertive nation-states among which they were divided. At the end of World War II, the Soviet-sponsored Mahabad Republic came into being. It was ended after the Soviet withdrawal from, and Iranian occupation of the area in 1946.

During the post-World War II period the Kurds were fairly quiescent due to efforts of regional powers to control them. They were subjected, however, to a propaganda campaign between the United States and the Soviet Union through most of the period. In 1961 Mulla Mustafa Barzani rose in revolt in Iraq and was not fully defeated until 1975. The period from 1975 to 1980 saw a splintering of Kurdish political parties, suppression of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, and a renewed Kurdish revolt in Iran after the fall of the Shah. Throughout most of Kurdish modern history, external influences ranged from overt aid to the Kurds in revolt, to use of the Kurds against a neighboring country, to cooperative regional efforts to control Kurdish movements. While the Kurdish tribal element has remained strong and has provided most of the insurgents in the field, an extensive political organization has also developed to represent the movement.

It has consisted of parties within each country which maintained links with each other and which also maintained links to Kurdish political groups abroad. These overseas groups also have established ties to extraregional actors to obtain support for the Kurdish movement . The hypothesis examined in this thesis was: The importance of Kurdish nationalism and its vitality are dependent upon the greater conflict of which it is a part; to wit: the status of governments in, and disputes between the regional actors as well as the power roles of external actors in the 10

Northern Tier and Persian Gulf region. The methodology employed was a historic examination of Kurdish national revolts coupled with a study of the systemic interactions between Kurdish tribalism, Kurdish political parties, aspects of modernization, and the roles of external actors . Primary external actors considered were Turkey, Iran, Iraq, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel.


I. THE KURDS TO 1913 A. EARLY HISTORY As is the case of many of the peoples of the Middle East, the origins of the Kurds are shrouded by the mists of history. Their language has been analyzed and determined to be of the New Iranian branch of the Indo-European family which indicated strong links to the Iranian languages. Kurds have claimed that the name translated as "lion" and they trace their origins to the kingdoms of Guti or Gutium which existed in the third millenium B.C., under the Assyrians. Other sources have claimed that they were descended from the Medes who were the military vanguard of the Achaenemid dynasty , while in a Sumerian inscription of 2000 B.C., a country known as Kardaka or Qar-da was mentioned. In 400-401 B.C. Xenophon mentioned the Kardukai, a mountain people who attacked his forces during their march towards the sea. After their submission to the Arab advance of Islam in the seventh century A.D., this racially homogeneous group of tribes received the name "Kurds" from Arab historians. While they accepted Islam and were of Aryan stock, the Kurds continued to fight with both Aryan and Semitic groups who encroached on their territory. They were jealous of their autonomy and resisted caliphal authority. This resistance culminated in the establishment of two autonomous kingdoms, Shahrizor and Diarbekr, in the eleventh century A.D.


Much of this early history, however, is overshadowed by the exploits of Salah-al-Din Ayyubi (Saladin) , a Kurd from the mountains of. Ravad, who became a famous legendary hero to the Kurds. In 1171 he attacked and destroyed the Egyptian Fatimid dynasty; restoring it to the Abbasid caliphate, and in 1187 he defeated the armies of the local crusaders of the kingdom of Jerusalem at the battle of Hittin. The deeds of Saladin were important in that they reinforced one of the basic tenents of Kurdish nationalism; that of a long-standing tradition of martial prowess. Kurdistan, which today encompasses parts of eastern Turkey, northeastern Syria, northeastern Iraq, northwestern Iran, and a small contiguous portion of the southeastern Soviet Union, was destined to become a buffer region during the periods of the Ottoman and Persian empires. B. THE KURDS AND ISLAMIC EMPIRES TO 188 The various Turkic and Mongol migrations wwere deleterious to the Kurds, but because of the unattractive nature of the area in which they lived, they were not severaly troubled as long as the tribal chieftans retained their own authority and could retain direct control over their tribal areas. If these various groups of outsiders were of the Sunni sect of Islam, and did not directly interfere with tribal authority, they were normally tolerated. Alliances were made between the Kurdish tribes and Mongols, Turks, and Persians on several occasions. These alliances, in the eyes of the Kurdish tribal leaders, were more for aggrandizement of the tribe when opportunities were presented, than for any wide13

spread belief or support of the goals of the other partners. Since they were located at the edges of the empires, far from the seats of authority in Persia or Asia Minor, the Kurdish chiefs were well able to take advantage of the lack of centralization and the lack of communication, to reinforce their own authority. The bulk of the Kurds, due to racial and cultural factors, had considered themselves to be a part of the Persian nation. However, with Safavid Shah Ismail's forced conversion of Persia to the Shi ' ite sect of Islam in 1501, the loyalties of the majority of the Kurds shifted to the seat of Sunni power in Constantinople; The Ottoman empire. During the ensuing wars of territorial conquest and religion between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid dynasty of Persia, parts of Kurdistan changed hands on numerous occasions. Major campaigns were fought from 1524-1576, and 1623-1642. 9 Several key factors emerged from these wars. First, the frontier between Persia and the Ottoman empire was agreed upon in the Treaty of Erzerum in 1639. This frontier was roughly as it is today and represented the first formal division of Kurdistan. Second, by their division between two empires, the Kurds became troublesome minority groups to the central authori-

ties. Third, in Persia, another complicating minority factor was added by the Sunni faith of the Kurds; not only were they tribally different from the Persians, but their sect was opposed to the official Shia sect in Persia. Fourth, many of the tribes maintained cross-border loyalties (and hostilities) with other 14

Kurdish tribes which were of concern to the central governments. Lastly, the constant wooing of the Kurds by the Ottomans and Safavids during the wars, made the Kurds realize their political importance and set a pattern for future Kurdish behavior. When the Turkish or the Iranian governments tried to impose upon them taxes or military service to which they were unwilling to submit, or encroached on what they considered to be their rights, they revolted. If their revolt was successful, they tried to make the best bargain from their momentary success; if not, they crossed the unguarded border into a neighboring state and took shelter with the Kurdish tribes living in that country, remaining there until more auspicious times. Subsequent to the Treaty of Erzerum, tribalism and feudalism remained predominant in the organization of the Kurds. Also at about this time the role of the Sufi or Dervish Sheikhs and Sayyids as leaders became enlarged. The Sufi orders had developed originally in the 12th century from a desire of individuals to personalize their faith and they gained many adherents among the Kurds. With more support, Sufi Sheikhs gained in importance and were able to organize their groups along tribal lines. Of these groups, the Naqsh bendis, Qaderis and Barzanis were probably the best known among Kurds, and added a more distinctive religious element to Kurdish primordialism (and later nationalism) than had been provided by Islam. The effects of the Sufi orders on the Kurds have been multivaried: a demonstration of faith, a proof of the rightness of faith and an ability to sustain no pain or suffering, a religious power passed from Sheikh to Sheikh in defiance of orthodox Islam and a mechanism to maintain the identity of the Kurds as a distinct culture group. 15

During the eighteenth century, the Kurds were embroiled again in several conflicts between Persia and the Ottomans, and they also fought on both sides in Persia during the Afghan invasion in the early 1700 's. During all of these conflicts a sense of tribal loyalty and aspirations appeared to predominate over other issues of loyalty to religion or empire. At the very end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth, a new factor entered into the existence of the Kurds. This was the entrance of the Russian empire in the Middle East. Both Persia (1804-1813) and the Ottoman empire (1805-1812) fought protracted wars with the Russians in which operations were sporadically conducted in Kurdistan. Sultan Mahmud II of the

Ottoman empire, partially as a result of his defeats at the hands of the Russians, embarked on reform policies in the early nineteenth century. Portions of these reforms were aimed at increasing control over outlying areas and in restricting the powers of the tribal chiefs and were not appreciated by the Kurdish Derebeys. In 1832, Kurdish tribes, led by Badr Khan, Sa'id Bey, Isma'il Bey and Mohammed Pasha revolted and overran large parts of eastern Turkey. Thanks to the efforts of Rashid Pasha and Osman Pasha, who were loyal to the Sultan, and due to little cooperation between the still tribally oriented Kurdish chiefs, these rebellions were controlled and Kurdistan was returned to the authority of the Sultan in 1836. The influence of the Russians was again felt in the RussoTurkish war of 1853-55. This was the first attempt by the Russians to appeal to the Kurds and gain their support. The Kurds were promised a limited autonomy and a Kurdish regiment was organized under Russian officers. Again in 1877, when the Turks and Russians were at war, the sons of Badr Khan revolted and were only defeated by the Ottomans after hostilities had been concluded with the Russians. The key point in these revolts was that there did not appear to be any sense of overall Kurdish nationalism involved, the Khans were more interested in autonomy for themselves in their own districts than some form of a united, independent Kurdistan. As was mentioned by Robert F. Zeidner: The failure of the Kurdish tribes to establish any form of coherent national union during this era of semiautonomy is indicative of disruptive tendencies inherent in their tribal structure. Whereas a number of loose confederations of tribes have waxed and waned throughout Kurdish history, the loyalties of the individual nomad never transcended the limits of the tribe. " It is felt, however, that further Russian the Kurds during the Russo-Turkish war of heightened the idea of a Kurdish national enced Sheikh Ubeidullah in his actions of C. THE RISE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM Boyd C. Shafer proposed a definition of nationalism in which the following elements were necessary: a defined unit of territory; common culture characteristics such as language customs, traditions, and manners; belief in a common history and a common origin; pride in the achievements of the nation and sorrow in its tragedies; disregard for other groups; love or esteem for fellow 17 overtures toward 1876-78 might have autonomy and influ1880.

nationals; devotion to the national entity; common dominant socioeconomic institutions; a common independent government or the desire for one; and a hope for a great and glorious future. Prior to the 1880 's, the Kurds had demonstrated that they were affected by at least the first five of these elements of nation-

alism. Developements in the last half of the nineteenth century would tend to further reinforce these and would also foster in some Kurds a growing awareness of and need for a devotion to the national entity, a desire for a common independent government, and a hope for the future. While it was true that most Kurds still remained tribally oriented, and that much information of their origins was obscured or arguable, they did believe in a common origin. As Richard Cottam has argued, the important point was that accuracy about historical matters was not as crucial as their acceptance by the Kurds . From 1880 until 1918, several major events occurred which gave impetus to a desire for Kurdish nationalism. These were, the rebellion led by Sheikh Ubeidullah in 1880, the foundation of a Kurdish newspaper in the 1890' s, the Young Turk movement and the constitutional movement in Turkey in 1908, the founding of a Kurdish political club in Constantinople in 1908, the Hamidye Kurdish regiments of Sulton Abdul Hamid II, and the actions of Kurdish forces in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and World War I. Sheikh Ubeidullah, who in 1878 had written a letter to the British insisting that the Kurdish nation was a people apart, was a Kurdish leader in the Shamdinan region of Turkey. In 1880, 18

as a reprisal for alleged Persian cruelties against the tribes there, he allied with Hamza Agha of the Mangur (Persian Kurdish) tribe and led some 20,000 Kurdish tribal cavalry into the Lake Reziah (formerly Lake Urmiah) region of Persia. This was the first instance in modern times of Kurdish cross-border support for members of the same nationality. There is strong evidence that Ubeidullah was religiously motivated, in that he intended to annex this portion of Kurdish Persia and form an autonomous Kurdistan under nominal Ottoman (Sunni) suzerainty. In this action, Ubeidullah was also given some aid by the Ottoman government against Persia. Although Ubeidullah delayed in his final attack and his tribally organized forces fell apart, this invasion did appear, at least in his mind, to be a genuinely Kurdish nationalist action. With a subsequent agreement by the regional actors, Persia and the Ottomans, to resolve regional disputes in 1881, Ubeidullah was forced to submit to the Sultan and was exiled to Mecca, where he died in 1883. It is interesting to note that this rebellion also attracted the interest of the Russians who still considered the Kurds as a potentially useful force against their Ottoman and Persian neightbors. In 1889, a number of Kurdish chiefs including Jafar Agha, Abdul Razzaq (of the Badr Khan family) , and Sayyid Taha (grandson of Ubeidullah) , were invited to visit Russia by Nicholas II, where they received gifts and encouragement. Another outcome of the rebellion was that the Ottomans developed a new tribal and Kurdish policy. Numerous Kurds were 19

recruited into Sultan Abdul Hamid II's Hamidye regiments. These regiments were utilized both to oppress the Christian Armenian and Assyrian minorities of the Ottoman empire and to police the Kurdish areas. While the Ottomans obviously used these forces in an attempt to curb Kurdish aspirations and to reassert Ottoman authority, their use in Kurdish areas set a precedent for future Kurdish demands for their own police units and authorities within Kurdistan. During this period, the appeal of nationalism was making itself felt throughout the Ottoman Empire . While educated Ottoman elites were forming the bases of their later Pan-Ottoman and PanTuranist ideologies, the minorities of the empire were not idle. In 1892, members of the Kurdish Badr Khan family began the publication of the newspaper Kurdistan which had a circulation as widespread as Cairo and London. The publication of this paper was in response to the tenent of nationalism in which preservation of the language is believed to be a key factor. Some students of nationalism have opined that of all the factors, language is the most important. In addition, a precedent to Kurdistan already existed in the patriotic poems of Hajji Qadir of Koi who had been active approximately fifty years prior to its publication. Other literary efforts which were undertaken to spread the use of the Kurdish language were the publication of books on Kurdish folk literature; the memorization of poems of the tenth century Kurd, Eli Termuki; the spread of the folk tales of seventeenth century Ahmed Khane; and the romantic-nostalgic history of the Kurds by Cheref Oudini (Sharraf eddin) , known as the Cheref Nameh . 20

The movement of the Young Turks to gain power in the Ottoman Empire also drew support from Kurdish nationalist leaders who were hopeful of receiving more autonomy under a constitutional regime. They had initially been encouraged in this by the ideas of Ottoman Prince Sabah al-Din, who in 1899 had put forth an idea which would have turned the empire into a nationalist federation in which all the minorities would achieve additional rights. According to Sureya Badr Kahn, a primary Kurdish nationalist in 1980: "at a congress in Paris in 1907 the Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, and Macedonians agreed to make common cause with the Young Turks to overthrow the Hamidian tyranny .. .the 1908 uprising was a result of this pact." As a result of the initial hurriet (freedom) of the Young Turk regime in 1908, many of the minorities of the empire were able to form and participate in new political organizations. Among these for the Kurds were the Kurdi Taawin Jamiyyati (Kurdish cooperation society) , and the student group Hewa (hope) in Constantinople. These were the first Kurdish political clubs and were founded by Amin Ali Badr Khan and General Sharif Pasha of Suleimaniyah. 33 The role of both the officers and the students were important in these clubs as they furnished the base of an educated Kurdish elite for the Kurdish nationalist movement. During this constitutional period Kurdish representatives also gained political experience in the Ottoman parliament which further

widened the base of the Kurdish nationalist elite. Despite the existence of a cosmopolitan Kurdish elite, in fact, probably the majority of Kurds did not support these 21

nationalist aspirations. Many Kurdish sheiks and tribal leaders saw a threat to their own local authority by a rising nationalist group and also viewed the Young Turks and their adherents as godless and revolutionary. 34 The Young Turks as well, once having achieved power, were not eager to preside over the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. While their espoused policies of PanOttomanism, and later, Turkif ication , were to alienate minorities in the future, they still maintained sufficient authority over the Kurds to use them against the Persians in 1913, and to fight the Christians in the Balkan Wars. Even during the Balkan Wars, however, there was evidence of unrest among Kurdish units due to lack of pay and also due to Young Turk mistreatment of Kurdish leaders in 1909. 36 On the eve of World War I then, Kurdish nationalism was nascent but the bulk of the Kurds still owed their primary loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire. Despite previous Russian efforts to win Kurdish support, efforts which were continued during the early stages of World War I, the fact that Russia was a major Christian power, an enemy of the Sultan, and a supporter of the Christian Assyrians and Armenians, meant that the Kurds by and large remained loyal to the Sulton throughout the war and answered the 1914 call to Jihad . The Kurds had long been antagonistic to the Assyrians and Armenians and had been used previously by the Ottomans to suppress those minorities. In fact, from 1894-1896 Kurds had massacred between ten and twenty-five percent of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. 37 The Armenians themselves were ready for revenge and between 1915 22

and 1918, with Russian support, killed approximately 600,000 Kurds in the Eastern Vilayets of Turkey. The war itself, in addition to depopulating vast areas of eastern Turkey, saw the use of 30 Kurdish irregular cavalry units on the Turkish Eastern Front, and the beginning of a fierce hatred of the Kurds for the Russians. 39 Although Persia did not declare war, Russians in north Persia supported Christian elements there as well and fostered a resultant cross-border cooperation between Ottoman and Persian Kurds. One result of this cooperation was the murder of Assyrian Patriarch Mar Shimun, the leader of some 5000 Russian supported Assyrian riflemen, by the Persian Kurdish leader Ismail Agha (Simko) in late 1917. 40 Assyrian counter-actions, aimed at revenge for this action, were defeated by the Kurds who were aided by the Turkish Army.

The outcome of World War I saw the Kurds well-armed (from retreating Russian forces eager to join the revolution) , trained militarily, and encouraged by United States' President Wilson's point 12 of January 1918. This point stipulated that the nonTurkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be "assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." 41 Also, in the last stages of the war, exiled Kurdish nationalist leaders in Cairo, Beirut, and Paris were bargaining for Allied support of their claims and founded the Kurdistan League for the advancement of Kurdish independence. One of the League's leaders, Sheikh Sharif Pasha obtained a hearing at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918 to propagate claims for Kurdish autonomy. 42 23

D. CONCLUSIONS Although much of Kurdish early history was dominated by factional disputes, rivalry between empires, and much conflict, the Kurds through 1918 survived as a distinct, although tribally oriented people, with a common language, heritage, religion, and territory. Although they were formally divided in 1639, several instances of cross-border actions have been demonstrated which indicate some sense of loyalty to the greater whole. With the rise of nationalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Kurds were influenced by modern education and political awareness as evidenced by their participation in the various political clubs of the Young Turk period. Although they remained loyal primarily to the SultanCaliph during World War I, this loyalty can be viewed essentially as of a religious, anti-Christian nature and not to the idea of Pan-Ottomanism. The tradition of tribal independence from a far removed central authority, and the existence of a vocal nationalist elite at the end of World War I allowed the Kurdish nation, such as it was, to have some impact on the peace process and to bargain for promises of the autonomy which it had sought. At this early stage several other patterns were established: efforts at assimilation and control by the Ottoman and Persians, cross-border united actions between Persian and Ottoman Kurds, efforts by the regional powers (Persia and the Ottoman Empire) to contain the Kurds, and the actions of at least one external actor, Russia, to use the Kurds against their Ottoman and Persian suzerains. 24

FOOTNOTES: SECTION I. Jere L. Bacharach, A Near East Studies Handbook (2nd ed., Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 136. 2 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive For Self -Determina-

tion," The Middle East Journal , 21 No. 3 (Spring, 1966), 280. 3 Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran , (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 66. 4 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) , p. 3. 5 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self -Determination," 280. 6 Phillip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs , (10th ed., New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 645. 7 Sidney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 126. 8 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 14. 9 ibid . , p. 16 . 10 ibid. 11 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 4. 12 Andre Singer, "The Dervishes of Kurdistan," Asian Affairs , 61 No. 2 (June, 1974), 179. This article covers in depth the workings of the Qaderi order and its effect on village life in Iran. 13 ibid. , 182. 14 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 20. 15. ibid. , p. 21.


16. ibid. , p. 23. 17. ibid . 18. Robert F. Zeidner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq Government," Middle Eastern Affairs , x No. 1 (Jan., 19 59), 25.

19 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 24. 20 Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., ed., Nationalism and International Progress , (San Francisco, Co.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1960), p. 5 . 21 Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran , p. 65. 22 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , p. 6. 23 Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt : 1961-1970, (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoestring Press, Inc. , 1973) , p. 16. 24 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , p. 7. 25 ibid . 26 Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 , p. 17. 27 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," The Middle East Journal , II No. 1 (Winter, 1957), 55. 28 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nationalism and Communism , (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 7. 29 C. J. Edmonds, The Kurds of Iraq," p. 56. 30 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self -Determination," 281. 31 Sidney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History , p. 344. 32 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self -Determination," 282. 33 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," 56. 26

34 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , p. 5. 35 ibid. 36 In U.S. State Department dispatch 361 of December 11, 1912, a report from Aleppo mentioned a threat to the city by 15,000 Kurdish cavalry who were intent on sacking the city as revenge for the assasination of a Kurdish chief by the Committee for Union and Progress in 1909. The American Embassy in Constantinople reported by telegram of January 10, 1913 that 15,000 Kurds had returned from the front and were threatening the government over pay (they had received no booty). Lawrence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924 , (Baltimore, Md. : Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 25. 37 Guilford A. Dudley, A History of Eastern Civilizations , (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), p. 419.

38 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 26. 39 The Calvary divisions were organized from several tribes: 1st Division (Hinis) Zerikanli, Jeberanli, Zeriki, Hayranli, Yusufyanli, Jemedanli, Kaskalli, Shadilli.; 2nd Division (Eleskirt) Jemadanli, Zeylanli, Sepiki, Adamanli , Pashmanli, Karapapakli, Sarachli, Jelali.; 3rd Division (Erchis) Hasananli, Nisif, Haidaranlu, Marharanli, Kalkanli.; 4th Division (Viransehir) Milli, Hizir, Deruki, Tai , Kiki, Karakechi; Van Reserve Cavalry Brigade (Van) Makuri, Takuri, Shefketi, Sherkan, Shemsheki, Maylan, Shiyoli, Liyoli. Hasan Arfa, The Kurds , pps . 26-27. 40 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , p. 10. 41 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," 56. 42 Robert F. Zeidner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq Government, " 25 .


II. KURDISH REVOLTS: 1918-1944 Kurdistan from 1918 to the mid-1940s was racked by a series of almost continuous revolts. The longest period of peace during this span of about two decades was from 1937 to 1941. These revolts, however, were not all led by the same leader, nor did they occur in the same provinces. Explanations advanced as to causation for the revolts ranged from purely tribal, through religiotribal, to nationalist. Robert F. Zeidner characterized the revolts of the era as the start of Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Other analysts, such as Cottam, Wenner, and C. J. Edmonds have characterized the revolts of 1919 and 1918-1922 as purely tribal in character. Subsequent analyses of the revolts of 1925, 1930, 1937, 1941, and 1943 as well as intermittent flare ups , have also been attributed to causes along the spectrum of tribal to nationalist. For purposes of analysis in this chapter, the following typology has been devised: tribal-feudal, religio-political , tribal with nationalist overtones, and nationalist revolts. In regarding nationalism versus tribalism, the definition formulted by Iliya Harik was instructive as well: Nationalist idealogy as we have witnessed it in the Middle East, is in effect a rationalization of the primordial sentiments of a people. The exaltation of the ethnic principle by bequeathing on it the name of nationalism does not blur that fact that it stems primarily from a primordialsentiment and that no nationalism in effect is any more sound or true than any other . 5


Within this chapter the terms Iran and Persia are considered to represent the same nation; Iran becoming the official name in 1935. Mesopotamia refers to the southern portion of modern Iraq and Mosul refers to the northern provinces of Iraq. A. TRIBAL-FEUDAL REVOLTS Revolts within this category were considered to have had as their primary causation the retention of tribal lands and the maintenance of ascendancy of a particular tribe or leader. Characteristic of these were that the leaders had been concerned with consolidation of tribal lands or revenge. Revolts included in this category were Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah f s revolt in 1919 in Iraq, the Dilo 1920 revolt in Iraq, the July 1925 revolt of Seyyid Abdullah in Turkey, and the 1928 revolt of Sheikh Hadjo in Turkey. 1. Sheikh Mahmud of Barzinjah As early as May, 1918 the British, who had occupied the liwas of Kirkuk and Suleimaniyah, had contacted Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah of the Baban confederation of tribes. Sheikh Mahmud was descended from a family which had provided the leadership of the Qaderi dervish community of Suleimaniyah. British aims were to establish, under their close control, an autonomous Kurdish state which would buffer both Mesopotamia and India from Turkey and the Soviet Union. With this in mind, Major E. W. C. Noel was sent in 7 to control the Sheikh or Hurkumdar . Sheikh Mahmud was advised that "... any Kurdish groups or tribes in the three liwas of Suleimani, Kirkuk and Arbil which might wish to accept his leader8 ship would be allowed to do so." The Ottoman reconquest of the 29

area put an end to this "kingdom" but the British reestablished it after the hostilities were concluded under the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918. Although the Sheikh initially cooperated with the British, subsequent British actions (establishment of police posts) were viewed by him as unwarranted interference in his tribal area. Additionally, despite parliamentary assurances to the contrary, he viewed British overtures to the Arabs as indications of future interference in his area. Because of this, to reassert his authority Sheikh Mahmud led a brief revolt in 1919 against the British. This revolt failed due to preponderant British strength and tribal frictions and the Sheikh was deposed and exiled to India.

2. Dilo Kurds in Iraq - 1920 The revolt of the Dilo Kurds in Iraq in 19 20 also deserves brief mention. It occurred during a general insurrection against the British of both Arab and Kurd, Shiite and Sunni in June - November 1920. The general rising has been characterized by Amal Vinogradov as "... a primitive, but genuine, national response to fundamental dislocation in the political and socioeconomic adaptation of the tribally organized rural Iraqis. These dislocations were brought about through the direct and in12 direct encroachment of the West." Within this general insurrection, the Dilo Kurds of Arbil in August, 1920 took advantage of a weakened central authority to consolidate their mastery of, and tribal independence in, the area. The British were successful in quelling this brief revolt of the Dilo 30 s and were also able to

suppress the general rising. A key element in the success of the British against the Kurds of Iraq was the action of the consul at Kermanshah in Persia. He was able to induce (by payment) , Persian Kurdish Sinjabi tribes to cross the border and attack and 13 weaken the Dilo Kurds. This also illustrated the rifts in an overall Kurdish nationalism which had been claimed by Sharif Pasha at Versailles. 3. Seyyid Abdullah, July 1925 The third tribal-feudal revolt of the period occurred in July 1925 in Turkey and was primarily motivated by revenge for Turkish actions during the earlier revolt of Sheikh Said, as well as a desire to regain tribal lands. This revolt was led by Seyyid Abdullah of the Turkish Qader tribes and lasted for approximately one month before it was suppressed by elements of the 14 Turkish Third Army. Seyyid Abdullah's father, Seyyid Abdul Kader had been a Senator in the Ottoman government and was implicated in Sheikh Said's revolt against the Kemalists. After his capture in June 1925, he was hanged and the Turks attempted to crush tribal authority in the eastern vilayets of Turkey. In reaction to this, Seyyid Abdullah led a series of raids, assisted by local clans, on government installations in the

Shamdinan region. The Turkish reaction was fairly swift and Seyyid Abdullah was chased across the Turkish border to Iraq with his followers on July 22, 1925. 4. Nisibin, Turkey - 1928 The brief revolt of December 1928 occurred in the vicinity of Nisibin, Turkey (on the Turko-Syrian border) and was 31

probably led by Sheikh Had jo (Hatcho) of the Badr Khan family. The actual leader is unknown, but Had jo was to also play a role in a subsequent revolt in Turkey, again staged from Syria. 16 As reported, the motivation of the "malcontent Kurds" in this revolt were "... to maintain their primitive tribal life unimpaired by Turkish modernism, but the incentive to smuggle and revenge themselves for the late war (1927) in which they were forced to 17 acknowledge Angora's authority has inevitably arisen." Thus the motives for this revolt appeared to be feudal (retention of lands vacated and of a way of life) and for revenge. Tribal loyalties can be pointed to due to the support of local clans for the raiders. Turkish suppression of this incident was also complicated by the fact that: The boundary in the neighborhood of Nisibin remains undefined although both parties (Syria and Turkey) resorted to the arbitration of a neutral, the Danish General Ernst. Turkey has refused to accept the award, and this northeast sector of Syria has become, in Turkish eyes, a source for smuggling and brigandage. 18 Of the four revolts in this category, the revolt of Sheikh Mahmud in 1919, and that of the Dilo Kurds of 1920, appeared to be primarily motivated by tribal-feudal rationales. The revolts of July 1925 and of 1928, while having tribal and revenge rationales appeared to be offshoots or remnants of major Kurdish revolts which had preceded them and which will be discussed below.


B. RELIGIO-POLITICAL REVOLTS Revolts in this category were characterized by religious rationales: either the restoration of the Caliphate or major support for a Kurdish leader on religious grounds. Coupled with this rationale were some limited political motives such as

opposition to Arab nationalism, or the influence of Ottoman nationalist forces. In the revolts to be discussed, claims for an independent Kurdistan were put forth but were muted by the religio-political inputs. 1. Sheikh Said of Palu (Genj ) Sheikh Said of Palu was the son of Sheikh Ali Effendi of the Naqshbendi dervish order and consequently the leader of that order in eastern Turkey. He was also related by marriage to 19 Sheikh Abdullah of Genj and Halid Bey of the Chiran Kurds. The 20 revolt which he led started on 13 February 1925 and lasted 21 until 28 April 1925. It was rather widespread in its impact and before the Turkish army suppressed it, spread to the provinces and towns of Arghana, Diarbekr, Mamuret-al-Aziz , Genj, Dersim, Mardin, Urfa, Siiverek, Sairt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkiari, Erzerum, and 22 Kharput . The causes of the revolt were several, chief among them being a strong opposition to the lay Republic and separation of church and state which the Kemalist government was undertaking at that time. 23 Another cause for Kurdish unrest in eastern Turkey was the enactment of a law in 1924 which had prohibited the teaching or use of the Kurdish language. Other political factors 33

of the revolt were related to a general dissatisfaction with cen25 2fi tral government policies, poor economic conditions, and discontent of tribal leaders over central government expansion of 27 authority. At the outbreak of the revolt the Kurds issued propaganda manifestos which argued for an independent Kurdistan in which the Caliphate, under Prince Selim (Abdul Hamid II' s son), 28 would be reestablished. Although the Turkish government initially tried to portray

29 the revolt as a local one fomented by religious reactionaries, they later reevaluated their position. On 4 March 1925, Fethi Bey, the Turkish Prime Minister allowed that the only objective of the revolt was "Kurdism". This was reinforced by the capture on 10 March of manifestos and documents of the "Kurdish War 31 Office." By 28 March, the Turkish government was admitting that the revolt was much more widespread and with more general 32 objectives than was first thought. Further evidence in support of this conclusion was that Sheikh Said's forces were estimated 33 to number over 7000 rebels and it ultimately cost the Turkish 34 35 government -6 2 million and 36,000 troops to contain and quell the revolt. The Turks at various other times blamed ex-Ottoman officers and Nestorians, the British, and the Kurds in Syria for instigating the revolt. There is some evidence to support the first and second of these claims. The aim of the restoration of the caliphate would have been sought by both the religious Sheikh Said and ex-Ottoman officers. Sidney N. Fisher also argues that since the revolt took place at the same time as the 34

League of Nations delegations visit to Mosul, the British would have been heavily interested in stirring up Kurdish nationalism against the Turks so as to gain the award of the vilayet to the 39 British Mandate. Other leaders who supported Sheikh Said were the Kurd Mustapha Pasha, Sheikh Ali, Sheikh Ghaleb, Sheihk Hazem Ismail,

40 Rashid Bey Liganlu, and Rashid Agha of Kargabazar. These leaders and Sheikh Abdullah of Genj were captured with Sheikh Said in April 1925 after a major Turkish offensive and the revolt was ended. Known tribes which joined the revolt were the Diarbekr 41 42 43 tribes, the Guiran tribe, the Goyan, and the Midiat tribes. Of these, the latter two escaped across the border, the Goyans to 44 Iraq and the Midiats to French Syria. Other tactics which the Turks used to suppress the revolt 45 were the use of aircraft bombings, the establishment of martial 46 law and "Tribunals of Independence", and cooperation with the French in Syria to use the Baghdad Railway to transfer an estimated 25,000 troops to the East. Post-revolt tactics included the hanging of Sheikh Said and nine of his followers on 3 June 1925 and the deportation of many insurgents to Cilicia as well 48 as a general pillaging of the area. One offshoot of this rebellion, the 1925 revolt of Seyyid Abdullah, has been discussed. Although the Turks claimed that they controlled the area after April 192 5, Abdul Rahman, Sheikh Said's brother, was not captured 49 until 17 January 1927 after sporadic raiding. In retrospect, the initial causes of this revolt did appear to be religio-political. In another sense, however, it can be 35

viewed as a revolt in transition. After this revolt religious sentiments subsided in Turkey and Kurdish nationalism, fortified by Turkish repression, began to be mobilized. According to O'Ballance, 206 villages were destroyed, 8,758 houses were burnt, and 15,200 people were killed during the course of the revolt 51

and during subsequent repressive actions. 2 . Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan The other two religio-political revolts occurred in 1927 and 1932 in Northern Iraq and were led by Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan. The Sheikhs of Barzan were leaders of the Naqshbendi dervish order 52 in the Barzan district of northern Mesopotamia. Sheikh Ahmed succeeded his brother as the leader of the order in 1914. In 1927 Sheikh Ahmed proclaimed himself as an incarnation of the deity and began to impose his rule and doctrines over the villages in the Shirwan district. This imposition was fought by several of the other local tribes and finally was ended by British-officered 53 Iraqi levies (composed of Assyrians) . The next uprising in April-July 1932 of Sheikh Ahmed covered the Iraqi districts of Shirwan, Barosh, and Mazuri Bala and again had strong religious overtones. These were coupled with political reasons. After Sheikh Mahmud's 1931 revolt (to be discussed below) , the British and Iraqis attempted to establish much more firm control over the northern provinces. Prior to this, even after Sheikh Ahmed's previous actions, all that had 55 been established in the region were a few police posts. With this encroachment on his territory by a central government which was also of a different (Orthodox Sunni) religious sect, Sheikh 36

Ahmed revolted. British and Iraqi mobile columns and airstrikes and The Sheikh was at large, however, to the Turks. He was subsequently

efforts at suppression included were ultimately successful. until 1933 when he surrendered amnestied and placed in a form

of "exile" in Suleimaniyah where the Iraqi government could 56 observe him. Another interesting factor in this revolt was the

first appearance of Sheikh Ahmed's brother, Mullah Mustafa Barzani 57 as a very successful leader of men. C. TRIBAL-NATIONALIST REVOLTS Revolts of this type were characterized by claims of Kurdish nationalism and proclamations of independence. The tribal element still strongly persisted, as a growing Kurdish intelligentsia had not yet joined with tribal leaders, and in some cases tribal frictions during the revolts contributed to their failures. Revolts which will be considered under this category are the 19181922 revolt of Agha Ismail (Simko) in Iran, the 1922-1924 and 1931 revolts of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah in Iraq, the Jelali and Haideranlu 1927 revolt in Turkey, and the 1935 revolt of Bazan of Zibar in Iraq. 1. Simko in Persia In Persia, after the Armistace of Mudros, the Kurdish 58 leader Simko of the Shakkak tribe was left with strong forces 59 which were virtually unopposed. Although Persian governors tried to control his activities (including an assasination attempt) , in the Summer of 1919 he proclaimed an open rebellion in Urmiah and within a few days was in control of the Lakistan 37

60 district. Shortly thereafter, he was attacked by elements of the Russian officered Persian cossacks and negotiated a truce. In 1920, probably influenced by the Treaty of Sevres provision on 6 l Kurdish independence and his communications with Sharif Pasha, Simko again rose and openly talked of independence. This time he had the support also of the powerful Herki tribe and was further reinforced in 1921 by the tribes of the Mahabad region (Mamash, Mangur, Dehbokri, Piran, Zarza, Gowrik, Feyzollahbegi, Pishtdari, 62 Baneh, and Qaderkhani) . The rising lasted until 23 July 1922,

by which time Simko had rallied over 10,000 Kurds (including some 3000 Turkish Kurds) to his banner. They were finally defeated in a major battle by the reconstituted Persian forces under General 6 "3 Reza Khan, and Simko fled to Turkey. This revolt had the first post-war calls for Kurdish independence but as has been argued, Simko would probably have 64 been satisfied with a "national" state under his tribal authority. Also of interest is that a grandson of the 19th century Sheikh Ubeidullah assisted Simko in his campaigns. Essentially, although Simko had heard of the Kurdish national idea, his nationalism was strongly tinged by tribal motives and further took advantage of the failing Qajar dynasty's lack of power in the region. 2. Sheikh Mahmud Revisited Although the British had exiled Sheikh Mahmud to India after his failure to cooperate with them in 1919, events in Mosul in the early 1920' s caused them to reconsider. The disposal of the Mosul Vilayet was to be hotly contested by Arab, Turk, Kurd, 38

and Englishman and was not finally settled until the mid-1920* s. In the meantime, however, the area was subjected to propaganda from all sides and occassional armed forays from Turkey. After one of these forays in 1922, the British reinstated Sheikh Mahmud 66 in Suleimaniya as King of Kurdistan. Their aim was to consolidate the Kurdish population in the area under him and oppose Turkish influence. Unfortunately for the British, the Kurds had stated in a plebiscite conducted in 1919 that they cared even 67 less for the Arabs than the Turks. After Sheikh Mahmud was in the area, he joined the anti-British forces and attempted a

separatist movement with the support of the Baban confederation 68 of tribes. This was a tribal revolt with strong nationalist overtones and pitted Kurdish nationalist feelings against Arab nationalism. The revolt was primarily against the control of the 69 British supported Arab overloads in the area. Tribal frictions and British military strength led to the failure of the revolt and in July 1924, Sheikh Mahmud and some of his followers fled to the refuge of the Iranian Kurds of the Marivan district (led by Mahmud Khan Kanisanani) . Sheikh Mahmud led sporadic raids back into Iraq (most notably in 1927) after the 1924 revolt, but he was not again successful in fomenting a general rising until 1931. The primary causation of the 1931 revolt was the Iraqi/British effort to consolidate control of the Mosul area and finalize the Iraqi71 Turkish frontier before the expiration of the Mandate in 1932. This action again activated Kurdish fears of submergence in an Arab sea and again the Baban confederation rose in support of 39

Sheikh Mahmud. Although the Kurds were able to hold out for several months in their mountain strongholds, British aircraft 72 and a new system of loudspeaker propaganda helped to weaken their resistance. Sheikh Mahmud was captured and exiled to Suleimaniyah and then Nasiriyah where he died in 1956. These latter revolts had nationalist motivations but were also beset with tribal frictions and a new factor, the inability to cooperate with a growing Kurdish urban nationalist intelli73

gentsia. Considering that Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan was also in revolt at approximately the same time, it is interesting to note that the two leaders did not join forces. This pointed further to the continued division between tribes in the area as well as probable lack of cooperation due to locational and sectarian differences ( Ahmed-Bar zan and Naqshbendi, Mahmud, Suleimaniyah and Qaderi) . 3. Jelali and Haideranlu in Turkey 1927 Sporadic Kurdish raids had occurred in Turkey during 1926 accompanied by deportations and repression by central government forces. The first reported instance of trouble in 1927 occurred in August when a Sheikh Pasho led a raid on Telit, Turkey from a sanctuary in Persia. This raid was met by Turkish notes of protest to the Persian government and claims in the Turkish newspaper Jumhuriet that: "Our apprehensions that the hostile attitude of Persia towards us is due to British influence (and) are thus confirmed." While this raid was countered, trouble again broke out in October 1927 by more raids into Turkey led by "Persian Officers and brigands." 76 Tribes involved in these raids were the 40

Jelali and Haideranlu, and were supported by the Turkish Kurds of the Kotch-Ushagh clan in Dersim and the Sassun and Bohtan 77 tribes of Bitlis. Although the Turks tried to downplay these raids as acts of brigands, they were later classed as a small war led by "Monarchists" and "reactionary conspirators" and re78 quired the use of some 4000 Turkish troops to suppress. The Persian government, in response to Turkey's protests, claimed that it was unable to control the tribes on the borders. Another possible motive for Persian interest in these incidents was a hope for 79 revision of the Turko-Persian frontier line of 1918. While a tribal rationale was probably the foremost reason for these raids, due to loss of land and Turkish repressive measures, it was reported also that during this period, a group of Kurds near Mt. Ararat had reformed the Khoybun (Kurdish Independent Government) and had proclaimed independence. With this in mind,

81 the rebellion, which lasted to approximately 6 December 1927, can be viewed as a prelude to the later 1930 revolt of Ishan Nuri. 4. Bazan of Zibar - 1935 The final revolt in this category occurred in Iraq from 82 August 1935 to March 1936 and was led by Khalil Khoshowi. This revolt also had as its motive some overtones of Kurdish nationalism but was primarily against central government control 8 3 over tribal areas. It is significant primarily in that Turkey was now willing to cooperate with an independent Iraq in closing 84 its frontier and in suppression of the revolt. With this in mind, this revolt was probably a final catalyst in convincing the regional powers that interregional control of the Kurds was 41

necessary. Discussions between the powers later led to the signing of the Saadabad Pact in 1937. D. NATIONALIST REVOLTS Revolts classed in this category were considered to have had as their primary aim the establishment of an independent Kurdish area. They were also characterized by links with external Kurdish nationalist organizations and intelligentsia and in almost all cases received external support and were able to rally Kurds over wide areas. The revolts which were grouped in this category were Ishan Nuri's revolt in 1930 in Turkey, Sayyid Riza's 1937 Revolt, revolts in Iraq from 1941-1943, and the revolt in Iran from 1941-42 1. Ishan Nuri in Turkey - 1930 This revolt, which actually started as raids of Haideranlu 85 and Jelali tribes into Turkey on 10 June 1930, escalated to widespread actions. Although it was centered in the Mt. Ararat region, it eventually included actions by Kurdish groups located in Turkey, Persia, Syria, and Iraq and shewed the influence of both external powers and Kurdish political groups. Primary causes of the revolt g r were continued dissatisfaction with Turkish repression, and the

arrest and trial of the 20 year old son of Sheikh Said of Palu, 87 the Sheikh Selaheddine, on 23 May 1930. Other sources maintain that it was a continuation of the Khoybun ' s action which stemmed 88 from the 1927 revolt in Turkey. Tribes involved in the revolt included the Haideranlu, 89 9 Jelali, Belikali, Moulari (Persian) , and the Herkis from 91 Iraq. During the revolt, the Kurds were able to muster 15,00092 20,000 tribesmen at Mount Ararat. After the Turkish offensive 42

93 of 60,000 regulars and reserves began in July and August 1930, 94 95 Kurds from Iraq and Syria attacked across the border into Turkey in an attempt to draw off Turkish troops. Primary leaders initially were one Hussein Yusuf Aptal of the Persian Jelalis, Sheikh Hadjo of Syria, and Ishan Nuri. Ishan Nuri later emerged as the key leader. An ex-Ottoman officer, he was able to provide military training to the Kurds and links with other ex-Ottoman officers who served in the revolt. By this time the Kurdish political groups had evolved under the oversight of the Khoybun and at least two groups were active in the revolt: a Pan-Iranian Kurdish Party which viewed Arabs and Turks 98 as aliens, and the Kurdish Union of Friends of Liberty, which 99 had been led by Sheikh Selaheddine. Aims of the revolt were various but were put forth in one declaration as the creation of a

Kurdish nationalist state in Bayezid, Van, and Mush provinces of Turkey. 100 The coordinated attacks from Persia, Iraq and Syria definitely pointed to an externally coordinated Kurdish group which sent a manifesto to Kurds in all areas plus to the League of Nations. The manifesto read, in part: Brother Kurds, you must be worthy to become a great nation. How can you allow the noble Kurdish nation to live as slaves under the bondage of the Turks, while all other nations have won their independence? A large free territory between Iran and Iraq had been promised to us [by the Treaty of Sevres] . Unite in the struggles we have started to liberate our brothers from the Turkish yoke, in order to liberate these lands which have belonged to us for many centuries .101 There was also strong evidence of external support for the revolt 102 which was channeled via Soviet Armenia and possibly, Persia. 43

The Turks at various times blamed the British, the Persians, and the Soviets for stirring up the revolt although definite proof of who did what to whom was not available. The Kurds were well armed during this revolt and were able to shoot down several Turkish aircraft. The organized phase of the revolt ended 104 approximately 17 October 1930 after Turkey used "hot pursuit" tactics into Persia and convinced the Persian government to cooperate with them. Final conclusions as to the motivation for the revolt, combined opinions of it as a true "war of national liberation" with probable Armenian (and possibly Soviet) support. Several letters to the editor in the New York Times appeared in support of Kurdish rights. Curiously, one of these letters was written by 106 an Armenian living in the U.S. Another letter written by the Kurdish Khoybun "representative" in the United States, one N. M.

Bekir, claimed that the Kurds had seized the provinces of Bayazid, Igdir, Sari-Kamish, Kahisman, Van, Mush, Bitlis, Hakkiari, and Seghert. 107 While much information about this revolt was clouded by propaganda and Turkish censorship, it is evident that a coordinating Kurdish nationalist group existed, that some external support was provided, that a large number of Kurds were mobilized and that Persia and Turkey became aware of a need to "control" the Kurds along their mutual border. 2. Sayyid Riza in Turkey, 19 3 7 The key thing about this revolt is that it largely broke out and was repressed under very strict censorship of the Turkish 44

government. It started on about 17 March 1937 and no news reports were made about it until 16 June 19 37 despite the fact that some "30,000 Turkish troops and a fleet of airplanes were 109 required..." to suppress it. Tribes involved were the Kalan, Abbasushagi, Haideranlu, Deman, and Lolanis with about 5000 total insurgents. They were led by Sayyid Riza in the Dersim region of Turkey and their professed aims were: "no garrisons be built or administrative divisions created; that the tribesmen be permitted to keep their arms; that they continue as before to pay 112 taxes by bargaining with tribal chiefs." Although this revolt appeared to be more local initially than the one of 1930, it continued through September 1937 when Sayyid 113 Riza was captured by the Turks and was joined in July by Kurds 114 of the Jezirah district in Syria. They, under the leadership of the Badr Khan family in Cizre Syria, were in revolt in Syria for 115 autonomy from French and Arab rule. There was also evidence of external support for the Syrian Kurds and possibly the Turkish Kurds when weapons enroute to the insurgents were discovered in

116 Alleppo by French authorities. The French were able to control 117 and suppress the Syrian Kurds by mid-August and Sayyid Riza was 118 hanged with his two sons in November 19 37 in Turkey. 3. Revolts in Iraq 1941-43 The revolts in Iraq during this period were primarily war related due to an anti-British coup, Nazi propaganda, and war hardships. In May 1941, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah led a brief uprising after the loss of central government control in the area following the Rashid Ali coup against the British. His hopes apparently 45

were that the British would be convinced of the unreliability of 119 the Arabs and would reward him with his independent Kurdistan. On the other side, possibly incited by the German agent Rudolf 120 Roser, Sheikh Mouhamed Zaidi rallied his tribe in Suleimaiyah 121 in revolt against the British in September 1941. Again, here the hope was for independence from a British dominated IraqiArab government. The most serious nationalist revolt was led by Mullah 122 Mustafa Barzani in 1943. Although this revolt was caused initially by famine in the Barzan area, a rise in war prices and 123 small "exile allowances" for the Mullah, he was quickly joined by the intellectuals of the Hewa (Hope) and Ruzkari Kurdish 124 political groups which had nationalist sentiments. The British employed the Iraqi Army against Barzani and paid some tribes to fight against him. Although successful for a short time, Barzani 's forces were eventually driven across the border to Iran

where they linked up with Kurdish nationalists in Mahabad in 1944. 4. Revolt in Iran 1941-1942 After the September 1941 occupation of Iran by British and Russian forces, Kurdish hopes in that area grew and on 27 September 1941 Mehmet (Hama) Reshid of the Baneh tribe rose in Kermanshah. This rising was accompanied by the declaration of a 125 "Free Kurdish State." The Teheran government responded by moving troops and artillery toward the region and blamed the 126 trouble on "communist" or "Nazi" inspirations. They were unclear of the support for the revolt but were sure that "foreign 127 separatist propaganda" was to blame for it. The revolt 46

eventually encompassed much of Iranian Kordestan and included the Baneh, Khorkoreh, Yakilis, Ardalans, and Gowrik tribes. It was not until May 1942 that Mehmet Rashid was defeated by the Iranian 128 army and he was later made a Governor of Baneh. This revolt, indicative of Iranian Kurdish nationalism, plus the forthcoming support of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, would serve to encourage other Iranian Kurds in the establishment of the Mahabad Republic. E. CONCLUSIONS Dividing the revolts of the 1918-1944 period in a typology obscures the chronological progression of revolts in the area. For that reason, the following chronological list of Kurdish revolts is provided: 1918-1922 Iran (Simko) 1919 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah) 1920 Iraq (Dilo Kurds) 1922-1924 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah) 1925 Turkey (Said and Sayyid Abdullah) 1927 Iraq (Ahmed Barzani) 1927 Turkey (Jelali and Haideranlu)

1928 Syria/Turkey (Hadjo) 1930 Turkey/Iraq/Syria/Persia (Ishan Nuri) 1931 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah) 1932 Iraq (Ahmed Barzani) 1935-1936 Iraq (Bazan of Zibar) 1937 Turkey/Syria (Sayyid Riza, Badr Kahn) 1941-1943 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah, Mouhamed Zaidi, Mullah Mustafa Barzani) 1941-1943 Iran (Mehmet Rashid) It appeared that the turbulence in the area created by territorial uncertainties after World War I, and attempts by new nationstates to consolidate their power, sparked a continuous series of Kurdish revolts. These revolts had tribal, political, religious and nationalist aspirations and were also affected by external influences. The primary external influences were a growing group 47

of Kurdish intellectuals; Soviet, British, Armenian, Nazi and possibly Persian instigations of revolts; and regional power attempts at cooperation to suppress the Kurds. Both the Kurdish national groups and nation-state control efforts grew and became more developed within the area. This will be discussed in the following chapter.



Robert F. Zeidner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq Government," Middle Eastern Affairs , X No. 1 (Jan., 1959), 24. 2 Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran , (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964) , pT 70 . 3 Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," The Middle East Journal , XVII Nos . 1 and 2 (Winter-Spring, 196-3) , 70. 4

Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran , p. 70. 5 Iliya F. Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," International Journal of Middle East Studies , III (1972), 309. c. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq , Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 79. 7 Briton C. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs 1914-1921 , (Berkeley, Ca. : University of California Press, 1971) , p. 35"8 . g C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," The Middle East Journal , XI No. 1 (Winter, 1957), 57. 9 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self -Determination, " The Middle East Journal , 21 No. 3 (Spring, 1966) 288. Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," 70. Philip W. Ireland, Iraq , (New York: Russell and Russell, 1937) , p. 270. 12 Amal Vinogradov, "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies , III (1972), 125. Philip W. Ireland, Iraq , p. 270. 14 "More Trouble in Kurdistan," Times of London , July 23, 1925, p. 13. 49

15 ibid . 16 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , (New York: Oxford University Press,

1966) , p. 41. 17 W. G. Tinckom-Fernandes , "Malcontent Kurds Provoke New Crisis," New York Times , Dec. 2, 1928, Sec. Ill, p. 1. ibid . 19 "The Kurdish Revolt," Times of London , March 3, 1925, p. 15. 20 "The Revolt in Kurdistan," Times of London , March 5, 1925, p. 13. 21 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 37. 22 "Turkish Kurds Revolt," Times of London , Feb. 25, 1925, p. 14 and "The Kurdish Revolt," Times of London , Feb. 25, 1925, p. 12. 23 "The Revolt in Kurdistan," Times of London , March 5, 1925, p. 13. 24 Dwight J. Simpson, "Turkey: Shadows of Conflict," Current History , 72 No. 423 (Jan., 1977), 12. 25 "The Troubles of Turkey," Times of London , February 25, 1925, p. 15. 2 6 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 37. 27 "The Revolt in Kurdistan," Times of London , March 5, 1925, p. 13. ibid.

29 ibid . 30... , ibid . 31 "Sharp Fighting in Kurdistan," Times of London , March 11, 1925, p. 14. 32 "Kurdish Revolt," Times of London , March 30, 1925, p. 13. 50

33 "Turkish Kurds Revolt," Times of London , Feb. 25, 19 25, p. 14. 34 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 37. 35 ibid ., p. 36. 36 "Turkish Kurds Revolt," Times of London , Feb. 25, 1925, p. 14 37 "The Kurdish Revolt," Times of London , Feb. 26, 1925, p. 12. 38 "The Kurdish Revolt," Times of London , March 21, 1925, p. 13. 39 Sidney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (3rd ed . New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 435. 40 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 37. 41 "Sharp Fighting in Kurdistan," Times of London , March 11, 1925, p. 14.

42 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 34. 43 "Kurd and Turk," Times of London , April 7, 1928, p. 11. 44 ibid . 45 "The Kurdish Revolt," Times of London , Feb. 26, 1924, p. 12. 46 "Angora and the Republic," Times of London , March 9, 1925, p. 13. ¦ Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 , (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoestring Press, Inc., 1973), p. 22. 48 "Deportation of Kurds," Times of London , Jan. 28, 1925, p. 13 49 "Capture Kurdish Chief," New York Times , Jan. 18, 1927, p. 10 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 37. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt , p. 27. 51

52 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq," The Middle East Journal , XIII No. 1 (Winter, 1959), 5. 53 ibid . 16. D4 "Kurd Rebels Put up Stiff Fight in Hills," New York Times , July 3, 1932, Sec. II, p. 5. 55 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq," 6. 56 ., . -. ibid . 57 "Kurd Rebels Put up Stiff Fight in Hills," p. 5.

58 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 48. 59 ibid , p. 56. 60 ibid. p. 57. ibid , p. 112. ibid , p. 59. ibid , p. 61. 64 Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran , p. 70. C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," The Journal of Contemporary History , VI No. 1 (1971), 96. 66 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 66. 67 Philip W. Ireland, Iraq , p. 168. 68 Robert F. Zeidner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq Government," 29. ibid . , 28 . Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 116. 71 C. J. Edmonds, " The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq ," 6. 52

72 "Loud-Speakers Helped Quiet Kurds," New York Times , May 29, 1932, p. 8. 73 Abbas Kelidar, ed., The Integration of Modern Iraq , (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) , p. 171.

74 "The Turks and Persia," Times of London , Aug. 16, 1927, p. 10. 75.. ibid. 76 "Kurds Raid Turks Again," New York Times , Oct. 4, 1927, p. 15. 77 "Kurd and Turk," Times of London , April 7, 1928, p. 11. 78 .. . -, ibid . 79-u-^ ibid. 80 "Kurds Fight For Freedom," New York Times , July 6, 19 30, Sec. Ill, p. 6. 81 "Turkey and the Kurds," Times of London , Dec. 7, 1927, p. 13. 82 Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq 1932-1958 , (2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960) , p. 61. ibid . , p. 60 . ibid. , p. 61 . 85 "Turkey Asks Persia to Halt Kurd Raids," New York Times , July 6, 1930, p. 9. 86 C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," 91. 87 "Turkey Asks Persia to Halt Kurd Raids," p. 9. 88 "Kurds Fight for Freedom," New York Times , July 6, 19 30, p. 6. ,

89 "Kurds Urge a Revolt," New York Times , July 5, 1930, p. 4. 90 "To Act Against Raiders," New York Times , July 4, 19 30, p. 6. 53

91 "Revolt of Kurds Covers Wide Area," New York Times, Aug. 31, 1930, Sec. 3, p. 8. 92 "Kurds Well Armed in Present Uprising," New York Times , July 13, 1930, Sec. 3, p. 8. 93 "Turkey Asks Persia to Halt Kurd Raids," p. 9. 94 "Turks Ready to Move on Remaining Kurds," New York Times July 27, 1930, p. 8. 95 "Kurdish Attacks Spread," New York Times, Aug. 7, 19 30, p. 17. 96 "Turks Fight Brigands in North Kurdistan," New York Times , June 30, 1930, p. 8. 97 "Revolt of Kurds Covers Wide Area," p. 8. 98 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporous , (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 295. 99 "Turks Fight Kurds With Land and Air Forces; Attack Tribesmen on Mt. Ararat on Four Sides," New York Times , July 7, 19 30, p. 1.

"Hear Son of Sultan Is at Rebel Centre," New York Times , July 10, 1930, p. 8. Turkischer Post , July 29, 1930. Quoted in Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 41. 102 "Hear Son of Sultan Is at Rebel Centre," p. 8. Another rumor which the Turkish government appeared to be concerned with was that British Col. T. E. Lawrence had visited Ruwandiz and stirred up the revolt from there. See New York Times , July 9, 1930, p. 8. 103 J. W. Collins, "Kurds Well Armed in Present Uprising," New York Times , July 13, 1930, Sec. 3, p. 8. See also New York Times , July 13, 1930, p. 13. 104 "Turks Hold Revolt of Kurds Crushed," New York Times , Oct. 18, 1930, p. 3. 105 C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," 91. 54

106 One example of this is the letter to the editor written by Vahan Cardashian in July 1930. In it he recounted Treaty of Sevres provisions and other Kurdish post-war history and also called for an independent Kurdistan and Armenia. New York Times , July 6, 1930, Sec. 3, p. 6. 107 "The Turco-Kurdish Campaign," New York Times, Oct. 22, 1930, p. 24. 108

"Turkey Combats Uprising of Kurds," New York Times , June 17, 1937, p. 11. 109 ibid. 110 ibid. "Kurd Rebel Surrenders , " New York Times , Sept. 14, 1937, p. 8 112 "Turkey Combats Uprising of Kurds," p. 11. 113 "Kurd Rebel Surrenders," p. 8. 114 "Rebellions Kurds Dispersed by French," New York Times , Aug. 13, 1937, p. 10. Robert F. Zeidner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq Government," 28. "Kurd Munitions Taken," New York Times , Aug. 14, 19 37, p. 4. 117 "Rebellious Kurds Dispersed by French," p. 10. 118 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 44. 119 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," 59. 120 "Axis Propagandists in Turkey," Times of London , April 29, 1942, p. 3. 121 "Iraqi Kurds Reported in Revolt," New York Times , Sept. 19, 1941. 122 Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," 70. 55

123 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq," 7. 124 ' Abbas Kelidar, ed., The Integration of Modern Iraq , p. 172. 125 "Guerillas Fight Iranian Patrols," New York Times , Sept. 28, 1941, Sec. I, p. 11. 12 6 "Iran Uprising Reported," New York Times , April 6, 1942, p. 2 127 ibid. 128 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , pp. 68-70.


III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1918-1944 Political developments in Kurdistan from 1918-1944 consisted of the interactions between Great Powers, developing regional actors, and Kurdish actions. The effect of Kurdish revolts has already been discussed, but also during this period, Kurds became more politically aware and developed their own political groups and parties. A. POLITICAL MANEUVERS PRECEDING THE TREATY OF SEVRES Sharif Pasha's efforts at Paris in 1918 through 1920, to obtain an independent Kurdistan, were enhanced by several factors: British imperialist designs on portions of the Ottoman Empire dating back to the Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement of October 1916; American and British public opinion which favored the establishment of an independent Armenia to protect oppressed Christian minorities; President Wilson's 12th point on non-Turkish nationalities; overtures of the Soviet Union to the Muslims of the East, and later, to Mustafa Kemal; and Sharif Pasha's ability to negotiate with Armenian and Great Power representatives. British interests in the area, particulary the objective of an independent or autonomous Kurdistan, were driven by concern for protection of India and its lifelines, the need to prevent French influences in the area, and a concern for control over suspected oil deposits in Mesopotamia and the vilayet of Mosul. A serious threat to their interests in Asia was posed by the new Soviet 57

government of Russia, or the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics (RFSFR) . As early as 1917, the Soviet government had issued an appeal to Muslim workers in the East to rise against their colonial masters : Even far-off India, that land which has been oppressed by the European "torchbearers of civilization" for so many centuries, has raised the standard of revolt, organizing its councils of deputies, throwing the hated yoke of slavery from its shoulders, and summoning the people of the East to the struggle for freedom. * Stalin, in May 1918, spoke to a strong Soviet interest in "liberating" the Muslims of the East from colonial oppression: Allow me to state in the name of the Central Soviet government that the Council of Peoples' Commissars has always believed and still believes that it is its sacred duty to meet halfway the movement of liberation of the oppressed and exploited masses of the East, and first of all, of the most wronged of the Muslims East. The entire character of our revolution, the very nature of the Soviet government, the general international situation, and finally even the geographical position of Russia, situated between imperialist Europe and oppressed Asia - all these necessarily prompt the Soviet government to pursue the policy of fraternal support of oppressed people of the East in their struggle for their own liberation. 3 The British could not ignore these threats to their imperial interests and in May 1919, endeavored to establish around Mosul a fringe of "autonomous Kurdish states with Kurdish chiefs who 4 will be advised by British Political Officers." After their reoccupation of Mesopotamia in late 1918, and subsequent problems with the "King of Kurdistan," Sheikh Mahmud, in 1919, the British emphasis shifted even more to automony vice independence for the Kurdish areas. 58

At the same time, Sharif Pasha of the Khoybun (Kurdish Independence League) , was in Paris. His negotiations were with

British and other Great Powers and with the Armenian representative, Boghas Nubar Pasha. Sharif Pasha's communications with Boghos Nubar Pasha were of crucial importance to a settlement which would be favorable to the Kurds. The Christian Great Powers were very concerned with the protection of the Christian Armenians of the Ottoman empire who had suffered so many deprivations during the war. President Wilson, in August 1919, sent a direct communication to the Ottoman Grand Vizier warning that: ... if immediate measures are not taken to prohibit all violences or massacres on the part of the Turks, Kurds, or other Musselmans [sic] against the Armenians in the Caucasus or elsewhere, the President will withdraw Article 12 from the Peace Conditions. This action would result in the complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. 5 Earlier in 1919, the King-Crane commission's report had also been received by the President. In it the formation of an Armenian state "...provided with a definite territory... which takes into account their losses by the massacres of 1884-96, and 1915-16" was recommended. This humanitarian interest in the Armenians gave Boghos Nubar Pasha an inordinate amount of influence at the Peace Conference and also made it essential for Sharif Pasha to come to an agreement with him if a Kurdistan were to be carved from the Ottoman Empire. Sharif Pasha was successful in his efforts with Boghos Nubar Pasha, and by December 1919, Kurdish and Armenian territorial claims had been resolved and an agreement of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded between the two representatives . Other King-Crane commission recommendations, which met with British needs and 59

inclinations also may have been considered during peace negotiations. First, with regard to Mesopotamia, its unity was to be preserved and was to include "...at least the Vilayets of Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern Kurds and Assyrians might g well be linked up with Mesopotamia." Secondly, in Anatolia, a Kurdish state was proposed. between the proposed Armenia on the north and Mesopotamia on the south, with the divide between the Euphrates and the Tigris as the western boundary, and the Persian frontier as the eastern boundary. A measure of autonomy can be allowed them under close mandatory rule, with the object of preparing them for ultimate independence or for federation with neighboring areas in a larger self-governing union. 9 These recommendations and the agreement between Kurd and Armenian fitted the objectives of both the U.S. and Great Britain, The Armenians would be protected, the two groups would work together, Mesopotamia would be held together (with Mosul) , and an autonomous Kurdish state would be interposed between the lifeline to India and the RSFSR. The way was cleared for a Kurdish

national state to be included in the Peace Treaty of Sevres. B. THE TREATY OF SEVRES TO THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE With the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920, Kurdish nationalist aspirations seemed assured. At the least, Article 62 guaranteed "... a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia ..." Further provision was made in Article 64 for independence of Kurdistan within one year of enactment of the 60

treaty provisions, as well as the adherence of Kurdish inhabitants of Mosul vilayet to the independent state. The treaty, however, was never enacted. Factors which contributed to its demise were: the rise of a Turkish nationalist regime intent on maintenance of Anatolian territorial integrity; Soviet links to the Turkish nationalists; American disinterest in the continued question of Anatolia; British, French, and Turkish claims to the province of Mosul and its oil resources, and the lack of a consistant Kurdish nationalist program, as well as the absence of a recognized Kurdish nationalist leader. The Turkish nationalists, led by General Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, had by mid-1919 banded together to oppose the dissection of Turkish Anatolia. In January 1920, (some eight months prior to Sevres) they issued their own statement on Turkish sovereignty, the Turkish National Pact. Article 5 of the Pact pledged to defend the rights of minorities in Turkey and Article 2 referred to the Kurdish Sanjak3 which had "... united themselves by a 12 general vote to the mother country." In short, the Allies were placed on notice that in the event of a treaty with the Ottoman Government of Constantinople which divided the Turkish territories, a fight would ensue. Further Turkish nationalist attitudes toward the question of the Kurdish minorities, in particular, were revealed in the writings of Ziya Gokalp. He insisted among other things, that the Kurdish language of Diarbekr was the 13 "Kurdish of the Turks" and that all the people of Turkey's

"...eastern and southern provinces, urban as well as rural ... has 61

14 so far remained Turkish." To Gokalp, the only reason that Turkoman tribes had become Kurdicized was to survive in early 15 times, but that they were still nationally Turks. These writings were later to form an ideological basis for the Turkish nationalists 1 claim that there were no Kurds in Turkey; just "mountain Turks. " Turkish nationalist links to the Soviets also date from the period of 1919-1920. These links were to enable the Turks to concentrate their forces against the French and Greeks in Anatolia and to ultimately defeat them in 1920 and 1922 respectively. There is some evidence to suggest that as early as May 1919, while Ataturk was serving as Inspector-General, that he met with a Soviet Army officer, Colonel Semen M. Budenny, himself of Kurdish extraction, 16 in Havza. The Soviets were willing to offer money, weapons, and direct military support in return for a sovietized Turkey. While Ataturk would not promise a sovietized Turkey, he did make use of what aid he could receive. The Turks took advantage of the signing of the Treaty of Moscow, in 1921, to crush the Armenian and other 17 (Kurdish) resistors to Turkish national authority. With Turkish nationalist military and diplomatic successes in Anatolia, the Treaty of Sevres was, in effect, overturned. Soviet motives in extending this aid and support to Turkey were both economic and political. Economically, the Soviets hoped to gain Turkish support for Soviet presence in the Caucasus so as 18 to be able to trade with the outside world. Politically, a friendly Turkey and Persia, as well as Soviet control of the Caucasus and in Azerbaijan were seen as the "...entering wedge in 62

19 the drive to undermine British interests in the Near East." There were also strong hopes of furthering the "revolution" in Turkey and Persia. To this end, a Soviet Central Asian Bureau under the Department of International Propaganda was established in 1919 and was entrusted to the Turkish revolutionary Mustafa Suphi. The Bureau soon had twelve sections: Arab, Persian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, Burkharan, Kurghiz [Caucasus] 20 Mountaineers, Kalmak, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and India. 21 Activities in Persia and Turkey were centered in Baku and were assisted in 1921 by the establishment of universities to train Asians in Communist ideology, infiltration, and propaganda 22 techniques. The Soviet government took this action upon themselves partially because as early as July 1920, they realized that the Turkish revolution was primarily anti-European and not 23 oriented toward the masses. Additionally, the Soviets saw the establishment of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan in April 1920 as beneficial to their goal of sovietization of the East: Red Turkestan has played the role of a revolutionary beacon for Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan, India, Bukhara, and Khiva. Now Soviet Azerbaijan with its old and experienced revolutionary proletariat and its sufficiently consolidated Communist Party (Gummet) will become revolutionary beacons for Persia, Arabia, and Turkey. It will bear a direct influence on the Transcaspian regions via Krasnovodsk. The fact that the Azerbaijani language can be understood by the Istanbul Turks and the Tabriz Persians and the Kurds, as well as by the Turkic tribes of the Transcaspian region and the Armenians and Georgians, will only increase the political significance of Soviet Azerbaijan for the East. From there it will be possible to disturb the British in Persia, to stretch a friendly hand to Arabia, to lead the revolutionary movement in Turkey until it takes the form of a class revolution. 63

The implications for Turkey and Persia were to either work

with the Soviet government, or be subjected to Communist infiltration through discontented tribes and other groups. The British in Mesopotamia and Mosul also faced difficulties with regard to controlling the Kurdish tribes and populace there. The Turks, still heavily interested in the Mosul vilayet propagandized the Kurds who were as previously discussed, not overly 25 enthusiastic about possible Arab control of the area. The Turks were still interested in Mosul for reasons of oil, past history of possession, and the fear that a Kurdish autonomous province in the area would threaten their own control over the Kurds in 26 Turkey. In addition to Mahmud ' s revolts and intrasigence in Mosul, after the British-French settlement over Syria and Faisal's installation in Mesopotamia as Emir, the British were faced with further Kurdish intransigence when the Kurds of Suleimaniyah, Arbil, and Kirkuk refused to participate in the referendum of 27 July 1921 which was to legitimize Faisal's rule. s By mid-1922, regardless of the provisions of Sevres, the Kurds had been defeated militarily by the Turks, Persians, and British. All their leaders had either been discredited or, as in the case of Sharif Pasha, were not in a position to take any action. Additionally, the British found themselves in a situation where they had to counter what was perceived as Soviet influence in Turkey and Persia, as well as among the tribes, and were in a position where the ownership of Mosul and its oil was still disputed. Another factor for the loss of Great Power support for the Kurds which should be considered is that they, unlike the 64

Arabs, had not been allied to the British during the war and had in fact, fought them and the Russians. With the loss of Armenia to Turkey, and subsequently Armenian support; after Sevres the Kurds had no real ability to influence Great Britain in their favor except in the Mosul area. The first Lausanne conference convened on 20 November, 1922 and the final acts were signed on 24 July 1923. Several provisions of Sevres had been altered in the negotiations and all references to an "independent Kurdistan" were deleted. The United States, which had previously championed the rights of minorities, was, at Lausanne, a non-voter. The U.S. position, however, was stated in

a memorandum from Allen Dulles to the Secretary of State. U.S. interests fell under several categories: capitulations, commerce, education and missionary activity, claims, the Straits, minorities, 2 8 and international financial control of Turkey. The strength of the Kemalist government in Anatolia made several of these objectives unobtainable, and the U.S., with regard to minorities, was 29 concerned only with the Christian ones remaining in Turkey. Trade and freedom of the Seas interests dominated other U.S. efforts and as long as the "Open Door" could be maintained and the Dardenelles kept open, U.S, isolationist tendencies did not permit further efforts at arbitration. The British raised the minorities question at Lausanne, with a view toward control of Mosul, but were countered by the Turkish negotiator, Ismet Inonu who claimed that "...if minorities were to be heard, those of Ireland, India and Egypt should appear also." He additionally maintained with regard to the Kurds that "... there 65

were no Moslem minorities in Turkey, for no distinction was made either in theory or in practice between the various elements of 31 the Moslem population." Ismet Inonu also saw it as his duty to press for as much of the vilayet of Mosul as he could. The British disputed Turkish claims to this province and put forth an Iraqi census of 1920 which showed 494,007 Kurds; 166,941 Arabs; 38,652 Turks; 61,336 Christians; 11,897 Jews; and 26,275 Yazidis 32 (total 799,090) residing in the vilayet . While Ismet made the same claims as to there being no such thing as a Kurd, the British persisted and Lausanne was signed with the Mosul question unresolved. This, as has been shown, led to further British-ArabTurko-Kurdish frictions. It appeared, that in all, other interests of the Great Powers, 33 who really "...made no pretense of interest in the Kurds," coupled with Turkish control of Anatolia, British desires not to yield on Mosul, and a U.S. desire not to get heavily involved,

caused the Kurdistan which was created at Sevres to be deleted from the Treaty of Lausanne. Because of the new boundaries, the Kurds were divided as follows: Southwestern Turkey 2,000,000; northwestern Persia 750,000; northern Iraq 700,000; northeastern 34 Syria 250,000; and the USSR up to 100,000. C. POST-LAUSANNE EUROPEAN ACTIONS TO 1944 European actors were involved in at least three major issues which affected the Kurds during this period. They were the Mosul Question, the Tripartite treaty of 1926, and World War II efforts. 66

1. The Mosul Question The Mosul question, unresolved at Lausanne, was referred to the League of Nations for determination. On 28 January 1925 a three-man delegation led by M. af Wirsen, who was assisted by Count Teleki and Colonel Paulus, arrived at Mosul and commenced interviews and surveys to determine the nature and desires of the 35 population. They found a variegated group, some of whom were strongly pro-Arab and some of whom were pro-Turk. Feelings had been polarized due to the propaganda and other efforts of the British and the Turks since about 1920. Additionally, the commission was hampered in its work by lack of knowledge of local 3 6 customs and an insufficient command of 'the language in the area. One comment made at the time described their difficulties: "So various are the communities that exist here and so confusing are the local politics that it defies the genius of any sincere searcher after truth to know where to begin, and having begun, 37 where to end. " Besides having to deal with a Turkish delegation led by 3 8 Jevad Pasha, and the British High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs,

who on 7 February was "... convinced that the commission now 39 realized that Mosul belonged to Iraq and was an Arab town," the commission also had to visit with local delegations of Assyrians, Chaldeans, Shebaks, Turkomans, Kurds, village Arabs 40 and Bedouin Shammar. To say the least, they were confronted with a confusing situation. By 25 February, Turkish irregular military encroachments were reported to have ceased but copies of a pamphlet by one Hashim Nahid which urged Kurds to declare 67

41 for Turkey, were being distributed throughout the area. It was probable that the need for Turkish troops to combat Sheikh Said's revolt was a primary causative factor in the troop withdrawal by Turkey during this period. Reasons for Turkey's concern over Mosul have already been described but Arnold Toynbee, while at Angora in 1924 found that economic and strategic reasons were not primary to the Turks. After he had discussions with then Prime Minister, Ra'uf Bey, Toynbee came away with the clear impression 42 that Turks were concerned over Mosul due to the Kurdish question. Their aims were to gain suzerainty over their "brothers" to the south as well as to prevent an autonomous Mosul from influencing the Kurds in Anatolia. 43 The commission concluded its work by 23 March 1925 and found that the Kurds of the area dreaded Arab rule more than they did Turkish administration but, rather than either of these alter44 natives, they preferred the British mandate government. The League Commission also did not accept the Turks' definition of the

Kurds as brothers and found that the vilayet only had a 3 percent 45 Turkish population. It appeared then that strong representations to the commission which were anti-Turk, coupled with the Sheikh Said revolt which "... had destroyed the fiction of Turco-Kurdish 46 friendship and solidarity," and a willingness on the part of the Kurdish majority to accept a British mandate influenced the final decision. By December 1925 the League had decided to award the 47 Mosul Vilayet to Iraq under a British Mandate.


2. The Tripartite Treaty; Iraq, Turkey , and United Kingdom5 June 1926 Despite the League award, the Turks and Iraqis (British) were still at odds over the Mosul issue, and in particular over the frontier line to be drawn. All three powers had by this time had to quell Kurdish revolts in their territory and were motivated to settle the issue so that they could concentrate their efforts on consolidating their holdings. As late as March 1926 the Turks were resorting to the tactic of insisting that since they were not a member of the League of Nations, its Council decisions were 48 not binding. Even after the treaty was signed, there was some deliberation in the Turkish heirarchy as to whether to go to war 49 rather than to ratify the treaty. The decision was made, however, due to lack of resources and the need to consolidate territorial holdings, to ratify the treaty. This decision was made only after 50 5 hours of heated debate on 9 June 1926 as opposed to a one hour debate and unanimous decision in Iraq on 14 June 1925. The treaty itself, as signed by Sir Ronald Lindsay and Tewfik Rushdi Bey contained the following main provisions: 1) The Brussels

line was to be accepted as the frontier (Turkey would receive a small slice of northern Mosul) , 2) the frontier was to be inviolable, 3) a final frontier was to established by joint commission in three months, 4) a general amnesty would be effected in Iraq, 5) people in Mosul would be allowed to choose Turkish nationality, 6) Turkey was to receive 10 percent of oil revenues for 25 years, and 7) a neutral zone, in which no insurgent bands could be formed, would be established on both sides of the 69

52 frontier. Other lessons learned during the Mosul question, which directly applied to and resulted from problems with the Kurds were incorporated in the treaty. Articles 6, 7 , and 8 expressly provided for the opposition of "... any preparations made by one or more armed individuals with the object of commiting acts 53 of pillage or brigandage in the neighboring frontier zone.../" and that reciprocal information exchange regarding such bands 54 would be undertaken. Additionally, article 12 was a mutual guarantee to refrain from . . . all correspondence of an official or political nature with the chiefs, sheikhs, or other members of tribes which are nationals of the other State and which are actually in the territory of that State . . . They shall not permit in the frontier zone any organization for propaganda or meeting directed against either State. "55 3. World War II Efforts The advent of World War II drew still another European actor, Nazi Germany, into the Kurdish arena. In Secret Protocal number 1 of the Russo-German negotiations on spheres of influence in the Near and Middle East of November 1940, it was agreed that the Soviet Union had unopposed territorial ambitions "...south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the 56 Indian Ocean." Additionally, in Secret Protocal number 2, Germany, Italy, and the USSR agreed to try to "...detach Turkey

from her existing international committments..." and to deal with 57 Turkey over the extent of her possessions. These agreements set the stage particularly after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, in which a Soviet-Nazi propaganda battle was to take place in both Turkey and Persia. One of the focal points in this battle was 7Q

to be eastern Turkey and western Persia, as well as in Northern Iraq. As reported in the Times of London , however, German efforts in Iraq were not all that successful and despite the efforts of a Herr Grobba, as of 23 May 1941 there was "... no evidence that the Kurds of northern Iraq have adhered to the rebel (Rashid Ali) 58 government." As has been previously discussed, there were small Kurdish revolts in Iraq in the wake of the Rashid Ali coup and possibly one, Shaikh Mahmud ' s , may have been influenced by Herr Grobba' s propaganda. German actions in Turkey and in Iran took a two-edged effort. On the one hand their agents .have been most active in stirring up trouble among the Kurdish tribes; on the other their propagandists in Turkey have been spreading rumors to the effect that the Russians, to be seconded when the time is ripe, by the British, are giving encouragement to an independent Kurdistan, which would encroach on the eastern provinces of Turkey. "59 As has been shown, both the Nazis and the Soviets were active in Iran among the Kurds in the early 1940* s. The Soviets especially, as early as 1942, had established. links with several Kurdish aghas 6 in Iran subsequent to the partition of that country. In any event, actions, or rumors of them, of instigation of the Kurdish tribes were sufficient to warrant at least one visit to the east by Turkish Premier Shukru Sarucoglu in August 1942.

Despite the actions of German agents, British and Soyiet control of the area was strong enough that by 1944 there was no real threat of Nazi-Kurdish cooperation in the area. The Soviets, however, were taking their "sphere of interest" aspirations 71

seriously and weEe attempting to consolidate their interests in Iran and in other areas of the Middle East. On 30 October 194 3, it was reported that the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Relations Ivan M. Maidky was visiting the entire area with a view to extending relations between what had been the traditional links with 6 2 Iran and Turkey. Some of these efforts were successful, as on 1 January 1944, the Soviets and Iraqis agreed to establish diplo63 matic relations. The largest Soviet effort, however, was to occur in Iran. Soviet motives were to gain access to oil concessions and to "fraternally assist" the Iranian Tudeh (masses) Party in its efforts to revolutionize the country. The situation in Kurdistan also by 1944 appeared attractive to the Soviets. The year 1944 saw Azerbaijan and Kurdistan filled with Soviet political officers and other agents, mostly Moslems from Soviet Azerbaijan. The work in Kurdistan centered around the Soviet consulate at Rezaieh, attached to which was at least one of the Soviet Union's 100,000 Kurds, known as 'Captain Jafarov, ' who wandered freely among the tribesmen and villagers in Kurdish dress. 64 After 1944, through overt support and propaganda efforts, the Soviets were able to infiltrate the Iranian Kurdish nationalist society, the Komala in Mahabad. These links, as will be discussed below, were to prove crucial to the formation of the Mahabad Republic in 1945. It was interesting to note that prior to this Soviet activity in Iranian Kurdistan, they had endorsed the Teheran Tripartite Statement of 1 December 1943. This read in part: "The Governments of the United States of America, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and ft ft territorial integrity of Iran." At least as early as 1940, 72

Soviet efforts to consolidate to consolidate their position, one factor of which, was to he support for Kurdish nationalists, were in place. Further evidence of post-war troubles were disputes with Mohammed Said's Iranian government over oil concessions in fi 7 October-November 1944 as well as the veiled threat in Tass of 25 December 1944 that "A movement is continuing among 'broad masses' ft Q in Northern Iran for the creation of a 'democratic government'." D. REGIONAL ACTORS: EFFORTS AT CONTROL Although the settlement of the Mosul question and the Tripartite treaty appeared to be a solution at least to KurdishTurkish-Iraqi problems, there were also earlier treaties enacted between the regional actors which had implications for control of Kurdish cross-border support. Article V of the Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship of 1921 prohibited "...the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organizations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against 69 Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia." Similarly, Article VIII of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship of 16 March 1921 prohibited organizations which would wage warfare against each other or claiming to be the Government of the other country. The Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality between Persia and the USSR of 1 October 1927, possibly after consideration of the Kurdish revolts up to that time, repeated the prohibition of subversive organizations and even went so far in Article 4 to " prohibit military enrollment and the introduction into their 73

territory of armed forces, arms, ammunition, and all other war material intended ... for those organization." While these treaty provisions were a start toward regional control of subversive groups, including the Kurds, there were no agreements binding between Turkey and Persia, or Persia and Iraq. After the 1930 revolt of Ishan Nuri, however, which was supported from Syria, Persia, Iraq, and probably Soviet Armenia, the countries moved gradually toward a regional non-aggression agreement. Turkish politicians had been extremely agitated by the lack of Persian action to control the Kurds in 1930. As stated by the Turkish periodical Akcham during the revolt, the Turkish people

72 "...view with alarm the stupid attitude of our neighbor." Additionally Djumhuriet mentioned that "Meanwhile the attitude of the Persian Government has caused a regrettable impression on 73 Turkish public opinion." In addition to hot pursuit methods of containing the Kurds, the Turks pressed in July 1930 for Persia to 79 cede Mount Ararat to Turkey. Negotiations over this issue continued for about two years until 30 May 1932 when Persia ceded Little Ararat to Turkey in return for some territory on the 75 southern border. Renewed revolts of Sheikhs Mahmud and Ahmed in the early 1930 's continued to cause Turko-Iraqi and Persian frictions and with Iraq's pending independence, Feisal visited Turkey in July 76 1931 in what can be viewed as a prelude to the Saadabad Pact. Iraqi -Turk negotiations were followed up by Turko-Persian negoti77 ations in December 1931. By 9 January 1932, Turkey and Iraq had signed a treaty on trade with extradition provisions which 74

78 could be useful against Kurdish cross-border support. This treaty was followed by a similar treaty in November 1932 between 79 Turkey and Persia. Again extradition provisions were included. By April 1934, there were rumors connected with the Shah's expected visit to Turkey that the formation of a Near-Eastern Bloc was 80 likely. There was even some speculation that the Soviets were interested in joining this bloc. It was reported in March 1935 that Soviet Ambassador L. M. Karakhan, Turkey's Rassif Bey, and

Persia's M. Sayed had been conferring in Moscow over frontier 81 issues. Apparently, however, Soviet overtures were rejected and a Pact of Non-aggression between Turkey, Persia, Iraq, and 82 Afghanistan was announced on 13 January 1936. The pact was 8 3 signed by the powers in July 1937, following Sayyid Riza's revolt, and it was no surprise that Turkey had been a prime mover in getting this Saadabad Pact enacted. While the Pact dealt with several issues, including the right to self-defense and promises of non-aggression, Article 7 appeared to be aimed directly at the Kurdish nationalists and tribes which had troubled three of the four signatories since the end of World War I. It read: Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent, within his respective frontiers, the formation or activities of armed bands, associations or organizations to subvert the established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the territory of another Party, or to change the constitutional system of such other party. 84 Although French Syria was not a signatory to the Pact, there was also evidence of Franco-Iraqi cooperation against the Kurds. In the 1937 Jezirah revolts when arms destined for Kurdish insurgents 75

were captured in Syria, the Iraqis were apparently concerned enough to send General Eussein Fawzi Cwho had been on maneuvers 8 5 with the Turkish Army) to inspect the arms. Methods inside each regional country varied to some extent for control over their Kurdish populations. Turkish deportations and Independence Tribunals, as well as failure to even acknowledge the existance of Kurds have already been discussed. The policy was essentially, in light of persistent revolts, one of repression and detribalization attempts following each revolt. Persian and French policy was to try to attract the Kurds to a superior

8 6 culture coupled with attempts to disarm and detribalize all 87 tribes. An assessment of Persian policy was provided in December 1933: "The tribes are said to be peaceful, subdued, and disarmed. The first is at the moment true, the second is doubtful, and the 88 third untrue." This same report blamed much of the failure of Persia's Kurdish and tribal policy to too much centralization of authority under Reza Shah, coupled with an incompetent and irresponsible bureaucracy. In Iraq, a policy of repression and exile of Kurdish insurgents was combined with the policy of allowing those Kurds who would cooperate, to participate in government. It has also been argued that Faisal I did not want to eliminate the Sheiks (Arab or Kurd) after 1932 and independence because he needed their tribal military power to offset each other and exter89 nal threats .


E. KURDISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS In addition to tribally led revolts from 1918-1944, Kurdish intellectuals both, on international and regional levels began to organize themselves in various political groups. These groups were the Khoybun , the Hewa Party, the Pan-Iranian League, the Komala, and the Shursh group. Links were forged between these groups and with other groups such as the Armenian Socialist Revolutionary Federation ( Dashnakzutium ) and the Iraqi Communist Party. 1. The Khoybun The Khoybun (Kurdish League for Independence) was first formed at the end of World War I in Paris by Sharif Pasha with, as previously discussed, the aim of negotiating with the Great Powers for an independent Kurdistan. The name was also used to denote the name of the ill-fated Kurdish state which was proclaimed in Turkey during the 1927 revolt. As Arfa describes the organization, its aims were "...the ultimate independence of the Kurdish nation, theoretically within the regions where the Kurds 90 were in the majority." Its leaders were primarily liberal

91 intellectuals interested in a westernized form of democracy and although it maintained links with local Kurdish groups, the organization maintained itself as an international body outside of Kurdistan. By 1942, it had headquarters in Beirut and large branches in Damascus and Paris and was led by Kamuran of the 92 Syrian Badr Khan family. For this reason, Eagleton described it as "...a small group of exiles" who represented almost no one actually in Kurdistan." 93 77

The group was important however, not only for its international links, But also for its ability as an outside group, to coordinate the efforts of other Kurdish groups. At least one of the external links was to the Armenian Socialist Revolution Federation, led by a M. Varandian in Geneva. In November 19 25, this group came out against Turkish repression and for Kurdish emancipation. In a speech to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Socialist and Labor International in London, Varandian stated: After exterminating the Armenian peoples and expelling the Greeks from Asia Minor, the Nationalist Turkish Government has now set about annihalating the Kurds so as to transform Asia Minor into an all-Turkish territory and to secure the triumph of the Pan-Turkish idea. In order to defend their very existence against this ruthless policy, the Kurds some months ago [Sheikh Said] rose in rebellion. The Turkish government answered with blood and iron applied to the whole Kurdish population. Now the first phase of the struggle is settled. Turkish troops are occupying Kurdish territory and the courts-martial are at work. Already more than 200 leaders of the movement have been hanged and several thousands of innocent men and women have been massacred and their homes given over to pillage. But this does not mean that the Kurdish revolutionaries have given up the cause of liberation of their people. ^ 4 After the 1927 revolt and during the 1930 revolt the presence of the Khoybun and its role of coordination was alluded to. In 1928 one report stated that "There is outside Turkey a Kurdish national movement, with groups of young adherents who sometimes bear very distinguished names. It has head95 quarters in Paris and at least one other in the Soviet Union.' "

Another report during the 1930 revolt asserted that a large "... secret, wealthy foreign propaganda organization is behind


9.6 the Ararat revolt

" At least two known splinters, of the

Khoybun were known to exist. One was the Kurdish. Union of the Friends of Liberty Calso known as the Association of the Friends of the Kurds) led by Sheikh Selaheddine which has already been discussed. Another, also in Turkey, and also led by Sheikh 97 Selaheddine was the Association of Northern Kurdistan. The Khoybun was also later, in the 1930' s and 1940' s, to provide 98 moral support to the Hewa Party and the Komala and in August 1944, provided the map of "Greater Kurdistan" which was agreed 99 on as a claim by several Kurdish groups. 2 . The Pan-Iranian League This group, led by Ishan Nuri of the 193 revolt, deserves some mention in that it may have been linked to the Khoybun and during the 1930' s carried out Pan-Iranian agitations in Turkey. Its basic platform was not for Kurdish nationalism but rather for a community of Iran and Kurdistan against "alien" Turks, Arabs and Semitic influences. 3. The Hewa Party The Hewa (hope) party derived its name from a youth organization in Constantinople in 1908 but was formed in Iraq as a Kurdish nationalist political group during the Mandate period, and may have grown from the Kurdish National Defense * 102 Organization formed in Mosul during 1925. It was dominated by educated, urban, purely Kurdish nationalist elements and had a major advantage over the Khoybun in that it was actually located in Kurdish territory. The party was first located in


Kirkuk and rapidly grew with branches in Baghdad, Suleimaniyah, 104 and Mosul. Some indications of its early actions, before it joined with tribal forces, occurred in 1930 over the proposed Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Riots were reported in several Kurdish cities and also protests were sent to the League of Nations 105 demanding guarantees of Kurdish rights. These rights were further delineated in 194 3 by ex-Captain Izzet Abd-el-Aziz in negotiations with the Nuri Sa ' id government. The Hewa, by this 10 6 time led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, demanded a Kurdish autonomous province to include Kirkuk, Suleimaniyah, Arbil, Dehok, and Khanaquin; a Special Minister for Kurdish Affairs in the Iraqi cabinet, an assistant Kurdish Minister in each Ministry, and provisions for cultural, economic and agricultural 107 autonomy . A major impact provided by this party was its links in 1942 to the Komala in Iran, and the advice on organization 108 which it was to provide. There was also evidence that members of this party had established ties with the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) . In 1935, the ICP issued a manifesto in which "...complete independence to the Kurds and of their 109 cultural rights was proposed." Tribal and intellectual frictions surfaced within the Hewa in the later 1940' s and ultimately resulted in its split. 4. The Shursh Group During 1943, another group of Iraqi Kurds formed themselves into the Shursh (Revolution) group. These Kurds were 80

urban intelligentsia but were Marxist-Leninist in philosophy and acted as the organ of the Iraqi Communist Party in Kurdistan. While they were only a splinter organization, they were to provide a leftist input to later Kurdish nationalist actions as well as a strong Kurdish input in the late 1940' s and early 1950 's, into the Iraqi Communist Party. 5. The Komala The Komala-i-Zhian-i Kurdistan (Committee for the regeneration/resurrection/life of Kurdistan) was formed on 16 September 1942 in Iran by a group of middle class Mahabadi 112 Kurds. Members joining it were subjected to secrecy and had to take an oath not to betray the Kurdish nation, to work for self-government, not to disclose secrets, to remain a member 113 for life, and not to join other parties. By April of 1943 114 a Central Committee was elected, chaired by Rahman Zabihi and by the end of 1944 it had spread through all of Northern Kurdistan. Although this was initially an Iranian Kurdish organization, the early members looked to the Hewa party of Iraq, represented by Mir Haj at the founding, for advice and as the "senior" Kurdish political party. Additionally, visits were exchanged between the two parties for advice and mutual 116 support through the summer of 1944. Although the party was initially middle class, it established tribal links also with 117 the Herkis, Shakkaks , and other local tribes. Tribal leaders joined primarily to avoid "missing" the political bandwagon, and 118 to avoid being subject to the Azerbaijanis . 81

Although there were Soviet efforts, as discussed, to infiltrate this group, they did not really come to fruition until later in 1945. Through 1944, the party was primarily Kurdish nationalist and was, with the Hewa party, a major mover in the August 1944 signing between Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian Kurds, of the Peman i Se Senar (Three borders pact) at Mount 119

Dalanpur in furtherance of the goal of "Greater Kurdistan." By October, 1944, partially to further appeal to the Kurdish chiefs, the "reactionary" Qazi Mohammed, future president of 120 the Mahabad Republic, joined the party. F. CONCLUSIONS External political influences played a large part from 1918-1944 both in the creation of the stillborne Kurdish state, and later in its division and repression. As has been shown, the fate of the Kurdish state rested on the moves and countermoves between Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Persia, and the Soviet Union. With the loss of the Sevres provisions and the rise of new nation-states with nationalist ideologies of their own, the Kurds took to revolt and also began to form political organizations. The problems which they caused were met in some instances with outright military repression and in other instances, with efforts at conciliation. The turbulence in the area culminated in the signing of the Saadabad Pact as a regional control instrument. The rise of regional Kurdish political groups was not really a major factor until the late 82

1930* s and early 194Q's when these small groups of intellectuals realized the need to join with tribal leaders so as to obtain forces in the field. The presence of large groups of dissident Kurds in the area provided numerous levers which could be pulled by various external powers in their conflicts and disputes. With the advent of World War II, Soviet interests in the area, first shown in 1918, became much greater. These Soviet interests were to be coupled with support for the union between Kurdish tribes and political leaders in Iran in 194 5 and would lead to the rise of the Mahabad Republic.



Tripartite CSykes-Picot) Agreement for the Partition of the Ottoman Empire: Britain, France, and Russia 26 April23 October 1916 in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record : 1914-1956, Vol. II, (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 18-22. 2

Soviet Appeal to Muslim Workers in Russia and the East, 3 December 1917 in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East , p. 27. 3 Quoted in Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East 1920-1927 , Stanford, Ca. : Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 26. 4 Telegram, Secretary of State for India to Political Section, Baghdad 9 May 1919, Phillip W. Ireland, Iraq (New York: Russell and Russell, 1937), p. 186. 5 U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States , The Paris Peace Conference 1919, Vol. VII, (1946), p. 858. U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States , The Paris Peace Conference 1919, Vol. XII, (1947), p. 821. 7 C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," The Journal of Contemporary History , VI No. 1 (1971), 90. U.S., Department of State, Vol. XII, p. 800. 9 ibid . , p. 836 . 10 > * Political Clauses of the Treaty of Sevres, 10 August 1920, in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East , p. 83. ibid . 12 The Turkish National Pact, 28 January 1920, in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East , p. 75. "My Nationality," Ziya Gokalp, 1923, in Niyazi Berkes, ed. , Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization, Selected 84

Essays of Ziya Gokalp , (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) , p. 44.





"Villager and the Commune," Ziya Gokalp, 1923, in ibid . , p. 141. 16 Richard G. Hovannisian, "Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente," International Journal of Middle East Studies, IV (1973), 137.


ibid., 129.

18 Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East 1920-1927 , p. 55. 19 ibid. , p. 91.






23 ibid.

p. 78. p. 83. p. 87. p. 81.


Speech of M. Sultan-Galiev, in ibid., p. 96.

25 C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," The Middle East Journal , XI No. 1, (Winter, 1947), 58. 26 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East , (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 37.


Philip W. Ireland, Iraq , p. 333.

28 Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey , 1914-1924, (.Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 383.


ibid. , p. 395.


Roderic H. Davidson, "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After," The Middle East Journal , VII No. 3, (Summer 1953) , 339. 31 ibid . , This comment can be considered to be somewhat obscuratinist when one considers that the Turkish Sunni Muslims are of the Hanifi school and the Kurdish Sunnis are of the Shaffiite school. There is also in Turkey a Kurdish Shiite minority of Alewites. See Vali p. 52. 32 Henry A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq , (New York: Russell and Russell, 1935), p. 165. 33 ibid . , p. 152 . 34 Population estimates as to the Kurds are just that, estimates. No combined census data between countries has been undertaken and considering the Turkish definition of Kurds as mountain Turks, none is likely to be. Robert F. Zeidner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq Government," Middle Eastern Affairs , X No. 1 (January, 1959), 26. 35 "In the Mosul Vilayet," Times of London, March 7, 1925, p. 11 and "The Mosul Commission," Times of London , March 20, 1925, p. 13.

36 "Commissioners at Mosul," Times of London , Feb. 24, 1925, p. 11. ibid . 38 "Iraq Commission," Times of London , Feb. 21, 1925, p. 11. 39 "Commissioners at Mosul," p. 11. ibid. ibid . 42 Henry A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq , p. 174. 43 "The Mosul Commission," Times of London , March 30, 1925, p. 13. 44 Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq," The Middle East Journal , XVII Nos . 1 and 2 (Winter-Spring, 1963), 70. 86

45 "Mosul Question," Times of London , Sept. 10, 1925, p. 12. 46 "Kurd and Turk," Times of London , Apr. 7, 1928, p. 11. 47 "Awards Mosul to Britain," New York Times , March 12, 1926, p. 5. ibid. 49 "Turks Dislike Treaty," New York Times , June 8, 1926, p. 3.

Turkey Ratifies Treaty, New York Times , June 9, 1926, p. 5. "Mosul Treatv Ratified in Baghdad," New York Times , June 15, 1926, p. 12. 52 "Explains Mosul Compact," New York Times , June 7, 1926, p. 2. 53 Frontier Treaty: The United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey, 5 June 1926, in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East , p. 145. 54... , ibid . 55.,.-, ibid . 56 Russo-German Negotiations For a Projected Soviet Sphere of Influence in the Near and Middle East, November 1940, in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East , p. 229. ibid . 58 "An Unpopular Revolt," Times of London , May 23, 1941, p. 3. 59 "Turco Russian Amity," Times of London , May 20, 1942. 60 Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Madabad," The Middle East Journal , I No. 3 (July, 1947), 251. C "I "Persian Premier to Tour East," New York Times , Aug, 29, 1942, p. 6.


62 "Russian Eyes Turn to Mid-East Areas," New York Times , Oct. 3(2, 1243, p. 3. 63 "Iraq-Soviet Tie Reported," New York Times , Jan. 2, 1944, Sec. I, p. 17. 64 Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," 251. ibid . 252. 66 "Text of Statement on Iran," New York Times , Dec. 7, 1943, p. 4. 67 "Soviet Scolds Iran for Denying its Oil," New York Times , Oct. 30, 1944, p. 5 and "Soviet Hits Said Again," New York Times , Nov. 4, 1944, p. 3. Said was here accused of following an "AntiSoviet" policy and the Iranians were stated by a Soviet Broadcast to be "indignant about and disgusted with Said's government." 68 "New Teheran Governor," New York Times , Dec. 25, 1944, p. 9. 69 Treaty of Friendship: Persia and Russia, 26 February 12 December 1921, in J. C. Hurewitz , Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East , p. 91. 70 Treaty of Friendship: Turkey and Russia, 16 March 1921, in ibid . , p. 96 . 71 Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality: Persia and the USSR, 1 October 1927, in ibid . , p. 155.

72 "Turkey Asks Persia to Halt Kurd Raids," New York Times , July 6, 1930, p. 9. ibid . 74 "To Ask Boundary Change," New York Times , July 15, 1930, p. 7. 75 "Persia Cedes Little Ararat to Turkey in an Exchange," New York Times , May 30, 1932, p. 1. 76 "Feisal to Visit Kemal, for Border Solution," New York Times , July 6, 1931, p. 71. 88

77 "Seeks Turco-Persia Border Pact," New York Times , Dec. 22, 1931, p. 26. 78 "Turkey and Iraq Sign Treaties," New York Times , Jan. 9, 1932, p. 7. 79 "Turkish-Persian Pacts Signed," New York Times , Nov. 6, 1932, p. 8. 80 "Britian not Interested," New York Times , Apr. 24, 1934, p. 10. 81 "Russians Envisage Near Eastern Pact," New York Times , March 6, 1935, p. 11.

82 "Triple Entente," New York Times , Jan. 13, 1936, p. 11. 83 "Turkey in Amity Pact with Three Neighbors , " New York Times , July 10, 1937, p. 1. 84 Treaty of Nonagression (Sa'Dabad Pact): Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, 8 July 1937, in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East , p. 215. 8 5 "Kurd Munitions Taken," New York Times , Aug. 14, 19 37, p. 4. 8 fi Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye , The United States and Turkey and Iran , (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952) , p. 188. 87 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Peoples Republic: Their Rise and Fall," Studies on the Soviet Union , XI No. 4, (1971), 410. 88 "Nationalism Used to Cement Persia," New York Times , Dec. 10, 1933, Sec. Ill, p. 2. 89 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq , (.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978) , p. 1Q1. 90 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , (.New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) , p. 124. ibid . 89

92 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish. Republic of 1946 , CNew York: Oxford University Press, 12.631, p. 33. 93 _ . , ibid. 94 "Turks Accused of Cruelty Against Kurdish People," New York Times , June 17, 19.26, Sec. VIII, p. 8. 95 "Kurd and Turk," Times of London , Apr. 7, 1928, p. 11. 96 "Turks Draft New Note of Protest to Persia," New York Times , July 30, 1930, p. 11. 97 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 39. ibid . , p. 124 . 99 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , pp. 36-37. Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporous , (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 295. William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , Sa'ad N. Jawad asserts that the Hewa was founded in 19 3 9 and did not appeal to the Kurdish intellectuals because of its right wing orientation. In this assessment it appears that he confused the Hewa with its splinter - right wing faction the "Freedom Group" which was formed in 1945. See Abbas Kelidar, ed . , The Integration of Modern Iraq , p. 181. 102 "Commissioners at Mosul," Times of London , Feb. 24, 1925, p. 11. William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 33. 104 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 120.

1Q5 New York Times , July 28, 1930, p. 6. 10 6 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 52. 107 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 121.


108 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 33. 109 Hanna Batatu, The. Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq , p. 437. 110.,., c ,~ ibid., p. 512. 11:L ibid. , p. 649-50. 112 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , pp. 33-34. Archie Roosevelt, Jr. asserted that the organization was formed in August 1943 and translated its Kurdish name as the "Committee Of Kurdish Youth." See Archie Roosevelt, Jr. "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," The Middle East Journal , July 1947. Eagleton and others state that the word zhian has been interpreted incorrectly as "youth" when the Kurdish word for youth is actually j uwan . The founders of the Komala were Rahman Halavi, Muhammed Amin Sharafi, Muhammed Nanavazadeh, Rahman Zabihi, Husain Furuhar (Zagani) , Abdul Rahman Emami, Qasim Qaderi, Mulla Abdullah Daudi, Qader Mudarisi, Ahmad Ilmi, Aziz Yendi, Muhammed Yahu, and Mir Haj from Iraq [HEWA] ; Eagleton p. 133. 113., ., , c ibid . , p. 35 . 114 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 77. William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 33. lbid. , p. 36 .

117., ... , ibid . , p. 35 . 118 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 73. 119 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 38. 120., ., , Q ibid. , p. 39 .


IV. THE KURDS FROM 19"45-19:58 At the close of World War II, the Kurds once again had an opportunity for an independent Kurdish state. The Mahabad Republic, unlike the one which was to have been created at the end of World War I, was not the creation of the Great Powers. Rather, it came into existence through the coincidence of at least three factors: the Soviet-British occupation of Iran and subsequent loss of Iranian central government control in northern Iran, Soviet designs to communize northern Iran, and the presence of organized Kurdish nationalists in a "shadow zone". The fall of this state was attributable directly to the withdrawal of Soviet support, dissension within Kurdish ranks, and the military preponderance of Iranian forces following the Soviet withdrawal. Other developments during this period of time which directly affected the Kurds were the influence of the Cold War and propaganda, continued Kurdish political development, and a regional pact which was backed by a superpower, the Baghdad Pact A. THE MAHABAD REPUBLIC 1. Political Prelude After the formation of the Komala, the Kurdish nationalists in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province, had a vehicle for Kurdish independence, or at least, autonomy. As this region was under Soviet control, the Soviets had, as discussed, maintained 92

links with, various Kurdish leaders. Throughout the war they maintained continuous contact with tribal leaders of the Jelali, Shakkak, and Herki tribes, but by late 1944 it had been decided to deal with and infiltrate the Komala rather than work through tribal leaders. This initial contact was accomplished via two

2 Soviet resident agents Abdullahov and Hajiov. Additionally, in early 1945, VOKS the Soviet State Propaganda ministry, approved the establishment in Mahabad of a Kurdish - Soviet cultural organization, the Anjoman-i-Farhangi-i-Kurdistan-u-Shurawi 3 (Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Relations Society) . Soviet motives in support of the Kurds were as follows. On the one hand, a "democratic" Kurdish Republic under Soviet tutelage could, in conjunction with an independent Azerbaijan, form a buffer between the West and part of the USSR's southern flank similar to the buffer which was to be created in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, such a state would also provide the Soviets with a location to weaken Turkey and Iraq and might serve as a wedge in further infiltration in the Middle East as 4 well as a way to break the ring of capitalist encirclement. The Soviets were faced with problems, however, in that the Komala was too loosely organized and too undisciplined for 5 efficient action. It was also dominated in their eyes by large landowners, feudal chiefs; and religious leaders. Another problem which the Soviets faced in dealing with the Komala , which was to persist even after the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) was formed, was the unwillingness of the Kurds to fully 93

cooperate with the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and the Communist Tudeh Party. To begin with, there was a latent 7 hostility between the Kurds and the Azeris along ethnic lines. There was also a wide gulf in class structure between the DPK and the Tudeh . "The gulf between the Tudeh Party and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan was even wider, for the latter, led

by local landlords, tribal chiefs, and religious leaders had no o pretense of carrying out a program of moderate reform" The primary reasons for Kurdish cooperation with the Soviets were not ideological, but rather, pragmatic. The Soviets were in physical control of the area, had espoused some sympathy for the Kurds, and the Kurds had hopes of a favorable post-war 9 settlement. In any event, Soviet moves toward support for the Kurds in Iran continued, and on September 12, 1945, Soviet Captain Namazaliev arranged a second visit of the prominent Kurdish chiefs, Qazi Mohammed, and Seif Qazi, to Baku. During this visit, after haggling between Qazi Mohammed and the Soviet Azerbaijani Baghirov over the nature of Kurdish independence, the Kurds were promised tanks, cannon, machine guns, and rifles as well as training and financial support. It was also during this visit that Baghirov insisted on the formation of the DPK 12 out of the Komala . Shortly after their return, Qazi Mohammed met with other Mahabadi Kurdish notables and announced the formation of the DPK in late September, 1945. The manifesto issued by Qazi Mohammed stated that the Kurdish people wished 94

"to take advantage of the liberation of the world from fascism 13 and to share in the promises- of the Atlantic Charter." Specifically, aims of the Kurds were listed as: 1) The Kurdish people in Iran should have freedom and selfgovernment in the administration of their local affairs, and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian state. 2) The Kurdish language should be used in education and be the official language in administrative affairs.

3) The provicial council of Kurdistan should be immediately elected according to constitutional law and should supervise and inspect all state and social matters. 4) All state officials must be of local origin. 5) A single law for both peasants and notables should be adopted and the future of both secured. 6) The Kurdish Democrat Party will make a special effort to establish unity and complete fraternity with the Azerbaijani people and the other peoples that live in Azerbaijan (Assyrians, Armenians, etc.) in their struggle. 7) The Kurdish Democrat Party will strive for the improvement of the moral and economic state of the Kurdish people through the exploration of Kurdistan's many natural resources, the progress of agriculture and commerce, and the development of hygiene and education. 8) We desire that the peoples living in Iran be able to strive freely for the happiness and progress of their country. 14 This proclamation, which also dissolved the Komala , led to some opposition of the tribal chiefs in the area, who despite some cooperation with the Soviets, were still distrustful of ultimate Soviet aims. Tribal dislike for the Soviets stemmed from historic, social, religious and economic reasons. " Further complications were caused for Qazi Mohammed in that he could not rely on the support of Kurdish tribes in Kordestan. That area of Iran had been occupied by the British, and Iranian cenIfi tral government control over the tribes had been maintained. This tenuous tribal support might have made the position of the 95

DPK in its later formation of the Mahahad Republic untenable but for the arrival of another actor, Mullah Mustafa Barzani of Iraq. 2. Mullah Mustafa's 1945 Revolt Mullah Mustafa realized that the intelligentsia of the Hewa party were not prepared to accept the realities of armed struggle, but he needed their support for logistics purposes. Additionally, he was not completely in agreement with all of their ideology and consequently on 12 February 1945 he formed, with Izzet Abd-el-Aziz, Mostafa Khoshnao, Abd-el Hamid Bager, Mohammed Mahmud, Ahmad Isma'il, Showkat Na'man, and Hefzollah 17 Isma'il, the "Freedom Group." The aims of this group were put

forth as to foster cooperation between all Kurdish tribes in Iraq, to accomplish the salvation of Iraqi Kurdistan, to establish contact with other liberal Kurdish parties, to send petitions to members of the foreign powers and publish propaganda, to struggle against the exploitation of the Iraqi govern18 ment, and to prepare armed forces. The Mullah was at first prepared to cooperate with the government of Nuri Sa'id, which had been somewhat conciliatory. With that government's fall in late 1944, the Iraqi government 19 began more repressive measures in Kurdistan. This, in turn, fueled Kurdish discontent and was a primary factor in the formation of the Freedom Group. Mullah Mustafa's group and the Hewa sent protests about suspected Iraqi actions to the British and 2Q U.S. Ambassadors through August 1945 but the Iraqi army moved 96

to control the Kurds. On 1Q August 1945, the Barzanis, assisted 21 by the Shivran and Milli Kurds, rose in revolt against the approaching Iraqi forces. The Iraqis were able to eventually 22 envelop the Kurdish forces by 25 September 1945. With his escape route to Turkey blocked by the Turkish army, and the untenable situation in Iraq, Mullah Mustafa, his brother Ahmed and some 10,000 followers, of which 1000 were insurgents, fled into 23 Iran on 30 September. By the end of October the Mullah's army had grown to 3000 armed men with British rifles, machine guns 24 and at least one field piece. Mullah Mustafa, his brother, and thirty three followers were later in December 1945 condemned 25 to death in absentia by the Iraqi government.

Also of interest in Iraq during this period was the continued growth of the Communist Kurdish elements. The Ruzkari Kurd (Party of Kurdish Liberation) was formed in 194 5 from an auxiliary of the earlier Shursh group. It was later, in 1946 in Iraq, to join with the Hewa and other nationalists to form the 2 £> Kurdish Democratic Party - Iraq (KDPI) . The name Ruzkari was also to be applied to the overall Kurdish nationalist front of the DPK, KDPI, Khoybun and other groups which joined in support of the Mahabad Republic. In this sense it denoted a united nationalist front organization. 3. Formation of the Republic With the arrival of Barzani ' s troops, formation of a political leadership, and Soviet support, the way was clear for the formation of the Mahabad Republic. Soviet support continued 97

in two ways. Tanks, planes, and artillery pieces were never to be given to the DPK but they did receive Soviet uniforms , training, and in December 1245, 12(30 rifles which the Soviets 27 had confiscated from the Iranian Gendarmerie. The Soviets also cooperated by keeping the Iranian central government forces out of the area. In October 1945, the Iranians attempted to enter the Mahabad region to quell an "...independence movement among shepherds and peasants," and were repelled by Soviet armed forces . There was also evidnece that Qazi Mohammed was attempting to dilute Soviet influence when in December 1945 he 29 approached the British for support, which was denied. The British were very concerned over any possible Kurdish autonomy in the area. Not only were they opposed to Soviet plans, but they were also concerned lest any Iranian - Iraqi Kurdish cooperation should threaten the oil-fields in the Mosul-Kirkuk area which were the main source of petroleum for the British Fleet. The Iraqis were very concerned about the collaboration of the Barzanis and the DPK, and Turkey also was watching the situation in Iran closely. The Turks, with their own sizeable Kurdish minority, and faced with claims by the USSR on Kars and Ardahan provinces, were wary of a possible Soviet-dominated Kurdistan in Iran. This was compounded by reports on 27 December 1945 that a new nationalist Kurdish organization had been formed

31 by the Soviets in eastern Turkey. As the Turks had commented previously in November regarding events in Iran, "This is not 32 an interior problem anymore . " 98

Qazi Mohammad felt sure enough, of support that following the Azerbaijani declaration of the establishment of their 33 "revolutionary government" on 16 December 1945, lie went ahead with plans for the Kurdish proclamation. In December 194 5 at Mahabad, accompanied by Soviet officers, Qazi Mohammed inaugu34 rated the Kurdish People's Government. This was followed by the formation of a 13 member parliament and the proclamation of 35 an autonomous Kurdish Republic on 22 January 1946. 4 . Demise of the Mahabad Republic The new government started off auspiciously. It sent observers to the Azerbaijan National Assembly and dispatched "General" Mullah Mustafa Barzani to fight the Iranian garrisons in Saqqiz, Baneh, and Sardasht with a view toward winning Kordestan for the Kurdish Republic. Unfortunately for Qazi Mohammed and the Kurds, events were already moving which would doom the existence of their Republic. Relations between the Soviets and Iran, and the Soviets and the U.S. would force a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area. Additionally, there were cracks in the front between tribal leaders and the DPK that would widen. Soviet negotiations for oil concessions with the Iranians

37 were continuing and to these were added Soviet demands for guarantees of autonomy for the Azerbaijan Republic. These negotiations were subject to pressure by the Soviets who ignored the deadline for withdrawal of their troops on 2 March 194 6 and who on 4 March started reinforcement of their forces. This was 99

to culminate in 15 brigades arriving in Azerbaijan by the end 38 of March.. To this U.S. President Rarry Truman, reacted by communicating to Stalin on 21 March that unless Soviet forces withdrew in six weeks, U.S. armed forces would be utilized in 39 Iran. The Soviets withdrew their forces on 9 May 1946 after U.S. pressure and after they had obtained the oil and Azerbaijan 40 concessions which they sought. The Soviets had not reckoned however, on the wilyness of the Iranian Premier Qavam or on the Shah. An inkling of Qavam 's attitude was revealed to the Azerbaijanis during their negotiations with the Iranian government following the Soviet withdrawal. He stated that the "...Iranian cabinet had decided to permit the Azerbaijanis to have their ideal relized as far as the Constitution and laws of 41 the country would permit." The Shah's attitude toward recovery of the Kurdish and Azerbaijani Republics was even more adamant. After the Soviet withdrawal he ordered new elections throughout the country. As he stated: When I ordered new elections throughout the country, that was exactly what I meant - and the country plainly included the province of Azerbaijan. The "autonomous" Azerbaijan regime naturally took a dim view of our holding elections in "their" province. The Russians found themselves in an awkward position; they wanted to support their puppet state [s], but at the same time they wanted to keep on good terms with Teheran in hopes of getting oil. At this juncture I followed my conscience. I ordered my troops to Azerbaijan to put down the rebellion once and for all and at the same time I personally flew over the rebel positions to ascertain their strength. The Russians now completely deserted their puppets, and the rebel government collapsed..." 42

While the Iranians were negotiating with the Soviets, the Kurds were also negotiating with the Azerbaijanis for 100

43 cooperation with. the. Azerbai3ani government. Despite terms of cooperation in this- treaty, the subsequent negotiations between the Azerbaijanis and the Iranians, which appeared before Iranian military actions to legitimize the Azeri regime, had not been favorable to the Kurds. In their eyes, through cooperation with the Azeris they had progressed from the condition of a minority in the Iranian state to a minority in the Azerbaijani 44 Turkish state. There were also rifts apparent within the Kurdish Republic. The tribal chiefs initially backed the government which they saw as dominated by leftist middle-class groups so as to allow no drastic reforms which could injure their interests. They were also displeased with the cooperation between the Azeris and the DKP . As was reported, many Kurds who wanted independence, felt that Qazi Mohammed had replaced one master, the 45 Iranians, with another, the Russians and Azeris. On the other hand the intelligentsia were trying to reduce the influence of 46 the chiefs. Initially, the Barzani tribes worked with the Herkis, Shakkaks , Milan, Jelalis, Haideranlu, Kuresuni, Gowrik, and Dehbokri tribes whose numbers totaled about 20,0 00 47 insurgents. The Mamash and Mangur tribes resisted Qazi Mohammed's forces and had to be attacked by the Barzanis in the 48 summer of 1946. The main problem for the Kurdish tribes was the isolation of the Kurdish Republic from Iran which had been 49 their chief market and source of food. By the fall of 1946,

without Soviet support and instigation of the Dehbokri and 101

Shakkak tribes., as well as frictions between the Barzanis and other Iranian tribes-, all Qazi Mohammed could count on was the support of the Gowrik and Zerza tribes with a little over 5Q 100Q men. There was also some indication that the Barzanis, who were dissatisfied with Qazi's leadership, were lessening their support. Overtures to the Kurds of Kordestan also appeared to be unsuccessful as the governor of the province, as late as April 1946 claimed that the province was quiet and that "...the 52 Kurds are docile and patriotic." With the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and frictions within their own movement, the Mahabad Republic's DPK was unable to hold out against the Iranian pressure. The Iranians were even helped in their move into the area by the Telekalis tribe, -and with the commencement of the advance of General Homayuni * s Iranian armies in November 1946, several of the chiefs opted for the Iranian government. By this time only the Barzanis, who felt they had no other place to go, were ready 53 to fight. Iranian forces were successful in their advance, and after the fall of the Azerbaijani Republic, Qazi Mohammed realized that he had no hope and surrendered on 15 December 54 1946 after heavy fighting. The Barzanis however, fought on for their own survival until they requested on 24 December 1946 55 to surrender to General Homayuni ' s armies . This marked the end of the Kurdish state although it was not the end of Kurdish nationalist sentiments. Followers 102

of the republic were tried and on 6 February 19.47 11 men were hanged. This was followed on 31 March 19147 By the hanging of Qazi Mohammed , his brother Sadr Qazi, and his cousin Seif 57 Qazi. Mullah Mustafa and his followers requested to return to Iraq but were rejected by the Iraqis. The counter-offer of the Iranians was to remain in Iran but be disarmed. This alternative was not accepted by the Barzanis and led to heavy 58 fighting in Ushnuigeh on 22 February 1947. This was followed by a campaign of repeated heavy fighting in which the Barzanis were gradually driven out of Iran and into Iraq by 59 April 1947. The Iraqi's were quick to react and in May attacked the Barzanis and drove Mullah Mustafa and 1000 followers into Turkey. From there, the Barzani group fled back into 6 2 the Soviet Union where they were granted refuge. 5 . Assessment and Regional Shocks Although the Mahabad Republic of 19 46 was formed with the heavy support of the Soviet Union, it was by no means a communist government. Tribal and landowner interests previously discussed prevented any such occurrence. Additionally, there was no communist mass party in West Azerbaijan. Although the Tudeh had supported the DPK, as Vahan states: "At the time of the Kurdish revolt in 1945, the Tudeh Party had no branches in the region, and only one person in the whole population of 63 Mahabad was familiar with Marxism." This interpretation was further borne out by Eagleton's findings that: "In Mahabad, however, there was no social revolution, no serious move 103

towards land distribution, no Marxist indoctrination, no secret 64 police, and no Russian-trained 'cadres'." Therefore, the Mahabad Republic was the manifestation of a Kurdish national

front between tribal and intellectual lines, with previous crossborder Kurdish nationalist support. If Mullah Mustafa's revolts in Iraq were the first real instances of tribal and intelligentsia cooperation in a revolt, the Mahabad Republic was the first Kurdish revolt in which large scale overt assistance had been received from an outside power. It was probably only of secondary importance to the Soviets in comparison with Azerbaijan. In any event, the loss of Soviet military support led to its rapid demise and pointed to continued frictions between tribes and the intelligentsia. The Republic and the Kurdish revolts did cause several regional shocks. The Iraqis and Turks were, as previously mentioned, concerned earlier with the threat to their own integrity. This concern was shown further during the existence of the Republic. As early as 1 March 1946 a Turkey-Iraq Conference on solidifying relations was opened at Ankara and one of the key objects of the conference was mutual support against the Soviets as well as "mutual protection against dangerous individuals" which were interpreted as the Kurdish tribes. Additionally on 20 March 1946 the Turkish newspaper ULUS , voicing government commentary, called upon Iraq and Syria to help forestall an "autonomous" uprising of the Kurds on the frontier. This was followed on 3CL March 194 6 by the 1Q4

signing of a Pact between Turkey and Iraq; which- would provide 67 for "mutual assistance on the question of public order." Clearly, the establishment of the Mahabad Republic had alarmed the other regional powers. B. COLD WAR PROPAGANDA EFFORTS With the defeat of Soviet aims in Iran, they continued attempts to weaken the influence of the West in the "Northern Tier" and to weaken the pro-Western governments which existed there. One of the instruments used by the Soviets was intensive propaganda and the Kurds were a primary target. Soviet ideologues felt that the October Revolution of 1917 had affected the rise of a Kurdish Nationalist movement and aimed their efforts at what was perceived as a growing Kurdish proletariat 69 led by "progressives". As argued by Geoff ery Wheeler: Soviet post-war propaganda started with several advantages: during and since the war many Middle Eastern, South, and Southeastern Asian countries experienced Western military occupation and armed intervention, but none except Iran, has ever seen Soviet ground troops... Always of a high order, Russian oriented studies conducted in Soviet universities and academies of science

have since the early days of the regime, been firmly geared to Soviet Asian policies. "70 To these advantages were added a Soviet interest in local cultures and widespread knowledge of foreign languages . In the case of the Kurds, past Soviet support was also to provide some receptivity to their message. The opening salvo of this propaganda effort was fired on 29 November 1947, less than one year after the collapse of 1Q5

the Mahabad Republic. A secret radio which, called itself the "democratic party's- radio station" Began Broadcasts from Russian AzerBaijan asserting that it sought to defend the Azeris and Kurds against the "persecution of the central 71 (Iranian) government." This campaign continued and asserted that the U.S. was assisting Iranian forces in suppression in 72 Iran, and blamed the U.S. for paying for the assasination 73 of Kurdish leaders with cigarettes . The motive was to reduce U.S. influence in Iran and was coupled with offers to 74 Kurds and others to visit Soviet Uzbekistan. These last allegations were disputed by George V. Allen was was a former Ambassador to Iran. He categorized Soviet efforts as: This is a prize example of Soviet propaganda at its worst. The use of the terms assassination and gunmen is typical. The allegations are false from beginning to end. During my stay in Iran I was on the friendliest terms with the Kurdish leaders, notably Amir Khan Shakkak, one of their most notable chieftans.'^ By June 19 49, the U.S. had become so concerned over potential disruptive influences of Soviet propaganda among the Kurds, that it was decided to establish a Kurdish broadcast from the U.S. Middle East Information Bureau. It was felt that it would be "worthwhile" to inform the Kurds that there were other forces at work than the Soviet Union and other ways 76 of life. The propaganda "war" continued with the establishment of another Soviet station in Erivan, Armenia SSR and by January 1950, the U.S. was coordinating its efforts with the

77 Iranian government to offset Soviet propaganda . Soviet 106

efforts in 12.50. culminated with, an offer broadcast in September to support Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey who were ready to "rise and fight for freedom, peace, and indepen78 dence." By 1253, this propaganda had intensified and was including the Albanians and Kurds in attempts to bypass a Western defense arrangement. Additionally, Soviet agitators were infiltrated into the Kurdish regions and it was rumored that Mullah Mustafa Barzani was considering reentering 79 Kurdistan with Soviet support. C. KURDISH POST-MAHABAD POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1. Formation of the UDPK In Iraq, the role of the Kurds in the Iraqi Communist Party, (ICP) , was also growing. Although, as Batatu argued, Kurds were still more interested in nationalism than Marxist ideology. "The relatively high proportion of the Kurds in the Party was to a considerable degree connected with the sense of 80 frustrated national rights under which they labored." Nonetheless, Iraqi Kurds had entered the Party in the 1240' s and part of the ICP ' s resurgence in Iraqi politics in 1251 was due to a Kurdish leader Din Nuri (a relative of Sheikh Mahmud) who 8 1 was a devout communist. This marked a period of ascendency in the ICP for the Kurds until 12 5 5 when the party was crushed. During this period the Kurds provided all of the General 82 Secretaries and 31 percent of all the Central Committee. In 1253 73 Kurdish communists had split from the party as


"right deviationists" and formed the Banner of the Workers fac83 tion. It was this- faction in 1254 which, helped to create the United Democratic Party of Kurdistan CUDPKI from what was left of the Hewa and KDPI in Iraq. The UDPK had as its Secretary Ibrahim Ahmed, a communist lawyer, and nominated Mullah Mustafa Barzani as its chairman in absentia . Another up and coming member of this party was Jalal Talabani who was on the five-man 84 Politburo. This Party which was Kurdish nationalist with Marxist leanings, was able to remain allied with the ICP through 1959. 2. Iranian and Turkish Kurds Both of these groups were under tight control by the central governments throughout this period and any political groups which existed such as the DPK were underground. There was some response in Iran, however, to Soviet incitements to revolt. On September 3, 19 50, the Javarundi tribe, along the Iraqi - Iranian border in Iran rose against the Iranian policy of disarming the tribes and had been influenced by Soviet 8 5 "secessionist" urgings. Their strength was estimated as 800-2000 men and no real support, either external or crossborder, was forthcoming. The Iranians were able to crush the 8 6 revolt by September 6 . There was also evidence of continued Kurdish international groupings, however. Sharif Pasha, of Versailles fame, had continued as a representative of Kurdish 87 aspirations to the U.N. in early 1950 but was largely ignored. After the Javarundi revolt, a group of Kurdish non-communist 108

leaders in Paris, led By Emir Dr. Kamuran Ali Badr Khan protested to the. U.S. again after the Iranian attacks. Badr Khan was the leader of a group which had evolved from the Khoybun and was called the Center for Kurdish Studies. These latest representations also seemed to appeal to some Western Middle East experts who were recommending that the Soviets ' propaganda efforts could be deflated if the Kurds were given protection 8 8 by the U.N. as non-autonomous peoples. The U.N. again rejected the Kurdish appeal and Soviet propaganda continued. By 1954, it was reported that most Kurds, now being led by 89 leftists, looked to the Soviets for any sort of independence and again in February 1956, the Javarundi tribe revolted in 90 Iran for twenty-one days before the Iranians defeated them. This period then, for the Kurds was marked by continued political development of at least one regional party and a sophistication which allowed for united action with other, non-Kurdish parties. There continued to exist a group of noncommunist internationalists. However, these political groups were ineffectual in achieving Kurdish autonomy. The regional parties still could not gain the support of the tribes. The internationalists were still largely cut-off from regional developments as well as being ideologically at odds with the only apparent patron of the Kurds, the Soviet Union, and the growing leftist Kurdish political leaders. 3. Regional Power Actions Regional power actions after Mahabad were concerned with controlling and assimilating their tribesmen where possible, 109

and resisting Soviet influences. These two threats would culminate in the signing of another regional cooperation Pact in 1955. Following their experiences of 1246, the Iranians had by 1949 opted to rearm the elected tribes and incorporate them into the army due to frictions which had risen over disarming 91 the tribes. Additionally, in June 1949, Iran signed with Iraq, a Mutual Aid pact which was designed for the "maintenance 92 of peace in this part of the world" and which could be useful

in controlling the tribes along their borders. By December, 1956 Iranian efforts at control and also development resulted 93 in the country being reported as "subversion free". In 1958, Iranian officials were openly voicing faith in the loyalty of 94 their Kurds despite Soviet intrigues and in July 19 58, in an effort to forestall further Soviet moves, Iran offered to unite the Kurdish minorities of Iraq and Syria with their "motherland". 95 Turkey was also very concerned, particularly in the early 1950 's, but maintained its army in place and in strength, 96 coupled with a slow modernization program Iraq, on the other hand, opted for a policy of inclusion in the government of some Kurdish notables and a gradual improvement of conditions 97 in the Kurdish areas. All three of these powers recognized what they saw as a Soviet threat and also kept their common Kurdish problem in mind. They were supported in this at first by Great Britain 110

and later, by the United States which, was interested in maintaining stability in the area and preventing Soviet influences in the "Northern Tier" and the iMiddle East. To this end, the U.S. heavily supported Iraq and Turkey with aid. Iraq and Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955. While this pact was primarily oriented against the Soviets , the Soviets had also been propagandizing the Kurds in their countries. In the Pact, article 3 pledged non-interference in internal affairs and Article 1 pledged mutual support for security and 9 8 defense. Iran later joined the Pact, over Soviet protests of 99 imperialism and aggression, in October 1955. The Kurdish areas remained relatively quiet, with the

exception of the 19 56 Iranian revolt, after the signing of the Pact. It appeared, at least for a time, that the Kurdish problem was under control and was gradually being settled by the local powers. The July 14, 195 8 coup d'etat in Iraq, however, would change the situation and lead to one of the longest running revolts in Kurdish history. D. CONCLUSIONS There were several trends which developed from 1944-1958. Firstly, a Kurdish state was established, with a union of tribal and intellectual leaders and with both cross-border Kurdish support and overt external power support provided by the U.S.S.R. As events showed, however, this state, while


nationalist in character, was: not strong enough, to withstand the loss of external support nor its own internal frictions. There was also, in news coverage, much more attention paid to Kurdish nationalist aspirations. In the 1920*3 and 1930 's they had largely been referred to as "brigands" or "bandits" but during this period their desire for their own state was more openly legitimized. This coverage was to change with the advent of cold war in the early 1950' s and some Kurds, especially Mullah Mustafa Barzani, were to be branded as Communists . The period, however, after Mahabad was fairly quiet for the Kurds. Again, nationalist leaders had been defeated and dispersed and regional actors regained control in their areas. The competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. marked a decline in British and French colonial interests which were also being pushed aside by the aspirations of regional powers. No longer would the Kurds look to the British for support. With only sporadic U.S. attention to light of continued Soviet propaganda Kurds would turn their eyes more and This was to be facilitated, in turn, dominated Kurdish political party in their problems and in and other efforts, the more to the Soviet Union. by the rise of a leftistIraq.

In short, after Mahabad, the Kurds were forced to sit and wait for a time in which local conditions of instability or super-power interest would favor their cause. They could then 112

hope for nevr support and re-attempt to establish, a "Kurdish Republic. "


FOOTNOTES-: SECTION IV Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," The Middle East Journal , I No. 3 (July, 1247);, 24 8. 2 ibid ., 251. 3 ibid . , 252. 4 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) , p. 71. 5 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 58. g Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 71. 7 ibid . , p. 72 . Q Abrahamian E. Vahan, Social Bases of Iranian Politics : The Tudeh Party 1941-1953 (Published Ph.D. dissertation Columbia University, 1969, Ann Arbcj:, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1979), p. 291. 9 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 42. Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," 254. Eagleton lists the following individuals as attending the 2nd Baku visit: Qazi Mohammed, Said Qazi, Manef Harimi, Ali Raihani, Qasim Ilkhanizadeh Dehbokri, Abdullah Qaderi Mamash, Kaka Hamza Nalos Mamash, and Nuri Beg Begzadeh. See William Eagleton, Jr. The Kurdish Republic , p. 133. William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 45. ibid.

13 Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,"

254. 14

ibid. 255. Point 5 of this manifesto would have been

particularly offensive to the Kurdish Aghas who were intent on maintaining their prerogatives and reflects the intellectual inputs in the DPK. 114

ibid., 263. The Hewa and Khoybun also were dissatisfied with, the Soviets? 1, lack, of religion and they were considered from World War I events and Before as traditional enemies. 16 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 93. 17 ibid . , p. 123. ibid . , p. 124 . 19 ibid . , p. 122. ibid . , p. 125. 21 ibid . , p. 127. 22 ibid . , p. 128 . 23 Clifton Daniel, "Kurd Nationalists Look to Russians," New York Times , Dec. 23, 1945, p. 13. 24 Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," 256. 25 "Iraq Dooms Kurdish Rebels," New York Times , Dec. 28,

1945, p. 2. 2 6 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq , (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1978) , p. 629. 27 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 55. It was also alleged by a "Kurdish Chieftan" that the Soviets had given the DPK twenty tanks, four trucks, and a number of mortars See "Kurd Says Rebels Get Russian Arms . " New York Times , Apr. 4, 194 6, p. 1.

28 "Kurd Disorders Continue," New York Times, Oct. 22, 194 5,

p. 5. 29

William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 61.


30 A. C. Sedgwick, "Kurd's Unrest Tied to British. Navy Oil," New York Times , March- 18, 12146", p. 3. 31 "Turks Hear Report of Kurd Maneuver," New York Times , Dec. 30, 1945, p. 5. 32 "Turks Disturbed at Iran's Trouble," New York Times , Nov. 23, 1945, p. 2. 33

"North Iran Sets up Autonomous Rule," New York Times , Dec. 16, 1945, p. 1. 34 The other leaders consisted of Seif Qazi Minister of War, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, Ami Khan Shakkak, Hama Rashid Khan Banei and Zero Beq who were made Generals. Other officials were Haji Baba Shiekh as Prime Minister, Sadig Haideri, Words and Propaganda, Nanaf Karimi , Education, Mohammed Amin Muini , Commerce, Ahmad Ilahi, Treasury, Seyyid Mohammed Tahazadeh, Health and Khalil Khosrovi, Interior. Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," 257. 35 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 61. 36 Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," 257. 37 "Talks on Iran Oil for Soviet Union Reported Begun," New York Times , March 18, 1946, p. 1. 38 William R. Andrews, "The Azerbaijan Incident: The Soviet Union In Iran, 1941-1946," Military Review , LIV No. 8 (August 1974) , 83. ibid. 40 ibid. , 84. 41 "Iran Unity Talks Said to Collapse," New York Times , May 12, 1946, p. 32. 42 Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country , (London: Hutchinson, I960), p. 117 .


43 The treaty provided for exchange of representatives, respect for minority groups, establishment of a commission to solve mutual problems, military alliance , agreement on a common policy toward the central Iran government, free use of both the Kurdish and Turkish languages, and punishment of reactionary elements. New York Times , May 5, 19 46, p. 29. 44 Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," 259. 45 "Accord Reported With Azerbaijan, New York Times , May 4, 1946, p. 4. 46 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 85. 47 ibid . , p. 92 . 48 Archie Roosevelt, "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," 2 65. 49 ibid . ibid. ibid . 52 "Rebellious Kurds Beaten Back," New York Times , April 22, 1946, p. 8. 53 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds , p. 98. 54 "Kurd Chief Seized By Iranian Troops," New York Times , Dec. 16, 1946, p. 7. 55 "Kurds Yielding to Iran," New York Times , Dec. 25, 1946,

p. 10. 56,l Iran Hangs 11 in Kurdistan," New York Times , Feb. 7, 1947, p. 4. S7 "Three Kurdish. Leaders Executed," New York Times , April 4, 1947, p. 3. 58 "Iranians Regain Town," New York Times , Feb. 23, 1947, p. 43. 117

59 New York Times , Apr. 8, 1347, p. 4. 60 " Iraqi Oust Kurd Chief," New York Times , June 2, 1947, p. 9. 61 "Iranians Encircle Barzani Tribesmen," New York Times , June 16, 1947, p. 8.

62 "Barzani Tribe in Russia," New York Times, June 20, 1947,

p. 4. 63

Abrahamian E. Vahan, Social Bases of Iranian Politics:

The Tudeh Party 1941-1953 , p. 300. 64 William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic , p. 64. 65 "Cooperation Studied by Turkey and Iraq," New York Times , March 3, 1946, p. 16.

New York Times , March 20, 1946, p. 3. 67 "Turkish-Iraqi Pact Reported by Ankara," New York Times , March 31, 1946. 68 "Iraqi Troops Mass Near Iran, Turkey," New York Times , Apr. 10, 1946, p. 2. 69 Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., The Soviet Union and the Middle East , (Stanford, Ca. : Hoover Institution Press, 1974) , p. 211. 70 Geoffrey Wheeler, "Propaganda in Asia," Asian Affairs , 63 (June, 1976) , 185. 71 New York Times , Dec. 1, 1947, p. 3. 72 Will Lissner, "Russia Whips up Interest in Iran," New York Times , June 14, 1948, p. 3. 73 "Kurdish Killings Laid to West," New York Times , June 9, 1949, p. 13. Will Lissner, "Russia Whips up Interest in Iran," p. 3. 118

75 "Allen Denies Charge," New York Times , June Id, 1949, p. 4, 76 Albion Ross, "U.S. To Broadcast Program to Kurds," New York Times , June 26, 1949, p. 12.

77 Albion Ross, "U.S. Seeks to Woo Kurds From Soviet," New York Times , Jan. 7, 195Q, p. 6. 78 "Soviet Offers to Aid Kurds," New York Times , Sept. 20, 1950, p. 10. 79 C. L. Sulzberger, "Soviet Prods Albanians and Kurds in Moves to Gird Southern Flank," New York Times ; Feb. 21, 19 53, p. 3. Other Soviet "aid" efforts were reported sporadically. One instance was the smuggling of arms into Azerbaijan in 1957. See "Iran Holds Arms Smugglers," New York Times , Jan. 9, 1957, p. 5. 80 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq , p. 650. ibid . , p. 662 . 82 ibid., p. 699. 83 ibid , p. 704. 84 Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt; 1961-1970 , (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1973), p. 61. 85 "Tribe Revolts in Iran," New York Times , Sept. 5, 1950, p. 9. 86 "Kurds Reported Crushed," New York Times , Sept. 7, 19 50, p. 16. 87 Albion Ross, "U.S. Seeks to Woo Kurds From Soviet," p. 6. 88 "Teheran Assailed in Kurdistan Riots," New York Times ,

Sept. 11, 195Q, p. 16. 89 "Kurds Eye Soviet For Independence," New York Times , July 7, 1954, p. 6. 119

90,, 12Q Die in Iran Revolt," New York Times , Feb. 28 , 1956, p. 3. 91 "Iran Incorporates Tribes Into Army," New York Times , May 14, 1949, p. 7. 92 "Iran, Iraq Sign Mutual Aid Pact," New York Times , June 24, 1949, p. 6. 93 Sam P. Brewer, "Iran is Reported Subversion-Free," New York Times , Dec. 2, 1956, p. 31. 94 Jay Waly, "Iran Voices Faith in Kurds* Loyalty," New York Times, Oct. 26, 1958, p. 28. 95 Homer Bigart, "Iran Invites Kurds in Iraq and Syria to Unite with Motherland," New York Times , July 26, 1958, p. 4. 96 C. L. Sulzberger, "Proximity to Russia Remains Traditional Worry of Turks," New York Times , Mar. 28, 1950, p. 26. 97 Homer Bigart, "Iraq Now Solving Kurdish Problems," New York Times , May 26, 1957, p. 3 and New York Times , March 10, 1957, p. 22. 98

Pact (Baghdad) of Mutual Cooperation: Turkey and Iraq, 24 February 1955 in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956 , Vol. II (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956, pp. 390-391. 99 "Soviet Tells Iran Mid-East Linkage Threatens Peace," New York Times, Oct. 13, 1955.


V. THE KURDS IN IRAQ 1353-19.80 "The Kurdish nation is indivisible and the frontiers separating it are artificial . "* Mullah Mustafa Barzani, 1959 "Government Forces took only seven days to end the mutiny which the imperialists had expected to last for seven years. " 2 Premier Abdel Karim Kassim, April 1962 "The fighting is over ... We are alone with no friends. The Americans have not provided any help or protection. I think dark times are coming. "3 Mullah Mustafa Barzani, March 197 5 The above quotes represent attitudes present during the key domestic crisis which existed in Iraq from 1959 through 1975. The Kurds continued to seek autonomy and were not defeated until 1975. At the same time, Iraqi governments continually resisted many of the various demands which the Kurds put forth. The expectations of Kassim 1 s "imperialists" were to prove more accurate than either his or subsequent Iraqi leaders' estimates of the longevity of the Kurdish Question. During this period, while the Kurds and Iraqis were at the center of the crisis, several other influences impacted and prevented a settlement of the problem. These influences were: political maneuvers within the Iraqi political structure; political maneuvers with the Kurdish political structure; Kurdish attempts to internationalize the dispute; and the actions of the USSR, the U.S., Israel, Iran, Egypt, and Syria. From 1975 to 1980, events


in Iraqi Kurdistan centered primarily around the Ba'th Party's efforts to spread and consolidate its control in the face of sporadic Kurdish resistance. A. THE GATHERING STORM: 14 July 1958 - September 1961 1. Initial Cooperation The 14 July 19 58 revolution, which deposed and killed King Feisal II and Nuri Said, was followed by an initial period of cooperation between Kassim and the UDPK led by Ibrahim Ahmed. Kassim needed support from as many segments of the population as he could attract, and the UDPK as well as its ICP links provided one leg of that support. Shortly after the revolution, Ibrahim Ahmed led a delegation to press for Kurdish rights and autonomy. This delegation was met by Michael Aflaq, Secretary General of the Ba'th party, and the Kurds were assured of their rights under the new regime: Brethren, take it from me as a clear and pure word... we are anxious for liberty for all mankind. We are prepared to make sacrifices in the defense of freedom in the world. ...How can we then not defend the freedom of those who have been living with us for hundreds of years, with nothing and nobody being able to divide us. Numerous links have bound us. We bear for you feelings of love and fraternity and this is not only because we care for you and your interests but also because we care for our country, and its safety and because we are anxious that stability, security, and cooperation should reign among all of us. While this statement guaranteed their "rights", it was, in effect, a denial of autonomy due to the "numerous links" which had bound Kurds and Arabs. Ahmed, however, was encouraged by the terms of the new provisional constitution. Articles 2 and


3 stated that Arabs and Kurds were "considered as partners in the [Arab] fatherland, and their national rights- within the unity of Iraq are acknowledged by this constitution." Additionally, several of the members of the Revolutionary Command Council had, or were reputed to be of Kurdish stock, including Kassim. It was also probable that Ahmed, who was a communist,

and who had strong ties with the ICP, may have been encouraged to work within a government structure with the aim of communizing it from within. This concept fitted well with the Soviet tactic of a Modified National Front explained by Lenczowski in which the "progressive" forces could work with other forces 7 to attain revolutionary objectives. Shortly after the coup, a national cabinet was formed with representatives of the Ba'th Party, the National Democratic Party, the Independence o Party and the UDPK. The cooperation of the Kurds also extended to the tribal areas in the north. On 26 July, BrigadierGeneral al-Tabakchali, in command in the north stated: "... the northern part of Iraq is wholly loyal to the new Government. 9 The army and population greeted the revolution with Doy." A Kurdish tribal leader was also reputed to have stated that the Kurds of the mountains were all behind the revolution. In a further attempt to gain Kurdish support, Kassim offered amnesty to Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who had been in the Soviet Union since the collapse of the Mahabad Republic. The


Mullah/ after some negotiations with, regard to his followers, and who was still the chairman of the UDPK, returned to Baghdad on 7 October 1958. This return was accompanied by both Soviet and Egyptian propaganda in favor of Kurdish independence. Later, in February 1959, the Mullah issued a call for a Kurdish National Congress which was supported by Iraq and an Iraqi minister, Ibrahim Kubba, further encouraged Kurdish hopes of autonomy by announcing the "abandonment" of assimilation tactics. Kassim during this period was engaging in verbal combat with President Nasser of Egypt over leadership of Arab nationalism. In January 1959 he stated that: "The free democratic Iraqi republic will work to build up true scientific nationalism and not the false nationalism that wished to rule the Arab people through a reactionary dictatorship regime carrying the 13

banner of total Arab Union." " The Ba'th-Nasser conflict also existed inside Iraq and in March 1959 the Pan-Arab (Nasserist) 14 Shammar Tribe and Nasserists in the military revolted in Mosul. This revolt was crushed by Kurds in the area, who were called out by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, as well as by ICP members, who were predominantly Kurds. The Mosul revolt was significant in that Barzani was still showing loyalty to Kassim, the Kurds and Iraqi communists were still working together and the Kurds were able to defeat a traditional enemy, the Arab Shammar tribe. The Kurds also expected to see as a reward, some form of autonomy,


16 Kurdish, education, ajid economic development. Of more significance, however, was the demonstration to Kassim of the amount of unity that existed in Kurdish, forces. 2. The Barzanis Return to the North After Barzani's demonstrated support, Kassim allowed his followers to return to Iraq from the USSR. On 7 April 1959 it was reported that 855 armed Kurds were enroute to Basra 17 from Odessa aboard the Soviet ship Gruzia. They were followed by another ship, the Argun later in April and 2 other ships 18 reported to be loaded with military equipment. Nasser viewed these Kurds as a "foreign legion" who's objective was to bol19 ster the Kassim regime against his internal enemies. The West, after Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact on 4 April 1959, was also concerned about the movement of the tribesmen. CIA Director Allen Dulles gave an assessment that: "The Soviet Union seems to be planning to use Kurdish refugee tribesmen, recently returned to Iraq from the Soviet Union to stir up

trouble in northern Iraq and establish a bridgehead for the ,.20 Soviet Union. There was some indication that, regardless of Soviet aims, Kassim hoped to "use" the Barzanis to weaken the more feudal tribal Kurdish leaders in the area, who by this time, were coming out in opposition to the government. At least one leader, Sheikh Rashid of the Birost tribe was disillusioned by the "leftist" leanings of Kassim, and persecution of religious 21 leaders. To this was added the natural inclination of the Barzanis to reclaim their lands in the north. Their move back 125

into the area caused fighting and tribal frictions to break out with the Biradosts, Lolanis, Pishtdaris, Zibaris, and 22 Rikanis, many of whom fled into Turkey and Iran. By allowing and supporting Barzani in this move, Kassim was able to accomplish several things. He could suppress mounting opposition among some Kurdish tribes, cause numerous tribal frictions which might break up any united Kurdish threat from the north, separate the Mullah from the other, leftist and detribalized UDPK leadership, maintain Barzani ' s support, and cooperate with the Soviets. This last factor was important. The Soviets had supported Barzani, and as mentioned, had engaged in extensive propaganda in support of the Kurds. To this was also added the strong concern of the Soviet Union for the role that the ICP was to play in governing Iraq. Kassim on the other hand, with opposition from Nasser, and his break with the West, needed arms. Kassim could not yield to all the demands of the ICP for representation or he would lose 23 control of the revolution. The Kurdish card, however, allowed him to show support for at least one perceived Soviet faction. Kassim 1 s overtures were successful and on 26 June 1959, Iraq signed a $100 million arms contract with the 24

Soviets. This was followed rapidly by the formation of the United National Front between the ICP, National Democratic 25 Party and the UDPK to govern the country.


3 . Road to Revolt Despite Kassim's maneuvers, there were indications in July 1959, that a monster had been created. There were large scale disturbances in Kirkuk on 14-16 July against Turcomans and Arabs by the Kurds and the ICP and, significantly, the 2 6 mostly Kurdish 2nd Division was not used to quell the revolt. The revolt was only put down on 17 July when an armored column from Baghdad, under the command of Col. Abd al 'Rahman Arif, entered the city. One of the results of this rioting was Kassim's break with the Communists in late July, followed by a UDPK suspension of members who had cooperated in the past with 27 the ICP. Following this period, Barzani continued to cooperate with Kassim and to consolidate his control in Kurdistan. Kassim was trying again to formulate a new coalition of support between the various groups and on 6 January 1960 the Law of Association was promulgated to legalize selected parties. One result of this law was the change of the UDPK 2 8 into the Kurdistani Democratic Party (KDP) . This name change was a compromise between Kassim and Barzani. Kassim was not happy with the regional implications of "United" nor was he happy with the secessionist implications of "Kurdistan" and proposed, through Brigadier General Yahya, the name Kurdish Democratic Party. The Mullah was not ready to drop "Kurdistan"

29 but did eventually accept "Kurdistani". There were other elements in the negotiations to legalize the party which


resulted in references to the "Kurdish People" and "fighting for self-determination" being eliminated. Although this allowed the Kurds continued participation as a party in the government, the wrangling, according to Ahmed "finally convinced the party that Kassim wished to convert it into a cultural society devoted to his own support." To this was added, while the Fifth congress of the KDP was sitting in May 1960, Kassim' s publicized overtures to the 32 Surchi and Herki Kurds . These tribes had been traditional enemies of the Barzanis and the overtures were further evidence of Kassim 1 s desire to play off one group against another. That the Kurds were becoming more dissatisfied with Kassim was also shown during the 2nd anniversary parade of the 33 Revolution in which no Kurds took part. On 6 November 1961 with no reforms in progress for Kurdish autonomy and no economic development, the Mullah sought Soviet support and journeyed 34 to the USSR. Ibrahim Ahmed was also outspoken in his criticism of the government and was arrested for a short period 35 as a warning. Barzani returned from the USSR in January 1961 with no Soviet support and convinced that the Kurds would 3 6 have to take matters into their own hands. This was followed by the closing down by Kassim of the Kurdish news37 paper Khabat in March 1961 and rising Arab-Kurd tensions in

Baghdad. Also during March, Barzani returned to his tribal area where he quickly took charge. He was still the chairman


of the KDP, but moat control of the Party was held by Ahmed. According to O'Ballance, the Mullah with, this development had it both ways ; he could retain a strong stake in tribal matters and had a prestige position in the KDP. The KDP, as before, 38 had little tribal support and needed the Mullah's links. After the KDP and the Mullah presented a petition for Kurdish 39 rights in June 1961 and its rejection by the RCC, positions hardened on both sides which would lead to the outbreak of the revolt. B. THE KURDISH REVOLT September 1961 - April 1975 The revolt can be broken into essentially three phases: September 1961 - 29 June, 1966; March 1969 - March 1974 and March 1974 - April 1975. Prior to September 1961, the Mullah continued his pressure on the opposing tribes, and after persuading most of the tribes to support him he was ready to raise the standard of revolt. 1. The First Phase - September 1961-29 June 1966 The revolt broke out on 16 September 1961 initially against Mullah Mustafa's advice. He had wanted more time to prepare but younger party members, among them Jalal Talabani, 41 and the Derbendi Khans went into revolt anyway. The Mullah joined with his own forces after the Iraqi government followed 42 a policy of indiscriminate bombing and attacked his own area. Initially the Kurds had approximately 8QQQ followers but by April 1962, the Pesh Merga ("those who face death") forces had 129

grown to 15-20,000 and consisted of the Ako, Pishtdaris, Balak,

43 and Zibari tribes. Other: support also came from Abbas Mamandour Agha as well as a spectrum of other Kurdish national44 ists, communists, army deserters, and the KDP. The initial government attitude was that the revolt had been crushed by the end of September 1961 and Baghdad reported not only that it was crushed but that the "British Stooge" 45 Barzani was under arrest in Iran. These reports were untrue and were more reflective of a disguise for poor Iraqi army performance as well as a reason to break off the campaign with the advent of winter. The Kurds, this time armed with captured and brought-over bazookas and mortars, attacked again in 46 January 1962 in an attempt to expand their holdings. Despite repeated claims of "glorious victories" by the Iraqis, by 23 April 1962 the fighting was recognized as a widespread revolt and the Kurds had gained control in the north from Mosul 47 to the Turko-Iranian border and in the south to Suleimaniyah. Kassim outlawed the KDP in September shortly after the 48 revolt and blamed the insurgency on the British, the U.S. 49 and CENTO Powers. Kurdish demands were put forth and were to remain much the same throughout the next several years. They were announced in April 1962 as "an autonomous Kurdistan within the Iraqi Republic and withdrawal of the Iraqi army from 50 the north" To these were added in late May 1962 guarantees of political, economic, social and cultural rights and a cessa51 tion of exploitation of tribal rivalries. 130

52 Despite the "Red Mullah. 1 s" initial successes, the Iraqis, who committed 26 battalions of troops and police against them, were hurting the Pesh Merga and particularly Kurdish civilians. Particularly irksome to the Kurds was the strafing arid bombing of villages which the Iraqis pursued. This tactic was used for two primary reasons. First, it was only in the flat areas where the towns were where the Iraqi forces could be effective, and secondly, it was hoped that by damaging houses and injuring civilians left behind, that the Pesh Merga in the mountains would be weakened in their resolve. Because of these casualties, the Kurdish Bureau in Lausanne issued a protest in June 1962 to the U.N. This "Statement from the Kurdish Bureau" attested that "Entire towns and villages have been wiped out in aerial bombardments and some 54 innocent men, women and children have been slain." The "Kurdish nation" then appealed to the UN to investigate crimes of genocide in the Kurdish area. Another effect of the bombings was to drive numerous other Kurds, particularly in the detribalized intelligentsia, up into the mountains to join Pesh Merga units. Although the West had asserted in the past that the Mullah was being used in a nefarious plot by the Soviets, and the Iraqis insisted that he was being used by the West, the Mullah maintained that he was receiving no support from any power. He did request aid from the U.S. and in return offered


55 to make Iraq into a "Western Stronghold. " As. he stated in September 19.62 though: If the Americans go on thinking only of the interests of Turkey and Iran, who do not want us to get help, if the Americans never ask after our interests, there is a danger. The danger is that we will be obliged by necessity to accept aid from the communists. Then it will not be our fault. 56 Essentially, he was ready to work with the U.S., especially after the Soviets had supplied weapons to Iraq, but would take aid from whoever or wherever necessary to sustain the fight. The U.S., at this early stage, however, was not willing to trust the Mullah. Not only did the U.S. feel that such aid would be meddling in the internal affairs of Iraq, but a strong Kurdish movement would threaten CENTO allies Iran and Turkey with their own large Kurdish minority groups. At the same time, an "independent" Kurdistan was not considered viable 57 and would therefore be "prey" for the Soviet Union. In the face of the U.S.'s refusal to supply Barzani, the Soviets stepped up their propaganda support but apparently provided little else. In September 1962 an article appeared in the CPSU publication Problems of Peace and Socialism in which the KDP was characterized as an "anti-imperialist" party and in which 5 8 a national front between the KDP and ICP was urged. Additionally, in September, the Tudeh party of Iran and the ICP urged Barzani to extend his efforts into Iran in return for 59 Soviet aid. Barzani did not respond to these offers as he was still awaiting U.S. or other Western support. In any event, 132

it did not appear that any aid in weapons, other than that provided by the DKP "CSyria)' , DKP Clranl , and the Kurdishbureau was received. At this time, one witness described the Kurdish arsenal as consisting primarily of some machine guns, light mortars, Czech Brno rifles (captured from Iraqi troops) and some British and Russian rifles. The initial period saw several trends established:

repeated Kurdish calls for aid, Iraqi control of control of mountainous areas, campaigns governed considerations, some internationalization of the U.S. - USSR maneuvering with regard to the Kurds

towns, Kurdish by winter conflict, and and Iraq.

The revolt still continued in force as the Iraqis could not successfully enter the mountain strongholds of Barzani's Pesh Merga . At the same time they were also having severe difficulties in attacking the southern region which was controlled by a KDP faction led by Jalal Talabani; despite the use of the Jash , or anti-Barzani Kurds, who were serving as Iraqi auxiliaries. By January 1963 Kassim was in severe straits and offered an "amnesty or destruction" proposal on 14 6 2 January to all the Pesh Merga . Despite use of over one third of the Iraqi army and border controls imposed by Iran, Syria, and Turkey the revolt had not been crushed. The Kurds refused the amnesty as Kassim refused any conditions. On 8 February 1963, Kassim was removed as an actor by a coup d'etat, which was engineered by the Ba'th dominated Iraq executive in Damascus . 133

64 The new government, led by General 'Abd al-Salam *Arif , was eager to end the Kurdish question and reunite Iraq. It was thought that with Kassim out of the way this might be accomplished, and a cease-fire was offered which Mullah Mustafa Barzani agreed to on 16 February. The chief negotiator for the Kurds was Jalal Talabani although Barzani ensured that he 6 fi was represented in talks by his associate Omar Mustafa. The Kurds presented three demands: autonomy in an Iraqi Republic, a fair division of state revenues (primarily from oil in the Kurdish region) , and withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kurdish 67 areas. *Arif was in a precarious position. His government was under pressure from the ICP and there was a strong likeli-

hood that if too many concessions were given to the Kurds, extreme Arab Nationalists in the Ba ' th party as well as disgruntled military officers might attempt to overthrow him. At the same time, however, Iraq was negotiating with Syria and 6 8 Egypt to form the tripartite UAR. This also posed problems for 'Arif. If Iraq appeared disunited, the other two countries might not be willing to join. On the other hand, a strong united Iraq might be able to negotiate for a strong position within the UAR. There was also the danger that by granting Kurdish autonomy, 'Arif might be perceived by the Syrians and Nasser as a traitor to Arab Nationalism. The course he chose 69 was to release many Kurdish political prisoners and an agreement to "a decentralized government" for the Kurds. Because


of the equivocation, by 28 February Barzani threatened to resume the war if no autonomy was granted and even threatened 71 to declare independence from Iraq. At the same time, Talabani was in Cairo talking with Nasser in an attempt to gain Arab 72 support for the Kurdish cause. The negotiations, however, dragged on and despite Talabani ' s efforts and a two week stay in Baghdad by Barzani 73 in April, the issue of autonomy remained a sticking point. By early June there were reports that the negotiations had failed and, with the coming of spring, that both sides were preparing to fight. By 10 June another Iraqi offensive was underway against the Kurds and the RCC proclaimed: "We are purging the northern area of the remnants of Barzani 's gang and the 74 northern area is reported operational." Again a bombing

offensive against villages was initiated and some 60,000 75 Iraqis were estimated to be fighting up to 30,000 Pesh Merga . The Kurds again followed their pattern of withdrawing from the lowlands but this time added a new tactic: threats against 76 the oil pipelines. Other new factors were the gathering of elements of almost all (except the Herkis) tribes to Barzani, use of Talabani as a Kurdish representative in Europe, and the 77 support for the Kurds by Arab newspapers. Another new element was added in June 1963, when in an anti-Nasser move, Syria sent MIG aircraft and 1 battalion of troops to fight alongside the Iraqis.


During the negotiations, the Soviets had claimed that 'Arif was prevaricating and continually came out in support of the Kurds. To this was added in July 1963, the recall of Soviet technicians from Iraq and a Mongolian initiative at 79 the U.N. which accused Iraq of extermination tactics. The fighting continued very heavily through 18 August 1963 with neither side really able to win. On the 18th the Kurdish representative Abbas Mamand Agha met with Ma j . General Saleh Mahdi Anashi at Raniah, and conditions were exchanged. The Iraqis were willing, in return for Mullah Mustafa's departure from Iraq and a cessation of fighting, to offer to grant some Kurdish demands for self-rule (i.e. cultural and education demands), $56 million dollars annually from state revenues, and $14 million in indemnities to the tribes. Autonomy issues would be discussed later. The Kurds countered with a demand for release of political prisoners and stated that Mullah Mustafa would only leave Iraq if those responsible for the war

8 of extermination were ousted also. Needless to say, neither side would accept those terms and the war continued. Iraq, however, was running out of parts for their aircraft and tanks, as well as ammunition. Egypt and -the USSR refused to supply the 81 parts and Syria had very few to give. In November, however, a mini-coup was held in which the Ba'th leaders were removed and which 'Arif and the military remained solely in power. On 23 November 'Arif, freed of his


Ba'thish constraints, reinitiated moves toward the UAR and pro8 3 posed new promises to the Kurds to end the fighting. The Kurds held out for terms but were also beginning to suffer from an economic blockade and heavy civilian casualties. Also in January 1964, Nasser had talked with 'Arif at the Arab Leader's Conference about the Kurds and had sent a representative to Barzani. Nasser, at this time, was still concerned with his prestige, but was also becoming more concerned with uniting Arab armies against Israel. On 10 February 1964, 'Arif and Barzani announced a truce and a resumption of negotiations. The Government position was once again stated but without promising autonomy: "the Iraqi government endorses the national rights of the Kurds 85 within one Iraqi national entity." This was coupled with promises to release prisoners and to reconstruct the north. 8 6 Additionally, Mullah Mustafa was free to remain in Iraq. The Mullah, by now rather wary of Iraqi promises, stated his position clearly on 29 February: We're going to give the government a chance to show what it is willing to do for the Kurds by way of granting their national rights. If they don't live up to their promises, we will be forced to fight again. 87

During the cease-fire period, the Iraqis delayed in implementing promises granted. Of more importance was the outbreak of fighting within the Kurdish movement due to the longsuppressed differences between Barzani and the Politburo of


the KDP . Essentially these differences were due to on the one hand, Mullah Mustafa's desire to negotiate with the Iraqis and on the other hand the KDP politburo's desire to press militarily what they saw as a weakened, unsteady Iraqi government. Additionally, there were ideological splits as the Mullah was still very tribally oriented in his outlook while the KDP Politburo was concentrating on building a political infrastructure and implementing "agrarian reform measures" in their 88 area. After much maneuvering, in which the Mullah gained the support of the Herkis, in July 1964 some 2000 Barzani Pesh Merga advanced southward into the KDP sector and drove Talabani's forces into Iran where they gained some new re90 cruits and it is thought, some support from the Shah. At this stage, the Shah was interested in seeing a disunited Iraq persist and also, by playing off the KDP Politburo against Barzani, could prevent a united Kurdish movement from attrac90 ting too many Iranian Kurds. The absence of the KDP hierarachy allowed Barzani to strengthen his own grassroots support and at two Kurdish congresses held in July and 91 September he first expelled the Politburo from the KDP, and then, after mediation, reaccepted all members of the KDP under his sole authority. The Iraqis continued to delay implementation of Kurdish reforms, perhaps encouraged by the internecine fighting between the Kurds. As a result, after talks in August,


the Mullah began reforming his troops and on 12 November 1964, 93 proclaimed a defacto autonomy in Kurdistan and formed a cabinet. Because of winter conditions/ no real outbreaks of fighting ensued and 'Arif continued to express his willingness to con94 ^ sider the "realities of the Kurdish problem." At the same time, Mullah Mustafa again appealed to the West and to U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant for guarantees of Kurdish autonomy. The uneasy truce persisted through March 19 65 when reports of up to 65,000 Iraqi troops massing near Kurdistan were 96 received. By 23 April 1965 the Iraqis had started another 97 heavy offensive against the Kurds. This offensive was similar to earlier ones and had essentially the same result: stalemate. In November, 1965 Abdulla Rahman al-Bazzaz, a civilian, gained the Premiership in Iraq and a new chance for peace seemed possible. On 9 November 1965, the Bazzaz government issued a new appeal to the Kurds which stated that Kurdish autonomy would be recognized within a unified Iraq, and in which Kurdish demands for cultural, economic, and social rights 9 8 would be recognized. The Kurds, now very wary of Iraqi overtures, continued fighting with some success through December and the Iraqis on 7 December began receiving help 99 from Egyptian troops. Nasser, who had seen the Kurdish problem severly hamper his efforts for a UAR and for Arab unity against Israel, by now had made up his mind to help his Arab brothers once and for all against the Kurds. During this


winter fighting, itself a new development in the revolt, the Kurds were much better armed, with heavier equipment then before and inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi forces. There was, in addition to evidence that Iran was providing covert support to the Kurds, a first mention that Israel was also providing support. Israel's motives would have been rather obvious. By supporting Barzani they could accomplish several objectives: a key Arab state would remain divided and unable to confront them, sizeable amounts of Arab troops and other resources would be tied up against the Kurds, and the civil war might continue to delay other efforts at Pan-Arab unity. There were further reports in late December that the Iranian border was open and that Kurds were crossing it at will enroute to Europe and other areas, and that a new KDP 102 office for international support was being opened in Brussels. The fighting persisted but in February 1966 Talabani, in a new move for power, attempted to overthrow Barzani and started undercover dealings for peace with the Iraqi government. The Mullah found out about this and attempted to arrest Talabani who was able to escape into Iran from where he made 103 direct contact with Premier Bazzaz. It was probable that the Iraqis knew that they would continue to have difficulties in negotiating with the unassailable Barzani and Talabani ' s move gave them a chance at the least, to actively work to split the Kurdish movement, and at best, to achieve peace on


Iraqi terms. This was not to occur, as the Mullah retained his position and fighting continued through April 1966. On 13 April, President 'Arif was killed in a helicopter crash, and his brother Abdul Rahman 'Arif became the new President. This factor opened a new opportunity. Mullah Mustafa now had a new actor to deal with to replace the other 'Arif whom he had come, quite naturally, to distrust. The new President, on 104 19 April, made a statement which talked to autonomy and the Mullah responded on 20 April with a ceasefire. The Kurdish demands presented were essentially the same as before with

one new one, a requirement for a neutral Arab country to act 105 as a guarantor for any agreement reached. After some 10 6 negotiations, the Iraqis, fortified by offers of Soviet aid, again were unable to swallow autonomy for the Kurds. After a statement on 2 8 April in which 'Arif stated that the Kurds 107 would be forgiven if they repented, and with the arrival of good weather, the Iraqis launched another offensive with 108 30,000 men on 2 May 1966. Barzani had consolidated his strength during the ceasefire but still was at odds with Talabani. Nonetheless, the 109 Kurds were able to inflict defeats on the Iraqis by late May. The Iraqis were following a new policy of relocating Kurds from oil-areas by this time and were also continuing to negotiate with Talabani. The failure of this Iraqi offensive strengthened Bazzaz's hand and Barzani, probably concerned over


Talabani's actions, as well as operating from a position of strength, offered new demands to Iraq in late June. Demands for a Kurdish military force and oil revenues were dropped from this list and Bazzaz broadcast a twelve point program for peace in which, among other things, Kurdish government rights would be established, the Kurdish language would be 112 used, and money for reconstruction would be made available. Barzani accepted the proposal and a new cease-fire went into 113 effect which was to last until 1 March 1969. 2. The Ceasefire There were indications, however, that the ceasefire was not popular among all segments of the Iraqis. In July 1966 a Colonel Razzak led an abortive coup attempt in which

the professed goals were to forceably solve the Kurdish pro114 blem, redeem the army, and preserve the Arab unity. Army influence was also sufficient to force the resignation of Bazzaz in August 1966. The Kurds, as well, were not completely satisfied with the results of the ceasefire. Barzani retained his forces intact through the period and made repeated charges that the government was reneging on its pro116 mises. By March 1968, both sides were dissatisfied with the situation but neither was willing to fight again. The Mullah was still trying to obtain political goals and to prevent further destruction in Kurdish areas. The Iraqis also had 117 large forces in Jordan facing the Israelis. The situation


remained in a stalement through 17 July 19 68 when another coup in Iraq brought the Ba ' th party back to power under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. The new regime, however, continued to maintain the ceasefire with the Kurds. On 21 July 1968 in a gesture of reassurance, then Premier Razek al-Nayef, met with Barzani to continue discussions on Kurdish rights and in August 1968 the government issued a pledge of adherence to the promise of 118 Kurdish local government. The Kurdish reception to these overtures was cool but the attitude was one of "wait-and-see" with regard to the new regime's actions. Later in August there was new friction between Barzani and the Ba'thists. The Kurds had been promised four cabinet ministerial positions in the new government but were only allowed to appoint two. One minister from the Talabani faction of the KDP, Tahar Mohieddon, i , o 119 was also appointed.

Perhaps these differences might have been worked out, but later in December, there were evidences of outside powers approaching Barzani with offers of support. On 14 December 1968, the Iraqis reported that they had broken up an Israeli spy ring which had been active in Kurdish areas . According to Iraqi sources the purposes of this ring were to "... stir up 120 trouble with dissident Kurdish tribesmen in the north." Additionally, after the ceasefire ended and fighting resumed, it was reported that Barzani ' s forces had received new anti-tank


121 and anti-air warfare weapons. Finally, an Iraqi BrigadierGeneral Madhat al-Haj Sirri, on trial for espionage in June 1969, admitted that he had been working for the CIA for 9 years and had coordinated Israeli and Iranian overtures to the 122 Kurds. While these reports were initially dismissed in the West as propaganda, the new weapons systems plus Iran's 123 abrogation of the Shatt-al-Arab agreement on 18 April 1969 pointed to continued Iranian and Israeli attempts to foment disunity within Iraq. The ceasefire finally broke down on 1 March 19 69 when -the Pesh Merga attacked oil facilities at Kirkuk and caused a disruption of 70 percent of Iraq's oil re124 fining capacity and $2 million dollars in damage. 3. The Second Phase March 1969-March 1974 This phase consisted of active Kurdish insurgency from March 1969-March 1970, and a ceasefire from March 1970-March 1974. During this phase Iranian and Israeli influences on the Kurds continued but were joined by U.S. support. Iraq's Ba ' th leaders moved closer to the Soviets.

The new Kurdish offensive in March 1969 achieved several gains and the Mullah regained control of much of Kurdistan. The Iraqi's were largely unsuccessful in containing the situation and in May 196 9 made new peace initiatives to the Mullah. These initiatives included a renewed proposal for a law on autonomy which would achieve a "peaceful and just solution" to 125 the Kurdish question. In this regard, it appeared that Hassan al-Bakr was trying to avoid the mistakes of past


governments in being drawn into a no-win war situation and then overthrown. Additional considerations which motivated the Iraqis were that they still had 12,000 troops in Jordan and 6000 in Syria, faced possible internal difficulties from 'Arif-ists still at large, and needed to conserve their strength 12 6 in the dispute with Iran. One of the most crucial reasons for attempting to settle with the Kurds, however, was the threat to oil resources. At that time, even considering low price levels, Iraqi oil accounted for some 65 percent of state 127 revenues or a little over $400 million dollars annually. These revenues were also badly needed to continue paying for Soviet weapons. The Soviets also in August 1969 moved closer to Iraq by signing an agreement for access to Iraqi oil and 128 the development of the North Rumeila oil fields. Barzani, with continued support from Iran, was not satisfied with the Iraqi government offer. Again the problem was over the definition autonomy. In October, Iraq launched another offensive in the Kurdistan area in an attempt to cut 129 off the Iranian border from the Kurds. This offensive was also unsuccessful but both sides were suffering, from

casualties and damage and the Mullah, still maintaining de facto autonomy in Kurdistan, responded to an Iraqi peace overture in December 1969. During the peace talks in Baghdad, Barzani continued to insist on maintaining a Kurdish militia and autonomy. Discussions were successful and on 11 March


1970 a new manifesto was issued by Hassan al-Bakr. This manifesto proclaimed a decentralized government for the Kurdish region, economic reconstruction, amnesty, and other cultural guarantees, and provided for autonomy for the Kurds by 131 11 March 1974. There were, however, disagreements between Barzani and al-Bakr over the Kirkuk area which the Kurds claimed and which, because of its oil facilities, the Iraqis 132 could not afford to give away. The Kurds agreed to work within this framework but also maintained 10,000 Pesh Merga 133 intact. By 30 March 1970, in partial implementation of the agreement, five Kurds were appointed to the cabinet which also 134 held ICP and Ba'th party members. As before, however, Barzani remained dissatisfied over Iraqi slowness in implementing this agreement and in delayed economic reconstruction. On 11 August 1970 he threatened to withdraw the five cabinet ministers and refused to appoint 135 the Kurdish Vice-President until more progress was achieved. Peace continued, though, but Kurdish reconstruction continued slowly and in January 1971 Emir Kamuran Badr Khan formed a Kurdish American Relief society for reconstruction aid in the United States with Justice William O. Douglas as its honorary 13 6 President. There were also indications of strife between

rival Kurdish factions during the peace. In early December 137 1970 an assasination attempt was made on Barzani' s son Idris and in September 1971 an attempt was made on the Mullah's


13 8 life. There were also indications that the Iraqis were still trying to split the movement by dealing with the KDP fac139 tion led by Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmed. Barzani was very disturbed over this and also continued to be dissatisfied with Iraqi progress in implementing the March 11th manifesto. In late October 1971 he sent letters to Al-Bakr demanding that shortfalls in autonomy, the Kirkuk problem, conduct of a 140 census, and appointment of legislators be rectified. In 1972, the two super powers became directly involved in the situation, as well. The U.S. through Iran which was dealing with a more and more receptive Barzani, and the Soviets became involved more closely than ever before with Iraq. On 6 April 1972 Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Iraq and negotiated agreements on the use of the port of Umm Qasr, 141 oil, and military support. Iraq, which had been urging war on Israel and which was still embroiled in the dispute with Iran, was receptive to these overtures and on 9 April 1972 signed a 15 year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets. The U.S. also was receptive to overtures of the Shah and was able to provide indirect support for Israel. The story of U.S. involvement with the Kurds did not "break" until late 1975 when the Pike Commission was investigating CIA activities. However, it was determined that in May 1972, during President Nixon's visit to the Shah, that it was agreed to


support the Kurds against an anti-Israeli and pro-Soviet Iraq. As Henry Kissinger stated: "Whatever the failings of the Shah, wrestling perhaps with forces beyond any man's control, he was for us that rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally, and one whose understanding of the world situation enhanced our ..143 own. It was f e i t t h at there was a danger of Sovietradical encirclement of the "moderate" regimes of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates and U.S. support for the Shah could bolster Iran and maintain the Kissingerian idea of 144 a regional balance of power. Another key factor in obtaining U.S. support was that the U.S., still suffering from Vietnam, would not have to commit any troops in the endeavor 145 and that it could be handled through covert means . Yet another benefit to be derived from supporting the Kurds was the occupation of Iraqi troops. Although Kissinger still has not revealed the complete story of U.S. involvement, as he stated: "The benefit of Nixon's Kurdish decision was apparent in just over a year: only one Iraqi division was available to participate in the October 1973 Middle East War." 6 With this new source of support, and with what he perceived as continued Iraqi intransigence, the Mullah by June 1973 began to rebuild his forces. His attitude on the Iraqis was that only through force could he attain Kurdish aims: "These Arabs seem to favor a no war - no peace policy everywhere. We have it here, too, where they make war under the 148

147 cover of a peace agreement." Also his rebuilding was coupled with renewed calls for outside aid and promises to 148 the West of control of oil areas. With the autonomy deadline drawing near, it was reported the Kurds still had some 20,000 men under arms and that Barzani could muster up to 100,000 149

Pesh Merga . Barzani was also openly admitting the receipt of aid from Iran but said that it was only 10 percent of what 150 it should be. With regard to financial help and other assistance from Israel, Barzani was evasive and when pressed, only stated that "There are things that may be true that are 151 better not spoken about." In October 1973, the Kurds and Arabs were still at odds over the issue of autonomy. As Saddam Hussein stated: "You are aware that members of the KDP had submitted a proposal but we see it is far removed from the concept of auto152 nomy." All historical arguments were rejected with regard to Kurdish demands and negotiations continued for a time but were broken off in early March 1974. Finally the Ba'th party, being rapidly reinforced by sophisticated Soviet weapons and advisors, felt strong enough to issue an ultimatum to the Kurds. The Iraqi position was also aided by the presence of the ICP with its own Kurdish representatives in the National Front. The ultimatum issued to Idris Barzani was that discussions could continue from the 9th to the 11th of March 1974. After that, the Law of Autonomy would be promulgated and a


15 day period of acceptance for the KDP would be allowed. If the KDP had not joined the National Front by that time, they 153 would be considered as enemies. The discussions were fruitless and Iraq proclaimed on 11 March 1974 the Law of Autonomy for 154 Kurdistan Region. By 14 March there were indications that this was unacceptable to Barzani's followers. Some fighting was breaking out between the Pesh Merga and the 45,000 Iraqi troops who were . . . 155 taking positions in the area. Additionally the Voice of 156 Kurdistan (clandestine) , began to call out the tribesmen.

Talks still continued, but on 21 March 1974 the Kurds, with approximately 20,000 men, declared a "defensive alert" in their area and with the deadline approaching on 27 March, Mullah 157 Mustafa threatened all out war again. By 29 March 1974 war was in the air and the Mullah continued to seek additional aid. When asked about his sources he stated: "A drowning man stretches his hand for everything, whether a stone, a 158 piece of food, or a piece of grass." A senior KDP official also admitted that aid was being received from Israel, Iran, and Syrian, and Turkish Kurds and that numerous doctors, engineers, students, professors, religious leaders, army 159 deserters, and policemen were flocking to Barzani. 4. The Third Phase March 1974-April 1975 Preparations escalated on both sides and fighting broke out in April 1974 as the Kurds successfully cut off Iraqi


bases in the area in retaliation to a renewed Iraqi economic blockade. By late April, the fighting was in earnest and despite initial Kurdish successes, the Iraqis were able to inflict massive damage in the area. Evidence of the severity of Iraqi actions was provided when a new letter to U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim was sent protesting mass genocide and the use of napalm. For the first time in the revolt, 161 large numbers of Kurdish refugees began fleeing into Iran. The force of the Iraqi offensive was such that by September 1974, the Iraqis had captured virtually every village and 162 the Mullah, for the first time, began to talk about defeat. The government was also pressing hard into the mountain areas

with approximately 80,000 men committed and utilizing combined 163 arms attacks with Soviet advisors. There was also evidence that the Sunni regime of Hassan al-Bakr was using this conflict for internal political purposes. Large scale conscriptions of the Shiites in the south were con164 ducted and many casualties were sustained within their ranks. Iran continued its support by providing direct intervention of mobile artillery and by shooting down Iraqi Migs with Hawk missiles in December 1974. Once again, winter snows slowed the Iraqi drive and gave the Kuds a breather. During this period Iraq continued attempts to mobilize Arab support for its drive against the Kurds and Iran. These negotiations proved successful and on 8 March 1975 at a meeting in Algiers


among OPEC nations, Iran and Iraq agreed to settle the Shatt-al 166 Arab dispute and to end Iranian support for the Kurds. This agreement on Iran's part was due to a perceived need to strengthen OPEC unity. Also, clashes between Iraqi and Iranian forces alerted the Shah to the fact that this conflict could rapidly widen. This would have also been against U.S. interests for regional stability in the area. Kissinger admitted that the settlement of the dispute was also made possible by a U.S. agreement with Iran's assessment of the Kurds' situation: The Shah's decision in 1975 to settle the Kurdish problem with Iraq was based on the judgment, almost certainly correct, that the Kurds were about to be overwhelmed; they could not have been saved without the intervention of two Iranian divisions and $300 million in assistance from us. The Shah was not willing to commit the former; this was his sovereign decision to make. To imagine that Congress would have appropriated the latter seen in the month that Vietnam was collapsing would be fatuaous. If we had sought this escalation of our covert intelligence operations, many of those later mourning the Kurds' tragic fate would have probably led the charge against it. 167

With this final withdrawal of support, the Iraqis were able to concentrate their full force on the Kurds and a massive offensive was mounted on 11 March 1975 which pushed the Kurds out of the mountains. This was followed by the Iranians closing 16 8 their border on 12 March to all but refugees. Finally on 13 March 197 5, the Kurds, outmanned and outgunned, agreed to a two week ceasefire which had been proposed by the Shah. Iraq's leaders promised at the end of this ceasefire to "resume their march to 169 liquidate the pocket of lackeys for good" if they had not yet surrendered, and on 19 March rejected Barzani ' s last offer 152

to negotiate. The only option was an amnesty offer which would expire on 1 April. The Mullah, realizing that his support was gone and with over 150,000 refugees in Iran, announced the end of his resistance on 22 March 1975 saying: "Instead of getting our rights and seeing a good end, we see a bad end. There is a sort of cooperation between different 171 countries at our expense." Kurdish forces continued to withdraw out of Iraq to Turkey and Iran and on 31 March Iraqi forces advanced into what was left of the Kurdish areas and 172 were reported to be in complete control by 2 April 1975. Mullah Mustafa Barzani wisely took refuge in Tehran and stated 173 that further rebellion was futile and would never be resumed. C. DEVELOPMENTS FROM APRIL 197 5-1980 1. Kurdish Political Developments With his defeat and his associations with Iran and the U.S., Mullah Mustafa Barzani was effectively discredited as a leader of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. This led to political groups which had been overshadowed by him to strive for more influences and dominance within the Kurdish movement. With Barzani ' s break with the government in March 1974,

two groups of KDP broke from his leadership and, professing socialist ideals, worked with the Ba'th party. The first of these was the branch led by Aziz Akrawi and Hashim Hassan. Another member of this group was one of Mullah Mustafa's sons, 174 Ubaidalla. This group became the KDP - Government Branch 153

and closely cooperated with the Ba'th government and joined 175 the National Peoples Pregressive Front. Hashim Hassan became the Chief of the Executive Council of the Kurdish 176 Province. The second of these parties was the Kurdistani Revolutionary Party led by 'Abd al-Sattar Tahir which had pre177 viously claimed itself as the left wing of the KDP . It too cooperated with the Ba'th government and entered the National Front. Another small group which broke off was led by a moderate Kurdish nationalist Abd-Allah Ismail. This faction has remained very small and while working with the Ba'th, Ismail has not been able to form a party as such. The biggest splits came after Barzani's defeat, however. The Kurdistan Democratic Party - Provisional Leadership, was formed in December 1975 and remained closer to Barzani's original philosophy. Although there were no distinct leaders, Massoud and Idris Barzani were known to be members of this party. It has also maintained external links 179 with Kurdish groups in Europe, Iran and Turkey. Another group was the KDP-Preparatory Committee, formed in December 1976 by a onetime follower of Barzani, Mahmoud Osman. Osman has been critical of Barzani's methods and intended to struggle for overall leadership of the movement for the KDP and to reconstitute it along "new progressive and 180 democratic bases." Talabani also made a not unexpected


break in June 1975 when he formed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) . He has been highly critical of Barzani's "tribal" methods and described as the PUK's main objectives, the overthrow of the Baghdad regime and the destruction of all 181 elements of the KDP. This group was based in Damacus and with Iraq's perceived "turn to the west" after 1978 some evi18 2 dence of Soviet support for their faction has been seen. Aligned with the PUK were the Kurdistan Socialist Movement 183 which was founded in late 197 6 by Ali Askari, and the Marxist-Leninist League (Maoist) which officially came into U 10-7C 184

being in 1976. The defeat of the Kurds caused a large-scale splintering of the movement and the emergence of the more leftistoriented groups vying for positions and clashes were reported between the KDP-Provisional Leadership and other groups in 18 5 18 6 July 1976 and again in July 1978. A dominant party has not emerged and strife between the groups could prevent a unified Kurdish national movement from rising again in Iraq. The KRP, however, has closely worked with the Ba'thists and on 15 August 1979 praised the Ba * th party for scoring "huge 187 development and nationalist gains." There were further evidences of factional fighting in Iran between the PUK and 18 8 the KDP-Provisional Leadership in August 1979 which indicated that both of those groups were trying to obtain Iranian Kurdish support for their objectives.


Mullah Mustafa Barzani ' s death on 1 March 1979 in 189 Washington, D.C. also removed the one Kurdish leader who had had some success against the Iraqis. This could lead to support for Talabani who has remained anti-Ba'th and was one of the last surviving names of the Kurdish Revolt. On the other hand, there have been signs that tie Kurds in Iraq have forgiven Barzani for his indiscretions and as stated in his obituary, that he "will go down in history with the greatest 190 of all the Kurds - Saladin the Great." A mellowing of attitudes toward Barzani, coupled with Ba'thist repression, could serve to work to the advantage of his sons Idris, now 37, and Massoud now 34. 2. Iraqi Ba'th Policies After taking control of the area, Iraq continued to mend its fences with Iran and to fully impose the March 1974 declaration in Kurdistan. Its cooperation with the KRP and other Kurdish elements, plus large oil revenues after 197 3, has allowed the regime some success. This was coupled with strong military control of the area and deportations of Kurds 191 away to southern Iraq. Additionally, in late 1977, the Ba'th went on a campaign to eliminate Kurdish contacts abroad. On 9 December an amnesty was announced which would last for 192 two months for the return of all Iraqi Kurds. By December 1978 it appeared to Lord Kilbracken that there was peace throughout most of Kurdistan, and Iraq was


sure enough of its control to allow neutral observers into the 193 area for the first time. It was also reported in August 1978 that much redevelopment had occurred and one witness observed new schools, housing and factories under construc194 tion. In early 1980, further evidence of the Ba'th's benevolence, now directed by Saddem Hussein, was provided by a member of the ruling council of Kurdistan, Abdel-Gafar al Seyegh. He stated that he was an Iraqi first and that most 195 educated Kurds now considered themselves as Ba'thist Iraqis. He also stated that: "We speak our own language, have our own press, and schools, and Kurds are represented at all levels 196 of government." Additionally a budget allocation of some $3,125 million has been announced for rebuilding in the region 197 for 1980. The Iraqi Ba ' th position toward Kurdistan was stated by Hassan al-Bakr in 1976: In the present circumstances of prevalent stability in the northern part of the homeland and of the growing national unity, it behooves us to double and redouble our efforts for implementing the revolution's programmes as regards automony rule, the fulfillment of the ambitions of our Kurdish people, and promotion of all-embracing development in that dear part of the homeland. 198 Conditions as late as April 1980 were vividly described by an Iraqi Kurd of the Pishtdari tribe who revisited the area after living in the United States. To him there was much evidence of money being spent in the area as previously mentioned, and this in turn has kept Kurdish youth in the 199 ¦ area. However, the regime has removed the instruction in


language from the schools and it is now only voluntary. Additionally, only one Kurdish newspaper Khabat , in Kurdicized Arabic, is authorized for publication and it is "full of Ba'thist, Pan-Arab, and Iraqi naticnalist propaganda." A key change which he noted was the pervasive influence of the Iraqi army. Where before the Kurds had been left alone in their mountain fastnesses, now"there is not a hill in Kurdistan 201 which does not have an Iraqi army or police post on it. " Despite Ba'thist inspired improvements there are three issues which may lead to unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan according to him. The first is that Kurds cannot enter the Ba'th party proper and therefore have no real hope of attaining power in Iraq. Secondly they are very upset about the removal of language instruction in the schools. Lastly, the Kurds are becoming more and more resentful (as a "simmering volcano") of Arab 202 settlement and inroads in Kurdistan. The recent, ongoing Iraqi-Iranian war could lead to further unrest among Iraqi Kurds. Despite Ayatollah Khomeini's 203 castigation of the Iranian Kurds as infidels, with the latest outbreak of war Tehran radio has urged the Kurds of 204 Iraq to revolt against the Baghdad regime. This appeared to be a replay of the Shah's tactics except without the military support. There were 20,000 Iranian troops "poised" 205 in Kordestan but as of 14 October 1980, their presence appeared to be aimed more at control of Iranian Kurds who might take advantage of war disruption than for use against 158

Iraq or in support of Iraqi Kurds . Any support which Khomeini might hope of receiving from Iraqi Kurds could also be more than offset by damage and casualties which Iranian aircraft have caused in Kirkuk, Mosul, Arbil, Kut, and 20 6 Nasiriyah, all of which are in Kurdish territory. D. CONCLUSIONS From the foregoing, several conclusions are readily apparent. The first one is that throughout the period of revolt, and continuing to today, a strong fabric of Kurdish nationalism and a demand for their rights has existed. This nationalism, however, was caught in the web of local, regional, pan-Arab and anti-Israel politics. Mullah Mustafa, in his search for allies and support became embroiled in negotiations with various parties, any and all of whom, would change sides away from the Kurdish cause in search of a greater goal. This happened both during the search for the UAR and also during the pressure on Iran for greater OPEC unity. The second conclusion is that while there was a fabric of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, it continued to be subject to both tribal and ideological rifts. The intelligentsia in the KDP politburo during the revolt really only worked with Barzani because he held control over the majority of Kurdish military forces. There was also evidence that not even all the tribes rallied to the Kurdish banner and that some even fought for the Iraqis against Barzani. Once the 159

intelligentsia, particulary Talabani, had created their own military capabilities in the mid-1960' s, there was a renewed ideological struggle for control of the movement. This struggle in turn made both Kurdish sides susceptible to Iraqi bargaining. Talabani was susceptible in the hope of recognition as the true progressive leader of the Kurds and the Mullah was susceptible in that he had to negotiate after 1965 to preempt government overtures to Talabani. As has been shown, these ideological rifts are still existant and may even be a dominant factor in preventing further Kurdish action in Iraq. The proliferation of groups and parties after the Mullah's defeat pointed both to the success of Ba'thist overtures to Kurdish elements, as well as the wide diffusion of Kurds who would like to be leaders for all the Kurds. External influences were existant through all phases of the revolt. It was Soviet support which caused the return of Mullah Mustafa in the first place. There was also a constraint on U.S. action initially for fear of disturbing either Iran or Turkey. Arab nationalist and Israeli actors came into play either to use the Kurds to weaken Iraq or to support Iraq against the Kurds, depending on what the Iraqi internal political status was. Iraqi politics also became heavily involved starting with Kassim who hoped to divide the

Kurdish movement using Barzani. The Iranian factor, which came into play after 1966 in response to Soviet arming of


Iraq and in 1969 with the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, became increasingly important; enough so that the United States would enter the picture in direct support of Iran and in indirect support of Israel in 1972. Initially, although Barzani repeatedly requested it, the Kurds of Iraq were able to hold out against unstable governments and an inefficient military without much aid. Up to 1966 it appeared that all they received was what they could steal or capture or what was provided to them by Kurdish groups abroad. With heavier Soviet interests in Iraq, and particularly after the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the Kurds were no longer facing just the Iraqis but the military sophistication of the Soviets. For Mullah Mustafa's forces to survive in that environment, massive external weapons support and aid was required. The loss of this aid in 1975 in the face of a strong regime with modern weapons led, just as it did in Mahabad in 1946, to the crushing of the Kurdish movement for autonomy and the reimposition of central government control. The role of oil has only been briefly touched on, but it became more important as well after the 1973 price rises and Iraqi nationalization efforts. Not only were the Iraqis more than ever determined to defend and retain the oilbearing areas of Kurdistan after this, but the oil was a key factor in attracting Soviet support and paying for Soviet weapons and advisors. Finally only through the availability 161

of these oil revenues have the Iraqis been able to devote resources to the redevelopment of Kurdistan which has been an important factor in maintaining the peace and stability which the Ba ' th party has sought.



C. L. Sulzberger, "The Kremlin's Dangerous Kurdish Wedge," New York Times , Jan. 7, 1959, p. 32.

2 "Iraqi Reports Victory," New York Times , April 2, 19 62, p. 7. 3 Eric Pace, "Leader of Kurdish Revolt Says That Fighting in Iraq is Ended," New York Times , March 23, 1975, p. 1. 4 Iraq, Ministry of Information, The Kurdish Question Attitudes and Achievements , Documentary Series No. 60 ("Baghdad: al-Hurria Printing House, 1977), p. 10. R. D. McLaurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin, and Abraham R. Wagner, Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East: Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, and Syria , (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1977), p. 133. Aside from Kassim, who later denied his Kurdish ancestry, the Foreign Minister Abdul Jabbar Jomard and the Minister of Public Works Baba Ali, were of Kurdish descent. C. L. Sulzberger, "The Kremlin's Dangerous Kurdish Wedge," p. 32. 7 George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East , (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 16. g Iraq, Ministry of Information, The Kurdish Question Attitudes and Achievements , p. 11. q Foster Hailey, "North Iraq Backs New Regime; Tension Less Than in Baghdad," New York Times , July 28, 1958, p. 2. ibid . Sam Pope Brewer, "Soviet is linked to Kurdish Shift," New York Times , Oct. 27, 1958, p. 9. Egypt was probably at this point in time following the Soviet line in attempting to hurdle or weaken the Baghdad Pact. Additional motives for the Soviets may have been simply to get rid of Barzani or to use him either as a lever against Iraq in the future or as a pro-Soviet element in the new national front. 163


"Kurds Push Aim for Statehood," New York Times , Feb. 8, 1959, p. 5. 13 Kenneth Love, "Iran Seen as 3ase for Soviet Drive," New York Times , Jan. 7, 1959. 14 Richard P. Hunt, "Nassar Declares Enmity to Kassem," New York Times , March 14, 1959, p. 1. The UDPK at this stage was very close to the ICP and a Covenant of Cooperation had been signed between the two parties on 10 November 19 58. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt; 1961-1970 , (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoestring Press, 1973) , pp. 65-66. 16 R. D. McLaurin, et al . , Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East , p. 133. 17 "855 Armed Kurds Go Through Suez," New York Times , April 7, 1959, p. 10. 18 "Soviet Said to Ship More Kurds to Iraq," New York Times , April 12, 1959, p. 1. ibid . 20 Dana A. Schmidt, "C.I. A. Head Warns of Danger in Iraq," New York Times , April 29, 1959, p. 1. 21 "Fighting in Iraq Related by Kurds," New York Times , May 26, 1959, p. 8. 22 Dana A. Schmidt, "U.S. Envoy Is Back to Report on Iraq" New York Times , May 6, 19 59, p. 5 and "Kurds Seek Asylum,"

New York Times , May 13, 1959, p. 8. 23 These demands were put forth by Salam 'Adil of the ICP at an address to the 21st Congress of the CPSU on 2 February 1959: "The Communist Party of Iraq calls for the creation of the necessary democratic conditions for elections to a constituent assembly which would draw up a democratic constitution taking into account the national rights of the Kurds of Iraq and the aspirations of our country towards an alliance with independent Arab countries." Aryeh Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror , (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973), p. 154. 164

24 "Iraqi Says Army Has Atomic Bombs," New York Times , June 26, 19 59, p. 5. 25 "Iraq United Front with Reds Formed," New York Times , June 30, 1959, p. 8. 26 "Fighting in Iraq Said to Continue," New York Times , July 21, 1959, p. 1. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 , p. 68. 28 Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem , (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 298. 29 ibid . ibid . 31 ibid., p. 299. 32... A ibid . 33 Richard p. Hunt, "Iraq Is Troubled by Kurdish Tribe,"

New York Times , Dec. 27, 1960, p. 10. 34 Vito Priestly, "The Political Situation in Iraq," Middle Eastern Affairs , XIII No. 5 (May, 1962), 142. 35 Richard P. Hunt, "Iraq Is Troubled By Kurdish Tribe," p. 10. 36 Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 , p. 72. ibid . ibid . , p. 73 . ibid . °Vita Priestly, "The Political Situation in Iraq," 142. 41 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurdish Rebel Chief Says Force Is Only Way to Win Autonomy," New York Times , Sept. 11, 1962, p. 1. 165

ibid . 43 During this period Barzani again had to fight to establish his authority over the Baradostis, Herkis , and Lolanis. Some of the tribesmen joined his forces, others remained neutral, and others joined the Jash Iraqi auxiliaries. Morale in the Barzani forces was reported to be high and his tactics were to not back those Iraqi forces which ventured into the mountains . Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurd's Guerilla Tradition Aids Rebels in War on Iraqi Army," New York Times , Sept. 12, 1962, p. 1. 44 New York Times , Sept. 24, 1961, p. 43. 45 "Iraqi Kurds' Leaders Reported Arrested," New York Times , Sept. 27, 1961, p. 5. 46 "Kurdish Fighting Reported," New York Times , Jan. 3,

1962, p. 3. 47 "100 Towns Reported Destroyed in Kurds' Revolt Against Kassim," New York Times , April 24, 1962, p. 1. ibid . 49 "Britain Is Accused on Revolt in Iraq," New York Times , September 24, 1961, p. 43. "100 Towns Reported Destroyed in Kurds' Revolt Against Kassim, " p. 1 . 51 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds Reported to Resist Attack," New York Times , May 27, 1962, p. 16. 52 Barzani was known as the "Red Mullah" in the popular press because of his long stay in the USSR and his suspected leanings toward communism. Later events were to prove this label inappropriate. "Mullah's Brother Said to Yield," New York Times , Oct. 5, 1961, p. 18. 53 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds Reported to Resist Attack," p. 16. 54 Statement From the Kurdish Bureau , June 15, 1962, published in The Middle East Journal XVI No. 3 (Summer 1962) , 373374. 166

55 Dana A. Schmidt/ "Kurdish Rebels Confident of Victory in Iraq," New York Times , Sept. 10, 1962, p. 1. 56.. . A ibid .

57 "U.S. Rules Out Aid to Rebels in Iraq," New York Times , Sept. 10, 1962, p. 14. 58 Seymour Topping, "Iraq Reds Ask Link With Kurds; Have Tacit Approval of Kremlin," New York Times , Sept. 15, 1962, p. 1. Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds Said to Get Offers of Red Aid," New York Times , Sept. 24, 1962, p. 10. fi Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds Guerilla Tradition Aids Rebels in War on Iraqi Army," New York Times , Sept. 12, 19 62, p. 1. 61 ibid . Barzani's forces opposing the Iraqis and the Jash were not just loose bands. They were organized into various groups. Pasta 10 men, Pal 50 men, Serpal 150 men, lek 350 men and Seriek 1000 men and relied on speed, endurance, marksmanship, and deception. 62 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraq Offers Kurds 'Amnesty 1 If They Give Up Before Sunday," New York Times , Jan. 15, 1963, p. 3. 63., ibid . 64 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurd Chiefs Leaving Mountains For Peace Meetings in Baghdad," New York Times , Feb. 18, 19 63, p. 1. 65 -K-^ ibid . 66., .. ibid . 67.,., -,

ibid . 68 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds and Iraqis Meet on Peace; Baghdad Talks Called Friendly," New York Times , Feb. 29, 1963, p. 1. 69 "Iraq to Release Kurdish Captives," New York Times , Feb. 21, 1963, p. 1. 167

70 "Amnesty Given Kurds By the Baghdad Regime," New York Times , March 13, 1963, p. 4. 71 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds Threaten to Resume Fight," New York Times , March 2, 19 63, p. 1. 72 ibid . The Mullah, however, stated that he was displeased with Talabani ' s visit to Cairo and that he had not authorized it. In his view Talabani was working against the KDP and would weaken Kurdish unity. Nasser, however, did appear responsive, at least verbally. During Talabani* s visit Nasser, who may have been hoping to turn the Kurds against Turkey or Iran, stated: "No one can deny that the Kurdish people exist. Consequently they have their rights and of these is to seek autonomy." 73 ibid . 74 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraq Resumes War with Kurds; Demands Surrender in 24 Hours," New York Times , June 11, 1963, p. 4. 75... A ibid . 76 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraqi Troops Driving on Kurdish Rebels' Centers," New York Times , June 13, 19 63, p. 7.

77 Another new element was outright support by the proNasserist paper Beirut al-Massa which stated: "What we do know is that neither the Kurds nor the Barzanis are enemies of the Arab Nation of Iraq. They have not asked to secede from Iraq or from the proposed tripatite Arab Union. We know also that they are not usurpers of Iraqi territory. We believe, therefore, that to crush them is not a wise policy either from the humanitarian viewpoint or from the viewpoint of Arab interests. Arabs may be forced to fight many battles. But they do not have to fight their Kurdish brothers with whom they are tied with unbreakable links." Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraqi Kurd War Has New Aspects," New York Times , June 17, 1963, p. 3. 78 Dana A. Schmidt, "Syrian Battalion Said to Aid Iraq," New York Times , July 1, 1963, p. 1. 79 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraq Foils Uprising by Reds at Base," New York Times , July 4, 1963, p. 1. Shortly after this, in October, a Pravda article also criticized the Ba ' th regime and


was favorable to the Kurds: "Discontent is prevalant in the army, particularly among soldiers and NCO's; there is dislike of the dirty war in Kurdistan and of the policy of killing the patriot officers. The forming of a "national guard" from among adolescents [to suppress communists] befuddled by jingoist propaganda , declassed elements and all sorts of riffraff, is an expression not only of the fascism of the regime but also of the Ba'thists fear of the Army. Thousands of officers and soldiers have deserted to the Kurds." Quoted in Aryeh Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror , p. 16 9. 80 "Kurds Report Bid by Iraq for Peace," New York Times , Aug. 19, 1963, p. 7. 81 "Ammunition Lack Said to Slow Iraqis," New York Times , Sept. 7, 1963, p. 6.

82 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraq Puts Down Revolt Attempt," New York Times , Nov. 14, 1963, p. 8. 83 "Iraq Will Seek to Carry Out Merger of 3 Nations," New York Times , Nov. 22, 19 63, p. 6 and Dana A. Schmidt, "New Iraqi Chief Vows Neutrality," New York Times , Nov. 23, 1963, p. 24. 84 Dana A. Schmidt, "Middle Easts Conflicts," New York Times , Feb. 12, 1964, p. 6. 85 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurdish Rebels and Iraq Agree to Cease Fighting," New York Times , Feb. 11, 1964, p. 1. 86 ., . -, ibid . 87 "It was noted, however, that the Mullah, aged 60, looked his age and appeared tired and worried. Points presented for discussion were: Definition of Kurdish national, cultural, economic and political rights; a release of political prisoners; withdrawal of the economic blockade; withdrawal of all Iraqi forces except the 2nd division; the establishment of mixed administration; and Kurdish deserters to be allowed to return to their original units. "Iraqi-Kurd Peace Still in Balance," New York Times , March 1, 19 64, p. 4. 88 Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 , p. 120. ibid . , p . 121 . 169

90 ibid . , p. 120 .

91 ibid . , p. 121 . 92 ibid . , p. 122. 93 The cabinet was to have 43 members. 16 KDP, 9 Pesh Merga and 18 others (6 of whom would be appointed by Mullah Mustafa Barzani.) Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds in Iraq Set Up 'Regime' After Failing to Sway Baghdad." New York Times , Nov. 12, 1964, p. 4. 94 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraqi Chief Seeks Internal Accord," New York Times , Nov. 22, 1964, p. 6. 95 "Kurds Renewing Pleas to the World," New York Times , Jan. 24, 1965, p. 24. 96 "Iraqi Force Massing For Drive on Kurds," New York Times , March 30, 1965, p. 11. 97 "Iraqi Army Said to Drop Parachutists to Fight Kurds," New York Times , April 23, 1965, p. 4. 98 "Iraqis Announce Plan for Reform," New York Times , Nov. 9, 1965, p. 12. 99 Kurdish sources asserted that the UAR in a gesture of solidarity had sent over 3000 troops and 52 Soviet built bombers to support Iraq. At least 1100 troops were sent and had been stationed near Baghdad. "New Iraqi Offensive Reported by Kurds," New York Times , Dec. 8, 19 65, p. 4. It was also reported that the Kurds had bridged the rift between tribal and political groups. The weapons consisted of heavy mortars, heavy bazookas, and some field guns which apparently came across the Iranian border. Dana A. Schmidt,

"Kurds are Pressing War on Iraqi Army Despite the Winter," New York Times , Dec. 24, 1965, p. 7. Iraqi officials also asserted that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were helping the Kurds and stated the following rationales: "The Soviet Union and Britain and the United States joined to form Israel. Nov/ they are cooperating to


strengthen Israel by weakening an Arab country." Thomas F. Brady, "Iraq Would Recognize Rebel Kurds As a 'Nation, 1 " New York Times , Dec. 21, 19 65, p. 15. The Israelis did take advantage of the Kurdish war and the discontent of Iraqi pilots to gain possession of a MIG 21 in August 1966. The pilot, Munir Redfa, was a Christian who was dissillusioned with attacks on Kurdish villages and susceptible to Israeli intelligence efforts. See Dennis Eisenberg, et al . , The Mossad , (New York: Paddington Press, 1978), p. 61 and New York Times , Aug. 17, 1966, p. 9. 102 Dana A. Schmidt, "Kurds are Pressing War on Iraqi Army Despite the Winter," New York Times , Dec. 24, 196 5, p. 7. Other evidence of external support for Iraq's Kurds was revealed when on 23 June 19 66 in Saarbrucken W. Germany, an arms smuggling ring which had been in operation for several years and which shipped Czech weapons via West Germany, France and Turkey, was broken up. Also on 31 January 1966 Lebanese authorities seized 1500 automatic rifles from Bulgaria which were thought to be destined for the Kurds . See "Arms Smuggling to Kurds Uncovered, Germans Say," New York Times , Jan. 24, 1966, p. 4 and "Seized Shipment of Rifles May Have Been for Kurds," New York Times , Feb. 1, 1966, p. 2. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 , p. 135. 104 "Kurds List Terms for Negotiations," New York Times , Apr. 21, 1966, p. 10. ibid. 10 6 Abdel Rahman 'Arif had visited Moscow in April to discuss obtaining new Soviet weapons and was reinvited to visit Moscow in late May 1966. See "High Iraqi Military Officers Seeking Arms Aid in Soviet," New York Times , April 12, 19 66, p. 2. and "Soviet Said to Seek Improved Arab Ties," New York Times , May 24, 1966, p. 11.

107 "Iraqi President Rules Out Kurdish Offer to Negotiate," New York Times , Apr. 28, 1966, p. 13. 108 "Kurds Assert Iraqi's Begin New Attack," New York Times , May 13, 1966, p. 10. 109 "Iraqis' Offensive Blunted By Kurds," New York Times , May 29, 1966, p. 6. 171

ibid . Thomas F. Brady, "Kurdish Accord Believed Likely," New York Times , June 21, 1966, p. 14. 112 A synopsis of the broadcast is in the appendices. Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt; 1961-1970 , p. 179. 113 Eric Pace, "Iraqis Awaiting Move by Regime," New York Times, March 6, 1969, p. 7. The Soviets also welcomed the ceasefire of June 1966. As stated by Aryeh Rodfat: "Soviet commentators welcomed the ceasefire in Iraqi Kurdistan. With the establishment of closer relations between Moscow and Baghdad, which was now included among the "progressive" Arab states, and in which the USSR had a certain influence (though less than in Egypt or Syria) , there was no longer any reason to write about the Kurdish question, that is, to attack a regime of which they approved. A renewal of the war against the Kurds might increase the influence of the right wing elements in that country; whatever attitude Russia adopted in such a case, support for the government, support for the Kurds, or even official neutrality, would be to its disadvantage, improved Soviet relations with Iran and Turkey, which also had large Kurdish minorities, likewise dictated less Soviet publicity about the Kurdish question." See Aryeh Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror , p. 191. 114 "Iraq Reports Suppression of a Revolt by Officers," New York Times , July 1, 1966, p. 2.

"Bazzaz Resigns as Iraqi Premier," New York Times , Aug. 7, 1966, p. 14. 116 Thomas F. Brady, "Kurds Mistrust of New Regime Said to Slow Pacification Plan," New York Times , Sept. 25, 1966, p. 20. 117 Thomas F. Brady, "Kurds and Iraqis Restive in Peace," New York Times , March 22, 1968, p. 25. 118 "New Regime in Iraq Backs Kurdish Plan," New York Times , Aug. 4, 19 68, p. 24. 119 Thomas F. Brady, "New Rift Reported Between Baghdad and Kurds," New York Times, Aug. 19, 1968, p. 3.


120 Dana A. Schmidt, " 19, Including 8 Jews, Awaiting Sentence in Iraq as Israeli Spies," New York Times , Jan. 19, 1969, p. 22 121 "Kurdish Offensive in Iraq Is Reported," New York Times , May 20, 1969, p. 3. 122 Raymond H. Anderson, "U.S., An 'Octopus,' Ridiculed in Iraq," New York Times , June 10, 1969, p. 8. 123 "Iran Voids Border Pact, Charging Iraqi Violations," New York Times , April 19, 1969, p. 2. 124

"Kurdish Unrest Unabated in Iraq," New York Times , March 30, 1969, p. 10. 125 "Iraq, In Peace Offer, Proposes Kurdish Autonomy," New York Times , May 24, 19 69, p. 5. ibid. 127 ibid . 128 "Soviet Achieves Stake in Iraq Oil," New York Times , Aug. 11, 1969, p. 47. 129 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraqi Army Renews Its Offensive Against Kurds," New York Times , Oct. 12, 1969, p. 32. 130 The size of the "militia" desired by Barzani was at least 10,000 armed effectives. "Amnesty for Kurds Reported in Iraq," New York Times , Jan. 26, 1970, p. 8. Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraq Recognizes Kurdish Autonomy," New York Times , March 12, 1970, p. 8. The full manifesto is available in Iraq, Ministry of Information. The Kurdish Question Attitudes and Achievements , pp. 48-68. ibid . 133 ibid . Other reasons for Iraq's willingness to seek peace were estimates that the war, since 1961, had cost over $1 billion and that the Ba'thists wanted to free up their military forces to deal with both Iran and Kuwait. Dana A. Schmidt, "Rulers of Iraq Place Priority on Consolidating Their Power," New York Times , March 13, 19 70, p. 3. 173

134 The Kurdish Cabinet members were Ihsan Shairzad Municipal and Rural Affairs, Mohamed Mahmoud - Northern Development, Nouri Shawees - Works and Housing, Saleh al Yousefi - Minister of State, and Nafidh Jalal - Agriculture None of these posts were crucial to state security, however, and there was no Kurdish representative in the real center of power, the RCC . "5 Kurds Appointed to Iraqi Cabinet," New York Times , March 3Q, 1970, p. 5. 135 Dana A. Schmidt, "Iraq - Kurd Accord Is Said to Falter," New York Times , Aug. 17, 1970, p. 7. 136 "Kurdish-Aid Group Formed in U.S., New York Times , Jan. 17, 1979, p. 12. 137 Eric Pace, "For the Kurds in Iraq, Peace but Little Else," New York Times , Dec. 31, 1970, p. 4. 138 It was claimed that the assasins were members of a rival Kurdish group. "Baghdad Says Kurdish Chief Escaped Attempt on His Life," New York Times , Sept. 30, 1971, p. 5. 139 Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Tensions on Rise In Northern Iraq," New York Times , Oct. 24, 1971, p. 8. ibid . 141 "Kosygin Flies to Baghdad for State Visit," New York Times , April 7, 1972, p. 2. 142

The Pike Committee was actually the House Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by New York Congressman Otis Pike. It found, in closed testimony, that the Nixon-Kissinger covert program to aid the Shah in support of the Kurds ultimately cost $16 Million. Aid was provided both as arms and cash to "an ethnic group fighting for autonomy in a country bordering our ally. The bordering country and our ally had long been bitter enemies. They differed substantially in ideological orientation and in their relations with the U.S." (Iraq had broken relations with the U.S. after the June 1967 war with Israel). It was also mentioned that U.S. aid was viewed as symbolic as Iran's aid substantially dwarfed the U.S. aid package. Other findings of the committee were that the Kurds without U.S. -Iranian aid would have probably come to a quicker and less costly accomodation with the Iraqis, that neither the U.S. nor Iran hoped that the Kurds would prevail but would merely 174

sap the strength, of Iraq, and that the U.S. action was "cynical." The administration's response to the conclusions of the committee was that "covert action should not be confused with missionary work." Aaron Latham, "The Pike Papers," The Village Voice , February 16, 19 70, p. 85. Another administration account is briefly provided in William E. Colby, Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA . CNew York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 421. 143 Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years , (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 143.

ibid. , p

1263. Tad Szulc mentions that the Shah actually

requested U.S. aid in January 19 70 but was rebuffed by the U.S. for reasons similar to older reasons of not wanting to create "Prey" for the Soviet Union. Apparently by 1972, the perceived threat to regional stability was great enough to warrant U.S. involvement. See Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), pp. 583-584.

145 ibid. , p. 1264 .


ibid. , p. 1265 .

147 Jim Hoagland, "The Kurds Gird for Another War," Washington Post , June 24, 1963, Sec. C, p. 1. 148 Barzani stated: "We are ready to do what goes with American policy in this area if America will protect us from the wolves. If support were strong enough, we could control the Kirkuk field and give it to an American company to operate." in ibid.



The Kurds had repayed Iran by capturing Iraqi saboteurs trying to infiltrate into Iran through Kurdistan. in ibid . 151...ibid . 152 Saddam Hussein, On Current Affairs , (Baghdad: Ath Thawra Publications, 1975), p. 23. 153.. ., .ibid. , p. 47


154 Raymond H. Anderson, "Limited Local Autonomy Granted to Kurds in Iraq," New York Times , March 12, 1974, p. 5. A detailed presentation of the manifesto and constitutional amendments may be found in Iraq, Ministry of Information, The Kurdish Question Attitudes and Answers , pp. 73-105. "Iraq Presses Kurds on Self Rule Plan," New York Times , March 13, 1974, p. 4. 156 "Iraqis Reported Battling Kurds," New York Times , March 15, 1974, p. 11. 157 "A Kurdish Guerilla Force in Northern Iraq Is Reportedly Put on Defense Alert," New York Times , March 23, 1974, p. 4. 158 Gwynne Roberts, "Kurdish Leader, Facing Possible Civil War, Looks to West for Support," New York Times , April 1, 1974, p. 14. ibid . 16 The Kurds reportedly cut off 8000 total Iraqi troops and the outposts at Kol Sanjak and Zakho. Gwynne Roberts, "Kurds Cut Off Second Iraqi Stronghold," New York Times , April 13, 1974, p. 4. 161 "70,000 Kurds Flee to Iran From Big Iraqi Offensive," New York Times , Aug. 31, 1974, p. 3. 162 James F. Clarity, "Iraqi Forces Seize Most Kurdish Towns," New York Times , Sept. 27, 1964, p. 4. 163 One Soviet advisor was identified as the advisor for air,

Col. Alexandr Vasiliev. It was also reported that TU-22 bombers were being flown in missions for the first time outside the USSR and that their pilots were all Soviets. Chris Goddard, "Kurds caught between trust and treachery," Times of London, Oct. 16, 1974, p. 14. 164 David Hirst, "Iraq's War in the Kurdish Mountains," Washington Post , Oct. 20, 1974, Sec. C, p. 5. 165 "A Little War May Get Bigger," New York Times , Dec. 22, 1974, Sec. IV, p. 2. 176

166 "An OPEC Payoff: Persian Gulf Accord," New York Times , March 9, 1975, Sec. IV, p. 3. 167 Kissinger also mentioned that the U.S., Iran, and Israel collaborated in preventing the Kurds from launching a diversionary offensive during the October 1973 war because intelligence estimates showed that they would be defeated. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years , p. 1265. Another rationale for Iran's willingness to deal with Iraq and disengage support from the Kurds has also been provided: "Common oil interests, fear of prolonged involvement on the wrong side of a popular national struggle, and new openness of the Iraqi government to Western economic interests impelled the Shah to repair relations with Iraq." "The Kurds Trust a Bad Ally," Middle East Research and Information Project , No. 38 (June, 1975) , p. 26. 16 8 Eric Pace, "Iraqi Kurds Face Arms Shortages," New York Times , March 13, 1975, p. 6. 169 Eric Pace, "Iraq - Kurdish Fighting Said to Continue Despite 2-Week Truce Asked by Iran," New York Times , March 14, 1975, p. 3. 170 "Baghdad Is Said to Reject Kurdish Offer to Negotiate,"

New York Times , March 20, 1975, p. 4. 171 Eric Pace, "Leader of Kurdish Revolt Says That Fighting in Iraq Is Ended," New York Times , March 23, 19 75, p. 1. In an indication of things to come, it was also noted that neither Idris or Massoud Barzani endorsed their father's statement and both remained highly critical of the Iraqi regime. Eric Pace "Some Kurds Said to Plan to Fight On," New York Times , March 24, 1975, p. 12. 172 Juan de Onis, "Iraqis Complete Seizure of Kurdish Rebel Area," New York Times , April 3, 1975, p. 3. 173 "Kurdish Leader Calls Rebellion Futile," New York Times , May 4, 1975, p. 7. 174 Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq , (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Instituted 1978) , p. 9~3. Barzani 's comment on his son's defection was: "He left us because he is useless, he won't dare to come back." See James F. Clarity, "Iran's Help to Kurds Fighting Iraq Includes Arms, Secret Agents, and Public Relations," New York Times , Oct. 11, 1974, p. 12. 177

1 Amanda Cuthbert, "The Kurds/' MEED Arab Report , Feb. 14, 1979, p. 5. 176 Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq , p. 93. 177 ibid . , p. 94 . ibid.


Amanda Cuthbert, "The Kurds," p. 5. ibid . ibid . 182 Gerde Linde, "Soviet Policy in the Arab Peninsula," Berichte Pes Bundesinstituts fur Ostwissen Shaftliche Und Internationale Studien . Summaries 31-53, 1978, p. 41. 18 3 Amanda Cuthbert, "The Kurds", p. 5. 184 Libya's Col. Qaddaf i , in an anti-Baghdad move, has also expressed verbal support for the Kurds of Iraq. ibid . 185 Edward Mortimer, "Kurds Force Change of Iraq Policy After Clashes," Times of London , July 27, 1976, p. 7. 18 6 Edward Mortimer, "Veteran Kurd Group in New Clashes with Iraqi Forces," Times of London , July 18, 1978, p. 6. 187 Baghdad INA, 15 August 1979, FBIS Daily Report Middle East and North Africa , V No. 160, August 16, 1979, p. Rl . 188 Mullah Mustafa Barzani was 76 years old and was flown to Tehran for burial in the village of Oshnovich on the Iraqi border. "Kurds' Hero Dies," MEED Arab Report , March 14, 1979, p. 3. 190., . , ibid . 191

"The Kurds Pay the Price," Times of London , March 8, 1976, p. 13.


192 "Iraq Says That Kurds Living Abroad Must Return in 2 Months for Amnesty/" New York Times , Dec. 9, 1977, Sec. II, p. 11. Just prior to this the Canadians expelled, as per sonna nongrata , the second ranking Iraqi diplomat in Ottawa, Tarik Abu al Khail. He was charged with luring Kurdish refugees in Canada back to Iraq where the would face imprisonment." Canada Expels Iraqi Diplomat, New York Times , Nov. 11, 1977, p. 9. 193 Roger Hardy, "In Iraq: Independence is the Watchword," Times of London , July 17, 1978, p. 4. 194 J. P. Smith, "Rebellious Kurdistan Now Conquered, Quiet," Washington Post , Aug. 8, 1978, p. 14. 195 Christine Osborne, "Kurds enjoy autonomy in Iraq," Middle East Economic Digest , March 28, 1980, p. 31. ibid . 197.,. , ibid. 198 Iraq, Ministry of Information, Steadfast Programme in Dealing with the Masses , Documentary Series No. 53, (Baghdad: Al Huria Printing House, 1976), p. 15. 199 Prof. Mahmoud Hamza Pishtdari, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, Ca., Interview Conducted Aug. 11, 1980. 200.,. ,

ibid . 201.,. , ibid. 202., . ibid . 203 John Kifner, "Uprising By Kurds Strains Iranian Regime," New York Times , May 31, 1980, p. 5. 204 "Both Iran, Iraq Claim Control of Khorramshar , " Monterey Peninsula Herald, Oct. 3, 1980, p. 1.


205 Steven Strasser, et al., "Fighting to a Standstill," Newsweek , Oct. 13, 1980, p. 52. The Kurds in Iran have been in defiance of the central government since shortly after Khomeini's return in early 1979. If Iraqi links to them during the 1980 war can be shown, then a near reversal of Iran's earlier policies would have taken place with Iraq this time using the Kurdish card to tie up large amounts of enemy troops. 206 Vahe Petrossian and Jonathan Crusoe, "Shatt al-Arab Feud Erupts," Middle East Economic Digest, Sept. 26, 1980, p. 14.


VI. CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS A. CONCLUSIONS 1. Kurdish Nationalism At the start of this study a definition of nationalism was proposed which had as its elements unity of territory,

unity of culture, common history, pride and sorrow in the nation's achievement, disregard of other groups, esteem for nationals of the same group, devotion to the national entity, common dominant socio-economic institutions, common government, or a desire for one, and the hope for a great and glorious future. The definition was further modified to reflect Middle Eastern conditions in that nationalism could be considered to be a rationalization of primordial sentiments of a people and the exaltation of an ethnic principle. As has been shown, the Kurds, throughout much of their history, and particularly since 1880, have fit all or most of the requirements of the proposed definition. They have resided in and claimed ownership of the same unit of territory and have had a belief in a common history. The history has been embelished over time by numerous instances in which the Kurds could both take pride and have sorrow for. Principal items in which they have been able to take pride in have been the exploits of Saladin Ayyubi, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Sheikh Said of Palu, and their general capability as warriors to hold 181

out against seemingly greater odds. On the other hand, a common sorrow can be expressed in the continued inability to achieve a united independent Kurdish state and in the hardships such as deportation, repression, and mass destruction, which have accompanied each attempt to establish one. There has also existed a strong disregard for other groups, such as Turks, Assyrians, Armenians, and Arabs who live in or near Kurdish areas. This disregard has been reinforced by the efforts of Arabs, Iranians, and Turks to divide, repress, and control the Kurds. One weakness in the definition has been the requirement for esteem for other nationals. Revolts up through 1975 depended heavily on the support of tribal levies to form large groups of insurgents, or Pesh Merga which indicated some sense of loyalty to the greater whole. However, inter-tribal frictions, which weakened Sheikh Ubeidullah's rebellion, which contributed to the end of the 19 2 Dilo Kurd Revolt, the end of the Mahabad Republic, and which also worked against Mullah Mustafa Barzani's revolt in Iraq, have also persisted throughout the Kurdish struggle. As was shown, the lack of unity between Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan and Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah in the 1930' s also pointed to an inability to cooperate toward the greater whole. This weakness also combined with two other areas of weakness: the common devotion to a national entity and common socio-economic links. Although the revolts of 1930 and 1937 132

in Turkey, the Mahabad Republic of 1946 and Mullah Mustafa's revolt of 1961-1975 showed evidences of cross-border loyalties

and external coordinating international Kurdish groups, they also displayed rifts in different conceptions of the national entity. The tribal leaders or "feudalists" possessed a conception which was largely at odds with the perception possessed, particularly after the 193 's, by a growing group of modernized Kurdish intellectual political actors. This in turn led to a split in ideas as to what the common socio-economic institution for Kurds should be. The pattern which developed was one of each group using each other for its own advantage. The tribal leaders used the intellectuals as links to the prevailing central government and the outside world and for logistic support. Intellectuals on the other hand, such as the Kurds in the Komala , or the ICP or Ibrahim Ahmed, or Jalal Talabani used the tribal leaders to provide armed support with the hope of achieving a break-away from a hostile regime and the subsequent hope of creating a new order in Kurdistan. With the growth of power of national regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, the devotion to an independent national entity for Kurds was also tempered by reality. This was indicated by Mullah Mustafa's shift to demands for autonomy as well as the several groups of Iraqi Kurds who elected to work with the Ba'thist government after 1974. The Iranian Kurds, who have been opposing the Khomeini regime since March 1979, have also


insisted not on independence, but on demands for autonomy within a federal Islamic republic. Primordial sentiments, however, have remained strong for the majority of Kurds and a tribal structure, which is being slowly eroded, still exists. As Hudson found: The social structure in Kurdistan remains patriarchal and tribal with local leadership over a village or locale in the hands of an agha or local clan leader, linked to a larger tribal community. The tribal organization helps keep order among groups of adjacent and economically independent villages, and it also functions to mobilize warriors in the event of external threats, which, as Kurdish history indicates, are chronic. 2 There have been developments throughout Kurdistan which point to continued sociological rifts, however. In Turkey, development in the east has been slower than in other areas, but it has expanded greatly since the 1930' s, particularly in the towns. The areas unaffected have been largely the remoter 3 areas in which tribal aghas still have much influence. Iraq's massive attempts to redevelop and modernize the Kurdish pro-

vince have also led to new jobs and schooling. One danger of the modernization efforts for national regimes has been the historic growth of a middle class in those areas and the 4 creation of "... the breeding ground of modern nationalism." As in Iraq, Turkish educated youth have rejected tribal-feudal values and have joined socialist-oriented groups such as the

Dev-Genc , the Turkish Workers Party and the Eastern Revolutionary 5 Hearths (DDO) . This development promised to widen the ideological split between traditional Kurds and modernized Kurds


as well as posing a potential danger to established regimes. There has been a similar development in the Iranian Kurdish situation between landlords and tribal leaders, or feudalists, and the poltical leaders of the KDPI, the Marxist Komala and associated groups. These developments pointed to another assessment of Hudson that in the Middle-East, socio-political cleavages have been becoming more important than primordial 7 parochial cleavages. However, the modernization and politization process has proven to be a slow and agonizing one and in all likelihood, primordial sentiments and ethnic particularism seem likely to persist. This in turn, poses continued problems for local governments attempting to assimilate the Kurds: "Since it is clear that no amount of modernization is likely to eliminate (through total assimilation) minority solidarity groups, the possibility for ethnosectarian conflict remains a constant g danger should the conflict precipitating circumstances arise." Studies in political culture and political socializa-

tion also have pointed to the importance of primary socialization in the home in a child's early years as being crucial in deter9 mining his self -perception and attitude toward a government. Continued Kurdish emphasis on folk-tales and the glory of the Kurdish people can only partially be offset by later attempts at schooling to instill loyalty to a greater Arab, Turkish or Iranian entity. The conflict of loyalties has in the past caused a phenomenon of cognitive dissonance as a result of discontinuous 185

socialization in which, the individual has become hostile toward either the regime or to his earlier ties . In the Kurdish case, particularly in Turkey, it has been found that after years of insistance the Kurds were really Turks, most Kurds had insufficient Turkish to follow a Turkish newspaper or radio newscast and that they were very receptive to broadcasts in Kurdish from other neighborning countries, which in turn reinforced their ethnic particularism. In short, Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East exists, although it has evolved from a largely tribal, ethnic phenomenon to one which is now tempered by the physical realities of the Kurds' situation as well as the impacts of modernization and new ideologies. A strong tribal, traditional element still forms the core of this nationalism but it has been progressively split by the growth of a new class of intellectuals who are striving for leadership of the Kurdish movement. 2. The Impact of External Influences External influences on Kurdish nationalism have impacted in a number of ways. Lack of government control of the area, government efforts to impose authority or to repress the Kurds, regional actor use of the Kurds against other actors, regional cooperation against the Kurds, and extra-regional actors' use of the Kurds for various reasons, have all occurred in the past. The interaction of these factors has led to a confused situation of countries working with the Kurds,


then against the Kurds , and with and against each other depending on the political vagaries of the Middle East political sub-system. It has also led to the Kurds developing a sense of political importance as a regional actor as well as the

knowledge that a successful move for Kurdish autonomy can only 12 be independently sustained in the short-run. Long-run efforts at autonomy or independence for the Kurds have required some support from an external actor and when this support has been removed, the revolt or republic, has failed. Lack of central government control of the Kurdish areas as a factor was demonstrated in several instances. It had been a factor in pre-modern times and allowed the Kurdish aghas and derebeys to maintain a semi-independence in their feudal domains. Ismail Simko's revolt in Persia after World War I was successful for as long as it was, in large part due to the Qajar dynasty's weaknesses and inability to project effective power into the regions. The Dilo Kurd revolt of 1920 occurred in a period when a new Arab government was establishing itself and had not, even with British support, gained full control of Iraq. Soviet actions in the West Azerbaijan region during World War II prevented the central Iranian government from imposing control over the Kurdish nationalists there. In Iraq from 1961-1975, government forces, weakened by internal Iraqi political differences, were also unable to effectively enter and control the region. During the last two of these


examples, regional and extraregional actors also interacted to provide support to the Kurds against the central governments. Central government attempts at control caused at least two reactions among the Kurds: fear of submergence in an Arab, 13 Turkish or secular culture and violent reactions to measures of repression such as deportation and criminal punishments. As early as Sultan Mahmud ' s time, his reform measures and attempts at imposing control in Kurdish areas alienated the derebeys . Sheik Said's revolt in 1925 and the revolt of Sheikh Abdullah which followed it, were reactions to Turkish secularism, the attempted imposition of central government and Turkish nationalist control in the region, and the Turkish Independence Tribunals and deportations. The 1927 revolt of the Haideranlu and Jelali tribes also had as a motivation anger against continued Turkish repressive policies as did Sayyid Riza's 1937 revolt. The

1930 's revolts in Iraq also reflected a fear of submergence, particularly after settlement of the Mosul question, and a reaction to Britain's (then acting as a regional actor) and Iraq's attempts to consolidate holdings prior to expiration of the mandate. Regional actor use of the Kurds has existed since ancient times in the alliances between Kurds, Mongols, Turks, Arabs and Persians. It was followed by Ottoman and Safavid use of Kurdish tribes against each other to obtain or control border territories. It was also a factor in Sheikh Ubeidullah's revolt in 1880 when he received Ottoman support in an attempt

to gain Persian territory. In the mid-19 th century, Russia, as a regional actor, appealed to and used Kurds against both the Ottomans and Persians. After World War I, there was evidence of Persian, British, and Ottoman restorationist support for revolts in Turkey against the Kemalist regime. More recently, the Iranians and Israelis supported the Kurds against Iraq to weaken and divide the country so as to provide for greater security for both Israel and Iran, and to assist in territorial aggrandizement for the Shah. Iraq's leaders, notably Kassim and later, the 'Arifs and al-Bakr played on ideological and tribal rifts within the Kurdish movement to internally divide it and weaken the Kurds. Nasser and the rulers of Syria, while never providing tangible support for the Kurds, did, as the situation warranted, attempt to use them as a lever against recalcitrant or hostile Iraqi regimes. Finally, various regional parties such as the Tudeh , the ICP, the Ba'th; and ethnic groups, such as the 14 Armenians and the Palestinians have aligned with Kurdish factions in attempts to further their own aspirations; whether security for an autonomous Azerbaijan or weakening a Westernleaning Iraqi regime. The pattern of involvement with the Kurds appeared to be one in which the stronger regional power attempted to use the Kurds against the weaker. Another side of regional actors ' relations with Kurdish nationalism has been shown by efforts at regional cooperation-in-control. This usually became manifest after 189

a period of Kurdish revolts in which the regional nationstates (or empires) decided that they were losing more than they were gaining by supporting the Kurds against one another. Perhaps the first instance of this cooperation was the Treaty of Erzerum in 1639. More recent examples were provided by the Turko-Soviet cooperation in 1921 which made the Sevres provisions unworkable. Other evidences of this were the bilateral treaties in the 1920' s and 1930 's between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, which culminated in the signing of the Saadabad Pact in 1937. The regional powers have also cooperated with each other by closing their borders to Kurdish movements. This was shown during Sheikh Said's revolt in 1925 when additional Turko-Syrian (French) cooperation occurred in the transit of Turkish troops along the Baghdad Railway. In 1935 Turkey and Iraq cooperated against the Zibaris and in 1937 the French and Turks cooperated against the Kurds at Jezirah. During Mullah Mustafa's flight after the end of the Mahabad Republic, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey all cooperated with each other to prevent his movements and further insurgency. Provisions in the Baghdad Pact of 19 55 were aimed against the Kurds, and later, at least Turkey cooperated with Iraq in attempting to prevent Kurdish cross-border support to the Pesh Merga. Even the Shah, after the 1975 accord with Iraq, rejoined the cooperative effort against Kurdish nationalism.


Extraregional support for the Kurds was largely a post-World War I phenonmenon which was initiated by Sharif Pasha's efforts to gain Great Power recognition of and guarantees for a Kurdish state. The British, this time acting as an extra-regional power, attempted to establish Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah in 1918 and later an autonomous Kurdish state which would act as a buffer against Soviet threats to India and other colonial interests. As has been noted, British actions also took a regional character when they attempted to influence the Kurds against the Turks during the Mosul controversy. The Soviets also, after the 1917 revolution, have acted for ideological reasons to use the Kurds in an effort to communize the area. The overtures of the Nazis and the Soviets toward the Kurds during World War II were also an effort by extra-regional actors against regional actors as well as against the other extraregional powers, notably Great Britain. The Soviet effort at Mahabad could be viewed from two perspectives: one as an attempt to expand Soviet influences for ideological purposes and secondly as an attempt against other extraregional powers to both establish a buffer or to break out of the "ring of capitalist encirclement." With the advent of the cold-war, the Soviet Union and the U.S. became involved in propagandizing the Kurds. The former became involved with the objective of weakening the pro-Western regimes of what was to become the Baghdad Pact and the latter with the objective of preventing subversion.


Repeated appeals of the Kurds to the League of Nations, the United Nations and to the U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, were further evidence of their recognition that external power support was needed to achieve Kurdish aspirations. This was especially true during Mullah Mustafa Barzani's 1961-1975 revolt. His willingness to accept aid from any side also demonstrated his unwillingness to be classed as anything other than a Kurdish nationalist. The U.S., which was forestalled by its concerns for Turkey and Iran during the 1950*3 and 1960 's, also came to the conclusion in 1972, that to achieve its regional and global aims for stability, aid to the Kurds could be useful. Another "external actor" which heavily affected the Kurds' chances in 1975, was the entity of OPEC. While furtherance of OPEC unity was not the dominant reason for the Shah's withdrawal of support in 1975, it was a factor in that withdrawal. A major conclusion drawn from the above not lost on today's Kurds, has been that extraregional or regional actors supporting the Kurds have rarely wanted them to be fully successful in their aspirations. They have been employed for the most part in pursuit of the goals of the other actors, who payed lip-service to Kurdish nationalist goals, but who really had other objectives in mind. This has become more apparent to the Kurds, particularly since 1975. While they still have maintained fairly widespread external links, both for


coordination of efforts, and for links to external powers, there is also evidence of a realization of the need for selfreliance. As stated by Iran's KDP leader Abdul Rahman Qassemlu: Defeat piled upon defeat have given rise to the legend which says that the Kurds have no friends. The truth is that the Kurds have many friends but to find them they must seek them out, especially in the country they live in.!6 This sentiment could also be interpreted to mean that the Kurds in the future may be susceptible to external influences, but they are also very likely to be more exacting or demanding in the alliances made. At least two developments have pointed to this. The ascendancy of the Kurdish intelligentsia to positions of power could lead to more sophisticated negotiations for support and pay-back. Secondly, the apparent abandonment, at least for the present, of the goal of independence, and the acceptance of a goal for local autonomy, could make the Kurds less desperate for and therefore less susceptible to extraregional overtures.

3. The Hypothesis The hypothesis posed for examination was that the importance of Kurdish nationalism and its vitality are dependent upon the greater conflict of which it is a part; to wit: the status of governments in, and disputes between the regional actors as well as the power roles of external actors in the Northern Tier and Persian Gulf region. The foregoing evidence supports this hypothesis. External influences on the movement


have been an important factor in causation and suppression of revolts and other Kurdish actions and much of the visible vitality of Kurdish nationalism has been due to the effects of those influences. As was vividly demonstrated in Iran in 1946 and in Iraq after 1958, the withdrawal of external support /caused the collapse of large-scale Kurdish efforts. The search Jbr support of Iraq's post-revolt Kurds, either from the Ba'th or Syria or even the West, points to the continual recognition that while Kurdish nationalism is strong enough to attract large numbers of followers, outside support is essential to achieve any success. B. PROGNOSIS Various estimates place total Kurdish population figures 17 between 6,990,000 and 16,470,000. Those figures in and of themselves point to continued difficulties within the region. As the current de facto Kurdish autonomy in Iran indicates, the Kurds are still very capable of mustering support along ethnic lines. The Kurdish success there, while no extra18 regional support has yet been proven, seems to be largely a factor of lack of central government there have established links with both Barzanis 1 KDP-Provisional Leadership. ever, established additional ties with control. The Kurds Talabani ' s PUK and the They have also, howother parties, such as

19 the Tudeh , the Fedayi and the Mujahidin . While these groups are primarily leftist in orientation, they appear to be working 194

with the Kurds through a revitalized marxist Komala and the 20 KDPI of Qassemlu. Additionally, anti-Sh'ism is a factor and many of the Sunni Kurds are united in their support of 21 the other main Kurdish leader Sheikh Ezzeddin Husseini. At least two other Kurdish radical groups are known to exist and are centered in the Marivan region: The Revolutionary Kurdish Worker's Movement and the Movement for the Defense of Liberty 22 and Revolution in Kurdistan. Qassemlou and Hosseini have repeatedly stated that they wished to work with the Khomeini regime in order to carry out the revolution and achieve auto23 nomy for Iranian Kurdistan. It would appear for the present that the Kurds will remain in control of their area until a stronger central government is able to reimpose its control. Whether or not the U.S. or U.S.S.R. will be approached, given their past records, or if approached, will give aid is unclear. With regard to the U.S., current policy appears to place more emphasis on actual U.S. military involvement to protect the West's interest in the region which might, in turn, rule out covert 24 support for the Kurds or other groups. While Kurdish autonomy in Iran and links to leftist groups is seen to offer 25 opportunities to the Soviets, it has been argued that current Soviet policy is: "... to support the Iranian Left so long as there are no open clashes with Khomeini. There are no indications that the Soviet Union will try to use leftist groups, the Kurds, or other minority groups in Iran, to destabilize the country. ° 195

The Soviets may very well be forestalled from acting in support of the Kurds by the suspicion that further destabilization in the region could only draw the U.S. in deeper. Recent relations during the 1980 Iran-Iraq war have shown that the Soviets and the U.S. were immobilized with regard to action in the

region for fear of causing a larger reaction by the other power, There have been indications that the Israelis recently have attempted to work with Iranian Kurds. On 28 August 1979 it was reported that four Israeli spies were arrested in Kordestan in fighting between the "defunct Democratic Party of 27 Kordestan" and Islamic Republic forces. Israeli motives could be to support the KDPI against the Khomeini regime, which 2 8 has shown sympathy for the PLO or possibly to strengthen Kurdish segments who may be opposed to Talabani ' s PUK which 29 also has PLO ties. More recent reports have claimed that over 200 Kurds from both Iraq and Iran are being trained in Israeli camps with a view toward weakening the regime of Saddam 30 Hussein in Iraq. In Turkey, prior to the military coup, it was evident that Kurds were also dissatisfied with their situation and were causing unrest. Several groups were known to be active. The Apocular is one of the major ones and is described as a leftwing group which espouses an independent, socialist Kurdish 31 state. Leftist groups were reported to be active in the recruitment of 5000 Turkish Kurds to fight alongside the Kurds


32 of Iran in the Fall of 1979. Other known organizations in Turkey are the Anti-Colonialist Democratic Culture organization (ASDK-DER) , the Peoples Revolutionary Culture Association (DDKD) , and the Kurdish Proletarian Party. These are all leftist in orientation and the last two argue for the Kurdish 33 state as part of a greater proletarian revolution. " The remaining groups are underground: the Liberation of the Kurdish Nation (KUK) , the KDP , and the Kawa (a legendary Kurdish hero)

34 and are known collectively as the Rizkari (Liberation) group. These last groups may also have ties with the Armenian Secret Army (ASA) which is also leftist and has engaged in post-coup 35 terrorist activities. The overall size of these groups is uncertain, but it was reported in August 1979 that over 30,000 people in east Turkey had signed a petition to participate in 3 fi a Kurdish political struggle in the area. When this figure 37 is combined with estimates of 7000-50,000 Pesh Merga in Iran, and when one considers the reputed numbers of Mullah Mustafa's past followers, a potential force of over 100,000 Pesh Merga could be mobilized. This appears unlikely however, in that there are numerous groups and leaders all vying for control who are unlikely to cooperate with each other. Additionally, the regional powers at present are cooperating 38 with each other in controlling the Kurds and it does not appear that extraregional powers are willing to become involved.


What does appear certain is that the question of Kurdish discontent with their situation is likely to persist. The political movement appears divided along ideological and personal lines and is therefore susceptible to external efforts to play one faction off against the other. The growth of the leftist influence points to Kurds who are disillusioned with traditional tribal organizations as well as a likelihood that in the future Kurdish demands may be oriented more towards a world ideology than towards geographic separation.



Kurds at Sanandaj fought Iranian troops on 18 March 1979. Initial causes were a desire for autonomy and anti-Shi-ite sentiments. The two main Kurdish leaders were named as religious Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini and the KDPI leader Abdul Rahman Qassemlu. Ayatollah Khomeini's response to the Kurds was that they were "acting against Islam" and were "foreign agents". He further stated: "We are all part of a single nation and a single Koran." John Kifner, "Kurdish Tribesmen Battle Iranian Troops , " New York Times , March 20, 1979, p. 3. 2 Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legiti macy , (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 73. ^Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporous , (Baltimore, Md. : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 51. 4 Andrew Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally , (Beverley Hills, Ca. : Sage Publications, 1975), p. 56. 5 ibid . , p. 54 . c The KDPI-led Pesh Merga consider the local landlords and tribal leaders, who have most of the wealth, as feudalists but also rely on another feudalist tradition, the men's houses and associated food, for sustenance. See David Hirst, "Kurds Exploit Iran Turmoil," Manchester Guardian , Dec. 16, 1979, p. 8. 7 Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy , p. 15. ibid , p. 79. 9 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics , (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 66. ibid . , p. 70. and James A. Bill and Robert Hardgrave, Jr., Comparative Politics , (Columbus, Oh. : Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1973), p. 108. William M. Hale, Ed. Aspects of Modern Turkey , (New York: Bowker, 1976), p. 45. It has also been noted that the Kurds are no longer described as "Mountain Turks," but as "Easterners"


(Dogulu) in Turkey. Andrew Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally , p. 53. 12 Mullah Mustafa Barzani recognized this as early as 1943 when he requested British and American support, both for his efforts in Iraq and later, in Mahabad. 13 The role of religious differences in Iran has been discussed. Vali asserts that in Turkey religion, despite Sunni sectarian and Alewi differences has helped Kurdish assimilation in that it has not stood as a barrier to intermarriage. See Vali, p. 52. Keddi on the other hand discounted the overall role of Islam compared to other factors: "Despite frequently repeated statements that Islam combines religion and politics, and that Islamic law and custom encompass the believer's whole way of life, it seems clear that prior and continuing forms of economic and social organization are and have been frequently more important than Islam in determining the way of life of a particular Muslim people or group." Nikki R. Keddi, "Is There a Middle East?", International Journal of Middle East Studies , IV (1973) , p. 270. 14 It was reported in late 1970 that the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine had successfully recruited Kurds for its ranks. Additional information was provided as to Kurdish Palestinian links in June 198 by the PUK ' s Dr. Kamal Khoshnaw who stated that the PLO was providing aid to a "National Rally" of the Communists, PUK, and the Marxist-Leninist Liberation Army. The objective of the national rally, headquartered in Damascus, was to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. See Eric Pace, "Jordan Reported Still Holding Scores of Syrians Seized While Fighting Beside Palestine Guerillas," New York Times , November 11, 1970, p. 11 and Tony Allaway, "Overthrow of Regime in Baghdad target of underground coalition," Times of London , June 19, 1980, p. 7.

C. J. Edmonds listed the following overseas groups and associations: Centre d' Etudes Kurdes founded 1949 in Paris by Dr. Kamuran Badr-Khan, The Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE) founded 1956 with 15 branches and affiliated with the International Union of Students, Kurdish Students' right-wing splinter National Union of Kurdish Students in Europe (NUKSE) founded in 1965 in West Germany, Bahoz (Society of Fighters for Kurdistan) founded in 1969 in Sweden, the Kurdish Students Association in the U.S., International Society Kurdistan (ISK) of Amsterdam, and the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan in Great Britain. Periodicals published by these groups include Kurdistan , Kurdistan Information , Ciya (Mountains) , The


Kurdish Journal / Kurdish Facts , Kurdish Bibliography , and Kurdica. C. J. Edmonds, "Kurdish Nationalism," The Journal of Contemporary History , VI, No. 1 C1971) , 1Q5-106. 16 "The Murderous Oppression of the Kurds," Times of London , June 4, 1980, p. 19. 17 Estimates of Kurdish population can be broken down as follows : Total Population Minimum Maximum of Country

Turkey Iran Iraq Syria USSR (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan) Lebanon Total

3,200,000 1,800,000 1,550,000 320,000 80,000 40,000

8,000,000 5,000,000 2,500,000 600,000 300,000 70,000

35,666,500 28,448,000 9,498,000 6,294,000 13,132,000 2,645,000

6,999,000 16,470,000

Amanda Cuthbert, "The Kurds," Meed Arab Report , Feb. 14, 1979, p. 5 . 18 Sadegh Ghotbzadeh claimed in August 1980 that the Soviets were arming Kurdish rebels in Iran. Reports in December 1979 quoted the Kurds as feeling confident that they had sufficient weapons and ammunition, stolen from Iranian garrisons after the Shah's fall, to last for 5 years. All weapons and ammunition

seen bore the Imperial crest. See Current News , 15 August 1980, p. 5 and "Kurds Exploit Iran Turmoil," Manchester Guardian , Dec. 16, 1979, p. 8. 19 See Tehran International Service , 3 Jan. 1980 FBIS Daily Report Middle East and North Africa , V No. 3, Jan. 4, 1980, p. El, and Paris AFP, 15 August 1979, FBIS Daily Report Middle East and North Africa , V No. 160, Aug. 16, 1979, p. Rl . Additionally an interview with an Iranian Leftist Pointed to Kurdish links to the Samzani-i-Cherik-he-yi Feda'-i Khalq-i Iran (The Organization of the Guerilla Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People) or Marxist Fedayi , and the Marxist Mujahidin In June 1980. The Marxist Mujahidin is a splinter from the Islamic Mujahidin and took the name of Sazman-i Paykar-dar Rah-i-Azad i-Tabageh-i Kargar (The Fighting Organization on the Road for Liberating the Working Class) and is now known simply as Paykar (Battle) . See Middle East Research and Information Project , No. 88, (June; 1980), pg. 10. and Ervand Abrahamian, "The


Guerilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977," Middle East Research and Information Project , No. 86, (Mar -Apr . , 198Q1 , p. A~. 20 Qassemlu's attitudes were for autonomy m all things except for foreign policy, national defense and longterm economic planning which would be reserved for the central government. Jean Gueyras , "Iran's Kurds Want Real Autonomy," Manchester Guardian , April 8, 1979, p. 11. 21 Husseini has downplayed the role of religion in his ideology, however. He stated that his actions were based on three principles - "Kurdish nationalism, a reasonable socialism and morality," and that he was "a liberal and even if I don't personally agree with the Left and the Marxists, I feel they should have the right to express themselves freely so that the people may choose and decide what's good for them." in ibid . 22

Middle East Research and Information Project , No. 87, (May, 1980) , p. 12. 23 Teheran Ayandegan , 26 June 1979, FBIS Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa , V No. 131, Jul. 6, 1979 P. R15. Khomeini later called the Kurds of the KDPI "bad people" and stated that they would not gain their freedom. This was followed by an apology in November 1979 and then a new attempt to foreceably reimpose Iranian control in June 1980. See "Kurds and Iranians In a Fierce Battle," New York Times , Aug. 29, 1979, p. 7. and "The Murderous Oppression of the Kurds," Times of London , June 4, 1980, p. 19. 24 R. K. Ramazani, "Security in the Persian Gulf, " Foreign Affairs , (Spring, 1979), 823. 25 Yair P. Hirschfeld, "Moscow and Khomeini: Soviet-Iranian Relations in Historical Perspective," Orbis , XXIV No. 2 (Summer 1980), 224. 2 6 ibid . , 30. It is interesting to note with regard to the Soviets in Afghanistan, that they appear to have learned from their mountain fighting against Barzani in Iraq but if that is any indication, that they are in for a long struggle in Afghanistan. 27 Ayatollah Khomeini declared the KDPI illegal in August 1979, see "Iran's Troops Move on Kurdish Capital," New York Times , Aug. 20, 1979, p. 12. The capture of the Israeli spies accompanied by claims that "the Zionists intended to set up a 7^2

new Israel in the region." was reported by Tehran Domestic Service , 28 August, 1979, FBIS Daily Report Middle East and

North Africa , V No. 169, Aug. 28, 1979, p. R4 . 28 Yassir Arafat was welcomed to Tehran in February 1979 as the first foreign "head of state" to visit the new regime. The relations between Iran and the PLO have been characterized as an "alliance" along revolutionary and Shi 'a lines, See John K. Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians, and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs , (Summer, 1979), 1017-1034. 29 Times of London , June 19, 1980, p. 7. Diplomat News Service: The Arab Press Service , 13 No. 15, 8/15 October 1980, pp. 3-4. This article also points to Israeli and Iranian support for rightist Kurds, Syrian support for leftist Kurds, and Iraqi support for Sunni Kurds in Iran. As recently as May 1980 the Apocular was responsible for clashes with the Turkish Army in Urfa and Birecik. Senan Fisek, "Turks hold 22 Kurds after village battles," Times of London , May 12, 1980, p. 8. 32 Anthony McDermott, "Nagging problem of the Kurds," Financial Times , Jan. 21, 1980, p. 6. 33 ibid . and James Dorsey "Kurdish Unrest Grows in Turkey as well as Iran," Christian Science Monitor , Aug. 28, 1979, p. 4 . 34 Anthony McDermott, "Nagging problem of the Kurds," p. 7. 35 The ASA was reported to have set off bombs in London, Los Angeles, and New York near a Turkish mission and properties owned by Turks. The bombings in the U.S. were claimed by the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. "Terrorist Bombings Injure 5 Persons in London, Paris, New York, L.A.," Monterey Peninsula Herald , Oct. 13, 1980, p. 1.

36 James Dorsey, "Kurdish Unrest Grows in Turkey as well as Iran," p. 4. 37 John Kifner "Uprising by Kurds Strains Iranian Regime," New York Times , May 31, 1980, p. 5. and "50,000 Iranian Kurds Said to Flee to Asylum Near the Iraq Border," New York Times , Sept. 6, 1979, p. 3.


38 In April 1979, there were reports that Turkey and Iraq were cooperating in operations against the Kurds in border areas. Anthony McDermott, "Nagging Problem of the Kurds," Financial Times, Jan. 1980, p. 6.


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APPENDIX B PERTINENT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 1. Treaty of Peace and Frontiers (Erzerum) : The Ottoman Empire and Persia 17 May 1639 (excerpts) : The result of the discussions on both Parties has been written down and is as follows: Tzanan, Bedrie, Mendelgeen, Derteuk and Dernai, in the Pashalik of Baghdad, will remain under the authority of our august Padishah, who will also take possession of the Plains between Mendelgeen and Derteuk, and the Mountain will remain under the authority of the Shah, Serminil is fixed as frontier between Derteuk and Dernai. That part of the country of Haronia, occupied by the Tribes of Djaf and Zilja Uddin, will belong to the Sultan. Pezai and Zerdony remain to the Shah. The fortress of Zindjir, which lies on the top of the Mountain, shall be demolished; the Sultan will take possession of the Villages lying westward of it, and the Shah will take possession of those lying eastward. The villages on the Mountain above Sailm Cale, near Chehrezor, will be in the possession of the Sultan, and the Villages lying on the East, will be in the possession of the Shah, who will also keep the Castle of Orman with the Villages which are dependent on it. The defile leading to Chehrezor has been established as a frontier. The fortress of Cotour (Kotur) and Makoo on the frontier of Van, and the fortress of Magazberd towards Kars and Van, will be demolished by the two Parties, and so long as the Shah will not have molested the fortresses of Akiskha, Kars, Van, Chehrezor, Baghdad, Bassora, and other Places within the limits, such as fortresses, forts, Districts, lands, hills and mountains and no such horrible act as provoking to rebellion shall have been committed by Him, on their part also His Majesty our Great Padishah will respect this Peace, and no molestation shall, contrary to Treaty, be done to the places which remain within the limits of the other side.

2. Treaty of Peace (Erzerum): The Ottoman Empire and Persia 28 July 1823 (excerpts) : Art. I. The Two High Powers do not admit each other's interference in the internal affairs of their respective States. From this period, on the side of Baghdad and Koordistan 206

within the Boundaries, is the Persian Government to intermeddle, or authorise any acts of molestation, or to assume any authority over the present or former Possessors of those Countries. And on that frontier, should the Tribes of either side pass the boundaries for a summer or winter residence, the Agents of His Royal Highness the Heir Apparent, with the Pasha of Bagdad, shall arrange the tribute customary to be paid, the rent of the pasture lands, and other claims, in order that they may not cause any misunderstanding between the two Governments . Art. III. The Tribes of Hyderanloo and Sibbikee, which have been the cause of contention between the Two High Powers, and are now dwelling in the Territory of the Ottoman Empire, should they from thence transgress the boundary of Persia, and commit any ravages, the Turkish Frontier Authorities will endeavor to prevent such proceedings, and punish the offenders. In case that these tribes continue to invade and molest the Persian Territory, and the Frontier Authorities do not put a stop to these aggressions, the Ottoman Government shall cease to protect them, and should these Tribes of their own will aid choice return to Persia, their departure shall not be prohibited nor opposed. But after their arrival in Persia, should they again desert to Turkey, the Ottoman Government shall afford them no further protection, nor shall they be received. In the event of their return to Persia, should these tribes disturb the tranquillity of the Ottoman Territory, the Persian Frontier Authorities agree to use every effort to prevent these irregularities . Source ; Numbers 1 and 2: J. C. Hurewitz , Diplomacy In The Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1914-19 56 . Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956, Vol. I.

N 3. The Treaty of Sevres: Articles 62-64, 10 August 1920. Art. 62. A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local

autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia , as defined in Article 27, 207

II. (2) and C3) . If ananimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission composed of British/ French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier, where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia. Art. 63. The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from their communication to the said Government. Art. 64. If within one year frcm the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet.

4. Treaty of Friendship: Persia and Russia, Article V, 26 February 1921: V. The two High Contracting Parties undertake1. To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organizations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia.

They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object. 208

2. Not to allow a third party or any organisation, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party. 3. To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

5. Treaty of Friendship: Turkey and Russia, Articles IV and VIII, 16 March 1921: IV. The contracting parties, establishing contact between the national movement for the liberation of the Eastern peoples and the struggle of the workers of Russia for a new social order, solemnly recognise the right of these nations to freedom and independence, also their right to choose a form of government according to their own wishes. VIII. The contracting parties undertake not to tolerate in their respective territories the formation and stay of organisations or associations claiming to be the Government of the other country or of a part of its territory and organisations whose aim is to wage warfare against the other State. Russia and Turkey mutually accept the same obligation with regard to the Soviet Republic of the Caucasus. "Turkish territory," within the meaning of this Article, is understood to be territory under the direct civil and military administration of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

6. Frontier Treaty: The United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey Articles 6-12, 5 June 1926. Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties undertake reciprocally to oppose by all means in their power any preparations made by one or more armed individuals with the object of committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the neighbouring frontier zone and to prevent them from

crossina the frontier.


Art. 7. Whenever the competent authorities designated in article 11 learn that preparations are being made by one or more armed individuals with the object of committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the neighbouring frontier zone they shall reciprocally inform each other without delay. Article 8. The competent authorities designated in article 11 shall reciprocally inform each other as quickly as possible of any act of pillage or brigandage which may have been perpetrated on their territory. The authorities of the party receiving the notice shall make every effort in their power to prevent the authors of such acts from crossing the frontier. Article 9. In the event of one or more armed individuals, guilty of a crime or misdemeanour in the neighbouring frontier zone, succeeding in taking refuge in the other frontier zone, the authorities of the latter zone are bound to arrest such individuals in order to deliver them, in conformity with the law, to the authorities of the other party whose nationals they are, together with their body and their arms. Article 10. The frontier zone to which this chapter of the present Treaty shall apply is the whole of the frontier which separates Turkey from Iraq and a zone 75 kilometres in width on each side of that frontier. Article 11. The competent authorities to whom the execution of this chapter of the Treaty is entrusted are the following: For the organisation of general co-operation and responsibility for the measures to be taken :On the Turkish side: the military commandant of the frontier; On the Iraq side: the mutessarifs of Mosul and of Arbil. For the exchange of local information and urgent communications : On the Turkish side: the authorities appointed with the consent of the Valis; On the Iraq side: the kaimakams of Zakho, Amadia, Zibar and Rowanduz . The Turkish and Ira q Governments may, for administrative reasons, modify the list of their competent authorities, giving notice of such modification either through the permanent frontier commission provided for in article 13 or through the

diplomatic channel. Article 12. The Turkish and Iraq authorities shall refrain from all correspondence of an official or political nature with the chiefs, sheikhs, or other members of tribes which are nationals of the other State and which are actually in the territory of that State. They shall not permit in the frontier zone any organisation for propaganda or meeting directed against either State.


7. Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality: Persia and the USSR, Article 4. 1 October 1927. Art. 4. In view of the obligations laid down in Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty of February 26, 1921, each of the Contracting Parties, being determined to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other Party and from any propaganda or campaign against the Government of the other Party, shall strictly forbid its officials to commit such acts in the territory of the other Party. Should the citizens of either of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other Party engage in any propaganda or campaign prohibited by the authorities of this latter Party, the Government of that territory shall have the right to put a stop to the activities of such citizens and to impose the statutory penalties. The two Parties likewise undertake, in virtue of the abovementioned Articles, not to encourage or to allow in their respective territories the formation or activities of: (1) organisations or groups of any description whatever, whose object is to overthrow the Government of the other Contracting Party by means of violence, insurrection or outrage; (2) organisations or groups usurping the office of the Government of the other country or part of its territory, also having as their object the subversion of the Government of the other Contracting Party by the above-mentioned means , a breach of its peace and security, or an infringement of its territorial integrity. In accordance with the foregoing principles, the two Contracting Parties likewise undertake to prohibit military enrolment, and the introduction into their territory of armed forces, arms, ammunition, and all other war material, intended for the organisations mentioned above.

8. Treaty of Nonagression (Sa'dabad Pact): Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Article 7. 8 July 1937.

Art. 7. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent, within his respective frontiers, the formation or activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to subvert the established institutions, or disturb the order or security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the territory of another Party, or to change the constitutional system of such other Party.


9. Pact CBaghdad) of Mutual Cooperation: Turkey and Iraq, Article 3. 24 February 1355. Art. 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Source ; Numbers 3-9: J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1914-1956 . Princeton, N. J. : D. Van Hostrand Co., Inc., 1956, Vol. II. 10. Twelve Point Program for Peace with the Kurds (Synopsis). 29 June 1966. 1. Kurdish nationality would be recognized in the law on decentralization of the administration, in a provisional Constitution then being prepared, and in a future permanent Constitution . 2. Kurdish would be recognized as an official language, along with Arabic, in the predominantly Kurdish areas, and would be taught at the Baghdad University. 3. Kurdish districts would have their own elected councils, which would be responsibile for education, health and municipal affairs. 4. Civil servants in Kurdish areas would be Kurds, unless local needs required other personnel. 5. Parliamentary elections would be held within a period to be laid down in the provisional Constitution. The Kurds would be represented in Parliament, the Cabinet, the Civil Service, the Judiciary, and the diplomatic and military services in proportion to their numbers in the population. 6. The Kurds would be free to form their own political organizations and to publish their own newspapers. 7. A general amnesty would be proclaimed after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement. 8. Kurds who deserted from the Army and the police force would report back to their units within two months .

9 . The other Kurds under arms would be formed into an ' organization 1 attached to the Government, which would help them to return to civilian life. 10. Kurdish civil servants and workers who had been dismissed would be reinstated in their former posts.


11. Money being spent on the campaign against the Kurds would be used for reconstruction of the Kurdish areas, for which a special ministry would be responsible. 12. The Government would compensate, as far as lay in its powers, widows, orphans, the disabled and other war victims. Source; Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 . Hamden, Conn.: The Shoestring Press, 1973.

11. The March 11, 1970 Kurd-Iraq Manifesto (Excerpts) : It is public knowledge that the Revolution had taken all necessary measures for the re-establishment of calm and peace throughout northern Iraq. The following steps have been taken: A) Recognition has been given to the legitimacy of the Kurdish nationality, this being in accordance with the Resolutions of the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and the official and press statements issued by the revolutionary authority. This fact shall be enshrined in a lasting manner in the Interim Constitution and the Permanent Constitution. B) The Revolutionary Command Council has approved the establishment of a university in Sulaimaniyah and the establishment of Kurdish academy of letters. It has also recognized all cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurdish natianality, prescribing that the Kurdish language be taught in all schools, institutes and universities, teachers training institutes, the Military College and the Police College. The Revolutionary Command Council further prescribed the wide dissemination of Kurdish literature - scientific, literary and political - expressive of the national and nationalist ambitions of the Kurdish people. It ordered measures to be taken to help Kurdish authors, poets and writers to form a federation of their own, get their works printed and afforded them all opportunities and possibilities for developing their scientific and artistic talents. The Revolutionary Command Council also ordered arrangements to be made for founding a Kurdish publishing and printing house and a directorate general of Kurdish culture, the publishing of a weekly newspaper and a monthly magazine in

Kurdish and expanding the Kurdish programme on the Kirkuk TV Station, pending the construction of a TV station broadcasting exclusively in Kurdish. C) In recognition of the rights of the Kurds to revive their traditions and national days and to make it possible for the whole of the people to join in the observance of national


days, the Revolutionary Command Council has decreed Nawrooz Day as a National Day in the Republic of Iraq. D) The Revolutionary Command Council has promulgated the Governorates Law which provides for the decentralisation of the local administration and for the creation of the Governorate of Dohuk. E) The Revolutionary Command Council has issued a general amnesty for all civilian and military personnel who has joined in acts of violence in the North so as to do away with vestiges of former negative and exceptional conditions and lay the new national life on solid foundations of pervasive security and national fraternity. The Revolutionary Command Council has thus decreed the following: 1) The Kurdish language shall, side by side with the Arabic language, be an official language in the areas populated by a majority of Kurds. The Kurdish languages shall be the language of instruction in these areas. The Arabic language shall be taught in all schools where teaching is conducted in Kurdish. The Kurdish language shall be taught elsewhere in Iraq as a second language within the limits prescribed by the law. 2) It has been one of the main concerns of the revolutionary government to secure participation by our Kurdish brothers in Government and eliminate any discrimination between Kurds and other nationals in regard to holding public offices including sensitive and important ones as cabinet ministries, army commands, etc. While endorsing this principle, the revolutionary government stresses the need of endeavouring to have the principle achieved in fair proportions with due care to considerations of merits, the population ratio and the deprivations experienced by our Kurdish brothers in the past. 3) In view of the backwardness experienced in the past by the Kurdish nationality in the cultural and educational domains, a plan should be worked out for the treatment of this backwardness. This is to be achieved through: (a) Implementing expiditiously the resolutions of the

Revolutionary Command Council in regard to the language and cultural rights of the Kurdish peop.Ve and tying up the preparation and direction of special programmes on Kurdish national affaire in the radio and TV network to the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information. (b) Reinstating students who were dismissed or had to leave school because of former conditions of violence in the area. These students should be allowed to return to their respective schools regardless of age limits or else have a convenient remedy suggested for their problem. (c) Building more schools in the Kurdish area, elevating the standards of education and admitting, at a fair rate, Kurdish students to universities and military colleges and grant them scholarships. 214

4) In the administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority, government officials shall be appointed from among Kurds or persons wellversed in the Kurdish language as long as these are available. The principal Government functionaries - governor, district officer CQaimuqam) , director of police, director of security, etc. - shall be drawn from among the Kurds. Steps shall immediately be taken to develop state organs in the area in consultation within the framework of the High Committee supervising the implementation of this Manifesto in a manner insuring its proper enforcement and consolidating national unity and stability in the area. 5) The Government recognises the right of the Kurdish people to set up student, youth, women and teachers organisations of their own. There organisations shall be affiliated in the national counterparts in Iraq. 6) (a) The validity of paras (1) and (2) of the Revolutionary Command Council's Decree No. 59 dated August 5, 1968, shall be extended to the date of the issuance of this Manifesto. This shall cover all of those who took part in hositilities in the Kurdish area. (b) Workers, government functionaries and employees, both civilian and military, shall go back to service without this being subject to cadre considerations. The civilian personnel shall be posted to the Kurdish area within the limits of its requirements. 7) (a) A committee of specialists shall be formed to speed up the uplift of the Kurdish area in all respects and provide indemnities for the affliction of the past number of years, side by side with drawing up an adequate budget for all of this. The committee in question shall be attached to the Ministry of Northern Affairs. (b) The economic plan shall be drawn up in such a way

as to ensure equal development for various parts of Iraq, with due attention to the backward conditions of the Kurdish area. (c) Pension salaries shall be made available to the families of members of the Kurdish armed movement who met with martyrdom in the regrettable hostilities as well as to those rendered incapacitated or disfigured. This shall be regulated in a special legislation patterned on the existing laws of the land. (d) Speedy action shall be taken to bring relief to aggrieved and needly persons by means of building housing units and other projects ensuring work to the unemployed, offering appropriate aid both in kind and in cash and granting reasonable indemnities to aggrieved persons who stand in need for help. This shall be the responsibility of the High Committee, with the exception of these specified in the above paras.


3) The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be repatriated to their places of habitation. As to villagers whose villages lie in areas requisitioned by the Government for public utility purposes in accordance with the provisions of the law, they shall be settled in neighbouring districts and shall be compensated for whatever loss they might have incurred as a result. 9) Steps shall be taken to speed up the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Kurdish area have the Law amended in such a way as to ensure liquidation of all feudalistic relationships, handing out appropriate plots of land to all peasants and waiving for them agricultural tax arrears for the duration of the regrettable hostilities. 10) It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution as follows: (a) The people of Iraq are composed of two principal nationalities: the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution recognises the national rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all nationalities within the framework of the Iraqi unity. (b) The following paragraph shall be added to Article (4) of the Constitution: "The Kurdish language, an official language in the Kurdish area. (c) This all shall be confirmed in the Permanent Constitution. 11) The broadcasting station and heavy arms shall be given back to the Government - this being tied up to the implementation of the final stages of the agreement.

12) One of the vice-presidents of the Republic shall be a Kurd. 13) The Governments Law shall be amended in a way conforming with the contents of this Manifesto. 14) Following the issuance of the Manifesto (necessary steps shall be taken in consultation with the High Committee supervising its enforcement, to unify the government and administrative units populated by a Kudish majority as shown by the official census to be carried out. The state 3iall endeavor to develop this administrative unity and deepen and broaden the Kurdish people's process of exercising their national rights as a measure of ensuring self-rule. Pending the realisation of administrative unity, Kurdish national affairs shall be coordinated by means of periodical meetings between the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As self-rule is to be established within the fromework of the Republic of Iraq, the exploitation of the natural riches in the area shall obviously be the prerogative of the authorities of the Republic. 15) The Kurdish people shall contribute to the legislative branch in proportion to the ratio they have to the population of Iraq. 216

Source ; Iraq, Ministry of Information, The Kurdish Question , Attitudes and Achievements . Documentary Series No. 6Q, Baghdad: Al-Hurria Printing House, 1977. 12. The National Action Charter - Iraq (excerpts) 15 November, 1971. D. THE KURDISH ISSUE: The Kurdish nationalistic issue, for long years, had been on top of the greater national issues awaiting solution. Due to the issue being suspended, our people had suffered many losses and pains and its unity and the unity of the homeland was endangered. The July 17 Revolution expressing the principles of the democratic and human principles of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, has provided wide horizons for a peaceful democratic and final settlement of this issue. The revolution's efforts, through cooperation between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, were culminated with the issuance of the historical March 11 Manifesto. The March 11 Manifesto is the sound framework for securing the legitimate nationalistic rights and aspirations of our Kurdish people, including autonomy, and for security unity of the homeland and the people and that of its progressive national and nationalist forces, on the path of struggling against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

In order to continue fulfilling all the requirements of the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish issue, in accordance with the spirit and provisions of the Manifesto and under the national joint work for building up the unitary revolutionary democratic society the Charter defines the following: 1. The alliance between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, an alliance constituting the foundation stone in national coalition is based, as to premise and far reaching objective, on the historical revolutionary alliance of destiny between the Arab and the Kurdish peoples, and in particular, the Arab and Kurdish toiling masses. It is based on these masses and represents their interests and reflects their legitmate aspirations and ambitions. 2. The Kurdish masses practicing their legimate nationalistic rights, including autonomy, is done within their


natural scope embodied through, one national policy, one land and one political regime in the Iraq Republic. It is also done on the basis of accepting and believing that Iraq is an inseparable part of the Arab Homeland, and that the potentialities of the Arab Nation and its energies and legitimate and just struggle for full liberation from imperialistic domination and Zionist usurpation, and for the realization of unity and socialism are historical and sure guarantees for the freedom of nationalities and minorities and their legitimate rights. 3. The implementation of the clauses of March 11 Manifesto and acquiring all parts of a peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish national quest is consolidated deeply with the existing revolutionary regime and its constant development and consolidating its bases to confront plotting and intrigue, planned by imperialistic, Zionist and reactionary quarters. They are also linked with the struggle for the liquidation of suspciious and adventurous forces and elements, moving under the direction of the abovementioned quarters. The relationship between the popular, democratic and national revolution, heading towards the attainment of unity and socialism, consolidated by the alliance of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party and the union of all progressive national and patriotic forces with the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question in an

indivisible dialectal relationship. Any partitional outlook to such relationship is liable to serve at the end imperialistic, Zionist and reactionary schemings to strike at the Revolution and devastate our Kurdish people's expectations to practice its legitimate national rights. 4. The revolutionary transitions in all political, economic, social, and cultural fields in the direction of implementing the tasks of popular democratic stage before the attainment of socialism, as well as the justification of the interests of peasants, workers and toiling masses of the people are but objective assurances of a peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question and to consolidate its progressive content. 5. The responsibility of fulfilling March 11 Manifesto and the justification of a peaceful democratic solution of the Kurdish question does not depend on one party, rather it is a common national responsibility that no national party can shun and give up.


6. The ideological and permanent political struggle against chauvinist, isolationist, superior, and secessionistic elements and trends is a fundamental condition to safeguard the peaceful, democratic solution of the Kurdish question, and its development on one hand, and to safeguard national unity and revolutionary transitions aiming at the attainment of national and patriotic goals on the other.

13. The Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Articles 8-10. June, 1972. Article 8. The two high contracting parties will, in the event of a situation developing which endangers the peace of either of them or constitutes a threat to peace or a violation of peace, hold immediate contacts to coordinate their positions in the interest of eliminating the developing danger and re-establishing peace. Article 9. In the interests' of the security of both countries, the two high contracting parties will continue to develop co-operation in the strengthening of the defense capabilities of each. Article 10. Each of the two high contracting parties declares that it will not enter into any international alliance or grouping or take part in any actions or undertakings di-

rected against the other high contracting party. Each of the two high contracting parties also undertakes not to allow its territory to be used for any action that might cause military harm to the other party. Source ; Numbers 12 and 13: Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq . Washington, D.C." The Middle East Institute, 1978.

14. The March 11, 1974 Declaration of Iraq on the Law of (Kurdish) Autonomy (excerpts) : Article (1) (a) Kurdistan Region shall enjoy Autonomy, and it shall be referred to as (The Region) whatever it exists in this Law.


(b) The Region shall be delimited as wherever the Kurds constitute the majority of it population, and the general census shall decide the Region's borders in accordance with the provisions of March 11 Manifesto. The records of 1957 Census shall be deemed as the basis for defining the national nature of the absolute majority of population in the places where the general census shall be performed. (c) The Region shall be deemed as one administrative unit which has a body corporate enjoying Autonomy within the framework of the legal, political and economic unity of the Republic Of Iraq. Administration divisions in it shall be performed under the provisions of Governorates Law and with observation to the provisions of this Law. (d) The Region is an inseparable part of the land of Iraq and its people is an inseparable part of the people of Iraq. Article (2) (a) The Kurdish language shall be, beside the Arabic language, the official language in the Region. (b) Kurdish shall be the language of education for Kurds in the Region. Teaching of Arabic language shall be compulsory in all educational levels and utilities. Article (10) The Legislative Council is the legislative body elected in the Region; its formation, organization and procedure shall

be defined by a Law. Article (20) (a) The President of the Republic is entitled to dissolve the Legislative Council in case the Council is incapable of exercising its jurisdictions because of the resignation of half its members, or the quorum is not obtained during thirty days as from the date the invitation for convening it is forwarded or because of not acquiring the confidence stipulated in paragraph (d) of Article (13) of this Law for more then two consecutive times or in case of its nonabiding by the decisions of the Observation Body stipulated in Article (19) of this Law. Source; IRAQ, The Kurdish Question Attitudes and Achievements.


15. First Protocol to Iran-Iraq Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighborly Relations Cexcerpts). , 13 June 1975. Following is the text of protocol on Border Security between Iraq and Iran. Pursuant to the resolutions of the Algiers Agreement dated March 6th, 1975, and proceeding from the keenness to consolidate security and mutual confidence along joint borders; Proceeding from their determination to exercise firm and effective control along the borders to cease all infiltrations of a subversive nature and establish close cooperation between them, with a view to preventing any infiltration or illegal passage through their common borders, with the purpose of subversion, rebellion or mutiny; With reference to the Teheran protocol dated March 15, 1975, minutes of the Foreign Ministers meeting concluded in Baghdad on April 20, 1975, and minutes of the Foreign Ministers meeting concluded in Algiers on May 20, 1975; The two contracting parties have agreed to the following provisions : ARTICLE ONE The two contracting parties shall exchange information related to the movement of subversive elements which may penetrate into either of the two countries with a view to committing acts of subversion, rebellion or mutiny in that country. The two contracting parties shall take appropriate measures

in respect to the movements of elements referred to in article one hereof. Each shall notify the other immediately of the identity of such persons; it is agreed that they shall utilise all measures to prevent them from committing acts of subversion. The same measures shall be adopted against the persons who gather in the territory of any contracting party with a view to committing acts of sabotage or subversion in the territory of the other party. ARTICLE TWO Versatile cooperation established between competent authorities of both contracting parties shall be applicable in respect to border closure with the purpose of preventing the penetration of subversive elements, at the level of border authorities of both countries, through to the highest levels of Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior in each of the contracting parties.


ARTICLE FOUR 1. The two contracting parties undertake to assign necessary human and material facilities for effective border closure and control against any penetration of subversive elements through the passage points specified in Article three above . 2. In the case that experts, due to experience acquired on the subject, consider that more effective measures should be adopted, means thereof shall be specified through monthly meetings of border authorities of both countries or through contacts made, when necessary, between such authorities. Results of such meetings, together with their minutes, shall be forwarded to the supreme authorities in each party; in the case of a dispute between border authorities, competent heads of department, in Baghdad and Teheran, shall meet to reach entente and the results of such meetings shall be listed in special minutes. ARTICLE FIVE 1. Arrested saboteurs shall be handed over to the authorities concerned of the party in the territory of which they are arrested, and shall be subject to the legislations in effect therein. 2. The two contracting parties shall notify each other of the measures adopted in respect to the persons referred to in para. 1 hereof.

3. In the case of border crossings by wanted saboteurs, the authorities of the other party shall be notified, which shall taken all necessary measures to help arrest the persons mentioned above. ARTICLE SIX When necessary, by agreement between the two contracting parties, embargo areas may be specified with a view to preventing saboteurs from attaining their ends .

Source; Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq.



ANK- Association of Northern Kurdistan, 1930 in Turkey. Branch of Khoybun , led by Prince Selaheddine. AOPFLP- Action Organization, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Part of the Palestinian Rejection Front-opposed to Fateh . Apocular- Left-wing Kurdish Group. Underground in Turkey. Founded 1970' s. ASA- Armenian Secret Army, terrorist. ASDK-DER- Anti-Colonialist Democratic Culture OrganizationLeftist, underground in Turkey, formed early 1970 's. ALF- Assyrian Liberation Front, terrorist. ASRF- Armenian Socialist Revolutionary Front ( Dasnak zutium ) , headquarted in Geneva in 1925. Bahoz - Society of Fighters for Kurdistan. Formed 1969, Sweden Bar-30- Ahmed Barzani, 1930. Ba'th- Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, founded 1940 ' s by Michael Aflaq. Active in Iraq and Syria. BW- Banner of the Workers. Right-wing faction of Communist Kurds in Iraq. Split from Iraqi Communist Party in 1953. CKS- Center for Kurdish Studies (Centre d 1 Etudes Kurdes) , founded 194 9 by Dr. Emir Kamuran Badr Khan in Paris.

DDHD- Peoples' Revolutionary Culture Association, leftist, underground in Turkey. Formed late 1960's. DDKD- Eastern Revolutionary Culture Association, leftist, underground in eastern Turkey. Formed late 1960's. DDO- Society of Eastern Hearths, leftist, underground in Turkey. Formed 1960's. DG- Dev Gene , leftist student organization in Turkey, underground. DPK- Democrat (ic) Party of Kurdistan. Name given to Komala in 194 4 in Iran. Led by Qazi Mohammed. Also name of Kurdish Party in Syria. Sometimes used interchangeably with KDP . 228

DPKS- DPK of Syria. FG- Freedom Group. Mullah Mustafa Barzani's splinter group from the Hewa in Iraq, 1945. FK- Feda'i Khalq . The Organization of the Guerrilla Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People, Marxist, Iran. Hewa - Hope. Kurdish Youth Group linked to KTJ in Constantinople in 1908. Also Kurdish nationalist party in Iraq possibly evolved from KNDO of 1925. Founded 1930 's in Kirkuk by intellectuals . ICP- Iraqi Communist Party. ISK- International Society Kurdistan. Formed in Amsterdam in late 1960 's. IUS- International Union of Students. Kawa - Kurdish underground group in Turkey. Named after a Kurdish hero. Formed 197 0's. KDP- Kurdistani Democratic Party-led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Ibrahim Ahmed in Iraq, founded 1960. Also indicates KDP in Turkey. KDPB- KDP Barzani Faction of middle 1960's in Iraq. KDP-GB- KDP Government Branch, Iraq. Split from KDP 1974. Led by Aziz Akrawi ,Hashim Hassan, and Ubaidalla Barzani. KDPI- Kurdish Democratic Party, Iraq-evolved from Hewa, RK, FG, and others in 1954. Also indicates Kordestan Democratic Party of Iran-currently de facto autonomy leader in Iran .President-Abdul Rahman Qassemlu.

KDPP- KDP Politburo faction in Iraq mid-1960 's. Led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani . KDP-PC- Kurdestani Democratic Party-Preparatory Committee. Split from KDP in Iraq in 1976. Led by Mahmoud Osman. KDP-PL- Kurdestani Democratic Party-Provisional Leadership. Remnant of Barzani faction of KDP in Iraq. Probably led by Idris and Massoud Barzani. Formed 1975. Khoybun - Kurdish Independence League/Government. Founded by Sharif Pasha and members of the Badr Khan family in 1918. 229

KNDO- Kurdish National Defense Organization, Mosul, 1925. Komala - Committee for the Resurrection of Kurdistan. Formed 1942 in Iran. Komala M/L is a new group in Iran which is Marxist-Leninist. KPG- Kurdish Progressive Group. Aligned with Ba'th in Iraq since 1974. Led by 'Abd Allah Ismail . KPP- Kurdish Proletarian Party. Leftist, underground in Turkey. Formed 1970 's. KRP- Kurdistani Revolutionary Party. Leftist Kurdish group in Iraq, formed 1974. Led by 'Abd al-Sattar Tahir. KSAUS- Kurdish Students* Association, United States. KSSE- Kurdish Students' Society in Europe-founded 1956. Exists in East and West Europe. KSM- Kurdish Socialist Movement. Formed 19 76 in Iraq by Ali Askari. KTJ- Kurdish Cooperation Society. Political group formed in Constantinople in 1908 by Sharif Pasha. KUFL- Kurdish Union of the Friends of Liberty. Formed 1930 in Turkey, by Prince Selaheddine . KUK- Liberation of the Kurdish Nation. Underground, leftist group in Turkey, formed 1970's. MFDLRK- Movement for the Defense of Liberty and Revolution in Kordestan. Leftist group in Iran. Formed 1970* s MLL- Marxist-Leninist League. Maoist Kurds in Iraq.

Formed 1976. MLPLA- Marxist-Leninist Peoples' Liberation Army. Located in Iraq and Syria. Formed 1970's. NUKSE- National Union of Kurdish Students in Europe. Right-wing splinter of KSSE. Founded 1965 in West Germany. Paykar - Battle. Marxist Splinter of the Islamic Mujahidin in Iran, 1979. PIL- Pan-Iranian League. Formed 19 30 in Iran by Ishan Nuri .


PUK- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Kurdish leftist, antiBa'th group formed by Jalal Talabani in 1975. Headquartered in Damascus. PLO- Palestine Liberation Organization. PWND- Progressive Wing, National Democrats. Iraq, 1958. RF- Rizkary . Front of KUK, Kawa , and KDP in Turkey, 1979. RK- Ruzkary (Liberation) Kurds. Communist faction in Iraq, formed 1945 from the Shursh group. Ruzkary also has been used to denote the 1945-46 front between DPK, Hewa , and Khoybun . RKWM- Revolutionary Kurdish Workers' Movement. Leftist organization in Iran, 1979. SAKUK- Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan, United Kingdom. Salat - Right-wing and religious group led by Mullahs in 1941-42 in Iranian Kordestan. Shursh - Revolution Group. Communist Kurds in Iraq of urban intelligentsia. Formed 1943. Tudeh - Masses. Communist Party in Iran and Azerbaijan. TWP/TLP- Turkish Workers' Party/Turkish Labor Party. UDPK- United Democratic Kurdistan Party. Formed by Ibrahim Ahmed in Iraq in 1954. UF- United Front of Iraq, 1958. USII- United States, Iran, Israel. VOKSCRS- Kurdistan Soviet Cultural Relations Society.

Formed in 1945 by Soviet Union in West Azerbaijan.



I . BOOKS Almond, Gabriel A., and Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Comparative Politics; A Developmental Approach . Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966. Arfa, Hassan. The Kurds . New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Bacharach, Jere L. A Near East Studies Handbook . 2nd ed. Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1976. Batatu, Hanna. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq . Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1978. Berkes, Nijazi, ed. Turkish Nationalism and Western Civiliza tion, Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp . New York : Columbia University Press, 1959. Bill, James A. and Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory . Colombus , Oh.: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1973. Busch, Briton C. Britain, India and the Arabs 1914-1921 . Berkeley, Ca. : University of California Press, 1971. Colby, William E. Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978. Cottam, Richard W. Nationalism in Iran . Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964. Dann, Uriel. Iraq Under Qassem . New York: Frederick A. Praeger , 1969 . Dudley, Guilford A. A History of Eastern Civilizations . New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19 73. Eagleton, William, Jr. The Kurdish Republic of 1946 . New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Eisenberg, Dennis; Dan, Uri; and Landau, Eli; The Mossad . New York: Paddington Press, 1978. Eudin, Zenia Joukoff and North, Robert C. Soviet Russia and

the East 1920-1927 . Stanford, Ca. : Stanford University Press, 1957.


Evans, Lawrence. United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey , 1914-1924 . Baltimore, Md. : John Hopkins Press, 1965. Fisher, Sidney N. The Middle East: A History . 3rd Ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. Foster, Henry A. The Making of Modern Iraq . New York: Russell and Russell, 1935. Hale, William M. , ed., Aspects of Modern Turkey . New York: Bowker, 1976. Hitti, Phillip K. History of the Arabs . 10th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970. Hudson, Michael C. Arab Politics, The Search for Legitimacy. New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1977 . Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East . Vols. 1 and 2. Princeton, N. J.: D. Nan Nostrand and Co., 1956. Hussein, Saddam. On Current Affairs . Baghdad: Ath-Thawra Publications, 1974. Iraq. Ministry of Information. Steadfast Programme in Dealing with the Masses . Documentary Series No. 53. Baghdad: Al Huria Printing House, 1976. Iraq. Ministry of Information. The Kurdish Question, Attitudes and Achievements . Documentary Series No. 60. Baghdad: Al-Huria Printing House, 1976. Ireland, Philip W. Iraq . New York: Russell and Russell, 1937. Kelidar, Abbas, ed. The Integration of Modern Iraq . New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Khadduri, Majid. Independent Iraq 1932-1958 . 2nd ed. New York Oxford University Press, 1960. . Socialist Iraq, A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968 . Washington, D. C: The Middle East Institute, 1978. Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years . Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1979. Lederer, Ivo J. and Vucinich, Wayne S., eds . The Soviet Union and The Middle East . Stanford, Ca. : Hoover Institution

Press, 1974. 233

Lenczowski, George. Soviet Advances in the Middle East . Washington, D. C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971. McLaurin, R. D. ; Maghisuddin, Mohammed; and Wagner, Abraham R. Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East: Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, and Syria . New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. Mango, Andrew. Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally . Beverly Hills, Ca. : Sage Publications, 1975 . O'Ballance, Edgar. The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 . Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press, 1973. Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah, H.I.M. Mission for My Country . London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd."^ 1961 . Seton-Watson, Hugh. Nationalism and Communism . New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. Szulc, Tad. The Illusion of Peace . New York: The Viking Press, 1978. Thomas, Lewis V. and Frye, Richard N. The United States and Turkey and Iran . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952. U. S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 . Vol. VII. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946 . U. S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States , The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 7~ Vol. XII. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947. Vahan, Abrahamian E. Social Bases of Iranian Politics: The Tudeh Party 1941-1953 . Published Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1979. Vali, Ferenc A. Bridge Across the Bosporous . Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Whitaker, Urban G., Jr., ed. Nationalism and International Progress . San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1960. Yodfat, Aryeh. Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror . Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973.


II. JOURNALS AND MAGAZINES Abrahamian, Erwand. "The Guerilla Movement in Iran, 19 63-1977." Merip Reports, 86 (March/April, 1980), 3-15. Andrews, William R. "The Azerbaijan Incident: The Soviet Union in Iran, 1941-46." Military Review , LIV (August, 1974), 74-85. Cooley, John K. "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf.: Foreign Affairs , LVII (Summer, 1979), 1017-1034. Cuthbert, Amanda. "The Kurds.: MEED Arab Report , 14 February 1979, pp. 4-6. Davidson, Roderic H. "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After. : The Middle East Journal , VII (Summer, 1953) , 324-348. Edmonds, C.J. "The Kurds of Iraq." The Middle East Journal , II (Winter, 1957), 52-62. "The Kurds and the Revolution in Iraq." The Middle

East Journal , XIII (Winter, 1959), 1-10. "Kurdish Nationalism." The Journal of Contemporary

History , VI (1971), 87-107. Harik, Iliya F. "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East.: International Journal of Middle East Studies , III (1972), 303-323. Hirschfeld, Yair, P. "Moscow and Khomeini: Soviet-Iranian Relations in Historical Perspective. Orbis , 24 (Summer, 1980) , 219-240. Hovannisian, Richard G. "Armenia and the Caucasus in The Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente." International Journal of Middle East Studies , IV (1973), 129-147. Keddi, Nikki R. , "Is There a Middle East?" International Journal of Middle East Studies , IV (1973), 268-278. "Kurd's Hero Dies." MEED Arab Report , 14 March 1979, p. 3. "The Kurds Trust a Bad Ally." Merip Reports , 38 (June, 1975), 25-26. Latham, Aaron. "The Pike Papers." The Village Voice , February 16, 1976, pps. 69-92.


Linde, Gerde. "Soviet Policy in the Arab Peninsula" Bericte des Bundesinstituts fur Ostwissen Shaftliche und Inter nationale Studien Summaries 31-53, 1978, 40-42. Merip Reports , 88 (June, 1980), 10-14. Naamani, Israel T. "The Kurdish Drive for Self -Determination. " The Middle East Journal , XX (Spring, 1966), 279-295. Osborne, Christine. "Kurds Enjoy Autonomy in Iraq." Middle East Economic Digest , 28 March 1980, p. 31. Petrossian, Vahe and Crusoe, Jonathan. "Shatt al-Arab Feud Erupts." Middle East Economic Digest , 2 6 September 1980, pps. 13-14. Priestly, Vito. "The Political Situation in Iraq. : Middle Eastern Affairs , XIII (May, 1962), 139-145. Ramazani, Rouhollah K. "The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Peoples 1 Republic: Their Rise and Fall." Studies on the Soviet Union , XI no. 4 (1971), 401-427. . "Security in the Persian Gulf.: Foreign Affairs,

LVII (Spring, 1979), 821-835. "Revolutionary Guards Intervene in Kurdistan Land Seizures." Merip Reports , 87 (May, 1980), 12. Roosevelt, Archie, Jr. "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. : The Middle East Journal , I (July, 1947), 247-269. Schmidt, Dana Adams. "The Kurdish Insurgency." Strategic Review , (Summer, 1974), 51-58. Simpson, Dwight J. "Turkey: Shadows of Conflict." Current History , 72 (January, 1977), 11-14. Singer, Andre. "The Dervishes of Kurdistan." Asian Affairs , 61 (June, 1974) , 179-182. "Statement of the Kurdish Bureau." The Middle East Journal , 16 (Summer, 1962), 373-374. Strasser, Stephen, et_al. "Fighting to a Standstill." Newsweek , October 13, 1980, pps. 51-54. Vinogradov, Amal. "The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics." International Journal of Middle East Studies III (1972), 123-139.


Wenner, Lettie M. "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq. The Middle East Journal , 17 (Winter-Spring, 1963), 68-82. Wheeler, Geoffrey. "Propaganda in Asia." Asian Affairs , 63 (June, 1976), 183-189. Zeidner, Robert F. "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq Government." Middle Eastern Affairs , X (January, 1959), 24-31.

III. NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER SOURCES A. Note: Full citations for newspaper articles used are found in the footnotes after each section. Following is a listing of newspapers used. Christian Science Monitor Current News Diplomat News Service: The Arab Press Service (Nicosia, Cyprus) FBIS Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa Financial Times Manchester Guardian Monterey Peninsula Herald New York Times Times of London Washington Post B. Other Interview. Professor Mahmoud Hamza (Pishtdari) . Instructor of Arabic, Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, California, August 11, 1980.



No. Copies

1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314 2. Library, Code 0142 2 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 3. Department Chairman, Code 56Bc 1 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 4. Assoc. Professor J. W. Amos, II., Code 56Am 1 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 5. Asst. Professor R. H. Magnus, Code 56 MK 1 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 6. Adj. Asst. Professor M. W. Clough, Code 56Cg 1 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 7. LCDR Donald B. Disney, Jr., USN 1 8360 Country Life Road Pasadena, Maryland 21122


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